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ASASocialRelevanceof Hegel's Absolute Idea

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Russell Rockwell, PhD.

No current institutional affiliation

Email          RussellRockwell@hotmail.com

Keywords       Hegel, Marcuse, absolute idea, critical social theory, dialectic



    The Social Relevance of Hegel’s Absolute Idea: Herbert Marcuse’s Two Hegel Books

                                             Abstract



        The central chapter of Herbert Marcuse’s relatively well-known 1941 work, Reason and

Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, presents what is actually an abbreviated

version of a more through investigation of the social relevance of Hegel’s absolute idea Marcuse

first developed in Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, published a decade earlier

(1932). In addition, Marcuse’s initial, more comprehensive interpretation blunts the critical

points he makes against the social relevance of Hegel’s absolute idea in the later work.



                                           Introduction

        Herbert Marcuse took the lead among Critical Theorists in explicating Hegel’s texts and,

just as significantly, in conceptualizing their social relevance. He wrote two major books on

Hegel in the decade 1932-1941—Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity (Hegel’s

Ontology)(Marcuse, 1987) and Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory

(Reason and Revolution) (Marcuse, 1999).

        In the years leading up to publication of Reason and Revolution the expectation was that

Marcuse’s research would be central to the development of the Institute for Social Research
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(ISR), founded in Germany in the late 1920s with the explicit intention to develop Marxist

critical social theory (Wiggershaus, 1994, 25-6). Marcuse tried to move the ISR even further to

the left after its exile from Nazi Germany, eventually to the U.S. in 1934

       In the following I will argue that Marcuse’s assessments of the untapped potential of

Hegel’s dialectic for critical social theory changed significantly in the period (1932-1941) during

which he published two major books on Hegel. Comparisons of the two works suggest that the

tendency of these alterations was to render Marcuse’s social theory ultimately more compatible

with the pessimistic “one dimensional” thesis first fully developed by Horkheimer and Adorno

(Horkheimer and Adorno, 1988; Horkheimer, 1987). This thesis held that the post-liberal social

totality had become non-contradictory and hence was not internally susceptible to radical social

transformations. Moreover, even taking into account Marcuse’s two major close readings of

Hegel’s Science of Logic (Hegel, 1969), significant questions persist as to whether that work in

particular contains insights relevant to current attempts to develop critical social theory.

       Recent developments from within the Critical Theory tradition also suggest the need to

reexamine Marcuse’s original research on Hegelian dialectic. Jürgen Habermas’s influential

efforts to overcome what he believed was the exhaustion of the Hegelian-Marxian approach to

understanding and changing society may have diverted new research away from important

aspects of Marcuse’s work altogether. The U.S.-based Critical Theorist Moishe Postone’s

“reinterpretation of Marx’s mature critical theory” includes as well novel perspectives on Marx’s

“social explanation” of Hegelian philosophy. Postone’s interpretation of the mature Marx’s

social theory (including the latter’s ability to “explain” Hegel’s absolutes) is nonetheless more

critical of Habermas’s non-Hegelian social theory than of Marcuse’s Hegelian Marxism. In any

case, the continuing lack of consensus on Hegel’s ideas represented in Habermas’s and Postone’s
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divergent approaches point to the need to reassess the entire Critical Theory tradition’s

relationship to Hegel’s ideas.



Marcuse’s Two Hegel Books



        Compared to the 1940s, at the time Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity was

published (1932), Marcuse had no close theoretical collaborators. In this period Marcuse was just

on the verge of joining with the ISR where he would have a particularly close intellectual

relationship with Max Horkheimer, who had directed the ISR since 1930. Yet, even though

Marcuse’s first work on Hegel contained no references whatsoever to Marx’s theory, Marcuse

himself wrote in a 1931 letter to Karl Löwith that he hoped the work would, “throw some new

light” on the “Hegel-Marx question” (Marcuse, 1987, xii). In contrast, the 1941 Reason and

Revolution has been classified (Jay, 1984) as marking the end of the Frankfurt School’s taking

seriously the study of the relationship of Hegel’s philosophy and Marx’s theory as the means for

grasping and overcoming contemporary forms of social domination. In sum, Marcuse’s first

Hegel book has been thought to be unrelated to critical social theory and the second a sort of

stillbirth in this respect.



Marcuse’s Changed Interpretation of the Ideas of the True and the Good



        Marcuse’s assessment of Hegel’s Science of Logic is the central chapter of Reason and

Revolution, even though the work also contained other important features such as the first

analysis of Marx’s 1844 economic-philosophic manuscripts to appear in English (Anderson,

1995). The Subjective Logic, or The Doctrine of the Notion, is divided into three sections—
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Subjectivity, Objectivity, and The Idea. Each section contains three chapters divided into

subsections. In the treatment of the Logic in both Hegel books Marcuse focuses attention on

Section Three, “The Idea”. Hence I will outline this section in the following.

       The three chapters of “The Idea” are titled, respectively, “Life”, “The Idea of Cognition”,

and “The Absolute Idea”. “Life” is very prominently featured in Hegel’s Ontology, due to the

work’s basic topic, but receives significantly less attention in Reason and Revolution. The “Idea

of Cognition” (subdivided into sections on the Idea of the True and the Idea of the Good)

receives careful and varied assessments in Marcuse’s two Hegel books. “The Absolute Idea” is

the subject of an entire chapter in Hegel’s Ontology. The attention it receives in Reason and

Revolution is abbreviated, though there Marcuse’s analysis of it is nonetheless pivotal to his

theoretical conclusions on the current social relevance of Hegel’s dialectic.

       Hegel (after Kant) analyzes the theoretical and practical ideas, the terms denoting the

differentiation of spheres of reason. (Among Kant’s principal works were The Critique of Pure

Reason, and Critique of Practical Reason.) Hegel also uses the terms Idea of the true and Idea of

the good interchangeably with the terms theoretical and practical ideas. Hegel writes,


       In the theoretical Idea the subjective notion, as the universal that lacks any determination
       of its own, stands opposed to the objective world from which it takes to itself a
       determinate content and filling. But in the practical Idea it is as actual that it confronts the
       actual (Hegel, 1969, 818).


       Hegel’s Ontology provides the philosophic background for the meaning of Hegel’s

concepts of the idea of the true and the idea of the good. Marcuse writes,


       …An explicit reference that the “good” must be understood as an objective-ontological
       determination is given in Hegel’s introduction to this concept in his Lectures on the
       History of Philosophy and in his discussion of Socratic philosophy. With the concept of
       the “good”, Socrates is said to aim at a determination of “essence” or “substance,” “qua
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       that which is in-and for-itself, qua what preserves itself, substance has been defined as
       purpose (telos) and more precisely as the true, the good…” Thus the “good” is
       understood as the “universal, which has determined itself in itself…” …the
       philosophers of nature had sought to define it as one or more self-sufficient substance.
       Hegel views it as Socratic “one-sidedness” that he applied this concept of the good to the
       moral sphere alone, whereby “subsequently all followers of moral idle talk and popular
       philosophy declared him their patron saint…” But “the good that is purpose in-and for-
       itself…is also a principle of the philosophy of nature…” (Marcuse, 1987, 170; emphasis
       added).



       The passage makes the central point that a prior unity of the ideas of the true and the

good existed in Socratic philosophy. In the Logic Hegel analyzed the modern separation of the

two. Finally, there is an intention at the core of Hegelian philosophy to re-conceptualize their

dialectical unity, or “identity”, at a higher level and more concretely than found even in Socrates.

Hegel critically notes that Socrates applies the idea of the good to the moral sphere alone. Yet,

for Hegel, more important than this limitation is the historical context in which individual self-

determination intrinsic to the universal was represented in the personality of Socrates (Hegel,

1995, 408). (Later I will indicate the importance Hegel attributed to “personality”, even at the

level of the transition from the idea of the good to the absolute idea).

       Much more than criticism of Socratic philosophy per se, Hegel’s insistence that the idea

of the good apply to nature as well as to the moral sphere reflects historical developments from

Ancient Greece to modern society. For example, in line with Hegel’s original concept of

alienation and its transcendence as underlying historical developments, and Marx’s detailed

depiction of the quasi-objective, nature-like structures that function “behind the backs” of social

actors, the theoretical attitude adduced by the concept of the true, split off from the concept of

the good, emerges within the context of the social totality as well. For awareness, even

scientifically determined, of abstract forms of social domination not only does not result in their
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abolition (Marx, 1976, 167). Such awareness may provide the bases for more deeply imbedding

social domination, in that it may contribute to the expansion and/or increasing fragmentation of

specialized knowledge and with it proliferation of expert cultures split off from each other and

from everyday life. The true is true only in its dialectical relationship with the idea of the good.

       Likewise, while forces of social domination that are not cognized by social actors may be

analyzed historically as alienation, they may also actually shape the idea of the good (or the good

life) as well, a possibility that should shake any certainty concerning the actual separation of one

concept (the true) from the other (the good). Hence the good is really good only in a dialectical

relationship with the idea of the true. For example, in contemporary society freedoms of choice

in terms of a variety of lifestyles may appear to be expressions of the value attributed to the

individual or respect for the social diversity of groups. Yet, generalized “nonconformity” may

itself be coercive, an abstract form of social domination. Here “abstract” means in part that no

particular individual or group intends or wills this domination. In this sense, many of Marx’s

analyses of modern capitalist society involved developing to the fullest the implications of

individuals freed from relationships of direct personal domination but wholly subject to labor

mediated social relations, terming this situation individual personal freedom in the framework of

“objective dependence” (Marx, 1973, 158).

        After an account of prior sections of the Subjective Logic Marcuse states in Reason and

Revolution that he will attempt, “a rough interpretation of the closing paragraphs of the Logic,”

(Marcuse, 1999, 161-162), which should situate his analysis in the Logic’s final chapter, “The

Absolute Idea”. Marcuse none the less proceeds to discuss more generally, “the concluding

sections of the Logic” (Marcuse, 1999, 162). The difference between the stated initial intention

and the amended actual approach is significant. The real basis of Marcuse’s critique of Hegel’s
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absolute idea is already formulated through his assessment of the Idea of the True and the Idea of

the Good. There Marcuse critically notes, “the final transformation of history into ontology”

(Marcuse, 1999, 163), in place of development of their dialectic relationship that was an abiding

theme in the Logic up to this point.

       According to the account in Reason and Revoluton, Hegel succeeded in maintaining a

proper tension in the relationship between the social and/or historical and philosophic cognition

within the category of essence. But within the Subjective Logic history philosophy transcends

history. According to Marcuse this development is clearly retrogressive from the standpoint of

contemporary critical social theory. It is helpful to recall here that Marx’s critique of Hegel

already involved Marx’s explicating the plausibility of notions such as abstract being

transcending objectivity in terms of the social relations that constitute a specifically capitalist

society. In an example derived from Marx Marcuse provides in a later chapter, abstraction is the

most powerful social force within capitalist society in particular:



       [A]bstraction is capitalism’s own work…the Marxian method only follows this
       process…the capitalist economy is built upon and perpetuated by the constant reduction
       of concrete to abstract labor…individual work counts merely in so far as it represents
       socially necessary labor time…relations among men appear as relations of things
       (commodities) (Marcuse, 1998, 313).


       Still, Marcuse is looking for something in Hegelian dialectic that might warrant a less

definitive conclusion, which he is nonetheless prepared to issue, about the relationship of

philosophy and history in the Logic. In a statement that seems anticipatory of some postmodern

theories’ criticisms of Hegelian dialectic Marcuse first dismisses the idea that it is the tendency

of a multitude of notions (most generally being and essence) to converge in a single notion
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(specifically the absolute idea) that ultimately excludes an historical interpretation of Hegel’s

Logic. According to Marcuse Hegel’s absolute idea could be regarded simply as meaning,


        [r]ealization of the notion…universal mastery, exercised by men having a rational social
       organization, over nature—a world that might indeed be imagined as the realization of
       the notion of all things (Marcuse, 1999, 161).


       But nonetheless Marcuse quickly issues a clear statement rejecting the prospect that

further detailed examination of Hegel’s dialectic proper might still make independent

contributions to establishment of a critical social theory. Marcuse remarks,


        Hegel tends to dissolve the element of historical practice and replace it with the
       independent reality of thought (Marcuse, 1999, 161).


       Marcuse attempts to demonstrate this conclusion, but not before affirming Hegel’s initial

approach to the absolute idea through the theoretical and practical ideas in the concluding

sections of the Logic. Marcuse writes,


       [T]he adequate form of the idea is termed the unity of cognition and action, or (in Hegel’s
       words), “the identity of the Theoretical and Practical Idea” (Marcuse, 1999, 162).


       Note that Hegel’s phrase on the identity of the theoretical and practical ideas Marcuse

reproduces here actually appears within the first paragraph of the Absolute Idea chapter, the

concluding chapter of the Logic. Nonetheless, without noting this Marcuse seamlessly directs

attention back to an observation Hegel offered in the prior chapter (section on the Idea of the

Good). Marcuse writes,
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       Hegel expressly declares that the practical idea, the realization of the “Good” that alters
       external reality, is higher than the Idea of Cognition…for it has not only the dignity of the
       universal but also of the simply actual (Marcuse, 1999, 162-163).


       Thus Marcuse’s reading creates an inaccurate impression that the “higher” status of the

practical idea may consist in its concreteness compared to even the absolute idea.

       In connection with this, it is also important to note that the last passage from Reason and

Revolution quoted above contains a significant theoretical error. The ellipsis in Marcuse’s

quotation replaces Hegel’s words, “already considered”. The idea of cognition Hegel had

“already considered” was the Idea of the True. Thus, according to Hegel’s actual text the

practical idea is not only not, “higher than the Idea of Cognition”, it can not possibly be. The

dialectic of the idea of the true and the dialectic of the good constitute the Idea of Cognition

chapter that concludes with a paragraph in which Hegel (on the only occasion in the entire Logic)

actually defines the absolute idea. The latter, as the unity of the theoretical and practical ideas,

radically alters the type of critique of each considered by itself. I will reproduce this definitional

passage at the end of this section.

       In summary, first Marcuse presents the textual appearances of two of Hegel’s key

statements in reverse order. This results in a suggestion that the identity of the theoretical and

practical ideas consists in a sort of priority and/or predominance of the practical idea over the

theoretical idea. Following this Marcuse removes the practical idea altogether from its dialectical

relationship to the Idea of the True as constitutive of the Idea of Cognition chapter. In doing so

Marcuse’s analysis implies that a contemporary critical approach to Hegelian philosophy rightly

interprets Hegel’s initial apparent elevation and preference for the practical idea so that it

represents the highpoint of the Logic. In this context, however preliminarily, the special nature of

the identity of the theoretical and practical ideas (to which Marcuse refers) should be noted as
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well. Hegel writes that the absolute idea (identity of the theoretical and practical ideas) still

nonetheless,


        contains within itself the highest degree of opposition… possesses personality…but
        which, none the less is not exclusive individuality, but explicitly universality and
        cognition… (Hegel, 1969, 824).


This passage clearly evokes Hegel’s analyses in the History of Philosophy, cited earlier, his

historical description of the type of individuality that characterized the life of Socrates—a

dialectical unity (or identity) of personality and universality. However, now Hegel’s suggestion

seems to be that while in ancient Greece there was one such personality (Socrates),

contemporary historical conditions hold the potential to realize such “personality” generally.

        Continuing to trace Marcuse’s argument, more important than his reversal of Hegel’s

categorical presentations and questionable interpretation of the practical idea, Marcuse does not

explicitly note Hegel’s key intermediary observation. This also appears in the Idea of Cognition

chapter, in the section on the Idea of the Good. In fact it sets off Hegel’s apparently higher

evaluation of the practical Idea than of the theoretical Idea from Hegel’s reference to the

“identity” of the two. Hegel writes,


         But what is still lacking in the practical Idea is the moment of consciousness proper
        itself; namely that the moment of actuality in the notion should have attained on its own
        account the determination of external being. Another way of regarding this defect is that
        the practical Idea still lacks the moment of the theoretical idea… (Hegel, 1969, 821)


The practical Idea contains an intrinsic defect. The practical idea in its immediacy (volition, will,

action) is by virtue of what it opposes. The limitations, or particularities, of its own activities are

disclosed in an outer actuality that has held out against this aspect of the idea. Hegel will thus

describe in detail a second negation that the practical idea undergoes.
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       On the bases of the textual evidence Marcuse presents in Reason and Revolution, the

question of the “idealistic” unity of the theoretical and practical ideas is adequately resolved in

the practical Idea as initially presented by Hegel. In Reason and Revolution Marcuse does not

directly comment on Hegel’s further attention to the practical Idea. Instead Marcuse criticizes the

“manner” in which Hegel attempts to demonstrate the unity of the theoretical and practical ideas.

       According to Marcuse, the manner is Hegel’s absolute idea, which reflects a “knowing

subject” that must comprehend all objects, “so that their independent objectivity is overcome”

(Marcuse, 1999, 163). Hence Hegel’s absolute idea is essentially a “mark of resignation”

(Marcuse, 1999, 164) in respect to the social realization of freedom. In Hegel’s pursuit of

“perfect freedom”, the idea was the only element of modern society that could measure up. For

now at least it must be preserved as such. From the beginning, the concepts of idealism, though

admittedly less so in Hegel than in his philosophic predecessors, “reflected a social separation of

the intellectual sphere from the sphere of material production” (Marcuse, 1999, 163-164).

Marcuse says that while he “spoke for the actual power of reason and the concrete

materialization of freedom”, Hegel was, “convinced that modern society was a system of

irreconcilable antagonisms”. In the aftermath of the French Revolution he was, “frightened by

the social forces that had undertaken the concrete realization of freedom” (Marcuse, 1999, 164).

According to Marcuse, this is traceable to Hegel’s belief that the type of labor in modern society

would never allow for “perfect freedom” (Marcuse, 1999, 164).

       By contrast to what I just described above of Marcuse’s Reason and Revolution analysis,

Hegel’s Ontology gives a fuller presentation of key passages in the Subjective Logic and

considers Hegel’s arguments as they are further developed in the section on the Idea of the Good.

In Hegel’s Ontology, following a description of “pure cognition” or the idea of the true, Marcuse
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at first describes the practical idea in as unreservedly positive terms as he employs in Reason and

Revolution:


        Is there a higher truth of life which does not suffer from the deficiency of cognition? Is
        there a mode of being which lets the world emerge, and which “lets go forth” its object
        such that this object no longer has the “appearance” of in-itselfness, of a self-sufficient
        objectivity which stands over and against one? …Indeed this is the “practical idea” of
        action, the Idea of the “good”…(Marcuse, 1987, 169).


But, despite his observation that the idea of the good, “does not suffer from the deficiency of

cognition”, Marcuse continues in clear awareness of the persistent limitations of the practical

idea:


        So long as the “good” to be realized through the practical Idea is considered a “subjective
        purpose” alone which is not implicitly contained in objective actuality but which first
        must be embedded in it, then action is just as deficient as knowledge, but in the opposite
        sense…(Marcuse, 1987, 169).


Finally, Marcuse sums up Hegel’s overall assessment of the idea of the true and the idea of the

good thus far:


        Pure cognition [Idea of the True] views its world as the other which is implicitly true,
        thereby misunderstanding the subjectivity of objectivity, whereas action [Idea of the
        Good] treats the world as empty receptacle for the actualization of its subjective
        purposes, thereby misunderstanding the objectivity of subjectivity…(Marcuse, 1987,
        169).


        Marcuse next quotes from the following passage, which contains the heart of Hegel’s

argument.


        external reality for the will does not receive the form of a true being; the Idea of the good
        can therefore find its integration only in the Idea of the true… (Hegel, 1969, 821).
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       As I just discussed, Marcuse did not incorporate this development into his presentation of

the Idea of the Good in Reason and Revolution. More significantly, Marcuse does not note in

either Reason and Revolution or Hegel’s Ontology the next sentence in Hegel’s text:



       But it [the practical idea] makes this transition [to an identity of the true and the good]
       through itself (Hegel, 1969, 821).


       Marcuse himself characterizes the dialectic relationship constituting the absolute idea

through the idea of the true and the good as, “an action that knows and a knowledge that acts”

(Marcuse, 1987, 170). But Marcuse’s conclusion is more obscure when he writes:


       this transition to the “absolute idea” is made possible by the fact that the “good” no
       longer appears as mere subjective purpose but as an ontological determination of beings
       themselves (Marcuse, 1987, 170).


       This conclusion, based on the final paragraph of the Idea of the Good (though Marcuse

does not note this) is at best far too general. This criticism is supported by the fact that Marcuse

returns to subject the passage to closer scrutiny after his analysis of the Logic has progressed

most of the way through The Absolute Idea (the next and concluding chapter).

       In remarks on Hegel’s Absolute Idea chapter itself Marcuse clearly indicates for the first

time that the idea of the good (by itself) as much as of the true (by itself) constitutes the idea of

cognition. Marcuse writes,



       Cognition by itself, however, cannot reach its truth, for it presupposes a “prefound
       world”, upon which it is essentially “dependent”…[it] exists in its own world as by
       another, by a negativity it has not yet grasped to be its own. To this extent the movement
       of cognition is not the highest form…(Marcuse, 1987, 182).
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       Marcuse’s clarification of the concepts Hegel develops in the Idea of Cognition chapter

within his analysis of Hegel’s chapter on the Absolute Idea contains a single reference to a

fragment of a sentence in Hegel’s own definitional paragraph. Marcuse writes:


       The “Absolute Idea” of Being is first concrete as a subjectivity which grasps objectivity
       to be subjectivity and which knows it, “as an objective world, whose inner ground and
       actual permanence is the concept itself” (Marcuse, 1987, 182).


       The quoted fragment is taken from the final sentence of the concluding paragraph of “The

Idea of Cognition” (from the chapter’s final section, “The Idea of the Good”). In explaining this

final paragraph (which is the Logic’s only real definition of the absolute idea) with references to

Hegel’s works earlier than the Logic Marcuse repeats a procedure he had used to end his

analysis of the Idea of Cognition chapter itself. As I suggested above, I will quote and assess the

paragraph in the context of the Idea of the Good’s conclusion, wherein Hegel reanalyzes the

practical idea. I have already demonstrated, on the one hand, that Marcuse did not directly

analyze these passages in Reason and Revolution and, on the other, that a careful reading of

Hegel’s Ontology is necessary in order to get a clear view of Marcuse’s interpretation of these

passages and of the section on the Idea of the Good as a whole.

       In Hegel’s Ontology, proceeding from his characterization of the transition from the idea

of the good to the absolute idea, Marcuse critically notes that Hegel’s absolute idea represents,

“thought thinking itself” (Marcuse, 1987, 182). Thus, he rejects Hegel’s conclusion to the Logic,

which he interprets as a certain type of ontology, perhaps even rooted as far back as Aristotle

(Marcuse, 1987, 182). Marcuse nonetheless continues to defend Hegel to some extent, arguing

that Hegel did not “postulate thought thinking itself” from the beginning (of the Logic), which
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would then dominate the ontological investigations. In addition, Hegel may not have understood

the deeper implications of his own philosophy. Marcuse writes:


       [A] purely formal interpretation of his determination [“thought thinking itself”] on the
       basis of the concept of movement which Hegel considers basic would be insufficient. The
       concrete determination of the Absolute Idea as the unity of theoretical and practical Idea
       or as the unity of Life and cognition would speak against this (Marcuse, 1987, 183).


Hence, Marcuse suggests that a current understanding of Hegel’s dialectic may be superior to

Hegel’s self-understanding. Marcuse suggests that his own reading indicates that Hegel’s actual

philosophy, the “concept of movement” connected to social practice and life that uniquely

characterizes it, does not really permit thought thinking itself as the “end”, or what today is often

understood as an idea of an “end to history”.

       The decade-later Reason and Revolution represents more conclusive negative evaluations

of the potential social theoretic implications of the absolute idea. Nonetheless, Marcuse’s

discussion of the absolute idea in Hegel’s Ontology, in which references to the crucial final

passages in the Idea of Cognition appear, suggests that in key respects Hegel’s Ontology as the

earlier work containing severe doubts in respect to Hegelian dialectic served as the fundamental

basis of the interpretation of Hegel’s Logic in Reason and Revolution. However, I have pointed

out some important differences, mainly associated with Marcuse’s greater (though still

insufficient) attention in Hegel’s Ontology than in Reason and Revolution to the details of

Hegel’s argument, particularly with respect to the crucial section on the Idea of the Good.

       In Marcuse’s Reason and Revolution interpretation, the absolute idea becomes the core of

Hegel’s metaphysical solutions to what Hegel nonetheless knew were actually social problems.

Once Hegel opted for these solutions, he affirmed philosophy’s most characteristic limitation, its

own basis in the split between mental and manual production. Thus the method (or manner) of
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the absolute idea, supposed to be the dialectical transcendence of objectivity, formed the bases of

the “famous” transitions from Logic to Nature to Mind, in other words, of Hegel’s Encyclopedia

of the Philosophical Sciences itself. The latter work’s completion in 1817 coincided with Hegel’s

late, conservative period, when he became the official philosopher of the Prussian state and, in

Marcuse’s words, “the philosophical dictator of Germany” (Marcuse, 1998, 169). Many critics of

Hegel’s idealism, Marxists prominent among them, have considered this transcendence of

objectivity to be the weak point in Hegel’s philosophic system. Hegel’s dialectic of pure

abstraction, which Marcuse traced as an ontology, and in which spirit unfolds through

overcoming moments of objectivity, has often been regarded as simply inadequate to the social.

Yet, in the final paragraph of the Idea of the Good section, Hegel writes:



       When external actuality is altered by the activity of the objective notion [idea of the
       good] and its determination therewith sublated, by that very fact the merely phenomenal
       reality, the external determinability and worthlessness, are removed from that actuality...
       In this process the general presupposition is sublated, namely the determination of the
       good as a merely subjective end limited in respect of content, the necessity of realizing it
       by subjective activity, and this activity itself. In the result the mediation sublates itself; the
       result is an immediacy that is not the restoration of the presupposition, but rather its
       accomplished sublation. With this the Idea of the Notion that is determined in and for
       itself is posited as being no longer merely in the active subject but as equally an
       immediate actuality; and conversely this actuality is posited, as it is in cognition, as an
       objectivity possessing a true being. The individuality of the subject with which the subject
       was burdened by its presupposition, has vanished along with the presupposition…
       Accordingly, in this result cognition is restored and united with the practical idea; the
       actuality found as given is at the same time determined as the realized absolute end; but
       whereas in questing cognition this actuality appeared merely as an objective world
       without the subjectivity of the notion, here it appears as an objective world whose inner
       ground and actual subsistence is the notion. This is the absolute idea (Hegel, 1969, 823;
       emphasis added).


        Hegel equally emphasizes the “active subject” and a result, a new, immediate actuality

(the social determined by the knowledge and freedom of social individuals). Thus, this passage is
17

clearly inconsistent with Marcuse’s conclusion in Reason and Revolution. There Marcuse

concluded that Hegel’s ontological concept of subject implied that the independence of the social

movement internal to the practical idea was undermined with the idea of a “knowing subject”

alone. To the contrary, Hegel indicates (in a “second negation) that that form of activity (the

exclusive individuality of the subject) is overcome by the restoration of cognition to the practical

idea and thereby its reintegration with the universal. With the term “questing cognition” it is

clear that Hegel is summarizing his initial descriptions of the relationship of the theoretical and

practical ideas defining existing society. Yet in the concluding final points Hegel depicts the

emergence of a different society in which the good and the true are identical.

       According to Marcuse, deep-seated class barriers intrinsic to philosophy barred Hegel’s

thought full access to the significance of the existence of proletarian labor as the unique, socially

relevant negation of bourgeois society and culture (Marcuse, 1999, 163-164; 261). This is

reflected in the negligible social relevance Marcuse attributed to the philosophic categories

Hegel developed in the final parts of the Logic.



Conclusion



       Marcuse’s view of the primacy of the practical idea in Hegel’s Logic reflects an

ontological notion of the “existence” of the proletariat—the living (and unique in terms of social

relevance) negation of the false universalism of bourgeois culture and society. The social

theoretical significance Marcuse attributed to this link (proletariat’s negation of the bourgeois

social order) constituted a real barrier to deepening critical social theory. Marcuse’s repeated

suggestion in Reason and Revolution that the mere existence of the proletariat represented not
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only the negation of existing society but Hegel’s absolute implied a too passive role for critical

thought. Likewise with the idea that this same proletarian labor’s alleged integration (practical

nonexistence) constituted the totally administered, one-dimensional society (Marcuse, 1965).

       At Marcuse’s most radical theoretical pole, he did consider the question of whether

dialectic proper, as understood in Hegel’s concepts of the true, the good and the absolute idea,

was potentially accessible to large numbers of people. Certainly, on the threshold of Hegel’s

absolute idea, it may be just this possibility that motivated Hegel’s transition between the Idea of

the Good and the Absolute Idea—a transition made from social practice, “through itself”.

       Hegel’s dialectic developed in the final paragraph defining the absolute idea, in which the

individual’s freedom and knowledge is the “subsistence” of the social, remains very relevant

today. Hegel’s absolute idea developed as the dialectic of the ideas of the true and good may act

as a constitutive social force alongside the variety of new social movements that have continued

to emerge in opposition to social domination of various types. In this sense Hegel’s absolute idea

is potentially a force for emancipatory social change




                                            References

Anderson, Kevin

1995   Lenin, Hegel and Western Marxism. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Hegel, G.W.F.

1969    Science of Logic. London. New York: George Allen & Unwin.

1995   Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Volume I. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
19


Horkheimer, Max

1987   The Eclipse of Reason. New York: Continuum.

Horkheimer, Max and Adorno,Theodor W.

1988   Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York: Continuum

Jay, Martin

1984   Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas. Berkeley:

       University of California.

Marcuse, Herbert

1964   One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press.

1987   Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity. Cambridge: MIT Press.

1998   Technology, War and Fascism. London: Routledge.

1999   Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. Amherst, NY: Humanity.

Marx, Karl

1973   Grundrisse. New York: Vingage.

1976   Capital. Volume One. London: Penguin Press.

Wiggershaus, Rolf.

1994   The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance. Cambridge: MIT

       Press.
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Description: “The Social Relevance of Hegel’s Absolute Idea: Herbert Marcuse’s Two Hegel Books” Paper presented at the American Sociological Society meetings, San Diego 19 pages