Anti Money Laundering Manual - IIS7

Document Sample
Anti Money Laundering Manual - IIS7 Powered By Docstoc
					Anti Money Laundering
 procedures manual /
 Financial Crime Plan
Chapter                             Contents                        Page
   1                              Background                         3
   2             The Joint Money Laundering Steering Group           7
   3                      Money Laundering Forms /                   8
                      Obtaining ID and proof of address
  4                      Staff awareness and training                19
  5                     Money Wise’s responsibilities                23
  6       How Money Wise’s products and services might be used as    24
            a vehicle for Money Laundering or terrorist financing
  7                  Responsibilities of Money Wise staff            27
  8                             Record keeping                       29
  9             Suspicious activities or suspicious transactions     30
  10                          Ongoing monitoring                     41
  11                            Freezing funds /                     44
                 Persons we should not accept as customers
  12           Reporting Money Laundering suspicions (MLRO)          45
  13          Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Terrorism Act       50
  14                      Financial Action Task Force                51
  15            Anti-money laundering changes in March 2006          52
  16                        Sanctions and penalties                  55
  17                 Appendix - Money Laundering Form                56

1/ Background
Terminology used in this manual
MLRO – Money Laundering Reporting Officer
POCA – Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
SOCA - Serious Organised Crime Agency
SAR - Suspicious Activity Report
CDD - Customer due diligence
AML - Anti Money Laundering
CTF - Combating Terrorist Financing

What is money laundering?
The goal of a large number of criminal acts is to generate a profit for the individual or group
that carries out the act. Money laundering is the processing of these criminal proceeds to
disguise their illegal origin. This process is of critical importance, as it enables the criminal to
enjoy these profits without jeopardising their source.
Illegal arms sales, smuggling, and the activities of organised crime, including for example
drug trafficking and prostitution rings, can generate huge sums. Embezzlement, insider
trading, bribery and computer fraud schemes can also produce large profits and create the
incentive to "legitimise" the ill-gotten gains through money laundering.
When a criminal activity generates substantial profits, the individual or group involved must
find a way to control the funds without attracting attention to the underlying activity or the
persons involved. Criminals do this by disguising the sources, changing the form, or moving
the funds to a place where they are less likely to attract attention.
What is the scale of the problem? By its very nature, money laundering occurs outside of the
normal range of economic statistics. Nevertheless, as with other aspects of underground
economic activity, rough estimates have been put forward to give some sense of scale to the
The International Monetary Fund, for example, has stated that the aggregate size of money
laundering in the world could be somewhere between two and five percent of the world's
gross domestic product.
Using 1996 statistics, these percentages would indicate that money laundering ranged
between US Dollar (USD) 590 billion and USD 1.5 trillion. The lower figure is roughly
equivalent to the value of the total output of an economy the size of Spain.

What is the scale of the problem?
By its very nature, money laundering occurs outside of the normal range of economic
statistics. Nevertheless, as with other aspects of underground economic activity, rough
estimates have been put forward to give some sense of scale to the problem. The
International Monetary Fund, for example, has stated that the aggregate size of money
laundering in the world could be somewhere between two and five percent of the world’s
gross domestic product. Using 1996 statistics, these percentages would indicate that money
laundering ranged between US Dollar (USD) 590 billion and USD 1.5 trillion. The lower figure
is roughly equivalent to the value of the total output of an economy the size of Spain.

How is money laundered?
In the initial or placement stage of money laundering, the launderer introduces his illegal
profits into the financial system. This might be done by breaking up large amounts of cash
into less conspicuous smaller sums that are then deposited directly into a bank account, or
by purchasing a series of monetary instruments (cheques, money orders, etc.) that are then
collected and deposited into accounts at another location.

After the funds have entered the financial system, the second - or layering - stage takes
place. In this phase, the launderer engages in a series of conversions or movements of the
funds to distance them from their source. The funds might be channelled through the
purchase and sales of investment instruments, or the launderer might simply wire the funds
through a series of accounts at various banks across the globe. This use of widely scattered
accounts for laundering is especially prevalent in those jurisdictions that do not co-operate
in anti-money laundering investigations. In some instances, the launderer might disguise the
transfers as payments for goods or services, thus giving them a legitimate appearance.

Having successfully processed his criminal profits through the first two phases of the money
laundering process, the launderer then moves them to the third stage - integration - in
which the funds re-enter the legitimate economy. The launderer might choose to invest the
funds into real estate, luxury assets, or business ventures.

Where does money laundering occur?
As money laundering is a necessary consequence of almost all profit generating crime, it can
occur practically anywhere in the world. Generally, money launderers tend to seek out areas
in which there is a low risk of detection due to weak or ineffective anti-money laundering
programs. Because the objective of money laundering is to get the illegal funds back to the
individual who generated them, launderers usually prefer to move funds through areas with
stable financial systems.

Money laundering activity may also be concentrated geographically according to the stage
the laundered funds have reached. At the placement stage, for example, the funds are
usually processed relatively close to the under-lying activity, often, but not in every case, in
the country where the funds originate.

With the layering phase, the launderer might choose an offshore financial centre, a large
regional business centre, or a world banking centre - any location that provides an adequate
financial or business infrastructure. At this stage, the laundered funds may also only transit
bank accounts at various locations where this can be done without leaving traces of their
source or ultimate destination.

Finally, at the integration phase, launderers might choose to invest laundered funds in still
other locations if they were generated in unstable economies or locations offering limited
investment opportunities.

Risk Identified
There is a requirement to adhere to anti money laundering requirements and ensure staff
are adequately advised of their responsibilities and are trained. We do not have a history of
money laundering reporting instances. Monitoring of anti money laundering procedures will
be undertaken as part of the review of conduct of business practice.

The risk to Money Wise
The potential effect (on us and our clients) of any breach of this law is that we may be at risk
if (without the consent of SOCA) we process transactions, which involve the proceeds of

What are the money laundering or terrorist financing risks for financial advisers?
The vast majority of financial advice business is conducted on a face-to-face basis, and
investors generally have easy access to the funds involved.

Some criminals may seek to use financial advisers as the first step in integrating their
criminal property into the financial system.

The offences of money laundering or terrorist financing include aiding and abetting those
trying to carry out these primary offences, which include tax evasion. This is the main risk
generally faced by financial advisers. In carrying out our assessment of the risk we face the
risk of becoming involved in money laundering or terrorist financing, or entering into an
arrangement to launder criminal property, it is important that we considers the risk related
to the product, as well as the risk related to the client.

Clearly, the risk of being involved in money laundering or terrorist financing will increase
when dealing with certain types of customer, such as offshore trusts/companies, politically
exposed persons and customers from higher risk or non-FATF countries or jurisdictions, and
may also be affected by other service features that we offer to our clients. Customer activity,
too, such as purchases in secondary markets – for example, traded endowments – can carry
a higher money laundering risk.

Training will be given as and when required. An annual report will be made to the Directors,
including a record of staff training and any reports made to, or by, the Money Laundering
Reporting Officer.

Money Laundering Reporting Officer
The Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) is John Skillman. The MLRO has
responsibility for oversight of our compliance with the FSA's rules on systems and controls
against money laundering.
SYSC 3.2.6H&I


Systems and controls
We must take reasonable care to establish and maintain effective systems and controls for
countering the risk that we might be used to further financial crime, i.e. any kind of criminal
conduct relating to money or to financial services or markets, including any offence
     Fraud or dishonesty
     Misconduct in, or misuse of information relating to, a financial market
     Handling the proceeds of crime
Our systems and controls enable us to identify, assess, monitor and manage money-
laundering risk, and are comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale and
complexity of our activities. We carry out regular assessments of the adequacy of these
systems and controls.
SYSC 3.2.6, SYSC 3.2.6A and SYSC 3.2.6C

We have procedures in place for anti-money laundering purposes. Monitoring of money
laundering procedures will be undertaken as part of the review of conduct of business
practice. Monitoring of client files will report on any cases where procedures have not been
followed. The Money Laundering report to the Board is due each December.

FSA findings
According to the Financial Services Authority (FSA), the two main failings of firms with regard
to their Money Laundering systems are:
     Know your client information
     Staff training & awareness

From which external sources does the MLRO receive information to enable Money Wise to
take decisions on the money laundering and terrorist financing risks facing us?
FSA bulletins, The Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG) guidance notes and
Financial Action Task Force (FAFT) website, SOCA website.

How is each MLRO report acted upon?
Any recommendations are implemented into this company procedures manual.

Is the MLRO report considered against previous reports?

Does the MLRO report inform senior management of the risk assessment and review?
Yes, annually.

Does the MLRO report format require positive action from our senior management?

What information on a customer is appropriate for verifying identity?
This is listed on the Money Laundering forms.

Do we have flexible identification procedures to cater for all types of customers?
Yes, this is listed on the Money Laundering forms.

What forms of identification will we not accept?
Anything not listed on the Money Laundering forms.

2/ The joint Money Laundering Steering Group
Who are they?
The Joint Money Laundering Steering Group is made up of the leading UK Trade Associations
in the Financial Services Industry.

What do they do?
Its aim is to promulgate good practice in countering money laundering and to give practical
assistance in interpreting the UK Money Laundering Regulations. This is primarily achieved
by the publication of industry guidance.

Guidance notes
The Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG) has issued Guidance Notes, in two

JMLSG guidance notes - part 1 (main text)
JMLSG guidance notes - part 2 (sectoral guidance)

The sectoral guidance for Financial Advisers is in part 2, sector 6:

Overview of sector
Financial advisers, whether they only give advice or whether they act on behalf of their
customers in dealing with a product provider, are subject to the full provisions of UK law and
regulation relating to the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing.

Generally, financial advisers do not hold permission from the FSA to handle client money, so
in practice there is unlikely to be any involvement in the placement stage of money
laundering. There is, however, considerable scope for financial advisers being drawn in to
the layering and integration stages.

Their website address is:

3/ Money Laundering Forms / Obtaining ID and proof of address
What are Money Wise’s arrangements, policies and procedures for managing the Money
laundering risk and for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing?
Customer due diligence (CDD)
We must obtain sufficient ‘Know your client’ information on fact finds and Money
Laundering forms (see appendix) (e.g. ID and proof of address) for all clients, which is stored
on the Back Office system. We do not hold client money. We do not accept
payments/investments/premiums in cash. The checking of this information is part of the file
checking procedure.

What is the importance of obtaining sufficient evidence of identity and the need to verify
the identity of the customer for money laundering prevention purposes?
Having sufficient information about customers and using that information underpins all
other anti-money laundering procedures. We should not enter into a business relationship
until the identity of all the relevant parties to the relationship has been verified.

What is the importance of the “know your customer” requirements?
When a full advice service is offered, the process will involve information gathering (‘Know
your client‘ (KYC)), Fact find):

       Understanding the customer’s circumstances & business
       Source of funds
       Source of wealth
       Objectives / Purpose of specific transactions
       Anticipated funds available for investment
       Expected nature and level of transactions
       Conduct ongoing monitoring

The adviser would also need an understanding of the customer's needs and priorities. The
amount of information held about a client will build over time, as there will often be ongoing
contact with the customer in order to review their circumstances. However, the level of
information held about a customer will be limited if business is transacted on an execution-
only or direct offer basis and financial advisers should have an increased regard to the
monitoring of business undertaken in this way.

Whose identity should be verified?
We must apply CDD measures when we:
    Establish a business relationship
    Carry out an occasional transaction
    Suspect money laundering or terrorist financing
    Doubt the veracity of documents, data or information previously obtained for the
       purpose of identification or verification.

Timing of verification
The verification of the identity of the client must take place before the establishment of a
business relationship or the carrying out of an occasional transaction.

Customers who cannot provide the standard evidence
If we are unable to apply CDD measures we must:
     Not carry out a transaction with or for the customer through a bank account
     Not establish a business relationship or carry out an occasional transaction with the
     Terminate any existing business relationship with the customer
     Consider whether we ought to be making a report to SOCA, in accordance with our
        obligations under POCA and the Terrorism Act

However, some clients may not be able to produce identification information equivalent to
the standard. Such cases may include, for example, some low-income customers in rented
accommodation, customers with a legal, mental or physical inability to manage their affairs,
individuals dependent on the care of others, dependant spouses/partners or minors,
students, refugees and asylum seekers, migrant workers and prisoners. We will therefore
need an approach that compensates for the difficulties that such customers may face in
providing the standard evidence of identity.

The FSA Rules adopt a broad view of financial exclusion, in terms of ensuring that, where
people cannot reasonably be expected to produce standard evidence of identity, they are
not unreasonably denied access to financial services. The term is sometimes used in a
narrower sense, for example, HM Treasury refers to those who, for specific reasons, do not
have access to mainstream banking or financial services - that is, those at the lower end of
income distribution who are socially/financially disadvantaged and in receipt of benefits, or
those who chose not to seek access to financial products because they believed that they
will be refused.

Check with the MLRO and refer to JMLSG guidance part 1, paragraph 5.3.98 to 5.3.119

Using ‘Source of funds’ as evidence
Under certain conditions, where the money laundering or terrorist financing risk in a product
is considered to be at its lowest, a payment drawn on an account with a UK or EU regulated
credit institution, or one from an equivalent jurisdiction, and which is in the sole or joint
name of the customer, may satisfy the standard identification requirement. Whilst the
payment may be made between accounts with regulated firms or by cheque or debit card,
the accepting firm must be able to confirm that the payment (by whatever method) is from
a bank or building society account in the sole or joint name(s) of the customer.

Whilst it is immaterial whether the transaction is effected remotely or face-to-face, each
type of relationship or transaction that is entered into must be considered before

determining that it is appropriate to rely on this method of verification. We will need to be
able to demonstrate why we considered it to be reasonable to have regard to the source of
funds as evidence in a particular instance.

One of the restrictions that will apply to a product that qualifies for using the source of funds
as evidence will be an inability to make payments direct to, or to receive payments direct
from, third parties. If, subsequent to using the source of funds to verify the customer’s
identity, we decide to allow such a payment or receipt to proceed, we should verify the
identity of the third party. A further restriction would be that cash withdrawals should not
be permitted, other than by the customers themselves, on a face-to-face basis where
identity can be confirmed.

If we (when proposing to rely on the source of funds) have reasonable grounds for believing
that the identity of the customer has not been verified by the firm on which the payment
has been drawn, we should not permit the source of funds to be used as evidence.

If we have reason to suspect the motives behind a particular transaction, or believes that the
business is being structured to avoid the standard identification requirement, it should not
permit the use of the source of funds as evidence to identify the customer.

Customers whose identity might not need to be verified
Customers with an existing business relationship with us when the obligation to verify
identity was introduced might not need to be verified. Customers who come to us through
the acquisition of one financial services firm, or a portfolio of customers, by another might
not need to be verified.

Our risk assessment procedures take account of the money laundering and terrorist-
financing risks identified in the sectors in which the relevant product provider operates.
Customers may be assessed as presenting a higher risk of money laundering, whether
because they are identified as being a Politically Exposed Person (PEP), or because of some
other aspect of the nature of the customer, or his business, or its location, or because of the
product features available. In such cases, we will need to decide whether it should require
additional identity information to be provided, and/or whether to verify additional aspects
of identity. For such customers, advisers will need to consider whether to require additional
KYC information and/or whether to institute enhanced monitoring.

Special Cases
Some persons cannot reasonably be expected to produce the standard evidence of identity.
This would include persons such as individuals in care homes, who may not have a passport
or driving licence, and whose name does not appear on utility bills. Where customers cannot
produce the standard identification evidence, reference should be made to the guidance set
out as follows:

Many customers in the categories below will be able to provide standard documents, and
this will normally be our preferred option. The following list is a non-exhaustive and non-
mandatory list of documents (see Notes) which are capable of evidencing identity for special
cases who either cannot meet the standard verification requirement, or have experienced
difficulties in the past when seeking to open accounts, and which will generally be
appropriate for opening a Basic Bank Account. These include the following categories. The
document(s) required for each category is noted underneath.

Benefit claimants
Entitlement letter issued by DWP, HMRC or local authority, or Identity Confirmation Letter
issued by DWP or local Authority

Those in care homes/sheltered accommodation/refuge
Letter from care home manager/warden of sheltered accommodation or refuge Homeless
persons who cannot provide standard identification documentation are likely to be in a
particular socially excluded category. A letter from the warden of a homeless shelter, or
from an employer if the customer is in work, will normally be sufficient evidence.

Those on probation
It may be possible to apply standard identification procedures. Otherwise, a letter from the
customer’s probation officer, or a hostel manager, would normally be sufficient.

It may be possible to apply standard identification procedures. Otherwise, a letter from the
governor of the prison, or, if the applicant has been released, from a police or probation
officer or hostel manager would normally be sufficient.

International students
Passport or EEA National Identity Card AND Letter of Acceptance or Letter of Introduction
from Institution on the DfES list. Guidance on identification for international students is
available at JMLSG - International Students - Basic Bank Account opening procedures).

Economic migrants (here meaning those working temporarily in the UK, whose lack of
banking or credit history precludes their being offered other than a basic bank account)
National Passport, or National Identity Card (nationals of EEA and Switzerland) Details of
documents required by migrant workers are available at Employing Migrant Workers and
Home Office.

We are not required to establish whether an applicant is legally entitled to work in the UK
but if, in the course of checking identity, it came to light that the applicant was not entitled
to do so, the deposit of earnings from employment could constitute an arrangement under
the Proceeds of Crime Act.

Refugees (those who are not on benefit)
Immigration Status Document, with Residence Permit, or IND travel document (ie Blue
Convention Travel doc, or Red Stateless Persons doc, or Brown Certificate of Identity doc)
Refugees are unlikely to have their national passports and will have been issued by the
Home Office with documents confirming their status. A refugee is normally entitled to work,
to receive benefits and to remain in the UK.

Asylum seekers
IND Application Registration Card (ARC). NB This document shows the status of the
individual, and does not confirm their identity.

Asylum seekers are issued by the Home Office with documents confirming their status.
Unlike refugees, however, information provided by an asylum seeker will not have been
checked by the Home Office. The asylum seeker’s Applicant Registration Card (ARC) will
state whether the asylum seeker is entitled to take employment in the UK. Asylum seekers

may apply to open an account if they are entitled to work, but also to deposit money
brought from abroad, and in some cases to receive allowances paid by the Home Office.

Travellers may be able to produce standard identification evidence; if not, they may be in a
particular special case category. If verification of address is necessary, a check with the local
authority, which has to register travellers’ sites, may sometimes be helpful.

1. Passports, national identity cards and travel documents must be current, and not expired.
Letters should be of recent date, or, in the case of students, the course dates stated in the
Letter of Acceptance should reasonably correspond with the date of the account application
to the bank. All documents must be originals. In case of need, consideration should be given
to verifying the authenticity of the document with its issuer.

2. As with all retail customers, we should take reasonable care to check that documents
offered are genuine (not obviously forged), and where these incorporate photographs, that
these correspond to the presenter.

Non-personal customers
Categories of non-personal customers that are likely to be of particular relevance to financial
advisers are:

       Private companies - Unlike publicly quoted companies, the activities of private or
        unlisted companies are often carried out for the profit/benefit of a small and
        defined group of individuals or entities. Such firms are also subject to a lower level
        of public disclosure than public companies. In general, however, the structure,
        ownership, purposes and activities of many private companies will be clear and

       HMRC approved pension schemes - UK pension schemes can take a number of legal
        forms. Some may be companies limited by guarantee; some may take the form of
        trusts; others may be unincorporated associations. Many obtain HMRC approval in
        order to achieve tax-exempt status

       Charities, church bodies and places of worship - Charities have their status because
        of their purposes, and can take a number of legal forms. Some may be companies
        limited by guarantee, or incorporated by Royal Charter or by Act of Parliament;
        some may take the form of trusts; others may be unincorporated associations.

       Other trusts, foundations and similar entities - There is a wide variety of trusts,
        ranging from large, nationally and internationally active organisations subject to a
        high degree of public interest and quasi-accountability, through trusts set up under
        testamentary arrangements, to small, local trusts funded by small, individual
        donations from local communities, serving local needs. It is important, in putting
        proportionate AML/CTF processes into place, and in carrying out their risk
        assessments, that we take account of the different money laundering or terrorist
        financing risks that trusts of different sizes, areas of activity and nature of business
        being conducted, present.

       Partnerships and unincorporated businesses - Partnerships and unincorporated
        businesses, although principally operated by individuals, or groups of individuals, are
        different from private individuals in that there is an underlying business. This
        business is likely to have a different money laundering or terrorist financing risk
        profile from that of an individual.

       Clubs and societies - Where an application is made on behalf of a club or society, we
        should make appropriate distinction between those that serve a limited social or
        regional purpose and those where the activities and connections are more
        sophisticated, or are geographically based and/or with financial links to other

Under what circumstances is it necessary to obtain appropriate additional customer
information (Further Verification Evidence) in the context of the nature of the transaction
or business relationship concerned, and why is this important?
Enhanced due diligence (EDD)
We must apply EDD measures on a risk-sensitive basis in any situation that by its nature can
present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. As part of this, we may
conclude that the standard evidence of identity is insufficient in relation to the money
laundering or terrorist financing risk, and that we must obtain additional information about
a particular customer.

What would be the procedure for customers who present a higher risk of money
laundering or terrorist financing
The additional Know Your Customer (KYC) information (Further Verification Evidence) that
should be collected for higher risk business is:

For non face-to-face identification and verification
Non face-to-face transactions can present a greater money laundering or terrorist financing
risk than those conducted in person because it is inherently more difficult to be sure that the
person with whom we are dealing is the person that they claim to be. Verification of identity
undertaken on a non face-to-face basis should be carried out.

Where the customer has not been physically present for identification purposes, we must
take specific and adequate measures to compensate for the higher risk, for example by
applying one or more of the following measures:

       Ensuring that the customer’s identity is established by additional documents, data or
       Supplementary measures to verify or certify the documents supplied, or requiring
        confirmatory certification by a financial services firm in the UK, EU or an equivalent
       Ensuring that the first payment of the operation is carried out through an account
        opened in the customer’s name with a bank

Whilst some types of financial transaction have traditionally been conducted on a non-face-
to-face basis, other types of transaction and relationships are increasingly being undertaken
in this way: e.g. Internet and telephone banking, online share dealing.

Although applications and transactions undertaken across the Internet may in themselves
not pose any greater risk than other non face-to-face business, such as applications

submitted by post, there are other factors that may, taken together, aggravate the typical
risks, the:

       Ease of access to the facility, regardless of time and location
       Ease of making multiple fictitious applications without incurring extra cost or the risk
        of detection
       Absence of physical documents
       Speed of electronic transactions

The extent of verification in respect of non face-to-face customers will depend on the nature
and characteristics of the product or service requested and the assessed money laundering
risk presented by the customer. There are some circumstances where the customer is
typically not physically present - such as in many wholesale markets, or when purchasing
some types of collective investments - which would not in themselves increase the risk
attaching to the transaction or activity.

Additional measures would also include assessing the possibility that the customer is
deliberately avoiding face-to-face contact. It is therefore important to be clear on the
appropriate approach in these circumstances.

Where a customer approaches us remotely (by post, telephone or over the internet), we
should carry out non face-to-face verification, either by reference to documents (Money
laundering Forms) or electronically:

Electronic verification
If identity is verified electronically, this should be by us, using as our basis the customer’s full
name, address and date of birth, carrying out electronic checks either direct, or through a
supplier, that provide a reasonable assurance that the customer is who he says he is.

As well as requiring a commercial agency used for electronic verification to meet the criteria,
it is important that the process of electronic verification meets a standard level of
confirmation before it can be relied on. The standard level of confirmation, in circumstances
that do not give rise to concern or uncertainty, is:

       One match on an individual’s full name and current address
       A second match on an individual’s full name and either his current address or his
        date of birth.

Commercial agencies that provide electronic verification use various methods of displaying
results - for example, by the number of documents checked, or through scoring mechanisms.
We should ensure that they meet the standard level of confirmation set out above.

Nature of electronic checks
A number of commercial agencies which access many data sources are accessible online,
and may provide us with a composite and comprehensive level of electronic verification
through a single interface. Such agencies use databases of both positive and negative
information, and many also access high-risk alerts that utilise specific data sources to
identify high-risk conditions, for example, known identity frauds or inclusion on a sanctions
list. Some of these sources are, however, only available to closed user groups.

Positive information (relating to full name, current address, date of birth) can prove that an
individual exists, but some can offer a higher degree of confidence than others. Such
information should include data from more robust sources - where an individual has to
prove their identity, or address, in some way in order to be included, as opposed to others,
where no such proof is required.

Negative information includes lists of individuals known to have committed fraud, including
identity fraud, and registers of deceased persons. Checking against such information may be
necessary to mitigate against impersonation fraud.

For an electronic check to provide satisfactory evidence of identity on its own, it must use
data from multiple sources, and across time, or incorporate qualitative checks that assess
the strength of the information supplied. An electronic check that accesses data from a
single source (e.g., a single check against the Electoral Roll) is not normally enough on its
own to verify identity.

Criteria for use of an electronic data provider
Before using a commercial agency for electronic verification, we should be satisfied that
information supplied by the data provider is considered to be sufficiently extensive, reliable
and accurate. This judgement may be assisted by considering whether the provider meets all
the following criteria. It:

       Is recognised, through registration with the Information Commissioner’s Office, to
        store personal data
       Uses a range of positive information sources that can be called upon to link an
        applicant to both current and previous circumstances
       Accesses negative information sources, such as databases relating to identity fraud
        and deceased persons
       Accesses a wide range of alert data sources
       Has transparent processes that enable us to know what checks were carried out,
        what the results of these checks were, and what they mean in terms of how much
        certainty they give as to the identity of the subject

In addition, a commercial agency should have processes that allow the enquirer to capture
and store the information they used to verify an identity.

To mitigate the risk of impersonation fraud, we should either verify with the customer
additional aspects of his identity that are held electronically, or follow the guidance below
on ‘Mitigation of impersonation risk’:

Mitigation of impersonation risk
Non face-to-face identification and verification carries an inherent risk of impersonation
fraud. Where identity is verified electronically, or copy documents are used, we should apply
an additional verification check to manage the risk of impersonation fraud. The additional
check may consist of robust anti-fraud checks that we routinely undertakes as part of our
existing procedures, or may include:

       Requiring the first payment to be carried out through an account in the customer’s
        name with a UK or EU regulated credit institution or one from an equivalent

       Verifying additional aspects of the customer’s identity, or of his electronic ‘footprint’
        (i.e. the identity of an individual has a number of aspects: e.g., his/her given name
        (which of course may change), date of birth, and place of birth. Other facts about an
        individual accumulate over time (the so-called electronic “footprint”): e.g., family
        circumstances and addresses, employment and business career, contacts with the
        authorities or with other financial sector firms, physical appearance)
       Telephone contact with the customer prior to opening the account on a home or
        business number which has been verified (electronically or otherwise), or a
        “welcome call” to the customer before transactions are permitted, using it to verify
        additional aspects of personal identity information that have been previously
        provided during the setting up of the account
       Communicating with the customer at an address that has been verified (such
        communication may take the form of a direct mailing of account opening
        documentation to him, which, in full or in part, might be required to be returned
        completed or acknowledged without alteration)
       Internet sign-on following verification procedures where the customer uses security
        codes, tokens, and/or other passwords which have been set up during account
        opening and provided by mail (or secure delivery) to the named individual at an
        independently verified address
       Other card or account activation procedures
       Requiring copy documents to be certified by an appropriate person

Politically exposed persons (PEP)
Individuals who have, or have had, a high political profile, or hold, or have held, public office,
can pose a higher money laundering risk to us as their position may make them vulnerable
to corruption. This risk also extends to members of their immediate families and to known
close associates. PEP status itself does not, of course, incriminate individuals or entities. It
does, however, put the customer, or the beneficial owner, into a higher risk category.

A PEP is defined as “an individual who is or has, at any time in the preceding year, been
entrusted with prominent public functions and an immediate family member, or a known
close associate, of such a person”. This definition only applies to those holding such a
position in a state outside the UK, or in a Community institution or an international body.

Although under the definition of a PEP an individual ceases to be so regarded after he has
left office for one year, we should apply a risk-based approach in determining whether they
should cease carrying out appropriately enhanced monitoring of his transactions or activity
at the end of this period. In many cases, a longer period might be appropriate, in order to
ensure that the higher risks associated with the individual’s previous position have
adequately abated.

Public functions exercised at levels lower than national should normally not be considered
prominent. However, when their political exposure is comparable to that of similar positions
at national level, we should consider, on a risk-based approach, whether persons exercising
those public functions should be considered as PEPs. Prominent public functions include:

       Heads of state, heads of government, ministers and deputy or assistant ministers
       Members of parliaments
       Members of supreme courts, of constitutional courts or of other high level judicial
        bodies whose decisions are not generally subject to further appeal, except in
        exceptional circumstances

       Members of courts of auditors or of the boards of central banks
       Ambassadors, charges d’affaires and high-ranking officers in the armed forces; and
        (other than in respect of relevant positions at Community and international level)
       Members of the administrative, management or supervisory boards of State-owned

These categories do not include middle-ranking or more junior officials.

Immediate family members include:
    A spouse
    A partner (including a person who is considered by his national law as equivalent to
      a spouse)
    Children and their spouses or partners
    Parents

Persons known to be close associates include:
     Any individual who is known to have joint beneficial ownership of a legal entity or
       legal arrangement, or any other close business relations, with a person who is a PEP
     Any individual who has sole beneficial ownership of a legal entity or legal
       arrangement which is known to have been set up for the benefit of a person who is
       a PEP

For the purpose of deciding whether a person is a known close associate of a PEP, we need
only have regard to any information which is in our possession, or which is publicly known.
Having to obtain knowledge of such a relationship does not presuppose an active research
by us.

We are required, on a risk-sensitive basis, to:
    Have appropriate risk-based procedures to determine whether a customer is a PEP
    Obtain appropriate senior management approval for establishing a business
       relationship with such a customer
    Take adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds
       which are involved in the business relationship or occasional transaction
    Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship
    Risk-based procedures

The nature and scope of our business will generally determine whether the existence of
PEPs in our customer base is an issue for us, and whether or not we need to screen all
customers for this purpose. In the context of this risk analysis, it would be appropriate if our
resources were focused in particular on products and transactions that are characterised by
a high risk of money laundering.

Establishing whether individuals qualify as PEPs is not always straightforward and can
present difficulties. Where we need to carry out specific checks, we may be able to rely on
an Internet search engine, or consult relevant reports and databases on corruption risk
published by specialised national, international, non-governmental and commercial
organisations. Resources such as the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions
Index, which ranks approximately 150 countries according to their perceived level of
corruption, may be helpful in terms of assessing the risk. If there is a need to conduct more
thorough checks, or if there is a high likelihood of our having PEPs for customers,
subscription to a specialist PEP database may be the only adequate risk mitigation tool.

Using verification work carried out by another firm
The responsibility to be satisfied that a customer’s identity has been verified rests with the
firm entering into the transaction with the customer. However, where two or more financial
services firms have an obligation to verify the identity of the same customer in respect of
the same transaction, in certain circumstances one firm may use confirmation of the
verification carried out by another firm as appropriate evidence of the customer’s identity.

We should bear in mind that they are often the party that is carrying out the initial customer
identification and verification process. As such, it is they who will be asked to confirm to a
product or service provider that such verification has been carried out. Although not directly
related to the sort of work that financial advisers typically carry out, the significance of
issuing such confirmations is highlighted by the actions of the FSA in 2005 in fining a bond
broker who gave such conformation when he was aware that he had not, in fact, carried out
appropriate customer due diligence.

Product providers often rely on customer verification procedures carried out by financial
advisers, which underlines the importance of their systems and procedures for risk
assessment being effective.

How should ‘Further Verification Evidence’ be recorded?
This should be recorded under ‘Further Verification Evidence’ of the Money laundering

4/ Staff awareness and training
All staff, irrespective of adviser or administrator status should be trained on Money
Laundering procedures at least every two years allowing this to form part of our Financial
Crime Plan.

One of the most important controls over the prevention and detection of money laundering
is to have staff who are alert to the risks of money laundering/terrorist financing and well
trained in the identification of unusual activities or transactions, which may prove to be

This guidance includes suggested questions that staff should be asking themselves, and
circumstances that should cause them to ask further questions about particular transactions
or customer activity.

       How can we ensure that our policies and procedures have been effectively
       How do we monitor compliance with our procedures?
       How often is staff training provided?
       How is the effectiveness of any training measured?
       How do we ensure staff use our company procedures?

To answer the questions above, all staff, management, sales and admin, received money
laundering training frequently, receive regular newsletters or monthly bulletins, and at least
once a year, have access to and read this Anti Money Laundering procedures manual. All
staff must undertake an annual Money Laundering awareness test.

Does our training address specific risks posed to the business?
Yes, examples of the risks that money laundering and terrorist financing pose to Money Wise
are provided. Also shown are how Money Wise’s products and services might be vulnerable
to be used as a vehicle for money laundering or terrorist financing.

What specific training do staff require in relation to the procedures designed to mitigate
these risks?
Access to this manual and any updates, including:
     Responsibilities of Money Wise staff
     Examples of suspicious activities or suspicious transactions
     Ongoing monitoring
     Persons we should not accept as customers

Also email bulletins, annual exams.

Do new staff, unfamiliar with money laundering issues, require more intensive training?
Yes. Training program will be presented at outset of employment, then at regular intervals.

How is training tailored for different staff roles?
Staff involved in customer acceptance, in customer servicing, or in settlement functions will
need different training, tailored to their particular function.

How are changes to procedures communicated to staff?
Email bulletins.

Staff must be aware of:
     ML Regulations
     FSA Rules
     Industry guidance

Staff training should be given at regular intervals, and details recorded.

The MLRO is responsible for oversight of our compliance with its requirements in respect of
staff training. The relevant director or senior manager has overall responsibility for the
establishment and maintenance of effective training arrangements.

Actions required, to be kept under regular review
We must provide appropriate training to make staff aware of money laundering and terrorist
financing issues including how to operate a risk-based approach to Anti Money Laundering
(AML) and Combating Terrorist Financing (CFT).

We should providing staff with:
    Case studies
    Examples related to our business

Why focus on staff awareness and training?
One of the most important controls over the prevention and detection of money laundering
is to have staff who are alert to the risks of money laundering/terrorist financing and well
trained in the identification of unusual activities or transactions which may prove to be

The effective application of even the best-designed control systems can be quickly
compromised if the staff applying the systems are not adequately trained. The effectiveness
of the training will therefore be important to the success of our AML/CTF strategy.

We must implement a clear and well articulated policy for ensuring that staff are aware of
their obligations in respect of the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing
and for training them in the identification and reporting of anything that gives grounds for
suspicion. This is especially important for staff that handle customer transactions or
instructions. Temporary and contract staff carrying out such functions should also be
covered by these training programmes.

It is important, therefore, that staff are made aware of these obligations, and are given
training in how to discharge them.

General legal and regulator obligations
The FSA’s Training and Competence Sourcebook contains high-level commitments for all FSA
regulated businesses and these provide an important background to the provision of money
laundering awareness and training.

Our commitments to training and competence are that:
    Its employees are competent
    Its employees remain competent for the work they do
    Its employees are appropriately supervised
    Its employees’ competence is regularly reviewed
    The level of competence is appropriate to the nature of the business

The FSA specifically requires the MLRO to have responsibility for oversight of our Anti
Money Laundering systems and controls, which include appropriate training for our staff in
relation to money laundering.

Where a staff member is found to have had reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting
money laundering, but failed to make a disclosure, he will have a defence under POCA if he
does not know or suspect, and has not been provided with AML training by his employer. No
such defence is available under the Terrorism Act.

A successful defence by a staff member under POCA may leave us open to prosecution or
regulatory sanction for not having adequate training and awareness arrangements.

We should therefore:
    Obtain acknowledgement from staff members that they have received the necessary
    Take steps to assess its effectiveness

Training in our procedures
Staff should be aware of how our products and services may be used as a vehicle for money
laundering or terrorist financing, and of our procedures for managing this risk.

Training methods and assessment
There is no single solution when determining how to deliver training; a mix of training
techniques may be appropriate.
     On-line learning systems can often provide an adequate solution for many
        employees, but there will be classes of employees for whom such an approach is not
     Focused classroom training for higher risk or minority areas can be more effective.
     Relevant videos always stimulate interest, but continually re-showing the same
        video may produce diminishing returns.
     Procedures manuals, whether paper or intranet based, are useful in raising staff
        awareness and in supplementing more dedicated forms of training, but their main
        purpose is to provide ongoing reference and they are not generally written as
        training material.
     Ongoing training should be given at appropriate intervals to all relevant employees.
        This may take the form of a rolling programme.

5/ Money Wise’s responsibilities
Responsibilities of senior management
Senior management must be aware of their obligations under the ML Regulations to
establish appropriate systems and procedures to forestall and prevent operations relating to
money laundering and terrorist financing. It is an offence not to have appropriate systems in
place, whether or not money laundering or terrorist financing has taken place.

The relevant director or senior manager has overall responsibility for the establishment and
maintenance of effective training arrangements. The MLRO is responsible for oversight of
our compliance with our requirements in respect of training, including taking reasonable
steps to ensure that our systems and controls include appropriate training for staff in
relation to money laundering. Awareness and training arrangements specifically for senior
management and the MLRO should therefore also be considered.

The relationship between the MLRO and the director(s)/senior manager(s) allocated overall
responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of our Anti Money
laundering/Combating Terrorist Financing systems is one of the keys to a successful
AML/CTF regime. It is important that this relationship is clearly defined and documented, so
that each knows the extent of his, and the other’s, role and day to day responsibilities.

Our approach to training is built around ensuring that the content and frequency of training
reflects the risk assessment of the products and our services and the specific staff role.

Assessing Financial Position for advisers
We require financial advisers to provide (annually and when they join us):
     a statement of net assets
     a credit report (from Experian)
This allows us to demonstrate that our adviser’s’ personal money management is such that
it would not influence advice and should there be concern, business activity could be
monitored. This of course also touches on TCF aspects.

Where we accept payment via debit or credit cards we should consider how staff record
such sensitive information and if such data is easily removed from the office premises.

Mortgage fraud / self certified or fast track cases
With the huge rise in mortgage fraud, advisers cannot accept at face value details provided
by prospective clients. Where income is self certified or cases fast tracked, robust checks
need to be undertaken by the adviser to:
     Verify the stated income
     Review P60s
     Assess affordability
     Review bank statements

Where income cannot be verified, a report must be made to the MLRO.

6/ How Money Wise’s products and services might be used as a vehicle
for Money Laundering or terrorist financing
How do these crimes operate?
Regular series of publications on the typologies of financial crime, FATF’s Guidance for
Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing issued in April 2002 contains an in-
depth analysis of the methods used in the financing of terrorism and the types of financial
activities constituting potential indicators of such activities. These documents are available

SOCA publishes a range of material at such as:
    Threat assessments
    Risk profiles
    Case studies

Example 1: A singular SAR received by a UK Police Force concerned an individual who had
not previously been the subject of Law Enforcement attention within the UK. Subsequent
checks on the SAR highlighted the fact that the individual was wanted by a foreign
jurisdiction for a major fraud and extradition proceedings have been commenced. This is an
excellent example of the importance of SARs in assisting UK Law Enforcement in the
identification and location of subjects wanted by both national and international law
enforcement bodies. This SAR has provided a good example of international co-operation.

Example 2: As a direct result of numerous SARs a joint investigation was conducted by a UK
Police Force with the relevant regulatory body relating to a Credit Union. The SARs
highlighted a deficit of over £500,000 and after further investigation the Credit Union was
dissolved and a compensation package formulated to protect the members. This is a good
example of how SARs have helped reduce harm in the community. Had the SARs not been
submitted and investigated, the organisation would have 'gone under' and vulnerable
members of a community would have potentially faced financial hardship.

Example 3: A single SAR revealed a link between an individual and a well-known criminal,
which pushed the existing financial investigation forward and assisted in the discovery of the
nature of the predicate offence - insurance fraud. There was one conviction for obtaining
money transfers by deception; one conviction for money laundering and over £250,000 was
subject to confiscation. This is a good example of how a SAR can assist an ongoing
investigation and identify previously unknown details that can have a significant impact on
the progress of an investigation.

Example 4: An individual’s full identity was confirmed as a result of research performed on
several SARs received. An operation was conducted and as a result there were nine arrests
made for money laundering, possession of firearms, burglary and immigration offences. This
is a good example of how a SAR can have a major effect on the course of an investigation by
corroborating existing intelligence.

Example 5: A SAR on a relatively minor financial transaction has recently led to the arrest of
an individual for money laundering and drug trafficking. Enquiries into the subject of the SAR
identified a property portfolio, which was inconsistent with the subject's status. Production
Orders were obtained in order to evidence the intelligence provided by the SAR. The subject

was arrested and searches revealed suspected criminal property valued in excess of £1.5
million and several hundred thousand pounds worth of controlled drugs.

Other information on this website could also usefully be incorporated into our training

Illustrations, based on real cases, of how individuals and organisations might:
      Raise funds
      Use financial sector products and services for money laundering or to finance
are available at

What risks do money laundering and terrorist financing pose to Money Wise and how
might Money Wise’s products and services be vulnerable to be used as a vehicle for money
laundering or terrorist financing?

Example 1: Insurance policies and real estate
An insurance company informed an FIU that it had underwritten two life insurance policies
with a total value of US$268,000 in the name of two European nationals. Payment was made
by a cheque drawn on the accounts of a brokerage firm in a major EU financial market and a
notary in the south-eastern region of the country.

The two policies were then put up as collateral for a mortgage valued at US$1,783,000 that
was provided by a company specialising in leasing transactions. As the policyholders did not
pay in their own name, the issuer contacted the brokerage firm in order to discover the
exact origin of the funds deposited in its account. It was informed that the funds had been
received in cash and that the parties concerned were merely occasional clients.
The parties - two brothers - were known to a law enforcement agency through a separate
investigation into the illegal import and export of classic automobiles. Moreover, two
individuals with the same surname were suspected by the same agency of drug trafficking
and money laundering.
This example shows the necessity for non-bank financial businesses (in this case insurance
companies) to be aware of what constitutes suspicious financial activity. It also
demonstrates the critical need for effective co-ordination between the information
contained in suspicious transaction reports and law enforcement information.

Example 2: Criminal funds laundered through payment of insurance premiums
Mr H, a director of company W, set up a money laundering scheme involving two
companies, each established under two different legal systems. Both of the entities were to
provide financial services and financial guarantees.
The companies were then used to send criminally derived funds of US$1.1 million via wire
transfers to the accounts of Mr H in country S. Mr H also received transfers from country C.
Funds were then transferred from several current and savings accounts; through one of
these transfers, funds were made available from a current account to make payments on life
insurance polices. Investment in these policies was the principal laundering mechanism
amounting to around US$1.2 million, representing the last step in the laundering operation.

Insurance companies should not automatically believe that funds are derived from
legitimate activity merely because they are paid from an established bank account.

Example 3: Insurance and personal investment products
Life policies and other personal investment products, and general insurance can be
attractive to the launderer. Life policies and personal investment products can often be
purchased with cash, especially through smaller intermediaries. A useful ploy for the
launderer is to purchase the investment with cash, followed by early cancellation or
surrender of the policy.

In many jurisdictions, life insurance polices are viewed as another form of investment, and it
is this investment aspect that increases the vulnerabilities of the products. Because the
insurance sector within many jurisdictions tends to view itself as lower risk for money
laundering, the insurance broker may often prove to be one of the weaker links in an anti-
money laundering strategy.

General insurance policies can also be an attractive laundering technique: putting an
expensive asset on cover, paying a large premium by bank transfer, followed by early
cancellation of cover requesting the refund remittance to be made to another bank in
another country.

7/ Responsibilities of Money Wise staff
Where would you find information relating to your responsibilities so that you refer to
them as and when appropriate throughout your employment?
This manual.

Staff responsibilities to report Money Laundering suspicions internally
It is the responsibility and legal obligation of all staff that handles, or is managerially
responsible for the handling of, transactions, which may involve money laundering to raise
an internal report as soon as is reasonably practicable (where they have knowledge or
suspicion, or where there are reasonable grounds for having knowledge or suspicion, that
another person is engaged in money laundering, or that terrorist property exists) to our
Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO), John Skillman. The MLRO must consider all
reports. The reporting mechanism can be verbally, in writing or by email.

What are your personal responsibilities, obligations, legal position and role as a staff
member under Money Wise’s arrangements for the prevention of money laundering and
terrorist financing?
The legal obligation to report suspicions to the MLRO remains with the staff member to
decide for themselves whether a report should be made. The staff member must not allow
colleagues to decide for him. Where a colleague has been consulted, he himself will then
have knowledge on the basis of which he must consider whether a report to the MLRO is
necessary. In such circumstances, we should make arrangements such that the MLRO only
receives one report in respect of the same suspicion.

All suspicions reported to the MLRO will be documented and recorded electronically. The
report should include full details of the customer who is the subject of concern and as full a
statement as possible of the information, giving rise to the knowledge or suspicion. All
internal enquiries made in relation to the report should also be documented, or recorded
electronically. This information may be required to supplement the initial report or as
evidence of good practice and best endeavours if, at some future date, there is an
investigation and the suspicions are confirmed or disproved.

Once a staff member has reported a suspicion to the MLRO, he has fully satisfied his
statutory obligation.

Until the MLRO advises the staff member reporting the suspicion that no report to SOCA is
to be made, further transactions or activity in respect of that client, whether of the same
nature or different from that giving rise to the previous suspicion, should be reported to the
MLRO as they arise.

Where staff move between jobs, or change responsibilities, their training needs may change.
Ongoing training should be given at appropriate intervals to all relevant employees.

Legal obligations on staff
There are several sets of offences under POCA and the Terrorism Act which directly affect
staff – the various offences of money laundering or terrorist financing, failure to report
possible money laundering or terrorist financing, tipping off, and prejudicing an

The offences of involvement in money laundering or terrorist financing apply to all staff. The
offences have no particular application to those engaged in specific customer-related
activities – that is, they also apply to back office staff.

What is the importance of recognising and reporting knowledge or suspicion of money
laundering or terrorist financing?
To help in the fight against financial crime. In addition, the offence under POCA and the
Terrorism Act of failing to report applies to all staff, and to all MLROs. Once a report has
been made to the MLRO, it is an offence to make any further disclosure that is likely to
prejudice an investigation.

How would you become aware of changes to these legal positions?
By notification by email and amendments to this manual.

8/ Record keeping
Core obligations
We must retain:
    Copies of, or references to, the evidence they obtained of a customer’s identity, for
       five years after the end of the customer relationship
    Details of customer transactions for five years from the date of the transaction

We should retain:
    Details of actions taken in respect of internal and external suspicion reports
    Details of information considered by the MLRO in respect of an internal report
      where no external report is made

What records must be kept?
   Customer information
   Transactions
   Internal and external suspicion reports
   MLRO annual (and other) reports
   Information not acted upon
   Training and compliance monitoring
   Information about the effectiveness of training

In circumstances where a financial adviser is unable to take a record of documents used to
verify identity, (e.g. when at a customer’s home) he/she should keep a record of the type of
document, its number, date and place of issue, as proof of identity, so that, if necessary, the
document may be re-obtained from its source of issue.

Whatever the approach to training, it is vital to establish comprehensive records to monitor
who has been trained, when they received the training, the nature of the training given and
its effectiveness, e.g.
      Dates AML training was given
      Nature of the training
      Names of the staff who received training
      Results of the tests undertaken by staff, where appropriate
Compliance monitoring
      Reports by the MLRO to senior management
      Records of consideration of those reports and of any action taken as a consequence

The form in which records have to be kept
Any of:
    Original documents
    Photocopies of original documents
    On microfiche
    Scanned documents
    Computerised or electronic form

Where we are involved in mergers, take-overs or internal reorganisations we need to ensure
that records of identity verification and transactions are readily retrievable for the required
periods when rationalising computer systems and physical storage arrangements.

9/ Suspicious activities or suspicious transactions
Core obligations
We must seek consent from SOCA before proceeding with a suspicious transaction or
entering into arrangements.

Actions required, to be kept under regular review
Enquiries made in respect of disclosures must be documented.
The reasons why a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) was, or was not, submitted should be
Any communications made with or received from the authorities, including SOCA, in relation
to a SAR should be maintained on file.
In cases where advance notice of a transaction or of arrangements is given, the need for
prior consent before it is allowed to proceed should be considered.

General legal and regulatory obligations
It is a criminal offence to make funds, economic resources or, in certain circumstances,
financial services available to those persons listed as the targets of financial sanctions
legislation. There is also a requirement to report to HM Treasury both details of funds frozen
and where we have knowledge or suspicion that any of our clients or a person with whom
we have had business dealings is a listed person, a person acting on behalf of a listed person
or has committed an offence under the sanctions legislation.

What constitutes a ‘suspicious activity’ or ‘suspicious transaction’?
We are ideally placed to identify activity which is abnormal, or which does not make
economic sense, in relation to a person’s circumstances. Obtaining details on the source of a
customer’s wealth, and identifying the purpose of an activity are all part of the normal
advice process. We do not have to handle the transaction personally to have an obligation to
report it.

Staff alertness to specific situations
Staff must be able to recognise when a transaction is unusual or suspicious, or when they
should have reasonable grounds to know or suspect that money laundering or terrorist
financing is taking place.

The set of circumstances giving rise to an unusual transaction or arrangement, and which
may provide reasonable grounds for concluding that it is suspicious, will depend on the
customer and the product or service in question. Illustrations of the type of situation that
may be unusual, and which in certain circumstances might give rise to reasonable grounds
for suspicion, are:

How would you identify or recognise unusual activities or transactions that may prove to
be suspicious or gives grounds for suspicion?
Staff should also be on the lookout for transactions such as:
     Transactions which have no apparent purpose
     Transactions that make no obvious economic sense (including where a person
        makes a loss against tax)
     Transactions that involve apparently unnecessary complexity
     The use of non-resident accounts, companies or structures in circumstances where
        the customer’s needs do not appear to support such economic requirements
     Where the transaction being requested by the customer

       Where the size or pattern of transactions, is, without reasonable explanation, out of
        the ordinary range of services normally requested
       Where the transaction is inconsistent with our experience in relation to the
        particular customer
       Dealing with customers not normally expected in that part of the business
       Transfers to and from high-risk jurisdictions, without reasonable explanation, which
        are not consistent with the customer’s declared foreign business dealings or
       Where a series of transactions are structured just below a regulatory threshold
       Where a customer who has entered into a business relationship with us uses the
        relationship for a single transaction or for only a very short period of time
       Unnecessary routing of funds through third party accounts
       Unusual investment transactions without an apparently discernible profitable
       Policyholder did not pay in own name
       Early cancellation or surrender of a policy or investment
       Payment for large premiums with cash and cancelling cover shortly afterwards
       Where income cannot be verified

Also, it is often the more mundane transactions that are overlooked, e.g. a self employed
manual worker seeking to invest say £7k into their yearly maxi ISA, yet whose net profit is
only £12k or £15k.

Issues around the customer identification process that may raise concerns include such
matters as the following:
     Has the customer refused, or appeared particularly reluctant, to provide the
         information requested without reasonable explanation?
     Do you understand the legal and corporate structure of the client entity, and its
         ownership and control, and does the structure appear to make sense?
     Is the staff member aware of any inconsistencies between locations and other
         information provided?
     Is the area of residence given consistent with other profile details, such as
     Does an address appear vague or unusual – e.g., an accommodation agency, a
         professional ‘registered office’ or a trading address?
     Does it make sense for the customer to be opening the account or relationship in
         the jurisdiction that he is asking for?
     Is the information that the customer has provided consistent with the banking or
         other services or facilities that he is seeking?
     Does the supporting documentation add validity to the other information provided
         by the customer?
     Does the customer have other banking or financial relationships with us, and does
         the collected information on all these relationships appear consistent?
     Does the client want to conclude arrangements unusually urgently, against a
         promise to provide information at a later stage, which is not satisfactorily explained?
     Has the customer suggested changes to a proposed arrangement in order to avoid
         providing certain information?

How should we be aware of customers changing behaviour and practices?
Staff should also be on the lookout for such things as:
     Sudden, substantial increases in cash deposits or levels of investment, without
        adequate explanation
     Transactions made through other banks or financial firms
     Regular large, or unexplained, transfers to and from countries known for money
        laundering, terrorism, corruption or drug trafficking
     Large numbers of electronic transfers into and out of the account
     Significant/unusual/inconsistent deposits by third parties
     Reactivation of dormant account(s)

Staff should be aware of the nature of terrorism funding and terrorist activity so that they
are alert to customer transactions or activities that might be terrorist-related.

Examples of activity that might suggest to staff that there could be potential terrorist activity
     Round sum deposits, followed by like-amount wire transfers
     Frequent international ATM activity
     No known source of income
     Use of wire transfers and the internet to move funds to and from high risk countries
         and geographic locations
     Frequent address changes
     Purchases of military items or technology
     Media reports on suspected, arrested terrorists or groups

What is meant by “knowledge” and “suspicion”?
Having knowledge means actually knowing something to be true. In a criminal court, it must
be proved that the individual in fact knew that a person was engaged in money laundering.
That said, knowledge can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances; so, for example, a
failure to ask obvious questions might be relied upon by a jury to imply knowledge. The
knowledge must, however, have come to the staff member in the course of business, or as a
consequence of a disclosure. Information that comes to the staff member in other
circumstances does not come within the scope of the regulated sector obligation to make a
report. This does not preclude a report being made should staff choose to do so, or are
obligated to do so by other parts of the Terrorism Act or POCA.

Suspicion is more subjective and falls short of proof based on firm evidence. Suspicion has
been defined by the courts as being beyond mere speculation and based on some
foundation, for example:

       A degree of satisfaction and not necessarily amounting to belief but at least
        extending beyond speculation as to whether an event has occurred or not
       Although the creation of suspicion requires a lesser factual basis than the creation of
        a belief, it must nonetheless be built upon some foundation

A transaction that appears unusual is not necessarily suspicious. Even customers with a
stable and predictable transactions profile will have periodic transactions that are unusual
for them. Many customers will, for perfectly good reasons, have an erratic pattern of
transactions or account activity. So the unusual is, in the first instance, only a basis for
further enquiry, which may in turn require judgement as to whether it is suspicious. A

transaction or activity may not be suspicious at the time, but if suspicions are raised later, an
obligation to report then arises.

A member of staff, including the MLRO, who considers a transaction or activity to be
suspicious, would not necessarily be expected either to know or to establish the exact
nature of any underlying criminal offence, or that the particular funds or property were
definitely those arising from a crime or terrorist financing.

Transactions, or proposed transactions, as part of ‘419’ scams are attempted advance fee
frauds, and not money laundering; they are therefore not reportable under POCA or the
Terrorism Act, unless the fraud is successful, and we are aware of resulting criminal

What is meant by “reasonable grounds to know or suspect”?
In addition to establishing a criminal offence when suspicion or actual knowledge of money
laundering/terrorist financing is proved, POCA and the Terrorism Act introduce criminal
liability for failing to disclose information when reasonable grounds exist for knowing or
suspecting that a person is engaged in money laundering/terrorist financing. This introduces
an objective test of suspicion. The test would likely be met when there are demonstrated to
be facts or circumstances, known to the member of staff, from which a reasonable person
engaged in a business subject to the Anti Money Laundering Regulations would have
inferred knowledge, or formed the suspicion, that another person was engaged in money
laundering or terrorist financing.

To defend themselves against a charge that they failed to meet the objective test of
suspicion, staff need to be able to demonstrate that they took reasonable steps in the
particular circumstances, in the context of a risk-based approach, to know the customer and
the rationale for the transaction, activity or instruction. It is important to bear in mind that,
in practice, members of a jury may decide, with the benefit of hindsight, whether the
objective test has been met.

Depending on the circumstances, if we were served with a court order in relation to a
customer this may give rise to reasonable grounds for suspicion in relation to that customer.
In such an event, we should review the information we hold about that customer across the
company, in order to determine whether or not such grounds exist.

Money laundering requirements cover ‘any criminal conduct’ and suspicion is both personal
and subjective and falls far short of proof based on firm evidence. The courts have defined it
as ‘a degree of satisfaction not necessarily amounting to belief but at least extending beyond
speculation as to whether an event has occurred or not.’

Non-UK offences
The offence of money laundering, and the duty to report under POCA, apply in relation to
the proceeds of any criminal activity, wherever conducted (including abroad), that would
constitute an offence if it took place in the UK. This broad scope excludes offences (other
than those referred to in the paragraph below) which any of our staff members or MLRO
knows, or believes on reasonable grounds, to have been committed in a country or territory
outside the UK and not to be unlawful under the criminal law then applying in the country or
territory concerned.

Offences committed overseas which the Secretary of State has prescribed by order as
remaining within the scope of the duty to report under POCA are those which are
punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term in excess of 12 months in any part of the
United Kingdom if they occurred there, other than an offence under:

       The Gaming Act 1968
       The Lotteries and Amusements Act 1976
       ss 23 or 25 of FSMA

The duty to report under the Terrorism Act applies in relation to taking any action, or being
in possession of a thing, that is unlawful under ss 15-18 of that Act, that would have been an
offence under these sections of the Act had it occurred in the UK.

The obligation to consider reporting to SOCA applies only when the MLRO has received a
report made by someone working within the UK regulated sector, or when he himself
becomes aware of such a matter in the course of relevant business (which may come from
overseas, or from a person overseas). The MLRO is not, therefore, obliged to report
everything that comes to his attention from outside of the UK, although he would be
prudent to exercise his judgement in relation to information that comes to his attention
from non-business sources. In reaching a decision on whether to make a disclosure, the
MLRO must bear in mind the need to avoid involvement in an offence under ss327-329 of

Attempted fraud and attempted money laundering
POCA provides that a disclosure must be made where there are grounds for suspicion that a
person is engaged in money laundering. “Money laundering” is defined in POCA to include
an attempt to commit an offence under s327-329 of POCA. There is no duty under s330 to
disclose information about the person who unsuccessfully attempts to commit fraud. This is
because the attempt was to commit fraud, rather than to commit an offence under ss 327-
329 of POCA.

However, as soon as we have reasonable grounds to know or suspect that any benefit has
been acquired, whether by the fraudster himself or by any third party, so that there is
criminal property in existence, then, knowledge or suspicion of money laundering or
terrorist financing must be reported to SOCA. Who carried out the criminal conduct, and
who benefited from it, or whether the conduct occurred before or after the passing of
POCA, is immaterial to the obligation to disclose, but should be reported if known.

In circumstances where neither the identity of the fraudster, nor the location of the criminal
property, is known nor is likely to be discovered, limited useable information is available for
disclosure. An example of such circumstances would be the theft of a chequebook, debit
card, credit card, or charge card, which can lead to multiple low-value fraudulent
transactions over a short, medium, or long term. In such instances, there is no obligation to
make a report to SOCA where none of the following is known or suspected:

       The identity of the person who is engaged in money laundering
       The whereabouts of any of the laundered property
       That any of the information that is available would assist in identifying that person,
        or the whereabouts of the laundered property

Care should be taken that the requirement to obtain consent for a particular transaction
does not lead to the unnecessary freezing of a customer’s account, thus affecting other,
non-suspicious transactions.

Consent under POCA
Reporting before or reporting after the event are not equal options which we can choose
between. Where a customer instruction is received prior to a transaction or activity taking
place, or arrangements being put in place, and there are grounds for knowledge or suspicion
that the transaction, arrangements, or the funds/property involved, may relate to money
laundering, a report must be made to SOCA and consent sought to proceed with that
transaction or activity. In such circumstances, it is an offence for the MLRO to consent to a
transaction or activity going ahead within the seven working day notice period from the
working day following the date of disclosure, unless SOCA gives consent. Where urgent
consent is required, use should be made of the process referred to above (i.e. to SOCA’s

When an activity or transaction (or a related transaction) which gives rise to concern is
already within an automated clearing or settlement system, where a delay would lead to a
breach of a contractual obligation, or where it would breach market settlement or clearing
rules, the MLROmay need to let the transaction proceed and report it later. Where the
MLRO intends to make a report, but delays doing so for such reasons, POCA provides a
defence from making a report where there is a reasonable excuse for not doing so. However,
it should be noted that this defence is untested by case law, and would need to be
considered on a case-by-case basis.

When consent is needed to undertake a future transaction or activity, or to enter into an
arrangement, the disclosure should be faxed to the SOCA UKFIU Consent Desk (see SOCA
website immediately the suspicion is identified. The Consent Desk will
apply the ACPO-agreed consent criteria to each submission, carrying out the necessary
internal enquiries, and will contact the appropriate law enforcement agency, where
necessary, for a consent recommendation. Once SOCA’s decision has been reached, the
disclosing firm will be informed of the decision by telephone, and be given a consent
number, which should be recorded. A formal consent letter will follow.

In the event that SOCA does not refuse consent within seven working days following the
working day after the disclosure is made, we may process the transaction or activity, subject
to normal commercial considerations. If, however, consent is refused within that period, a
restraint order must be obtained by the authorities within a further 31 calendar days (the
moratorium period) from the day consent is refused, if they wish to prevent the transaction
going ahead after that date. In cases where consent is refused, the law enforcement agency
refusing consent should be consulted to establish what information can be provided to the

Consent from SOCA (referred to as a ‘notice’ in POCA), or the absence of a refusal of consent
within seven working days following the working day after the disclosure is made, provides
the person handling the transaction or carrying out the activity, or the MLRO, with a defence
against a possible later charge of laundering the proceeds of crime in respect of that
transaction or activity if it proceeds.

The consent provisions can only apply where there is prior notice to SOCA of the transaction
or activity; SOCA cannot provide consent after the transaction or activity has occurred. The
receipt of a SAR after the transaction or activity has taken place will be dealt with as an
ordinary standard SAR, and in the absence of any instruction to the contrary, we will be free
to operate the customer’s account under normal commercial considerations until such time
as the LEA determines otherwise through its investigation.

Where there is a need to take urgent action in respect of an account, and the seven working
day consent notice period applies, SOCA will endeavour to provide a response in the
shortest timeframe, taking into consideration the circumstances of the particular case.
Where possible, this will be sooner than the seven working day time limit. If the customer
makes strong demands for the transaction/activity to proceed, SOCA will put us in touch
with the investigating law enforcement agency for guidance, in order to prevent the
customer being alerted to the fact of suspicion and that a disclosure has been made. In
these circumstances, each case will be dealt with on its merits.

In order to provide a defence against future prosecution for failing to report, the reasons for
any conscious decision not to report should be documented, or recorded electronically. An
appropriate report should be made as soon as is practicable after the event, including full
details of the transaction, the circumstances precluding advance notice, and to where any
money or assets were transferred.

Consent under the Terrorism Act
There are no provisions under the Terrorism Act for consent to be given within a specified
period. Where we have made a report to SOCA under this Act, no related transaction or
activity is allowed to proceed, until we have been contacted by SOCA or a law enforcement

Transactions following a disclosure
We must remain vigilant for any additional transactions by, or instructions from, any
customer or account in respect of which a disclosure has been made, and should submit
further disclosures, and consent applications, to SOCA, as appropriate.

In the case of deposit-taking institutions alone, following the reporting of a suspicion, any
subsequent transactions (including ‘lifestyle’ payments) involving the customer or account
which was the subject of the original report may only proceed if it meets the ‘threshold’
requirement of £250 or less; where the proposed transaction exceeds £250, permission to
vary the ‘threshold’ payment is required from SOCA before it may proceed.

The significant practical difficulties involved in meeting the legal requirements set out in the
paragraph above are being discussed with the authorities as part of the changes proposed in
the Home Office consultation on the consent regime. Further guidance on meeting these
obligations will be provided once these discussions are satisfactorily completed. See for such further guidance.

The disclosure provisions within POCA and the Terrorism Act protect persons making SARs
from any potential breaches of confidentiality, whether imposed under contract, statute (for
example, the Data Protection Act), or common law. These provisions apply to those inside
and outside the regulated sector, and include reports that are made voluntarily, in addition
to reports made in order to fulfil reporting obligations. SOCA has established a SARs

Confidentiality Hotline (0800 2346657) to report breaches from reporters and end-users a

SOCA’s consent following a disclosure is given to the reporting institution solely in relation to
the money laundering offences. Consent provides the staff involved with a defence against a
charge of committing a money laundering offence under ss 327-329 of POCA. It is not
intended to override normal commercial judgement, and we are not committed to
continuing the relationship with the customer if such action would place the reporting
institution at commercial risk.

Whether to terminate a relationship is essentially a commercial decision, and we must be
free to make such judgements. However, in the circumstances envisaged here we should
consider liaising with the law enforcement investigating officer to consider whether it is
likely that termination would alert the customer or prejudice an investigation in any other
way. If there is continuing suspicion about the customer or the transaction or activities, and
there are funds that need to be returned to the customer at the end of the relationship, we
should ask SOCA for consent to repatriate the funds.

Where we know that the funds in an account derive from criminal activity, or that they arise
from fraudulent instructions, the account must be frozen. Where it is believed that the
account holder may be involved in the fraudulent activity that is being reported, then the
account may need to be frozen, but the need to avoid tipping off would have to be

When an enquiry is under investigation, the investigating officer may contact the MLRO to
ensure that he has all the relevant information, which supports the original disclosure. This
contact may also include seeking supplementary information or documentation from the
reporting firm and from other sources by way of a court order. The investigating officer will
therefore work closely with the MLRO who will usually receive direct feedback on the stage
reached in the investigation. There may, however, be cases when the MLRO cannot be
informed of the state of the investigation, either because of the confidential nature of the
enquiry, or because it is sub-judice.

Where we do not wish to make the payment requested by a customer, we should notify
SOCA of this fact and request them to identify any information that they are prepared to
allow the us to disclose to the court and to the customer in any proceedings brought by the
customer to enforce payment. SOCA should be reminded that:

       The court may ask him to appear before it to justify his position if he refuses to
        consent to adequate disclosure
       The refusal to allow adequate disclosure is likely to make it apparent to the
        customer that our reasons for refusing payment are due to a law enforcement

If the investigating officer is able to consent to the disclosure of adequate information to
permit us to defend ourselves against any proceedings brought by the customer, that
information may be shown to the court and to the customer without a tipping off offence
being committed. In the event that we and the investigating officer cannot reach agreement
on the information to be disclosed, an application can be made to the court for directions
and/or an interim declaration.

In any proceedings that might be brought by the customer, we may only disclose to the
court and the other side such information as has been consented to by the investigating
officer or the court.

Constructive trusts
The duty to report suspicious activity and to avoid tipping off could, in certain circumstances,
lead to a potential conflict between the reporting firm’s responsibilities under the criminal
law and its obligations under the civil law, as a constructive trustee, to a victim of a fraud or
other crimes.

Our liability as a constructive trustee under English law can arise when we either know that
the funds held by us do not belong to our customer, or is on notice that such funds may not
belong to its customer. We will then take on the obligation of a constructive trustee for the
rightful owner of the funds. If we pay the money away other than to the rightful owner, and
we are deemed to have acted dishonestly in doing so, we may be held liable for knowingly
assisting a breach of trust.

Having a suspicion that it considers necessary to report under the money laundering or
terrorist-financing legislation may, in certain circumstances, indicate that we know that the
funds do not belong to our customer, or is on notice that they may not belong to its
customer. However, such suspicion may not itself be enough to cause us to become a
constructive trustee. Case law suggests that a constructive trust will only arise when there is
some evidence that the funds belong to someone other than the customer.

If, when making a suspicious activity report, we know that the funds that are the subject of
the report do not belong to our client, or have doubts that they do, this fact, and details of
the our proposed course of action, should form part of the report that is forwarded to SOCA.

If the customer wishes subsequently to withdraw or transfer the funds, we should, in the
first instance, contact SOCA for consent. Consent from SOCA will, however, not necessarily
protect us from the risk of committing a breach of constructive trust by transferring funds. In
situations where the assistance of the court is necessary, it is open to us to apply to the
court for directions as to whether the customer’s request should be met. However, the
powers of the court are discretionary, and should only be used in cases of real need. That
said, it is unlikely that our acting upon the direction of a court would later be held to have
acted dishonestly such as to incur liability for breach of constructive trust.

Although each case must be considered on its facts, the effective use of customer
information, and the identification of appropriate underlying beneficial owners, can help us
to guard against a potential constructive trust suit arising out of fraudulent misuse or
misappropriation of funds.

It should be noted that constructive trust is not a concept recognised in Scots law.

Data Protection - Subject Access Requests, where a suspicion report has been made
Occasionally, a Subject Access Request under the Data Protection Act will include within its
scope one or more money laundering/terrorist financing reports, which have been
submitted in relation to that customer. Although it might be instinctively assumed that to
avoid tipping off there can be no question of ever including this information when
responding to the customer, an automatic assumption to that effect must not be made,
even though in practice it will only rarely be decided that it is appropriate to include it.

However, all such requests must be carefully considered on their merits in line with the
principles below.

The following guidance is drawn from guidance issued by HM Treasury in April 2002. This
guidance – The UK’s Anti-Money Laundering Legislation and the Data Protection Act 1998 –
Guidance notes for the financial sector - is available at:

On making a request in writing (a Subject Access Request) to a data controller (i.e. any
organisation that holds personal data), an individual is normally entitled to:

       Be informed whether the data controller is processing (which includes merely
        holding) his personal data; and if so
       Be given a description of that data, the purposes for which they are being processed
        and to whom they are or may be disclosed
       Have communicated to him in an intelligible form all the information that
        constitutes his personal data and any information available to the data controller as
        to the source of that data.

Section 29 of the Data Protection Act provides that personal data are exempt from
disclosure under section 7 of the Act in any case where the application of that provision
would be likely to prejudice the prevention or detection of crime or the apprehension or
prosecution of offenders.
However, even when relying on an exemption, data controllers (i.e., us) should provide as
much information as they can in response to a Subject Access Request.

Where we withhold a piece of information in reliance on the section 29 exemption, it is not
obliged to tell the individual that any information has been withheld. The information in
question can simply be omitted and no reference made to it when responding to the
individual who has made the request.

To establish whether disclosure would be likely to prejudice an investigation or a potential
investigation, we should approach SOCA for guidance; SOCA will usually discuss this with
past or present investigating agencies/officers. This may also involve cases that are closed,
but where related investigations may still be continuing.

Each Subject Access Request must be considered on its own merits in determining whether,
in a particular case, the disclosure of a suspicion report is likely to prejudice an investigation
and, consequently, constitute a tipping-off offence. In determining whether the section 29
exemption applies, it is legitimate to take account of the fact that although the disclosure
does not, in itself, provide clear evidence of criminal conduct when viewed in isolation, it
might ultimately form part of a larger jigsaw of evidence in relation to a particular crime. It is
also legitimate to take account generally of the confidential nature of suspicious activity
reports when considering whether or not the exemption under section 29 might apply.

In cases where the fact that a disclosure had been made had previously been reported in
legal proceedings, or in a previous investigation, and the full contents of such a disclosure
had been revealed, then it is less likely that the exemption under section 29 would apply.
However, caution should be exercised when considering disclosures that have been made in
legal proceedings for the purposes of the section 29 exemptions, as often the disclosure will

have been limited strictly to matters relevant to those proceedings, and other information
contained in the original report may not have been revealed.

To guard against a tipping-off offence, the MLRO should ensure that no information relating
to SARs is released to any person without the MLRO’s authorisation. Further consideration
may need to be given to suspicion reports received internally that have not been submitted
to SOCA. A record should be kept of the steps that have been taken in determining whether
disclosure of a report would involve tipping off and/or the availability of the section 29

We should bear in mind that there is a statutory deadline for responding to Subject Access
Requests of 40 days from their receipt by us. The timing of enquiries to SOCA, or any other
party, to obtain further information, or for guidance on whether disclosure would be likely
to prejudice an investigation, should be made with this deadline in mind.

10/ Ongoing monitoring
The Money laundering Form information (above) must be kept current and valid and we
need to monitor the activities of a client post sale:

The requirement to monitor customers’ activities
We must conduct ongoing monitoring of the business relationship with our clients. Ongoing
monitoring of a business relationship includes:
    Scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of the relationship
       (including, where necessary, the source of funds) to ensure that the transactions are
       consistent with our knowledge of the customer, his business and risk profile
    Ensuring that the documents, data or information held by us are kept up to date

Why is the monitoring of customer activity important?
Monitoring customer activity helps identify unusual activity. If unusual activities cannot be
rationally explained, they may involve money laundering or terrorist financing. Monitoring
customer activity and transactions that take place throughout a relationship helps us know
our customers, assists us to assess risk and provides greater assurance that we are not being
used for the purposes of financial crime.

What is monitoring?
The essentials of any system of monitoring are that:
     It flags up transactions and/or activities for further examination
     These reports are reviewed promptly by the right person(s)
     Appropriate action is taken on the findings of any further examination

Monitoring can be either:
   In real time, in that transactions and/or activities can be reviewed as they take place
       or are about to take place
   After the event, through some independent review of the transactions and/or
       activities that a customer has undertaken and in either case, unusual transactions or
       activities will be flagged for further examination

Monitoring may be by reference to specific types of transactions, to the profile of the
customer, or by comparing their activity or profile with that of a similar, peer group of
customers, or through a combination of these approaches.
We should also check on customers who have not had contact with us for some time, in
circumstances where regular contact might be expected, and with dormant accounts or
relationships, to be able to identify future reactivation and unauthorised use.
When monitoring, it is important that appropriate account be taken of the frequency,
volume and size of transactions with customers, in the context of the assessed customer and
product risk.
Monitoring is not a mechanical process and does not necessarily require sophisticated
electronic systems. The scope and complexity of the process will be influenced by our
business activities and size. The key elements of any system are having up-to-date customer
information, on the basis of which it will be possible to spot the unusual, and asking
pertinent questions to elicit the reasons for unusual transactions or activities in order to
judge whether they may represent something suspicious.

Nature of monitoring
Some financial services business typically involves transactions with customers about whom
we have a good deal of information, acquired for both business and regulatory reasons.

Other types of financial services business involve transactions with customers about whom
we may need to have only limited information. The nature of the monitoring in any given
case will depend on our business, the frequency of customer activity, and the types of
customer that are involved.

Effective monitoring is likely to be based on a considered identification of transaction
characteristics, such as the:
     Unusual nature of a transaction: e.g., abnormal size or frequency for that customer
        or peer group; the early surrender of an insurance policy
     Nature of a series of transactions: for example, a number of cash credits
     Geographic destination or origin of a payment: for example, to or from a high-risk
     Parties concerned: for example, a request to make a payment to or from a person
        on a sanctions list

Staff should be able to spot and deal specially (e.g., by referral to management) with
situations that arise that suggest a heightened money laundering risk; or they could involve
arrangements for exception reporting by reference to objective triggers (e.g., transaction
We must have in place some form of regular monitoring activity.
Higher risk accounts and customer relationships require enhanced ongoing monitoring. This
will generally mean more frequent or intensive monitoring.

Manual or automated?
A monitoring system may be manual, or may be automated to the extent that a standard
suite of exception reports is produced.

Staff alertness is important. Such factors as staff intuition, direct exposure to a customer
face-to-face or on the telephone, and the ability, through practical experience, to recognise
transactions that do not seem to make sense for that customer, cannot be automated.

In relation to our monitoring, an automated system may add value to manual systems and
controls, provided that the parameters determining the outputs of the system are
appropriate. We should understand the workings and rationale of an automated system,
and should understand the reasons for its output of alerts, as we may be asked to explain
this to the FSA.

The greater the volume of transactions, the less easy it will be for us to monitor them
without the aid of some automation. Systems available include those that many firms,
particularly those that offer credit, use to monitor fraud. Although not specifically designed
to identify money laundering or terrorist financing, the output from these anti-fraud
monitoring systems can often indicate possible money laundering or terrorist financing.

There are many automated transaction monitoring systems available on the market; they
use a variety of techniques to detect and report unusual/uncharacteristic activity. These
techniques can range from artificial intelligence to simple rules. The systems available are
not designed to detect money laundering or terrorist financing, but are able to detect and
report unusual/uncharacteristic behaviour by customers, and patterns of behaviour that are
characteristic of money laundering or terrorist financing, which after analysis may lead to
suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing. The implementation of transaction

monitoring systems is difficult due to the complexity of the underlying analytics used and
their heavy reliance on customer reference data and transaction data.

Monitoring systems, manual or automated, can vary considerably in their approach to
detecting and reporting unusual or uncharacteristic behaviour. It is important for us to ask
questions of the supplier of an automated system, and internally within the business,
whether in support of a manual or an automated system, to aid them in selecting a solution
that meets their particular business needs best. Questions that should be addressed include:
     How does the solution enable us to implement a risk-based approach to customers,
        third parties and transactions?
     How do system parameters aid the risk-based approach and consequently affect the
        quality and volume of transactions alerted?
     What are the money laundering/terrorist financing typologies that the system
        addresses, and which component of the system addresses each typology? Are the
        typologies that are included with the system complete? Are they relevant to the our
        particular line of business?
     What functionality does the system provide to implement new typologies, how
        quickly can relevant new typologies be commissioned in the system and how can
        their validity be tested prior to activation in the live system?
     What functionality exists to provide the user with the reason that a transaction is
        alerted and is there full evidential process behind the reason given?
     Does the system have robust mechanisms to learn from previous experience and
        how is the false positive rate continually monitored and reduced?

What constitutes unusual or uncharacteristic behaviour by a customer is often defined by
the system. It will be important that the system selected has an appropriate definition of
‘unusual or uncharacteristic’ and one that is in line with the nature of business conducted by

The effectiveness of a monitoring system, automated or manual, in identifying unusual
activity will depend on the quality of the parameters which determine what alerts it makes,
and the ability of staff to assess and act as appropriate on these outputs. It is important that
the balance is right in setting the level at which an alert is generated; it is not enough to fix it
so that the system generates just enough output for the existing staff complement to deal
with – but equally, the system should not generate large numbers of ‘false positives’, which
require excessive resources to investigate.

Monitoring also involves keeping information held about customers up to date, as far as
reasonably possible. Where information is held about customers, it must, as far as
reasonably possible, be kept up to date. Once the identity of a customer has been
satisfactorily verified, there is no obligation to re-verify identity (unless doubts arise as to
the veracity or adequacy of the evidence previously obtained for the purposes of customer
identification); as risk dictates, however, we must take steps to ensure that they hold
appropriate up-to-date information on our customers. A range of trigger events, such as an
existing customer applying to open a new account or establish a new relationship, might
prompt a us to seek appropriate evidence.

Although keeping customer information up-to-date is required under the Anti Money
Laundering Regulations, this is also a requirement of the Data Protection Act in respect of
personal data.

11/ Freezing funds / Persons we should not accept as customers
How can we check whether a client is ‘Financially excluded’ and what does this mean?
Financial sanctions apply to those listed at HM Treasury Financial sanctions. On 24 October
2007 responsibility for the administration of Financial Sanctions in the UK transferred from
the Bank of England to the HM Treasury Financial sanctions. Therefore, the consolidated list
of financial sanctions targets and other information on financial sanctions previously held at
Bank of England can now be found on HM Treasury Financial sanctions.

We must report to HM Treasury:
    Details of funds frozen under financial sanctions legislation
    Where we have knowledge or a suspicion that the financial sanctions measures have
      been or are being contravened
    That a customer is a listed person or a person acting on behalf of a listed person.
    We may also need to consider whether we have an obligation also to report under
      POCA or the Terrorism Act

To avoid committing a failure to report offence under financial sanctions legislation, we
must make our reports to HM Treasury. The relevant unit is:
Asset Freezing Unit
HM Treasury
1 Horse Guards Road

Reports can be submitted electronically at and the
Unit can be contacted by telephone on 020 7270 5454.

How do we comply with the legal requirement to check the sanctions list?
By the MLRO checking our clients against the sanctions list. This is covered in the Annual
Money Laundering report under ‘Lists for ‘Financial Sanctions targets’ and ‘Investment

12/ Reporting Money Laundering suspicions (MLRO)
Evaluation and determination by the MLRO
The MLRO must consider each report given by staff members and determine whether it
gives rise to knowledge or suspicion, or reasonable grounds for knowledge or suspicion. The
MLRO is permitted to have access to any information, including ‘know your customer’
information that could be relevant. The MLRO may also require further information to be
obtained, from the customer if necessary, or from an intermediary who introduced the
customer to us, to the extent that the introducer still holds the information (bearing in mind
his own record keeping requirements).

Any approach to the customer or to the intermediary should be made sensitively (probably
by someone other than the MLRO) to minimise the risk of alerting the customer or an
intermediary that a disclosure to SOCA may be being considered.

When considering an internal suspicion report, the MLRO, taking account of the risk posed
by the transaction or activity being addressed, will need to strike the appropriate balance
between the requirement to make a timely disclosure to SOCA, especially if consent is
required, and any delays that might arise in searching a number of unlinked systems and
records that might hold relevant information.

As part of the review, other known connected accounts or relationships may need to be
examined. Connectivity can arise commercially (through linked accounts, introducers, etc.),
or through individuals (third parties, controllers, signatories etc.). Given the need for timely
reporting, it may be prudent for the MLRO to consider making an initial report to SOCA prior
to completing a full review of linked or connected relationships, which may or may not
subsequently need to be reported to SOCA.

If the MLRO decides not to make a report to SOCA, the reasons for not doing so should be
clearly documented, or recorded electronically, and retained with the internal suspicion

Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)
The MLRO must make an external report, disclosing all Money Laundering suspicions, to the
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) as soon as is practicable if he considers that there is
knowledge, suspicion, or reasonable grounds for knowledge or suspicion, that another
person is engaged in money laundering, or that terrorist property exists. The MLRO must
report suspicious approaches, even if no transaction takes place.

The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) is a law enforcement agency created to reduce
the harm caused to people and communities in the UK by serious organised crime.

On Saturday 1 April 2006 SOCA took over the functions of:
    The National Crime Squad (NCS)
    The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS)
    The role of HMRC in investigating drug trafficking and related criminal finance
    Some of the functions of the UK Immigration Service (UKIS) in dealing with organised
       immigration crime

Does the MLRO understand under what grounds they should make a disclosure to SOCA?
If the MLRO determines that a report does give rise to grounds for knowledge or suspicion,
he must send a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) to SOCA.

Under POCA, the MLRO is required to make a report to SOCA as soon as is practicable if he
has grounds for suspicion that another person, whether or not a customer, is engaged in
money laundering.

Under the Terrorism Act, similar conditions apply in relation to disclosure where there are
grounds for suspicion of terrorist financing.

A Suspicious Activity Report to SOCA must include:
     Suspicion or knowledge of, or reasonable grounds for knowledge or suspicion of,
        money laundering
     Identity of the subject
     Whereabouts of the laundered property as far as is known

We should also include in each SAR as much relevant information about the customer,
transaction or activity that we have in our records. In particular, the law enforcement
agencies have indicated that details of an individual’s occupation/company’s business and
National Insurance number are valuable
in enabling them to access other relevant information about the customer. As there is no
obligation to collect this information (other than in very specific cases), we may not hold
these details for all our customers; where it has obtained this information, however, it
would be helpful to include it as part of a SAR made by us. SOCA’s website
( contains guidance on completing SARs in a way that gives most
assistance to law enforcement. In particular, SOCA has published a glossary of terms, and
find it helpful if we use these terms when completing a SAR.

The manner of reporting
SOCA prefers that SARs are submitted electronically using one of the existing electronic
submission methods:

Money Web interface
Secure extranet. See the Proceeds of Crime page at

SARs Online
SOCA’s secure web-based reporting mechanism. See



Typed, paper-based submission on a standard form
Currently a paper copy of the SOCA preferred form and guidance on completion can be
found at: and and they should be typed or word-
processed to enable them to be scanned and prevent errors. Submission should be by fax,
first class post or courier, although SOCA suggests that standard SARs should be posted and

that only paper copies of SAR consent requests should be faxed. There is no need to fax and
post the same disclosure.

In order that an informed overview of the situation may be maintained, all contact between
particular departments/branches and law enforcement agencies should be controlled
through, or reported back to a single contact point, which will typically be the MLRO. In the
alternative, it may be appropriate to route communications through an appropriate member
of staff in our legal or compliance department.

A SAR’s intelligence value is related to the quality of information it contains.

We need to have good base data from which to draw the information to be included in the
SAR; there needs to be a system to enable the relevant information to be produced in hard
copy for the law enforcement agencies, if requested under a court order.

Where to report
To avoid committing a failure to report offence, MLRO must make their disclosures to SOCA.
The national reception point for disclosure of suspicions, and for seeking consent to
continue to proceed with the transaction or activity, is the UKFIU within SOCA

The UKFIU address is:
PO Box 8000
SE11 5EN
Tel: 020 7238 8282 (office hours)

Urgent disclosures, i.e., those requiring consent, should be transmitted electronically over a
previously agreed secure link or by fax as specified on the SOCA website at

Speed of response is assisted if the appropriate consent request is clearly mentioned in the
title of any faxed report

Tipping off - Should the suspected Money Launderer be made aware that he/she is
The issues and consequences around tipping off?
It is a criminal offence for anyone, following a disclosure to the MLRO or to SOCA, to do or
say anything or to release information that might either ‘tip off’ another person that a
disclosure has been made and/ or prejudice an investigation. The suspected Money
Launderer must not be made aware that he/she is suspected.

Tipping off, and prejudicing an investigation
POCA contains two separate sections creating offences of tipping off and prejudicing an
investigation. These sections are similar and overlapping, but there are also significant
differences between them. It is important for those working in the regulated sector to be
aware of the provisions of both sections. The Terrorism Act contains similar offences.

Once an internal or external suspicion report has been made, it is a criminal offence for
anyone to release information, which is likely to prejudice an investigation. Reasonable
enquiries of a customer, conducted in a tactful manner, regarding the background to a
transaction or activity that is inconsistent with the normal pattern of activity is prudent
practice, forms an integral part of CDD measures, and should not give rise to tipping off.

Where a confiscation investigation, a civil recovery investigation or a money laundering
investigation is being, or is about to be, conducted, it is a criminal offence for anyone to
release information, which is likely to prejudice the investigation. It is also a criminal offence
to falsify, conceal, destroy or otherwise dispose of documents, which are relevant to the
investigation (or to cause or permit these offences). It is, however, a defence if the person
does not know or suspect that disclosure is likely to prejudice the investigation, or if the
disclosure is made in compliance with other provisions of POCA, or similar enactments.

The fact that a transaction is notified to SOCA before the event, and SOCA does not refuse
consent within seven working days following the day after disclosure is made, or a restraint
order is not obtained, does not alter the position so far as ‘tipping off’ is concerned.

This means that we cannot:
     At the time, tell a customer that a transaction is being delayed because a report is
       awaiting consent from SOCA;
     Later – unless law enforcement/SOCA agrees, or a court order is obtained permitting
       disclosure – tell a customer that a transaction or activity was delayed because a
       report had been made under POCA;
     Tell the customer that law enforcement is conducting an investigation

The case of Squirrell Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc (2005) EWHC 664 (Ch) confirmed
the application of these provisions. A full copy of the judgement in this case is available at The judgement in K v Natwest further confirmed the provisions. The
judgement in this case also dealt with the issue of suspicion stating that the “The existence
of suspicion is a subjective fact. There is no legal requirement that there should be
reasonable grounds for the suspicion. The relevant bank employee either suspects or he
does not. If he does suspect, he must (either himself or through the MLRO) inform the
authorities.” It was further observed that the “truth is that Parliament has struck a precise
and workable balance of conflicting interests in the 2002 Act”. The Court appears to have
approved of the 7 and 31-day scheme and said that in relation to the limited interference

with private rights that this scheme entails “many people would think that a reasonable
balance has been struck”. A full copy of the judgement is available at

If we receive a complaint in these circumstances, we may be unable to provide a satisfactory
explanation to the customer, who may then bring a complaint to the Financial Ombudsman
Service (FOS). If we receive an approach from a FOS case-handler about such a case, we
should contact a member of the FOS legal department immediately.

SOCA has confirmed that, in such cases, we may tell the FOS’ legal department about a
report to SOCA and the outcome, on the basis that the FOS will keep the information
confidential (which they must do, to avoid any ‘tipping off’). The FOS’ legal department will
then ensure that the case is handled appropriately in these difficult circumstances – liasing
as necessary with SOCA. FOS’ communications with the customer will still be in the name of
a case-handler/ombudsman, so that the customer is not alerted.

13/ Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) and the Terrorism Act
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
The law relating to money laundering is the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which received
Royal Assent on 24 July 2002, consolidates, updates and expands all earlier anti-money
laundering legislation.

The principal provisions of Part 7 of the Act are set out below: -
It is an offence for any person to acquire or possess criminal property, or to provide
assistance to any other person to launder the proceeds of any criminal conduct. Criminal
conduct includes not only serious crime but also any other offence of whatever size where
any person gains benefit.
A mandatory reporting requirement is introduced for the regulated sector in respect of
money laundering arising out of any criminal conduct regardless of the amount involved.

In addition to reporting where there is knowledge or suspicion of money laundering, the Act
introduces a requirement to report where there are reasonable grounds to suspect money
An additional offence of not reporting has been introduced for MLROs who has received an
internal report has knowledge, suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect money
laundering and does not make a report to SOCA as soon as is practicable after the internal
report was received.
Reports from the regulated financial sector must be made only to SOCA and must be made
in the form that is prescribed i.e. the SOCA disclosure form.
A time limit of 7 working days is introduced for SOCA to respond with consent or refusal
when a report has been made before a transaction has been completed. If SOCA refuses
consent within 7 days there is a 31 working day moratorium period in which law
enforcement must obtain a restraint order if they wish to prevent the transaction from going

Terrorism Act
The Terrorism Act specifically aims to make it more difficult for extremists to abuse our
country’s freedoms, in order encourage others to commit terrorist acts.

14/ Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
Who are they?
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the
development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money
laundering and terrorist financing.

What do they do?
The FATF is therefore a 'policy-making body' created in 1989 that works to generate the
necessary political will to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas. The
FATF has published 40 + 9 Recommendations in order to meet this objective.

Background to FAFT
Money laundering methods and techniques change in response to developing counter-
measures. In recent years, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has noted increasingly
sophisticated combinations of techniques, such as the increased use of legal persons to
disguise the true ownership and control of illegal proceeds, and an increased use of
professionals to provide advice and assistance in laundering criminal funds. These factors,
combined with the experience gained through the FATF's Non-Cooperative Countries and
Territories process, and a number of national and international initiatives, led the FAFT to
review and revise the Forty Recommendations into a new comprehensive framework for
combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF now calls upon all countries
to take the necessary steps to bring their national systems for combating money laundering
and terrorist financing into compliance with the new FATF Recommendations, and to
effectively implement these measures.

The review process for revising the Forty Recommendations was an extensive one, open to
FATF members, non-members, observers, financial and other affected sectors and
interested parties. This consultation process provided a wide range of input, all of which was
considered in the review process.

The revised Forty Recommendations now apply not only to money laundering but also to
terrorist financing, and when combined with the Eight Special Recommendations on
Terrorist Financing provide an enhanced, comprehensive and consistent framework of
measures for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF recognises that
countries have diverse legal and financial systems and so all cannot take identical measures
to achieve the common objective, especially over matters of detail. The Recommendations
therefore set minimum standards for action for countries to implement the detail according
to their particular circumstances and constitutional frameworks. The Recommendations
cover all the measures that national systems should have in place within their criminal
justice and regulatory systems; the preventive measures to be taken by financial institutions
and certain other businesses and professions; and international co-operation.

The original FATF Forty Recommendations were drawn up in 1990 as an initiative to combat
the misuse of financial systems by persons laundering drug money. In 1996 the
Recommendations were revised for the first time to reflect evolving money laundering
typologies. The 1996 Forty Recommendations have been endorsed by more than 130
countries and are the international anti-money laundering standard.

In October 2001 the FATF expanded its mandate to deal with the issue of the financing of
terrorism, and took the important step of creating the Eight Special Recommendations on
Terrorist Financing. These Recommendations contain a set of measures aimed at combating

the funding of terrorist acts and terrorist organisations, and are complementary to the Forty

A key element in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism is the
need for countries systems to be monitored and evaluated, with respect to these
international standards. The mutual evaluations conducted by the FAFT and FAFT-style
regional bodies, as well as the assessments conducted by the IMF and World Bank, are a
vital mechanism for ensuring that the FATF Recommendations are effectively implemented
by all countries.

Their website address is:

15/ Anti-money laundering changes in March 2006
We must be aware of these changes, which are:
    The changes to the FSA’s anti money laundering rules
    The introduction of new guidance from the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group

The changes to the FSA’s anti money laundering rules
The FSA have made improvements to their anti-money laundering (AML) requirements.

Many financial advisers may not see money laundering as a significant risk to their business,
mainly because most don’t handle client money. However, investment products are being
used for ‘layering’ – that’s when criminals create a complex web of financial transactions to
disguise the origin of the proceeds of crime. So we need to be alert to the possibility of
Money Wise being used to launder money and ensure we have systems and controls in place
to minimise this risk.

The FSA have streamlined their AML rules to make them more effective. They have replaced
the detailed AML rules with a broader requirement for us to have risk-based controls on
money laundering. The changes give us greater flexibility, enabling us to target resources to
what is most likely to help deter and detect money laundering.

New guidance on combating money laundering
The new Joint Money Laundering Steering Group Guidance complements the FSA rules.
There is specific guidance for financial advisers (summarised below).

Applying the Guidance in our procedures can show that we have made the effort to meet
the FSA requirements to have systems and controls to deal with the risk of money
laundering. The range of new options it gives us include:

       Identification of personal customers in some circumstances by using just a single
        document like a passport, rather than two as at present.

       The use of electronic ID verification methods. There are new options for customers
        who don’t have documents like passports.

       Less reliance on ID checks, and more on ‘knowing your customer’.

       Reducing unnecessary duplication of ID checks, making life easier for your
        customers. In particular, product providers are encouraged to assume that you have
        properly identified the customer, removing the need for you to pass the provider
        copies of the ID documents.

What this means for us
The challenge now facing us is to take advantage of the opportunity to make life more
difficult for the criminal while minimising inconvenience and cost to our clients and us. The
likelihood is that this won’t be too costly or difficult for us because we know our clients and
their business very well. It is unlikely that we will need expensive transaction monitoring
software, for example. More important is having up-to-date customer information, so that
we can spot anything unusual.

AML remains a high priority for the FSA and Money Wise. Effective defences against money
laundering make a real impact in the fight against crime. The FSA take any lax procedures,
and in the past they have used their enforcement powers to take action against firms with
significant failings.

16/ Sanctions and penalties
What is the potential effect on Money Wise, on staff personally and on our clients, of any
breach of the laws?

Money Wise may be at risk of prosecution if we process transactions without the consent of
SOCA where a SAR has been made.

Under POCA and the Terrorism Act, individual members of staff face criminal penalties if
     Are involved in money laundering or terrorist financing
     Do not report their knowledge or suspicion of money laundering or terrorist
       financing where there are reasonable grounds for their knowing or suspecting such

Where we fail to comply with the obligations to freeze funds, not to make funds, economic
resources and, in relation to suspected terrorists, financial services, available to listed
persons or to report knowledge or suspicion, we are open to prosecution.

Record keeping
Where the record keeping obligations under the ML Regulations are not observed, a staff
member or we are open to prosecution, including imprisonment for up to two years and/or
a fine, or regulatory censure.

Reports to SOCA
Where a person fails to comply with the obligation under POCA or the Terrorism Act to make
disclosures to a MLRO and/or SOCA as soon as practicable after the information giving rise
to the knowledge or suspicion comes to the member of staff, we or a staff member are open
to criminal prosecution or regulatory censure. The criminal sanction, under POCA or the
Terrorism Act, the offence of not reporting, carries with it a prison term of up to five years,
and/or a fine.

One of the most striking points is how easy it is to become swept up in an investigation by
simply not reporting reasonable suspicions.

The consequences of not reporting are severe via a fine or imprisonment for 5 years. Under
the various Acts staff are personally responsible, however, by understanding their
responsibilities and immediately reporting any suspicions or concerns the potential criminal
investigation need not be a worry.

17/ Appendix - Money Laundering Form

                           PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL

1. DETAILS OF INDIVIDUAL (see explanatory notes below)
name of
Current                                                         Previous address and postcode if changed in last 3
address                                                         months

Date of

I/we confirm that
a) The information in section 1 above was obtained by me/us in relation to the customer;
b) The evidence I/we have obtained to verify the identity of the customer:

[Tick only one]
Meets the standard evidence set out within the guidance for the UK
Financial Sector issued by JMLSG (written details of the standard verification evidence
taken are attached to this confirmation); or
Exceeds the standard evidence (written details of the further verification evidence taken are
attached to this confirmation)

I/we also confirm that I/we have:
c) Seen the original documents;
d) Checked that any requiring a signature were pre signed; and
e) Confirmed that any associated photograph of the applicant bore a good likeness to the
f) Included the relevant reference information or certified documentary evidence on/with this
g) Ensured that the full name of the funding account has been endorsed on the Building Society
cheque or Bankers draft where a payment is being made by non-personal cheque,
h) Confirmed that the address is current,
i) Given consideration as to whether the documents relied upon are forged.



Position in company


Full Name of Regulated Firm:                         Money Wise Independent Financial Advisers
FSA Reference Number:                                                185778

                                            Page 1 of 3

                                             Explanatory notes
1. A separate confirmation must be completed for each customer (e.g. joint holders, trustee cases and
joint life cases). Where a third party is involved, e.g. a payer of contributions who is different from the
customer, the identity of that person must also be verified, and a confirmation provided.

2. This form cannot be used to verify the identity of any customer that falls into one of the following
     Those who are exempt from verification as being an existing client of the introducing firm
          prior to the introduction of the requirement for such verification;
     Those whose identity has not been verified by virtue of the application of a permitted
          exemption under the Money Laundering Regulations; or
     Those whose identity has been verified using the source of funds as evidence.

3. This confirmation must carry an original signature, or an electronic equivalent.

I have identified and verified the client by: -
Evidence of name

                     Reference/account                                                           Certified
                     number                                                                      copy
Current signed                              Place       Date    Issuing               Date of
passport or EEA                             of birth    of      authority/country     expiry
Member state                                            birth
identity card
Resident permit                                                                       Date of
issued to EEA                                                                         expiry
nationals by
Home Office
Current UK/EEA                                                                        Date of
photo driving                                                                         issue
license (only
valid if
photograph is no
more than 10
years old from
first issue)
Current full UK                                                                       Date of
driving license                                                                       issue
(old style)

Firearms/shotgun                            Issuing authority                         Date of
certificate                                                                           issue

State pension or                            Issuing authority                         Date of
benefits                                                                              issue
Sub contractors                             Issuing authority                         Date of
certificate                                                                           issue

Inland Revenue                              Type Notice of coding / Tax               Date of
tax notification                            assessment/statement of account           issue

(One of the above required)
                                                  Page 2 of 3

Current address

                   Reference/account                                                  Certified
                   number                                                             copy
Home visit                                              Premised     Date of visit
                                                        Yes / No

Solicitor letter                                                     Date of letter
completion of
house purchase
or land
Electoral roll                                                       Date of
check                                                                check

Most recent                            Name of          Current or   Date of issue
mortgage                               lender           previous
statement                                               address?

Current Local                          Name of          Current or   Date of issue
Authority Tax                          authority        previous
Bill                                                    address?

Local Authority                        Name of          Current or   Date of issue
rent card or                           authority        previous
tenancy                                                 address?
Bank / building                        Name of          Current or   Date of issue
society / credit                       issuer           previous
union statement                                         address?

Recent utility                         Name of          Current or   Date of issue
bill (not mobile                       utility          previous
phone)                                                  address?

Current                                                 Current or   Date of issue
UK/EEA photo                                            previous
driving license                                         address?
Current full UK                                         Current or   Date of issue
driving license                                         previous
(old style)                                             address?

State pension or              Issuing                   Current or   Date of issue
benefits                      authority                 previous
book/notification                                       address?
House or motor                Name of                                Date of issue
insurance                     issuer
(One of the above required).
Listed below (if applicable):

                                            Page 3 of 3