Resolving the Nuclear Deadlock with Iran by sfx15166

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									                   Resolving the Nuclear Deadlock with Iran




                                 Jordan Tama

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

                                 July 30, 2004




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       Abstract: Since the revelation of secret Iranian nuclear facilities in August 2002,

inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have uncovered an

Iranian nuclear program that is substantially larger and more advanced than most

analysts previously believed. Inducing Iran to abandon permanently all uranium

enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities is critical and requires a multifaceted

approach, including both sticks and carrots. The United States should continue to wield

the stick of potential UN Security Council sanctions on Iran, while offering Iran

economic and security-related carrots in exchange for an Iranian agreement to end

verifiably all activities that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons. The

economic incentives should include Security Council assurances for the provision to Iran

of nuclear fuel for peaceful energy production, the unfreezing of Iranian assets in the

United States, and the easing of U.S. sanctions on Iran. The United States should also

offer to engage Iran, Israel, and other Middle East countries in serious discussions on the

formation of a process that could lead to a regional peace agreement and, ultimately, a

Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.




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       While foreign policy makers in Washington remain focused on the prospects for

stabilizing and democratizing Iraq, another critical policy challenge lies next door in Iran.

Since the revelation of secret Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak in August

2002, inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have uncovered an

Iranian nuclear program that is substantially larger and more advanced than most

intelligence analysts previously believed. Iran maintains that its program is strictly for

the peaceful production of nuclear energy, but the accumulating evidence of the scope

and nature of its program strongly suggests that the country has been pursuing the

development of a strategic nuclear weapons option.

       The United States, leading European countries, and the IAEA have generally

projected a united front in demanding that Iran allow more rigorous inspections and

terminate activities that could lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In response, in

October 2003, Iran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and suspend uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing

activities. But subsequently Tehran continued to conceal important nuclear activities,

failed to comply with key IAEA demands, and resumed the manufacture of centrifuge

components, thereby raising the possibility of a more confrontational U.S. approach to

Iran. Indeed, the United States has repeatedly threatened to press the IAEA Board of

Governors to report the issue to the UN Security Council, where sanctions on Iran could

be adopted.

       How the United States and the international community address Iran's nuclear

program will have important consequences for security in the Middle East and for the

credibility of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Following




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nonproliferation setbacks in recent years in Pakistan, India, and North Korea, a failure to

stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapons option would further weaken the regime's

credibility. Additionally, an Iranian nuclear weapons program could fuel an arms race in

the Middle East or lead to a preemptive attack by Israel or a regional war.

       Inducing Iran to abandon permanently all uranium enrichment-related and

reprocessing activities is therefore critical, but it requires a sophisticated and multifaceted

approach, including both sticks and carrots. The United States should continue to wield

the stick of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran, while offering new carrots in

exchange for Iranian agreement to end verifiably all activities that could contribute to the

development of nuclear weapons. The economic incentives should include Security

Council assurances for the provision to Iran of nuclear fuel for peaceful energy

production, the unfreezing of Iranian assets in the United States, and the lifting of some

U.S. sanctions on Iran. Since these economic incentives would probably not be adequate

to induce Iran to cooperate fully on the nuclear issue, the United States should also hold

out the prospect of a non-aggression pact between Washington and Tehran and should

offer to engage Iran, Israel, and other Middle East countries in serious discussions on the

formation of a process that could lead to a regional peace agreement, and, ultimately, a

Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While such a process would

face strong opposition in the United States and the region, and would require years of

complex negotiations to bring to fruition, U.S. support for it could provide Iran with an

added incentive to forgo a nuclear weapons program. This type of broad approach would

also open up new opportunities for mutual gain among the United States, Iran, Israel, and

other countries in the region.




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       Following a brief history of Iran's nuclear program, this paper assesses the impact

of IAEA inspections and diplomatic pressure on Iran; outlines U.S., European, and

Iranian policies on the nuclear issue; and presents a roadmap for resolving the nuclear

deadlock.

A brief history of Iran's nuclear program

       Iran's nuclear program began in 1959, when it purchased a research reactor from

the United States. Under Shah Reza Pahlavi, Iran reportedly sought to build up to 23

nuclear power reactors by the 1990s. Iran was not known to be pursuing a nuclear

weapons program under the Shah, but some intelligence reports and a recent Iranian

declaration to the IAEA have indicated that Iran conducted reprocessing-related

experiments and sought laser enrichment technology in the 1970s, which could have been

useful for the development of nuclear weapons.1

       Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, the new Islamic government apparently

stopped the country's nuclear program for several years. Many scholars believe this

suspension stemmed from a belief then held by leading Iranian clerics that nuclear

weapons contradicted Islamic principles.2 In the mid-1980s, however, the Iranian

government restarted Iran's nuclear power program and began covert procurement of

technology and materials that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. Tehran's

decision to pursue a nuclear program was motivated in part by the Iran-Iraq war of the

1980s, in which Iraq attacked Iran repeatedly with chemical weapons. Those attacks and

Iraq's pursuit of nuclear weapons led some Iranian leaders to believe that unconventional

weapons were essential to Iran's security. In 1988, Hashemi Rafsanjani, then

Commander-in-Chief of Iran's Armed Forces and later President of Iran, stated: "We




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should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical,

bacteriological, and radiological weapons."3

       As part of its nuclear program, Iran sought to complete construction of two light-

water nuclear power reactors at Bushehr that were supplied by Germany during the reign

of the Shah. In 1995, Russia signed an $800 million contract with Iran to finish

construction of one of the two reactors and to provide Iran with low-enriched uranium

fuel for it and technical training. The Bushehr reactor is unlikely to be suitable for the

production of weapon-usable material, but the United States has opposed its construction,

arguing that it could benefit an Iranian nuclear weapons program by augmenting Iran's

nuclear technology infrastructure and advancing Iran's nuclear research and development

through exchanges between Iranian and Russian nuclear scientists. Additionally, the

United States is concerned that the delivery of low-enriched uranium could serve as a

cover for the illicit transfer to Iran of other nuclear materials and technology.4 The 1000

megawatt Bushehr reactor is scheduled for completion in 2005, but Moscow has

promised Washington it will not ship fuel to Iran until Moscow and Tehran reach an

agreement regarding the return of spent fuel from the reactor to Russia.5

       While pursuing the public Bushehr project, Iran also conducted numerous covert

nuclear activities during the past two decades, according to Western intelligence

assessments, Iranian declarations to the IAEA, IAEA reports, and recent revelations

concerning proliferation from Pakistan. Beginning in the mid-1980s, Iran pursued

experimental programs in fissile material production, including both uranium enrichment

and plutonium reprocessing.6 It sought to procure equipment and designs valuable for

developing gas centrifuges from German, British, and Swiss firms, as well as from




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entities in Pakistan, using front companies to order thousands of sensitive centrifuge

components. Iran's acquisitions included drawings for the advanced Pakistani P-2

centrifuge, which has a greater enrichment capacity than the older P-1 design.7

Intelligence agencies in Europe and the United States have also spotted North Korean

scientists at Iranian nuclear facilities, suggesting Pyongyang has been sharing nuclear

expertise with Tehran.8

       With its extensive imported equipment and know-how, Iran may have secretly

achieved self-sufficiency in centrifuge manufacturing by the mid-to-late 1990s, though

some experts believe Iran was unable to master the indigenous construction of the P-2.9

Subsequently, between 1997 and 2002, Iran operated small cascades of between 10 and

20 P-1 centrifuges and achieved some success in testing centrifuges both with and

without uranium. In 2002, Tehran moved centrifuge operations to Natanz, where it built

centrifuge assembly areas and a pilot fuel-enrichment plant slated to hold 1000 P-1

centrifuges. Iran operated small cascades at the pilot plant until suspending enrichment

activity in October 2003.10 Tehran also has a production-scale fuel enrichment plant

under construction at Natanz that is scheduled to hold about 50,000 centrifuges, which

could produce enough weapon-grade uranium for 15 to 30 nuclear weapons per year

when at full capacity.11 A danger with the production plant is that it could be operated to

make low-enriched uranium fuel until Iran decided to withdraw from the NPT and

produce weapon-grade uranium, at which point, using low-enriched uranium feed, the

plant would have the potential to produce enough weapon-grade material for a single

weapon within days.12 Iran's pursuit of uranium enrichment is facilitated by the

underground presence of uranium ore at an Iranian mine near the city of Yazd.13




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       Several other sites and activities are also causes of concern about Iran's nuclear

intentions. One such site is the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran, where the IAEA has

found positive traces of both highly-enriched and low-enriched uranium. Some of the

highly-enriched uranium was found to be 36% U-235, a common standard for Russian

reactors, while other traces found at Natanz reached a purity of 90% U-235, a weapon-

grade concentration. Iran asserted that all of the highly-enriched uranium found in its

facilities resulted from contamination that occurred before imported equipment entered

the country, but it has refused to identify the country of origin of the contamination. It is

possible that the traces reveal an advanced indigenous Iranian enrichment capacity.14

       Another cause of concern is a 40-megawatt heavy-water reactor that Iran

announced it would start building at Arak this year, which would be capable of producing

weapon-grade plutonium in natural (unenriched) uranium fuel. Iran claims the reactor is

strictly for research, development, and the production of radioisotopes for medical and

industrial use, but the IAEA has reported that Iran procured some materials for the

reactor, known as hot cells, which are typically used for handling spent reactor fuel,

suggesting that Iran might intend to use the reactor for the production of plutonium.15

Furthermore, IAEA reports indicate that Iran has experimented with separating

plutonium.16 Iran has also reported to the IAEA that it has been developing a laser

enrichment program for twelve years and that it conducted laser enrichment experiments

in late 2002 and early 2003 that produced small amounts of reactor-grade enriched

uranium (3-4% U-235).17 Additionally, the IAEA reported in February 2004 that Iran

had secretly produced polonium, a radioactive isotope that can be used, in combination




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with beryllium, to produce neutrons that can trigger a powerful fission chain reaction in a

nuclear weapon.18

       While none of the revelations concerning Iran's nuclear program represents a

smoking gun that proves Iran is seeking a nuclear arsenal, the wide scope and depth of its

nuclear program strongly suggest that Iran has ambitions greater than the civilian

production of nuclear energy. Most American and European experts agree that the range

of nuclear activities pursued by Iran is not necessary or economical for the pursuit of a

civilian nuclear fuel cycle.19 Although it remains difficult to determine how far Iran's

nuclear program has advanced, Tehran might be only two or three years away from

producing enough highly-enriched uranium or plutonium for the production of nuclear

bombs.20

IAEA inspections and diplomatic pressure on Iran

        International scrutiny of Iran's nuclear program has increased markedly since the

August 2002 revelation by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a dissident group,

of the secret nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak. Subsequent IAEA inspections found

that Iran had concealed a number of nuclear activities that it was obligated to report to the

IAEA under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. For instance, the introduction of uranium

into centrifuge enrichment processes must be reported to the IAEA, according to the

Safeguards Agreement, but Tehran failed to do so. The agency sharply criticized Iran in

a June 2003 report for this and other reasons, stating: "Iran failed to meet its obligations

under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to reporting of nuclear material, the

subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the

material was stored and processed."21 The United States asserted three months later that




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Iran's nuclear activities and reporting failures justified a finding of noncompliance by

Iran with its safeguards obligations, but the IAEA Board of Governors did not conclude

that Iran had violated its Safeguards Agreement, which would require the Board to report

the issue to the UN Security Council.22

       Following increased pressure on Iran from the United States, leading European

countries, and the IAEA, Iran agreed in October 2003 to sign the Additional Protocol to

the NPT and to suspend "uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities". In

return, Britain, France, and Germany promised Iran future access to civilian nuclear

technology. In the agreement, Iran consented to comply with the Additional Protocol on

a provisional basis until its ratification by the Iranian parliament. This compliance has

allowed the IAEA to conduct more intrusive inspections on shorter notice. However,

Tehran did not agree to abandon permanently its enrichment or reprocessing efforts, and

it continued through the winter of 2003/2004 to manufacture and import centrifuge

components and to assemble and test centrifuges. While the United States and European

governments asserted that this continuing centrifuge activity violated Iran's October

agreement, Iran argued that the manufacturing of centrifuges did not constitute "uranium

enrichment-related" activity. In the face of Western pressure, though, Iran stated on

February 24, 2004 that it would "suspend the assembly and testing of centrifuges and

suspend the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components, including those related to

existing contracts."23 Still, Western governments charged that Iran did not stop all

centrifuge work after this statement. Iran seemed to acknowledge the truth of that charge

in April when an Iranian nuclear official, Mohamed Saeedi, stated that Iran had stopped

assembling centrifuges on April 9, six weeks after its February statement.24 Yet an IAEA




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report on June 1, 2004 stated that three private workshops in Iran were continuing to

build centrifuge components and that Iran was preparing to produce uranium

hexafluoride, which can be fed into centrifuges to produce enriched uranium.25 These

findings suggested that Iran was still failing to abide by its pledge to suspend all uranium

enrichment-related activity, including the manufacture of centrifuge components.

       In parallel with its agreement to sign the Additional Protocol and suspend

enrichment and reprocessing activities, in October 2003 Iran submitted to the IAEA a

detailed declaration on its nuclear program, which it said represented the "full scope of

Iranian nuclear activities" and a "complete centrifuge R&D chronology."26 This

declaration clearly indicated that Iran had engaged in numerous nuclear activities that

should have been reported to the IAEA over the years. In a November 20, 2003 report to

the Board of Governors, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei stated that "it is

clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet

its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement."27 At its November 24 meeting, the

IAEA Board of Governors condemned Iran's clandestine pursuit of nuclear activities and

stated that the Board would meet immediately to consider "all options at its disposal" if

any further serious Iranian failures came to light.

       Subsequent IAEA inspections during the winter uncovered Iran's research and

development program for the P-2, which Iran did not mention in its October declaration,

even though that declaration was supposed to be a complete accounting of its uranium

enrichment program. The IAEA's discovery of traces of highly-enriched uranium at

Natanz and the Kalaye Electric Company further increased tensions between Iran and

Western governments, which demanded that Iran explain the source of the enriched




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material. On March 13, 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors issued a new resolution,

which stated that Iran has been "actively cooperating" with the IAEA, but that its

cooperation "has fallen short of what is required". The resolution "deplored" that Iran's

October declaration omitted any reference to its P-2 program and expressed "serious

concern" that the declaration failed to mention several other nuclear activities."28 In a

statement at the March Board meeting, U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Brill asserted that Iran

is "continuing to pursue a policy of denial, deception, and delay," but the United States

refrained from urging referral to the Security Council in a compromise with European

governments, which sought to allow more time for a non-confrontational approach.29 A

State Department official indicated that the United States would continue to allow the

IAEA to take the lead on resolving concerns about Iran's nuclear program, but that the

Board of Governors should refer the issue to the Security Council "at the appropriate

time" if Iran continues to fail to comply with its obligations.30

       Three months later, on June 1, 2004, the IAEA issued a new report on Iran's

nuclear program, which described Iran's continuing efforts to produce centrifuge parts

and new evidence that Iran misled inspectors with some of its claims concerning the

origin of components it obtained for P-2 centrifuges. The report also criticized Tehran

for delaying IAEA inspections of some locations scheduled for March for a month,

preventing the agency from taking environmental samples from the sites in a timely

manner.31 Following this report, on June 18 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a

new resolution, drafted primarily by Paris, Berlin, and London, stating that the Board

"deplores" the fact that "Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it

should have been."32 The resolution also expressed "concern" that Iran had delayed




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inspections, continued to produce centrifuge equipment, and proceeded with the

generation of uranium hexafluoride. The United States wanted the Board to set a

deadline for Iran to meet the IAEA's demands, but since other leading governments

opposed setting such a deadline the resolution only "calls on Iran to take all necessary

steps on an urgent basis to help resolve all outstanding questions."33 Outstanding issues

include the source of the traces of low-enriched and highly-enriched uranium

contamination, the nature and scope of Iran's P-2 centrifuge program, and the purpose of

Iran's polonium experiments.

        Following the June resolution, Iran sent a letter to Britain, France, and Germany

on June 24 stating that it would resume assembling centrifuges and related components,

and would restart the testing of centrifuges at the pilot plant at Natanz. An Iranian

Foreign Ministry spokesperson explained to reporters that this decision was a response to

the failure of the IAEA Board to close Iran's case at its June meeting, as Iran had

requested.34 A month later, on July 27, diplomats at the IAEA confirmed that Iran had

broken IAEA seals placed on centrifuge equipment and had resumed the construction of

centrifuges. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami also announced in July that "nothing

stands in the way" of renewed centrifuge activity, though Iranian officials stated at the

same time that Iran would keep its promise not to produce weapon-grade uranium.35

        In another development of concern to the IAEA and the Western allies,

commercial satellite photos released in June 2004 indicated that Iran had demolished

buildings at a military site called Lavizan and carted away a layer of topsoil. This

activity, which followed earlier efforts by Iran to alter the interior of a building at the

Kalaye Electric Company prior to IAEA inspections there, suggested that Iran might be




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trying to conceal evidence of nuclear-related activity.36 Additionally, the United States

and IAEA officials are concerned that Iran is continuing to move forward with

construction of the Natanz production plant and the Arak heavy-water reactor.

U.S., European, and Iranian policies

       United States: The United States' approach to the Iranian nuclear issue since the

summer of 2003 has been to work with the IAEA and key European partners, especially

Britain, France, and Germany, to maintain pressure on Iran to comply with the NPT, its

Safeguards Agreement, and IAEA resolutions. President Bush set an important guideline

for U.S. policy by stating in June 2003 that the United States would "not tolerate

construction" of a nuclear weapon by Iran.37 In a March 2004 speech on Iran, Paula

DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, elaborated on

U.S. policy, stating: "Iran must finally come clean to the international community, honor

its safeguards and NPT obligations, implement the Additional Protocol, and fulfill its

suspension commitment."38 The United States also asserts that Iran must be held

accountable for violations of its nuclear obligations. John Bolton, Under Secretary of

State for Arms Control and International Security, stated in March 2004 testimony to the

House International Relations Committee: "The IAEA Board will at some point, in order

to uphold the effectiveness and credibility of the entire NPT regime, need to fulfill its

responsibility under the IAEA Statute to report the safeguards failures found in Iran to the

UN Security Council. If Iran continues its unwillingness to comply with its NPT and

IAEA obligations, the Council can then take up this issue as a threat to international

peace and security."39




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       But thus far the Bush administration has refrained from pressing the IAEA Board

to refer the issue to the Security Council, choosing instead to back continued diplomatic

efforts led by Britain, France, and Germany to achieve Iranian cooperation. An

administration official commented about America's cooperation with European

governments in March: "We are very determined... that Iran gets no perception that there

is any difference among us about the need to hold Iran's feet to the fire." The official

added that the Bush administration is comfortable with the existence of tactical

differences among the United States and European governments so long as their ultimate

objective -- the complete cessation of Iranian enrichment and reprocessing activities --

remained the same.40

       The Bush administration also asserts that given Iran's violations it should be

allowed to purchase no further enrichment or reprocessing equipment and should be

denied any other help for its nuclear program until compliance issues are resolved.41 As

part of its effort to pressure Iran to cooperate on the nuclear issue, the Bush

administration announced in April the imposition of sanctions on thirteen foreign

companies and individuals in seven countries that it claims have sold equipment or

expertise that Iran could use for a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons program. The

sanctions were imposed under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, which aims to

prevent the sale to Iran of goods or technology that Iran could use to acquire long-range

missiles or unconventional weapons.

       There are also many additional U.S. sanctions on Iran. These include U.S. laws

and executive orders that prohibit U.S. trade with and investment in Iran, and provide for

sanctions on foreign companies that invest in Iran's energy sector. Other sanctions,




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stemming from Iran's place on the U.S. government's list of state sponsors of terrorism,

ban direct U.S. financial assistance and sales of arms or dual-use items to Iran, and

require the United States to oppose multilateral lending to the country.42 For most of the

past decade, the State Department's annual report on international terrorism has labeled

Iran "the most active state sponsor of terrorism," emphasizing Iran's financial assistance

and provision of arms to groups violently opposed to peace talks between Israel and the

Palestinians, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The United

States also believes that Iran has backed major acts of international terrorism in places

other than Israel. For instance, it asserts that Iran was complicit in the 1994 bombing of a

Jewish community center in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people and in the 1996 bombing

of the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 American

airmen.43 Additionally, in July 2004 the report of the 9/11 Commission stated that Iran

had facilitated the safe passage of members of al Qaeda through Afghanistan prior to the

terrorist attacks on the United States, though the Commission did not find evidence of

direct Iranian knowledge of or involvement in the terrorist plot.44

       One of the more contentious issues within the Bush administration has been

whether to support a policy of regime change in Iran. While the United States does not

have such a policy, some hardliners within the administration have reportedly pressed for

more aggressive action to destabilize the Iranian government. President Bush has thus

far, however, gone no further toward a regime change policy than giving rhetorical

support to Iranian reformers and anti-government activists, and he has taken a few steps

in the direction of limited engagement with the Iranian government. With some shared

interests in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States and Iran have cooperated informally




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and have even held direct talks on issues ranging from the overthrow of the Taliban and

the formation of a new Afghan government to the need to quell violence and instability in

Iraq.45 In May 2003, Washington and Tehran acknowledged for the first time that they

were holding direct talks, and in April 2004 the United States requested Iranian mediation

to help resolve the standoff with Shi'ite cleric Moktada al-Sadr in Najaf.46 But the Bush

administration has not offered a clear response to an Iranian offer in May 2003 to open up

a broader dialogue on issues including nuclear weapons, terrorism, and Israel. While

some administration officials, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell, reportedly favor

deeper engagement with Iran, key conservatives, such as Vice President Dick Cheney and

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, argue that developing a closer relationship with

Iran would give its regime greater legitimacy and undermine anti-government activists.47

Given the deep difficulties confronting the United States in Iraq, it is highly unlikely that

the United States will pursue a policy of regime change in Iran anytime soon, and it is

more likely that the United States will need Iran's help in the region.

       European countries: Key European governments share the U.S. goal of ensuring

that Iran does not pursue a nuclear weapons program, but they emphasize that diplomatic

and economic incentives should be employed to induce Iran to comply with its NPT

obligations and IAEA resolutions. Britain, France, and Germany have taken the lead on

behalf of Europe and have presented unified public positions on Iran. They have backed

IAEA resolutions critical of Iran for its reporting failures, but they have opposed

threatening Iran with Security Council sanctions, arguing that such a threat would

strengthen hardliners in Iran and make it more difficult to achieve Iranian cooperation.




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       The motivations for the extensive European involvement in the issue include a

desire to demonstrate that Europe can manage difficult international security issues and

that nonproliferation challenges can be addressed diplomatically, without resorting to

force.48 A British diplomat described this approach as "Talk softly, and carry a big

carrot."49 European governments also hope to resolve the nuclear issue with Iran as part

of their effort to achieve a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran, which they have

conditioned on Iranian cooperation on the nuclear issue, as well as on improved Iranian

policies on human rights, terrorism, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.50

       There are signs, however, that European tolerance of Iran's nuclear policy is

wearing thin. In March 2004 the Iranian government announced that it had begun

operating a facility at Isfahan that is capable of converting uranium yellow cake into

uranium compounds, including uranium hexafluoride, which could be used as nuclear

fuel. In response to this announcement, the foreign ministries of Germany, France, and

Britain issued identical statements asserting that the Iranian announcement "sends the

wrong signal regarding Iran's readiness to implement a suspension of its activities related

to uranium enrichment," and "will make it more difficult for Iran to restore international

confidence in its activities." A month later, in April 2004, French President Jacques

Chirac criticized Iran publicly for violating the spirit of its October agreement with the

European countries and asserted that unless Iran met the IAEA's demands before the June

meeting of its Board of Governors, it ran the risk of eroding international goodwill

toward it.51 These statements reflected growing European frustration with Iran's failure

to stop its enrichment program definitively, which contributed to the European support

for the June IAEA resolution condemning Iran's incomplete cooperation.52 One




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nonproliferation expert who has discussed the issue with French officials even

commented that the French government is "genuinely outraged" and "embarrassed" about

Iran's continuing deception and intransigence.53 Indeed, a senior French official stated in

April, "We are seeing a pattern of Iran making promises and then trying to find ways

around them. The Iranians are fighting us trench by trench. They are very clever

cheaters."54 France's frustration with Iran has led it to become more inclined to support a

tougher approach toward the country, but France also wants the United States to adopt a

more conciliatory stance toward Iran than it has thus far adopted.55 Additionally, there

are signs that Russia and China, which have frequently backed Iran on nuclear-related

disputes with the IAEA, are now distancing themselves from Iran. At the June 2004

Board of Governors meeting, Moscow and Beijing generally supported the approach of

the Western allies.56

       Iran: The Iranian government insists that its nuclear program is strictly for power

generation, claiming that it wants to produce nuclear power for domestic consumption so

that it will have more oil and gas available for export. Iranian President Mohammad

Khatami, a highly respected cleric, has provided theological backing for this claim,

asserting that nuclear weapons are contrary to Islamic precepts. He stated in August

2003 that Iran "cannot use [nuclear] weapons" because of its "Islamic and moral

teachings".57

       Yet, as noted above, former Iranian President Rafsanjani asserted in 1988 that

Iran should develop "radiological" as well as other unconventional weapons, and on other

occasions Iranian officials have asserted that Iran reserves the right to possess nuclear

weapons to counter Israel's nuclear arsenal.58 In a Friday prayer sermon in December




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2001, Rafsanjani, then Expediency Council Chairman, stated: "If one day, the Islamic

world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the

imperialists' strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb

inside Israel will destroy everything."59

       Iranian officials have also defiantly asserted that Iran is not obligated to reveal all

of its nuclear activities to the IAEA. In February 2004, Hassan Rowhani, the head of

Iran's Supreme Nuclear Security Council, stated after the IAEA's discovery of previously

undisclosed nuclear activities: "We have other research projects which we have not

announced to the agency and do not think it is necessary to announce them to the

agency."60 On March 7, Rowhani further asserted that "the international community has

to accept Iran in the world nuclear club."61 While this comment could be interpreted as

suggesting only a desire to produce nuclear energy, it and other statements fuel

speculation that Iran is pursuing a weapons program.

       Iran's motivation for pursuing a nuclear weapons option would include the desire

to enhance Iran's national prestige, counter Israel's suspected arsenal of 100-200 nuclear

weapons, and balance U.S. conventional forces deployed in the region.62 For these

reasons, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has asserted that Iranian interest in a

nuclear capability is broadly shared among reformers and hardliners in the Iranian

government.63 But independent experts assert that the Iranian government is divided on

the question of cooperation with the IAEA between the Foreign Ministry, which

advocates greater openness and transparency, and the Atomic Energy Organization and

the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which favor snubbing the IAEA and

continuing with covert nuclear development.64 Iranian politicians, academics, and




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newspapers have engaged in a vigorous debate since the summer of 2003 regarding the

wisdom of complying with the IAEA's demands, demonstrating a range of opinion within

the country on this issue.65

       Similarly to the Bush administration, the Iranian government also appears split on

the issue of U.S.-Iranian relations between conservatives that wish to maintain a

confrontational policy and moderates that would like to see deeper engagement between

the two countries. While Iran has demonstrated both defiance and some cooperation on

the nuclear issue, it has sought to reach out to the United States with a bold diplomatic

initiative. In May 2003, shortly after the U.S.-led overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iran

presented the United States with a multifaceted offer -- which was unpublicized at the

time -- for the normalization of relations. Under the proposal, Iran said it would address

U.S. concerns on nuclear weapons and terrorism, coordinate policy with the United States

on Iraq, and consider a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in return for

the lifting of sanctions by the United States, American recognition of Iran's security

interests, and the eventual reestablishment of diplomatic relations. The offer reportedly

included the possibility of Iran cutting off support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad and

converting Hezbollah into a purely social and political organization, but did not clarify

whether Iran was prepared to abandon its development of the nuclear fuel cycle. The

Bush administration has given no formal response to the offer.66

       Given Iran's history of hostile rhetoric and confrontational policies toward the

United States, this offer might represent a dramatic shift in Iran's foreign policy. Some

experts on Iran assert that Iran only makes important foreign policy decisions after its

government has reached a broad internal consensus among all major political factions.67




                                                                                            21
If that is the case, the proposal might indicate a significant movement toward a greater

Iranian interest in improving relations with the United States. Iran's motivation for such a

shift could include a wish to strengthen its sense of regional security at a time when the

United States has great military and political influence in two neighboring countries, Iraq

and Afghanistan. Additionally, the Iranian government may be increasingly interested in

ending its economic isolation because of a growing sense that foreign investment is

necessary to revitalize its stagnant economy. The fact that a majority of the government

officials and scientists that have responsibility for Iran's nuclear program are Western-

educated and seek closer ties with the United States further strengthens the prospects for

U.S.-Iranian cooperation.68 Yet Iranian hardliners continue to launch vitriolic attacks on

the United States, complicating any potential rapprochement between the countries. For

instance, on May 3, 2004, in the wake of revelations of U.S. abuse of Iraqi prisoners at

Abu Ghraib, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi speculated that the United States

has a "systematic plan to torture Iraqis, to kill them, to rape them."69

A roadmap for resolving the nuclear deadlock

       Preventing Iran from developing a nuclear arsenal is critical to the preservation of

the current nonproliferation regime and to Middle East and international security. After

the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 and North Korea's withdrawal from the

NPT in 2003, a failure to enforce the NPT and IAEA resolutions with respect to Iran

would further erode the credibility of nonproliferation norms. Moreover, a nuclear-

armed Iran could lead to a regional arms race in the Middle East and to violent

confrontation among Iran, Arab countries, and Israel. Iranian possession of nuclear

weapons is particularly alarming because Iran's military and intelligence services are




                                                                                             22
dominated by hardliners who profess a desire to eliminate the state of Israel.70 Israel

would view even the smallest Iranian nuclear arsenal as a great threat and might employ

military force in an effort to preempt it, possibly leading to a regional conflict. Indeed,

the Israeli government is on record stating that it will not allow Iran to become a nuclear-

weapon state.71 Iranian possession of nuclear weapons would also present the frightening

possibility that a terrorist group such as al Qaeda or Hezbollah could obtain a nuclear

bomb from Tehran.

       The goal of U.S. policy in Iran should therefore be to ensure that Iran does not

engage in any activities that could contribute to the development or acquisition of nuclear

weapons. More specifically, the United States should seek the verifiable termination of

all Iranian nuclear programs and activities other than the construction and use of light-

water nuclear reactors. This would mean Iran must terminate all aspects of its uranium

enrichment and plutonium reprocessing programs and must allow all fissile materials,

centrifuges, facilities, and other equipment associated with those programs to be removed

or destroyed. The United States should be willing to allow Iran to employ light-water

reactors to produce nuclear energy, so long as the nuclear fuel is provided by an outside

source and the spent fuel is taken out of the country.

       To achieve this goal of ensuring that Iran does not pursue a nuclear weapons

option, the United States must develop a more multifaceted approach that includes both

carrots and sticks. Thus far, the United States has generally played "bad cop" to Europe's

"good cop," threatening to move the issue to the Security Council if Iran does not comply

with IAEA demands. While the threat of Security Council action against Iran is an

important tool of pressure against Iran, by itself it is inadequate to obtain Iranian




                                                                                              23
cooperation. Additionally, preventive military action against Iran's nuclear facilities

would be unlikely to succeed in ending Iran's nuclear program because of the extent to

which its facilities and nuclear materials are dispersed in different locations throughout

the country.72 Moreover, a preventive strike by the United States would probably

provoke international condemnation and strengthen hardliners within Iran who would

seek to retaliate against Israel and the United States either through a direct attack on

Israel or through increased support for terrorist groups.

       To encourage greater Iranian cooperation, the United States should offer Iran a

package of incentives in exchange for its termination of activities that could contribute to

the development of nuclear weapons. These incentives should include direct economic

benefits, such as support for the provision of nuclear fuel for peaceful energy production,

the unfreezing of Iranian assets in the United States, and the easing of U.S. sanctions on

Iran, as well as proposals designed to address the security concerns that motivate Iran's

interest in a nuclear weapons option. The latter proposals should include a far-reaching

diplomatic initiative designed to lead to mutual security guarantees between Washington

and Tehran and the establishment of a peaceful Middle East that is free of weapons of

mass destruction. Offered as a package, these proposals could allow for the signing of a

new agreement by the United States, Iran, the IAEA, and other interested parties that

would permanently close down all aspects of Iran's nuclear program other than energy

production by light-water reactors.

       1) Providing nuclear fuel for civilian energy production: First, the United States

should offer to support a Security Council resolution that would guarantee the provision

to Iran at reasonable cost of nuclear fuel for civilian energy production as long as Iran




                                                                                             24
terminated and refrained from all nuclear activities unnecessary for light-water reactor

energy production. This assistance would conform to President Bush's proposal in a

February 11 speech on nonproliferation that the world's leading nuclear exporters should

ensure that states that renounce enrichment and reprocessing have reliable access at

reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors.73 In the case of Iran, the United States should

make clear that if Iran fully abandons all enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities,

including the construction of enrichment plants and heavy-water reactors, the United

States would support an agreement whereby Russia would provide low-enriched uranium

for the Bushehr light-water reactor and take back the spent fuel generated by the reactor.

       Iran might be concerned under this proposal that its fuel supply could be cut off

by Russia at a later date, leaving it without the capacity to produce nuclear energy. The

United States should address this concern by supporting a UN Security Council

resolution that would guarantee the supply of fuel so long as Iran complied with its

commitments under the new nuclear agreement reached between the United States and

Iran.74 The Security Council would then have to pass an additional resolution stating that

Iran was not complying with its obligations under the agreement in order for the fuel

supply to be cut off.

       2) Unfreezing assets and lifting sanctions: Second, the United States should offer

to unfreeze some of Iran's assets and to ease some of the unilateral sanctions it has placed

on Iran. These incentives would appeal to Iran's interest in attracting foreign investment,

developing its economy, and ending its international isolation. While sanctions mandated

by Iran's place on the U.S. government's list of state sponsors of terrorism could only be

removed once Iran was taken off of that list, sanctions tied to U.S. nonproliferation




                                                                                           25
objectives as well as other unilateral U.S. trade and investment restrictions could be lifted

upon Iranian cooperation on the nuclear issue. To maximize the leverage gained from

these incentives, the United States should condition them on Iran's compliance with the

new nuclear agreement, phasing in the unfreezing of assets and the easing of sanctions

over time as Iran meets certain benchmarks concerning the termination of various aspects

of its nuclear program. For instance, Iranian assets could be released once Iran stopped

all work at the Natanz enrichment plants and the Arak heavy-water facilities, while some

sanctions on trade and investment could be lifted once Iran tore down the Natanz and

Arak facilities and turned over all centrifuges and centrifuge parts to the IAEA. The

United States could reward other constructive Iranian actions by supporting Iranian

applications for loans from international development banks and financial institutions.

       3) Moving toward a "grand bargain": Third, the United States should offer to

begin a diplomatic process designed to address some of the security concerns that

influence Iran's interest in a nuclear weapons option. This process would aim to achieve

an agreement by the United States and Iran not to attack each other, a regional peace

agreement among all countries of the Middle East, and, ultimately, a Middle East free of

weapons of mass destruction. Such agreements, which could be considered a "grand

bargain," would be extremely controversial in the United States as well as Iran, and could

only be reached after years of difficult multilateral negotiations. Achieving these

agreements should therefore not be a precondition for shutting down various aspects of

Iran's nuclear program. But Iran's offer of a proposal along similar lines in May 2003

suggests that it is feasible that Iran and the United States could reach agreement at least

on the initiation of a process that could lead to a grand bargain.




                                                                                              26
       This strategic approach is necessary because economic incentives alone -- even

substantial ones -- are unlikely to be sufficient to induce full Iranian cooperation with

U.S. nonproliferation goals. Iran's nuclear program is driven in large part by strategic

concerns and ambitions that the United States must take into consideration -- namely, the

complex regional security environment in the Middle East, Iran's sense of being

threatened by the United States and Israel, and Iran's fierce opposition to Israel's own

nuclear arsenal. Since 9/11, Iran's sense of being threatened by the United States has

been exacerbated by the large U.S. military presence in Iran's neighbors, Afghanistan and

Iraq. Experts on Iranian politics emphasize that Iran's history of being surrounded by

hostile governments, from Israel and Saddam Hussein to the Taliban and now the United

States, makes it particularly protective of its sovereignty and unwilling to compromise on

issues of national security.75 Furthermore, the U.S. record of meddling in Iranian politics

-- in 1953 the CIA sponsored a coup overthrowing Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed

Mossadegh and replacing him with the pro-Western Shah Reza Pahlavi -- makes Iran

especially suspicious of U.S. intentions.

       Negotiations toward mutual security guarantees, a regional peace agreement, and

a WMD-free Middle East would require both bilateral discussions between Iran and the

United States and multilateral negotiations among countries of the region. The United

States could begin by offering Iran a security guarantee that it will not attack Iran if

Tehran complies with all of its nuclear commitments under a new agreement and refrains

from supporting acts of terrorism outside of Iran, including by assisting al Qaeda in any

way or supplying arms to Palestinian resistance groups that engage in attacks on Israeli

civilians. The UN Security Council could be made the arbiter of disagreements about




                                                                                            27
whether Iran is living up to these commitments, with the power to verify whether Iran is

fulfilling its nuclear obligations and to assess any U.S. claims that Iran is continuing to

back acts of terrorism.

        Expanding the issues on the table to include terrorism as well as Iran's nuclear

program would greatly complicate negotiations over a security guarantee. Given these

complications, some analysts argue for keeping negotiations with Iran limited to the

nuclear issue.76 But the United States will be unwilling to provide Iran with any type of

security guarantee unless Iran ceases acting as the world's leading state sponsor of

terrorism, and, specifically, stops funding Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic

Jihad.77 Iran seemed to acknowledge this fact, moreover, in its May 2003 offer to address

U.S. concerns on both its nuclear program and terrorism, including its support for militant

Palestinian groups, in exchange for substantial concessions from the United States.

        Iran, for its part, will not agree to stop supporting groups, such as Hamas and

Hezbollah, which it views as legitimate anti-Israel resistance movements, unless it sees

what it considers to be major progress in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Discussions of

the bilateral security guarantee will therefore need to be connected with efforts to resolve

the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Those efforts, in turn, could be linked to the goals of

achieving a regional peace agreement and establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle

East, which could include all 22 members of the Arab League as well as Israel and Iran.78

These last two issues must be linked to each other because Israel will only consider

giving up its nuclear arsenal if it feels secure and is at peace with all countries in the

region. While it might seem far-fetched to think that Israel would consider eliminating

its nuclear arsenal, in fact Israel has long supported the idea of a Middle East free of




                                                                                              28
WMD, but has always predicated that support on the establishment of a regional peace

agreement.79 Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon reiterated that Israeli position as

recently as July 8, 2004, in a meeting with IAEA Director-General ElBaradei, who has

recently been promoting the idea of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East.80

        Two incentives that could be used to make Israel more willing to eventually give

up its nuclear weapons would be for the United States to offer it a bilateral security

guarantee -- pledging to protect Israel in case of any attack on it -- or for it to be invited

to join NATO.81 Establishment of the WMD-free zone would also require Syria to give

up its suspected biological and chemical weapons programs, which should be possible if

Syria's cold war with Israel finally came to an end. To build adequate confidence among

the members of the zone that countries were not continuing to possess or develop nuclear

weapons in secret, very stringent verification mechanisms would need to be established

to ensure compliance. One such mechanism could be the establishment of a new sub-

agency of the IAEA with the power to oversee the dismantlement of all nuclear programs

unnecessary for the civilian production of energy and to engage in intrusive and

unannounced inspections in any country belonging to the WMD-free zone.82

        While the political obstacles to achieving a Middle East free of WMD would be

great, there are some encouraging signs in the region of the beginning of a trend of

moving away from unconventional weapons. Two of the major, long-standing states of

concern -- Iraq and Libya -- no longer possess or are dismantling their WMD arsenals.83

It may therefore now be easier for the United States and its European and Arab partners

to press Iran to abandon its apparent pursuit of its own nuclear weapons option.




                                                                                             29
       By offering this multifaceted proposal to Iran -- featuring significant economic

incentives and the beginning of a diplomatic process to address Iran's security concerns --

the United States could test Iran's willingness to take the steps necessary to improve its

relations with the United States and end its international isolation. The proposal would

also test whether Iran is really only seeking a civilian nuclear energy program, as it

claims. If the proposal was made in good faith and rejected by Tehran, it would be clear

to most observers that Iran's real goal is to develop nuclear weapons. The United States

could then gain greater international backing for a tougher approach to Iran, including the

reporting of the nuclear issue to the Security Council, where sanctions could be imposed

on Iran. In order to make the threat of sanctions credible, the United States should

engage in extensive consultations with its European allies and all members of the

Security Council to ensure their support for sanctions should Iran reject the new U.S.

offer and fail to adhere to its NPT obligations and IAEA resolutions. The proposed

sanctions should be focused on areas that would do substantial harm to Iran's economy,

while being acceptable to members of the Security Council. Such sanctions could

include restrictions on foreign investment targeted to the development of Iran's energy

industry and on Iran's receipt of assistance from international financial institutions.

Cutting off all foreign investment would be particularly worrisome to the Iranian

government because it is counting on approximately $5 billion per year in foreign

investment, primarily from European countries and Japan, to modernize existing oilfields

and develop new ones, and it is also seeking major investment to develop its extensive

gas reserves.84 With a credible threat of damaging and isolating sanctions in hand, the




                                                                                             30
United States would have greater leverage to induce Iran to accept its offer of a grand

bargain that could resolve the nuclear deadlock.



1
  Sharon Squassoni, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, CRS Report for Congress,
Congressional Research Service, March 4, 2004, p. 1.
2
  Nasser Hadian, "Iran's Nuclear Program: Contexts and Debates," in Iran's Bomb: American and Iranian
Perspectives, The Nixon Center, March 2004, p. 56.
3
  Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002, p. 256.
4
  Cirincione with Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, pp. 258-9.
5
  Marshall Breit, Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium, Carnegie Endowment
Fact Sheet, April 1, 2004.
6
  Cirincione with Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, pp. 258-9.
7
  David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "The Centrifuge Connection," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
March/April 2004; Breit, Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium.
8
  David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Evidence Is Cited Linking Koreans to Libya Uranium," New
York Times, May 23, 2004.
9
  Albright and Hinderstein, "The Centrifuge Connection."
10
   Ibid.
11
   Breit, Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium.
12
   Albright and Hinderstein, "The Centrifuge Connection."
13
   Geoffrey Kemp, "Iran's Bomb and What to Do about It," in Iran's Bomb: American and Iranian
Perspectives, The Nixon Center, March 2004, p. 4.
14
   Craig S. Smith, "Alarm Raised over Quality of Uranium Found in Iran," New York Times, March 11,
2004.
15
   Associated Press, "Iran to Build Reactor That Can Produce Plutonium," April 8, 2004; Breit, Iran's
Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium; Paul Kerr, "IAEA Report Questions Iran's
Nuclear Programs," Arms Control Today, July/August 2004.
16
   Squassoni, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, p. 6.
17
   Breit, Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium.
18
   Roula Khalaf and Stephen Fidler, "US Seeking Common Stance toward Iran," Financial Times, March 3,
2004.
19
   The Economist, "A World Wide Web of Nuclear Danger," February 28, 2004; Squassoni, Iran's Nuclear
Program: Recent Developments, p. 2.
20
   Carol Giacomo, "Fear of Nuclear Iran Could Influence U.S. Diplomacy," Reuters, July 21, 2004.
21
   Squassoni, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, p 5.
22
   Ibid., p. 6.
23
   Ibid., p. 5.
24
   Ali Akbar Dareini, "UN Nuclear Inspectors Arrive in Iran," Associated Press, April 12, 2004.
25
   Kerr, "IAEA Report Questions Iran's Nuclear Programs;" William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "Iran
Still Making Nuclear Materials, U.N. Agency Says," New York Times, June 2, 2004.
26
   Mohamed ElBaradei, Introductory Statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, March 8, 2004.
27
   Cited in John Bolton, The Bush Administration's Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future
Challenges, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, March 30, 2004.
28
   IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran: Resolution Adopted by the Board on 13 March 2004.
29
   Kenneth Brill, Statement by the United States of America, IAEA Board of Governors meeting, March 13,
2004; Craig S. Smith, "U.S. Softens Its Rebuke on Iran's Nuclear Issue, Appeasing Allies," New York
Times, March 10, 2004.
30
   Paul Kerr, "IAEA Condemns Iran—Again," Arms Control Today, April 2004.
31
   Paul Kerr, "Global Nuclear Agency Rebukes Iran," Arms Control Today, July/August 2004; Broad and
Sanger, "Iran Still Making Nuclear Materials, U.N. Agency Says."


                                                                                                    31
32
   IAEA Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran: Resolution adopted by the Board on 18 June 2004.
33
   Ibid.; The Economist, "Iran and Its Nuclear Ambition: Still at It," June 19, 2004.
34
   The Economist, "Europe and Iran: A Common Flop," July 3, 2004; Kerr, "Global Nuclear Agency
Rebukes Iran".
35
   David R. Sands, "Tehran Breaks U.N. Seals on Nukes," Washington Times, July 28, 2004.
36
   The Economist, "Europe and Iran: A Common Flop;" Kerr, "IAEA Report Questions Iran's Nuclear
Programs."
37
   Kenneth Katzman, Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service Issue
Brief, July 25, 2003, p. 3.
38
   Statement by Paula A. DeSutter, Contending with a Nuclear-Ready Iran, March 7, 2004.
39
   Bolton, The Bush Administration's Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future Challenges.
40
   Khalaf and Fidler, "US Seeking Common Stance toward Iran."
41
   DeSutter, Contending with a Nuclear-Ready Iran.
42
   George Perkovich and Silvia Manzanero, "Plan B: Using Sanctions to End Iran's Nuclear Program,"
Arms Control Today, May 2004; Katzman, Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy, pp. 10-12.
43
   Katzman, Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy, pp. 4-6.
44
   National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), pp. 240-1.
45
   James Dobbins, "Time to Deal with Iran," Washington Post, May 6, 2004.
46
   Katzman, Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy, pp. 9-10; Guy Dinmore, "Washington Hardliners
Wary of Engaging with Iran," Financial Times, March 17, 2004.
47
   Dinmore, "Washington Hardliners Wary of Engaging with Iran."
48
   The Economist, "The Divine Right to a Bomb," February 28, 2004; Gareth Harding, "Analysis: The EU's
Iranian Quandary," United Press International, March 23, 2004.
49
   Alan Cowell, "Europe Is Back Playing Its Flute to America's Trumpet," New York Times, February 22,
2004.
50
   Stephen Castle, "Closer Ties Depend on Nuclear Issue, EU Tells Iran," The Independent, May 4, 2004.
51
   Elaine Sciolino, "Speaking for Europe, Chirac Warns Iran on Inspections," New York Times, April 22,
2004.
52
   Richard Bernstein, "Europeans Criticize Iran's Plan to Start up Enrichment Plant," New York Times, April
1, 2004; Dafna Linzer, "Effort to Curb Iran's Nuclear Ambitions on Allies' Agenda," Washington Post, July
28, 2004.
53
   Comments by George Perkovich at Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, April 13, 2004.
54
   Sciolino, "Speaking for Europe, Chirac Warns Iran on Inspections."
55
   Comments by George Perkovich, April 13, 2004
56
   Mark Landler, "U.N. Agency to Rebuke Iran for Obstructing Inspections," New York Times, June 18,
2004.
57
   Squassoni, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, p. 2.
58
   Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Overview: Iran Profile, September 2003.
59
   Michael Eisenstadt, "Delay, Deter and Contain, Roll-Back: Toward a Strategy for Dealing with Iran's
Nuclear Ambitions," in Iran's Bomb: American and Iranian Perspectives, The Nixon Center, March 2004,
p. 25.
60
   Nazila Fathi, "Iran Defends Decision Not to Disclose All Nuclear Information," New York Times,
February 25, 2004.
61
   Cited in Bolton, The Bush Administration's Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future Challenges.
62
   Daryl G. Kimball, "Turning Iran Away from Nuclear Weapons," Arms Control Today, July/August 2003.
63
   Perkovich and Manzanero, "Plan B: Using Sanctions to End Iran's Nuclear Program."
64
   James Traub, "The Netherworld of Nonproliferation," New York Times Magazine, June 13, 2004.
65
   Farideh Farhi, "To Sign or Not to Sign? Iran's Evolving Debate on Nuclear Options," in Iran's Bomb:
American and Iranian Perspectives, The Nixon Center, March 2004, pp. 32-50.
66
   Guy Dinmore, "U.S. Split over Iranian Bid to Renew Relations," Financial Times, March 17, 2004;
Dinmore, "Washington Hardliners Wary of Engaging with Iran."
67
   Interview with William Miller, March 1, 2004; Hadian, "Iran's Nuclear Program: Contexts and Debates,"
p. 53.


                                                                                                        32
68
   Interview with William Miller.
69
   Castle, "Closer Ties Depend on Nuclear Issue, EU Tells Iran."
70
   For instance, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei stated in December 2000 that "the cancerous tumor
called Israel must be uprooted from the region," and in January 2001 that "the perpetual aim of Iran is the
obliteration of Israel." Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani, Expediency Council Chairman Hashemi
Rafsanjani, and other high-ranking Iranian officials have also called for Israel's destruction. See Michael
Rubin, "No Change: Iran Remains Committed to Israel's Destruction," National Review Online, July 1,
2002.
71
   Bennett Ramberg, "Defusing the Nuclear Middle East," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2004.
72
   David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Iran, Player or Rogue?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
September/October 2003.
73
   Remarks by President George W. Bush, National Defense University, February 11, 2004.
74
   This idea was suggested to me by Frank von Hippel, February 27, 2004.
75
   Hadian, "Iran's Nuclear Program: Contexts and Debates," p. 55.
76
   Comments by George Perkovich, April 13, 2004.
77
   Kemp, "Iran's Bomb and What to Do about It," p. 12.
78
   Ramberg, "Defusing the Nuclear Middle East."
79
   Avner Cohen and Thomas Graham Jr., "WMD in the Middle East: A Diminishing Currency,"
Disarmament Diplomacy, March/April 2004.
80
   Herb Keinon, "Sharon: Nuke-Free Zone after Peace," Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2004; Greg Myre, "Nuclear
Talks End in Israel; Cordial Tone Is Reported," New York Times, July 9, 2004.
81
   Ramberg, "Defusing the Nuclear Middle East."
82
   Ibid.
83
   Cohen and Graham Jr., "WMD in the Middle East: a Diminishing Currency."
84
   Perkovich and Manzanero, "Plan B: Using Sanctions to End Iran's Nuclear Program;" The Economist,
"Europe and Iran: A Common Flop."




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