Creditors’ Remedies LAW 443, Section 1 Professor Tony Sheppard Lecture Notes, Tuesday, March 4, 2003 [revised March 6, 2003 to correct p. 2] Note: On Tuesday, March 4, the law building was picketed, and picketers marched outside classroom 157 to the uplifting accompaniment of drum[s?] and cymbals. Because of the noise, the class was moved to room 102 and started late. These notes are not a verbatim transcript of the class discussion. Perhaps they are an improvement on the lecture ( I hope so). These notes are being sent to the students in my e-mail group and will be posted on the Faculty of Law’s website. In the previous class, we were discussing various stages in the life of a writ of seizure and sale (Form 45 in the B.C.S.C. Rules). The writ’s life is short (one year subject to renewal). Before being entitled to apply for a writ, a creditor must have been awarded a monetary judgment. Having obtained a judgment, the [now] judgment creditor can apply to the court registry for issuance of the writ. Delivery of the writ to the court bailiff authorizes the court bailiff to seize the execution debtor’s goods, chattels and effects, money and other securities for money, and investments in corporate stock. In determining competing claims to goods of the debtor under s. 35 of the Law and Equity Act, the date of issuance of the writ pales in comparison to the critical dates and times of delivery of the writ to the court bailiff and actual seizure of goods by the court bailiff. Delivery and actual seizure are the two moments of legal significance, when sorting out conflicting claims to goods in execution. Delivery of the writ authorizes the court bailiff to seize the judgment debtor’s goods not only from the debtor, but also from any third person to whom the debtor gave the goods or sold them dishonestly, if the debtor did so after delivery of the writ to the bailiff. Assume the court bailiff received the writ on Monday morning, and made the seizures on Wednesday. If on Monday afternoon or Tuesday, the debtor either gave goods to a family member (say), or sold them to a dishonest purchaser who knew the bailiff would be coming for them, s. 35 says the title acquired is as good as the debtor’s was [nemo dat] but is vulnerable to the claim of the court bailiff, who can seize the goods. These folks have a vulnerable title because they acquired goods by gift or dishonest purchase after delivery of the writ to the court bailiff. On the other hand, s. 35 protects the innocent purchaser of the goods as long as the purchase occurred before actual seizure of the goods. If, after the writ has been delivered to the court bailiff and before actual seizure, the debtor sells the goods to the bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the court bailiff cannot seize the goods from the innocent purchaser. Section 35 protects the innocent purchaser who acquires goods from the execution debtor anytime up to actual seizure, but not afterwards. If the innocent purchaser bought the goods from the debtor on Monday or Tuesday, the court bailiff could not take them. However even the innocent purchaser loses out to the court bailiff’s right of seizure if the purchase took place after actual seizure on Wednesday. Lloyds and Scottish Finance interprets “actual seizure” broadly in s. 35 to include not only physical removal of the debtor’s goods by the court bailiff from the debtor’s custody but also “walking possession,” or “constructive seizure,” whereby the court bailiff indicates to the debtor that the goods are seized, but leaves them in the debtor’s possession temporarily prior to removal and execution sale. Silva says “walking possession” is accepted practice in B.C. Following actual seizure the debtor has the privilege within 2 days to claim exemptions over the goods, or pay off the court bailiff, otherwise execution sale of the goods will be forthcoming. Following through on milestones in the life of a writ, execution sale would rank up there with delivery and actual seizure. Even after seizure the debtor retains ownership of the goods, and can pass title [subject to nemo dat] to third persons by gift or sale, but the title is vulnerable to the superior right of seizure held by the court bailiff. The execution debtor can dispose of goods even after seizure with civil and criminal consequences and pass a title. The third persons acquiring title can be either innocent purchasers or others. Innocent purchasers: Under s. 35, actual seizure gives the court bailiff the right to take the goods from third persons including an innocent purchaser whose title is chronologically later than the actual seizure of the goods by the court bailiff. [italicized phrase contains a correction of first version] Others: Under s. 35, the court bailiff can take goods from anyone else whose title was acquired after delivery. Lloyds and Scottish states the debtor remains owner of the goods after seizure, but sale makes the debtor liable for the consequences of fraud, and no matter how many innocent purchasers’ hands the goods pass through, the court bailiff’s right of seizure sticks like glue to the goods [caveat emptore.]. Whether seizure involves removal of the goods or leaving them with the debtor, ownership remains with the debtor. At the execution sale, the debtor’s title or interest passes directly to the execution purchaser: s. 62(2) of the Court Order Enforcement Act. As previously discussed, caveat emptore applies to the purchaser at an execution sale. Silva discusses the implications for the debtor of owning goods under seizure. The debtor bears responsibilities for insuring the goods following seizure and prior to sale. Whereas under the old common law concept of “seizure,” the sheriff had a duty to remove the seized goods to a safe place where they could remain until sale, the contemporary practice of walking possession means the goods can be left in the debtor’s care. Who is responsible for looking after the goods and insuring them? Following seizure the debtor would be in error to assume that the goods become only the court bailiff’s problem to look after and insure. As Silva learned the hard way, the legal position is the debtor retains the same ownership of the goods as was held prior to seizure. The debtor has a financial interest in the process of execution sale of the goods, because the net proceeds will help pay off the judgment debt, and any surplus on execution sale goes to the debtor. Hence the debtor stands to lose big time if seized goods are lost prior to sale, and the loss is uninsured. Silva owed back income taxes to Revenue Canada in the amount of $30,000. RevCan used its speedy collection techniques under the Income Tax Act to issue itself a certificate and register it in the Federal Court in B.C, which gave it the status of a judgment. As a judgment creditor in the Federal Court, RevCan obtained a writ of fi. fa. out of the Federal Court Registry and delivered it to the Sheriff of Nanaimo County. [Under the prior regime before privatization of civil execution and appointment of court bailiffs to the role of sheriff for civil enforcement purposes]. The sheriff, a provincial official, seized Silva’s luxury boat tied up at a wharf in Silva’s marina in Nanaimo. The boat was valued at $220,000, exceeding the debt by almost $200,000, and Silva would have every expectation that the execution sale of the boat should pay off the taxes owing, execution costs, and leave a substantial surplus for Silva. Unfortunately, financial disaster ensued. The sheriff took “walking possession” of the boat, leaving it tied up at the wharf in Silva’s possession. The sheriff had a contemporary discussion with Silva about insurance on the boat. Silva apparently said he couldn’t afford insurance premiums on his own. If Silva hoped to avoid liability for the premiums, it was not to happen. The sheriff sought insurance coverage for the boat, charging the premiums back to Silva as an addition to the execution costs. The sheriff thought the policy was for the sheriff’s own protection, but in the aftermath, Silva thought otherwise. Before issuing coverage, the insurer had the boat inspected by marine surveyors, who made recommendations for improving the boat’s seaworthiness, and reducing the insurer’s risk. The insurer made the recommendations conditions of the insurance coverage. If the insured [the sheriff] did not comply with the conditions, coverage would be denied in the event of loss attributable to non-compliance. Among the conditions was the requirement to install automatic bailing pumps in the boat. The sheriff obtained the coverage, but did not perform any of the conditions. A snowstorm ensued one night, and the weight of snow lowered the boat deeper into the water, until it was swamped and sank to the bottom. If pumps had been installed, the loss would have been prevented, because they would have started automatically and bailed out the water. The insurer denied the sheriff’s claim, and returned some of the premiums to the sheriff. Silva, having lost a valuable asset and facing the judgment debt with additional execution costs to be paid in full, claimed damages for negligence against the sheriff and the province. Silva won at trial, but the B.C.C.A. reversed the decision. The Court held the sheriff did not owe a duty to an execution debtor to provide insurance coverage for seized goods. With the passage of time Silva apparently reconstructed the events leading up to the loss and became convinced that he was relying on the sheriff to look after insurance for Silva’s protection, but at the time he did not want to pay for insurance and told the sheriff so. The court thought Silva did not have any basis for expecting the sheriff to provide free insurance. Silva’s failure to obtain insurance did not result from reasonable reliance on the sheriff to get the necessary coverage, but from Silva’s own lack of funds. The sheriff and the province were free from liability to Silva for the loss. Silva, however, still had to pay the judgment debt and costs. The writ of seizure and sale authorizes the court bailiff to “seize” and “sell.” If the debtor’s goods are hidden or locked up, some preliminary steps might need to be taken prior to seizure. The writ authorizes the court bailiff to enter the debtor’s home without breaking in, but once inside the court bailiff can break into locked containers, vaults or wall safes in the home. The debtor can open them for the bailiff, but if not, the court bailiff can break them open. The writ also authorizes the court bailiff to break into [non- residential] commercial premises. Commercial premises do not have the same degree of sanctity as a home, which is as impregnable as the proverbial “castle” to the court bailiff’s use of force under the writ In Boyce, RevCan was pursuing collection of Boyce’s back income taxes in Manitoba. The tax debtor’s safety deposit box was located in the vault of a bank in Winnipeg. To open a safety deposit box requires two keys – one held by the holder of the box and the other by the bank. Outside the context of debt collection, the relationship between bank and safety deposit box holder is contractual, and if the holder loses the key or passes away and the key cannot be found on death, the bank must drill the lock to open a safety deposit box, requiring a locksmith, and payment of charges. In the context of administering the estate of a deceased safety deposit box holder, the bank needs documentation authorizing the drilling of the box, and listing of the contents. Perhaps this practice began to creep into the bank’s approach to access to a debtor’s safety deposit box because the bank did not think the writ was sufficiently explicit authority to drill the debtor’s safety deposit box. RevCan obtained a judgment and writ of fi. fa. from the Federal Court in Winnipeg against Boyce for tax arrears, and on the authority of the writ sought entry into the safety deposit box, as a potential treasure chest for Boyce’s valuables. Once into Boyce’s box the sheriff could seize the contents under the writ – jewelry, gold, cash, investment certificates, insurance policies, etc. Apparently Boyce was unwilling or unable to assist RevCan’s entry into the safety deposit box. The sheriff in Winnipeg served the writ on the branch of the bank to obtain forced entry into Boyce’s safety deposit box. The bank refused, claiming that the sheriff required a “drilling order,” in addition to the writ. The court held that such an order was unnecessary. As the writ fully authorized forcible entry into non-residential premises of the debtor, it also included breaking open a safety deposit box without further ado. The bank, however, was entitled to reimbursement from the sheriff for the costs of drilling. The sheriff would look to RevCan as execution creditor for the costs of drilling the box. In its turn RevCan could add the costs of drilling to Boyce’s liability as an execution cost. Since Boyce ultimately bears the cost of drilling, and has the option of opening the box with the key, the debtor holds the key to preventing being charged back with additional drilling costs. Boyce raises the prospect that an execution creditor might run up execution costs for ulterior purposes, like punishing a perceived deadbeat, that will ultimately be added to the debtor’s tab. What if an execution creditor incurs excessive or unnecessary execution costs, and tries to charge these excesses back to the debtor, to settle some perceived grievance? Does the debtor have any recourse? In Cybulski v. Bertrand, a motor-vehicle accident occurred between Cybulski, the driver of a motor-vehicle, and a Canada Post truck, driven by its employee, Bertrand. Cybulski brought an action for damages in negligence, claiming she had sustained serious head injuries. At the end of the trial, Canada Post was held 100% liable for negligence. Cybulski was awarded judgment for $140,000 although the issue of damages was hotly disputed during the trial. The conduct of the defence during pre-trial discoveries and at the trial, including casting aspersions on the plaintiff’s character for honesty, and dragging out the proceedings for 4 years, raised the ire of Cybulski and her counsel. After judgment was handed down in Cybulski’s favour, plaintiff’s counsel requested immediate payment. Defence counsel asked for time to arrange payment. Plaintiff’s counsel said that because of the perceived misconduct of the defence, the plaintiff would not extend concessions, demanded prompt payment, and threatened to commence execution. Defence counsel replied that the deadline for payment could not be met, and that since payment would be forthcoming in time, execution was unnecessary, and would be opposed. Plaintiff’s counsel issued the writ and delivered it to court bailiff with instructions to seize Canada Post trucks. Defence counsel obtained an ex parte stay of execution, to prevent further seizures. The stay was continued after an inter partes hearing. While the stay remained in effect, the judgment was paid. Defence counsel then applied for an order that the costs of an improper and unnecessary execution should be charged to the plaintiff, not the defendants. The judge reviewed the conduct of the proceedings, and faulted plaintiff’s counsel for an unwarranted tone in her communications with defence counsel, and for instructing the court bailiff to carry out an illegal and unnecessary execution. The execution was illegal because the trucks were owned by a third party, and only leased to Canada Post, a Crown corporation. The trucks were exempt from execution because they were leased to the Crown for its own use. Assets owned or leased by Canada Post qualified for Crown immunity from execution. Where a party abused the right of execution, the court said it had an inherent jurisdiction to stay execution and to exonerate the defendant from costs. The stay was justified in the circumstances. In its inherent jurisdiction to do justice the court could penalize the execution creditor or its counsel for costs of unnecessary execution. The court said the plaintiff should pay the costs of execution to the court bailiff, under s. 9 of the Sheriff’s Act (B.C.), with no recovery from the defendants. However, the court added that the plaintiff was at liberty to claim reimbursement of the costs from her solicitor, who would bear them personally. Under the adversary system of trial, clients usually bear the consequences of their lawyers’ tactics, and the imposition of costs on a solicitor personally is an exceptional form of severe judicial sanction. [there’s more] (ii) Money and securities for money At common law the ancestors of the writ of seizure and sale authorized execution against the debtor’s tangible chattels. Section 55 of the Court Order Enforcement Act captures this aspect of the writ’s scope with the phrase “goods, chattels and effects.” In Vancouver A & W Drive-Ins, the B.C.S.C. judge thought that the addition of the word, “effects” in s. 55 was broad enough to cover intangibles or choses in action such as the investments held in a debtor’s R.R.S.P., but another judge of the same court disagreed in the Bank of B.C., and said “effects” is confined to tangible chattels, excluding an R.R.S.P. As forms of wealth change over time, the scope of the writ has to be adapted to keep up, or become irrelevant. Adaptation can result from developments in the caselaw [e.g., Mortil, writ authorizes seizure and sale of tangible aspects of intellectual property with court directions as to execution sale], or legislative amendment. Section 58 is a legislative expansion of the scope of the writ to include intangibles listed there as money or bank notes, cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds, specialties, and other securities for money. Form 45 authorizes seizure and sale. While this method of realization might work well enough for “goods, chattels and effects,” it does not work for these intangibles, and s. 58 authorizes the “sheriff or other officer” [read “court bailiff”] to “seize,” “take” and “hold” intangibles. In many cases, arrival of a court bailiff with a writ of seizure and sale on the debtor’s doorstep might overcome a debtor’s reluctance to pay the judgment. If the debtor pays cash to avoid execution against other assets, section 58 authorizes the court bailiff to pay it to the execution creditor as monies levied by execution. In the case of a cheque or IOU payable to the debtor, the court bailiff can seize it and notify the named payer in the instrument to provide a new financial instrument payable to the court bailiff: s. 59. Payment to the court bailiff instead of the debtor discharges the debt: s. 59. The court bailiff has authority to collect from the third party through litigation: s. 58. Before starting an action against the judgment debtor’s debtor, the court bailiff can require the execution creditor to indemnify the court bailiff for costs: s. 61. The machinery provisions are contained in ss. 59 –61. As forms of wealth and financial products evolve rapidly, section 59 shows its age – some terms listed there have fallen into disuse and new ones have emerged. Should s. 59 remain static or move with the times? The usual presumption of statutory construction is that the “law is always speaking.” Section 59 contains the phrase “other securities for money,” and the courts interpret it liberally to continually update s. 59, starting by extending the scope of the writ to financial instruments that were closely analogous to the listed items, but more recently expanding the scope of s. 59 by further and further leaps. The cases in this area show this progression. In the venerable Canadian Mutual Loan, the court interpreted the phrase “other securities for money” to extend the writ of seizure and sale to authorize execution on whole life insurance on the debtor’s life. Canadian Mutual Loan had made a loan to Nisbit, the debtor, taking back as security for the loan a mortgage on Nisbit’s property and an assignment of Nisbit’s life insurance policy with Canada Life. Nisbit defaulted on the loan. Canadian Mutual did not recover the full amount of Nisbit’s indebtedness from the assets covered by the mortgage and the collateral security agreement. Canadian Mutual obtained a judgment against Nisbit to collect the balance owing. Since Nisbit had paid all the premiums to Canada Life the policy was fully paid-up. Whole-life insurance has fallen out of favour, but at the time it offered not only the prospect of a payment of the policy proceeds on the death of the life insured, but also rights to cash during the debtor/insured’s lifetime. Canada Life was obligated to pay out policy bonuses or dividends during the lifetime of the policyholder. Canadian Mutual Loan anticipated that Canada Life might pay a bonus to Nisbit, and wanted to catch it. Unfortunately for Canadian Loan, its collateral security agreement with Nisbit excluded bonuses and dividends on life insurance, so Canadian Loan had to go after the anticipated bonus on the policy in its capacity as an execution creditor. The court said that ordinarily the writ of seizure and sale would be effective to recover the bonus for the benefit of an execution creditor, as the fully paid-up whole life policy qualified as “other securities for money,” [The ordinary execution creditor might be more interested in authorizing the court bailiff to cash in the whole-life policy for a bigger pay-off through its “cash surrender value.”] The court went on to hold that this was a case for “equitable execution,” because the collateral security agreement over Nisbit’s whole life policy created what is known as “an impediment” to legal execution, that is, a debtor’s whole life-policy was amenable to execution in principle, but in this case the collateral security agreement prevented the court bailiff from seizing the policy. Canadian Mutual Loan had a security interest in the policy that prevented seizure. Equity provided a remedy, however, and the court appointed a receiver by way of equitable execution to collect any bonus paid by Canada Life for Canadian Mutual Loan. The court commented that Canadian Mutual Loan was misguided in going to a lot of unjustified expense for very remote cash payment because the bonus, if any, would probably be insufficient to cover the costs of the receivership to collect it. As in Cybulski, the court refused to charge the execution debtor with the execution costs. For our purposes, the case illustrates the courts’ attitude to the phrase, “other securities for money” in s. 58. The Act is always speaking, and legislative intention was to extend the scope of the writ to catch any sort of contemporary financial instruments of the debtor that the court bailiff can derive money from. Section 54 of the Insurance Act (BC) [Casebook, p. 9-1] contains a statutory exemption over life insurance. Section 54(1) exempts life insurance policy proceeds on the death of the policy-holder if any beneficiary has been designated. As long as some beneficiary has been designated, the policy proceeds pass to the designated person on death, free from claims of creditors. If the policy proceeds are payable to deceased’s estate, however, they are not exempt on death and creditors of the deceased can recover them. Section 54(2) provides that during a person’s lifetime life insurance is exempt from creditors and can’t be cashed in if the designated beneficiary on death is the debtor’s spouse, child, grandchild or parent. If Nisbit had made such a designation, his policy and the case bonus would have been exempt from execution during his lifetime. Patmore also illustrates the versatility of the phrase, “other securities for money,” in s. 58 to bring a range of financial instruments within the scope of the writ of seizure and sale. Patmore says corporate shares in “street,” or “bearer” form qualify as “other securities for money.” The ownership of shares in a corporation is reflected in the register of shareholders maintained by the company or its transfer agent. The register contains the names of the shareholders, classes and numbers of shares held by the registered owner, the share certificate number corresponding to the entry in the register, and the date. The registered owner is the person entitled to the rights attached to the shares, as far as the company is concerned. The company would issue a share certificate to the person named as registered owner on its books. The company would then pay dividends and recognize voting rights to that same person. To record a transfer of shares, the person seeking registration would apply to the company or its transfer agent presenting a share certificate with the name of the registered owner on the front of the certificate and on the back of the certificate the transfer form would be filled in and signed by the registered owner, authorizing the change of registered ownership to the specified transferee. The old entry in the company’s books would be cancelled and replaced by a new entry. A new certificate in the name of the intended transferee would issue to the named person. A share certificate with a completed transfer form on the back of the certificate all filled in except for the name of the intended transferee is known as a share in “bearer” or “street” form. Someone who acquires a share in bearer or street form could fill in their name as the intended transferee in the transfer form and apply to the issuing company for registration as owner. If a holder of the share certificate in bearer or street form prefers they can sell the shares in that form to a purchaser. The name of the seller would not match the name of the registered owner, but that is not a problem because the transfer form has been completed by the registered owner. The name of intended transferee is not a problem either, because a purchaser call fill it in later if they wish. A purchaser of shares in bearer form can complete the blank transferee later, and present the certificate to the corporation or its transfer agent for registration in that name. In other words, share certificates in bearer or street form are all ready to be sold and registered by anyone in possession of the certificate. The identities of seller and purchaser do not need to be known, or to appear on the certificate to complete a sale. As such the full rights of registered ownership are available to any person having possession of the certificate, called “the bearer” of the certificate. The certificates easily pass rights of ownership from seller to buyer informally over a stock exchange, or in private transactions on the “street.” Patmore obtained a loan from the Bank of Montreal. As collateral security for the bank loan, Patmore put up various assets, including shares in a Delaware-based gold-mining stock. Patmore gave the stock certificates to the bank in so-called “bearer” or “street” form. Because the bank took the certificates in bearer or street form it could easily dispose of the shares if Patmore defaulted and the bank needed to sell the shares to cover Patmore’s debt. The bank did not need to sell the shares to cover Patmore’s loan, however. Having no further use for the shares as collateral, a lender would normally return the certificates to the borrower, Patmore. The bank was made aware that Patmore owed money to judgment creditors, including RevCan. Patmore demanded return of the the share certificates but the creditors objected to the bank. The bank was unsure about the rival claims to the share certificates asserted by Patmore and the creditors. Fearing a risk of liability for giving the certificates to the wrong party, the bank decided that the safest route was a form of interpleader, whereby the bank put the shares into the custody of the court for determination of the competing claims. The court could decide which party could obtain the shares. The creditors claimed to have the proper remedy for execution on the shares in court through a charging order. They applied ex parte and were granted charging orders nisi. RevCan and Patmore argued the creditors had used the wrong remedy, and applied to show cause why order absolute should not be granted. The court decided the creditors were entitled to the shares and granted order absolute. [These terms are explained later on.] In advising the claimants, the court said that shares in bearer or street form were similar to cash or negotiable instruments, because rights of ownership passed by possession of the certificate. As such shares in bearer or street form qualified as “other securities money,” and were usually exigible by writ of seizure and sale. Ordinarily the writ of seizure and sale would be effective to execute on shares of a judgment debtor in bearer or street form. However the writ was ineffective against these share certificates because they were property in the custody of the court [“in custodia legis”]. The court said the proper method of getting at the share certificates was by means of a legal/statutory or equitable charging order. The creditors were held to have followed the correct procedure in applying for execution on the shares by means of a charging order. Referring to Brereton, decided in England in the 1880’s [p. 5-55] the court was explaining that equity created a charging order to provide an execution remedy for a judgment debtor’s money in the court registry. As shares in bearer or street form were almost like money, the equitable charging order would be effective. The equitable charging order was borrowed by the court of equity from the form of charging order created by the Judgments Acts (UK) (1838-40). To differentiate the two types of charging orders, nowadays each is referred to by its origin. The statutory charging order is part of the received law in B.C. under s. 2 of the Law and Equity Act. For money in court belonging to the judgment debtor, the execution remedy is the equitable charging order. For corporate stock and other forms of financial instruments, a charging order under the Judgment Act (1838) can be used, called a “legal” charging order [as opposed to an equitable charging order], or a statutory charging order. In BC, the writ of seizure and sale is preferable, and the charging order should only be used where the writ is ineffective [pp. 5-63, 5-71]. The court said the legal charging order would work just as well to get at corporate stock in court: p. 5-56. The court had in mind the 1840 amendment to the Judgments Act of 1838 to extend execution to a judgment debtor’s shares, and other financial instruments held by a trustee or in the court registry [see the Casebook, p. 5-92 for the impenetrable provision]. The procedure for obtaining either form of charging order is the same: the execution creditor must apply to court ex parte, for a charging order nisi to show cause, and serve the order on the court registry holding the shares. Six months later, there is a second “show cause” hearing to determine whether the order should be made absolute or discharged, and if the execution creditor prevails, the creditor obtains order absolute for the shares. Others can oppose the creditor’s application at the “show cause” – to convince the court discharge the order nisi. Here Patmore and RevCan failed in that regard. The creditors won the order absolute. The consequences were that the creditors got the shares, and could sell them. In ranking charging orders priority is determined according the rule of “first in time, first in right,” which means the chronological sequence in which the judgment creditor obtained a charging order nisi over the particular asset. Bank of B.C. took the phrase “other securities for money” far from the listed financial instruments in s. 58, to keep the writ up-to-date, and capable of meeting the task of executing on the relatively new and pervasive form of wealth known as the R.R.S.P. R.R.S.P’s are post-war income-tax favoured retirement phenomena to meet social and financial conditions that the legislators could not have begun to contemplate when s. 58 was enacted. R.R.S.P’s do not bear the characteristics of the listed items in s. 58 – they are not financial instruments, and cannot be sold. However, R.R.S.P.’s can be cashed in, and that is the critical factor. Vancouver A &W said execution on R.R.S.P.’s required receivership – a more costly and less inefficient remedy offered by equity where legal remedies are inadequate. Since the writ, a legal remedy, is adequate to effect execution on R.R.S.P.’s in most cases, the writ would be the usual remedy and receivership the exception. [To be continued on Thursday in class] E.& O.E. .