THE WAY AHEAD for Transatlantic Cooperation Exploiting Collective Advantages

THE WAY AHEAD for Transatlantic Cooperation Exploiting Collective Advantages April 1999 Keynote Remarks and Ministerial Commentaries from the WEU Transatlantic Forum Roundtable The Ronald Reagan Building March 2, 1999 Organized under the auspices of the Danish presidency of the WEU Transatlantic Forum In cooperation with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. For further information contact: Ms. Maggie Forster Schmitz IFPA Tel: (617) 492-2116 Fax: (617) 492-8242 Email: MAIL@IFPA.ORG Table of Contents Preface Introduction Roundtable Chairman, General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.), former SACEUR; Dean, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University Speakers’ Keynote Remarks Roundtable President, The Honorable Hans Haekkerup, Minister of Defense, Denmark The Honorable José Cutiliero, Secretary-General, Western European Union The Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, the United States The Honorable Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Minister of National Defense, Poland The Honorable Douglas Henderson, Minister of State for Armed Forces, Ministry of Defense, the United Kingdom Ministerial Commentaries Bulgaria The Honorable Gueorgui Ananiev, Minister of Defense The Czech Republic The Honorable Vladimir Vetchy, Minister of Defense Estonia The Honorable Andrus Öövel, Minister of Defense Finland The Honorable Anneli Taina, Minister of Defense Latvia The Honorable Girts Valdis Kristovskis, Minister of Defense Lithuania The Honorable Ceslovas V. Stankevicius, Minister of National Defense Norway The Honorable Dag Jostein Fjærvoll, Minister of Defense Portugal The Honorable José Veiga Simão, Minister of Defense Romania The Honorable Victor Babiuc, Minister of National Defense The Slovak Republic The Honorable Pavol Kanis, Minister of Defense Turkey The Honorable Hikmet Sami Türk, Minister of National Defense Roundtable Agenda Roundtable Participants 3 3 6 8 11 13 15 15 15 17 17 18 19 19 20 21 21 22 25 27 iii 1 The Way Ahead page i Preface This report is a collection of prepared remarks by speakers and participants at a high-level roundtable conference entitled The Way Ahead for Transatlantic Security Cooperation: Exploiting Collective Advantages. The conference, held on March 2, 1999, in Washington, D.C., was organized under the auspices of the Western European Union (WEU) Transatlantic Forum in cooperation with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. (IFPA). The aim of the WEU Transatlantic Forum is to enhance mutual understanding between Europe and North America on security and defense issues. The Forum’s primary message is that the transatlantic relationship and its institutions are based on shared core values. A main objective of the Forum is to present the European perspective – or, in some cases, the European perspectives – on transatlantic relations and to highlight the active role that Europe plays in the Alliance. The Forum seeks to underscore Europe’s contributions to NATO’s preservation and to stress the renewed European commitment to building the European pillar of the Alliance. A further Forum goal is to convey, to North American audiences, European intentions in developing the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). A work in progress, ESDI is a concept whereby NATO’s European component proposes to strengthen its indigenous security and defense capabilities so as to achieve more equitable burden sharing in ensuring Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. Finally, the WEU Transatlantic Forum seeks to demonstrate that European integration and the transatlantic link are mutually reinforcing. The Danish Presidency: 1 July 1998-30 June 1999 During Denmark’s presidency of the WEU Transatlantic Forum, Danish and WEU officials addressed American and Canadian target groups on The Way Ahead the transatlantic relationship and stressed that its institutions are based on common values, that the WEU, NATO, and the European Union are mutually reinforcing institutions, and that the development of ESDI contributes substantially to the transatlantic security relationship. During their talks, the officials sought to correct misconceptions in the United States and Canada about Europe’s contribution to peace and security on the Continent, including Europe’s efforts in Bosnia. They also addressed the issue of how to achieve a balanced division of labor among the various European security institutions. Furthermore, the Danish presidency highlighted the possibility that future European-led operations could use NATO assets and capabilities, which would enable European allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security and defense and thus help to fulfill ESDI. On March 2 the Danish presidency hosted a congressional breakfast and a high-level roundtable in Washington in cooperation with IFPA, designed as a prelude to the April 1999 NATO summit. The Capitol Hill breakfast gave European defense ministers the opportunity to discuss security issues with senior congressmen and key congressional staff members. 1 The Honorable Hans Haekkerup, Minister of Defense, Denmark. page iii The ministers then moved on to the roundtable, where a number of ministers offered brief introductory statements as a means to spark a spontaneous discussion between the ministers and their staffs and security experts from both the U.S. government and various public policy institutions. While the event was interrupted by a gas leak in the building where it was being held, this report includes an introduction by General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.), former SACEUR, followed by the prepared keynote remarks of all speakers and brief commentaries by the other ministerial participants at the conference. 2 The Honorable José Cutiliero, Secretary-General, Western European Union. page iv The Way Ahead Introduction Roundtable Chairman General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.) Former SACEUR; Dean, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University The timing for this roundtable could not have been more appropriate. With NATO reviewing its founding principles and with the situation in Kosovo in daily flux, now is the time to move ahead with questions of collective action, crisis management, and burden sharing. These issues must be tackled, not only among old partners but with new participants, and not just within NATO but among various security organizations. Waiting in the wings is the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) initiative. Formally placed within NATO at the 1996 Berlin and Brussels meetings, ESDI has picked up steam in the last several years. In 1997, the European Union (EU) signed the Amsterdam Treaty, which further advanced the European capacity for a Common Foreign and Security Policy, while the joint FrenchBritish declaration at St. Malo in 1998 resolved to place European security squarely on the EU’s political agenda. However, despite this progress, much work lies ahead to realize a more active and independent European defense entity. While institutional questions are important, ESDI remains in the hands of politicians. What is needed is concrete planning and collaboration on the ground, especially with NATO. Three years in Bosnia have brought home several key points regarding the requirements for post-Cold War operations and institutional arrangements. On the operational side, large-scale mobilizations and ground battles in response to cross-border attacks are now unlikely to occur. Instead, future tasks will resemble those undertaken in the past decade, such as peacekeeping and monitoring. Furthermore, sustained operations require more than ground troops. Satellite and lift capabilities, intelligence, and longrange communications, to name a few, are vital pieces of a successful mission. True combat power includes more than troops, and the United States currently furnishes much of the Alliance’s technology and capability. Europe’s actions will continue to be circumscribed by the materiel it can offer, and if Europeans are serious about striking out on their own, they must provide all the attendant parts of an operation, not only foot soldiers. Therefore, committed spending on defense technology is needed if Europe is to offer a force that can act independently of American power. Nevertheless, troops remain the essential part of current and future operations. As NATO discovered in Bosnia, the ability to sustain required force levels is a vital element of any mission. A sufficient supply of trained soldiers must be available to rotate through peacekeeping or other operations while maintaining readiness for other national or Alliance missions, a heady task at a time when many nations have substantially cut back their ground forces. Furthermore, Bosnia has taught us that future situations may be larger and more involved than previously expected, and that these missions could escalate beyond original projections. While large-scale operations on the The Way Ahead page 1 European continent will involve NATO, Europe may very likely take on small missions, such as the 1997 operation in Albania, without U.S. participation. Therefore, not only must European states prepare for a broader spectrum of missions and their operational tasks, from deployment to extraction, but they must also ensure that if an entirely European coalition takes on such tasks, it must be able to move up several rungs of the escalation ladder without relying on American help. The WEU figures in many discussions as the potential vehicle for European operations. Over the past several years, its ties with other institutions have been strengthened through talks with NATO about using Alliance assets and through discussions with the EU about the political route to take to request help from the WEU. Regardless of good intentions, however, Europe cannot and should not rely on the WEU alone. As mentioned above, the United States supplies the Atlantic Alliance with the majority of its most sophisticated equipment and detailed intelligence. Nonetheless, while it is clear that Europe must provide some of its own resources, redundancy must also be avoided. Furthermore, NATO alone has the organizational backbone, built up over the past fifty years, to provide for extended expeditionary force operations. SHAPE, SACLANT, and the network of regional headquarters across Europe allow for detailed planning, joint training and exercises, and combat deployments, which the WEU, with its single small headquarters, cannot duplicate without decades of effort and billions of euros. 3 From left to right: General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.), Dean, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; the Honorable K. Erik Tygesen, Ambassador of Denmark to the United States; Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., USN, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic; Minister Haekkerup; the Honorable William S. Cohen, U.S. Secretary of Defense. Therefore, Europe’s security ambitions must be realized within NATO’s broader structural, operational, and technological capabilities. Simply put, NATO is the only organization that can provide both the material means and the infrastructure to carry out a broad spectrum of missions, from controlling no-fly zones to missions on the ground. Therefore NATO must figure in the plans of any European defense initiative, be it via the WEU or some other institution. Steps toward collaboration with NATO have already been taken but must be expanded, and the question remains as to how to make use of NATO’s presence and assets while ensuring that the Europeans have their own vehicle. The answer lies somewhere between complete reliance on the Atlantic Alliance and an entirely European solution. The opportunity that the WEU presents, despite its limitations, must be taken up. Europe must have a security framework that will allow it more flexibility. While the transatlantic relationship remains important to many U.S. policymakers and security experts, a large majority of Americans have always been and will continue to be insular and interested primarily in domestic issues. Therefore, Europe needs to find its own role, if only because the U.S. public will not tolerate continued support of what they view as primarily European missions without greater sharing of the burden. This argues for keeping the European defense identity firmly ensconced in NATO in order to retain the vital transatlantic link that some in the United States may be all too willing to let drop. Thus, the Euro-Atlantic security relationship is at a crossroads. All must carefully walk a tightrope to satisfy European ambitions for autonomy while not pushing away the United States. It is unlikely that a definitive answer will be found at the NATO summit in Washington or at any other high-level meeting. Instead, progress will continue in the same manner it has for the past decade: gradual links and piece-bypiece cooperation. There is much talk these days of the continuing importance of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. However, while the partnership should continue, the commitment must be a true balance. page 2 The Way Ahead Speakers’ Keynote Remarks Roundtable President The Honorable Hans Haekkerup Minister of Defense, Denmark Next month, the then-nineteen NATO nations will meet in Washington in this building complex for the NATO summit in order to mark NATO’s first fifty years and to ensure that the Alliance is ready for the coming decades. Partner countries also will attend, as they have done today. It is difficult to overstate the importance of the transatlantic partnership for our security and stability. The collective security guarantee and the North American engagement in Europe have, I believe, made the difference between success and failure in post-Cold War Europe. Transatlantic relations remain important, as we are facing new challenges to our common security. The Alliance is the bedrock on which arrangements and initiatives aimed at still further enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region are developed. The presence here today of sixteen European ministers of defense and the U.S. secretary of defense is testimony to that. New Challenges The challenges we encounter today are different from those we faced a decade ago. We have had to adapt our tools and sharpen them for the tasks ahead, and hence we are right to speak about the “new NATO” and the “new tasks.” Looking back, the changes have been as dramatic as the crises we have had to confront. First, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will join NATO later this month, and the door will remain open for more new members. Second, NATO is active in military operations both alone and with partners to support peace and stability. Third, NATO is cooperating with Partners – including Russia and Ukraine – to promote stability and to prepare future peace-support operations. Fourth, NATO has welcomed a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance, under the heading “separable but not separate.” Yet as our discussions have confirmed today, we are not finished. Our tools can become even sharper and we can use them more effectively. Our Shared Values In a speech to the British Parliament in 1654, Oliver Cromwell noted the virtue of the maxim, “Though peace be made, yet it’s interests that keep peace.” He could not possibly have foreseen today’s security challenges, but nevertheless the axiom goes to the heart of the transatlantic relationship. Our basis for cooperation is our shared values, ideals, and interests. The reason why we all came here today lies in our shared belief in democracy, human rights, market economy, and the right of our people to prosper and live in peace. Leadership Looking at our past experience with crisis management, one important element has been the need for leadership. Leadership is to a large degree a result of political will, but it also depends on political structures that facilitate effective and timely decision making. It is no secret that U.S. leadership in the last decade has been vital to the successful management of crises in Europe. But with the enactment of the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Union (EU) will take steps The Way Ahead page 3 to strengthen its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Furthermore, following the initiative of Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Anglo-French St. Malo Declaration, Europeans are now engaged in a new debate over European security and defense. While the approach is practical and gradual, and the discussion takes place in several organizations, it is too early to speculate on the result. But the direction is clear: Europe wants to strengthen its crisis-management capability. and the EU, including those that are not members of both organizations. Partner countries should also be able to contribute. The EU and NATO remain the most important institutions for security in Europe, and the NATO summit should reflect the need to develop the relationship further between NATO and the EU as mutually reinforcing institutions. Exploiting Collective Advantages The need for better cooperation among security organizations and other actors is a general lesson learned from Bosnia. If we are to manage crises effectively – that is, to bring stability to a country or region threatened by instability and war – we need to use all the instruments at our disposal in a coordinated way. This is critical in initiating, running, and downscaling peace-support operations. Military tools must be combined with political and economic instruments if we are to be more successful in our endeavors. The EU and NATO together – supported by Partners – have at their disposal a very impressive toolbox with several compartments and many different tools, and we should strive to use that toolbox more effectively together. EU-NATO In this realm, the main objective should be to develop mechanisms that allow Europeans to use NATO assets to implement decisions undertaken within the CFSP. We know the dangers we should avoid: there should be no unnecessary duplication, no decoupling, and no discrimination. There is no need to duplicate assets that are already provided by NATO, such as the multinational command structure. The 1996 Berlin decisions have put us on the right track, but as we prepare for the NATO summit, we should look beyond Berlin. There should be no doubt, however, that NATO is the only credible framework for a military operation of any significant scale. That said, a larger European capability to take on responsibility for crisis management, when the United States for whatever reason does not want to take an active part in an operation, can only serve to strengthen the transatlantic partnership. The real challenge will be to adapt the EU’s framework such that it can provide the political management and strategic guidance needed for Petersberg operations – that is, crisis-management, humanitarian, and peacekeeping missions. In doing so, we must take into account the interests of all members of NATO Military Effectiveness An important element in effective crisis management has been credible and effective military involvement. This has been crucial both for the implementation of the Dayton Accords and for the pressure applied by NATO on the parties in the Kosovo conflict. The lesson is that while the strength of our forces should be second to none, peace-support operations also put new and challenging demands on our armed forces, including those of sustainability, deployability, and strategic lift. When it comes to deployability of forces and other demands we face today, our starting points are different. As European forces were predominantly structured towards territorial defense in their own region, the ability to deploy substantial forces across Europe and for tasks not covered by Article 5 is a new challenge. The challenge is being met, but not overnight. The Defense Capabilities Initiative, which will be one of the elements of the NATO summit in Washington, will help focus our attention on the central capabilities needed in the future by introducing the core capabilities of mobility, effective engagement, sustainability, and survivability into a revitalized defense planning mechanism of the Alliance. 4 Congressman Ike Skeleton, Ranking Member, House Armed Services Committee. page 4 The Way Ahead The European Contribution The Defense Capabilities Initiative will also help European countries to improve their military capabilities. Yet Europe is already making a substantial contribution to our common security. Seventy percent of the NATO forces in SFOR are provided by European NATO members, including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, while all other countries here today have also committed troops. If we look at the contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, the European share is even larger. In NATO’s ground reaction forces, the European NATO members – not counting the three invited countries – provide 90 percent of the forces (in brigade equivalents). These are the forces most likely to be called upon in times of crisis. well. Member nations share the same values, ideals, and goals, and we are engaged in constant dialogue to improve our capabilities. The present debate over the European capability in crisis management is not only a European discussion but also a transatlantic topic and thus the essence of the transatlantic partnership. The next steps will be taken here in Washington at the NATO summit. Multinational Formations A big success of the last several years has been the active participation of Partners in the NATO-led operation in Bosnia. This is a feature that is here to stay. Participation by many countries in an actual operation not only increases the legitimacy of the operation, but is also a demonstration of burden sharing. The experience in Bosnia shows that multinationality is possible at relatively low levels, as with the Nordic/Polish Brigade in Bosnia, which includes units from the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Some of the major units answerable to the Western European Union also feature multinationality. The demand for multinational formations has also resulted in a drive to establish multinational formations in Eastern and Central Europe. New patterns of cooperation are not only stabilizing in themselves, but they also prepare participating nations to contribute forces for peace-support operations. However, for all multinational formations, we should ensure that they are relevant and suited to the operations at hand. Interoperability based on NATO standards is essential both for European formations and for NATO-Partner formations. A decision to develop a comprehensive concept for multinational formations as an element in both the enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) and ESDI should be one of the goals of the NATO summit. The transatlantic partnership is as important today as it was in 1949, yet the challenges we face and the tools we need to meet those challenges are very much different. But our relationship is alive and The Way Ahead page 5 The Honorable José Cutiliero Secretary-General, Western European Union Let me begin by paying tribute to Hans Haekkerup and his team in Copenhagen and Brussels, who have put so much effort into organizing an impressive series of events during their Transatlantic Forum presidency. The range of countries represented here at the ministerial level is recognition of his work. This conference takes place at a defining moment in transatlantic security relations: we are a few days away from the first post-Cold War enlargement of NATO; we are little more than a month away from the NATO summit meeting here in Washington; and we are faced with new peacekeeping challenges in the Balkans. Each of these events obliges us to take a fresh look at North American-European security relations. This is reinforced by broader developments on both sides of the Atlantic. Let me just cite two on the European side: first, the introduction of a single currency, and second, the impending entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, with its objective to strengthen the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Moreover, Europeans have now engaged in a new debate over their own role in defense and security. This is the context in which our conference is taking place. Let me confine my introductory remarks to two issues: first, the importance of further developing the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) at the NATO summit, and second, the effect of the European defense debate on transatlantic relations. NATO and the WEU have already accomplished much of the ESDI agenda outlined at the Berlin and Brussels NATO ministerial meetings in 1996. NATO has agreed with the ESDI responsibilities of the deputy SACEUR and has developed European command arrangements as part of its restructuring. WEU-NATO consultation arrangements have been set up to allow the two organizations to work together from the earliest moments of a crisis and establish whether and how Europeans should take on a distinct role of their own. The WEU is now exploiting the NATO defense planning process to test the European capacity for crisis management and to identify shortfalls. NATO and WEU military staffs are working closely together to dovetail military planning processes and to negotiate a framework agreement that addresses the practical questions involved when the WEU uses NATO assets and capabilities. It is important that we complete this work – particularly the framework agreement – by the time of the Washington Summit and then use the summit to agree on guidelines for further developing ESDI. The WEU-NATO combined crisis-management exercise in 2000 will be the opportunity to test what we have achieved and to identify how we can improve our cooperation. The renewed European defense debate launched by President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Tony Blair last year was born out of a realization that Europe must confront crisis situations better. Three sets of issues quickly emerged from this debate: how can Europeans mobilize a common political will to tackle a crisis situation? How can Europeans enhance their defense capabilities to meet the new security challenges? And how can European decision making and institutions be streamlined? In response, the U.S. secretary of state analyzed the implications for the transatlantic alliance and identified three potential dangers to be avoided: strategic decoupling, duplication of force structures, and discrimination among interested European states. Two of these three concerns have been addressed by Europeans from the outset. All key statements reaffirm NATO’s role in the collective defense of its members, while decisions concerning Kosovo demonstrate that when American and European strategic interests are shared, NATO is the crisis-management instrument of choice. When European-led operations are launched, NATO assets will often be the pre- 5 From left to right: General Galvin, Secretary-General Cutiliero, Minister Haekkerup. page 6 The Way Ahead ferred, if not the only, choice for carrying them out, and the need to safeguard NATO-WEU arrangements by giving access to these capabilities will be an interest of all Europeans. This leads me to the third concern, that of avoiding discrimination among European states. Within the WEU, we have reached a workable arrangement in which all EU member-states and European NATO members participate broadly on an equal footing in WEU crisis-management activities and where those Central European countries with the potential for EU membership also participate. Any new EU-based institutional arrangements must take other European NATO members into account, quite simply because these countries will have to consent to the use of NATO assets and capabilities by Europeans. These are sensitive questions, but I hope they can be used as an opportunity to develop an inclusive approach to European defense, which focuses the attention on those aspects that unite a very wide community of Europeans in this field, rather than letting institutional barriers divide them. Avoiding such pitfalls is important, but succeeding in this and tinkering with institutions will still not make us do more operations or do them better. The key issues here are the Europeans’ common political will, their readiness to act in a more collective fashion, and their willingness to pay for a good defense. If Europe can meet these challenges, it will be an achievement of historic proportions and, in my view, a happy day for the transatlantic relationship as well. The Way Ahead page 7 The Honorable William S. Cohen Secretary of Defense, the United States It is fitting that as we gather to discuss the future of European security, we are led by our conference chairman, General Jack Galvin, who, as supreme allied commander, oversaw the transition of Europe out of the dark days of the Cold War. History will note with approval the vital and stabilizing role he played during that turbulent time. Allow me also to thank my friend Hans Haekkerup, minister of defense for Denmark, for his leadership of this forum. The poet Horace wrote, “It is when I am struggling to be brief that I become unintelligible.” I hope to be both brief and intelligible before this distinguished gathering. When I was in Munich several weeks ago for what was formally called the Wehrkunde Conference, I recounted an essay by the American journalist Walter Lippman that expresses one of the central challenges of our era. Lippman wrote of a remote island in the Atlantic during the months leading up to the First World War. It was an island whose residents were shocked to learn in the fall of 1914 that the world around them had slipped into war months before without their notice. These islanders, wrote Lippman, had held a view of the world that no longer corresponded to the world in which they were actually living: “There was a time,” he wrote, “when each man was still adjusted to an environment that no longer existed.” A decade removed from the Cold War, I believe the challenge for the United States and our European allies and friends is somewhat similar to that of those islanders. We have yet to adjust fully to the new world in which we live. We must see the world not as it once was, but as it truly is, and to imagine it as it might yet become and how we might shape it. On the very day I addressed this forum last year, Iraq targeted coalition planes with their anti-aircraft radar in what has since become a consistent pattern of military provocation, a pattern that ultimately prompted our strikes in December 1998, which, with the help of our British friends and coalition partners in the region, diminished Iraq’s ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction and to threaten its neighbors. Indeed, the past year has reinforced, in bold relief, a fundamental truth of our times: that we live in an uncertain and often dangerous world. In this past year, nuclear explosions in India and Pakistan sent shock waves of concern reverberating around the globe. Terrorists slaughtered hundreds and injured thousands, most of them African and many of them Muslim, near U.S. embassies in Africa and attempted more attacks, prompting our targeted action in self-defense. And North Korea stunned the world by firing a long-range missile over Japan and into the Pacific. Indeed, we have moved from a cold war to a simmering peace. These threats to peace and stability, and to the lives of our citizens, make clear what the members of the WEU and NATO have known for fifty years: that a strong, transatlantic partnership and active engagement to counter the threats we face are indispensable to our collective security. Indeed, the cooperation and determination that created the Western alliance and carried us through the last half century can guide us through the next. We need a new alliance for the new century, one that is designed for the missions ahead. As the famous Italian strategist, General Guilio Douhet, said, “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate changes, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.” The Strategic Concept that NATO will unveil at the Washington Summit in April 1999 will both reaffirm enduring truths and recognize emerging realities: that NATO is first and foremost a military alliance whose central mission remains the collective defense of its members; that NATO will always act on the basis of consensus; and that NATO will always act in the spirit of the principles of the United Nations. Our first overarching challenge in building a new NATO is therefore to adjust and transform the Alliance to meet new challenges. Last year at this forum, I highlighted a lesson from Bosnia: that our forces must be prepared to endure the stresses and strains of operations where they will lack preexisting communications, logistics, headquarters, or other infrastructure. And I called upon us to take steps toward building forces that are fully compatible. This year, I can report on an initiative that the United States and our allies are developing to transform the defense capabilities, not just as individual page 8 The Way Ahead nations, but of the Alliance as a whole. In order to transform its defense capabilities, NATO is preparing to embrace a common operational vision that includes four core capabilities. First, we must be mobile enough to project our forces as rapidly as necessary. Second, we must effectively engage by delivering the right response, whether it be combat or humanitarian support, when and where it is needed. Third, we must increase the sustainability of our forces by supporting them with more tailored and efficient logistics systems. And fourth, we must enhance the survivability of our forces by protecting them from terrorist, chemical, biological, and electronic attacks. Individually, many allies are already working to counter the threat of chemical and biological weapons, poison arrows aimed at our Achilles’ heels. Collectively, we can do even more to disrupt the plans, to borrow from Eliot, of those who would “show us fear in a handful of dust.” That is why the United States has proposed an initiative on weapons of mass destruction, with a central clearinghouse to increase sharing of information and improve programs to protect both military and civilian populations. These efforts would enhance, not eclipse, the work already underway across the Alliance. Preparing NATO forces for the future also means preparing for the possibility of terrorist attacks against NATO forces, facilities, and peoples. Individually, many allies have taken steps to confront this scourge as well. Collectively, we must do more to address the threat that terrorism poses to the Alliance. Indeed, I believe the Washington Summit affords us the opportunity to lay the framework for dealing with this threat as an Alliance. This transformation will require the combined efforts of all partners in the Alliance, North American and European, the oldest NATO members as well as the newest, and our friends in the WEU and the Partnership for Peace. Indeed, the nations of Europe have shown a growing and impressive willingness to play a more active role in European security. The OSCE-led verification mission in Kosovo and the French-led extraction force in neighboring Macedonia are welcome steps toward a more active role for Europeans in European security. A stronger security profile for Europe benefits all members of the Alliance. That is why the United States continues to support the WEU as a vehicle for strengthening the European pillar of NATO and why we support the Combined Joint Task Force concept and the development of the European Security and Defense Identity, the so-called ESDI, within NATO, that will make use of separable but not separate Alliance assets for possible European-led operations. Of course, if our Alliance is to be prepared for tomorrow’s missions, we must invest more wisely today. That is why President Clinton’s budget proposal makes available $112 billion in additional defense resources over the next six years, our largest sustained increase in defense spending in fifteen years. To ensure the readiness of our people, our budget includes the largest increase in military pay and benefits in a generation. To ensure the readiness of our weapons, our budget includes $53 billion for this year’s procurement needs, the second annual increase since we reversed a thirteen-year decline in 1998. These new resources keep us on the path to achieving our procurement goal of $60 billion per year by 2001, growing even more in subsequent years. This infusion of funds will allow us to equip our forces with the next generation of ships, aircraft, and weapons that they will need to carry out equally revolutionary operational concepts that will change the way we fight in the future. Our budget not only reflects the world as it is, but as it might become. It continues funding to develop and deploy air and missile defenses designed to protect U.S. forces overseas, as well as our friends and allies. Our budget also contains substantial new funding for our national missile defense program (NMD), designed to protect the American homeland against 6 Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, House Committee on International Relations. The Way Ahead page 9 the emerging strategic ballistic missile threat from rogue nations. President Clinton will not make a deployment decision on our NMD program until next year. Nevertheless, the United States is actively engaging our Russian friends in discussions on the nature of the modifications that may be required to the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty, modifications that will satisfy our mutual strategic concerns while providing protection to our people from a limited ballistic missile attack. It may not be possible for all Alliance members to seek and secure dramatically increased defense budgets. Yet, we believe that if the Alliance is to exist in word and deed, in fighting capacity as well as political appeal, then, at a minimum, defense budgets cannot be reduced further. The difficulties and dangers of the world surely do not permit it. The dangers of our world also demand that we embrace the second overarching challenge in building a new alliance for the new century: forging even stronger ties with our non-NATO European partners. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is now an indispensable cornerstone of regional stability and security. However, PfP must not only assist nations in climbing the stairs to NATO’s open door. PfP must remain a worthy end, in and of itself. Enhancing the inherent worth of PfP membership is the driving force behind our efforts in several areas. We envision strengthening PfP training and education programs by improving military education through a consortium of defense academies, by enhancing training exercises through a computer simulation network, and by sharing expertise through specialized training centers in Partner nations. At the same time, we are examining how multinational formations, such as the eight-nation Nordic Brigade now in Bosnia, can work even more closely with NATO in the future. And I note Hans Haekkerup’s leadership in turning the idea for the brigade from theory into practice. We are also examining how we might operationalize PfP so that future NATO-led PfP operations such as SFOR (Stabilization Force) occur less on an ad hoc basis and more in an institutionalized fashion. Perhaps the most critical relationships NATO has are those with Russia and Ukraine. Every session of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council represents our mutual commitment to security consultations and practical cooperation that promote peace and security across Eurasia. Every session of the NATOUkraine Commission reflects our belief that a democratic, prosperous, and stable Ukraine is essential to a democratic, prosperous, and stable Europe. Indeed, every nation benefits when Ukraine and Russia are full partners in European security. Nowhere is the test of whether NATO can meet the missions of the future greater than in the Balkans. NATO’s recent decision to reduce troop levels in Bosnia by another 10 percent is yet a further sign that our presence has indeed been a stabilizing influence. We are hopeful that the ongoing NATO review will conclude that the security situation in Bosnia is such that SFOR can be reduced even further. The international community must build on the progress already achieved and press ahead on full implementation of the Dayton Accords, especially with civilian implementation, which continues to lag behind. As our Alliance begins its second half century, we stand at a moment of challenge that is exceeded only by its potential. The threats we face have changed, but our strength remains unmatched, our solidarity unfrayed. Like the Biblical Joseph’s many-colored coat, the flags and fates of our nations are woven together, the hues of each combining to create a rich and enduring fabric. And from the same loom used to craft our victory in the Cold War, we can bring forth a new alliance adapted for a new century. In doing so, we can create a Europe that is truly healed, whole, and free. page 10 The Way Ahead The Honorable Janusz Onyszkiewicz Minister of National Defense, Poland There is no doubt, in my opinion, that the Transatlantic Forum embodies the most important aspect of transatlantic security cooperation: a continuous and open dialogue between Europeans and our Allies on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Exactly ten days before my country becomes a member of NATO (and consequently a WEU Associate Member), I cannot pass up the opportunity to stress that we fully commit ourselves to pursuing this dialogue, enriching it, and strengthening it wherever possible. For the last several months, Europeans have been incessantly juggling two catchwords, “the British initiative” and “St. Malo.” Both of them are tightly connected to the ongoing debate over the EuroAtlantic security relationship, and both should be viewed in the context of the latest developments in the European security environment: the current crisis in Kosovo. Since we have met here to discuss the way ahead for transatlantic security cooperation, I think we cannot avoid the question of what effects these two initiatives will have on this cooperation, and hence how we should explore and build on them. Last December, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright outlined the three ds: no duplication, no decoupling, and no discrimination, which encapsulates the untouchable principles on which any European defense cooperation should be based. I am convinced there is no one who would now find it advisable to question the principles of the 1996 Berlin Communiquè concerning the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), as we have already agreed that transatlantic cooperation and greater European responsibility for its own security are the two sides of the very same coin. Thus, whatever institutional shape European security and defense take, any change of relations among NATO, the WEU, and the European Union (EU) should fully respect the rules of ESDI so carefully worked out three years ago. It should also avoid any discrimination against those European allies that do not currently participate in EU security-related work. I am convinced that there is a will among all of us to abide by these rules. I would also agree with those who say that the problem of determination and capabilities should have priority today against the institutional one. In other words, any debate on institutional arrangements should not overshadow our real needs and existing deficiencies. In this context, I would like to stress Europe’s separable but not separate military capabilities, as well as capacities to use them in the theater. Today, all Europeans recognize this as a fundamental problem. Furthermore, it is also what our North American allies define as the most important challenge Europe has to face. Following Prime Minister Blair’s initiative at the beginning of February 1999 under the German presidency of the Western European Union, we have begun an audit of forces and capabilities available for European-led crisis-management operations concerning forces of all WEU members as well as European members of the Alliance and of the EU. I am convinced it would be worthwhile to expand the audit, as soon as possible, to WEU Associate Partners. It is also very important that the audit not be aimed at indicating the number of soldiers and assets we presently have in Europe but instead at identifying what we do not have. This so-called negative approach will allow Europeans to fill in gaps and shortages and not to be caught by future shortfalls. We all know that Europe does not have a problem with numbers but instead with the lack of some operational capacities, such as heavy lift, C3 (command, control, and communications), and sustainability in general, as well as with some inadequacies in the 7 From left to right: Secretary Cohen; the Honorable Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Minister of National Defense, Poland. The Way Ahead page 11 allocation of funds for research and development and inadequately competitive defense industries. In our opinion, the process launched in the WEU should be pursued in close cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance and should benefit from the work already done in NATO, such as the Special Report on Forces and Capabilities Available for WEU-Led Operations. If we also succeed in ensuring that the process complements NATO’s practical work directed at the transformation of its defense capabilities, the development of the ESDI within the Alliance will come into being because it will be seen not only as politically but also practically fruitful, and not only for Europe but for the North American allies as a whole. Such collaboration towards reinforcement will definitely serve the effectiveness of transatlantic security management by placing both partners on a more equal footing and hence give increasing opportunity for cooperation. I am deeply convinced that this should be the focus of our effort for true development of transatlantic security cooperation. And last but not least, while strengthening and developing both ESDI and the transatlantic link, we must remember that these processes should be extended further to Partner countries. Let me place at this point a particular stress on two mechanisms that we have in our hands: the WEU and Partnership for Peace, in its broad format of twenty-eight countries. It is difficult to find the most effective, clear-cut structures and arrangements for cooperation in today’s Euro-Atlantic security environment. I don’t believe we can make any dramatic discoveries in this area, but I do think we should follow the pragmatic direction that was so widely confirmed in the last months. page 12 The Way Ahead The Honorable Douglas Henderson Minister of State for Armed Forces, Ministry of Defense, the United Kingdom The United Kingdom has for a long time enjoyed a particularly close relationship with our friends on this side of the Atlantic, which has been built on the core values our nations share. This Transatlantic Forum provides an opportunity for us to develop further our mutual understanding, and we in the United Kingdom welcome the opportunity to meet our friends, both old and new, and discuss such important issues in this forum. This is particularly important as we look forward to the Washington Summit, as we develop a new NATO Strategic Concept, and as we consider the form of Euro-Atlantic security architecture that will best meet our needs for the next millenium. Whatever will emerge from these discussions must be founded on cooperation, whether it is between nations and their armed forces or within and between multinational institutions. NATO, the WEU, and the European Union (EU) are founded on the desire of nations to work together to help achieve shared goals. We should be proud of what has already been achieved, both internally within those organizations and more recently between the organizations themselves. between organizations. This is a significant package that provides a means by which Europe could deploy military capabilities drawn from NATO to undertake peace-support operations in circumstances where our North American allies choose not to participate for whatever reason. This package puts in place the key elements of building ESDI within the Alliance. We look to the Washington Summit to set a new program to further enhance the effectiveness of ESDI and, in particular, the contribution European forces can make. European Defense Initiative As you know, the British prime minister, Tony Blair, opened a debate on future defense arrangements within Europe in Pörtschach, Austria, at the end of October last year. Our aim in this initiative is quite simple. It is to enable the EU to have a more united voice, articulated with greater speed and coherence through the Common Foreign and Security Policy and backed up when the need arises with effective and prompt military action. We are not talking about removing defense from the control of national governments and national parliaments, and we do not envisage a role for the European Commission or the European Parliament in defense matters. Most importantly, whatever arrangement is developed within Europe cannot be allowed to undermine NATO or duplicate the capabilities and structures that we have been developing over the last fifty years. NATO remains the cornerstone of European security and defense, and the foundation of our collective defense is set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic European Security and Defense Identity In 1996, the North Atlantic Council decided to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. This decision will, I am sure, be recognized as a major milestone in NATO’s history. The development of formal linkages between NATO and the WEU and also between the WEU and the EU created a framework for cooperation between nations, cooperation over that most vital of all government responsibilities, defense. Since the 1996 decisions, the staffs within NATO and the WEU have worked hard to turn that vision into reality. We hope that by the Washington Summit, we will have completed the remaining outstanding tasks. We hope to have in place a framework agreement on the use of NATO assets and capabilities for operations under the political and strategic control of WEU, consultation arrangements between the two organizations, a program of joint exercises, procedures to undertake joint defense and military planning to develop the effectiveness of our forces, and, finally, procedures so that information can be shared 8 The Honorable Douglas Henderson, Minister of State for Armed Forces, Ministry of Defense, the United Kingdom. The Way Ahead page 13 Treaty. This was explicitly recognized in a European Union context in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, and strengthening the European pillar will strengthen the Alliance itself. The transatlantic relationship lies at the heart of European security. North America’s capabilities and commitment to Europe are crucial and we must preserve them. Therefore, any new arrangements for European activities must be based on full transparency, which is essential to maintaining the intimate trust among nations that has been built up through fifty years of hard work. Defense Capabilities/Multinational Forces Europe needs a defense capability that is better able to fit today’s world and ready to face the challenges of the new century. The lessons from recent crises, from the Gulf to Bosnia, are clear. Increasingly, we face situations that call not for large numbers of troops but for strength in capabilities where we are now weakest. We need to develop armed forces that are deployable and sustainable; powerful and flexible; mobile, survivable, and highly capable. These factors were fundamental to Britain’s Strategic Defense Review which was completed last year. They are also cornerstones of NATO’s current Defense Capabilities Initiative. But as well as individual efforts, there is much that we all could do. Collectively, we could do more to improve cooperation in combined military capabilities, in particular the operational effectiveness of the various European multinational forces. We must not engage in a false debate over whether these forces are primarily for NATO operations or for European operations. In both cases, they should serve mutual interests, and we should take practical measures to enable them to do so better. Building the types of forces that Europe needs will allow these countries to shoulder a greater share of the burden of Alliance missions. The way to take cooperation forward is through practical measures, measures that improve the abilities of our forces to operate together. Such improvements will be good for NATO, and they will be good for Europe. page 14 The Way Ahead Ministerial Commentaries Bulgaria The Honorable Gueorgui Ananiev Minister of Defense The further enhancement of Associate Partners’ participation in WEU activities and the gradual integration of Partner states into Euro-Atlantic security structures is an important evolution in the development of the WEU as an efficient European instrument for crisis management and a means of strengthening the European pillar of NATO. The efforts by Associate Partners to allocate and train national military forces that can be earmarked for the WEU and eventually included in Petersberg missions, including the use of NATO assets via the WEU, will undoubtedly contribute both to the strengthening of the European Security and Defense Identity and to the future involvement of Associate Partner assets in the wider European security system. The continued process of drawing Central and Eastern European countries into Euro-Atlantic security structures will strengthen the transatlantic relationship and increase the European contribution to the responsibilities related to ensuring peace and stability in Europe. It is our understanding that for the successful development of the European Security and Defense Identity, the NATO enlargement process and the open-door policy of the Alliance should be pursued in the future as well. The accession of Associate Partners to NATO will reinforce their status in the WEU, thus directly contributing to the further strengthening of the Alliance and helping to establish it as the major European instrument for crisis management. Therefore, at the forthcoming NATO summit in Washington, Bulgaria expects that the real contribution of each applicant to the collective security of the Alliance will be taken into account, as well as the progress made by each in meeting the key membership requirements. On the basis of results so achieved, Bulgaria feels certain that the summit will offer a clearer perspective on the timing of additional membership invitations. This, in turn, will be an impetus and stimulus for national efforts within candidate countries for joining Euro-Atlantic security structures. The Czech Republic 9 The Honorable Vladimir Vetchy, Minister of Defense, the Czech Republic with interpreter, Ms. Renata Drahozalova. The Honorable Vladimir Vetchy Minister of Defense Europe’s new security architecture is only now being born, but because of new risks that threaten the region’s safety and well-being, capable defense must be provided immediately. NATO, with its functional structures, military power, and operational capabilities, remains the only organization capable of ensuring Europe’s security. Strong transatlantic links and the patterns of cooperation arising from them are essential prerequisites of the Alliance’s ability to act. The Way Ahead page 15 Traditional security interests will continue to dominate security developments in Europe, but it is difficult to predict the future setting of these interests. Thus, when shaping the European security model, the key conditions affecting Europe’s security, namely persistent relative uncertainty; the dominant behavior of major powers; threats emerging from unstable countries; the crucial role of U.S. involvement; and NATO’s adaptation to the new geopolitical situation must be considered. Moreover, the boundary between military actions and diplomatic and political activities is no longer sharply defined. The current strategic environment does not preclude the use of military power in a variety of scenarios, from humanitarian and rescue operations to peacekeeping missions and combat deployment in regional and local conflicts, while post-conflict stabilization is also becoming increasingly important. These ongoing changes may also be viewed as an indispensable component of a broader reshuffling of forces and influences, which itself is part of the creation of new and more permanent regional foundations of globalization. Many international organizations have successfully adapted themselves to the new, post-Cold War situation and are expanding their respective bailiwicks. Simultaneously, there are manifest attempts to meet these new challenges by creating flexible formations of states outside of traditional institutional structures. As for the Czech Republic, multilateral cooperation and membership in international organizations also represent ways to compensate for the asymmetric power and economic muscle of bigger countries. The accession of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to the Alliance will profoundly change Europe’s security and political situation. The purpose of NATO’s enlargement and transformation is to increase the security of all European countries. With the first wave over, the door will remain open for other candidates, and all countries will be allowed to join the common security architecture without having to be members of the Alliance. The tools to accomplish these goals will be the reinforced Partnership for Peace program and additional bilateral or multilateral initiatives in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) or the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. Additionally, the need to reflect in the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept aspects of mutual cooperation and a possible sharing of responsibilities among other international organizations has emerged. These issues include the preparation and conduct of military operations under the WEU’s political leadership and strategic control that would utilize NATO forces and assets. The security of Europe and the security of America are indivisibly linked. The transatlantic alliance constitutes the basis of security for countries on both sides of the Atlantic, even after the Cold War. Almost every European nation is linked to North America by transatlantic agreements, either as a NATO member or in the EAPC framework. Moreover, almost all European countries are members of the UN or the OSCE. However, the manner in which transatlantic relations are currently maintained will change. These alterations have already begun to assume more organized forms. Since the 1990s, the new geostrategic situation gives a better indication of a potential division of labor between NATO and the WEU, while the concept of Combined Joint Task Force, no matter how difficult to define and translate into operational procedures, meets Europe’s requirement for operations in which North Americans do not want to participate. Nonetheless, transatlantic relations need constant attention and strengthening. Successful European integration has been possible largely because of the transatlantic link provided by NATO. If we disregard this crucial aspect, we will not only damage Western Europe and North America, but also cast doubts upon the political and economic transition of Central and Eastern European nations looking for ties to the West’s political, economic, and military institutions. Presently, joint European security policy is still in the beginning stages. Yet, the entire process will be accelerated by dynamic internal developments within Western Europe’s principal organizational structures. The European Union is transforming itself into a major twenty-first century political force by moving towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy. NATO supports the efforts of its European members to assume greater responsibility for European security in the framework of the European Security and Defense Identity. Relations between the WEU and the Alliance should avoid any duplication in roles, tasks, and missions, as well as mutually competing command structures. Assuming that the page 16 The Way Ahead above requirements are met, such developments would justify a forecast that Europe’s future will be determined not by fragmented security and political objectives, but mainly by a continuing close cooperation with North American countries. Estonia The Honorable Andrus Öövel Minister of Defense It is with great pleasure that I offer a few general remarks with regard to future developments in EuroAtlantic security. First, as we all know, the definition of security has changed considerably during the past decade or so: we are now talking about soft rather than hard, military-centered security. However, looking at our common defense field we notice truly active relations and interactions. It is a well-established truth that security – any kind of security – is indivisible. There are no losers or winners. It is common will and mutual trust that unite nations today, and this engenders stability. If any security system is to remain viable in the future, its overall reliability depends on the strength of the smallest part in this system. Therefore, it is clear that the security of the Baltic region forms an inseparable part of European security as a whole. And only enhanced European security can ensure sufficient security in the Baltic region. Second, I would like to emphasize that today, reliability of the transatlantic security system depends mostly on the European ability to act as a strong partner. Therefore, we believe that Europe should take on greater responsibility for its own security and stability and that the WEU should form the solid basis for this. Estonia, as a European country, will do its utmost as a reliable partner to add to the establishment of this system and will continue to contribute its share in preserving transatlantic security. Defense cooperation among the three Baltic states is an excellent example of how our countries can contribute to Euro-Atlantic security, both in general and through specific projects such as BALTBAT, BALTNET, BALTRON, and BALTDEFCOL. Third, it is questionable whether it will be possible to belong to European social and economic structures and not be a part of the common security and military system. Our region is already being integrated into the European security architecture through comprehensive security cooperation, which in itself comprises a whole variety of elements. It is with a feeling of gratitude that I mention security assistance to the Baltic nations, including my own country. In conclusion, please allow me to express Estonia’s expectation that the forthcoming NATO summit will demonstrate a firm commitment to a robust enlargement policy. Promoting the establishment of defense capabilities in new democracies will support the idea of a stronger and more capable Europe. The decisions made by NATO in 1999 should assure us that our efforts in moving towards membership are recognized by the Alliance. We believe that political, strategic, and moral reasons exist for such a decision. Finland The Honorable Anneli Taina Minister of Defense Finland participates actively in the development of transatlantic security cooperation in the field of crisis management. We believe that crisis prevention and effective early management of crises are key elements in the preservation of stability and the enhancement of security in Europe. The effectiveness of these measures largely depends on the texture of the transatlantic link. We participate in this effort as a member of the European Union, as an observer in the Western European Union, and as a member in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. All three venues have implications for our transatlantic relations in the field of security cooperation. On the operational level, in response to the question of what has worked in security management in 10 From left to right in foreground: Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis, Executive Vice President, IFPA; The Honorable Anneli Taina, Minister of Defense, Finland. The Way Ahead page 17 the past decade, the IFOR/SFOR operation in Bosnia and the UNPREDEP in Macedonia are the obvious answers. On the policy level, we are following with great interest the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) that will be finalized at the Washington Summit, as well as the refinement of the St. Malo process. PfP has been an enormous success, as it has drawn Partner nations into closer cooperation with NATO in crisis management while respecting the twin principles of self-differentation and inclusiveness. Through the Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the creation of the Political-Military Framework (PMF), the non-allied EU members can associate themselves ever more closely with future European crisis management and its planning and implementation, be the operation NATO- or WEU-led. On the more concrete operational level, we must strive to enhance and consolidate the PARP over the entire spectrum of crisis-management capabilities. Partnership goals and ministerial guidance are future tools in this effort. The partnership goals are important because they concretely link Partners to the development of the Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters. The creation of Allied-Partner multinational formations established a structural link between the PARP and the PMF, and Finland intends to contribute to this common effort as best it can. Yet how can one move forward in exploiting collective advantages? The elements are already largely in place. On the political level, the future course remains to be defined. The foundation of ESDI within NATO and the creation of a capacity for autonomous action by Europeans à la St. Malo are critical tasks looming in front of us. The decisions must leave the crucial transatlantic link intact while simultaneously finding the right institutional solution. Latvia 11 From left to right: the Honorable Ceslovas V. Stankevicius, Minister of National Defense, Lithuania; the Honorable Girts Valdis Kristovskis, Minister of Defense, Latvia; the Honorable Andrus Öövel, Minister of Defense, Estonia. The Honorable Girts Valdis Kristovskis Minister of Defense Today we are approaching the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the same time that we are in the process of developing collective and long-term efforts to ensure security and stability in the entire North Atlantic area for the next century. Maintenance of a strong transatlantic link in political, security, and defense fields, a wide spectrum of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation that involves both Allied and Partner countries, an enhanced Partnership for Peace program, and a continuation of NATO enlargement are what I believe most of us view as indispensable guides to these efforts. Multinationality and interoperability, team spirit and teamwork, operational and enhanced partnership today are the key words in the development of security and defense cooperation in the transatlantic area. Here I would like to add and stress one more word – integration. This is the principle that should be maintained and equally applied to all states that are ready to share the obligations and responsibilities of Western security organizations. Following the events in Kosovo, we clearly see the need to develop further cooperation in the crisismanagement area, including NATO-led peace-support operations with both Allied and Partner forces’ involvement. In this regard, many Partner states, among them Latvia, have already declared their readiness to contribute forces to the possible new NATO-led peace operation in this region. Latvia welcomes the enhancement of a political-military framework for Partner involvement in NATO-led peace operations. I sincerely believe that all these issues will be addressed at the Washington Summit in April, with the aim of building upon achievements already gained and advantages of cooperative efforts between our nations to effectively foster growing security cooperation realities in the transatlantic area. page 18 The Way Ahead Lithuania The Honorable Ceslovas V. Stankevicius Minister of National Defense The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, founded as a defense alliance by countries of North America and Western Europe fifty years ago, reliably protected the Western democracies against the potential threat of aggression from the Eastern bloc. During the decade that has passed since the collapse of the Soviet empire, it has become clear that the role of the Alliance not only remains valid, but has grown even more important. NATO’s active policy of peace support, partnership, and cooperation became the main factor in dispelling threats to security and decreasing tensions around the world. Enlargement of the Alliance to include all Central and Eastern European countries has emerged as an imperative. It has become obvious that stability in all of Europe and true European unification, without any dividing lines, can be ensured solely by means of such enlargement. Our meeting is taking place on the eve of the Washington Summit. We hope that the forthcoming NATO summit will give applicant countries a new status and framework for membership in the next round. This would be a new real step towards walking through NATO’s open door. We hope that the Washington Summit will specifically name as potential candidates for membership in the Alliance those nations who seek such membership and who are making progress towards NATO integration. The North Atlantic Council could be given the task of evaluating the progress made by NATO aspirants in their preparations and inviting the best-qualified candidates to start accession negotiations by a specified date. We in Lithuania believe that an early invitation of at least one Baltic state for membership will benefit all three, as that would essentially strengthen the security and stability of the entire Baltic region. This would be a signal that it is only a matter of time before the other two are admitted. Such a decision would also erase a dangerous new “red line” being drawn in Eastern Europe by Russian political leaders in order to hinder the Baltic states from joining NATO. We believe that Baltic membership in NATO can create a solid foundation for confidence building in the Baltic region and help to achieve ultimate reconciliation between Russia and the Baltic states. We expect the Washington Summit to provide a clear perspective of further enlargement and clear procedures of how to walk through NATO’s open door. We also hope that the summit will decide to create a program specifically to assist aspiring countries in their preparations to assume Allied responsibilities. We think that the European Security and Defense Identity should be developed in the framework of NATO, not outside of it, and we back further development of the WEU as a stronger pillar of NATO. Lithuania also supports practical cooperation and institutional dialogue between NATO and the WEU to further develop the Combined Joint Task Forces concept as well as the involvement of the WEU and Associate Partners in its implementation. Norway The Honorable Dag Jostein Fjærvoll Minister of Defense Transatlantic cooperation in the security field now faces a new and important dimension as a result of the introduction of the Franco-British initiative at St. Malo. As a NATO member and as a considerable contributor to preserving peace and stability abroad, Norway follows with utmost interest the ongoing debate on how to give the European Union (EU) a better defense capability. The WEU’s operational capabilities have been developed significantly since the beginning of this decade, despite the fact that this has not yet resulted in a prominent role for the organization in practical terms. I do believe that the WEU has a role to play, and therefore there are obvious reasons for making the structure more effective. 12 From left to right: Ambassador Tygesen; the Honorable Dag Jostein Fjærvoll, Minister of Defense, Norway; Mr. Christopher Gyllenstierna, Director, International Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Sweden. The Way Ahead page 19 The direction of European integration in the area of security and defense seems quite clear, but the timeframe is far more uncertain. Even if Norway as a non-EU member does face new challenges in the future, the Norwegian government assumes that the various status categories of European states in relation to Atlantic and European institutions will all be handled within a refined or redesigned Euro-Atlantic security landscape. Thus, our ambition is to participate actively in the formation of a European security and defense policy. The finalization of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) agenda at the upcoming Washington Summit, as agreed to in Berlin, will give Europe more operational capacity and facilitate practical actions to meet future crises in Europe. The completion of ESDI within NATO will also be a concrete expression of better burden sharing between North America and Europe. To what extent the Washington Summit will also send new signals in relation to the European security identity remains to be seen. From a Norwegian point of view, it is important that NATO remain the prime instrument for military operational capacity, even within a European context. Portugal The Honorable José Veiga Simão Minister of Defense The Atlantic Alliance must remain the core institution for security and defense matters in the Euro-Atlantic area for the twenty-first century. In today’s world, Europe and North America are the two poles of greatest economic, political, cultural, and social development. They should coordinate 13 In foreground, the Honorable José Veiga Simão, Minister of Defense, Portugal. their efforts to expand common goals and to promote their fundamental values. Yet a more balanced partnership between Europe and North America must be achieved in NATO. Efforts to give shape to the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) should be undertaken within NATO, while the political, monetary, and economic progress in the construction of the European Union should be reflected in the Atlantic Alliance. ESDI should rely on separable but not separate military tools, while unnecessary duplication should be avoided. However, we cannot avoid the fact that, in this framework, Europe will have to make significant investments in the areas of logistics, communications, and intelligence and reorganize its defense industries under a coherent philosophy, without excluding the possibility of transatlantic cooperation or ignoring the legitimate interests of smaller states. NATO’s enduring purpose is to ensure transatlantic solidarity, guarantee our collective defense, and create a widening area of stability in the EuroAtlantic area through structural multilateral cooperation. We should resist the temptation to let NATO’s success and relevance be defined by its ability to undertake successful crisis management. We cannot allow situations of open conflict, such as we see in Kosovo, to fester. But we must also find a way to go beyond the stage of crisis stabilization to more permanent and enduring solutions. At the end of the day, our key objectives should be to promote the values of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law in the Balkans. The overall aim should be the adoption of what I call a Magna Carta for the Balkans, regulating both the relations among the countries of the region and the rights and obligations of their individual citizens and minorities. NATO should not lose track of the southern shore of the Mediterranean, an area in which it can make a positive contribution to peace and stability. NATO should consider the establishment of a cooperative framework based on the Partnership for Peace program, adapt it to the Mediterranean political and strategic environment, and gradually implement it with selected countries. Regarding the Strategic Concept, we agree that a common operational vision is needed to steer the Alliance towards the future, and we also agree that NATO should take a more active stance regarding page 20 The Way Ahead new sources of threat arising in particular out of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the danger of their dissemination to non-state actors. NATO should also devote some fresh thinking about the importance of human factors in order to achieve operational interoperability and to prepare our forces to deal with the new missions. To prepare for these missions, the personnel of the armed forces will have to be highly qualified, with a broad range of professional capacities, including appropriate language skills and a good knowledge of human behavior. Romania As for the NATO summit in Washington, Romania expects with hope and confidence that this meeting will represent the next stage beyond Madrid so that aspiring members may have a precise time horizon regarding the issuing of a future invitation to join the Alliance. We believe that this horizon should not extend beyond the year 2001. The evolution of security management in Europe in the 1990s proves that the transatlantic link is vital for a coherent and viable security architecture and that NATO enlargement is the most important vector for its strengthening. Romania’s future actions regarding its own security will take these conclusions into account. The Slovak Republic The Honorable Victor Babiuc Minister of National Defense The end of the Cold War raised for Romania, as well as for the other Central and East European states that had been prisoners of the Yalta Agreement, the issue of how to solve its own security equation. In response, Romania has adopted the traditional orientation: security, cooperation, and solidarity with the West. The Warsaw Treaty Organization membership was just a “road accident” enforced by Soviet hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe. This post-Cold War security option has enjoyed the combined backing of political forces in Romania and the overwhelming support (70 to 90 percent) of Romanian public opinion. Romania joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in January 1994, and its participation in PfP activities has reinforced military reform and given more and more substance to interoperability with NATO forces. However, in our view, PfP does not represent a substitute for NATO integration. Since the Alliance set up admission criteria in September 1995, changes within Romanian society have focused on the directions outlined by these criteria. Examples include the deepening of democratization within Romanian society; fostering the market economy; good neighborly relationships; and significant participation in regional security management (for example, the IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the mission in Albania, and the readiness to participate in solving the Kosovo crisis). We have also actively participated in activities organized within the WEU framework, and we have repeatedly affirmed our desire to become a de facto member of this organization. The Honorable Pavol Kanis Minister of Defense The Slovak view of future security cooperation in the transatlantic area is colored by our historical experience. In our history, we have been an arena of competition between European powers and many times a wandering trophy for the winner. Moreover, even during those rare and short periods when we and other states were left on our own, we could not resist the temptation to fight among ourselves. If we define what we would really like to achieve together in Central Europe, it would be stability. This requires a sound society that respects human rights with the rule of law and well-functioning democratic structures. The situation in the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East demonstrates that deeply rooted ethnic and religious contradictions multiplied by economic problems pose a permanent threat and may result in large conflicts. Therefore, a very important aspect of understanding security from a Central European point of view is to realize that stability anywhere in the world affects stability in Central Europe itself. In particular, the mission of the developed countries in Western Europe is the transfer of stability to the East. This is not a strategy of expansion, but only the transfer of those values and institutions that enabled Western Europe to overcome its heritage of conflicts. What is the role of the United States in this process? Naturally, it is up to American citizens to base their decisions on their interests and their role in the world. The history of the twentieth century clearly shows, however, that the fates of Europe and The Way Ahead page 21 North America are closely linked. A mutual relation exists: when Europe is stable and peaceful, the United States and Canada are also more secure. The objective should be to create a relationship in which Europeans and North Americans together pursue and defend common interests both within and beyond Europe. We realize that bringing stability to Central Europe is impossible without NATO. The Alliance offers a combination of political and military solutions that no other organization can offer. The Slovak Republic turns to NATO because we consider the Alliance to be the main factor of stability in Europe. Our more active engagement as a Partner country in the Partnership for Peace and WEU programs also has its axiological aspects. While the Alliance and the Union enable their Partners to participate in a wider spectrum of activities, they simultaneously enlarge the space for common culture, values, and interests, which is beneficial for every Central European country and Europe as a whole. Turkey NATO has gone through a process of adaptation. With the threat of massive attack in Europe gone, NATO allies view their security as increasingly linked to the risk of conflicts arising outside their territories. Instabilities stemming from violent ethnic conflicts, terrorism, mass migration, civil breakdowns, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction have become the new risks and challenges that we need to address in the future. We now feel confident enough of our process of transformation and adaptation to the new circumstances that we speak of a “new NATO.” Yet the Alliance’s core function of collective defense should stay, for it not only underpins our fundamental security but is the basis on which our commitment exists. A permanent North American involvement in European security is one of the lessons learned from the tragedies of the first half of this century. European integration is the other, and consolidating a Europe that is willing and able to shoulder more responsibility will also mean consolidating this transatlantic link. It is in NATO that the real operational future of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is now taking shape. The links between NATO and the WEU have been increasingly strengthened on the basis of the agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. NATO will support the WEU in developing its operational capabilities. However, this must not lead to a duplication of structures and bureaucratic procedures. In this context I would also underline that Turkey’s objective continues to be full membership in the WEU. Artificial linkage between EU and WEU memberships established in Maastricht should be abandoned, and the members of the EU and European members of NATO should ultimately be one and the same. This is certainly necessary to develop a genuine ESDI. Turkey’s geostrategic location and its adherence to universal values such as pluralistic democracy and its adoption of market economy principles gave it a prominent role during the Cold War era, whose end radically altered the scene on Turkey’s borders. Yet in spite of these dramatic changes, Turkey’s role and strategic importance in its region have remained intact and perhaps even increased. As a country that has traditionally been an invaluable contributor to stability, security, and prosperity, Turkey continues to be a stabilizing force in a very turbulent region, and The Honorable Hikmet Sami Türk Minister of National Defense Europe is going through a period of immense changes that will have far-reaching consequences. We have recently witnessed the demise of communism, the end of the East-West confrontation, the liberation of Central and Eastern European nations, and the emergence of newly independent states. We are now confidently moving towards a new European security architecture where our long-cherished values will flourish. In such a framework, the North Atlantic Alliance will continue to be the bedrock of our security. NATO not only brings the nations of Europe and North America together through the transatlantic link, but also remains the only effective and reliable defense structure. The success of the NATO-led force in Bosnia-Herzegovina is concrete proof of this fact. On the other hand, it is also evident that a redefined Europe and Euro-Atlantic community with interlocking systems and agencies are gradually taking shape. In this increasingly interlinked security network, the new NATO will more than ever assume the function as an anchor for stability. Over the past decade, the world has changed, the European security landscape has been altered, and page 22 The Way Ahead 14 In foreground, the Honorable Hikmet Sami Türk, Minister of National Defense, Turkey. its strategic relevance in the post-Cold War era lies in its ability to remain firmly committed to its Western orientation, while simultaneously recognizing the complexities of its geographic destiny and the realities of its immediate neighborhood. Turkey will not only remain central to the security and prosperity of the West, but will also be a key state in the containment and resolution of regional and global problems that we now face. A NATO-centered Atlantic web of institutions will be able to meet the challenges of today and certainly of tomorrow. The solid effort within the Alliance to update its Strategic Concept proves that a common Allied vision for the twenty-first century is emerging. Considerable work on new command structures has been accomplished and, with regard to the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept, the outcome of the trials recently conducted to validate this important concept are encouraging. NATO must remain the main forum for consultations among allies on issues concerning the security and defense of Europe. This is required not only because the transatlantic link is vital for European security, but also as NATO is the only forum in which all European allies enjoy equal opportunities and full rights on matters of common defense. The work on the creation of ESDI within NATO should continue with this understanding. NATO enlargement is part of this post-Cold War European consolidation. Its goal is to enhance stability and well-being throughout Europe. NATO enlargement remains a process, not a single event and the recent new members should not be the last. Russia remains a country in transition. It has yet to find its true role in the new cooperative security order in Europe, which should be a close partnership with NATO. This is the basis for the Permanent Joint Council with Russia as a new forum for consultation on security-related issues. Transparency and reciprocity should be the main tenets in this process. In short, the past achievements have given us confidence that a lasting and productive relationship between NATO and Russia is truly at hand. On the other hand, the NATO-Ukraine Charter is also an important element of the evolving security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic area. Ukraine’s geostrategic location gives it a major role and responsibility, and the development of intensive and pragmatic consultations between Ukraine and NATO aimed at the full implementation of the charter is essential. Looking at the wider security landscape, the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) has established itself as a regular mechanism for enhancing the political relationship between partners and the Alliance. The EAPC, with forty-four countries of diverse backgrounds and security traditions, has emerged as an important forum for regular consultation and cooperation in security issues. The Partnership for Peace program is also developing rapidly and substantively. As the security in the Euro-Atlantic region is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean, the Mediterranean dimension should be an important component of our vision for the twenty-first century, and NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue will add to confidence building and cooperation in the region. In the future, our performance will be judged on whether we can have a shared vision and a shared response to the challenges facing us. As in the past fifty years, Turkey will continue to exert every effort for the success of this common vision. Turkey will remain central in this process and will be a key state. The Way Ahead page 23 Roundtable Agenda March 2, 1999 The International Trade Center The Ronald Reagan Building 8:30-9:30 AM Registration and Continental Breakfast 9:30 AM Welcome by Roundtable Chairman General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.) Dean, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Member of the Board of Directors, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Introductory Remarks The Honorable Hans Haekkerup Minister of Defense, Denmark Roundtable President The Honorable José Cutileiro Secretary-General of the WEU Session I What Has Worked in Security Management for Europe over the Past Decade? Introductory statement by: The Honorable William S. Cohen U.S. Secretary of Defense Roundtable Discussion Coffee Break Session II How Can Security Cooperation Best Be Moved Forward? Introductory statements by: The Honorable Janusz Onyszkiewicz Minister of National Defense, Poland The Honorable Douglas Henderson Minister of State for Armed Forces, Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom Roundtable Discussion 9:35 AM 9:45 AM 11:00 AM 11:15 AM The Way Ahead page 25 12:20 PM 12:30 PM Concluding Remarks by Roundtable President The Honorable Hans Haekkerup Luncheon and Keynote Address Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council Roundtable Adjournment Simultaneous translation between English and French was provided during the roundtable. 2:00 PM 15 From left to right: Dr. Davis; General Galvin; Minister Haekkerup; Dr. Charles M. Perry, Vice President and Director of Studies, IFPA. page 26 The Way Ahead Roundtable Participants U.S. Delegation Department of Defense The Honorable William S. Cohen Secretary of Defense The Honorable Walter B. Slocombe Under Secretary of Defense for Policy The Honorable Franklin D. Kramer Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Lieutenant General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Mr. Frederick C. Smith Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Ms. Lisa Bronson Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs Mr. Paul Gebhard Assistant Chief of Staff Office of the Secretary of Defense Major General Howard J. von Kaenel, USA Military Deputy to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs) Dr. Edward M. Ifft Senior Advisor Defense Threat Reduction Agency Mr. Bernd McConnell Director, Balkans Task Force Office of the Undersecretary of Defense Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Strang, USA Political-Military Officer, Baltics and Scandinavia Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs) Lieutenant Colonel Mark J. Foster, USA Central European Desk Officer Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Headquarters, U.S. Army Ms. Cathryn Thurston West European Desk Officer Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Headquarters, U.S. Army NATO & Major NATO Commands Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., USN Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic Ms. Joan E. Corbett Minister Counselor Political Advisor to NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic Rear Admiral Larry C. Baucom, USN Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic Mr. Clarence Juhl Deputy Defense Advisor U.S. Mission to NATO Commander Douglas G. Cooper Military Assistant to POLAD Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic Department of State Ambassador James Dobbins Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton Implementation Mr. Ronald D. Asmus Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Mr. Robert Beecroft Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Regional Security Affairs Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Dr. Bowman H. Miller Director, Office of Analysis for Europe and Canada Bureau of Intelligence and Research Mr. Joseph De Thomas Director, Office of EU and Regional Affairs Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs Colonel Allan D. Childers, USAF Member, Policy Planning Staff Ms. Lauren Lovelace Public Affairs Specialist Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs Ms. Janina de Guzman USIA-I Bureau, Europe The Way Ahead page 27 National Security Council Mr. Donald K. Bandler Special Assistant to the President & Counselor to the National Security Advisor for the NATO Summit Dr. Stephen J. Flanagan Special Assistant to the President & Senior Director of Central and East European Affairs Mr. Lawrence Butler Director, European Affairs Mr. Philip Gordon Director, NATO Summit Office Intelligence Community Mr. Bradley M. Knopp Defense Intelligence Officer for Europe Directorate for Policy Support Office of the Secretary of Defense Mr. Barry Lowenkron National Intelligence Officer for Europe National Intelligence Council Mr. Daniel Wicks Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Europe National Intelligence Council Congress The Honorable Curt Weldon Chair, Military Research and Development Subcommittee House Armed Services Committee Mr. Ian Brzezinski Legislative Assistant Office of Senator William V. Roth., Jr. Dr. John Hardt Senior Specialist in Post-Soviet Economics Congressional Research Service Mr. Gary J. Pagliano Specialist in Defense and International Affairs Congressional Research Service Mr. Joe Sixaes Professional Staff Member Senate Committee on Armed Services Mr. Stanley Sloan Senior Specialist in International Security Policy Congressional Research Service Research Institutes, Universities & Public Policy Centers Dr. C. Kenneth Allard Vice President Potomac Strategies International Dr. Hans Binnendyk Director Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Colonel James D. Blundell, USA (Ret.) Director of Programs Institute of Land Warfare, AUSA General Charles G. Boyd, USA (Ret.) Executive Director 21st Century Study Group National Security Study Group Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski Counselor Center for Strategic and International Studies Dr. Stephen A. Cambone Director of Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Dr. Patrick Cronin Director of Research and Studies U.S. Institute of Peace Dr. Ivo Daalder Visiting Fellow Foreign Policy Studies Program The Brookings Institution Dr. Cathleen S. Fisher Senior Associate The Henry L. Stimson Center Ambassador James E. Goodby Guest Scholar The Brookings Institution Dr. William R. Graham President and Chairman of the Board National Security Research, Inc. Ms. Jacqueline Grapin President The European Institute Dr. Donald F. Herr Senior Research Fellow Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Dr. Kim R. Holmes Vice President, the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis International Studies Center The Heritage Foundation Mr. Arnold Horelick Vice President for Russian and Eurasian Affairs The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Mr. Craig Kennedy President The German Marshall Fund of the United States Dr. Stanley Kober Research Fellow The CATO Institute Dr. Charles Kupchan Senior Fellow and Director for European Studies The Council on Foreign Relations Mr. Eric Leklen Research Assistant Institute for National Security Studies National Defense University Mr. Joseph Montville Director, Preventive Diplomacy Center for Strategic and International Studies page 28 The Way Ahead Mr. Howard Olsen Army Peace Fellow U.S. Institute of Peace Dr. Andrew J. Pierre Senior Fellow U.S. Institute of Peace Mr. Peter Rashish Executive Vice President The European Institute Dr. Frédéric Ruiz-Ramón Senior Analyst Center for Naval Analyses Dr. Kori Schake Senior Research Professor Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Dr. Simon Serfaty Director of European Studies Center for Strategic and International Studies Mr. Jack M. Seymour Director, Program on Atlantic Cooperation Atlantic Council of the United States Ms. Emily Skov Center for Defense Information Dr. Richard Solomon President U.S. Institute of Peace Ambassador Helmut Sonnenfeldt Guest Scholar Brookings Institution Mr. Gayden E. Thompson Director, Program on NATO and European Security Atlantic Council of the United States General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret.) President and CEO Institute for Defense Analyses Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. Associate Director, West European Studies Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Industry Mr. Scott A. Harris Vice President, Plans and Analysis Lockheed Martin Corporation Mr. Donald J. Neese Director, International Business Development Lockheed Martin Corporation Mr. Arthur J. O’Leary, Jr. Vice President, Europe, Middle East, and Africa Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Mr. Harry A. Pearce Vice President, Business Development Northrop Grumman International, Inc. Mr. Robert J. Stevens Corporate Vice President, Strategic Development Lockheed Martin Corporation Mr. William H. Swanson Chairman and CEO Raytheon Systems Company Canadian Delegation Mr. John Higginbotham Political Minister Embassy of Canada Dr. Natalie Mychajlyszyn Senior Research Fellow Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University European Delegations Austria Dr. Franz Josef Kuglitsch Deputy Chief of Mission Embassy of Austria Brigadier General Guntmar Heck Defense Attaché Embassy of Austria Belgium The Honorable Alex Reyn Ambassador Embassy of Belgium Mr. Ivo Schalbroek First Secretary Embassy of Belgium Bulgaria The Honorable Gueorgui Ananiev Minister of Defense The Honorable Boyka Noev Ambassador to NATO and WEU Major General Stoyan Tzonkov Defense, Military, Naval and Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria Colonel Ivan Ivanov Chief of Section Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria Mrs. Daniela G. Dimitrova Personal Interpreter for the Minister Ministry of Defense Czech Republic The Honorable Vladimir Vetchy Minister of Defense Mr. Jaromir Novotny First Deputy Minister of Defense Ministry of Defense The Honorable Alexander Vondra Ambassador Embassy of the Czech Republic Ms. Renata Drahozalova Interpreter Ministry of Defense Denmark The Honorable Hans Haekkerup Minister of Defense The Way Ahead page 29 The Honorable K. Erik Tygesen Ambassador Royal Danish Embassy Ms. Mette Kjuel Nielsen Deputy Permanent Undersecretary of State for Defense Ministry of Defense Mr. Svend Boje Madsen Deputy Chief of Mission and Minister Royal Danish Embassy Mr. Carsten Damgaard Deputy Permanent Representative of Denmark to NATO and WEU Brigadier General Erik Thorup Pedersen Defense, Military, Naval and Air Attaché Royal Danish Embassy Ms. Lis Frederiksen Head of Information Minister Counselor Royal Danish Embassy Mr. Jens-Otto Horslund First Secretary Royal Danish Embassy Mr. Jesper Vahr Head of Section (N.2) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ms. Susanne Shine Royal Danish Embassy, Ottawa Mr. Peter Michael Pilgaard Deputy Head of Division Ministry of Defense Lieutenant Colonel Tom Stoltenberg Assistant Defense, Military, Naval and Air Attaché Royal Danish Embassy Mr. Mads Lindberg Press Secretary to the Minister Ministry of Defense Ms. Agnethe Kirkegaard Private Assistant to the Minister Ministry of Defense Estonia The Honorable Andrus Öövel Minister of Defense The Honorable Kalev G. Stoicescu Ambassador Embassy of Estonia Dr. Boris Tamm Professor Estonian Academy of Sciences Mr. Tiit Noorkoiv Head of Department Defense Policy Planning Ministry of Defense Lieutenant Colonel Tiit Tammela Defense Attaché Embassy of Estonia Finland The Honorable Anneli Taina Minister of Defense The Honorable Jaakko T. Laajava Ambassador Embassy of Finland Rear Admiral Juhani Kaskeala Head, Policy Department Ministry of Defense Mr. Juha Harjula Senior Analyst, Policy Department Ministry of Defense France The Honorable Michel R.J. Duclos Ambassador Permanent Representative of France Western European Union Major General Jean-Francois Louvion Defense Attaché Embassy of France Mr. Olivier Caron Political-Military Counselor Embassy of France Germany The Honorable Jürgen Chrobog Ambassador Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Harald Braun Minister Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany Brigadier General Peter Goebel Military Attaché Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Otfried Nassauer Director Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security Greece The Honorable Alexander Philon Ambassador Embassy of Greece Mr. Konstantive Catsambis Political Counselor Embassy of Greece Colonel Nikolaos Tsirogiannis Defense Attaché Embassy of Greece Hungary The Honorable János Szabó Minister of Defense The Honorable Géza Jeszenszky Ambassador Embassy of Hungary Dr. Alfréd Köhalmy Assistant State Secretary Chief of Cabinet Ministry of Defense page 30 The Way Ahead Mr. Gabor Csaba Second Secretary (Political) Embassy of Hungary Mr. Tibor Kiss Defense Attaché Embassy of Hungary Mr. Zoltán Sáringer Interpreter Ministry of Defense Iceland Mr. Fridrik Jonsson First Secretary Embassy of Iceland Latvia The Honorable Girts Valdis Kristovskis Minister of Defense The Honorable Ojars Kalnins Ambassador Embassy of the Republic of Latvia Mr. Einars Semanis Deputy Chief of Mission Embassy of the Republic of Latvia Colonel Valdis Matiss Defense Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Latvia Lithuania The Honorable Ceslovas V. Stankevicius Minister of National Defense The Honorable Stasys Sakalauskas Ambassador Embassy of Lithuania Major Valdemaras Sarapinas Defense, Military and Naval Attaché Embassy of Lithuania Captain Kestutis Zelnys Aide-de-Camp to the Defense Minister Ministry of National Defense Luxembourg The Honorable Arlette Conzemius Ambassador Embassy of Luxembourg Mr. Carlo Krieger Deputy Chief of Mission Embassy of Luxembourg The Netherlands Mr. Rob Swartbol Political Counselor Royal Netherlands Embassy Norway The Honorable Dag Jostein Fjærvoll Minister of Defense The Honorable Tom E. Vraalsen Ambassador Embassy of Norway Mr. Svein Styrvold Deputy Director General Ministry of Defense Mrs. Barbro Hugaas Advisor Ministry of Defense Mr. Jan A. Olsen Counselor, Security and Defense Issues Embassy of Norway Poland The Honorable Janusz Onyszkiewicz Minister of National Defense Colonel Waldemar Dziegielewski Defense, Military, Naval and Air Attaché Embassy of Poland Mr. Plotr Piatkowski Deputy Director International Security Department Ministry of National Defense Captain Bogdan Sordyl Cabinet Officer Ministry of National Defense Dr. Piotr Ogrodzinski Minister Counselor Deputy Chief of Mission Embassy of Poland Portugal The Honorable José Veiga Simão Minister of Defense The Honorable Fernando Andresen Guinarães Ambassador Embassy of Portugal The Honorable Antonio Martins de Cruz Ambassador Permanent Representative of Portugal Western European Union General António Gonçalves Ribeiro Director-General for National Defense Policy Ministry of Defense Mr. Bernardo Futscher Pereira Diplomatic Attaché to the Minister Ministry of Defense Major José Dias Gonçalves Assistant Deputy Chief to the Minister Ministry of Defense Mr. Nuno Mathias First Secretary Embassy of Portugal Mr. Manuel Silva Pereira Press Counselor Embassy of Portugal Romania The Honorable Victor Babiuc Minister of National Defense The Honorable Mircea Dan Geoana Ambassador Embassy of Romania The Way Ahead page 31 General Gavril Ghitas Deputy Chief of the General Staff Ministry of National Defense Brigadier General Mihail Ionescu Chief European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Ministry of National Defense Ms. Arda Filip Minister Counselor Embassy of Romania Slovak Republic The Honorable Pavol Kanis Minister of Defense The Honorable Martin Bútora Ambassador Embassy of the Slovak Republic Mr. Juraj Sivácek Second Secretary Embassy of the Slovak Republic Colonel Stefan Kristof Defense, Military and Air Attaché Embassy of the Slovak Republic Lieutenant Colonel Julius Demetrian Interpreter Ministry of Defense Slovenia The Honorable Franci Demsar Minister of Defense Ambassador Matjaz Sinkovec Slovenian Mission to NATO and WEU Ambassador Dimitrij Rupel Embassy of Slovenia Mr. Zoran Klemenic Chief Center of Strategic Studies Ministry of Defense Mr. Roman Kreutz Ministry of Defense Spain The Honorable Jorge Fuentes Ambassador Permanent Representative of Spain Western European Union Mr. Raphael Conde Deputy Chief of Mission Embassy of Spain Mr. Juan Antonio Martin-Burgus NATO Counselor Embassy of Spain Sweden Mr. Christopher Gyllenstierna Director International Affairs Ministry of Defense Mr. Jan Knutsson Political Counselor Embassy of Sweden Turkey The Honorable Hikmet Sami Türk Minister of National Defense The Honorable Baki Ilkin Ambassador Embassy of Turkey Rear Admiral K. Nazif Özdagdeviren Chief General Plans and Principles Department Ministry of National Defense Mr. Inan Özyildiz Counselor Embassy of Turkey Colonel Okan Sunat Chief Division of International Relations and Treaties Ministry of National Defense Colonel Derya Okçu Chief of Cabinet Ministry of National Defense Lieutenant Colonel Vahap Özkan Assistant Deputy Chief Ministry of National Defense United Kingdom The Honorable Douglas Henderson Minister of State for Armed Forces Ministry of Defense Commander Simon Gillespie, RN Executive Assistant to the Minister of State for Armed Forces Ministry of Defense Mr. Michael O’Neill Secretary of the Chancery British Embassy Mr. William J. Shapcott Counsellor, Political and Military Affairs British Embassy Western European Union The Honorable José Cutileiro Secretary-General Western European Union Mr. Jacques Baumel Chairman, Political Committee Western European Union Assembly Mr. Eike Burchard Deputy for Political Affairs and Defense Western European Union Assembly Mr. Colin Cameron Clerk to the Assembly Western European Union Assembly Mr. Armand De Decker Chairman, Defense Committee Western European Union Assembly page 32 The Way Ahead Mr. Richard Tibbels Head, Security Policy Section WEU Political Division Western European Union Ms. Myriam Sochacki Acting Head, Private Office Head, Press and Information Office Western European Union Media ABC Network News Mr. Bent Albrectsen Politiken Ms. Helle Bering Editor, Editorial Pages The Washington Times Mr. Luís Bocangel Cameraman RTP Ms. Ann Buffington Associated Press TV Mr. Tom Buk-Swienty US Bureau Chief Weekendavisen Mr. Martin Burcharth Freelance Journalist Mr. Franco Carusso Independente CBS Network News Mr. Steen Rabing Christiensen Foreign Editor Scandinavian Broadcasting Mr. Colin S. Clark Reporter Defense News Mr. Dennis Cook Associated Press Photos Mr. Eduardo Dâmaso Público Mr. Martin Eichtinger Director, Austrian Press and Information Service Austrian Embassy Mr. Carlos Fino RTP Mr. Manuel Carlos Freire LUSA Mr. Regner Hansen Journalist Ritzhaus Bureau Mr. Thomas Hass Freelance Cameraman Mr. Vibeke Hjortlund Börsen Mr. Ilir Ikonomir Voice of America Ms. Hanna Jansen Danish Broadcasting Mr. Torsten Jansen Danish Broadcasting Corporation (TV) Ms. Malene Jensen Freelance Journalist Mr. Klaus Justesen Freelance Journalist Mr. Finn Joens Journalist Jannich Kofoed Danish Broadcasting Corporation Mr. Jorgen V. Larsen Politiken Ms. Lene Lovschall Journalist BT Mr. Lyubomir Nikolov BBC – Bulgarian Service Mr. Helge Ogrim US Correspondent Ritzhaus Bureau Ritzaus Bureau Mr. Samuel Rachlin TV2 Denmark Mr. Scott Rensberger Cameraman TV2 Denmark Mr. Flemming Rose Washington Bureau Chief Berlingske Tidende Ms. Rützou Producer Danish Broadcasting Mr. Cid Saldanha Rádio Renascença Mr. Poul Erik Skammelsen TV 2 Mr. Vladimir Spencer Senior Editor, Romania Service Voice of America Mr. Lada Trifonna Deutsche Welle Mr. Michael Ulveman Jyllands-Posten Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. General John R. Galvin, USA (Ret.) Dean, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Tufts University; Member of the Board, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis Executive Vice President Dr. Charles M. Perry Vice President & Director of Studies Mr. Jack Kelly Senior Research Associate Ms. Martha King Administrative Assistant to the Executive Vice President The Way Ahead page 33 Ms. Marilyn Laczkovich Research Associate Ms. Maggie Forster Schmitz Research Associate Ms. Michelle Suchan Research Intern Mr. Mike Sweeney Senior Research Associate Mr. David R. Tanks Senior Defense Analyst Mr. Toshi Yoshihara Research Associate page 34 The Way Ahead Further Information and the Internet For further information on the role and activities of the WEU, as well as the latest news, visit the WEU’s website @ WWW.WEU.INT For further information on the activities and projects of the Institute for Foreign Policy, visit IFPA’s website @ WWW.IFPA.ORG or send email to MAIL@IFPA.ORG The Way Ahead page 35