The Market for Nursing Home Quality
David Grabowski University of Alabama at Birmingham
Background
• The standard economic model of quality competition assumes:
– – – – Privately purchased care Perfectly informed consumers Choice across providers No government intervention
• The NH market clearly deviates from all of these assumptions
History
• In the 1970s, states generally paid for NH care on a cost-based basis • Little information typically available to potential NH consumers • Certificate-of-need and construction moratoria often created excess demand for services
– Occupancy rates were above 95%
Current Market (Times Have Changed)
• States generally pay for care on a case-mix adjusted prospective basis • Public quality reporting now available • CON/moratoria no longer relevant in many NH markets due to the growth in assisted living
– Occupancy rates now around 87% – One-third of facilities that call themselves "assisted living" have been in business for five or fewer years, and 60% have been in operation for ten or fewer years (Hawes et al., 1999)
Examples: Market for Quality
• Beverly Enterprises, Inc.
– Currently experimenting with model of “residentcentered” care in 10 NHs in order to gain competitive advantage – 11 NHs formed alliance to compete on the basis of quality for managed care business
– Philadelphia has experienced growth in CCRCs due to increased housing wealth; Buffalo has experienced growth in assisted living due to large pensions of retired factory workers
• Wellspring Innovative Solutions, Inc.
• Philadelphia/Buffalo LTC markets
Research: Market for Quality
• Innovation
– Competition among nursing homes associated with more Alzheimer’s and sub-acute care units (BanaszakHoll et al., 1996)
• Facility closures
– High deficiency facilities more likely to voluntarily exit the market (Angelelli et al., 2003)
• Response to Medicaid Payment Changes
– Higher Medicaid payment rates are associated with better quality (Grabowski, 2001)
Grabowski & Angelelli, in press HSR
Effect of Medicaid Payment on patient-level riskadjusted pressure ulcer incidence Elasticity - 0.16* - 0.06 - 0.31*
All Markets High Occupancy Markets High Medicaid Homes
*=
statistically significant at the 1% level
Research Needs
1) What are the returns to greater competition in today’s marketplace?
– Earlier work finds that more concentrated markets achieve better outcomes (Zinn, 1994)
• I/O theory generally holds that when market share is concentrated in a few large firms, competition is diminished • In health care markets, concentration may diminish the effect of information asymmetry, which could increase competition (Pauly and Satterthwaite, 1981)
– Need to update this work with more recent data and better quality measures
Research Needs
2) Can we adjust Medicaid payment policy to better harness market forces?
– Why not reward high quality providers with higher Medicaid payment rates? – Demonstration-based evidence supports such a payment system (Norton 1992) – Additional demonstrations… – Tradeoffs of investment in NH and other LTC settings
Research Needs (cont.)
3) Will greater consumer information create greater quality competition?
– We need more research on the relationship between consumer information and consumer choice. – Limited knowledge of how hospital discharge planners influence process
Research Needs (cont.)
4) What is the return to increased NH regulation?
– State and Federal governments both are discussing increased minimum staffing standards – Federal government continues to use costly survey and certification process – Are there market-based alternatives that may encourage more efficient outcomes?
Research Needs (cont.)
5) What is the role of assisted living and other NH substitutes towards encouraging good outcomes?
– There is no research tying growth in assisted living market to NH quality – Very limited government intervention in assisted living markets in most states
• Thus, no systematic data
– However, some states have put assisted living providers under CON
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