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Employment Contracts in Arizona

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					To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

WP#        Title                                                                                Author(s)
85-1       Information and Conspiracy in Sealed Bid Auctions                                    R. Mark Isaac; James M. Walker
85-2       Group Size Hypotheses of Public Goods and Provision: An Experimental                 R. Mark Isaac; James M. Walker
           Examination
85-3       The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulations: The Case of Oil Field   Gary D. Libecap; Steven N. Wiggins
           Utilization
85-4       Contractual Failure in the Presence of Imperfect Information                         Gary D. Libecap; Steven N. Wiggins
85-5       Exante Attachments, Information Relevation and Contracts                             Eskander Alvi
85-6       Involuntary Unemployment Without Contracts                                           Eskander Alvi
85-7       Minimum Wage Effects With Output Stabilization                                       James C. Cox; Ronald L. Oaxaca
85-8       Strategic Capital Investment in the American Aluminum Industry                       Stanley S. Reynolds
85-9       Who Wins and Who Loses? An Economic Justice Overview and Research Agenda             Edward E. Zajac

85-10      Predatory Pricing in Experiments                                                     Glenn W. Harrison
85-11      A General Equilibrium Analysis of Tariff Reductions                                  Glenn W. Harrison
85-12      Sensitivity Analysis and Trade Policy Modeling                                       Glenn W. Harrison
85-13      Experimental Evaluation of Institutions of Monopoly Restraint                        Glenn W. Harrison; Michael Mckee; E.E. Ruström
85-14      Experimental Methods in Economics                                                    Vernon L. Smith
85-15      Managing J. Pierrepont Finch: Should He Be Given a PC?                               R. Mark Isaac; David E. Pingry
85-16      Capacity Investment and Preemption: A Differential Game Analysis                     Stanley S. Reynolds
85-17      On a Class of Two Player, Two State Differential Games                               Stanley S. Reynolds
85-18      The Econometrics of Piecewise-Linear Budget Constraints: A Monte Carlo Study         Sharon Bernstein Megdal

85-19      Londitudinal Changes in Salary at a Large Public University: The Response to         Sharon Bernstein Megdal; Michael R. Ransom
           Equal Pay Legislation
85-20      Incentive Regulations: A Case Study in the Use of Laboratory Experimental Analysis   James C. Cox; R. Mark Isaac
           in Economics
85-21      Stability of a Stock Market Economy                                                  Fernando M.C.B. Saldanha
85-22      On Monopolistic Competition and the Equilibria of Non-Tâtonnement Processes          Fernando M.C.B. Saldanha

85-23      The Hahn Process with Quantity Constraints                                           Fernando M.C.B. Saldanha
85-24      Hunting and Gathering Economies                                                      Vernon L. Smith
85-25      A Theory of Patent Licensing With Multiple Innovations                               Kevin A. McCabe
85-26      missing
85-27      missing
85-28   missing
85-29   In Search of the Effect of Unionism on the Wages of Union Workers and Non-Union Ronald L. Oaxaca
        Workers
85-30   Innovation and Property Rights in Information: An Experimental Approach to      R. Mark Isaac; Stanley S. Reynolds
        Testing Hypothesis About Private R&D Behavior
85-31   Plant Closings and Exit Behavior in Declining Industries                        Stanley S. Reynolds
          To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working pap

WP#     Title
86-1    A New Mechanism For Incentive Regulation: Theory and Experiment
86-2    Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset
        Markets
86-3    Electric Utility Deregulation
86-4    Efficiency-Wage Contracts
86-5    Monopoly Capacity Investment and Utilization Under Uncertain Demand
86-6    Theory and Individual Behavior of First Price Auctions
86-7    Experiment Methods in the Political Economy of Exchange
86-8    Hypothetical Valuations and Preference Reversals in the Context lo Asset Trading

86-9    Inducing Risk Neutral Preferences: An Examination in a Controlled Market
        Environment
86-10   On Testing the Utility Hypothesis
86-11   Laboratory Experiments with a Finite Horizon Job Search Model
86-12   Practical Aspects of the Deregulation of Electric Power: Applying and Extending
        Existing Institutions
86-13   Communication and Free Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

86-14   New Indirect Utility Functions With Applications to Forecasting Commodity Demand
        and Labor Supply
86-15   Incentive Regulation and Innovation
rly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

            Author(s)
            James C. Cox; R. Mark Issac
            Vernon L. Smith; Gerry L. Suchanek

            Stephen J. Rassenti; Vernon L. Smith
            Eskander Alvi
            Stanley S. Reynolds
            James C. Cox; Vernon L. Smith; James M. Walker
            Vernon L. Smith
            Marc Knez; Vernon L. Smith

            James C. Cox; Vernon L. Smith

            James C. Cox
            James C. Cox; Ronald L. Oaxaca
            Vernon L. Smith

            R. Mark Isaac; James M. Walker

            James C. Cox; Ronald L. Oaxaca

            James C. Cox; R. Mark Isaac
               To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the workin

WP#     Title
87-1    Success and Failure of the Voluntary Contributions Process: Some Evidence From
        Experimental Economics
87-2    The Assurance Problem in a Laboratory Market
87-3    A Note on the Analysis of OCS Oil Lease Auctions--Some Empirical Results and
        Their Implications For the Design of Laboratory Experiments
87-4    Joint Bidding in Common Value Auctions: Evidence From Offshore Oil Lease
        Auctions
87-5    Expert Systems: Tools For Economic Policy Analysis

87-6    Schumpeterian Competition in Experimental Markets
87-7    Strategic Investment With Capacity Adjustment Costs
87-8    An Experimental Study of Competitive Bidding In Incentive Procurement
87-9    Why is the Rent Seeking Industry So Small? A Nugatory Solution
87-10   Preference Reversals Without the Independence Axiom
87-11   Stability and Preference Distortionin Resource Matching: An Experimental Study of
        the Marriage Problem
87-12   Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition in Experimental Markets

87-13   Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding: in Sealed Bid Auctions
87-14   Why Are Backward Countries Backward?
87-15   The Economics of Torts
87-16   The Economics of Conflict
y (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

             Author(s)
             R. Mark Isaac; James M. Walker

             R. Mark Isaac; David Schmidtz; James M. Walker
             Elizabeth Hoffman; James R. Marsden; Reza Saidibaghgandomi

             Elizabeth Hoffman; James R. Marsden; Reza Saidibaghgandomi

             Elizabeth Hoffman; Varghese S. Jacob; James R. Marsden;
             Andrew Whinston
             R. Mark Isaac; Stanley S. Reynolds
             Stanley S. Reynolds
             Paula-Ann Cech; David Conn; James E. Cox; R. Mark Isaac
             Gordon Tullock
             James C. Cox; Seth Epstein
             Glenn W. Harrison; Kevin A. McCabe

             Jamie Kruse; Stephen Rassenti; Stanley S. Reynolds; Vernon L.
             Smith
             Robert Forsythe; R. Mark Isaac; Thomas R. Palfrey
             Gordon Tullock
             Gordon Tullock
             Gordon Tullock
               To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working

WP#     Title
88-1    The Costs of Rent Seeking: A Metaphysical Problem
88-2    Rent Seeking: The Problem of Definition
88-3    What To Do? What To Do?
88-4    Strategic Behavior and the Defects of the Nash Equilibrium: A Comment
88-5    Rent Seekings and Tax Reform
88-6    Technological Winds of Creation and Destruction in the Telecommunications: A
        Case Study
88-7    A Demand Based Benefit Cost Model of Central Arizona Project Supplies
88-8    An Input-Output Analysis To Estimate Tax Exporting in Hawaii
88-9    Monopsony and Sex Differentials in the Academic Labor Market
88-10   Testing Bargaining Theory in Experiments
88-11   Testing Agency Models Experimentally: A Preliminary Study
88-12   A Comparison of the Dutch and English Clocks in Simultaneous Multiple Unit
        Nondiscriminatory Auctions
88-13   A New Market Institution for the Exchange of Composite Goods
88-14   Production Effects of Price and Cost-Based Anti-Dumping Laws Under Flexible
        Exchange Rates
88-15   Hedging Across Suppliers Under Stochastic Input Deliveries "You Can't Always Get
        What You Want"
88-16   Competition and Pricing in the Arizona Gasoline Market
88-17   Removal of Regulatory Barriers to Entry
88-18   Spurious Injury: Free Trade Under the Prospect of Protection
88-19   Experimental Tests of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games
88-20   Markets and Hierachies: Chapter 1 Introduction
88-21   Markets and Hierachies: Chapter 2. Why Hierarchical Organizations? Why Not?

88-22   Bureaucratic Rules, Supervisor Behavior and the Effect on Salaries in Federal
        Government
88-23   The Political Economy of Crude Oil Cartelization in the United States: 1933-1972

88-24   Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Rights
88-25   Agency Growth, Salaries and the Protected Bureaucrat
88-26   Contenancy and Competitation In An Experimental Double Auction Market For
        Natural Gas Pipeline Networks
88-27   Experimental Methods To Advance Historical Investigation: An Examination of
        Cartel Compliance By Large and Small Firms
(merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

           Author(s)
           Gordon Tullock
           Gordon Tullock
           Gordon Tullock
           Gordon Tullock
           Gordon Tullock
           Edward E. Zajac

           R. Bruce Billings
           R. Bruce Billings; Richard L. Bowen; PingsunLeung
           Michael R. Ransom
           Glenn W. Harrison; Kevin A. McCabe
           David Conn; S. Mark Young
           Kevin A. McCabe; Stephen J. Rassenti; Vernon L. Smith

           Kevin A. McCabe; Stephen J. Rassenti; Vernon L. Smith
           Bernard M. Hoekman; Michael P. Leidy

           Michael P. Leidy

           R. Mark Isaac; Ronald L. Oaxaca; Stanley S. Reynolds
           Paula-Ann Cech
            Bernard M. Hoekman; Michael P. Leidy
           Jeff Banks; Colin F. Camerrer; David Porter
           Gordon Tullock
           Gordon Tullock

           Ronald N. Johnson; Gary D. Libecap

           Gary D. Libecap

           Gary D. Libecap
           Ronald N. Johnson; Gary D. Libecap
           Stephen J. Rassenti; Stanley S. Reynolds; Vernon L. Smith

           Brian R. Binger; Elizabeth Hoffman; Gary D. Libecap
              To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working pa

WP#     Title
89-1    Markets and Hierarchies: Chapter 3. Parallel Problems
89-2    Thoughts on Social Choice
89-3    Markets and Hierarchies: Chapter 4. In the Belly of the Beast
89-4    Markets and Hierarchies: Chapter 5. Life in the Interior
89-5    Markets and Hierarchies: Chapter 6. Structural Reform
89-6    The Scope of Bubbles and Crashes In Experimental Asset Markets
89-7    Capacity Planning and Resource Pricing For Pioneering Projects
89-8    missing
89-9    Accidental Freedom
89-10   Intergenerational Transfers
89-11   The Proper Scope of Self-Interest
89-12   Are Scientists Different?
89-13   Constitutional Freedom and Prosperity
89-14   Games and Preference
        A Laboratory Analysis of Price Dynamics and Expectations in the Cobweb Model
89-15
89-16   Democracy and the Courts
89-17   The Robustness of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Stock Markets
89-18   Complete Information and Provisionof Public Goods
        Auction Institutional Design: Theory and Behavior of Simultaneous Multiple Unit
89-19   Generalizations of the Dutch and English Auctions
        Inducing Risk Neutral Preference: An Examination ina Controlled Market
89-20   Environment
89-21   Costly Communication: An Experiment in a Nested Public Goods Problem
89-22   Auction Design for Composite Goods: The Natural Gas Industry
89-23   Geometry and Analysis of "Money Metric" Indirect Utility
89-24   Lakatos and Experimental Economics
(merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

            Author(s)
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            David Porter; Vernon L. Smith
            Jeffrey S. Banks; John O. Ledyard; David Porter

            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Eskander Alvi
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock

            Charissa P. Wellford
            Gordon Tullock
            Ronald R. King; Vernon L. Smith; Arlington W. Williams
            R. Mark Isaac; James M. Walker

            Kevin A. McCabe; Stephen J. Rassenti; Vernon L. Smith

            James C. Cox; Vernon L. Smith; James M. Walker
            R. Mark Isaac; James M. Walker
            Kevin A. McCabe; Stephen J. Rassenti; Vernon L. Smith
            Edward E. Zajac
            Kevin A. McCabe; Stephen J. Rassenti; Vernon L. Smith
                     To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the wor

WP#     Title
90-1    Markets and Hierarchies: Chapter 7. Termites
90-2    Markets and Hierarchies: Chapter 8. A General Picture
90-3    The Economics of (Very) Primitive Societies
90-4    Markets and Hierarchies: Chapter 9. Random Allocation
90-5    Markets and Hierarchies: Chapter 10. Restricted Scope
90-6    The Role of Military Draft in Optimal Fiscal Policy: A Comment
90-7    Experimental Market Economics
90-8    Rational Choice the Contrast Between Economics and Psychology
90-9    Random Thoughts on Debt
90-10   Environmental Problems
90-11   Trials on Trials Reconsidered
90-12   Markets and Hierarchies: Chapter 11. Incentives
90-13   Stochastic Innovation and Product Market Organization
90-14   Experimental Economics: Behavioral Lesson For Microeconomic Theory and Policy

90-15 Arch Modeling in Finance: A Selective Review of the Theory and Empirical
      Evidence With Suggestions for Future Research
90-16 Exchange Rate Volatility and Time Varying Hedge Rations
90-17 Reflections on Constitutions
90-18 Casual Recollection Of An Editor
90-19 The Impact of Exchange Rate Volatility on International Trade: Estimates Using the
      Garch-M Model
90-20 Optimal Dynamic Hedging Portfolios and the Currency Composition of External
      Debt
90-21 Experimental Research on Deregulation Natural Gas Pipeline and Electric Power
      Transmission Networks
90-22 Markets and Hierarchies: Chapter 12. Summing Up
90-23 Using Laboratory Experimental Auctions in Marketing Research: A Case Study of
      New Packaging for Fresh Beef
90-24 Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics
90-25 Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
      Utilizing Large Groups
90-26 Price Cap Regulation: Pitfalls of Implementation
90-27 Property Rights and Economic Development
90-28 From Private Property to Government Ownership: Federal Land Policy and the
      General Revision Act
90-29 The First Federal Consumer Quality Guarantees and the Origins of Antitrust
90-30 Patronage to Merit: Political Change in the Federal Government Labor Force
90-31 The Role of Employment Opportunities in Determining Employment Status
90-32 Racial Differences in Employment Probabilities
90-33 Nonmanipulable Voting Schemes When Participants' Interests Are Partially
      Decomposable
90-34 Nonnested Hypothesis Testing in Applied Economics
90-35 Hawks, Doves, and Free Riders
90-36 A Test of Weak Separability in Linear Demand Systems: An Application of
      Cointergration
90-37 Unemployment Insurance and Job Search
90-38 Tests for a Reservation Wage Effect
90-39 Direct Tests of the Reservation Wage Property
90-40 Institutional Choice and the Development of U.S. Agricultural Policies in the 1920's
le Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

            Author(s)
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Vernon L. Smith
            Vernon L. Smith
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            R. Mark Isaac; Stanley S. Reynolds
            Vernon L. Smith

            Tim Bollersleve; Ray Y. Chou; Narayanan Jayaraman; Kenneth F. Kroner

            Kenneth F. Kroner; Jahangir Sultan
            Gordon Tullock
            Gordon Tullock
            Kenneth F. Kroner; Jahangir Sultan

            Stijn Claessens; Kenneth F. Kroner

            Kevin A. McCabe; Stephen J. Rassenti; Vernon L. Smith

            Gordon Tullock
            Ray A. Field; Elizabeth Hoffman; Dale J. Menkhaus; Glen D. Whipple

            Vernon L. Smith; James M. Walker
            R. Mark Isaac; James M. Walker; Arlington Williams

            R. Mark Isaac
            Gary D. Libecap
            Gary D. Libecap

            Gary D. Libecap
            Ronald L. Johnson; Gary D. Libecap
            Leslie S.Stratton
            Leslie S.Stratton
            Diego Moreno; Mark Walker

            Barbara N. Sands; Michael W. Trosset
            Gordon Tullock
            Devajyoti Ghose

            James C. Cox; Ronald L. Oaxaca
            James C. Cox; Ronald L. Oaxaca
            James C. Cox; Ronald L. Oaxaca
Elizabeth Hoffman; Gary D. Libecap
        To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper

WP#     Title
91-1    A Modest Proposal For Lowering the Cost of Health Insurance
91-2    Identifying Discouraged Workers and Their Relative Attachment to the Labor Market

91-3    Games and Risk
91-4    Theory and Misbehavior in First Price Auctions: Comment
91-5    Game Theory and Experimental Economics: Beginnings and Early Influences
91-6    Nonmanipulable Decision Mechanisms for Economic Environments
91-7    Time Varying Distributions and Dynamic Hedging With Foreign Currency Futures

91-8    Economic Principles in the Emergence of Humankind
91-9    The Impact of the Form of New Technology on the Entry-Exit Game: A Preliminary
        Historical Exploration
91-10   A Game Theoretic Model of Public Goods Provision With Positive Nash Equilibria
        and Its Experimental Evidence
91-11   Tests for a New Medium Effect On Experimental Outcomes
91-12   Linear Aggregation in the Error-Correlation Model
91-13   The Good, The Bad, and the Paycheck Compensating Differentials in Labor
        Markets, 1884-1903
91-14   Guns Thugs, Rednecks, and Scabs: Violence in the Bituminous Coal Industry
91-15   The Economics of Company Housing: Historical Perspectives From the Coal Fields

91-16   Strikes and Wages Prior to the National Labor Relations ACT
91-17   In Praise of the Local Money Metric
91-18   Rationality With Economy
91-19   Convergence Theorems for a Class of Recursive Stochastic Algorithms
91-20   On Recursive Learning in Noncooperative Games
@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

            Author(s)
            Gordon Tullock
            Leslie S. Stratton

            Gordon Tullock
            James C. Cox; Vernon L. Smith; Mark Walker
            Vernon L. Smith
            Diego Moreno
            Kenneth F. Kroner; Jahangir Sultan

            Vernon L. Smith
            Edward E. Zajac

            Ya Li

            Ya Li
            Devajyoti Ghose
            Price V. Fishback; Shawn Kantor

            Price V. Fishback
            Price V. Fishback

            Price V. Fishback
            Edward E. Zajac
            Gordon Tullock
            Diego Moreno
            Diego Moreno
        To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizo

WP#
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92-8
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92-12
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92-14
92-15
92-16
92-17
92-18
92-19
92-20
92-21
92-22
92-23
92-24
92-25
92-26
92-27
92-28
92-29
92-30
92-31
                             To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with

Title
Rethinking the Model Selection Agenda: A Unification of Some Fundamental Issues
Reexamining Involuntary Part-Time Employment
A Source of Conventions
The Relationship Between Firm Size & Screening Ability in an Automobile Insurance Market
Multivariate Simultaneous Generalized Arch
Institutions and Economic Growth: The Contributions of Douglass C. North
Can Electric Power--A "Natural Monopoly"--Be Regulated?
Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
An Experimental Investigation of the Hahn-Noll Revenue Neutral Auction for Emissions Licenses
The Politics of Terrorism
Queues When Balking Is Strategic
A Note on Redistribution
An Experimental Stuy of the Courtnot Model
Removal of Firm-Specific Output Limits and Dynamic Market Power
Firm-Specific Output Limits in a Posted Offef Market-Distributive and Efficiency Effects
Firm-Specific VS Market Quotas: The Non-Equivalence of Price Outcomes
The Impactof Regulatory Controls on Industry Structure: A Study of the Car and Scooter Industry in India
Gainers and Losers in the Indian Regulatory-Deregulatory Experience
In Fairness, Smaller is Cheaper
A Dynamic Game Theoretic Model of Firms' Training and Developmen Behavior Under Externality
On the Existence of Training and Development Externalities in the Labor Market
Using Laboratory Market Experiments to Evaluate Econometric Estimators of Structural Models
The Preference Reversal Phenomenon: Response Mode, Markets and Incentives
The Relationship Between Garch and Stable Processes: Finding the Source of Fat Tails in Financial Data
Arbitrage and Cointergration
The Economic Consequences of Legislative Oversight: Theory and Evidence From the Medical Profession
The Causes and Consequences of Livestock Enclosure in the Postbellum South
Did Workers Gain From the Passage of Wokers' Compensation Laws?
United States V.Brown University ET AL.: Why Do Non-Profits Fix Prices?
Some Experimental Evidence on Differences Between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk
An Experimental Analysis of the Effects of Aggregation on Tests of the Permanent Income Hypothesis
ly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

            Author(s)
            Barbara Sands; Michael W. Trosset
            Leslie S. Stratton
            Gordon Tullock
            Kenneth F. Kroner; Douglas S. West
            Yoshihisha Baba; Robert F. Engle; Dennis F. Kraft; Kenneth F. Kroner
            Gary D.Libecap
            Vernon L. Smith
            Elizabeth Hoffman; Kevin McCabe; Keith Shachat; Vernon L. Smith
            Robert Franciosi; R. Mark Isaac; David E. Pingry; Stanley S. Reynolds
            Gordon Tullock
            Mark Olson
            Gordon Tullock
            Brian R. Binger; Elizabeth Hoffman; Gary D. Libecap; Keith M. Shachat
            Praveen Kujal
            Praveen Kujal
            Praveen Kujal
            Praveen Kujal
            Praveen Kujal
            Edward E. Zajac
            Ya Li
            Ya Li
            James C. Cox; Ronald L. Oaxaca
            James C. Cox; David M. Grether
            Devajyoti Ghose; Kenneth F. Kroner
            Robin J. Brenner; Kenneth F. Kroner
            Shawn Everett Kantor; Patric Legros
            Shawn Everett Kantor
            Price V. Fishback; Shawn Everett Kantor
            Robert Franciosi
            Michael K. Block; Vernon E. Gerety
            Devajyoti Ghose; Hansuk Kim
        To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.e

WP#
93-1
93-2
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93-4
93-5
93-6
93-7
93-8
93-9
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93-11
93-12
93-13
                          To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the

Title
The Relationship Between Garch and Stable Processes: Finding the Source of Fat Tails in Financial Data
Program Trading, Non-Program Trading and Market Volatility
Forcasting Volatility in Commodity Markets
Arbitrage, Cointegration and Testing for Simple Efficiency in Financial Markets
Another Look At Alternative Models of the Short-Term Interest Rate
Thoughts on Private Roads
Coalition-Proof Equilibrium
The Walrasian Equilibrium of Matching Models
An Experimental Study of Cost-Sharing Contracts For Procurement: Market Performance Results
Accuracy in Journalism: An Economic Approach
Toward a Positive Theory of Regulation
Housework, Effort and Wages of Married Workers
Housework, Wages, and the Division of Housework Time For Employed Spouses
@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

              Author(s)
              Devajyoti Ghose; Kenneth F. Kroner
              Kendreth C. Hogan Jr.; Kenneth F. Kroner; Jahangir Sultan
              Stijn Claeseens; Keven P. Kneafsey; Kenneth F. Kroner
              Robin J. Brenner; Kenneth F. Kroner
              Robin J. Brenner; Richard H. Harjes
              Gordon Tullock
              Diego Moreno; John Wooders
              John Wooders
              Paula-Ann Cech; James C. Cox
              James C. Cox; Alvin I. Goldman
              Edward E. Zajac
              Joni Hersch; Leslie S. Stratton
              Joni Hersch; Leslie S. Stratton
       To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) wit

WP#
94-1
94-2
94-3
94-4
94-5
94-6
94-7
94-8
94-9
                    To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the workin

Title
Common Persistence in Conditional Variances: Implications for Dynamic Hedging
An Anaylsis of Property Rights, Land Rents, and Agricultural Investment on Two Frontiers in Brazil
Are Involuntary Part-Time Workerws Indeed Involuntary?
An Experimental Investigation of the Incentives to Form Agricultural Marketing Pools
Government Growth
Civilized Ants
The Cost of Medical Progress
Arrow and All That
Economics and Psychology: Mediating the Conflict
@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

             Author(s)
             Devajyoti Ghose; Kenneth F. Kroner
             Lee J. Alston; Gary D. Libecap; Robert Schneider
             Leslie S. Stratton
             Elizabeth Hoffman; Gary Libecap; Jason M. Shachat
             Gordon Tullock
             Gordon Tullock
             Gordon Tullock
             Gordon Tullock
             Gordon Tullock
       To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.ar

WP#
95-1
95-2
95-3
95-4
                                   To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu

Title
Design of a Coordinating Process For Cost Sharing
Design of New Institutions for Environmental and Resource Management, With Application to Pollution Control
The Determination and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazillian Frontier
Matching and Bargaining of Markets: Approximating Small Markets By Large Markets
(merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

           Author(s)
           Edna Tusak Loehman; Steve Rassenti
           Edna Tusak Loehman; Steve Rassenti
           Lee J. Alston; Gary D. Libecap
           John Wooders
              To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working

WP#    Title
96-1   Experiments With the Pivot Process For Providing Public Goods
y@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

            Author(s)
            Greg Attiyeh; Robert Franciosi; R. Mark Isaac
        To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizo

WP#
97-1
97-2
97-3
97-4
97-5
97-6
97-7
97-8
97-9
97-10
97-11
                                 To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu)

Title
Effects of One-Way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R&D Cooperation
One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator and Research Joint Ventures
Robustness of the Incentive Compatible Combinatorial Auction
missing
Competing Claims To Land: The Sources of Violent Conflict in the Brazillian Amazon
The Legacy of New Deal Regulation: Why the AAA Succeeded, While the NRA Failed
The Structure and Contributions of Relational Contracts: Theory and Evidence From Oil and Gas Unit Operating Agreements
Common Property
Unitization
An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination In Noncooperative Games
Asset Mark Efficiency: The Effects of Tournament Incentives For Individuals
merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper number

            Author(s)
            Rabah Amir; John Wooders
            Rabah Amir; John Wooders
            R. Mark Isaac; Duncan James

            Lee J. Alson; Jeffrey R. Fuller; Gardy D. Libecap; Bernardo Mueller
            Barbara Alexander; Gary D. Libecap
            Gary D. Libecap; James L. Smith
            Gary D. Libecap
            Gary D. Libecap
            Diego Moreno; John Wooders
            Duncan James; R. Mark Isaac
       To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working

WP#
98-1
98-2
98-3
         To Request a copy of a working paper please email Carole Merly (merly@eller.arizona.edu) with the working paper nu

Title
Fact-Finding Efficiency in Legal Procedure: An Experimental Comparison of Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Regimes
Just Who Are You Calling Risk Averse
Venture Capital Financing: The Roles of Individuals and Institutions
with the working paper number

            Author(s)
            Michael Block; Jeffrey S. Parker
            R. Mark Isaac; Duncan James
            Willard T. Carleton; Duncan James

				
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