PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

							PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF
 AMERICAN GOVERNMENT


         Topic #2
               Study Guide Questions
• Cars and trucks used to emit large quantities of pollutants, resulting
  in air pollution that was both unpleasant and unhealthful. In the
  1970s, it became possible to reduce such pollution greatly by
  installing fairly inexpensive pollution-control devices on car and truck
  engines. Suppose in fact that everyone prefers (a) the state of
  affairs in which everyone pays for and installs the devices and the
  air is clean to (b) the state of affairs in which no one pays for and
  installs the devices and the air is polluted. Would (almost) everyone
  voluntarily install the devices? Would a law requiring everyone to
  install the devices pass in a referendum?
• On the whole human existence is happier and more prosperous if
  people are willing to undertake productive, future-oriented,
  ―investment‖ activities — that is, to undertake burdensome and
  unpleasant activities today that can provide rewards for tomorrow,
  e.g., to clear and cultivate land that can provide food later. Under
  what conditions are people more or less likely to undertake such
  activities?
• Governments impose taxes on people, stop people from doing some
  things they want to do, and make people do other things they don’t
  want to do. Can this be justified? If so, by what kind of argument?
                           Anarchy
• Anarchy (literal meaning): the state of affairs in which
  there is no government, i.e.,
   – no (man-made) law governing human affairs and,
     more specifically
       •   no legislature to make laws;
       •   no executive to execute laws;
       •   no court system to apply laws;
       •   no police to enforce laws.


• Anarchy (common connotation): social chaos, disorder,
  violence, plunder, etc.
   Normative vs. Empirical Statements
• Normative: what ought to be
• Empirical: what actually is
• The political philosophy of anarchism makes this
  normative claim: There ought to be no governments.
• However, most political theorists (and most ordinary
  people) would make the following empirical claim:
   – Anarchy (in its literal sense) produces anarchy (in the sense of
     its common connotation).
• Three different disciplines:
   – Physics (like other natural sciences) is strictly empirical.
   – Ethics (or moral philosophy) is strictly normative.
   – Political theory/science (and social science generally)
     distinctively mix empirical and normative elements.
         Legitimacy of Governments
• A government is normatively legitimate if the people over
  which it claims authority ought (according to some
  normative political philosophy or doctrine) to obey its
  rules/laws.
    – According to anarchism, no government is normatively
      legitimate.
• A government is empirically legitimate to the extent the
  people over which it claims authority actually believe that
  they ought to obey its rules/laws.
    – Even an (honest) anarchist would agree that the U.S.
      government has a high degree of empirical legitimacy
      (unfortunately, given his normative views) .

• A side point: a government effective to the extent that the people
  over which it claims authority actually do obey it rules/laws.
    – Otherwise, it is a ―failed state.‖
Divergent Theories of Normative Legitimacy
• The Divine Right of Kings: kings are authorized to rule
  on earth by God, which makes their rule legitimate.
   – ―Delegation from above‖
   – Rebellion against the king is rebellion against God.

• Consent of the Governed: legitimate governments are
  authorized to rule by the people over which they rule.
   – ―Delegation from below‖

• Governments by their nature impose rules, prohibit
  activities, conscript people, levy taxes, and generally
  force people to do things they would not voluntarily do.
   – So we may have a paradox of consent: why would people
     consent to have rules, prohibitions, taxes, etc. imposed on them?
   – Answer: because the alternative (anarchy) is worse.
          Social Contract Theory

• England during 1649-1700 was in a era of revolution,
  regicide, civil war, and political disorder.
   – Claims of divine right had largely lost their
     persuasiveness.

• Political philosophers, notably Thomas Hobbes and John
  Locke, sought a rational basis for legitimate government.

• Their basic argument:
   – social contract theory (―consent of the governed‖)
               The State of Nature
• Both Hobbes and Locke begin with a ―thought
  experiment.‖
   – They imagine a state of nature, i.e., the complete
     absence of political institutions and laws.
       • This is a state of ―natural liberty.‖


• Locke: To understand political power aright, and derive it
  from its original, we must consider what estate all men
  are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to
  order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and
  persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
  Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will
  of any other man.
    Consequences of a State of Nature
• Locke also takes note of the paradox of consent: If man in the state
  of Nature be so free as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his
  own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to
  nobody, why will he part with his [natural] freedom, this empire, and
  subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power?

• But as Locke immediately adds: To which it is obvious to answer,
  that though in the state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the
  enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the
  invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his
  equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice,
  the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe,
  very insecure.

• The state of nature is simply another term for anarchy in its literal
  sense.
• However, both Locke and (especially) Hobbes further argue that
  anarchy has bad consequences (disorder, insecurity, etc.).
        Hobbes: The State of War
• Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live
  without a common power to keep them all in awe, they
  are in that condition which is called war; and such a war
  as is of every man against every man [in contrast to
  international war].

   – For war consists not in battle only, or the act of
     fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the will to
     contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore
     the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of
     war, as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature
     of foul weather lies not in a shower or two of rain, but
     in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the
     nature of war consists not in actual fighting, but in the
     known disposition thereto during all the time there is
     no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.
    Hobbes: The State of War (cont.)
• Why does the state of nature produce a such
  state of war?

  – NATURE hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and
    mind as that . . . when all is reckoned together the difference
    between man and man is not so considerable as that one man
    can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may
    not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the
    weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by
    secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the
    same danger with himself.

  – From this equality of ability arises equality of hope in the
    attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the
    same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they
    become enemies; and in the way to their end . . . endeavor to
    destroy or subdue one another.
      Hobbes: The State of War (cont.)
    – And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any
      man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by
      force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can so long
      till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and
      this is no more than his own conservation requires, and is
      generally allowed.

    – Also, because there be some that, taking pleasure in
      contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which
      they pursue farther than their security requires, if others, that
      otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds,
      should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be
      able, long time, by standing only on their defense, to subsist.

• So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of
  quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.
       Hobbes: The State of War (cont.)
• The consequences of all this are disastrous.

  Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every
   man is enemy to every man, the same consequent to the time
   wherein men live without other security than what their own
   strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In
   such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit
   thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no
   navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by
   sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and
   removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of
   the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no
   society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of
   violent death; and the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
   and short.
         Hobbes: The Social Contract

• The solution to the state war is clear: a social contract or
  covenant between every man and every other man, in
  which everyone agrees to
   – renounce their natural freedom, and
   – authorize a single person (or perhaps a body of men) to act as a
     governor to enforce a state of peace.
       • The governor requires resources, needs to impose taxes, enforce
         regulations, etc.

• Text of the social contract:
   – I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to
     this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to
     him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.
     The Social Contract (cont.)
• A social contract creates a Commonwealth or Leviathan:
   – one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual
     covenants one with another, have made themselves every one
     the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of
     them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common
     defense.

• Note that the social contract is not
   – between the people and the ruler, but
   – among the people, who thereby authorize the ruler to rule.


• A commonwealth may be created by acquisition as well
  as by institution.
        Locke’s State of Nature
• Locke’s social contract theory is similar in basic structure
  and logic, but differs importantly in detail.

• In Locke’s view, the state of nature is ―inconvenient‖ and
  does not promote safety and happiness, but it is not as
  disastrous as Hobbes’ state of nature.
   – People could do better (under a good government),
     but they also could do worse (under a bad
     government).
   – So consenting to establish a government could make
     people better but it could also make them worse off
     (depending on the nature of the government).
    Locke’s ―Contingent Consent‖
• To Locke, the wrong kind of government, e.g.,
   – tyranny, or
   – kleptocracy
  is worse than no government at all.

        Preferences for different situations
        Hobbes                        Locke
      good government             good government
      bad government              anarchy
      anarchy                     bad government
             Locke’s Law of Nature
The state of nature has a [normative] law of nature to
  govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is
  that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that
  being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm
  another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.

Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station
  willfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not
  in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of
  mankind, and not unless it be to do justice on an offender, take
  away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life,
  the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

    – This law of nature is ascertainable by human reason.
              Locke’s Law of Nature
• But while everyone (even in the state of nature) understands the law
  of nature, this law of nature by itself does not offer people real
  protection and security.
    – The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths,
      and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their
      property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting.
        • First, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and
          allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong,
          and the common measure to decide all controversies between
          them.
        • Secondly, in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent
          judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the
          established law.
        • Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants power to back and
          support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution.
    – In the state of Nature every one has the legislative, judicial and
      executive power of the law of Nature.
        Locke’s Social Contract
• In Locke’s theory, rational people in the state of nature
  will not agree to an social contract that (like Hobbes’
  contract) sets no limits on the powers of the government.

• But they will agree
   – to give up some (but not all) of their natural freedoms;
   – to delegate some (but not all) powers to the government; and
   – they thereby authorize the government to do some things (but
     not other things).

• In general, they will consent to a limited government but
  not an unlimited government (like Hobbes’ Leviathan).
 Limited vs. Unlimited Government
• A limited [Lockean] government ought not (normative)
  but in fact can (empirical) overstep its limits and ―abuse
  its powers.‖
   – In contrast, an unlimited [Hobbesian] government by definition
     has no limits it can overstep.
• Therefore, a limited government should incorporate
  ―checks and balances‖ that will make it less likely to
  abuse its power.
   – In contrast, Hobbes wants no checks on Leviathan, as they
     would impede its ability to enforce peace.
• If such checks are unsuccessful, and a limited govern-
  ment in fact systematically abuses its powers, the people
  retain a right of revolution to overthrow the abusive
  government and replace it with another.
   – In Hobbes’ social contract, there is no right of revolution, as it
     would take people back into a state of nature (and war).
Limited vs. Unlimited Government (cont.)
• A social contract establishing a limited government will
  be relatively long and complicated. It must describe
   – what specific powers are delegated to the government;
   – what specific powers (or rights) are retained by the people;
   – what the structure of the government is to be,
       • and this structure may be made deliberately complicated so as to
         incorporate ―checks and balances,‖ and
   – the procedures the government must follow its exercising its
     limited powers (―due process of law‖).
• Moreover, there will be inevitable ambiguity in the words
  used to set these limits, such that reasonable people will
  likely disagree on how they are to be interpreted.

• In contrast, a social contract establishing an unlimited
  government can be short and sweet.