The Real Difficulties in Sovereign Debt Restructurings
Guillermo Nielsen Athens 2006
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Comparable Debt Restructuring Processes
Argentina Russia Ukraine Ecuador Pakistan Uruguay
# Old Bonds # New Bonds # Restructured (USD Bn.) # Governing Law # Months between default and closing Exchange participation rate Face value reduction Maturity extension (yrs.) Coupon improvement 152 11 81.800 8 38 76% 65,6% 17 -5,0% 3 2 31.600 1 18 98% 36,5% 5 2,5% 5 2 2.600 3 3 95% 0% 1,9 0,0% 5 2 6.600 2 10 97% 32% 2,7 5,3% 3 1 610 1 2 95% 0% 4,7 3,8% 66 31 4.900 6 0 92% 0% 5,3 0,0%
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Eligible Debt Analysis
Geographical Distribution of Bond holders (Dec-2001)
US 9,1% Italy 15,6% 38,4% Germany 5,1%
Argentina
Unidentified as at 01/09/03 12,8% Other 2,5% UK 1,1% Switzerland Japan 3,1% 10,3%
Netherlands 1,0% Luxembourg 0,8%
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Eligible Debt Analysis (2)
• 100% eligible debt issued between 1991and 2001. • 90% issued after 1995. • 60% issued between 1999 and 2001. • Low predictability of Credit Rating Agencies.
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Eligible Debt Analysis (3)
Marketing Channels (Dec-2001)
Retail Institutional
56,5% 43,5%
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Influential Background Structures
• US foreign policy: •IMF •G7 • Domestic Political Groups/Congress • Creditor Groups • Media
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Creditor Groups
• No possibility of recurrence to a steering committee. • Professional Groups interested in closing. • Unprofessional, ego driven, vested interest driven groups. • Sharp cultural differences.
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1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
200
EMBI+
400
600
800
0
02-01-98 02-05-98 02-09-98 02-01-99 02-05-99 02-09-99 02-01-00 02-05-00 02-09-00 02-01-01 02-05-01 02-09-01 02-01-02 02-05-02 02-09-02 02-01-03 02-05-03 02-09-03 02-01-04 02-05-04 02-09-04 02-01-05 02-05-05 02-09-05 02-01-06 02-05-06
Currency movements
Interest rate movements
Influential Market Developments
Argentine Debt Restructuring
Guidelines Closing Dubai Opening
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Institutions Involved
3 International Banks UBS, Merrill Lynch, Barclays Capital 3 Local Banks Banco de la Nación Argentina, BBVA, Banco Galicia 5 Groups of Lawyers
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, Tokyo Aoyama Aoki Law Office, Sullivan & Cromwell, Allen & Overy, Bruchou
4 Main Clearing Systems Euroclear, Clearstream, DTC, Caja de Valores) 3 Secondary Clearing Systems Luxembourg, CRYL, Monte Titoli 5 International Regulator Agencies SEC, Consob, Bafin, Kanto, CNMV 5 Local Regulator Agencies SAFJP, CNV,BCRA,SSN, National Attorney (PTN) 2 Commissioned Companies for Bondholders BOTM, Shinsei 1 Trustee and Exchange Agent Bank of New York 1 Information Agent Georgeson / GSC Proxitalia
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Building the Offer
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Sustainability Model Dynamics
Debt Refinancing Assumptions
New Macroeconomic Framework
Sustainable Growth
Repayment Capacity
The Offer
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Restructuring Objectives
Achieve sustainable debt dynamics Provide Argentina with debt service requirements compatible with the Country’s payment capacity under its new economic structure and;
Create conditions to strengthen Argentina’s domestic savings to foster economic growth and support Argentina’s debt repayment capacity
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Exchange Results
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Acceptance & Debt Reduction
Millions of U.S. dollars
Eligible Debt + Accrued Interest 102,566
Restructured Debt 35,261
Difference 67,305 (65.6%)
Debt Reduction
% GDP
160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 4 6 8 0 2 19 7 19 7 19 7 19 7 19 7 19 8 19 8 19 8 19 8 19 8 19 9 19 9 19 9 19 9 19 9 20 0 20 0 20 0 4
70%* 72% 113%*
Total Gross Public Debt e.o.p./GDP
The beginning of the debt crisis
16%
Cost of the Convertibility’s fall Cost of the Convertibility regime
Debt restructuring swap
* Calculated as a percentage of GDP using the current RER
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Public Debt Pre & Post Restructuring Ratios
Dec-01 Interest Services / Exports Public Debt Stock / Exports Foreign Currency Debt Stock / Expo. Interest Services / International Reserves Interest Services / Recursos tributarios Interest Services / GDP Debt / GDP Capital + Interest / Total Debt * 38% 544% 527% 70% 22% 8% 113% 88% Apr-05 9% 364% 204% 15% 10% 2% 72% 45%
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* Not includes Bogar, Boden Quasimoneys Provinces and BCRA.
Public Debt Pre & Post Restructuring Indicators
Dec-01 Interest Services (USD bn) Public Debt Stock (USD bn) Export goods (USD bn) International Reserves (USD bn) Fiscal revenues (AR$ bn) Nominal GDP (USD bn)
*RER end 2004
Apr-05 3.205 125.283 34.453 20.698 93.255 173.000
10.175 144.453 26.543 14.546 46.804 127.951
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Currency Debt Composition
Pre & Post Reestructuring Dec01 Pesos US Dollars Euros Japanese Yens Others 3% 66% 15% 3% 13% Apr05 37% 37% 14% 2% 10%
Debt Restructuring by Currency & Governing Law
In USD bn (equivalents)
TOTAL
USD NY Law ARG Law 8.401 1.812
EUROS UK Law 9.270
YENS AR$ JAP Law ARG Law 250 15.528
TOTAL 35.261
$ ARG Law 44%
US$ NY Law 24%
Yen Jap Law 1%
Euros UK Law 26%
US$ ARG Law 5%
Debt Simplification
152 Eligible Bonds
11 New Bonds
Eligible Bonds
New Bonds
8 Governing Laws 14 Currencies
4 Governing Laws 4 Currencies
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Present Value & Outstanding Debt
Pre & Post Restructuring Present Value
200 150 100 50 0
Outstanding Debt (restructured debt)
150
162.3 98.6
102.6
100 50 0
35.2
Pre Restructuring
Post Restructuring
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GDP-Linked Securities
Item Description
Payment amount Base case GDP
5% of available excess GDP of such year multiplied by aggregate notional amount of GDP securities held AR$287 mm in 2005 and a growth of 3.6% in 2006, 3.4% in 2007, 3.3% in 2008, 3.3% in 2009, 3.3% in 2010, 3.3% in 2011, 3.3% in 2012, 3.2% in 2013, and 3.0% thereafter
The excess gross domestic product for any reference year is the Excess GDP amount if any that Actual Real GDP exceeds the Base Case GDP (converted to nominal Pesos). Governing law The governing law will be the same as the New Security to which the GDP-linked Security is initially attached
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10.00 11.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00
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GDP-Linked Securities-Pricing Evolution
1 Database:
Px Close (Last Trade)1
Reuters/MAE GDP USD NY ‹TVPY› ARS PIB ‹TVPP› 23
/0 05 5 /1 2 / 15 05 /1 2/ 25 05 /12 /0 04 5 /01 / 14 06 /0 1 / 24 06 /0 1 /0 03 6 /02 / 13 0 6 /02 /0 23 6 /0 2 / 05 06 /03 / 15 06 /03 /0 25 6 /03 / 04 06 /04 / 14 06 /0 4 /0 24 6 /04 / 04 0 6 /05 / 1 4 06 /05 /0 24 6 /05 /06
Issues for the future
• Code of Conduct: risky bonds are not for retail, unsophisticated investors. • Transparency Code • New IT embedded in custodian and clearing systems should allow to distinguish: Original purchasers, Pre-crisis purchasers, Post-default purchasers •“Tailor made” a differential treatment
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Issues for the future
• Review of the institutional framework in the “Crisis Resolution Processes” Cross conditionality Sequential conditionality Acceptability vs. Sustainability • The market is Global, but regulations are local “Pass-porting” from SEC • Review alignment within Bretton Woods institutions
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