This is a study of the transformation of the by odq14517



This is a study of the transformation of the party system in one of the world's oldest

continuing democracies, Canada, with a limited comparison to the current state of the

party system of its southern neighbor, The United States. Carty et al. (2000) argue that

Canada is in the midst of developing its fifth party system and a debate rages as to

whether the United States is in its sixth or even seventh party system (see Aldrich 1997).

This dissertation draws a distinction between changeovers in party systems resulting in

the creation of new parties which remain competitive over a number of years and those

which result in simply a shift in the relative strength of pre-existing parties.

       My central claim is that an electorate that is divided along multiple, not

necessarily related issue dimensions is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the

emergence of one or more new political parties. In contrast, new parties do not result

from the temporary repudiation of a party because of the quality of its leadership or its

position on one or more valance issues. More specifically, with regard to the Canadian

national party system, I will contend that the rise of the Reform Party (which has since

morphed into the Canadian Alliance) was due to the attractiveness of various neo-

conservative economic policies as well as issues pertaining to the status of Quebec,

multiculturalism, the treatment of minorities, and immigration--issues that seemed to

definine what Canada was about as a nation.

       In this regard, there is a distinct similarity between the breakdown of the

Canadian party system in 1993 and the conflict leading to the demise of the Second Party

System in the United States during the 1850's and 1860's. In Canada, these dimensions

first weakened support for the national "two-party-plus" system and then led the

disaffected to support both Reform and the new pro-Quebec Sovereignty Party, the Bloc

Quebecois. In 1850's America, conflict over the extension of slavery to the territories

together with various economic issues eroded support for the Whigs, fragmented the

Democratic Party, and made possible the rise of the Republican Party.

       My central focus will be the transformation of the Canadian national party system

in the 1990s with a briefer analysis of the changes in the American Party system that

occurred before and after the Republican victory of 1994. However, in this chapter, I will

provide a brief historical overview of the party systems of the two countries. For

example, in 1930's Canada a combination of various economic grievances and

disaffection from the Parliamentary system of disciplined, cohesive parties helped

generate two new parties, Social Credit and the C.C.F. (after 1961, the NDP). In contrast,

the realignment of basic partisan forces that occurred in the United States in the 1930's

may have condemned the Republicans to a long period in the political wilderness but it

did not result in the emergence of one or more viable new parties. Other so-called critical

elections in both countries also produced changes in party fortunes, sometimes drastic,

but not necessarily new parties for reasons noted above. I begin with a brief description

of the origins of Canada's national party system.

Third Parties and Party Systems in Canada:


       The union of four provinces, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia

via an 1867 Act of the British Parliament created the new Dominion of Canada. This

event termed "Confederation" was facilitated by the fact that the institutions and

processes of a democratic political system were already largely in place and legitimized

by extensive usage. These included British model Cabinet government with a loyal

opposition, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, a protean bureaucracy subordinate

to elected officials, nascent political parties that competed regularly in free and

reasonably honest elections , and the widespread acceptance of the resolution of political

conflict through negotiations and mutual accommodation (Kornberg and Clarke 1992,


       The origins of the first political parties, the Liberals ("Grits") and Conservatives

("Tories") are rooted in the early 19th Century legislative struggle to achieve responsible

government. That is, an Executive (theoretically a committee of Parliament) which

continues in office only so long as it has the support of a majority of Parliament's

members. The Conservatives grew out of a coalition of business-professional and

Anglican Church elites in Ontario and ultra-conservative French Catholic and Anglo-

Scottish business and financial groups in Quebec. The Liberals, for their part, were a

coalition of rural and small town, non-Anglican, moderate reform groups in Ontario and

anti-business, anti-clerical, radical reform groups in Quebec (Reid 1932: 187-200). At

the national level, these two parties competed and alternated in office until the 1921

election. That election produced the first "hiccup" via the election of 64 members of the

Progressive Party (including 24 from Ontario), a party which grew out of a group of

provincially based Farmer's parties in the Western provinces and Ontario.

       It would be a stretch to call the election of 1921 a critical election since five years

later the Progressives were able to elect only 20 MPs, and by the end of the decade, their

national organization was moribund. Nonetheless, it did provide a preview of the "two-

party-plus" system which would characterize Canada for most of the twentieth century.

At the provincial level, especially in the three Prairie Provinces, the Progressives retained

considerable support (Morton 1950). In Alberta, many of the Progressives shifted their

electoral support to William Aberhart's newly founded Social Credit party (MacPherson

1953; Irving 1959). Aberhart utilized that support to enable Social Credit to win the 1935

provincial election and every Alberta provincial election thereafter until 1971.

       A second party, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) also had its

roots in the Progressive Party. The party's major electoral goal initially was to end the

capitalist economic system and to establish in its place, a socialist commonwealth.

However, this goal was modified as the party worked to widen its electoral base and

middle class participation in its organizational activities (Young ; Zakuta 1964).

       Both parties experienced initial success at the federal level beginning in the 1935

national election. However, neither ever came close to winning a national election or

even becoming the loyal opposition, despite the hope the CCF had of achieving that

status (or even better in the 1945 election). But, both continued to be major players at the

provincial level and both periodically had a significant influence on national politics as,

for example, when Real Caouette-led Social Credit Party reemerged in Quebec in 1962

and when Liberal minority governments of 1963, 1965, and 1973 required the support of

the CCF (which, as noted above morphed into the NDP in 1961) to stay in office. As a

consequence, Leon D. Epstein (1964) dubbed the Canadian national party system of the

period a "two-party-plus" system. That is, a system in which only two parties ever win

national elections but one in which other parties periodically play important roles in

national politics. This "two-party-plus" system, I will contend, despite periodic blips,

prevailed until 1993.

Other "slightly less than critical elections" and the election of 1993:

       Until 1993, Canadian federal elections tended to work in favor of the Liberals

because of the party's ability to campaign, win, and satisfy the voters of Ontario and

Quebec, in which two-thirds of the population lived. The two periods (excluding the

short-lived Clark government of 1979-1980) of Progressive Conservative (PC) majorities

after 1935 were notable in that they are the only ones in which the party was able muster

more than a handful of seats in Quebec (Beck 1968).

       Some scholars point to both the 1958 and 1984 Tory victories over the Liberals as

marking a transition from one party system to the next (Carty et al. 2000). However,

these victories were not all that spectacular; a perusal of the distribution of parliamentary

seats after the elections of 1957, 1958, 1962, and 1963 reveal a momentary "blip" in

electoral support for the Conservatives which peaked in 1958. However, the distribution

of parliamentary seat in 1963 looked much like it had in 1957 (Beck 1968). The

substantial Conservative victory of 1958 and its victory in 1962--although it was reduced

to a minority government-- were largely due to the brief incursion the party made into


       Importantly, it is hard to describe this period as one in which the electorate

realigned itself in support of a Tory platform stressing a different and integrated approach

to economic or social issues. Instead, as Scarrow (1965) notes, there were few

distinguishing policy differences between the Liberals and Tories during the post-War

period. Rather, as Wrong (1958) argues in his analysis of Conservative ascendancy, the

Tory victories were due largely to the political smarts of its leader, John Diefenbaker,

who promised to stock his Cabinet with members from Quebec if the Province

"delivered" votes for the Party and the feelings of patriotism he aroused in the electorate.

For example, regarding the latter, media reports of the time note the enthusiastic

reception by the electorate of Diefenbaker's aspirations for an "unhyphenated Canada"

and for his "vision of the north." That is, a nation in which people were simply

Canadians and not distinguished by their ethnic, religious origins and in which great new

cities would arise that would house millions of people in the northern half of the country-

-sadly then, as now, largely uninhabited.

       An argument can be made that the Conservative victories of 1984 and 1988 were

more substantial, even that they were rooted in the growing support of Canadians for neo-

conservatism. Thomas (1988), for one, argues that the Conservative victories of the

1980s were the culmination of a trend toward conservatism in the previous decade largely

because center-left governments in Western countries such as Britain, Canada, and the

United States seemed incapable of dealing with the stagflation of the 1970s and early

1980s. Nonetheless, pace Thomas, I will demonstrate that a) conflict over issues in the

1980's were not multidimensional and b) the Conservative victories of 1984 and 1988

were in great part due to Mulroney's leadership, and a single short-term issue, free trade.

Taking Down the Canadian Party System--Why?

       In contrast to the above cited elections, the election of 1993 was one in which the

Liberals were not returned to power in areas in which the Conservatives made inroads.

Rather, the Alliance took a number of those seats in the West and the BQ took seats from

them in Quebec. The question is what made this election an opportune time for the new

parties to soundly defeat the Conservatives whereas previous defeats of the Tories

resulted in the Liberals reasserting themselves in areas they previously dominated (i.e.


       The downfall of the "two-party-plus" system, I contend, is due to a combination

of institutional and behavioral forces. Clarke, Kornberg, and Wearing (2000) note that

1993 could be considered a critical election because it was one in which widespread

partisan dealignment, grounded in the electorate's weak and unstable psychological

identification with the old line parties, led to the emergence of the two new parties.

However, there is more to the demise of the pre-1993 system than Clarke et al

acknowledge. The psychological forces were not just limited to weak attachment to

political parties, but rather the lack of ideological base attached to the Canadian parties

hurt the Tories. This was due to the fact that a growing portion of the electorate had well

defined positions on the two aforementioned dimensions.

       In essence, in the Canadian case, you had the opposite of what Conserve (1964)

observed in the American system of the late 1950's. Elites in Canada were reluctant to

stake out positions on the two dimensional plane for fear of alienating their loosely

attached supporters; however, I contend and will show that a good portion of the mass

electorate wanted political parties to take positions on issues related to the status of

Quebec, economic policies, and policies towards multiculturalism.

       In essence, the old-style brokerage politics which the Progressive Conservatives

proved adept at in the 1984, and to a lesser extent the 1988 elections, did not match the

desires of the electorate. Further weakening the Tories was the fact that their supporters

fell on opposite ends of the ideological dimension which measured the electorate's

opinions towards the status of Quebec and multiculturalism. In trying to please both the

pro-sovereignty forces in Quebec and the alienated, pro-assimilation westerners, the

Tories ended up pleasing nobody. Moreover, as my prior research (Stepheonson et al

2004) shows, that Tory supporters of the 1980's were also highly spread out on the single

left-right ideological dimension, likely measuring their views towards government

regulation of the economy. Further working against the party, I hypothesize, that voters

with the most consistent and extreme ideological positions were least satisfied with the

Conservative Party leaving them vulnerable to defection

       Indeed, it appears that the electorate finally held the political parties responsible

for their lack of cohesion and unwillingness to define themselves on the salient long-term

issues critical to the nation. John Porter (1965) noted that Canadian political and

economic leaders, despite their cries for national unity in the face of the persistent

regionalism which characterized the Canadian political system, focused on themes that

divided the electorate to maintain their positions as elites. Such divisiveness obfuscated,

or perhaps excused, the political parties from taking clear stances on the left-right goods

and services dimension envisioned by Downs (1957). For example, on political discourse

in Canadian society, Porter (1965: 368-369) notes:

       the dialogue is between unity and discord rather than between progressive and conservative
       forces...Canada must be one of the few major industrial societies in which the right and left
       polarization has become deflected into disputes over regionalism and national unity.

Similarly, John Meisel (1975) indicted Canada's federal political parties, principally the

Liberals, for failing to generate or campaign on coherent packages of policies that

transcended regional differences.

Historical solutions to Political Alienation--Why Not Now?

        Institutionally, Canadians not wanting to play the brokerage game were "left" to

support third parties with "slim to none" chances of winning a federal mandate. For

example, a left-of-center voter could support the social democratic CCF or NDP parties,

as a means of either demanding more redistributive economic policies or registering

frustration with the state of the major parties. In some of the provinces, particularly those

with smaller populations, left-right divisions over economic policies split the electorates

went when the remains of third party protest movements gained a foothold in provincial


        I hypothesize that the Canadian electorate is no longer satisfied with the left-right

dialogue being consigned to protest parties at the federal level or as major players in

provincial politics. The Alliance's success is due to its ability to respond to the

significant portion of the Canadian electorate who, by the early 1990's, were wedded to

the ideas of neo-conservatism and tired of Conservative appeasement towards Quebec,

the multiculturalists, and the aboriginal populations.

        Although compared to their Ontario and Eastern counterparts more Westerners

hold the above positions, Reform/Alliance cannot and should not be seen as another

manifestation of western alienation. Indeed, the fact that the party picked up two seats in

Ontario in the 2000 federal election and the increased percentage of the provincial vote

that went to the Alliance in the province is indicative of a party with national aspirations

reaching out to voters in all parts of the country which share the party's ideology. Due to

their appeal both to economic neo-conservatism and those with conservative positions on

minority and cultural issues, the Alliance found itself unconstrained by the institutional

difficulties traditional protest parties in Canada have run up against and why behavioral

forces are working in favor of the party. Indeed, their ability to compete on both

dimensions, particularly the minority issues dimension which had a lot to do with the

status of Canada as a nation lifted them above the need to rely on provincial politics


Summary: Institutional and Behavioral Reasons for the Proliferation but Limited
Appeal of Canadian Third Parties and why Reform/Alliance is Different.:

       Explanations for the success of third party movements in Canada place an

emphasis on Canada's uneven population distribution, a politically powerless Senate, and

the nation's unique combination of an almost con-federal structure with a Westminster-

style parliamentary government (Lipset 1950; MacPherson 1953; Irving 1959; Stein

1973; Clarke, Kornberg, and Wearing 2000). As a consequence of this "poor fit"

between institutional arrangements and demographic reality and in the absence of an

American-type Senate based on the moiety principle, the two old-line parties have tended

to ignore regions where their federal electoral support was scant in factor of areas in

which they were strongly supported (Kornberg and Clarke 1992). As Evelyn Eager

(1980, 44) points out in her book Saskatchewan Government, "[a]mong competing

national claims, with meager voting power, the Saskatchewan electorate finds its interest

far down on the list of federal party priorities." Hence, voters in the neglected provinces

"defect" and look to third parties to represent their interests in federal elections. In many

instances, there have been spillover effects into the provincial party systems where the

voters' attachments to third parties carried over into provincial politics. In many

instances, voters remained attached to the provincial wings of these parties even as

federal support waxed and waned. For example, third parties such as the C.C.F., whose

aspirations for federal power were stymied by the limited number of federal seats up for

grabs in the provinces where the party had the most support, were able to become major

players in the provincial politics. The party gained the first of a long number of mandates

in the 1944 Saskatchewan provincial elections during a period where its federal support

was plummeting (Beck 1968; Leeson 2001).

       The fact that the party, its successor, the NDP, and Social Credit were able to gain

a foothold in provincial politics provided the party with a base and maintained the "two-

party-plus" character of the Canadian federal party system in the 1935-1993 periods

(Epstein 1964). The fact that the Parti Quebecois also held power in Quebec during the

1970's and 1980's provided a base for the federal separatist party, the Bloc Quebecois to

win in federal ridings in Quebec in 1993.

       Institutionally, Reform/Alliance is different in that it is the first Canadian third

party movement whose success is not indebted to provincial politics. This better

positions the Party to tackle the left-right issues at the federal level that were previously

consigned to provincial politics in the pre-1993 era, enabling it to compete for a national

vote. However, as noted above, what enables the party to compete only at the federal

level is the fact that it has staked out clear policy positions on a multidimensional issue

plane--the left-right issue cleavage and a dimension with a cleavage considering not only

the status of Quebec but the status of the broader aspects of a multicultural society.

Replacement of the Progressive Conservatives occurred because the Reform/Alliance

have simultaneously been able to take a definitive stance on national unity issues while

staking out a claim on economic and social issues, a bold move the traditional Canadian

federal parties have avoided--positions the electorate demanded by 1993. The mixture,

and the extent that Canadian citizens place themselves along a left-right economic and

social issue dimension which either subsumes or is separate from issues concerning

national unity has made the Alliance an attractive alternative. Assuming that enough

Canadians are close to the positions taken by the party, the Party will be able to move out

of its base in the West.

       Contrary to many who study Canadian politics (Carty et al. 2000; Laycock 2002),

I make the argument that the party is not bound by regional appeal but rather is open to

many who are close enough to the party on the two spatial dimensions my prior work has

identified to matter amongst the Canadian electorate (Scotto et al. 2004). The fact that

(as of this writing, at least!) that the Alliance is beginning to subsume what remains of

the federal Progressive Conservatives should do one of two things a) allow the party to

moderate but remain defined on the two issue dimensions or b) the party will replace the

Progressive Conservatives as yet another major Canadian party whose positions on a left-

right dimension are sacrificed for its need to appeal towards unifying the nation. If

outcome "a" is attained, the new United Conservative Party will remain a key player in

Canadian politics, and become a truly national party whereas cycling through another

round of regionally based parties is more likely to happen if outcome "b" occurs.

Why is the Reform/Alliance Different? The question is why the Alliance appears has

remained a presence in federal politics whereas the other party who rose via taking a

number of seats, the Progressive Party, was nearly dead five years after the 1921 federal

election (Morton 1950)? Perhaps what makes the Alliance unique is that it forsook any

organization at the provincial level, going straight for representation in Ottawa.

Moreover (the recent plans to unite the right notwithstanding), the Alliance has viewed

provincial politics as a minor league for future party leaders rather than lent the party

label to politicians seeking power in the provincial legislatures. Carty et al. (2001, 57)

quote Preston Manning's speech to his supporters which outlines the party's strategy,

noting, "Manning's strategy is to attract supporters and activists from other political

groups, particularly at the provincial level, who are also committed to these [the

Reform/Alliance] principles."

       Third parties such as the CCF and Social Credit were held together by regional

alienation, and energetic leaders capturing the conscious of a limited portion of

individuals interested in economic issues who were less concerned with the national unity

issues. Traditional third parties have been successful at the provincial level because they

were not bound to make pleas towards uniting the diverse country and could focus on

economic issues affecting the provinces and provincial relations with Ottawa. In

contrast, Reform/Alliance's success is due because it has been able to take defined

positions on both the left-right issues dimension and on issues related to the

Government's treatment of Quebec and minorities.

The Shadow Case: The United States

The Emergence of the Republican Party and Similarities to Reform: After the 1984

Mulroney landslide in Canada, my earlier research (Stephenson et al 2003) finds that 90

percent of Canadians were willing to identify with one of the three federal political

parties with seats in the House of Commons. At the time, the two-party-plus system

seemed as stable as ever albeit with the Conservatives at the helm and the Liberals as the

"Official Opposition"--unfamiliar territory for the two parties. This situation was

remarkably similar to Binkley's (1962) estimation that "during the [eighteen] forties

probably ninety percent of the American electorate proudly professed either the

Democratic or the Whig political faith, and system [had] never stood higher."

Both the American Whigs and Canadian Progressive Conservatives would be eviscerated

at the federal level ten years after estimates of the strong partisan attachments were made.

       The most interesting similarity is the fact that both parties were brought down by

their inability to find the proper spatial location on two dimensions to satisfy a diverse

base. In the Canadian case, as is well documented, the Quebec and Albertan wings of the

Tory party were in direct opposition to one another on issues surrounding what Laycock

(2002, 12) labels "the constitutional and 'nation-building' visions of the...coalition

partners [which] was revealed in the process of negotiating first Meech Lake and then the

Charlottetown constitutional accord." However, what is often overlooked are the

significant differences between the old-right Tories which governed at the federal level in

the 1980's and the new-right Tories which governed in the provinces of Saskatchewan

and Alberta who embraced Reaganism and Thatcherism and openly rejected the Goods

and Services Tax (Dyck 1996). Such cross-national and federal divisions on two separate

dimensions proved to be what Reform needed to build support at the federal level.

       On a similar note, scholars often play up the role slavery and the succession rights

had in the breakup of the so-called "Third Party System" in the United States while

downplaying some of the economic factors loosely related to the slavery issue and the

structure of the Whigs as a party organization. Ranney and Kendall (1956, 511) note

"after the 1852 election, the Whig party collapsed nainly because of its leaders' inability

to find an acceptable compromise between its pro-slavery and anti-slavery elements."

Van Woodward (1951, 54) marks the breakdown of the Whigs and the "schism" of the

Democrats as the factors which made Civil War possible.

       However, slavery was not the only reason for the downfall of the Whigs.

Burnham (1967, 294-295) notes the problems plaguing the Whigs before the disastrous

1852 election, as:

       the Whig party below the presidential level was a good deal weaker than it seemed, and
       this weakness tended to accelerate in every election after 1848. This weakness, and
       particularly its tendency to increase, probably helped certain Whig elites--especially in the
       North--to turn their attention to other political combinations which would be more profitable to

Also neglected is the fact that the enabling factor behind the demise of a two-party

system which may have involved the Whigs in the Confederacy was the Confederate

Constitutional Convention's successful move to prohibit the protective tariff and the

federal funding of internal improvements (Jenkins 1999).

       Much as the Canadian Conservatives were unable to mend the rift between

Quebec and Western supporters over constitutional issues, the Whigs were not able to

keep the pro and anti-slavery forces of the party together. However, contributing to the

Party's demise was also the inability of the Whigs to rally people around its economic

program. For example, Brown (1985) notes that the party's platform was made irrelevant

by the 1850's as the banking system was opened up and railroads made the party's

positions on the public financing of canal construction a non-issue. Moreover, the Whig's

prediction of the "doom and gloom" that would result over the lowering of the tariff in

1846 did not materialize, further reducing their appeal of the party during what is

considered to be a prosperous time (Holt 1982).

       One..., the Northern business and textile interests did not challenge the pro-free

trade South on partisan lines over the tariff issue. Hofstader (1938) writes that revisions

of the Tariff of 1846 harmed both the wool manufacturers in the East and the growers in

the Western United States. Throughout the 1850's, as the Whig party was in decline, a

debate ensured with the manufacturers favoring a reduction in the import tariff on raw

materials and the producers opposing any cut in the import taxes. The issue was

significant in that disputes over economic policies of the time featured divisions across

areas that were once supportive of the Whigs and noninterference between business

interests in the Northeast and South. Hofstader (1937, 55) notes:

       Adversely affected by the tariff of 1846, the [producers] had the alternative of working for
       greater protection or lowering costs through reduced duties on raw materials. In choosing
       the latter course, they chose to do parliamentary battle with the Western wool growers rather
       than the Southern planters.

Hence, both economic and a social cleavages secured the downfall of the two-party

Democratic-Whig competition. As further evidence, elite data such as Poole and

Rosenthal's (1991) spatial model of roll call voting show the worst fit during the

Congresses of the early 1850's--poor fits which are not found during the changeover from

the Third to the Fourth Party system around 1896 and the Fourth to the Fifth Party system

around 1932.

Economics and Nothing But Economics in 1896 and 1932:

Hook that didnt happen in 1896 and 1932 but happened in 1856 America and 1993

Canada....Without a doubt, there was a clear shift in the groups that supported the

Republicans and Democrats from approximately 1894-1898 and 1924-1936. Burnham

(1967) notes a collapse in support for the Democratic Party in the South following the

"Democratic Depression" of 1893. Immigration is often cited as a key factor in both

critical periods, but the question is whether the immigration issue disabled any of the two

parties from mapping out an issue space to compete and save its internal coalition.

Unlike the 1850's where most voters who abandoned the Whig were members, those who

did not rally to support Bryan but underlying any urban hostilities and fears towards

urban immigrants are the economic conditions of the period. The splits in both parties

were over the coinage of money, and the fact that urban Democrats had very little interest

in the plight of the Populist Democrat farmer who feared interest rates. Although

analyses of aggregate data have shown differences in partisan shift to be partially related

to concentrations of ethnic groups (Benson 1957), I plan to make an argument that

conflict and partisan change can largely be explained on a single dimension, something

that cannot be said for the realignment that took place in the 1850's. Republicans were

able to win largely because there were not enough areas of the country believing that the

Democrats' solutions to the nations financial woes were convincing.

Plan for the Dissertation:

Chapter 1: A theoretical overview and an attempt to differentiate between critical

elections which result in the formation and sustenance of new political parties and those

which result in the realignment of preexisting parties. This chapter will contain a review

of the literature covering the debate over the party systems in the United States and

Canada. Particular attention will be paid to scholarly debate over the meaning of

realignment in the United States and its applicability to the Canadian case. Attention will

be given to what political scientists and historians have said about the movement from the

third to the fourth party system in the United States and how this movement differs from

subsequent changes from the fourth to the fifth system, the fifth to the sixth and so forth.

The goal is to come up with propositions to test to show that the move from the fourth to

the fifth Canadian Party system has more in common with the move from the party

system that gave rise to the Republicans in the United States than the most recent

realignments in the United States. Likewise, I develop a framework for comparing and

contrasting the two periods of Conservative ascendancy with the changes in the American

party system that took place in 1896, 1932, the 1960's?, and 1994. The changes are better

interrelated with one another than they are with the rise of the Republicans in the United

States during the 1850's and Reform/Alliance in Canada in the early 1980's.

Chapter 2: This chapter looks at the institutional forces at work when the Canadian Party

system collapsed in 1993. I expect to find many similarities between the type of people

who made the choice to affiliate with the Republican party in the 1850's and the career

choices of those who abandoned the Progressive Conservatives in Canada during the late

1980's and early 1990's. Much as Aldrich (1995, Chapter 5) differentiates between the

growth of the Republican Party in "strong" and "weak" Republican states, I want to look

at the organization of the Reform/Alliance in the "strong" provinces of the West and the

"weak" provinces of Ontario and the East. Party members will be compared as will

activists, regional platforms, etc. The point will be to show that the emergence of the

Alliance was different from the rise of other Canadian third parties and the two periods of

Conservative ascendancy both in terms of the identities of the elite actors and the

structure of the parties. Leadership of the parties will also be considered

Chapter 3: ideology chapter--distinct trend towards left-right dimension of ideology in

Canada...status quo in U.S. during 1970-2000 period. Shift in the character of ideology

in Canada leading up to 1993 real shift in US leading up to the 1994

election.... most disaffected with the parties are most ideological in Canada...opposite in

the United States...left-right ideology present in voters in the provinces (B.C. and Ontario

in '79)....present in both by 2000...measurement of ideology discussed....

Chapter 4: Discussion of partisanship...growing loyalty to parties and rebound nothing

new in the United States...loyalty to Reform/Alliance among most ideological

voters...changers are attracted to parties because of valance change in

U.S. over 1970-2000 period but fundamental change in loyalists non-loyalists in Canada

Chapter 5: Voting behavior...valance vs ideology...relative impact in the two

countries...critical/non critical elections

Chapter 6: Differences between Ontario Federal Provincial vote in late 1970's, early

1990's and similarities today...a uniform party system...goal is to show that the weight

given to valance, party id, and ideology in the provincial vote has remained constant but

things have changed at the federal level... P.C. has remained successful at the provincial

level because it has always competed along left-right grounds...

Chapter 7: Conclusion...speculation on right consolidation in Canada.,,,,

I discuss why there have only been three genuine transformations of Canada's national

party system in the country's entire history rather than the multiple changes that have

stipulated by some party scholars. Comparing the Canadian case to the United States, I

will also very brthe fact that in 1930's Canada,      In Chapter Three,

To recapitulate, I argue that an electorate that is divided along a variety dimensions, not

all necessarily logically related is a necessary but not always sufficient condition for the

emergence of one or more new parties.


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