Front Line Indonesia Murders Death Threat and Other Forms

Front Line Indonesia: Murders Death Threat and Other Forms of Intimidation of Human Rights Defenders, 1998-2002 Front Line & IMPARSIAL: The Indonesian Human Rights Watch In Memoriam Front Line and IMPARSIAL would like to dedicate this report to all those who have given their lives so that others might enjoy the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In particular, we would like to honour those who have been killed or disappeared in Indonesia (19982002) in connection with their defence of human rights as described in this report. Human Rights Defenders Fachrurazi Sukardi Suprin Sulaiman Tengku A. Kamal Jafar Siddiq Hamzah Bakhtiar Ernita Idris Rusli Tengku M. Yusuf Usman Disappeared Murdered Murdered Murdered Murdered Murdered Murdered Murdered Murdered Murdered Aceh Aceh Aceh Aceh Aceh Aceh Aceh Aceh Aceh Aceh Janurary 2000 January 2000 March 2000 March 2000 August 2000 December 2000 December 2000 December 2000 December 2000 September 2001 Political and Intellectual Leaders With a Role in Human Rights Defence Herman Hendrawan Petrus Bima Anugerah Suyat Widji Tukul Nashiruddin Daud Prof. Safwan Idris Prof. Dayan Dawood Theys Eluay Disappeared Disappeared Disappeared Disappeared Murdered Murdered Murdered Murdered Jakarta Jakarta Jakarta Jakarta Aceh Aceh Aceh Papua March 1998 March 1998 March 1998 March 1998 January 2000 September 2000 September 2001 November 2001 Table of Contents Front Line and IMPARSIAL: The Indonesian Human Rights Watch Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Commonly Used in this Report Executive Summary 1. Presentation of the Problem 2. Human Rights Defenders in Jakarta, 1998-2002: New Threats Post-New Order 3. Human Rights Defenders in Aceh: Savage Home for Human Rights Defenders 3.1 Human Rights Defenders 3.2 Political and Intellectual Leaders Who Also Have a Role in Human Rights Defence 4. Human Rights Defenders in Papua: (Still) Under Military Threat 4.1 Human Rights Defenders 4.2 Political and Intellectual Leaders Who Also Have a Role in Human Rights Defence 4.3 Threats to Witnesses of Human Rights Violations i iv v 1 8 31 42 47 68 77 84 94 97 Appendix: United Nations Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 100 i i Front Line Front Line is the International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. A Human Rights Defender is a person who works, nonviolently, for any or all of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Front Line supports those individuals in their activities, and tries to ensure that no physical or mental harm results from their Human Rights work. Front Line s main focus is on those Human Rights Defenders at risk, either temporarily or permanently, because of their work on behalf of fellow citizens. Front Line also promotes awareness of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other relevant internationally recognised standards. The cornerstone of Front Line is the indivisibility and interdependence of all Human Rights civil, cultural, economic, political, and social. Front Line is independent, impartial and is based in Ireland. Front Line the International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders was launched on 22nd February 2001 in Dublin. Front Line came about as a direct result of the 1998 Paris Summit and the need to have a body whose mandate and activities are focused specifically on Human Rights Defenders. Front Line is working to ensure that the principles and standards set out in the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders are known, respected and adhered to worldwide. Front Line Leadership Council Hanan Ashrawi Robert Badinter Bono His Holiness The Dalai Lama Archbishop Desmond Tutu Adolfo Perez Esquivel Wangari Muta Mathai Indai Lourdes Sajor Martin O Brien Front Line Trustees Denis O Brien (Chairman) Mary Lawlor (Director) Noeline Blackwell Michel Forst Kieran Mulvey Pierre Sane David Sykes ii FRONT LINE AND IMPARSIAL IMPARSIAL The Indonesian Human Rights Watch IMPASIAL was established in June 2002 by 17 of Indonesia s most prominent human rights advocates who shared the same concern: the power of the state showed an increasing tendency to assert itself to the detriment of civil society. The founders of IMPARSIAL are: T. Mulya Lubis, Karlina Leksono, M. Billah, Wardah Hafidz, Hendardi, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, Binny Buchory, Kamala Chandrakirana, HS Dillon, Munir, Rachland Nashidik, Rusdi Marpaung, Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Nezar Patria, Amiruddin, and Poengky Indarti. Ironically, although the new era after the fall of the New Order regime of President Suharto in 1998 has opened the way for greater public advocacy activities, the strength of human rights and other civil society groups has tended to decrease in recent years. All the founders agreed that the time had come for the establishment of a new human rights protection organization to work for the following goals: (1) to formulate a standardized approach to reporting and documenting human rights protection matters; (2) to prepare and campaign for an alternative human rights policy, and; (3) to work as a partner of the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM). Vision and Mission IMPARSIAL was taken from the word Impartial to denote the organization s commitment to upholding the fundamental equality of the rights possessed by all human beings, with special concern given to promoting the rights of the less fortunate. The organization s impartiality also denotes its commitment to helping victims of human rights abuse regardless of their social origins, gender, ethnicity, political or religious beliefs. IMPARSIAL is a vehicle for promoting civil liberties, struggling for fundamental freedom, fighting discrimination, and supporting human rights abuse victims seeking justice and accountability. FRONT LINE AND IMPARSIAL iii IMPARSIAL monitors and investigates human rights violations, releases its findings to the public, and demands the powerful within the state fulfill their obligation to protect human rights and work towards the elimination of violence from national life. IMPARSIAL promotes solidarity between Indonesians and works to garner international support for the faithful implementation of international human rights law. IMPARSIAL researches the social reality that forms the context in which human rights must be protected, recommends changes and alternative state policy, and keeps a close watch on their implementation. IMPARSIAL is independent of the state, non-partisan, and obtains its funding from like-minded organizations and individuals without any reciprocal obligation besides a firm commitment to work for the protection of human rights. Aim To function as a vehicle for Indonesian civil society in its attempts to apply internationally recognized human rights standards in public policy and in practice. Unique Characteristic IMPARSIAL is unique in Indonesia in that it strives to amalgamate a number of important endeavours: to formulate alternative human rights policies, establish a standardized documentation system of human rights protection matters in order to advocate legal remedies, and to institute a comprehensive system to protect human rights defenders. Work Ethic In its work, IMPARSIAL is committed to supporting the important role played by human rights defenders at all levels of society local, national iv FRONT LINE AND IMPARSIAL and international in advocating changes to national human rights policy and conducting disciplined research and documentation of related matters. Acknowledgements We are deeply grateful to all those people who were kind enough to take the time out to speak with us and share their experiences, analysis, ideas and documents. The report was written by Akuat Supriyanto, Hasudungan Sirait, Lyndal Meehan and Suryadi Radjab. Rachland Nashidik was the co-ordinator of the project at IMPARSIAL. v List of Abbreviations Commonly Used in this Report ABRI AJI ALDERA ALDP APEC ASEAN Bappeda Becak BKO Indonesian Armed Forces (prior to the change of name to TNI in 1999) Independent Journalists Alliance People s Democratic Alliance Papuan Democracy Alliance Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Provincial Development Planning Board Pedal-driven tricycle pedicab Bawah Kendali Operasi - non-territorial units and troops under the operational command of territorial commanders. Police Mobile Brigade Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Consultative Group on Indonesia (See IGGI) Convention on the Rights of the Child Civilian military informants Armed Forces Officers Honor Council Military Operations Region Provincial parliament Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy Human Rights Carers Forum Golongan Karya or 'Functional Groups' "Hate-sowing Articles" - Articles 154-57 of Chapter V of the Criminal Code National Islamic Institute International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights International Forum for Aceh Brimob CAT CEDAW CERD CGI CRC Cuak DKP DOM DPRD ELSHAM FP HAM Golkar Haatzaai artikelen IAIN ICCPR ICESCR IFA vi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS COMMONLY USED IN THIS REPORT IGGI IHRSA ILO ITB IWGJP Jalan Komnas HAM Komnas Perempuan Kontras Kopassandha division Kopassus Kostrad KPP HAM KUHP LBH Banda Aceh LBH Papua Lemasa LP3BH Menwa Moluccus NGO NU OPM Papua Council PB HAM PBI PCC PDI PDI-P PDP Pemraka Pepera Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, now Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), multilateral creditor organization Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy (See ELSHAM) International Labor Organization Bandung Institute of Technology Irian Working Group for Justice and Peace Road/street Indonesian National Human Rights Commission National Commission for Women s Rights Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence Now known as Kopassus or Army Special Forces Army Special Forces Army Strategic Reserves Command Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission Indonesian Criminal Code Banda Aceh Legal Aid Institute Papua Legal Aid Institute Amungme People s Foundation Legal Aid, Research, Investigation and Development Institute Military-affiliated student regiment Maluku and North Maluku provinces Non-governmental organization Nadhlatul Ulama Free Papua Movement Regency-level PDP branch Human Rights Aid Post (Pos Bantuan HAM) Peace Bridge International People Crisis Center, established by the Students Solidarity for the People (Solideritas Mahasiswa untuk Rakyat: SMUR) Indonesian Democratic Party Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle Papuan Presidium Council Concerned Aceh Students and People s Posko Papua s so-called Act of Free Choice LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS COMMONLY USED IN THIS REPORT vii PKI Polri Posko PPP PRD PusPOM RAN HAM RATA RCTI television station RUU PKB SEFA Semanggi I incident Indonesian Communist Party National Police Pos koordinasi or coordination post, established by NGOs as operational headquarters. United Development Party People s Democratic Party Military Police Center Human Rights National Action Plan Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims in Aceh Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia, private Draft National Security and Safety Law Save Emergency for Aceh On 13 October 1998, 14 people, mostly students, were shot dead by military snipers while protesting near the Semanggi overpass in Central Jakarta On 18 September 1999, 10 civilians were shot by military snipers while protesting near the Semanggi overpass in Central Jakarta Aceh People s Grand Assembly for Independence (Sidang Raya Rakyat Aceh untuk Kemerdekaan) 11 November 2000 Aceh Referendum Information Center Secretariat for Peace and Justice Students Solidarity for Democracy, the student wing of the PRD Referendum Strugglers General Session (Sidang Umum Masyarakat Pejuang Referendum) 8 November 1999. The name was chosen as a play on the People s Consultative Assembly General Session (also SU MPR). tahanan politik or political prisoner. Name chosen for the original British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners, also known as Indonesia Human Rights Campaign in London, established in 1973. Government fact finding team into the May 1998 riots in Jakarta Indonesian Armed Forces Semanggi II incident SIRA RAKAN SIRA SKP SMID SU MPR Tapol TGPF TNI viii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS COMMONLY USED IN THIS REPORT TPN Trisakti incident TVRI YLBHI YPMD YRBI National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the OPM On 12 May 1998, snipers opened fire on a peaceful student demonstration at Trisakti University in West Jakarta killing four students and sparking mass riots that engulfed the city in following days Televisi Rebublik Indonesia, state-owned countrywide television station Indonesian Legal Aid Institute Foundation Papua Rural Community Development Foundation Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia 1 Executive Summary and Recommendations Until the end of Soeharto s New Order government it was very difficult for human rights defenders to operate openly due to severe restrictions on freedom of assembly, association and expression. The popular movement which led to his downfall also in some ways provided the foundations for the human rights movement and other organizations (such as political campaigners). However, in spite of promises for reform, violations have continued against those who use their freedom to speak out against human rights violations. This report offers a broad outline of the political and historical context of human rights violations and the work of human rights defenders. Its primary focus rests on the cases of abuse, arbitrary arrest, torture, disappearance, murder and other forms of intimidation perpetrated against human rights defenders in Indonesia. The report is not exhaustive but gives a picture of a pattern of intimidation of human rights defenders. Three regions have been singled out for special consideration: the capital, Jakarta, in the lead up to and following the 21 May 1998 resignation of president Soeharto as well as Aceh and West Papua, which are home to Indonesia s longest and bloodiest separatist movements. Just as human rights violations have escalated in these regions, so too have crimes against human rights defenders. The overall political context and the pattern of human rights abuse remains the same in other regions that have not been included in this report, including Kalimantan, Sulawesi and the Moluccus (Maluku and North Maluku provinces). The political and economic legacy left by Soeharto continues to exert a powerful influence over national life. The economic crisis that precipitated his downfall continues. The ongoing political crisis is evident in the lack of true representation of the people s interests in the parliaments and other government agencies as well as the continuing influence of the armed forces over political developments. The corruption, collusion and nepotism, known in Indonesian as simply KKN , or korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme, developed under Soeharto continues to repress civil society. This is especially evident in the weaknesses of the Indonesian justice system, where justice is bought and sold and the judiciary and police continue to support the interests of the powerful elite within the government and security forces. The lack of 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS political will to reform the system has also inhibited the establishment of a functioning Ombudsman s office. In addition, human rights defenders have come to seriously doubt the independence of the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), itself a legacy of Soeharto s attempts to appease domestic and international critics. Within this system of patronage and protection , the armed forces and police continue to exert their power over civil society. The Army s Special Forces (Kopassus) and the police Mobile Brigade (Brimob) are responsible for the majority of attacks on civilians and human rights defenders, particularly in Aceh and West Papua. In addition, civilians with criminal connections are increasingly used by the security forces to abuse and intimidate human rights defenders. In Aceh in particular, civilians and internally displaced people have become pawns in the ongoing battle between separatist forces and the security apparatus and civilian deaths far outstrip fatalities from either of the warring sides. In this context of political stagnation, economic uncertainty and social flux, human rights defenders face numerous problems in empowering civil society, reporting on human rights violations and developing protective legal and institutional mechanisms. The following recommendations are needed to protect human rights in Indonesia and human rights defenders in particular. Recommendations IMPARSIAL and Front Line urge the Indonesian government to take the following measures to help guarantee the physical integrity and working conditions of those who defend human rights in Indonesia, as well as to guarantee that those who threaten, intimidate, harass or abuse these defenders are brought to justice. These recommendations are made with the aim of reforming the country s legal and justice system and resolving the conflicts in West Papua and Aceh. As a society in the midst of a transitional period, the government must play an active role in reforming the justice system and promoting human rights. The following recommendations are central to that effort. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 1. Guarantee the Application of the Principles in the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders The United Nations Declaration of the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1998, contains vital principles concerning the protection of human rights defenders. The Indonesian government should take measures to ensure the principles in the UN Declaration of the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are fully incorporated into national law and legal mechanisms. Authorities at all levels of government should explicitly commit themselves to promoting respect for human rights and to the protection of human rights defenders. The Indonesian government is also urged to guarantee and protect all human rights defenders in Aceh and West Papua in particular. The Indonesian government should issue an invitation to the UN Special Representative on Human Rights Defenders, Ms. Hina Jilani to visit Indonesia. 2. Investigate Fully Abuses Committed Against Human Rights Defenders Authorities at both the national and provincial level of government must ensure that thorough and impartial investigations are conducted into all human rights violations, particularly those directed at human rights defenders, so that those responsible are brought to justice and the victims or their relatives are provided with adequate reparation. It should go without saying that those who oversee such investigations must be independent and that those responsible for the alleged human rights violations have no authority over these investigations. The results of the investigations should be made public. 3. Recognise the Oversight of International Human Rights Bodies One critical means of providing human rights defenders the conditions necessary to perform their vital function is through full government recognition of and participation in international mechanisms for the 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS protection of human rights. Engaged participation in these mechanisms sends a clear message to domestic society that human rights defence is a legitimate and important social activity. This recommendation is particularly relevant for the defence of human rights in Aceh and West Papua. 4. Constitutional Guarantee of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms The global community has committed itself to respecting and protecting human rights and the role played by human rights defenders. The Indonesian government should formalize its commitment by guaranteeing fundamental freedoms and human rights under constitutional law. The government should further its commitment through taking action and education to ensure that all persons under its authority enjoy these rights and freedoms without discrimination and disturbances or threats that endanger their integrity. 5. Ratify the ICCPR and ICESCR and Publicize the CAT, CEDAW, CERD and CRC In strengthening its commitment to human rights, the Indonesian government should immediately ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) including Optional Protocols I and II and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The government should also effectively publicize the covenants that have already been ratified with particular attention paid to publicizing the rights contained in these covenants and the government s obligation to realize them in practice. The covenants in question are: 1) The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 2) The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 3) The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and 4) The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Indonesia has ratified the CAT and made its first report to the Committee Against Torture. The Committee made recommendations that Indonesia has yet to implement. For example the government has not invited the special rapporteur to visit Indonesia. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 6. Ratify the Rome Statute (International Criminal Court) The global commitment to reducing armed conflict has produced agreement on the application of international law. The Indonesian government should ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in order to inhibit the spread of violence and support the prosecution of all those accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 7. Strengthen the Commitment to Upholding the Law by Reducing the Incidence of Cruel Treatment, Torture, Punishment and Extra-Judicial Execution The Indonesian government must strengthen its commitment to guaranteeing the protection of human rights with the aim of eliminating or reducing cruel treatment, torture and extra-judicial execution crimes perpetrated by those responsible for upholding the law. We urge the government to adopt four key instruments related to this aim: a) Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, b) Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, c) Body of Principles for Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, d) Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. 8. Adoption of International Legal Principles for Victims of Abuse of Power The Indonesian government and House of Representatives should adopt international legal principles in regards to compensation for the victims of human rights violations resulting from the abuse of state power, particularly for victims of the extra-judicial crimes outlined in the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. The government should also formulate new draft laws that allow for the perpetrators of serious human rights violations to be tried under criminal law. 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9. Creation of an Independent Judicial System The commitment to upholding the law should be realised in a free and impartial justice system. The government and Supreme Court must take action to eliminate or drastically reduce corruption and bias in the judicial system. Immediate action aimed at straightening out the court mafia must be taken. Without an independent judiciary, equality before the law and justice for all will remain elusive and the culture of impunity will continue to spread. 10. Increase the Autonomy and Professionalism of the Police and End the Military s Political Role The separation of the National Police (Polri) and the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) was formalized in 1999. However, the government must work to improve the professionalism of the police force in dealing with and overcoming civil policing matters and promote a respect for human rights. In addition, the government must heed the demands of civil society and end the military s role in politics and return the troops to the barracks. Increased professionalism as a national defence force should drastically reduce human rights violations in civil society and in regions with separatist movements in particular. 11. Investigate Police and Military Abuse Independently Given that a significant portion of the instances of abuse and threatened abuse involve at least the suspicion of participation by the police and military, effective and independent investigations are vital to any comprehensive program aimed at ensuring that the work of human rights defenders is respected. Independent investigations necessarily require that civil authorities be empowered to investigate credible allegations of violence without relying on the police to take witness statements, visit the scene of the crime or provide other technical support. This is particularly urgent in cases in which the alleged violation involves the police or military. Investigators should be fully empowered to subpoena documents, summons witnesses and enter the premises of public offices, including police and military detention centers, in order to conduct thorough investigations. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 12. Victim and Witness Protection In developing a justice system that respects and protects human rights, the government must improve and accelerate the formulation of the draft law on victim and witness protection. Confidentiality and other measures should be complimented by guarantees that victims and witnesses are protected from legal prosecution in pursuing their cases. In this way, libel cases such as those taken out against Endin Wahyudin and Maria Leonita Sricandra, who reported corruption at the Supreme Court, would be avoided. 13. Increase the Commission Institutional Capacity of the Ombudsman Indonesia s first Ombudsman Commission was formed under president Abdurrahman Wahid in order to provide the government with input on developing and improving the rule of law. The current government has neglected this development. As a vital compliment to the justice system, the Ombudsman Commission institution must be strengthened so that it is capable of effectively monitoring judicial developments, especially regarding advocacy and human rights. 8 Presentation of the Problem The fall of president Soeharto on 21 May 1998 was a turning point in modern Indonesian history. The economic crisis started in Thailand in earlymid 1997 but the contagion soon spread. While other countries affected, such as Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand itself, have made a comeback despite the devastating impact of the watershed, Indonesia has not yet fully recovered. The collapse of the economic miracle was evident when Soeharto called in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and signed the first Letter of Intent agreement in October 1997 under a multi-billion rescue package hurriedly cobbled together as the crisis spread to all sectors of the national economy.1 But the agreement could not stop the mass exodus of capital from Indonesia and near collapse of the banking sector nor stabilize the social undercurrents of resistance to the ruling regime. The students were the first to popularize the new catch cry of economic and political change: reformasi .2 As months of mass layoffs and skyrocketing prices passed, the call drew increasing support from other elements of civil society. Demonstrations on campuses across the country soon spread to the streets to be met with military and police repression. Students became the symbolic leaders of the emerging movement and its aspirations for national renewal. The shooting deaths of four students at Jakarta s upmarket private Trisakti University on 12 May 1998 thus had an immense effect on the national psyche at the time. Riots soon broke out around the campus in West Jakarta. The chaos then gripped many parts of the capital, while the police and security forces tended to stand idly by particularly when they became the targets of the people s ire. But there was much speculation that elements of the military and regime leadership were playing a dangerous game as the rioting spread throughout 1 2 Suryadi A. Radjab (1999), Praktik Culas Bisnis Gaya Orde Baru, Jakarta: Grasindo at pp 20-25. Hendardi (1998), Penghilangan Paksa, Mengungkap Kebusukan Politik Orde Baru, Jakarta: PBHI and Grasindo. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 9 Jakarta over 13 - 16 May . Reports of provocateurs appearing at trouble spots and encouraging the destruction mounted particularly in the Glodok area where Indonesian-Chinese were set upon. Rape and arson soon reduced the shopping district to a state of anarchy.3 As the chaos spread, thousands of students began occupying the parliament grounds. The students and supporters were united in the cause of ending Soeharto s 32-year iron grip on the country. In addition, the movement had developed into a broader pro-democracy and human rights movement encompassing every sector of national life. Still the students came in increasing numbers even after Soeharto offered to hold democratic elections immediately. As Jakarta burned, Soeharto finally stepped down and handed power to his handpicked successor B.J. Habibie. Soeharto left behind a legacy of rapid economic and social development but one shaped by militarism, corruption and inequality between the haves and have-nots . Demands for decentralization of government power and an end to the military s role in politics were just two of the themes of the movement that burst into the national arena to shape the future development of the country. The overwhelming push for reformasi, subsequent repression, and the first tentative steps into a new democratic era represent the context in which the current struggle for human rights in Indonesia must be placed. The election of 1999 the country s first democratic elections since the 1950s instated a more democratic system. However, the past still casts a long shadow over Indonesia today, particularly in the two regions selected for special consideration in this report West Papua and Aceh. At the eastern and western ends of the archipelago, West Papua and Aceh are home to the country s longest and most violent independence movements. With the exception of now independent East Timor, the two provinces have seen the most systematic violations of international human rights standards. 3 Potret Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia di Indonesia 1998: Menagih Tanggung Jawab Negara, (Jakarta: PBHI and Inpi Pact, 1998). 10 PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM Defining Human Rights Defenders The United Nations has manifested in no uncertain terms that the work of human rights defenders is of critical importance for the promotion of human rights worldwide and, as such, these defenders deserve special protection. The UN General Assembly, in Resolution 53/144, approved the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on 9 December 1998 - the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Resolution 2000/61 of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, passed in April 2000, established the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights Defenders.4 While these resolutions emphasize the critical role played by human rights defenders and create the means for ensuring that governments respect and protect their work, they do not exactly define who is a human rights defender. Similarly, Hina Jilani, Special Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights Defenders, appointed pursuant to Resolution 2000/61 of the Commission on Human Rights, opted not to establish a static definition of human rights defenders in her initial report on the situation of human rights defenders submitted to the General Assembly on 10 September 2001.5 Front Line provides the following definition of a human rights defender: A human rights defender is a person who works, non-violently, for any or all the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This definition thus encompasses those who defend a wide range of rights not only civil and political human rights, but also economic, social and cultural rights. This report focuses on the killing, death threats, beatings, frivolous lawsuits and prosecutions, and other means of intimidation directed against human rights defenders as a result of their work. Thus, while we begin with a broad definition of human rights defence, we limit cases documented to those in which the evidence demonstrates a clear link between the killing, death threat and other intimidation suffered by the 4 Front Line & Global Justice (2001), Front Line Brazil: Murders, Death Threats and Other Forms of Intimidation of Human Rights Defenders, 1997-2001, Dublin: Front Line, at p. 11. 5 See A/56/341, September 10, 2001. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 11 person and her or his defence of the rights protected in the Universal Declaration.6 Overview: Political Context President Soeharto rose to power in 1965 on the back of massive social, economic and political turmoil. The economy at that time was in chaos and tensions between political adversaries, particularly the Armed Forces, Muslim groups and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), had reached boiling point. Speculation is still rife on just how much Soeharto knew in the lead up to the abduction and murder of six military generals on the eve of 30 September 1965. In any case, with the Armed Forces reeling from the murders and the population in a state of shock, the new military leadership - under Soeharto launched a massive bloodletting campaign aimed at ridding the country of the PKI. In the chaos that ensued an estimated one million civilians perished. Although the military and civilian supporters primarily targeted PKI members, the anarchy allowed the settling of old scores in villages primarily across Java and Bali - and Soekarnoists were also targeted. President Soekarno was incrementally stripped of his power and Soeharto s New Order regime set about entrenching itself in all facets of national life. Even as the regime arrested and imprisoned without trial those with links to the PKI and Soekarno, many intellectuals and students tended to see Soekarno s removal as an opportunity to grow and prosper. While their support lent the new authoritarian regime much of its legitimacy, its real power lay in the military. The militaristic regime embraced the free market and reopened relations with the West and global capital movers and shakers in general. Investment flowed in and the effects of the economic crisis gave way to rapid growth. 6 As a result, instances in which the abuse suffered is not targeted at the victim because of her or his work in rights defense (such as an injury suffered during a public demonstration) are not included (unless the demonstration itself is viewed as a defense of human rights). Ibid, at pp. 12-13. 12 PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM Drawing on the nationalist ethic known under Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the New Order effectively constructed an integralist state . Formally autonomous groups within civil society came to be enmeshed in state organs. The regime sanctioned only one representative body for a broad range of interest groups, such as women, youth, students, workers, peasants, entrepreneurs and even fishermen. The government did not call its new model of national organization integralist as such. The regime adapted the national ideology Pancasila or five pillars in order to Indonesianise the project. Pancasila, the regime maintained, promoted consensus and abhorred the Western model of political rivalry. In effect, political opposition was not merely banned but portrayed as a betrayal of Pancasila and the nation. The representative bodies allowed under this system were incorporated into what has been described as an electoral machine , namely Golkar (Golongan Karya, or 'Functional Groups'). Golkar obtained over 60% of the vote in the general elections held every five years from 1971 until the regime s demise in 1998. Golkar can in fact be traced back to an armydevised competitor to the communist party in the 1960s. Closer relations with the military developed as retired officers began entering national and local government through Golkar. Golkar s (and the military s) power over civil society lay in the pervasive bureaucracy of this system. A comprehensive strategy to limit political activity in civil society in the interests of economic growth and national stability developed throughout the 1970s. The Pancasila Democracy of Soeharto s regime required the amalgamation of five secular nationalist and Christian parties into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Sensing the potential for concerted resistance from the Islamic community, the United Development Party (PPP) was also formed in 1973 as a result of a fusion of four surviving Islamic parties. Dissent was further silenced by the fact that other political parties were outlawed and only Golkar was allowed to campaign outside the cities and outside of a strictly controlled campaign season. All government employees, including teachers, were compelled to campaign and vote for Golkar. The government further obliged all mass organizations to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological basis, which sparked opposition from the Islamic community in particular. However, open resistance subsided after the PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 13 shooting deaths and subsequent torture and disappearances of Muslim activists at Jakarta s Tanjung Priok port district in 1984. Students and intellectuals also presented periodic opposition. In the 1970s, independent student representative bodies on campus continued to pressure for greater democracy. Ascending military power saw them as a threat and banned them, later introducing a series of policies that sought to depoliticize or normalize campus life. 7 Overall, Soeharto s master plan to wipe out political opposition in the interests of economic growth and national stability was highly effective throughout the 1970-80s and into the 1990s. The dual function (dwifungsi) of the military in both security and national politics became entrenched. However, one figure did emerge as a possible threat Megawati Soekarnoputri, daughter of Indonesia s founding president. She was elected to lead the nationalist PDI in 1993 and her popular appeal with the ordinary people mounted. Soeharto and the military finally moved against her in 1996, ousting her through supporting the former party leader. Although her supporters rallied, a violent crackdown sparked riots, which in turn justified a broader crackdown on the pro-democracy movement. With Ibu Mega out of the way, the New Order s political dominance continued unabated. Indeed, Golkar had its most stunning victory at the May 1997 general elections with 74% of the vote. Even as the economy crashed and anti-government demonstrations mounted, Soeharto received the full endorsement of the People s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in March 1998 for yet another five-year term. Soeharto s handpicked vice president, B.J. Habibie, took over when the economic and political crisis overwhelmed him. Habibie did not enjoy good relations with the military, especially after the decision to work with the United Nations to hold a referendum on independence in East Timor. Civilians pushing the incumbent government for even greater political reforms at home were also targeted by the military. Military snipers killed 24 civilians in the Semanggi I and II incidents near the Semanggi overpass in Central Jakarta during the Habibie presidency. 7 Suryadi A. Radjab, Tahanan Politik Mahasiswa: Sandera bagi Pembangunan, Imparsial, April 1997. See also Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Pedoman tentang Normalisasi Kehidupan Kemahasiswaan dan Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan, (Bandung: Rektorat ITB, 1979). 14 PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM Megawati s victory at the subsequent democratic elections of June 1999 did not lead to the presidency. Islamic parties and Golkar, the second largest party in the new parliament, banded together to elect Muslim cleric Abdurrahman Wahid. The new President s apparent determination to reduce the military s role in national politics won him no friends in the country s most stable and powerful institution. Military circles and nationalist politicians in Jakarta also condemned Wahid s accommodative approach to the separatist movements in Aceh and West Papua. Wahid did not last long under such pressure and his enemies convened a Special Session of the MPR in July 2001. The military refused to uphold his order to disband Golkar and the parliament, issued the night before the Session. Vice President Megawati ascended to the presidency the next day. Megawati was indeed renowned for her close relations with the military prior to the push to remove Wahid. Repression in Aceh and Papua have increased further under her administration. In addition to domestic factors, international events have had a fundamental impact on recent political developments. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States forced a thorough re-evaluation of security policy with knock-on effects in the economic, political and social realms. The deaths of over 190 people, mainly foreign tourists, in the 12 October 2002 bombings in Bali brought the fight against terrorism closer to home. Soeharto s Legacy: Militaristic Corporatism The military s role in national politics and economic development was one of the defining features of the New Order and it continues to exert a powerful influence today. The trauma of the bloodletting of the 1960s kept the people in a state of fear and the regime began transforming itself with the military s ascendancy assured. Due to the centralization of power in the Jakarta elite, with Soeharto established as the unchallenged center point, patronage was the key to gaining a foothold in the economy. The culture of patronage and its networks extended down to the lowest levels of government and the military PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 15 resulting in what has been described as an exclusionary corporatist regime.8 In general under this system, the New Order co-opted potential opponents and bound allies and clients to the state with the allocation of rights to exploit national resources such as oil, minerals, timber as well as cheap labour. The system drew in international enterprises and Soeharto cultivated business partners among Indonesia s ethnic Chinese minority. The ascendancy of certain businessmen caused jealousy and contributed to the targeting of Indonesians of Chinese descent during the May 1998 riots in Jakarta. The integralist approach to politics described previously also encompassed the national economy and created, for example, Pancasila Industrial Relations . Under this labour organisation ethic, the government promoted economic partnership in which only one labour union was permitted and a host of other labour-related groups, such as entrepreneurs, fishermen and peasants, were also represented by one Golkar - controlled body. The military also expanded its business interests. This was particularly evident in Papua and Aceh where the security forces received payments from foreign and domestic companies, particularly in the forestry and mining and oil/gas sectors, for protection from the separatists but also began establishing and working in partnership with companies. Indeed, the first civilian Minister of Defence under president Wahid estimated that around two-thirds of the military s annual budget came not from the government coffers but from the profits of these myriad enterprises, which have never been comprehensively audited or reported to the government. The government-military elite hold of the national economy eventually came to encompass virtually all sectors of the economy from one end of the country to the other. Their power was evident in the virtual seizure of land required for business development. Owners according to existing laws as well as those whose claim rested on traditional ownership were powerless to resist the military-backed capitalist onslaught. Meanwhile in the broader society, corruption, collusion and nepotism came to be referred to simply as KKN , or korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme. Time magazine investigations revealed that assets valued at $73.24 billion gleaned from sectors as diverse 8 Vedi R Hadiz, Buruh dalam Penataan Politik Awal Orde Baru, Prisma, No. 7, July 1996. 16 PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM as mining, forestry, hotels and tollroads had passed through the hands of the Soeharto family alone during Soeharto s 32-year rule, with holdings at the time estimated at a conservative $15 billion.9 Defending Human Rights in Soeharto s Indonesia: Students and NGOs The highly centralized political and economic systems that drew heavily on national identity and pride described previously did not leave much room for the development of independent institutions in civil society. The regime in fact regularly stated that the Western-inspired concept of human rights was alien to indigenous culture. The impunity with which the regime and military imprisoned, held without trial and executed over one million alleged communists and others in the 1960s was an important factor in the people s fear of challenging the status quo. When protests did get out of hand, the regime used it as an excuse to crackdown on all groups voicing opposition to the government. In spite of the New Order established under Soeharto, many among the younger generation who had not experienced the immediate trauma of the slaughter soon began to mobilize. They maintained that the regime had coopted only a portion of the student movement in the 1960s and had subsequently betrayed the people s faith. Corruption and mismanagement at the State Logistics Body (Bulog) and state-owned oil and gas enterprise Pertamina were the first targets of note in early 1970. The regime did not waste time cracking down on the rebellious elements. 10 The student movement reared its head again in 1974 when University of Indonesia students organized large demonstrations to greet the arrival of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. The demonstrators spilled into the streets and were quickly joined by thousands of poor, angry Jakartans. At least eight people were killed in the "Malari" (January 15 Incident) fires and riots. In the aftermath, roughly 800 people were arrested and prominent student leaders and several faculty members were imprisoned. 9 Time Magazine, 24 May 1999. In Bandung, the capital of West Java, for example, police began cracking down on civil rights and forcibly cutting the long hair of youths on the streets. Student Rene L Conrad was shot and killed at a demonstration at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) on 6 October 1970. See Suryadi A. Radjab, Panggung-Panggung Mitologi dalam Hegemoni Negara, Gerakan Mahasiswa di Bawah Orde Baru, Prisma, No. 10, October 1991. See also Mayapada, No. 89, 22 October 1970. 10 PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 17 In the run-up to presidential elections in March 1978, student council leaders at major public universities across the country issued statements and held rallies boldly calling for the replacement of Soeharto and re-orientation of the country s economic and political systems. The students also criticised the close alliance between Golkar and the army and the increasing political role of the army. Soeharto later imposed the Campus Normalization Act of 1978, which prohibited political activities on campus and abolished the universitywide student councils that had provided the framework for student political activities.11 It was no coincidence that a plethora of new student groups mushroomed off campus during the 1980s. Study and discussion groups on all manner of topics, both political and nonpolitical, developed. During the 1980s, former student activists and some intellectuals also began establishing nongovernment organizations (NGOs), which continued to draw in new students and activists throughout the decade. Most aimed to empower local communities and enhance their economic opportunities. This trend was not only evident on Java island but also later in Aceh and West Papua where students and NGO activists began to take an active role in empowering local communities, in addition to their efforts to help victims of police and military brutailty. As the phenomena spread, the students former tendency to favor the regime s promotion of development soon took a critical bent. The high incidence of land dispute cases in particular lead NGOs to see those affected as victims of development. The other social strata of victims of the development grand plan workers also began mobilizing effective strikes in the 1980s for higher minimum wages and better conditions. The movement grew increasingly broad in the 1990s and was met with brutal force. The rape and murder of labour activist Marsinah in May 1993 in East Java became a rallying cry for human rights and labour activists and drew international attention to the situation in Indonesia. Military involvement has never been proven in a court of law but independent investigations by the YLBHI and others point to local military involvement in collusion with the factory owners. Repression of human rights came in for intense international scrutiny in the early 1990s. The United States voiced concerns on Indonesia s human rights track record in negotiations over the general system of preferences (GSP) 11 Suryadi A. Radjab, Op. cit. 18 PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM trade program. The scrutiny intensified with the 12 November 1991 massacre in Dili, the capital of East Timor, in which an estimated 271 people perished. Activists managed to smuggle a video recording of Indonesian soldiers indiscriminately firing on a memorial procession-turned-peaceful pro-independence demonstration in the Santa Cruz cemetery. International creditors and donors of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) began tying their assistance to improvements in the human rights situation in the country. The government made several attempts to appease its critics in this regard. In 1992, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Indonesia is by far the largest member country, released the Jakarta Message in which governments agreed to promote and respect human rights. The government ultimately established the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) in 1993 but reserved the right to hand pick all leaders, which it did with little reference to the aspirations of independent human rights defenders. These independent activists made their own landmark breakthrough in 1992 by dedicating an award to human rights workers "who resist the militaristic and repressive policies of New Order Indonesia." The most unique aspect of the Yapusham Award was that it was named after Yap Thiam Hien, a lawyer who courageously represented political prisoners associated with the communist party even as the New Order systematically eliminated the party and ideology. The award is presented every year on International Human Rights Day, 10 December. Former student and NGO activists also moved into the press. The tight control on the industry and the fact that only one representative body was allowed did not stop many journalists addressing the injustices of Soeharto s model of development as well as democracy and human rights issues. In 1994, the regime closed down three pioneering publications - Tempo, Editor and the DeTik tabloid. Nevertheless, unlicensed publications particularly on campus and among NGOs were circulated widely. As Soeharto s grip on the military weakened and his advanced age caused increasing speculation on the future of the country without him at the helm, Megawati Soekarnoputri continued to gain in popularity. The daughter of founding president Soekarno took over the nationalist state-sanctioned Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) in 1993. In addition to her mass popular PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 19 appeal, Megawati attracted the support of individuals and groups with far more commitment to championing democracy and human rights than she herself possessed. She became a popular figurehead for the emerging movement. The regime finally moved to cut her and her supporters down ahead of national elections by backing an internal party coup in 1996. When her supporters holed up in the party s headquarters in Jakarta and held anti-government demonstrations, the military and hired thugs of the Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth) group attacked the building on 27 July 1996. Five people inside the building were killed, twenty-three went missing, and nearly 150 people were injured in the ensuing rioting. The regime used the chaos as justification for a comprehensive crackdown on the opposition movement. Among Megawati s ambitious supporters were progressive students of the People s Democratic Party (PRD). The PRD was established on 22 July 1996 with branches in 14 provinces in deliberate contravention of the country s political laws, which allowed only two parties and Golkar. The regime blamed the PRD for inciting the rioting after the 27 July raid and labeled all PRD members communists in an attempt to discredit and demonise the party and democracy movement. PRD members arrested after 27 July were tried under the country s draconian anti-subversion laws but the party used the trials to popularize their ideas through the media. PRD chairman Budiman Sudjatmiko gave a three-hour speech in court critiquing the regime but was nevertheless sentenced to 13 years jail. Other PRD activists, such as Dita Indah Sari of the PRD-affiliated labour union, received lighter sentences. As the PRD case illustrates, the discourse on democratic and human rights was growing and spreading throughout the archipelago. The crackdown in the lead up to the 1997 general elections did not stop some activists encouraging voters to cast a white or invalid ballot in protest. Other activists and intellectuals established an independent electoral monitoring body to draw attention to vote rigging as well as the myriad political repressions enacted by the regime. The regional and then national economic crisis was not far away. Indeed when NGOs began mobilizing civilian demonstrations, particularly in early 1998, they raised non-political but fundamental human rights, such as the 20 PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM right to work and food.12 As the economy worsened and Soeharto and the elite dug in their heels, the reformasi movement popularized by the students gathered momentum. The media brought all the regime s worst traits into full view as the military crackdown intensified. The shooting deaths of four students at Trisakti University on 12 May 1998 triggered the final crisis of the corrupt regime as rioting engulfed many parts of the capital over 13-16 May. The rioting was marked by mass violence, particularly against Indonesia s Chinese minority in the Golodok area of Jakarta, where rapes, robery and arson reduced the shopping district to a state of anarchy. Nevertheless, the sight of tens of thousands of jubilant students occupying the national parliament in the final days of the regime was symbolic of the great enthusiasm in the broader society for comprehensive change. Many observers maintain that the military, or at least elements of it, were directly responsible for some of the worst violence witnessed in Jakarta during the lead up to Soeharto s downfall in an attempt to provoke mass unrest and further its political interests. In any case, the people were not as easily provoked as when Soeharto seized power 32 years before and a tragedy on that horrific scale was avoided. Economic development and the spread of new ideas such as human rights contributed to the euphoria as well as to the relative stability of the transition. Habibie Government and Human Rights Soeharto passed the reins of government to his handpicked vice president, B.J. Habibie, on 21 May 1998. The parliament itself remained unchanged and opinion was divided on whether the technocrat had the will or the power to realize the aspirations of the people. Civil society groups had already begun to investigate the riots, rapes and disappearances of activists when Habibie formed the Joint Fact Finding Team to look into the May tragedy. Activists felt a political compromise was behind the inclusion of military and police leaders on the Team with representatives of Komnas HAM and NGOs. Likewise, entrenched interests 12 Among the most effective early demonstrations were those held by the Voices of Concerned Mothers group, which was initiated in February 1998 by women's activist Dr Karlina Leksono to protest the soaring price of food for children. The sight of women, particularly housewives, protesting en masse against the government was not only morally compelling but no easy target for the security forces and government in the ensuing crackdown. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 21 in the parliament continually threatened to compromise the formulation of new political laws for democratic elections. However, the fall of Soeharto was a double edged sword for the civil society movement. After the victory, it splintered into factions and lost much of its popular support. Large demonstrations, nevertheless, continued at the Semanggi overpass near Atmajaya University in Central Jakarta. On 13 October 1998, 14 people, mostly students, were shot dead by military snipers while protesting in disgust at Golkar and the military s continuing political role and the parliament s official elevation of Habibie as president. Moderate electoral laws were eventually passed, with Golkar remaining and the military/ police seats in parliament reduced from 75 to 38. When the election was held in June 1999, 48 political parties took part but almost all parties, with the exception of the PRD and some Islamic parties, were most striking for their similarities. Most were linked in some way to the old regime - established by splinter groups or public figures - with no definitive policies.13 Almost no follow up action was taken on the numerous accusations of money politics, vote buying and vote rigging reported by domestic and international monitoring agencies. The Habibie presidency was also noted for the referendum on independence in East Timor. An estimated one-third of the population had perished from abuse and disease under Indonesian rule since the annexation in 1974. Some speculated that Habibie wanted to secure a place in history as a great human rights defender in allowing the referendum to go ahead. But while his esteem grew in the eyes of the international community, Indonesian nationalists were loath to let the territory go and the military openly stated its aim of maintaining national unity . Civilian militias were formed amongst proIndonesian East Timorese with military and police backing in the lead up to the 30 August 1999 ballot. The preparatory period was marked by intimidation and violence but hell broke loose when the extent of the proindependence victory became known. A scorched earth policy carried out by the militias and their backers lead to torture, rape, murder and an estimated 25,000 refugees were rounded up and taken across the border into 13 In the case of Megawati s new PDI-Struggle (PDI-P), a plethora of smaller parties of unclear origin copied her black bull party symbol leading many to believe that the old regime had pumped millions into nothing parties purely to confuse the tens of millions of disadvantaged voters sure to vote for their hero. 22 PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM Indonesian West Timor. The disaster in East Timor presented Indonesia s first official crimes against humanity cases.14 Anti-military, Habibie and Golkar demonstrations continued until the final days of the Habibie presidency at the Semanggi overpass in Central Jakarta. Snipers again shot at protesters on 18 September 1999 and 10 civilians were killed in the Semanggi II incident. Protesters also condemned a new draft National Security and Safety Law (RUU PKB), which many saw as directly related to the rising demands for independence in Aceh and Papua following East Timor s example. The demonstrators saw the laws as little more than a means to expand military dominance of civil society and even instate martial law should opposition threaten the government. Wahid Government and Human Rights Most human rights defenders breathed a sign of relief when Muslim cleric Abdurrahman Wahid was finally elected president in October 1999. The near blind head of Indonesia s largest Islamic organization, the Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), was noted for his pluralist and humanitarian approach to politics. However, the people s hopes were perhaps too high at such a tentative stage in the country s development. Wahid sent out many positive signals in the initial stages of his presidency. A cease fire agreement of sorts, known as the Humanitarian Pause , was brokered with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) with the aid of the Henry Dunant Center in Geneva. Wahid also indicated a readiness to change the name of Irian Jaya province to West Papua as requested by local leaders and allowed the flag that had come to symbolize the separatist movement to be flown alongside the Indonesian national flag. But in the field, the military repression continued and human rights violations cases began increasing. Wahid also removed Armed Forces Commander and Minister of Defence General Wiranto after the East Timor massacres. But he rejected the suggestion that Wiranto and other alleged human rights violators go before 14 Laporan Penyelidikan KPP HAM Timor Timur, released by Komnas HAM on 31 January 2000. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 23 an international tribunal.15 Rather, he supported the formation of a national ad hoc court and preparations were made for the necessary new law.16 Wahid s political enemies grew in number when he pushed through with the separation of the police and military and placed the police under the office of the President. This move was intended to further develop the civil policing function of the police force and develop the military s defence role primarily towards external threats to Indonesian sovereignty. In reality, the powerful military resisted relinquishing its former pre-eminent status and military units continued to interfere in policing matters, especially towards demonstrators and in labour disputes. Wahid s other attempts to reshuffle the military leadership and promote reform-minded officers also met tough opposition. There has been much speculation on the extent of military involvement in the bloody inter-communal clashes, primarily between Christians and Muslims, that threatened Wahid s presidency. There is much evidence that officers were involved in the clashes in the Moluccus, which has claimed over 8,000 lives since 1999. Some have linked retired generals and business interests to the conflict. But whether officers acted on orders or with the consent of the leadership in the conflicts in the Moluccus, Poso (Central Sulawesi) and Sampit (Central Kalimantan) has never been established. As conflict colored by religious animosity flared in the regions, the country was rocked by the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in which at least 16 people died and 90 were injured.17 Although the police and military blamed GAM, many suspected only certain organisations with military expertise could launch such a concerted attack spanning six provinces. Human rights defenders were also targeted during Wahid s presidency. NGOs were more than disappointed in the state-controlled investigations into human rights violations and the failure to endorse the declaration of serious human rights violations in the May 1998 riots. Bomb and death threats were widely reported. The offices of both the PBHI and Kontras were attacked in 2001. 15 16 Eka Fitria, Kejahatan terhadap Kemanusiaan, www.pbhi.org. Suryadi Radjab et.al, Pengadilan Hak Asasi Manusia dan Pengadilan Pidana, (Jakarta: PBHI and The Asia Foundation, 2002). 17 Tiga Tersangka Diduga Pelaku Pengeboman Ditangkap, Suara Pembaruan, 26 December 2000. 24 PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM With support in civil society waning, Wahid s political enemies in the military and parliament moved to convene an Extraordinary Session of the MPR to replace him and install his vice president Megawati Soekarnoputri in July 2001. Megawati Government and Human Rights Megawati s presidency thus far has been full of contradictions in almost all sectors of national life, not least in human rights protection. Many believe her accommodative approach to handling the military, which fully supported her rise to power on Wahid s heels, is a major factor in these contradictory phenomena. Although the incidence of communal conflict and grenade attacks in major cities has decreased markedly, the number of human rights violations perpetrated by the military - particularly in Aceh and West Papua - have increased substantially. Journalists in particular have been singled out while the arbitrary arrests, abductions, torture, shootings and murder of human rights activists in Aceh and Papua continue. The numbers of internally displaced people has swollen to 1.3 million.18 In Jakarta, civilians have perpetrated attacks on human rights defender organizations such as Kontras and the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC). This report maintains that these civilian groups would not have acted without support from on high . In addition, while many more cases of human rights abuse have gone before the courts and perpetrators have been sentenced, neither the police investigations nor the judicial process have fully explained the motives and aims of the perpetrators. Likewise, the masterminds behind the systematic terror campaign launched on Christmas Eve and in East Timor to name just two examples remain a mystery. The appearance of the rule of law and relatively stable internal security situation have not brought major advances in reducing the pervasive corruption that is keeping foreign investors away and perpetuating economic uncertainty. Many from among the ranks of the country s estimated 40 million unemployed or underemployed workers are turning to petty crime to survive. The rising numbers of those living below the poverty line include an 18 Masalah Pengungsi Baru Bisa Diselesaikan Tahun 2002, Suara Pembaruan, 16 October 2001. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 25 estimated 4.5 million under five-year-old children, or 25% of Indonesia's 18 million toddlers, suffering from malnutrition. These people have little time or energy to devote to human rights issues even those that directly affect them. One other fundamental contradiction in the government s human rights policy is not unique to Indonesia. The vast majority of countries that have committed themselves to the war on terrorism following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States have taken measures that are ostensibly aimed at netting terrorists but function to the detriment of civil liberties. Indonesia presents many unique problems and the government finds itself in an awkward position mainly due to the fact that more than 80% of the country s 220 million people are at least nominally Muslim. Islamic politicians within Indonesia made much of the fact that the US bought Indonesian support in its war with promises of $400 million in financial aid immediately after the catastrophe. Meanwhile, Vice President Hamzah Haz has loudly condemned the US over its terrorist actions against civilians in Afghanistan. Human rights activists were more concerned that the US was seeking to renew ties with the Indonesian military, embargoed since the East Timor massacres, and that the military was set to reassert its power over civil society. In this context, the government set about formulating controversial anti-terrorism laws. Human rights defenders rallied to condemn the initial drafts.19 The devastating 12 October 2002 bombings in Bali, in which at least 190 people perished, have fasted-tracked the passage of new laws governing police and military powers. Indonesian fundamentalist Muslim clerics such as Abu Bakar Baasyir and the mysterious Hambali have been accused of planning major terrorist attacks in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and their links to the Bali bombers and Osama bin Laden s AlQaeda organization are currently the focus of intense investigations. It is in this heated and uncertain climate that human rights defenders must work to ensure that the gains made after the collapse of the militaristic regime of former president Soeharto are not whittled away. While civil society institutions remain weak and human rights defenders remain the target of military and police brutality, there is no guarantee of a healthy democracy in Indonesia. 19 Pemberantasan Terorisme Harus Tetap Hormati HAM, Kompas, 10 December 2001, at p. 7. 26 PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM Indonesian and International Human Rights Protection Since 10 December 1948 and the birth of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the international community has committed itself to respecting and protecting human rights. That commitment was developed further with the Covenant and Economic, Social and Cultural Rightss and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights passed by the United Nations on 16 December 1966.20 Indonesia, however, has yet to ratify either of these covenants. From the mid-1980s, the New Order regime of former president Soeharto came under increasing domestic and international pressure to improve its human rights record and ratified four pivotal conventions. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was signed in 1984, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1990, the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) in 1998 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1999. Other conventions ratified with specific reference to the International Labour Organization (ILO) include: the Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively (ILO Convention No. 98, ratified 1956), Convention concerning Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (No. 100, ratified 1957), Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (No. 87, ratified 1998), Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor (No. 105, ratified 1999), Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (No. 111, ratified 1999), Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (No. 138, ratified 1999), and Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor (No. 182, ratified 2000). Unlike other regions, Indonesia and its neighbours have yet to formulate a joint agreement on human rights. At the 1994 meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Bogor, West Java, the visiting 20 Suryadi Radjab et.al, Hukum Hak Asasi Manusia dan Humaniter Internasional, (Jakarta: PBHI and The Asia Foundation, 2002), pp. 33-40. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 27 heads of state did discuss human rights and make several recommendations but no actual commitment or organizational structure has subsequently developed. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had planned to establish a Human Rights Committee but in 1997 leaders decided to change to a national focal point strategy that recommended: The formation of a task force to study issues related to a regional human rights protection mechanism; The convention of a regional conference to discuss the formation of the Human Rights Committee, and; The development of programs aimed at improving the rights of women, children and other vulnerable groups. Defending human rights in the region would be greatly facilitated by a joint body but many argue that the sheer size and diversity of the region inhibit its formation. The Legal Status of Human Rights Defence Indonesia s legal problems are not only related to corruption in the courts and the lack of an independent judiciary but also to the development of the system because most legal products are based on the legacy of the Dutch colonial regime and the 1945 Constitution. These factors present numerous difficulties in developing mechanisms to protect human rights. Perhaps the most contentious remaining law of the Dutch colonial era for human rights activists is the haatzaai artikelen or "Hate-sowing Articles". The Hate-sowing Articles are Articles 154-57 of Chapter V of the Criminal Code itself adopted almost whole from the Dutch legal code for indigenous subjects. The Articles prohibit the expression in public or through the media of hostility, hatred or contempt toward the government or toward one or more groups in Indonesia. After the Dili massacre of 1991, the government did take several steps towards improving its human rights record, or at least its image. The National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) was ultimately established under Presidential Decree No. 50/1993. Many cases were brought before the Commission but, although the public profile of the cases and the issues in general were raised, the results were generally disappointing. The government had reserved the right to appoint all leaders 28 PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM and the bureaucratic and submissive culture of Golkar entered along with them. The formation in 1998 of the National Commission for Women s Rights (Komnas Perempuan) and a Ministry for Women s Affairs under Wahid were considered major turning points in the struggle to further women s rights. The impetus for legal reform of human rights protection mechanisms gathered steam after the fall of Soeharto. The government finally passed Law No. 39/1999 on Human Rights and formulated a Human Rights National Action Plan (RAN HAM). International pressure was instrumental in the final formulation of Law No. 26/2000 on the formation of an ad hoc Human Rights Court to try crimes against humanity and gross human rights violations related to the East Timor case and the unlawful killing and disappearances of the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident. The 1945 Constitution, the world s briefest constitution, has undergone no fewer than four amendments in the last four years. But the results have not pleased human rights activists who maintain that the amendment process was largely closed to public participation and failed to resolve numerous legal obstacles related to the protection of human rights. The Ability to Monitor Human Rights Monitoring is the most essential element in formulating an accurate picture of the state of human rights protection. Over 30 years of militaristic rule in Indonesia severely restricted public discourse on human rights and consequently the public s ability to report violations, collect evidence and take follow-up action. Weaknesses also exist in the justice system comprising the judiciary, prisons and the police. At present in an administrative sense, the judiciary and judicial affairs as well as prisons are below the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. The system is virtually closed to independent observers and the government has displayed a complacent attitude towards reforming the judiciary and cracking down on rampant corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) at all levels of the judicial system. Members of the public experience numerous problems when facing the police detention and prison system. Members of the public not only often PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 29 have to bribe their way in to see relatives but access is also denied to human rights monitors. As a result, there is precious little research into prison conditions and the rule of law in this stage of the justice system. These institutional obstacles are symptoms of the economic and political crises that represent the greatest obstacle to monitoring human rights violations in Indonesia. Although the media has taken advantage of its new freedoms to popularize and report on human rights issues, the vast majority of Indonesians continue to feel disempowered in the midst of the current uncertain environment. Recent education programs with domestic and international backing cannot reach the millions of people suffering at the hands of a corrupt justice system. However, the human rights monitors trained will share their skills with the broader community and the movement will gather its own momentum and direction over time. Impunity The cycle of impunity that developed throughout the militaristic regime of former president Soeharto continues to exert a powerful influence over the development of human rights in Indonesia today. Human rights violations, including those against human rights defenders are rarely investigated and those that have been investigated have not reached trial. Victims of human rights violations are reticent to take their cases before the courts for a number of reasons. First, they believe that justice will not be served because of the corruption and bias of the justice system. Second, they fear for their safety because the perpetrators remain free and there is no witness protection act in place. And third, they are pessimistic regarding the development of the judicial process, which may be furthered through the pursuit of cases.21 The ad hoc Human Rights Court trials on East Timor have been deemed unsatisfactory by both domestic and international watchdogs. This highlights many of the problems faced by human rights activists in Indonesia in a broad sense. Complaints on the management of the East Timor trials focus on the limited scope of the prosecutions, which do not involve the national military 21 Suryadi Radjab et.al, Keadilan di Masa Transisi dan Impunitas, (Jakarta: PBHI and The Asia Foundation, 2002), pp. 29-30. 30 PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM and police leadership or reflect the systematic nature of the crimes. Highranking officers, such as Regional Police Commander, Brigadier General Timbul Silaen, who was responsible for security, have been acquitted. Only civilians have been found guilty to date although appeals are currently being planned in relation to military and police officers. Needless to say, these complaints have arisen despite intense international scrutiny and media attention. Problems have also arisen in regards to the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Although the 1999 Human Rights Law allows for the Commission s immediate establishment, it has yet to materialize. 22 Many human rights advocates have argued that the Commission, modeled on the South African Commission of the same name, is unsuitable in the Indonesian context because of the different nature of the crimes. Others have called for a completely independent Peoples Court to try human rights violators including those at the highest levels of the military, police and government.23 No Indonesian government to date has taken definitive action in protecting human rights defenders in their work. The cycle of military and police impunity continues unabated in Aceh and West Papua in particular. In addition, civilian groups are increasingly involved in human rights violations. They are generally linked under a patronage and protection system to powerful institutions or leaders of the security forces or civilian government. The distinct lack of will to reign in these groups and their patrons has lead many human rights defenders to believe that the government is simply allowing the current atmosphere of fear to continue. The freedom and safety of human rights defenders remains under threat. 22 23 See Article 47 Law No. 26/2000 on The Human Rights Court. Suryadi Radjab et.al., Keadilan di Masa Transisi dan Impunitas, pp. 84-106. 31 Human Rights Defenders in Jakarta, 1998-2002: New Threats Post-New Order As the seat of national government, Jakarta is indeed the focus of greater attention compared to the regions. Many human rights and other NGOs are based there and Jakarta serves as the main focal point for the networks of these organizations throughout the archipelago. But working as a human rights defender in the national capital is by no means a guarantee of safety. When the New Order of former president Soeharto fell, human rights defenders saw an unprecedented opportunity to increase their activities and expand their networks. With the fall of the dictator came increasing pressure on the armed forces - the 'traditional' abuser of human rights throughout the old era. Public support for the resolution of past human rights violations cases increased. A number of leading advocacy organizations, including the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute Foundation (YLBHI), Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association (PBHI) and the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence (Kontras), began pursuing cases through the courts. Although many cases that had never been addressed were opened up, their goals of accountability and suitable punishments for the guilty were not realized as hoped. That is, only junior officers have been tried and sentenced - leaving their commanders untouched by the investigations and legal process. This miscarriage of justice was caused by the continuing strength of the military in the post-New Order period and the fact that the Jakarta political elite was unable to exert control over the institution and its top brass. In addition, the 'new' political elite contained many with strong links to the old regime and military and furthering their political interests became an inhibiting factor in the pursuit of justice. Many cases failed to get off the ground because of actions taken by the civilian authorities. In the case of the shooting deaths of four students at Trisakti University in West Jakarta on 12 May 1998, for example, the special investigation team established by the parliament declared that there was no evidence of serious human rights violations24 Indeed, the Parliament 24 Almost all factions of the House of Representatives agreed that there had been no serious human rights violations in the case. The two parties that had initiated the formation of the special team, the PDI-P and the PKB, eventually also agreed. See Kompas, 12 June 2001. The Attorney General s Office, the government 32 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN JAKARTA, 1998-2002; NEW THREATS POST NEW-ORDER had no authority to decide on this matter, which should have been left to the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM). Nevertheless, the military used the decision as its justification for refusing to appear before the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (KPP HAM) established by Komnas HAM. The military used similar tactics to evade accounting for the shooting deaths of 24 demonstrators near the Semanggi overpass in Central Jakarta in 1999 also. The determination with which NGOs continued to pursue these cases brought greater threats and violence. Unfortunately, the threats and violence have increased as the new 'reformasi era has progressed. In two cases described in this section, the attack on Kontras and the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), civilians were the perpetrators. Few doubt they would have acted without protection 'from on high'. As bringing those responsible for human rights crimes to justice becomes increasingly convoluted and difficult, the need to protect human rights defenders in Jakarta is increasingly urgent. Student Demonstrations and Human Rights Violations Towards the end of 1997, the student movement burst once more into the national political arena. Not only was the timing right in terms of the economic crisis but the mood of the people was ripe for change. As the movement gathered steam, normally apolitical or politically apathetic groups, such as professionals, teachers, religious leaders and the women s movement, threw their support behind the students. The movement became increasingly radical. The orginal populist theme that the government lower prices soon transformed into a concerted push to bring Soeharto down . The government itself reacted negatively to these developments. Various policies and a terror campaign against leading groups and activists resulted. One of the most dangerous developments was the use of unprecedented numbers of intelligence operatives and informants. The groups considered most dangerous were constantly terrorized but this only added greater impetus to the struggle. agency responsible for pursuing human rights violation cases through the courts, also denied that serious human rights abuses had occurred. See Kompas, 24 May 2002. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN JAKARTA, 1998-2002; NEW THREATS POST NEW-ORDER 33 Confirmation of the terror campaign was soon evident. A bombing at Klender and the abduction of political activists, mostly students, hit the headlines (see following section). The increasing pressure on the police and military as the driving forces of the terror campaign and the general repression of the time meant that controlling troops in the field became increasingly difficult. But the repression did not stop the students. Their militancy increased as economic conditions deteriorated further. The aim of bringing Soeharto down emerged as a broader pro-democracy and human rights movement that aimed to end the military s role in national politics and abolish the repressive political laws that restricted political activities and the number of political parties. As momentum and support grew, the students began to take their demonstrations outside campus grounds and the numbers of ordinary citizens joining in increased significantly. The government even went so far as to outlaw demonstrations outside of campus grounds. But the impetus of the movement was overwhelming by that stage and posko operational headquarters had already sprung up on almost every campus to mobilize the masses into action. Clashes with the police and military intensified. In general, however, the students aimed for peaceful mass demonstrations. The brutality witnessed in upholding the ban was thus not based on the desire to protect the public. The shooting deaths of four students at Jakarta s upmarket private Trisakti University on 12 May 1998 is a case in point. At the time of the shootings, the students were returning to their campus after a peaceful demonstration in which no clashes occurred at all. They were shot from behind. Other abuses occurred around the Semanggi overpass in the heart of Jakarta near a campus that attracted large crowds to its demonstrations. Rubber crowd control bullets and real bullets were used in the Semanggi I incident on 13 October 1998 in which 14 civilians were shot dead and 25 people shot with two people shot more than once. Of the 467 injured in the chaos, 78 suffered head wounds. 34 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN JAKARTA, 1998-2002; NEW THREATS POST NEW-ORDER Komnas HAM recorded 85 violations of the right to hold peaceful demonstrations in relation to the Trisakti and Semanggi I cases alone, as the following table illustrates: Kind of Repression (Level 3) Forced disbursal of demonstration/ public protest, rally, street march Semanggi Obstruction of demonstration/ public protest, rally, 1 street march Semanggi Limitations on assemblies/ gatherings 1 Semanggi Forced disbursal of demonstration/ public protest, 1 rally, street march Cases Trisakti Total 22 39 12 23 The actions of the police and military at the time, as reported by Komnas HAM, show that the violence used against the students and fellow demonstrators was not only intended to paralyse the student movement. They also intended to threaten and endanger the lives of all civilians they faced in Jakarta as the old authoritarian regime crumbled around them. The pervasive culture of impunity enjoyed by the armed forces and police is evident in the fact that the masterminds of the attacks have never been revealed or punished according to the law. Abductions of political and human rights activists, Jakarta, 1997-199825 The abduction of human rights and political activists was one of the most important phenomena that marked the fall of the Soeharto New Order regime. The Indonesian military, in this case the Army Special Forces (Kopassus), have admitted to involvement in the abduction of nine activists, who were later released. Those freed have reported that they endured torture during their time in detention. They also maintain that activists abducted like themselves but never found were also incarcerated at the same locations in Jakarta. 25 Material taken from various sources, including testimony of Nezar Patria, ELSHAM annual report 1998, Kompas 7 and 8 January 1999, and www.detik.com. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN JAKARTA, 1998-2002; NEW THREATS POST NEW-ORDER 35 The abductions were carried out in three phases: in the lead up to the general elections of May 1997, in the two months prior to the General Session of the People s Consultative Assembly (SU MPR) in March 1998, and prior to Soeharto s relinquishment of power on 21 May 1998. A number of activists abducted in the second phase were released in May 1998. They are Pius Lustrilanang, head of ALDERA (People s Democratic Alliance), Desmon Mahesa (lawyer with a legal aid NGO), Haryanto Taslam (member of the People s Democratic Party of Struggle: PDI-P), as well as Faisol Reza, Rahardjo Waluyo Djati, Nezar Patria, Mugianto, Aan Rusdianto and Andi Arief - activists of the People s Democratic Party (PRD). Some of these men have spoken openly about their experiences. They were the lucky ones. Other activists abducted at this time have never been seen again. They are: Suyat, Herman Hendrawan, Petrus Bima Anugerah, and Widji Tukul. All were activists with the PRD, a party established by progressive students in 1996, when the ban on political parties not sanctioned by the government was still firmly in place. Widji Tukul was a founder of the PRD and a poet noted for his empathy and support for the struggles of ordinary people. Not one of the activists abducted in the first and third phases have been found alive. These victims, apparently abducted for their political activities, include Yani Avri and Sonny (PDI-P activists), Dedy Hamdun (activist with the United Development Party: PPP) and Ismail and Noval Alkatiri (friends of Dedy Hamdun). Meanwhile, those abducted in May 1998 and whose whereabouts remains unknown include Yidin Muhidin, Hendra Hambali (both students) as well as ordinary citizens Ucok Siahaan and M Yusuf who were apparently lost in the riots that gripped Jakarta from 13-15 May prior to Soeharto s downfall. Nezar Patria, secretary general of the Indonesian Students Solidarity for Democracy (SMID), the student wing of the PRD, gave an account of his ordeal to the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence (Kontras) on 7 June 1998. Nezar said that on 13 March a group of men later known to be Kopassus members stormed into the house rented by himself and Aan Rusdianto in Klender, East Jakarta. The gun-wielding abductors immediately warned them against resistance. Their hands were bound and eyes covered with black cloth. They were then taken to, what they believe was, an important military installation in Jakarta. 36 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN JAKARTA, 1998-2002; NEW THREATS POST NEW-ORDER Nezar said he endured various forms of torture. He was stripped to his pants and undershirt and forced into a room with chilling air conditioning. They asked repeated questions about the whereabouts of Andi Arief, who was then head of SMID and the PRD after PRD chairman Budiman Sudjatmiko was imprisoned. Nezar was repeatedly bashed and given electric shocks to the feet. He was later tied to a cot by the hands and feet and given repeated electric shocks. The attackers sought information on his political activities. The torture continued in the following days and Nezar met fellow PRD activist Mugiyanto, who also received the same treatment. On 15 March, Nezar, Aan and Mugiyanto were moved to cells at the Jakarta Metropolitan Police headquarters. They were forced to sign their letters of detention in which they were accused of criminal subversion against the state. They were kept separately in isolation for around three months before being released. During their detention at Jakarta police headquarters, all three were called by officers of the Military Police and asked about their abduction by the unknown assailants. From the accounts given by the survivors, it appears the methods of abduction and torture were similar for all victims. Rahardjo Waluyo Djati was also forced to sleep on a block of ice and Pius Lustrilanang was submerged in icy water. As public attention focussed on the kidnappings, a number of NGOs stated that the abductions were part of a concerted military operation. Commander of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defence at the time, General Wiranto, denied the accusations. He said the Armed Forces (then known as ABRI prior to the name change in 1999 to TNI) had never ordered the abduction of activists. On 29 June, Wiranto stated that they had identified several officers suspected of involvement in the kidnappings and that the officers had overstepped their authority. On 3 July, Wiranto announced the results of their internal investigation revealing that Kopassus officers were involved in the kidnappings. But he said that there had only been a procedural mistake or a mistake in interpreting their orders. Several days later, the military police announced that 11 officers, from the lowliest rank through to a Major, were involved in the procedural mistake . The scenario presented to the public ran like this: a certain Major Bambang Kristiono who led the abduction operation had erred in analyzing his orders. The Jakarta Military Command top brass had only asked the Kopassus members to investigate activists it considered could HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN JAKARTA, 1998-2002; NEW THREATS POST NEW-ORDER 37 disturb the upcoming SU MPR. Instead, so the story goes, they formed Rose Team to abduct the activists. A military tribunal was held to hear the cases and proceedings ran for almost one year. The charges against the officers were extremely mild all related to the problem of the procedural mistake . Not one mentioned the torture suffered by the activists. On 6 April 1999, the Military High Court sentenced the 11 soldiers to between 12 and 20 months jail. Major (Infantry) Bambang Kristiono was sentenced to 22 months, while Captain (Inf.) FS Multajar was sentenced to 20 months, as was Captain (Inf.) Nugroho Sulistyo Budi, Captain Julius Stefanus and Captain (Inf.) Untung Budiarto. They were also discharged from the Army. The officers sentenced to 16 months jail were: Captain (Inf.) Dadang Hendra Yuda (34), Captain (Inf.) Jaka Budi Utama (32), and Captain (Inf.) Sauka Nur Sarif (30). Junior Sergeants Sunaryo (38), Sigit Sugianto (40) and Senior Sergeant Sukardi (39) were sentenced to 12 months jail. Prior to the ruling, the armed forces Officers Honor Council (DKP) formed by the military leadership found three officers had allowed the procedural mistake , namely Lieutenant Prabowo (former Kopassus Commander), Major General Muchdi Purwopranjono (Kopassus Commander General) and Colonel Chairawan (former Commander of Kopassus Group 4). All three were discharged. Prabowo, Soeharto s son-in-law, admitted the charges against him before the DKP but no follow up action has followed. He denies knowing of the brutality against the nine activists released and the whereabouts of those still missing. But he maintains that his actions were carried out with the knowledge of his superiors either Wiranto or the President himself. The problem is, conspiracy theories abound particularly as suspicions remain that Prabowo s troops instigated much of the rioting in May 1998 to further his own political ambitions. Wiranto too had his eye on the top job after Soeharto fell. And how do the abductions of activists fit in? They were a threat just as the democracy movement was a threat to the military regime entrenched under Soeharto. With the elite power struggle and shadow play to distract attention, the military dodged fully accounting for those who perished for their belief in democracy and human rights. 38 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN JAKARTA, 1998-2002; NEW THREATS POST NEW-ORDER Kontras Offices Bombed and Raided, Jakarta26 The Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence (Kontras) was established in 1998 and began its work with investigating the abductions of political activists at the time. From there, the group developed into one of Indonesia s most respected human rights defender organizations noted for its bravery and ability in championing human rights abuse cases perpetrated by the state. Such credentials have not won it favor with those accused of perpetrating the crimes and Kontras has been constantly targeted. According to Kontras head, Munir, the office regularly receives bomb threats so often that the staff did not take the threats seriously. This only increased the shock when a loud explosion in front of the office in Central Jakarta occurred on 27 September 2001. Although the building shook violently, no windows were broken and none of the property inside was damaged at all. As such, Munir concluded that the bomb was not intended to harm the people but rather to serve as a warning for Kontras to scale back its activities. At the time, Kontras was indeed investigating several bombing cases, such as the bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange in which 11 people perished and an explosion on a bus near the courthouse where former president Soeharto was on trial in absentia. According to Kontras activist Munarman, the attack on their office could have been related to Kontras statements to the media that certain elements of the military were involved in the bombing cases. Around six months after the bombing, the office was once again attacked, this time by around 200 members of the civilian paramilitary groups established by the military prior to the elections of 1999. The paramilitary groups were ostensibly formed to assist the military control demonstrations leading up to the elections but they were widely hated and accused of being little more than hired thugs granted impunity to terrorize the population. The group that attacked Kontras called itself the Bloody Cawang Forum after the attack by irate locals of the Cawang district of Jakarta on the civilian paramilitary members in 1998. The group maintained that Kontras 26 Based on news published online by Tempo Interaktif, 27, 28, 29 September 2001 and 13, 14 March 2001. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN JAKARTA, 1998-2002; NEW THREATS POST NEW-ORDER 39 had discriminated against them by pursuing human rights violations cases involving students but paying no attention to their plight. The 200 former paramilitary men entered the Kontras offices through the back and front doors simultaneously and began tearing up the place. Windows, computers and other office equipment was destroyed as they yelled insults at Kontras and Munir, whose hand was injured as he faced the attackers. According to Munir, the attackers warned him to stop all Kontras investigations into the Triskati and Semanggi I and II incidents, which involved several high-ranking military officers. Although they were not the only human rights violations perpetrated by the military handled by Kontras at the time, they attracted alot of attention. Just one day before the attack on the office, Kontras lead a demonstration of the families of the victims in front of the home of former Armed Forces Commander, Wiranto. The demonstration was held because the former General refused to fulfill the summons of the official Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (KPP HAM) formed by Komnas HAM in relation to the Trisakti and Semanggi incidents. Because of this coincidence and the fact that the civilian parmilitary units were established during Wiranto s time at the helm of the Indonesian military, many have concluded that attack on the Kontras office was tied to Wiranto. The police arrested seven of the attackers who received short prison terms. Unfortunately they did not direct their investigations to those behind the attack. Urban Poor Consortium activists attacked, Jakarta, 28 March 200227 The Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) is one of Jakarta s foremost NGOs struggling for the rights of the millions of disadvantaged in the country s capital. Over the last five years, leader Wardah Hafidz has become something of an icon to the urban poor and the group has been at the forefront of resistance to city policies that do not protect the rights of the common people. One of the UPC s most public campaigns has centered on the issue of the peddle-driven tricycle pedicabs or becaks , which represent the only income 27 Based on various sources but primarily Kompas 30 March 2002. 40 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN JAKARTA, 1998-2002; NEW THREATS POST NEW-ORDER source for thousands of poor city dwellers. The city government has outlawed their use in important sections of the city and launched periodic crackdowns seizing and destroying the becaks and arresting drivers. The UPC has directed much of its campaigning against the man behind the becak policy and other polices that harm the poor: Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso. On the becak issue, the UPC together with 67 citizens representing 15,000 urban poor launched a class action suit against Sutiyoso as well as the Jakarta Metropolitan Police Chief and the Jakarta Military Commander. In the verdict handed down on 21 March 2002, the Jakarta High Court ruled that becaks, as well as street traders and buskers affected by the ban, were permitted to operate under law. Unfortunately, Governor Sutiyoso paid no heed to the court s decision. The seizures of becaks and of the food stalls of the street traders continued unabated. The crackdown compelled the UPC and 400 of their urban poor supporters to take their grievances to the National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) on 28 March 2002. While they were waiting for Komnas HAM representatives to meet them in front of the office in Central Jakarta, nine rented minibuses suddenly appeared. Around 500 people spilled out and immediately set upon the UPC group throwing rocks and beating all in sight. The attackers were members of the Betawi Rempug Forum claiming to represent the original Betawi inhabitants of Jakarta but known to be close to Governor Sutiyoso. As a result of the attack, 51 people including women and children sustained injuries. Wardah Hafidz was clutched around the throat and Komnas HAM staff member Vonny Renata was struck in the head with a stone. Endang, a twelve-year-old boy, was hit by stones and the attackers also stood on the head of a 5 year old child, Fitria. The windows of the Komnas HAM office were smashed. NGOs and human rights defenders throughout Jakarta and beyond condemned the attack. Many said the attack on defenceless people, particularly women and children, represented a serious human rights violation. Many also claimed the Betawi Forum would not have acted without support from friends in high places . The Jakarta Metropolitan Police indeed arrested seven of the attackers but they were only charged under civil law for the physical abuse of the UPC HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN JAKARTA, 1998-2002; NEW THREATS POST NEW-ORDER 41 members and supporters. There was no attempt to pursue those behind the attack, although Governor Sutiyoso was compelled to issue a statement denying his involvement. Despite the best efforts of the UPC and other concerned parties, Sutiyoso was re-elected Jakarta Governor in September 2002 amid allegations of massive corruption and the bribery of provincial parliament legislators. 42 Aceh: Cruel Home for Human Rights Defenders Victims of violence perpetrated by the so-called security apparatus (the police and military) are easy to come across in every corner of Nanggroe Aceh Darrussalam (NAD or more commonly known as Aceh province, hereinafter refered to as Aceh). The violence has in fact increased since the abolition of the Military Operations Region (DOM) martial law period, which was imposed from 1989 to 1998. Seeking to crush the GAM separatist movement despite the end of the DOM period, the Indonesian government has launched numerous military operations, including three waves of the Operasi Sadar Rencong (OSR I-IIIII) and Operasi Cinta Meunasah (OCM). Many more operations have never been publicly acknowledged. These operations have involved both territorial units of the Aceh Military Command as well as non-territorial units, which are troops brought in and placed under the operational command of Aceh s territorial commanders (known as BKO units/troops). The atrocities have continued. The slaughter of Acehnese at Simpang KKA, Idi Cut, Beutong Ateuh, and the Bumi Flora killings at a plantation in East Aceh, are only two of the worst examples. At the Islamic boarding school in Idi Cut, 57 civilians were murdered by rampaging soldiers, while 31 people were killed in the Bumi Flora incident on 9 August 2001 the police allege GAM was responsible but GAM denied slaughtering its own people. The results of the latest study by the Banda Aceh Legal Aid Institute (LBH Banda Aceh) show that the bloodshed in Aceh is far from over. In the eight months to August 2002, LBH Banda Aceh head Rufriadi says 3,503 civilians fell victim to the ongoing battle between the security forces and GAM. Of the total, 974 died. Others fell victim to torture (1,486 people), forced abduction (223) and arbitrary arrest (820).28 By comparison, in the 15 months prior to April 2001, 1,340 Acehnese and members of the security forces were killed.29 These and other figures show that the number of victims is increasing and civilians always represent the largest share. Civilians are especially caught in the struggle between GAM and the police and Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) in the regions. GAM has made its home 28 29 Press release LBH Banda Aceh director Rufriadi, 4 September 2002 Tempo, 28 May 2001. ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 43 base in the interior. A common tactic is the use of villages and townships as buffer zones. It is therefore highly likely that the entire area will turn into a battle zone when GAM is under attack. The logic of the Police/TNI is simple: GAM is a separatist movement and the separatist movement has broad support in Aceh, therefore the local people actively support GAM s activities and are their enemies. On the other hand, GAM has also been known to target civilians, especially when they betray the group s activities to the security forces, but these cases are not numerous. In addition to the loss of lives and destruction of property, the other major feature of this kind of conflict is the large number of internally displaced people. Acehnese refugees from the conflict are generally those accused by the Police/TNI of being GAM members or supporters. Haunted by fear, the people are forced out of their homes and most seek protection in public places, such as mosques and schools. A portion flee Aceh altogether. The suffering of these people touched the hearts of many who have gone on to become activists and embrace humanitarian work. Much of the relief effort has come from the student community and their activities revolve around reducing the burdens and suffering of the internally displaced. After the withdrawal of the DOM, Muara Dua district in North Aceh became the first real centre for humanitarian activists. At the time, around 13,000 people had fled their homes in Kandang township to avoid the police and military repression under the Operasi Wibawa (Operation Power). In January 1999, security personnel had run amok through Kandang because the people had banded together and demanded that human rights violators of the DOM era be tried for their crimes. In attempting to relieve the suffering of the people, the students came to bear much of the brunt of military and police repression. The operational headquarters or posko set up in Simpang Keramat, Kuta Makmur district, North Aceh, was raided. There was no physical violence. The students learned from their experiences in Muara Dua when further humanitarian work became necessary in Pusong, Banda Sakti district, North Aceh. This time the students were more focused and systematic in their work. The People Crisis Center (PCC) established by the Students Solidarity for the People (SMUR) had its headquarters in Pusong. The security forces responded by setting up a similar centre for activities nearby. 44 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS The students concentrated their efforts on meeting the internally displaced peoples basic needs, particularly regarding food, medical care and education for the children. The fact that many needed victimisation support compelled the students to expand their activities. They began taking patients to hospital and meeting them often. Students also stayed with many throughout their time in hospital because the security forces were everpresent and this gave rise to serious fears and concerns for their safety. Activists also attempted to raise money to pay for treatment. But the complexity of the conflict and the high incidence of detentions, torture and disappearances soon saw the students expand their activities even further into advocacy. They attempted to protect victims and hunt down missing persons from their last known positions and the security units stationed in the area. Besides establishing posko headquarters, they recorded data on conflicts in the regions, took part in negotiations and advocacy and helped evacuate and protect victims of the conflict. The next major centre for humanitarian activists was at Simpang Pt Kertas Kraft Aceh, North Aceh. Activists set up headquarters there and another at the Cut Meutiah hospital, Lhokseumawe, after the mass slaughter of civilians there. The flow of refugees increased after the introduction of the Operasi Sadar Rencong in 1999. Repression only made GAM increase its resistance and battles raged in numerous places. The people came in waves to seek shelter and the total number in the area reached 309,982 in 1999. 29 By late 1999, the situation intensified further with the 8 November gathering at the Banda Aceh Grand Mosque. The Aceh Referendum Information Center (SIRA) claimed two million Acehnese turned out for the rally to call for a referendum on the future of the province but independent observers say this figure is too high. In any case, the demonstration only lead to greater repression from Jakarta. Head of the SIRA Presidium Muhhamad Nazar was jailed. Student activism died down and, at camps for the internally displaced, only a fraction of the former student turnout remained to carry on the work. The Humanitarian Pause agreement reached after long negotiations in Geneva on 12 May 2000 did not spell the end of armed conflict between 30 Hidup dan Bertahan di Wilayah Konflik Aceh NGO Human Rights Coalition, 2001. ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 45 GAM and the Indonesian Police/TNI. The fall of president Abdurrahman Wahid in July 2001 lead to the appointment of President Megawati Soekarnoputri and renewed conflict between the antagonists. Human Rights Defenders Treated as Insurgents Humanitarian work is a dangerous business in Aceh. Of primary concern is the fact that the security apparatus regularly accuse human rights defenders of being GAM supporters or sympathisers. Commanding officers have told humanitarian workers that they, as defenders of GAM s armed wing (AGAM), should remain quiet if dealt the same treatment as AGAM. Head of staff at the Iskandar Muda military district that covers Aceh, Syarifudin Tippe, accused humanitarian workers of promoting double standards because GAM attacks on police and military personnel were not classified as human rights violations.4 Following Soeharto s fall from power in 1998, humanitarian workers were free to work even in conflict areas. The various symbols of their organizations and large stickers on their vehicles were enough to earn them entrance. Volunteers wore their ID cards wrapped to their forearms. Once at their intended destinations, the symbols would be displayed prominently and strung around their operational headquarters. But, as mentioned, the situation began to change in 1999 after Soeharto s immediate successor B.J. Habibie was ousted in the country s first democratic elections since the 1950s. The police and military changed from keeping a low profile to asserting their interests in Aceh. Arrests of activists and the terrorizing of their supporters became commonplace once again. A spate of murders of prominent activists followed, among them: Sukardi (YRBI; Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia), Tengku M. Yusuf Usman (Aceh NGO Human Rights Coalition), Suprin Sulaiman (PB HAM, an affiliate of the Aceh NGO Human Rights Coalition), Idris, Ernita and Bakhtiar (RATA; Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims in Aceh) and Jafar Siddiq Hamzah (IFA; International Forum for Aceh). Fachrurazi (Pemraka; Concerned Aceh Students and People s Posko) remains missing to this day. But activists were not the only ones targeted. Intellectuals and 31 Syarifudin Tippe, Aceh di Persimpangan Jalan, Pustaka Cidesindo, 2000. 46 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS other prominent citizens that had spoken out against the violence were also murdered, including Prof. Safwan Idris (IAIN Ar-Raniry Chancellor), Prof. Dayan Dawood (Syah Kuala University Chancellor) and Nashiruddin Daud (national legislator). It appeared the critics were being wiped out systematically. Unfortunately, humanitarian workers have not kept comprehensive records of the crimes against them. Many see the beatings, physical abuse and other forms of terror meted out against them as a natural consequence of their work. Even the head of the Banda Aceh Legal Aid Institute Rufriadi has not kept faithful records. The kinds of abuse listed in the following table have been documented after much cooperation between humanitarian groups. Violations Against Humanitarian Activists in Aceh Kind of Abuse Period JanJulJul 99 Dec 99 -9 -6 1 Total JanJulJun 00 Dec 00 2 2 1 6 3 -2 5 JanJulJun 01 Oct 01 9 21 --4 1 -2 Arrests 43 2 14 15 Disappearances -Torture -Murders -- Sexual Assault ---1 --1 Total -16 12 10 13 24 75 Source: Hidup dan Bertahan di Wilayah Konflik (Aceh NGO Human Rights Coalition 2001) The freedom once experienced by humanitarian workers in the field has ended. In many cases, the symbols that were once a free pass to conflict areas now draw down the wrath of the security forces. Sometimes, even looking like a student can cause trouble and students continue to be attacked as GAM supporters. ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 47 Assistance provided by international organizations such as Peace Bridge International (PBI) has alleviated some of the pressure on NGOs such as the Banda Aceh Legal Aid Institute, Aceh NGO Coalition Forum, RATA and Flower. PBI have stationed members at the Aceh groups headquarters and accompany their activists in the field. The security forces have been chastened with the appearance of foreigners but even this is no guarantee of safety for Acehnese humanitarian workers. Threats and Violence Against Human Rights Defenders in Aceh This section is divided into two sub-sections: 1) Human rights defenders whose work as human rights defenders is the direct reason for their being threatened. 2) Political and intellectual leaders who also have a role in human rights defence. 3.1 Human Rights Defenders YRBI activist Sukardi Tortured and Murdered Sukardi asked Syafridah, a fellow staff member of the Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia (YRBI), to wait for him. He planned to take another YRBI staff member to Lhok Pawoh village, a distance of about 4 kms, and return to take Syafridah to Panton Luas village. Sukardi left on his motorcycle at around 17.00 local time on 31 January 2000. Syafridah departed alone after waiting an hour. After 2.5 hours and still no sign of Sukardi, the remaining staff of YRBI attempted to track him down but found no trace. With night falling and an eerie stillness engulfing them, the humanitarian workers decided to halt the search. They began early the next day but were soon informed by a caller that a corpse had been found in an appalling condition just near the village of Kuta Blang, Samadua district. Upon inspection, they concluded that the corpse was Sukardi s remains. His whole body was covered in the telltale signs of heavy torture. Near the body, they found a copy of a magazine produced locally for the police and bullet casings. 48 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS The local people of Kuta Blang village said they had heard the approach of a vehicle in the middle of the night and then a gunshot. They later found his remains at dawn. His motorbike was never found. Sukardi, born in 1970 and a graduate of Animal Husbandry at Syah Kuala University, was one of YRBI s most active men in the field and kept in constant contact with various elements of South Acehnese civil society. While still a student, he was active at the headquarters in Sawang and often helped civilians reclaim cars detained by the police and military. When the issue of holding a referendum to decide Aceh s future began to heat up, he was also involved in compiling data on victims of violence and evacuating refugees from conflict areas. Exactly why he was singled out for such brutal treatment is unknown. Indeed the YRBI was not actively involved in advocacy work at the time. Since their establishment in 1995, they tended to concentrate on empowering local community groups and developing education programs for village children. When the armed conflict flared in Aceh s interior regions, their work decreased because the guerrilla warfare interrupted normal life and increased risk of injury to staff. The intensification of the war in the interior drew the group into humanitarian activities. Terror The YRBI office staff were terrorized the night following the discovery of Sukardi s remains. Just as a staff member replaced the phone after informing colleagues of the day s shocking events and was about to send a fax, the electricity died. Only the YRBI office was affected and the double-storey wooden structure fell silent. When staff went down to inspect the electricity board, they were informed that several unknown persons had been seen sitting on the office veranda likely listening to the activities inside through the thin walls. When the electricity died, the men suddenly left. Three days later, a YRBI staff members were terrorized at Kuala Bateh, Blang Pidie. Several armed men threatened the staff members with their guns and demanded to know where they were going. ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 49 When another staff member set out for the provincial capital Banda Aceh one week after the murder, the intimidation stepped up a gear. The day after the staff member departed, several men appeared at the person s house demanding to know where he had gone. When told of his intended destination, the men left and began searching for the staff member s cousin in three nearby districts. They finally located the cousin and set upon him as they would any GAM member. He was taken to Tapak Tuan and detained. YRBI has learned that the men involved were from one of the security units stationed nearby, which had come under pressure after Sukardi s death. The Aceh provincial police chief had been repeatedly questioned at the time on the murder by the international and national media on the brutal killing. The terror intensified even further in August 2000 only this time it was indirect. Unknown persons kept showing up at the old YRBI offices in Sawang and asking locals where the office had gone and where the activists were now living. By 2001, the pressure was increasing with these unknown persons doggedly searching the activists. Those that had assisted the group in the past became reticent to continue working with them. A man suspected of being an intelligence operative warned one staff member not to go home one night because he was the target of a major search. The terror campaign ruined YRBI s work and the staff member that made his way to Banda Aceh was afraid of returning to base in Simpang Tiga Sawang. He only returned in April 2001. In October 2001, a YRBI staff member was shot though not fatally wounded and another volunteer, an Islamic community leader, was terrorized. The organisation then decided to move its headquarters to Banda Aceh although they faced losing their close relations with the small communities that had supported their work.30 IFA President Jafar Siddiq Hamzah butchered in Medan, North Sumatra Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, the founder and president of the International Forum for Aceh (IFA), disappeared on 5 August 2000 from Medan, capital of North 32 Source: Sanusi M. Syarif, head of YRBI and elder brother of the deceased, Sukardi. 50 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS Sumatra province, which borders Aceh. His friends and family began the search but found nothing. Because Jafar was so well known to local as well as international activists, the pressure built on the police and military to find Jafar but the response was abysmal. They merely denied any knowledge. On 3 September 2000, villagers of Nagalingga, Merek district, Tanah Karo (around 80 kms from Medan), smelled something rotten on the outskirts of their little village. What they found were five badly decaying corpses. The police estimated the victims had been dead 10 days. All were naked, bound in barbed wire with their hands tied behind their back. They had been shot. Three days later with the help of the family, one of the corpses was identified as Jafar although his face was no longer recognizable from the effects of torture and decay. News of the activist s death spread quickly. However, the headlines at the time were dominated by the brutal murder of three foreign United Nations staff members in West Timor by locals allegedly provoked by the Indonesian security forces. According to his family, Jafar had been afraid throughout his stay in Medan. He had received death threats and suspected that he was being constantly followed. Jafar had lived in Medan before. He had worked at the local Legal Aid Institute as a lawyer and spokesman during his studies at Alwashliyah University. His forthright statements to the media on any number of issues at the time lead the security forces to see him as an enemy and he was also always suspected of supporting the Aceh separatist movement. He claimed that he was being shadowed by security personnel throughout OctoberDecember 1996 and, fearing for his safety, left for New York with his wife. In New York, the boy from Lhokseumawe who grew up in a strictly Islamic family was increasingly busy. He established IFA to promote human rights and democracy for his homeland. He also continued his studies at the New School University. In America, he was known as one of the most prominent Acehnese activists and lobbiers with an easy, calm and friendly manner. He gave testimony to a committee of the US Congress on human rights violations in Aceh and across Indonesia. ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 51 Jafar Siddiq Hamzah decided to return to Aceh in 2000 and intended to establish the very first local newspaper in the Acehnese language, the Su Aceh. He also intended to establish a new organization to be known as the Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh. But the plans were thrown into chaos with his untimely and tragic execution.31 Tengku A. Kamal, Lawyer and Humanitarian Pause Monitor, Murdered Tengku A. Kamal was head of an Islamic boarding school and a monitor of the Humanitarian Pause in South Aceh. He feared for his safety when summoned by police and asked Suprin Sulaiman, a lawyer with the Aceh NGO Human Rights Coalition, to accompany him to the Tapak Tuan police station. They set out with their chauffeur, Amiruddin, in a vehicle belonging to the Monitoring Team. The large sticker on the side of the vehicle said Peace Through Dialogue . The police said the summons was related to accusations that members of the police Mobile Brigade had mass raped women who had once been welcomed into Tengku A. Kamal s home. The women had gone to the Banda Aceh office of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) to give testimony on the ordeal. On the way home, they had stopped off at Tapak Tuan and Tengku A. Kamal had given them a place to stay for the night. When Tengku A. Kamal, Suprin Sulaiman and chauffeur were returning from the police station that day, 29 March 2001, they were stopped on the road and brutally murdered. It appeared that Suprin was their primary target from the beating he sustained. Suprin was born on 3 December 1965 in Susoh district, South Aceh, and graduated from the Law Faculty of Syah Kuala University. He then became involved with the Pos Bantuan HAM (PB HAM), which was affiliated to the Aceh NGO Human Rights Coalition. 33 Sources: Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Tapol and various Indonesian publications. 52 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS The Coalition immediately began looking into the murders. Several eyewitnesses said Mobile Brigade police had done the deed. A darkcoloured Panther that was known to be an unmarked Mobile Brigade car had been seen parked at the nearby Tapak Tuan school. The car was full of men in civilian clothes and several had long hair and wore earrings. When the car carrying the human rights defenders passed by, they followed and later overtook the car. The eyewitnesses said they then heard gunshots and the Panther was seen speeding back through the town in great haste not long after. The Aceh NGO Human Rights Coalition reported their information on the murders to Komnas HAM hoping that the perpetrators might be brought before the courts to pay for, what the NGOs described as, a serious human rights violation. They did not get the response they deserved. Komnas HAM merely sent a letter to the Aceh police chief asking him to investigate the murders and consider the findings of the NGO Coalition. Komnas HAM must have known that this would only intensify pressure on the Coalition and any other party that had reported on the murders and the rape case and leave them no recourse to seek justice elsewhere. Journalists were repeatedly called in over their reports and accused of publishing slander against the police. Although none were declared suspects in any legal case, the projustisia summonsing was in itself an act of terror. Subsequent developments in the rape case were equally devastating for human rights defenders in Aceh. The victims were summoned by the police and, after being detained, were flown by helicopter to Banda Aceh. In the provincial capital they were forced to make statements that their prior testimonies had been false. The effect was as intended: the case was dropped. Activists heavily involved in the victims advocacy campaign fled Aceh in fear. Three RATA Members Executed Initially, RATA (Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims in Aceh) had never come into conflict with the police or military. The organization had focused on handling the medical and psychological scars of victims of the DOM period of martial law in Aceh. They had actively cultivated good relations with the security apparatus and lobbied hard for understanding on ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 53 the nature of their purely humanitarian activities. But good relations are no guarantee of safety. The day was 6 December 2000. At around 8.00 in the morning, four volunteers left their office in Pusong, Lhokseumawe, to head out to the new office in Kuta Blang. The four Idris (27), Ernita binti Wahab, (23), Nazaruddin (22) and Bachtiar (24) set out in a RATA vehicle. The move to the new office was not yet complete and they spent some time tidying the place. From the new office, they then set out to meet patients in Tanah Pasir. They took three patients to the local health center and escorted them home after treatment. At around 12.30, they set out to visit another patient at Jambu Air. But the occupants of a vehicle that had been following them ordered them to pull over mid-journey. Two other vehicles appeared from behind. Four members of the so-called Operational Assistant Force also known as cuak or civilian military informants got out of the Taft-model vehicle. Around five men descended from the other two vehicles all in civilian clothes. All the men carried firearms. One of the cuak men ordered them from the RATA vehicle. Their wallets were inspected. After some questioning, they were separated and the questioning continued in the cars. In Lapang village at around 13.00, the RATA volunteers were ordered to remove their shoes and get out of the vehicles. The beating and threatening began. If they fell, they were ordered to stand again. Bullets were fired near their feet although none penetrated. This torture scene and the beatings with a camera tripod was recorded on a handycam. One of the assailants removed the RATA sticker from the NGO vehicle and fitted false number plates. He then set out in the car but returned after only 15 minutes apparently satisfied there were no unwanted witnesses in the vicinity. The four RATA volunteers were then ordered back into the vehicles and they set off. After passing through two military check points, they arrived at around 14.30 in the village of Cot Mat Tahe where a bomb had recently exploded. After further beatings and more bullets fired at the ground, a local 54 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS man named Rusli was forced into a vehicle and the convoy set out yet again. They stopped in front of the Kandang junior highschool and were ordered out. Bachtiar, Nazaruddin, Ernita, Idris and Rusli s hands were tied. Two vehicles (including that belonging to RATA) then brought them to a deserted house around 400 meters from the main road. The men continued to record on the handycam. Ernita and Idris were brought into the house by one of the cuak men and another man, a suspected armed forces officer. They were kicked until they fell to the ground and then shot in the head. Nazaruddin, who remained in the car, managed to free the bindings on his hands and he attempted to free Bachtiar. He had not succeeded when one of the cuak men appeared. Nazaruddin, Bachtiar and Rusli were ordered from the car. As they approached the dilapidated old house, Nazaruddin made a run for it. He heard two gunshots that spelt the end for Bachtiar and Rusli. One of the men chased after Nazaruddin and he heard the gunshots fired after him. Nevertheless, he ran for 15 minutes through the scrub and hid himself. As the sun set, he climbed a small hill and spied a light in a window of a nearby house. The occupants were scared of the man they saw wearing nothing but his underpants as he approached the house but they let him in and gave him some food and water. Nazaruddin asked to be taken to a neighboring village and the head of the household accompanied him. From the house, Nazar called RATA s office in Banda Aceh. One of the RATA activists then met him at the village and brought him back to the provincial capital. Fearing for his safety, Nazar left for the United States where he remains to this day. Nazaruddin testified on the events surrounding his abduction in New York. The police then released an official statement in which they claimed that the murders had been carried out by four members of the Lhokseumawe subdistrict military command assisted by four civilian informants. The murderers were put in detention in Medan, capital of neighboring North Sumatra province. The police released the identities of the four civilian cuak informants: Ampon Thaib Geudong (alias Teuku Pon 48 years old), Abdullah bin Yusuf (alias Guru 37), Maimun (alias Buyung 44) and Madiah (44). Meanwhile, the military officers detained at the North Sumatra Bukit Barisan military command in Medan were: chief of the 011 subdistrict ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 55 intelligence unit in Lhokseumawe Major Jerry Patras and three subordinates Sergeants Slamet Jawa and Ermanto and Lieutenant Harry Truman. However, in March 2001 news began circulating that the four cuak informants had escaped from the Medan police Mobile Brigade detention centre. The police apparently did not even attempt to locate them and no news was heard. That is, until RATA sources said they had seen several of the men in Banda Aceh in the very vehicle they had taken the day of the brutal murders. From the very beginning, RATA had doubted the police were serious in their efforts to resolve the case. They were also disappointed with the establishment of a joint civil-military panel of judges to try the case when the dossiers from the four military suspects were handed over to the Attorney General s Office. RATA director Nurdin AR publicly rejected the joint panel and stated that the murderers should be tried under the civil judicial process alone. Nurdin s statements brought only increased repression on the group he established. He was eventually forced to seek sanctuary in Jakarta for seven months after being followed continuously by unknown persons in Aceh. The murders also took their toll on RATA s humanitarian work and the organization effectively closed for three months immediately after as staff attempted to deal with their trauma. Their desire to see the murderers punished for their crimes was later tempered by repeated threats of violence. Every time they spoke out, their activists in the regions came under renewed pressure and grave fears were held for their safety. If we re too loud in our campaign, then our colleagues in the regions become targets, Nurdin AR commented after he had stepped down as RATA leader and attempted to make a new life as an entrepreneur. RATA concentrated on helping the victims of the DOM martial law period those suffering both physical and psychological scars no matter what agency was responsible. Their efforts focused on assisting victims get back on their feet financially and earn a living, although they admit that few fully recover from the trauma. To date, RATA has helped around 1,200 individuals in four of the worst conflict-torn areas: Pidie, Bireun, North Aceh and East Aceh. 56 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS Their latest efforts to rehabilitate victims of the DOM period are incomegenerating projects aimed at affected communities and villages across Aceh.32 PB HAM Volunteer Tengku M. Yusuf Usman Shot Dead Another murder took its toll on PB HAM s activities in Aceh with the death of volunteer Tengku M. Yusuf Usman in Septemeber 2001. The lead up to Indonesian Independence day celebrations on 17 August are always a tense time in Aceh. The people of Simpang Ulim in East Aceh, together with the entire population of the province, were ordered by security personnel to fly the Indonesian national red and white flag on the day in 2001. This assertion of Indonesian control has always been a point of contention for GAM. The people are thus always in a no-win situation, facing the wrath of either the police and military or the separatist fighters. PB HAM volunteer Tengku M. Yusuf Usman (41) sought counsel with local GAM leaders over the issue and asked that the Indonesian flag be flown in the interest of avoiding further conflict with the police. The GAM representatives were not pleased and Yusuf felt that they had threatened his life in their brief exchange. He then sought sanctuary in Banda Aceh where his friends advised him to remain in case the situation in his area deteriorated. On 6 September 2001 not long after Yusuf s return, a stranger came looking for him at his home at around 22.00 local time. The visitor left after several minutes and Yusuf prepared for bed. But moments later another call was made to the house and Yusuf left his four sleeping children and wife to meet the visitor. It is unclear if the same person returned or another appeared. The person then ordered Yusuf to go with him but he refused. Yusuf was then dragged out of the house and two or three minutes later shots were fired. He died before his wife could learn 34 Sources: Nurdin Abdul Rachman (RATA director at the time) and two staff members. Nazaruddin s testimony published by Human Rights Watch used as supplementary material. ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 57 the identity of the murderer. She had indeed not seen the man as she had not received him together with her husband and the night was dark. Just who murdered Tengku M. Yusuf remains a mystery. The Aceh NGO Human Rights Coalition is inclined to believe that GAM was responsible because of Yusuf s prior run in with local leaders. Unfortunately, the lack of clues and eyewitnesses has left little room for investigation and the Coalition has been unable to take further action on the case. The serious crimes outlined above are not the only ones to strike PB HAM. The warnings to stay away from trouble have seen the group s activities dwindle. In South Aceh, for example, the group no longer has a lawyer as none are brave enough to replace Suprin Sulaiman. The Aceh NGO Human Rights Coalition was formed in 1998 and brought together numerous smaller NGOs. They have concentrated on accompanying victims, advocacy, litigation and human rights campaigning. The group has aid posts (PB HAM) in East, North, West and South Aceh and in Pidie. Each PB HAM had at least two lawyers.33 Pemraka Activist Fachrurazi Missing Presumed Dead That night, the flare up in the armed conflict between separatists and the Indonesian Armed Forces and police in Samalanga, Bireuen, had forced thousands of locals to flee their homes. As normal, the national troops combed through the area on the following morning 6 January 2000. Fachrurazi, an activist of the Concerned Aceh Students and People s Posko (Pemraka), set out on his motorbike that day from the group s posko or operational headquarters in Simpang Mamplam, Samalanga, to the mountain region where the refugees from the violence had fled. Only around 2.5kms lay between the posko and the site of the previous night s clashes and only 3 kms to the location of the refugees. But, while on his way to pick up a wounded refugee and escort him to the nearest medical facility, Fachrurazi came across officers sweeping through 35 Source: Risman A. Rachman, Coordinator Aceh NGO Human Rights Coalition and Faisal Hadi, staff member of the Aceh NGO Human Rights Coalition. 58 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS the conflict zone. He backtracked to avoid the officers but he was too late. Mobile Brigade police of the Lyang regiment on their way to the refugee camp caught him by surprise and took him into custody. A local man was descending the mountain on a bike at around 10am local time and saw Fachrurazi being ordered to the ground. He dismounted and pushed his bike forward to get a better view but was chased off. He immediately headed for the Pemraka posko to relate what he had seen. After hearing the story, the Pemraka student volunteers contacted the Banda Aceh Legal Aid Institute and asked for assistance in locating Fachrurazi at the police stations in the area. Although they searched everywhere, they could not find him. The Dini police sub-precinct drew their attention because a Mobile Brigade Regiment 1 truck was seen leaving the grounds and heading east towards Fachrurazi s last known position. After the Idul Fitri celebrations to mark the end of the fasting month, the students continued their search at all the local police stations in East Aceh and Pidie. Fachrurazi had been a member of the military-affiliated student regimen (Menwa) at his campus and they also sought out his old associates to ask for help. But still there was no word. Around five months later, a friend saw a Lhokseumawe BKO officer from a unit sent to Aceh under the command of the local security apparatus riding Fachrurazi s motorbike. Pemraka activists accompanied by staff of the Legal Aid Institute then headed for the Cot Girek police Mobile Brigade office. The officers there just shrugged off their inquiries. Fachrurazi s parents searched for their son at the Pidie and North Aceh stations of both the police and military but found nothing. On 11 February 2000, they received word that Fachrurazi had been freed that very day but he has never been found. Fachrurazi, a student at the Iskandar Thani Institute of Higher Education, had only become involved with Pemraka four months before his disappearance. His work had almost exclusively centered on accompanying internally displaced people in and around Samalangga where people refused to return to their homes even after five months the longest resettlement of refugees after the end of the DOM martial law period. ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 59 Pemraka and its primarily student activists are among the human rights defenders most targeted by the so-called security apparatus. Their work in conflict areas puts them at the heart of the armed conflict in Aceh. Their posko in Batee Ilik, Bireuen, was fired upon during the Wibawa Rencong Operation. The shock therapy perpetrated by troops of Mobile Brigade Regiment I also included burning the homes of local community leaders. When the shooting began, all but one Pemraka activist fled the posko and the police later arrested and tortured the remaining member, Faisal. The Pemraka posko at Peurelak was also attacked. The incident began when two members of the police Mobile Brigade were shot at the Peurelak market and officers went looking for the perpetrators at the refugee camp. They fired shots apparently only to set locals into a panic and many refugees were beaten and kicked during the search. From the camp they proceeded to the nearby Pemraka posko and fired upon the office. No one was shot but activists were badly beaten. In Idie, East Aceh, the local Pemraka posko was also fired upon in 2000. At the time, the office was vacant. Not so at the Meulaboh posko where troops raided during a meeting in which activists were assessing their programs. Members of the security forces warned the Takengon posko to shut up shop and the activists later evacuated to Banda Aceh. In Mutiara district, Pidie, eight Pemraka activists were seized and taken to the local military subdistrict command. In preceding weeks, the volunteers had spoken to the local security forces and asked them not to force refugees to return home against their will. They later received a threat that their posko would be burned if they continued their activities in the area. The volunteers were evacuated to Banda Aceh for medical treatment. Even in Banda Aceh, the group s posko did not escape the crackdown. They were targeted before and after the Aceh People s Grand Assembly for Independence (SIRA RAKAN) held by the SIRA organization on 11 November 2000. Police raided the office and destroyed property. Three activists were arrested and taken to the local police station. Both Aceh police and the BKO police took part in the raid. Besides the physical intimidation, the group s poskos regularly received threatening phone calls before and after the SIRA rally. The callers would say things such as you are all protecting GAM, you are all GAM. We re 60 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS going to shoot you, and You re all going to be arrested tonight. If military or Mobile Brigade personnel passed the Banda Aceh office, they would yell out Independence (Merdeka) at the top of their voices to provoke the activists inside. Still in Banda Aceh, two Pemraka activists were detained for no reason while accompanying victims of military and police violence to the Zainal Abidin Hospital. They were only released two days later. The situation was also incredibly tense before and after the 8 November 1999 demonstration known as the SU MPR short for the Referendum Strugglers General Session. The name was chosen as a play on words because the People s Consultative Assembly General Session (also SU MPR) was held in Jakarta at around the same time. Owing to the national Assembly session, the security apparatus toned down their activities. But then a new trend emerged. Reports began coming in of unknown armed men arriving at the homes of citizens and demanding money and valuables. Pemraka did not stand idly by but sent out volunteers when reports were made. One night in Keuceut, Banda Aceh, a group of armed men arrived at the home of a local and demanded money and a car. By chance, around 20 volunteers were at the Pemraka office that night and all headed out after someone at the house contacted them. When they arrived, the electricity had been cut. A Toyota Kijang 4WD was seen leaving the house and the Pemraka activists assumed that all the assailants had left. However, four men on two trail bikes then emerged and confronted the Pemraka volunteers. Although the men left, they soon returned and began firing at the activists. Muhsalmina and Iswandi were shot in the hand. The incident occurred at around 00.30 local time. After investigations, Pemraka concluded that the men on the trail bikes at the house that day were members of the army. Pemraka was established on 10 April 1999 by student senates from 13 institutions of higher education across Aceh. They were inspired to form the group after launching relief efforts to deal with the violent crackdown in Muara Kundo, Bataile, Bireun regency. They initially concentrated just on accompanying victims, much like the RATA organization described ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 61 previously. But as the number of refugees from the violence increased, reaching into the hundreds of thousands at the worst time, their activities expanded. Their work soon included providing logistical support and delivering food and other basic necessities obtained from various sources, working with local government health care centres to deal with the sick and injured and supporting education programs for the children of internally displaced families. The group established offices to coordinate activities in the regencies, especially those torn apart by the armed conflict. Although several poskos remain, repression at the hands of the security apparatus has scaled down the group s activities drastically. They now concentrate on helping the victims.34 People Crisis Center (PCC) Terrorized Officers of the police Mobile Brigade suddenly appeared on 19 January 2000 at the refugee posko or operational center established by the PCC in Cot Ijue, Matang Geulampang Dua, Jeumpa district, North Aceh. They asked the activists there at the time why they had established the center and yelled and insulted them. When one of the volunteers said they were assisting the refugees, a policeman snapped There s no refugees here. This is all a lie. With no provocation, the police then set about turning the office upside down and destroying whatever they could get their hands on. Shots were fired, though not at the activists, who were then ordered outside. Once outside, they were ordered to stand in a line and look at the ground forbidden to look at the officers. PCC local coordinator Rizanur was seen sneaking a look at the officers and was punished with a bayonet stab to the back. The others were also beaten and kicked repeatedly. The abuse only stopped when refugees began protesting. Rizanur was taken to hospital after the police officers left. This was far from the only time PCC activists have been targeted. Volunteers in Julok, East Aceh, fell victim in the lead up to the 11 November 2000 SIRA demonstration to call for a referendum on the province s future. Officers from the Mobile Brigade appeared one day and asked the volunteers what the SIRA demonstration was about. They replied 36 Sources: Asnawi (Pemraka Coordinator), Farizal, and several Pemraka activists. 62 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS they did not know. The officers then became enraged and began tearing up the place and destroying everything in sight. The volunteers fled for the back door but two did not escape. They were badly beaten and taken to the local police station. The Mobile Brigade officers returned later and said they were looking for something . One of them then said he had found a homemade bomb in the office. The two prisoners were then tortured and accused of hiding the bomb. They were released one week later. The PCC denied that they had hidden a bomb at the office and maintained that the Mobile Brigade officers had planted it when they came the second time. A PCC activist named Ayub was singled out for brutal treatment in 2000 for his work at a refugee camp in Idi Rayauk, East Aceh. Ayub had just returned home at about midnight from the refugee camp and was met by several security officers waiting outside his home. They asked why he had been to the camp. When he answered that he was a humanitarian aid worker, the officers became angry and one yelled, There are no humanitarian workers, it s all just GAM s work. Ayub was then taken to the Idi Rayeuk police sub-precinct although the unit that took him remains unknown. Members of the secretive Army Special Forces (Kopassus) Rajawali (Eagle) unit then appeared and claimed only they had the right to handle the case. Ayub was then taken to the local military coordination headquarters by the Rajawali officers. They accused him of being a GAM operative and his protests that he was just a humanitarian worker only earned him repeated beatings. He was stripped naked and his feet crushed under chairs legs. He was even ordered to massage each of the officers at the headquarters. He was detained for one week and beaten repeatedly until several ribs were broken. Ayub s family and friends naturally set out to find the missing activist. But both the police and the military, including the Rajawali unit, denied any knowledge. On the seventh day, they finally admitted to detaining Ayub and his family was permitted to visit him. They were eventually permitted to take him home but with a catch. Ayub was forced to sign a statement that he had not been mistreated while in detention, that he would not seek legal recourse and that the matter was thereafter closed. ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 63 Although Ayub received medical treatment for over six months after returning home, his wounds have not healed properly and he experiences pain with every breath. He has also left the PCC group. Ayub has also just learned that his release from detention was due to repeated phone calls from local and international organizations. Many more PCC activists have fallen victim to the savagery of the security forces in Aceh. Iman was another activist targeted for his work with refugees at the Simpang Irok camp. One day he attempted to dissuade a group of officers from entering the camp. He was arrested and forced into the boot of the officers vehicle and later taken to the local police station. The PCC has often been targeted by the police and military because its work takes activists into the worst of the conflict-torn regions. The PCC is primarily a student group and was formed after the mass refugee exodus in and around Kadang, Lhokseumawe. This was the first wave of internally displaced people following the DOM martial law period. When the mass slaughter at Pusong, North Aceh, occurred in 1999, the PCC accompanied the victims to medical centers because the refugees were consumed with fear of the police and military officers stationed there. After the Pusong incident, the slaughter flared again in Simpang Kramat Idi and the PCC again stepped in to help the victims and their families. The students denied the military s accusation that they were involved in the separatist battle by asserting that their work was purely humanitarian. Assertions were not enough. 35 Banda Aceh Legal Aid Institute Targeted The Banda Aceh Legal Aid Institute (LBH Banda Aceh) continued to receive harsh treatment at the hands of the security apparatus throughout 2000 when their litigation and other legal activities piled up. The intimidation peaked when their office at Jl. Teuku Umar 225 was raided in July and all their computers seized and staff terrorized. Whether it was coincidence or not, the LBH Banda Aceh was cooperating with other Aceh human rights NGOs on an anti-militarism campaign at the 37 Source: PCC activists, including regional coordinator. 64 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS time. The LBH Banda Aceh office was raided on the third day of the campaign. The staff were ordered outside, told to take off their clothes and lie on the ground in the burning sun. The officers insulted the activists with taunts such as You re all GAM , This is GAM headquarters and animals . They were ordered into police and military trucks and locked in from the outside before heading to the police precinct station. Once there, the activists were told to lay in the hot sun and were insulted and beaten. When the officers learned that LBH Banda Aceh director Rufriadi was among those taken, their savagery increased. How much did you pay for your degree, one of the officers yelled. Addressing the others but accusing Rufriadi, the officer said, Turns out this is GAM s lawyer . This incident is just the most obvious case of abuse against the LBH Banda Aceh staff. Whenever VIP visitors arrived, officers would burst in. On one occasion, a foreign ambassador visited the head office and the police appeared and began ransacking the premises. They penetrated through to the back of the office to a small outside rest area. They searched the place from top to bottom and said they had found bullets. Wait a minute, we will look for all the evidence we can that this is GAM s headquarters, said one officer before they all departed. Officers returned when the Netherlands Ambassador to Indonesia paid a visit to LBH Banda Aceh. This time they arrived in a Toyota Kijang 4WD well-known as the vehicle of preference when abducting people because of its dark-tinted windows. They looked around the place and asked the locals who was at the office. They threatened that they would be back later at night . The LBH Banda Aceh offices were often used by activists planning strikes. If a strike occurred, the security forces always accused the LBH Banda Aceh of masterminding it. This justified the regular examinations of the office and its contents. The intelligence wing of the Army Special Forces (Kopassus) even went through the place when the LBH was holding a press conference to criticize the Henry Dunant Centre, which had helped broker the Humanitarian Pause and other agreements between GAM and the government. LBH activists in the field are also often disturbed. One female worker of the LBH legal division, for example, reported that she was regularly disturbed in her hotel room by an unknown man who would knock on her door while she ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 65 was trying to sleep and then disappear when she opened the door. A threatening voice would warn her over the phone, usually to drop the case she was handling at the time. LBH lawyers were also terrorized in their attempts to help a gentleman who had been detained because his son was a member of GAM. During negotiations with the Hasanuddin division of the Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad), one of the commanders said, We don t believe in the law or human rights. If we cut off all the heads of all the LBH people and throw them into the street today, we re sure not a single person would come to defend you. Not in Indonesia, not overseas either. The lawyers were naturally extremely worried for their safety. LBH s drivers are also repeatedly threatened in their journeys and have had guns held to their heads. On one occasion in 1999, one driver was pulled over and fitted with a bulletproof vest by soldiers. They then fired at him. Although the vest saved his life, he suffered concussion and serious bruising. Both the military and the police Mobile Brigade often accuse LBH Banda Aceh of being GAM, or at least supporting their separatist activities. This is most likely because most of the cases they handle involve people accused of being GAM members. LBH Banda Aceh director Rufriadi puts the proportion of such cases at around 80%. The remainder are activists with any number of problems with the security apparatus. LBH Banda Aceh was established in 1995. From that time until 1999, the organization primarily focused on providing legal support and specialized in human and civil political rights. This distinguishes them from the other LBH branches throughout Indonesia, which tend to specialize in the economic and social spheres, including labour and land issues. Since 2000, the organization s activities have expanded to include litigation, campaigning, documentation and mass organization of the human rights movement.36 FP HAM Activist Anwar Yusuf Abducted On 7 February 1999 at around 18.30 local time, a soldier of the Idi Rayeuk military sub-district command arrived at the house of Anwar Yusuf, a 38 Source: LBH Banda Aceh director Rufriadi 66 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS volunteer of the Human Rights Carers Forum (FP HAM). The soldier told Anwar s mother that her son was being taken to the command station for questioning over the recent incident at Matang Ulim. Indeed, Anwar had just returned from investigating the deaths of villagers shot by armed forces (TNI) soldiers when returning home from a meeting in Matang Ulim, East Aceh on 3 February. Besides interviewing witnesses, Anwar had also been to inspect the Arakundo River where the victims bodies had been found. At the Idi Rayeuk command, Anwar Yusuf was interrogated by four soldiers. Most questions concerned his reason for being at the Arakundo site. According to Anwar, throughout the interrogation he was beaten with stones, broom handles and chairs. Scalding coffee was thrown over him and the officers threatened his life. He was accused of being a GAM member and was forced to crawl along the floor with a wooden pole strapped behind his knees. He was then forced to sleep upright in the chair. The following day he was taken to the East Aceh military headquarters. The activist, who had been with FP HAM since 1998, was moved to a police detention house on 8 February. He was released two days later. After Yusuf failed to return home, his mother attempted to obtain some information concerning his whereabouts from the military and the police. They denied any knowledge of Anwar.37 SEFA Activist Amrisaldin Tortured Save Emergency for Aceh (SEFA) activist Amrisaldin was caught as the police Mobile Brigade were sweeping through Meukek, South Aceh. The 24 year old was arrested. His crime: carrying a report on human rights violations by the military and police and the situation concerning internally displaced people in South Aceh. He was also carrying medical supplies to distribute among refugees in the area. 39 Source: Amnesty International ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 67 At the Meukek police precinct station, Amrisaldin was tortured for five hours from around 21.45 local time on 2 September 2000 to around 02.15 the next day. He said he was beaten about the face and kicked repeatedly in the head and stomach. His forehead was slashed with a knife. Later, the officers set a flame from a lighter to his genitals, armpit hair and cheeks. They also threatened to kill him on the spot. The torture subsided somewhat when fellow activists began calling the police station. It stopped altogether when it became clear that the abduction was being monitored by a human rights organization in Jakarta. The interrogation, nevertheless, continued until 04.00 and he was repeatedly accused of being a GAM operative. A claim he denied outright. Amrisaldin was only freed on the condition that he stay in Tapak Tuan for five days and report to the local police. He was also forced to sign a statement saying that he would not make the case public.38 Wakampas Activist Muhammad Haikal Tortured The activists were distributing aid among refugees at the Ujoing Pulo Bakongan mosque in South Aceh when a number of soldiers under the operational command (BKO) of the Bakongan military subdistrict command arrived. They were ordered to go with the officers. The activists in question were Muhammad Haikal of the Wakampas group and five student activists Zairi Karnaini, M. Dinar, Ahmad Fadli, Razikin, and Rizal Sabri. At the military command station that day, 17 November 1999, the captives were stripped naked and tortured. Haikal received the most brutal treatment. They were finally freed after pressure came from numerous quarters. Zairi Kanani, Ahmad Fahdli, Razikin and Rizal Sabri of Syah Kuala University and Muhammad Dinal of IAIN Ar-Raniry were freed the day after their abduction but Haikal was only freed on 19 November. Before their release, the activists were tortured and forced to stand naked in front of a GAM flag to have their photo taken. Commander of the 0107 South Aceh military command Let. Col. (Infantry) Sunarto claimed the charges against the activists were forcing refugees to flee their homes and resisting arrest. 40 Source: Amnesty International 68 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 3.2 Political and Intellectual Leaders Who Have a Role in Human Rights Defence IAIN Chancellor Prof. Dr. Safwan Idris Murdered at Home Mrs. Safwan Idris was the one to open the door when there came a knocking at 6.50am on 16 September 2000. She thought the two men greeting her were students or colleagues of her husband and so she called to him. When the Chancellor of the Ar-Rinary National Islamic Institute (IAIN) came to the door, the two men suddenly drew pistols. The shots rang out through the morning stillness. Safwan collapsed bleeding profusely. In a state of panic the family then rushed him to the local hospital but his wounds were fatal. The Professor drew his last breath on the way to the hospital. The two gunmen had escaped on a motorbike. The cold-blooded murder came as severe shock to many in Aceh. Safwan was a respected religious leader or ulama and a prominent academic. His murderers have never been found. Many believe there were political motives behind the killing and most said Safwan was another victim of the systematic extermination of leaders of the educated classes who had taken a critical stance on the conflict in Aceh. Prof. Dr. Safwan Idris, a graduate of the University of Wisconsin in the United States, was one of the most prominent proponents of a peaceful solution to the situation in Aceh. He was a member of the Aceh Human Rights Violations Independent Investigation Commission a body established during the Habibie presidency. The IAIN chancellor was known as a moderate. He was also purported to be one of the strongest candidates for Aceh Governor for the 2000-2005 term. 39 Syah Kuala University Chancellor Prof. Dr. Dayan Dawood Shot Dead Dayan Dawood had not gone far from his office at Syah Kuala University, Jl. Tgk. Daud Beureeh. Directly in front of the provincial waterworks building, at the Lampriek bridge, shots were fired. Two bullets pierced the 41 Source: Human Rights Watch, Tapol, Amnesty International and various Indonesian publications. ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 69 left side of his face and one entered his back. His panic-stricken driver rushed Dayan directly to hospital but the wounds were too severe and the Chancellor could not be helped. Eyewitnesses to the shooting on 6 September 2001 said Dayan had been shot by two men on a motorbike who had followed him from the campus. The fact that the waterworks office was just 500 meters from the Governor s office did not stop the men firing on the dark sedan containing the Chancellor. Up till then, the area had not witnessed the violence sweeping across the province. In addition to being near the Governor s office, which was always guarded by the police Mobile Brigade, the area also contained the headquarters of the 012 military district intelligence unit, the Mobile Brigade and the traffic police. At the time of the shooting, the area was swarming with security personnel because President Megawati Soekarnoputri was scheduled to fly in the very next day. Dayan Dawood, born in Banda Aceh on 29 May 1946, graduated from the University of Hawaii and had served as head of the Aceh Provincial Development Planning Board (Bappeda) from 1993 to 1996. He was known as a moderate who abhorred violence and always advocated negotiation. Although he did not often speak of his political views to the media, he was one of the first local figures to suggest that the DOM martial law status be lifted from the province. On 14 October 1996 he said the DOM period should end because the business and economic life of the province was suffering. With the DOM in place, investors were staying away, he said. After the murder, the police immediately stated that GAM was responsible. They said GAM was angry at the Chancellor because he refused to meet their demands. Naturally, GAM denied the accusation. GAM spokesman for Aceh Rayeuk at the time, Ayah Sofyan, countered by saying the murder was part of the security apparatus attempt to finish off all prominent Acehnese intellectuals. After a year had passed and debate raged on whether to declare a military emergency in the province, the police announced that they had captured the GAM members responsible. They identified the men as: Mahyuddin (alias Raja Preman), Manaf (alias Letkol) and Daniel (alias si Ceh). During the 70 ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS raid to capture the men, the police said, Daniel and Manaf had perished while Mahyuddin was seriously wounded and brought to the Kramatjati police hospital in Jakarta for treatment of gunshot wounds. Mahyuddin s family approached the Banda Aceh Legal Aid Institute soon after. They claimed the accusation against Mahyuddin was false because Mahyuddin had been at home with them at the time of the murder. Because Mahyuddin was then in Jakarta in hospital, the Institute asked Kontras to look into the case. Their investigations revealed little except that Mahyuddin had been admitted to the Kramatjati hospital. They were not permitted to meet him.40 Many more questions hang over this case. Legislator Nashiruddin Daud Murdered in Medan As an Acehnese member of the House of Representatives (DPR), the name Nashiruddin Daud became linked to the troubled province. He was a member of the third largest party in the parliament, the United Development Party (PPP), and was extremely vocal in advocating trials for all human rights violators during the DOM period in Aceh. When the House finally established a special team to investigate human rights violations in Aceh, he was selected as deputy leader. He played an instrumental role in bringing several top armed forces and police leaders for questioning by the team in November 1999. In January 2000, Nashiruddin went home to Aceh with several other politicians to prepare for the Aceh People s Congress. He then planned to return to Jakarta after the preparations were complete through Medan, North Sumatra. In Medan on 24 January 2000, he was seen getting into a black Mercedes with an unidentified man. They left a housing complex for local legislators just moments before Nashiruddin should have caught his flight to Jakarta. His whereabouts after the sighting remain unknown. The very next day, 25 January 2000, a badly battered corpse was discovered in Deli Serdang, North Aceh. It was the 58 year old legislator. The murderers remain unknown to this day but most believe the killing was 42 Sources: LBH Banda Aceh director Rufriadi, Human Wrights Watch, Tapol, Amnesty International and various Indonesian publications. ACEH: CRUEL HOME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 71 politically motivated. Nashiruddin s determination to drag human rights violators of the DOM period before the courts was well known. In September 2000, a member of the military police and a civilian were arrested and charged with the murder. They have never appeared before a court and may have been released. 41 Journalists Victimized in Aceh After DOM withdrawn Journalists have been among the most targeted section of Acehnese society throughout the conflict. The following table documents the victimization of journalists in Aceh from 1998-2002. The list contains data on victims compiled by the Aceh branch of the Idependent Journalist s Alliance (AJI) and the Aceh Press Club. These attacks were carried out by all armed parties in the struggle and are perpetrated against international and national journalists. Perpetrators: Indonesian Armed Froces Brigade (7), Others (6)42 TNI (14), GAM (8), Mobile 43 44 Sources: Human Rights Watch and various Indonesian publications. Source: AJI Banda Aceh (2002) and Aceh Press Club (2002). 72 No Victim s Name 1 2 Muharram M Nur Mukmin Manani Organisation Serambi Indonesia Tabloid Panji Demokrasi Waspada RCTI Date 21/12/98 26/2/99 Results Equipment Destroyed Died Reason Failed to Quote GAM Statement Unclear Perpetrators GAM Unclear Location Lhokseumawe, North Aceh Desa Alue Awe, North Aceh Meureudu Pidie Lhokseumawe, North Aceh 3 4 Rusli Ismail Ali Raban May 99 19/6/99 Interned Beaten and Bruised 5 Umar HN RCTI 4/7/99 Threatened with a gun Threatened with a gun Threatened with a gun Threatened with a gun 6 Muharram M Nur Serambi Indonesia RCTI 4/7/99 7 Ali Rabab 4/7/99 8 Chalid Umar Reuters 4/7/99 Reported on GAM Funds Recording a dialogue between national police chief and victims of military violence Photographed a burning market place Photographed a burning market place Photographed a burning market place Photographed a burning market place GAM TNI TNI Matangkuli, North Aceh Matangkuli, North Aceh Matangkuli, North Aceh Matangkuli, North Aceh TNI TNI TNI 73 No Victim s Name 9 Armia Organisation APTN Date 4/7/99 Results Threatened with a gun Reason Photographed a burning market place Unclear Perpetrators TNI Location Matangkuli, North Aceh Hukit Hagu, North Aceh Banda Aceh 10 Supriadi Medan Post 3/8/99 11 Sjamsul Kahar Serambi Indonesia Analisa Asia Press Agency Cypa Press Aceh Ekpress 10/8/99 12 13 14 15 Guntur Adi Sukma Watara, Japanese National Thomas Dalal, US National Nasrun Yunan 16/9/99 30/11/99 30/11/99 12/12/99 16 Rusli Ibrahim Waspada July 00 17 Supriadi Medan Pos 2000 Abducted and murdered Grenades Unclear launched at house Tortured Accused of insulting police Beaten Photographed TNI soldier firing a gun Beaten Photographed TNI soldier firing a gun Roughened Reported GAM up anniversary ceremony House Accused of ransacked reporting falsehoods Died Unclear Unclear Unclear Police TNI TNI TNI Langsa, East Aceh Lamno, West Aceh Lamno, West Aceh Blang Pidie, South Aceh Meureudu, Pidie Lhoksulon, North Aceh TNI & Police Unclear 74 No Victim s Name 18 Murizal Hamsah Organisation Forum Keadilan Pena Lestari RCTI Reuters RCTI Date October 00 18/2/01 30/3/01 30/3/01 12/5/01 Results Detained Reason Resembled military-police informant Unclear Reported at a burning market Reported at a burning market Caught in GAM military and police crossfire Caught in GAM military and police crossfire Accused of photographing a local being assaulted by an officer Perpetrators GAM Location Ssamalanga, North Aceh Langsa, East Aceh Lhokseumawe Lhokseumawe Lhoseukon, North Aceh Lhoseukon, North Aceh Lhok Nibong, East Aceh 19 20 21 22 OZ Rusli Radja AB M Chalied Abdul Halim Mubary Umar HN Died Verbally assaulted Verbally assaulted Tortured Unclear TNI TNI Police Mobile Brigade Police Mobile Brigade TNI 23 Abbas Gani Majalah Fakta 12/5/01 Tortured 24 Murizal Hamzah Forum Keadilan 12/5/01 Tortured 75 No Victim s Name 25 Serambi Indonesia staff Organisation Serambi Indonesia Date 20/6/01 Results Did not go to print on June 20 Reason Perpetrators Location Greater Aceh 26 Ibrahim Ahmad Serambi Indonesia Waspada Waspada TVRI Aceh 29/7/01 Verbally assaulted Vehicle fired upon Vehicle fired upon Detained over one month Detained over three months Detained over one month 27 28 29 Adnan NS Ramadhan MS M Suheri 2001 2001 5/8/01 Threatened after GAM reporting on a murder suspected to have been carried out by GAM in June 19 edition Reported on Police refugees Mobile Brigade Crossed a TNIUnclear controlled area Returning home Unclear Accused of working GAM for the government Accused of working GAM for the government Accused of working GAM for the government Lhokseukon Banda Aceh Banda Aceh Peureulak, East Aceh Peureulak, East Aceh Peureulak, East Aceh 30 Bahrun Pohan TVRI Aceh 5/8/01 31 Kusuma Wijaya TVRI Aceh 5/8/01 76 No Victim s Name 32 Serambi Indonesia staff Organisation Serambi Indonesia Date 19/8/01 Results Did not go to print for 13 days, 11-24/8/01 Death threat Tortured Reason Perpetrators Location Greater Aceh Reported on the GAM Bumi Flora incident 33 34 Zahrial Maimum Mirdaz Serambi 13/12/01 Indonesia Serambi 10/7/02 Indonesia bureau chief in Bireun Unclear Reported that deputy GAM commander of the Batee Iliek region killed by the Mobile Brigade Reported that deputy GAM commander of the Batee Iliek region killed by the Mobile Brigade Reported that deputy GAM commander of the Batee Iliek region killed by the Mobile Brigade Police Police Mobile Brigade Teunom, West Aceh Aceh Jeumpa 35 Rizanur Serambi Indonesia Bireun bureau journalist 10/7/02 Tortured Police Mobile Brigade Aceh Jeumpa 36 Rusmadi HS Serambi Indonesia Bireun bureau journalist 10/7/02 Tortured Police Mobile Brigade Aceh Jeumpa 77 Human Rights Defenders in Papua: (Still) Under Military Threat Between 29 May and 4 June 2000, thousands of Papuans attended the Second Papua Congress. The massive gathering was thus named in reference to the First Papua Congress held in 1961, at which local leaders declared the territory s independence from Dutch colonial rule. Through the Second Papua Congress, the people of West Papua sought to clarify the circumstances surrounding their subsequent integration into the Republic of Indonesia.43 The primary resolutions of the Congress included the following: 1. The Papuan people have been sovereign as a people and state since 1 December 1961. 2. The Papuan people through the intermediary of the Second Congress reject the 1962 New York Agreement which was legally and morally flawed because no representatives of the Papuan people were involved. 3. The Papuan people through the intermediary of the Second Congress reject the results of the Pepera (the Act of Free Choice ) because it was conducted under threats, intimidation, sadistic killings, military violence and immoral deeds that gravely violated humanitarian principles. The Papuan people therefore call on the United Nations to revoke UN Resolution 2504 adopted on 19 November 1969. 4. Indonesia, the Netherlands, the United States of America and the United Nations must recognise the political rights and sovereignty of the West Papuan people, which are lawful by virtue of historical fact, law, and social and cultural heritage. 5. The crimes against humanity that have been perpetrated in West Papua as a result of the international political conspiracy in which Indonesia, the Netherlands, the United States of America and the United Nations were 45 Notes on the resolutions of the Congress are collected in : Theo PA Van den Broek, OFM dkk, Memoria Passionis di Papua, Kondisi Hak Asasi Manusia, Gambaran 2000, Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian (SKP) Keuskupan Jayapura, Jayapura, 2001. 78 involved must be thoroughly investigated and the perpetrators tried before an international tribunal. 6. The United Nations, the United States of America and the Netherlands should review their involvement in the process by which Indonesia annexed West Papua and should honestly, justly and truthfully convey the findings to the Papuan people on 1 December 2000. In addition, the Congress formalized the establishment of the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) as the means to struggle towards the peaceful attainment of independence and elected Theys Hiyo Eluay as chairman. The resolutions of the Congress became proof that that the Papuan people had never considered their integration with Indonesia as absolute. And yet the Western powers, the Republic of Indonesia and the UN endorsed the Pepera or Act of Free Choice in 1969, which maintained that the majority of Papuans had chosen integration with Indonesia. Consequently, Indonesia s takeover of West Papua was formalized in UN resolution No. 2504 on 19 November 1969. 44 In 2000, the people of Papua attempted to correct the historical record on the Pepera and the human rights violations that accompanied it, not least the violation of the right to determine their own fate free from fear and violence. After thirty years within Indonesia and experiencing all manner of human rights violations, the people of Papua sought an historical solution: they demanded the independence torn from them. Many differences, as well as similarities, exist between West Papua and Indonesia. The Dutch New Guinea of colonial times was administered in conjunction with the neighbouring Moluccu islands until the Pacific War. However, the differences were clear, as succinctly expressed in 1949 by Van Maarseveen, the Dutch Minister for Overseas Territories: 'New Guinea does not belong to Indonesia proper is separate from Indonesia geographically, ethnographically and also politically. New Guinea forms a completely separate territory with a separate history.' 46 The account of the political history of Papua is based on: Richard Chauvel, Where Nationalisms Collide, Inside Indonesia, July-September 2001. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 79 The evident differences, and national interests in the South Pacific, prompted the Dutch to hold the territory apart and West Papua was consequently not handed over upon the resolution of Indonesia s four-year independence struggle (1945-49). The Dutch then began to prepare West Papua for self-determination. Up until 1960, decolonization measures included the formation of a representative council, increasing numbers of Papuans in the administration to replace Europeans and Indonesians, and establishing a Papuan volunteer corps. These political changes in West Papua coupled with the escalation of the Cold War lead to the release on 19 October 1961 of a political manifesto produced by the Komite Nasional Papoea, under the leadership of members of the New Guinea Council. On behalf of the Papuan people, the manifesto demanded independence as enjoyed by the free peoples of the world and urged the Netherlands New Guinea government to permit the Papuan flag to be flown beside the Dutch flag and to change the name of the territory to West Papua. 1 December 1961 is considered by the West Papuans as their independence day because on that day the 'Morning Star' flag was raised for the first time and the 'Hai Tanahku Papua' anthem sung in the presence of the Governor, members of the Council and political party leaders. However, the proclaimed independence started to become less relevant, as the US, the Netherlands and Indonesia, under the auspices of the UN, began secret negotiations on the future of West Papua without any involvement from local leaders. The New York Agreement was signed in August 1962 and covered the transfer of West Papua to Indonesia after a period of UN administration. M W Kaisiepo, a leading member of the council and of the Komite Nasional Papoea, commented: 'We were traded as goats by the Americans'. The UN and other Western powers never saw genuine Papuan selfdetermination as an option after the Agreement and the Pepera was even conducted after Indonesia had effective control of West Papua. The people of Papua, as well as records recently released by Western governments, testify to the intimidation and violence perpetrated during the Pepera by the Indonesian military, which had moved in to West Papua since 1961. 80 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT And so, West Papua fell to Indonesia. In the years since, the collective memory of its people has been tainted with the trauma of ongoing violations of human rights: both civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. The policies of the militaristic regime of former president Soeharto in particular have fostered a deep antipathy in West Papuans towards Indonesia. 45 Militarism and Human Rights Violations Throughout the militaristic regime of former president Soeharto, human rights violations in West Papua were a constant problem. The military, as the most powerful element of government, sought to protect and develop their economic interests and the region s natural wealth in wood, mining and the seas was exploited. The military did not just stick to the business of ensuring security for mining and forestry enterprises active in West Papua but began a range of businesses of their own. 46 The military not only neglected the traditional and basic human rights of locals affected by its businesses but often used violence to achieve its aims. 47 In order to strengthen their power, the military turned West Papua into a Military Operations Region (DOM). The excesses of this time were most evident in the mass murder that took place in 1977 in and around Tiom (now Jayawijaya). The DOM, which was also part and parcel of an internal military project to boost its prestige and ensure promotions for all concerned, had a grave impact on the lives of the West Papuans. The Papua Legal Aid Institute (LBH Papua) maintains that thousands of civilians became victims of the military during this time. Arbitrary detention and 47 SKP Keuskupan Jayapura, Gambaran Permasalahan di Papua, makalah presentasi dalam pertemuan dengan presiden R.I, 27 June 2000. 48 See ELSHAM Report (1), Operasi Militer Pembebasan Sandera dan Pelanggaran HAM di Pegunungan Tengah Irian Jaya, ELSHAM, Jayapura, 1999. The report outlines the dependence of giant mining companies such as the Freeport mine in Timika on the military for security and protection . Also contains interview with Damianus Wakman, head of the Papua Legal Aid Institute, August 2002. 49 The military also exploited natural resources, including the forests, which often lead to conflict with local communitites. See ALDP, Laporan Hasil Penelitian Pemetaaan Daerah Konflik Pelanggaran HAM pada Lima Kabupaten di Papua, ALDP and USAID, Jayapura, 2001. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 81 arrest, seizure of property, razing of houses, torture, forced abductions, and murder were widely reported. 48 Research conducted by the Democracy Alliance for Papua (ALDP) in five regencies representing around 50% of the province by territory found that there were 132 human rights violations between 1995 and 2001. The state apparatus the military, police and other government agencies were directly responsible for the largest share (57%). 49 The constant repression coupled with the impunity of human rights violators were pervasive influences on the political, economic, social and cultural life of the West Papuans. Many young people elected to join the Free Papua Movement (OPM) established in 1964 by political leaders who rejected the Pepera to wage an ad hoc guerilla war for independence. This group employed a number of means to force their point, from attacking security outposts to taking both foreign and Indonesian hostages, and garnered significant support from the broader West Papuan society.50 Nevertheless, the vast majority of West Papuans prefer to reach their goal of independence by peaceful means. This point was also covered in the resolutions of the Second Papua Congress. Human Rights Defenders in Papua Front Line51 defines a human rights defender as a person who works, nonviolently, for any or all of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Though not always the case, a human rights defender is generally an activist from a non-government organization (NGO) or a community leader, including religious and traditional community leaders. In the case of West Papua, the role of human rights defender is generally fulfilled by NGOs, political activists, lawyers and community leaders. 50 Papua Legal Aid Institute, Laporan keadaan HAM di tanah Papua-Indonesia, Jayapura, 2001. Interview with Damianus Wakman, head of the Papua Legal Aid Institute, August 2002. 51 ALDP, Op.cit. 52 The attack on the Abepura police precinct in October 2001, for example, was reportedly sponsored by the OPM. See: ALDP, Op.cit. 53 Front Line & The Global Justice Center, (2001), Front Line Brazil: Murders, Death, Threaths and Other Forms of Intimidation of Human Right Defenders 1997-2001, Dublin: Front Line. 82 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT When the human rights movement as we know it today first emerged in West Papua at the beginning of the 1980s, the decision to become a human rights defender was very risky52. In 1983 when activist Arnold Ap was arrested by the military s Kopassandha division (now known as Kopassus or Army Special Forces), the four students that lobbied for his release in Jakarta, namely Ottis Simopiarief, Yohanis Rumbiak, Yakob Rumayau, and Loth Sarakan, were threatened and hunted by the Kopassandha. They eventually sought political asylum at the Netherlands Embassy in Jakarta. The incident represented the birth of the human rights movement in West Papua as well as the starting point for several human rights organizations. The advocacy campaign launched in Arnold Ap s defence brought together the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute Foundation (YLBHI) and the leaders of the Catholic and Protestant Churches in West Papua. They then formed the Papua Legal Aid Institute (LBH Papua). When formally established in 1983 under first director Bambang Widjoyanto, LBH Papua was already handling a number of political cases. Among them was the case of Dr. Thomas Wanggai, an intellectual who declared the establishment of the independent state of West Melanesia. Wanggai and his core followers were arrested and sent to trial. He was later found dead in his cell. LBH Papua together with several other NGOs in Jayapura facilitated the formation in 2000 of the Papua chapter of Kontras, the Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence. Kontras is also active in cooperating with all human rights defenders in investigating human rights violations cases such as forced abductions or disappearances. Another pioneer human rights organization in West Papua is the Papua Rural Community Development Foundation (YPMD) established in 1984. YPMD activist John Rumbiak was given the task in 1994 of researching the utilization of the traditional land of the Amungme people. His findings highlighted serious human rights violations perpetrated against the community in the interests of PT Freeport Indonesia - the world s largest gold mine. This widely published study grabbed considerable attention from international NGOs and governments. At the local level, traditional 54 The following account is based on : ELSHAM Papua (2), Militerisme dan Nasib pembela HAM di Papua Barat, Suatu Studi Kasus, manuskript, undated. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 83 community leader Tom Beanal was inspired to form the Amungme People s Foundation (Lemasa) to struggle for the victims of human rights violations. Another strong defender of human rights in West Papua is the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy (IHRSA), which is perhaps better known by its Indonesian acronym of ELSHAM (Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia). This group was formed from the Irian Working Group for Justice and Peace (IWGJP), which was active in human rights violation cases involving PT Freeport Indonesia. This group has developed networks of volunteers that extend down to the village level even in remote areas and it can consequently monitor human rights violations across West Papua. The militarism that has gripped West Papua means that NGO activists and other human rights defenders live with fear and terror. They are often accused of supporting separatist activities in West Papua. The accusation is usually launched by the elite leadership of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) because activists have exposed human rights violations perpetrated by the military.53 As the military is sworn to uphold the unity and integrity of Indonesia, the threats implicit in the accusations sometimes turn violent, as evident in the subsections that follow. The existence of NGOs to protect human rights defenders is thus of the utmost importance. As such, the monitoring and recording of cases of violence against them is central to upholding human rights. It is a small piece of a much larger picture and often forgotten by human rights defenders themselves. Threats and Violence Against Human Rights Defenders in West Papua There are three categories of threatened individual covered in this section of the report: 1) Human rights defenders whose work as defenders is the direct reason for their being threatened. 2) Political and intellectual leaders who also have a role in human rights defence. 55 Most recently at the beginning of October 2002, Armed Forces Commander General Endriartono Soetarto accused ELSHAM of being a supporter of the separatist movement immediately after the NGO announced its findings into military involvement in the attack on a school bus in Timika in August 2002. 84 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 3) Witnesses who in the absence of a witness protection programme put themselves at risk because of their determination to give evidence and testify against human rights violations. The cases illustrated in this sub-section support Recommendation 12 of this report54. This urges the government to accelerate the formulation of the draft law on witness protection. 4.1 Human Rights Defenders Threatened Arrest of ELSHAM Activist Fredy Sapari, Nabire55 At the beginning of June 2001, ELSHAM presented a report to the provincial police on numerous unresolved cases in the province. The NGO also released a statement to the press on the appearance of masked attackers (so-called ninjas ) armed with swords and machetes terrorizing the people of Nabire and surrounds at night. Several days after the release, the Paniai police summoned Fredy Sapari, a volunteer with ELSHAM in Nabire, for questioning. Freddy was summoned twice, on 13 and 14 June. The summons only mentioned that he was being called in relation to new information on threats to the security situation. The summons also did not mention the relevant laws under which the summons was made. ELSHAM protested the summons and maintained that the presentation of the report on unresolved criminal cases was handed to the police with the intention that the police launch follow up action. Unfortunately, the police used the release of the document as an excuse to threaten the work of human rights defenders. Freddy did appear at the Paniai city police station but, after receiving protests from numerous concerned parties, he was not summoned again. 56 57 Supra. See ELSHAM Papua (2),op.cit. Aloy Renwarin, Pentingnya Perlindungan Bagi Aktivis HAM di Papua Barat, makalah untuk lokakarya Pembela HAM di Bogor, Desember 2001. ELSHAM Papua (5) Tanpa Alasan Yang Jelas Fredy Sapari Tidak Jadi Diperiksa Polisi Paniai, press release, 19 Juni 2001. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 85 Death Threats Against Yohanis Gerson Bonay, Lawyer and ELSHAM Director, Jayapura56 ELSHAM is one of the leading human rights defenders networks in West Papua and its chairman, Yohanis Gerson Bonay, is therefore one of the most likely activists to receive threats. On 14 December 2000, Bonay was summoned by police for questioning in relation to the Bloody Abepura incident in which police raided student boarding houses in Jayapura. The police maintained the lawyer had committed libel against the police at a press conference held after the incident. Bonay was questioned for seven hours before being released. Six months later, when the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) fact-finding team had completed its investigation into the incident, threatening emails and telephone calls again arrived for Bonay. On 9 June, ELSHAM received an email from a person using the name Judas Iscariot that claimed the ELSHAM headquarters would be attacked at dawn. On 18 July 2001, Bonay was working at the ELSHAM office. Bonay, hear me well. Your life will not be long, said a voice with a heavy Javanese accent over the telephone. Not long after, Bonay s wife Elsye Rumbiak received similar threats over the phone. In a harsh voice the caller who claimed his name was Marthen said, Tell Bonay. He ll die sooner or later. The terrorizing calls continued the following day. Tell Bonay to be careful if he leaves the house, a caller told Bonay s wife. On that same day, an officer of the Army s Special named Donny Hutabarat visited Bonay at his office. In Donny said the purpose of his visit was to introduce Bonay that Kopassus members were not involved telephone calls. Forces (Kopassus) their brief meeting, himself and assure in the threatening 58 See: Interview with Johanis Bonay, September 2001. ELSHAM (2),ibid, Aloy Renwarin, ibid. ELSHAM (6), Lagi, Direktur ELSHAM Papua menjadi Incaran Aparat Keamanan, siaran pers, 6 September 2001. ELSHAM (7) Direktur ELSHAM Papua Yohanis G. Bonay, SH telah Diperiksa di Polda Papua, siaran pers, 13 September 2001. 86 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT We (Kopassus) do not usually terrorize. We are an anti-terror force and don t terrorize like that. If you receive any more threatening calls, contact us immediately, Hutabarat said while handing over his name card. The police summoned Bonay on 6 September 2001 in relation to accusations that he had again committed libel, but this time against Kopassus. The accusation originated in the disappearance of Hubertus Wresman, a student from the Sarmi district of Jayapura. The family of the victim had reported his disappearance to the Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) of Papua and the church had referred the matter to ELSHAM. After studying the case, ELSHAM suspected the kidnappers were criminal elements of Kopassus. The GKI and ELSHAM then reported the case to the commander of the XVII Trikora military command of West Papua and an investigation team was formed comprising intelligence officers of the military district. Kopassus, GKI and ELSHAM were invited to witness the investigation process. The team concluded that Hubertus had indeed been kidnapped but did find Kopassus members responsible. Based on this conclusion, Kopassus accused Bonay of blackening the force s name. ELSHAM rejected the accusations against Bonay and maintained that the investigation should have been conducted by the relevant military institution (the military police) or by an independent institution (Komnas HAM). Following the death of independence movement leader Theys Eluay, Bonay received further death threats. In December 2000, Theys family asked ELSHAM to look into the circumstances surrounding the suspicious death and ELSHAM s consequent investigation drew unwanted attention. One day a person purporting to be a policeman telephoned Bonay and claimed that he was being targeted by Kopassus. Because security could not be guaranteed, Bonay evacuated to Australia for three months. Death Threats Against Lawyer Yan Ch. Warinussi, Manokwari57 On 21 June 2001,Yan Ch. Warinussi, lawyer and director of the Legal Aid, Research, Investigation and Development Institute (LP3BH) Manokwari, 59 See: ELSHAM (2), ibid, Aloy Renwarin, ibid, dan ELSHAM (8), Yan Ch Warinussi, Pengacara Hukum LP3BH Manokwari Diancam Ditembak Komandan Sabhara Polres Manokwari, siaran pers, 21 Juni 2001. And interview with Johanis Bonay, September 2002. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 87 received a death threat from Commissioner Sebayang, commander of the local police unit. Sebayang threatened to shoot Warinussi because the lawyer had sent a letter containing a strong protest to chief of the Manokwari police district Drs. Budi Bambang Santoso. The letter dated 16 June 2001 protested the acts of violence perpetrated by the Manokwari police against his client, Yoseph Betay, since his detention three days before. The threat was made at the Manokwari police station when Warinussi was with his client. Sebayang said with great aggression that the accusations in the letter were lies. While pointing his pistol at Yoseph, Sebayang reportedly said, Instead of appealing (to your lawyer), it s best if I just shot you and your lawyer Sebayang then threw the letter on the ground and repeatedly trampled on it. He said to Warinussi: You re just a shit lawyer. LP3BH is shit, human rights shit. Lawyers don t know anything. Go ahead and report to the President as well. But note, this is my name! Intimidation of John Rumbiak, ELSHAM Supervisor, Manokwari58 On 19 July 2002, LP3BH in Manokwari held a training session on investigation techniques and human rights advocacy for 30 volunteers. The volunteers were being prepared to research the recent incident at Waisor, Manokwari, where traditional landowners were attacked by security forces. The expert invited to lead the course was John Rumbiak from ELSHAM Jayapura. While the training session was underway, seven members of the Manokwari police lead by Inspector Hasby W. arrived heavily armed. The police said they had come to the training session because Rumbiak had expelled two of their police intelligence colleagues from the area. Rumbiak said that he had done no such thing and had asked the two to stop wandering around the outskirts of the area bothering students who were trying to concentrate. He said he had asked the two to sit down but the 60 See: ELSHAM (2), Ibid and ELSHAM (9), Kopassus membantah Teror Johanis Bonay dan di Manokwari John Rumbiak Diteror Anggota Polisi, press release, 19 Juli 2001. 88 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT intelligence operatives had rejected the offer and then reported to their superiors at the Manokwari police station. Deputy chief of the Manokwari police, Drs. Tavip Yulianto, later admitted that the intelligence operatives had been sent to monitor the training and not break up the gathering. However, the arrogance of the police in bringing their full compliment of weapons to the training location had indirectly intimidated the training participants and John Rumbiak in particular. Questioning of Zandra Mambrasar and Ronald Tapilatu, ELSHAM Staff, Jayapura59 In mid-2001, two ELSHAM staff members, Zandra Mambrasar and Ronald Tapilatu, were summoned for questioning as witnesses by the Jayapura police. They were called in relation to the Bloody Abepura case and a press release issued by ELSHAM, which the police said slandered or offended the legal government and represented written slander according to the Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP). The civil case the police were planning was never taken to court. Students Attacked in Bloody Abepura Incident, Jayapura Students have also pioneered the human rights movement in West Papua and have met violent police and military repression, of which the Bloody Abepura incident is the most striking example. The incident began on 7 December 2000. At around 01.30 local time, a group of around 15 persons entered the grounds of the Abepura police station in Jayapura. Although the visitors were suspected of sympathizing with the Fee Papua Movement (OPM), they wore casual clothes and were initially received with courtesy by the officer on duty. However, the group suddenly overpowered the police at the station and escaped with a police issue Mouser gun. After the raid, the police Mobile Brigade attacked the boarding houses of West Papuan students in and around Abepura. The boarding houses were well known as places where students of Jayapura campuses and schools gathered. The police attacked all inhabitants of the 61 See: ELSHAM (2), ibid and Aloy Renwarin, Op.cit. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 89 boarding houses because the students had gained a reputation as leaders of the movement drawing renewed attention to issues such as the demilitarisation of the province and calls for independence. The police paid no mind to the fact that not all students were involved in this movement. They proceeded to round up students at the Ninmin, Yapen Waropen and Ilaga boarding houses. The police Mobile Brigade also attacked several nearby districts and shot dead Elkius Suhuniap. Two other gunshot victims, Lilimus Suhuniap and Agus Kabak, were not fatally wounded. In addition to the students, tens of residents were forcibly taken to the Jayapura police station. At the Jayapura police station, all of those arrested, both male and female, were tortured. The 23 persons taken from the Ninmin boarding house, were beaten as they descended from the truck, by police with plastic batons, rifle butts, shovels, rattan canes and other blunt instruments. The detainees were then divided according to gender and their status as university or highschool students. At 05.30 on the following day, the male victims were herded into the police waiting room and tortured beaten and repeatedly kicked. Eky Gwijange was forced to cut his hair and eat it as a police officer held a knife to his throat. One of those seized, Ory Ndorngky, died of the injuries sustained during the torture. The victims were detained and the torture continued until 8 December. They were only sent home on that day after signing statements avowing that they would not repeat their actions and were then forced to report to the police on a regular basis. After the incident, the National Commission on Human Rights formed a fact-finding team. The Commission worked on their report until mid-2001 and recommended that the Attorney General s Office investigate all parties to the attack and bring them before the Human Rights Court. They also urged the government to produce a Government Regulation on the protection of victims and witnesses as well as the provision of compensation, restitution and rehabilitation for all victims. The case currently remains at the Attorney General s Office and is scheduled for hearings in November 2002. 90 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT Detention of Hubertus Kwambre, ELSHAM Volunteer, Jayapura60 Towards the end of 2002, ELSHAM volunteer Hubertus Kwambre, who was then investigating the suspicious death of Papua Presidium Council chairman Theys Eluay, was taken into custody as he approached Arso by members of the Army Special Forces (Kopassus). He was eventually released. Threatening calls to Yance Hara, Fakfak61 On 19 January 2002, ELSHAM volunteer in Fakfak Yance Hara received a threatening call from a person who refused to give their name. Is this Yance Hara who upholds truth and justice? asked the stranger. Lance answered in the affirmative. Well if you give information, make sure it s right. Because if it isn t watch out the voice replied. Two days later, the caller rang again and said only one sentence: You should not spread information around about the things going on here. ELSHAM believes the threatening calls were related to the organization s public statements on the infiltration of Laskar Jihad fighters in Fakfak. This group, which is better known for its role in the bloody intercommunal violence in the nearby Moluccu islands, was suspected of opening operations in Fakfak and surrounds. While the local people were seriously concerned by the infiltration, the police have never taken a firm stance on the issue. The Terrorizing of Simon Hindom, ELSHAM Volunteer and Community leader, Fakfak62 Simon Hindom is one of the most influential leaders of the indigenous peoples of the Fakfak area and is well known for his vocal advocacy of the traditional rights of the people of West Papua. The arrival on the scene of the Laskar Jihad and another paramilitary group with connections to military 62 63 ELSHAM (3), Ibid. ELSHAM (2), Ibid. 64 See: ELSHAM (2), Ibid and ELSHAM (10), Simon Hindom Relawan Distrik Kokas Giliran Diteror, press release, 20 Februari 2002. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 91 the Red-White group prompted Simon to send regular reports and updates on the situation to ELSHAM Papua. Simon was terrorized on 28 January 2002 by two security personnel in civilian clothes. One Papuan and another non-Papuan were seen pacing up and down in front of his house with rifles. They left the area after thirty minutes. Sensing the danger, Simon went to the house of his brother-in-law Maryos. But shortly after a masked man in black was seen near the house. Local residents chased the man and he escaped into the night. Simon s family feared for his safety and suggested the leader evacuate to the relatively remote village of Gwerpe, near Fakfak city. In 2000, Simon was summoned by the Fakfak police and was asked to produce his identity card as an ELSHAM volunteer. The police concluded that he was the person that had regularly reported on human rights violations in the area to ELSHAM in Jayapura. The Terrorizing of Latifah Anum Siregar, PDP Lawyer, Jayapura63 Since the death of Papua Presidium Council (PDP) chairman Theys Eluay in November 2001, PDP lawyer Latifah Anum Siregar was continuously followed by an unknown stocky man with long hair. Anum had defended the PDP leaders arrested the year before. The longhaired man not only followed Anum when traveling but was a constant presence when Anum was at home in Bumi Cenderawasih, Entrop, Jayapura. He would stop his trail bike near the house and fire the engine up loudly at any hour of the day or night. Over a period of five days, the man also threw stones at the house. 65 See: ELSHAM (2), Ibid, and interview with Latifah Anum Siregar, September 2002. 92 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT Threats Against AJI Journalists, Jayapura64 Towards the end of 2000, two journalists of the Independent Journalists Alliance (AJI) in West Papua, Kris Ansaka from the TIFA Papua weekly and Lucky Ireeuw of the Cenderawasih Pos daily, were summoned by police. They were summoned in relation to reports published on the ELSHAM press release issued after the Bloody Abepura incident. Other journalists that reported on the ELSHAM press release were not summoned. Then on 24 November 2001, unknown persons attacked AJI s Jayapura office. The attack was launched in the middle of the night when the office was vacant. Rocks thrown broke all the office windows and glass shards were littered across the desk of AJI Papua chief Fritz Ramandey. According to Fritz, the attack was directly related to reports published by AJI journalists in Papua. AJI journalists in various papers throughout West Papua had always taken a critical approach in their writings after the death of Theys Eluay. The incident was reported to the police but they found no indication of who had been involved. Terror at ELSHAM Papua s representative office in Jakarta65 Unknown assailants broke into the representative office of ELSHAM Papua in Jakarta on 10 October 2002. ELSHAM head representative in Jakarta Albert Rumbekwan was not at the office at the time. The house was occupied only by three of his nieces, namely Beatrix Komboy, Corry, Mami, and his nephew named Otto. According to Albert s account, two persons arrived at the house at 12.00 local time on a Suzuki motorbike. They approached the front gate and rang the bell twice. Those inside were reticent to open the gate as Albert had instructed them to only admit persons known to them in his absence. Albert had left the instruction because unknown persons had often appeared at the office throughout September with the obvious intent of monitoring activities. 66 67 See: Aloy Renwarin, op.cit and interview with Frits Ramandey, head of AJI Jayapura. ELSHAM Papua Representative Office in Jakarta, Kronologi Kasus Pembongkaran Kantor Perwakilan ELSHAM Papua di Jakarta, 10 Oktober 2002, and interview with Albert Rumbekwan, October, 2002. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 93 The two men departed when no one opened the gate but returned ten minutes later. One jumped the fence into the yard and broke the lock with a crowbar. They were also seen wielding reaping knives known as clurit . The two men also successfully entered the house and headed straight for the office rooms at the front. They then broke into cabinets and removed files on human rights abuses in West Papua. After breaking into the main desk and other cupboards, the men took 10 diskettes filled with information on the organisation s investigations. The investigations covered human rights violations including the suspicious death of Theys Eluay and the attack on a school bus in which two Americans were killed. However, they did not take Albert s handphone, which had been left on top of the desk. Albert s nieces and nephew witnessed some of the raid but they hid in the bathroom because of fear for their safety. When the two men left the premises, they attempted to contact ELSHAM in Jayapura to notify them of the break in. When Albert returned at around 15.00 local time and heard of the raid, he immediately contacted the local area officials and the South Jakarta police. The police arrived and took fingerprints from the crime scene and eyewitness accounts. At the time of publication, the police have yet to determine the identity of the culprits. 94 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 4.2 Political and Intellectual Leaders Who Have a Role in Human Rights Defence The Abduction and Murder of Theys H Eluay Political and Cultural Leader, Sentani66 To the people of West Papua, and the independence movement in particular, Theys Hiyo Eluay was a revered leader. As such, he was installed as the chairman of the Papua Presidium Council (PDP) at the Second Papua Congress in 2000. Theys set out for the headquarters of the local Tribuana Army Special Forces (Kopassus) base in the Hamadi area near Jayapura on Saturday 10 November 2001 at around 19.00 local time. He went at the invitation of the Tribuana commander to attend national hero s day celebrations. At 22.15, Theys driver Aris Masoka telephoned Theys wife Ny. Yaneke Eluay and hurriedly told her that Theys had been abducted by a group of well built Amber denoting non-Papuan immigrants who had taken Theys in their car. On 11 November 2001 at 12.30 local time, Ny. Yaneke Eluay reported the incident to the Papua police headquarters. The police eventually located the car near Koya Tengah and found Theys dead inside. Aris Masoka remains missing to this day. Theys' death was pronounced unnatural by the Pathology Institute of the Medical Faculty of the University Indonesia in Jakarta, which conducted the autopsy and found evidence of death by strangulation. Eyewitness accounts indicated that the well built abductors were military officers. The murder of the independence leader attracted broad attention from national and international human rights workers. President Megawati Soekarnoputri issued Presidential Instruction No.10/2001 ordering the formation of a National Investigation Commission to thoroughly investigate 68 The primary material of this account of Theys murder is drawn from Damianus Wakman, Kriminal dan Pemunuhan Theys Hiyo Eluay, Kasus Penculikan dan Penghilangan paksa Aris Toteles Masoka: Murni atau Kejahatan Negara. The report is an undated manuscript of legal analysis of the case. See also the May- September 2002 editions of the Jubi tabloid, and ELSHAM, Papua Legal Aidf Institute and KONTRAS Papua: Menolak tim Independen Bentukan KOMNAS HAM Jakarta, undated media release. Also ELSHAM Papua (4), Penculikan dan pembunuhan Theys H. Eluay, Suatu Bentuk Tindak Kejahatan Negara, undated summary report. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 95 the death. The Commission comprised leaders from Jakarta, including National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) member Major General (Retired) Koesparmono Irsan, as well as Papuan leaders John Ibo and Phil Erari. The Commission found strong evidence that pointed to the involvement of three senior and three low-ranking officers of the Kopassus Tribuana division. The three officers were Lieutenant Colonel Hartomo, Major Doni Hutabarat and Captain Rianaldo. The military police have since arrested nine people suspected of carrying out the abduction. However, the Commission fell short of calling the abduction and death a serious human rights violation. Or in other words, they merely labeled it a standard criminal matter. The human rights defenders community in Papua was sorely disappointed with this development. From the very beginning they rejected the formation of the Commission and doubted its independence. The independent investigations launched by ELSHAM, the Papua Legal Aid Institute and Kontras concluded that the death involved state agencies and represented a serious human rights violation. They argued that the officers would not have acted without instruction from their seniors in the institution. On top of this, the elimination of Theys had reportedly been discussed at a Cabinet meeting on political and security matters. Two West Papuan members of the Commission, Phil Erari and John Ibo, eventually withdrew from the Commission after it had completed its work. They felt the desire of the sponsors of the investigation had compromised the findings. In addition, they discovered a record of a meeting between the head of the Commission, Koesparmono Irsan, and officials of the State Secretariat in which they decided to avoid declaring the case a serious human rights violation. Although the findings of the Commission were unsatisfactory to many concerned parties, the legal process continues to this day. In October 2002, the military police are preparing to bring Lieutenant Colonel Hartomo and the co-accused before a military court. 96 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT Arrest of Papua Presidium Council (PDP) members67 On 28 November 2000, PDP Secretary General Thaha Alhamid was detained by police and questioned in relation to the 12 November 1999 Declaration, wherein activists reportedly declared the independent state of West Papua at the House of PDP chairman Theys Eluay. The day after Alhamid s detention, Theys and other PDP leaders Don Flassy, John Mambor, and Father Herman Awom were taken into custody at the Papua provincial police headquarters. Their arrest was formalized on 29 November 2000 and all were kept at the provincial headquarters. The police denied the arrests were connected to the impending 1 December anniversary of the original declaration of West Papuan independence in 1961. Nevertheless, on the suspicion that the PDP leaders plotted insurgency against the legal government, the police planned to keep them in detention until 25 December 2000. The Jayapura High Court then granted an extension of the detention period until 15 March 2001. In the lead up to court hearings into the case, Theys was treated at the Cikini hospital in Jakarta and John Mambor at the Jakarta Hospital. The court hearings began on 14 May and the accused were charged with insurgency in relation to, among other things, the 12 November 2000 Declaration, The Papua Grand Council, the 1 December anniversary commemorations and the Second Papua Congress that took place from 29 May to 4 June 2000. The hearings were initially slow and drawn out but were jolted by the shock waves of the sudden abduction and murder of Theys Eluay in November 2001. The court eventually ruled that the insurgency charges were unsubstantiated on 4 March 2002. Death Threats Against Thaha Alhamid, Secretary General of the PDP68 Thaha Alhamid is a political activist who has always chosen to advocate a peaceful struggle for Papuan independence. Several weeks after the death of PDP Chairman Theys Eluay, on 28 November 2001, he received an SMS 69 The primary material of this account is drawn from: ALDP, ibid, and interview with Herman Awom, Papua Presidium Council (PDP) moderator, and Latifah Anum Siregar, PDP lawyer, September 2002. 70 ELSHAM (2), ibid, and Cenderawasih Pos daily newspaper 4 December 2001, Kaka Thaha ko Siap Sudah susul Bapak Theys. See also interview with Latifah Anum Siregar, PDP lawyer, September 2002. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 97 message: Big brother Thaha, you get ready to join Theys. The message was sent from handphone number 0815169058. PDP lawyer Latifah Anum Siregar reported the threat to the deputy chief of the Papuan police Drs Raziman Tarigan, SH. But the police follow up was not as hoped. Raziman merely said, We don t have to handle every report. We have to select which reports need to be followed up and which don t. Death Threats Against Herman Awom, PDP Moderator 69 Father Herman Awom, moderator of the PDP, also received death threats following Theys murder. Prior to the burial service in mid-November 2001, an unknown telephone caller threatened: Be careful. Get ready to join Theys. But that was not the end. Father Awom s house was also under constant watch by unknown men. They usually parked their Toyota Kijang 4WD in front of his house, which was not far from the Kopassus headquarters. Latifah Anum Siregar as the legal counsel in the Theys case repeatedly asked for the police to pay greater attention to these threats against political activists. Because his security could not be guaranteed, Father Awom has been forced to take precautions. At the very least, I must travel with three persons in the car, he said. 4.3 Threats to Witnesses of Human Rights Violations Threats Against Ismail Nali, Witness in the Murder of Theys Eluay70 The home of Ismail Nali, a witness in the suspicious death of Theys Eluay, was visited on 7 January 2002 by a messenger named Nathaniel Mallo from the Army Special Forces (Kopassus). The man left a message with Ismail s wife to the effect that Ismail must appear before Kopassus the following day. If he failed to do so, the man threatened that he would be taken by force. The following day, Ismail escorted by Mallo met with Kopassus members. 71 72 ELSHAM (2) ibid, and interview with Herman Awom, September 2002. ELSHAM (2), Ibid. 98 HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT Kopassus has no right to call witnesses or interfere in an investigation in any way. Ismail agreed to meet them out of fear at the threat from the Kopassus messenger. As noted previously, evidence of the involvement of Kopassus members in Theys death was reported and the force is known for using intimidation and fear against civilians who speak out against them. Threats Against Yeret Imowi, Witness in the Murder of Theys Eluay71 Yeret Imowi was traumatized as a result of his role as a witness to the murder of PDP chairman Theys Eluay. The Military Police Center (PusPOM) summoned Yeret to appear as a witness in the Theys case in Jakarta. On 18 August 2002, two officers of the military police force arrived at Yeret s home in the Hamadi Mountain area with the summons notice. However, Yeret did not want to fulfill the summons out of fear for his safety. He argued that he had already provided information as best he could in the investigation. He was also concerned that he would be forced to change his testimony. The greatest fear, however, was caused by the suspicion that he would be terrorized if he did not fulfill the summons and appear at the PusPOM. The local military police commander Colonel Sutarna had indeed threatened to force witnesses to comply with the summons. At the beginning of May, Yeret was badly shaken by another incident. He was almost shot by a Kopassus soldier, Sergeant Yani of the Hamadi division in Jayapura, although the officer maintained the he had not fired the shot deliberately. ELSHAM finally provided Yeret with legal assistance. 73 See: ELSHAM (2), ibid, ELSHAM (11) Giliran Yeret Iwomi Saksi Kasus Theys Dipanggil Lagi Oleh Puspom, press release, 18 April 2002. HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN PAPUA: (STILL) UNDER MILITARY THREAT 99 Telephone threats to Boy Eluay, witness in the Theys murder case72 Boy Eluay is not only the son of murdered PDP chairman Theys Eluay but also the head of the Free Papua Task Force (Satgas Papua Merdeka) the security force formed after the Second Papua Congress in 2000. Since the death of his father, Boy has received regular threatening telephone calls from an unknown person. On 14 December 2001, Boy received an SMS (short message service) from handphone number 08124801124: Boy, you just give good information. You must help the police because we are also helping your family. We have already received the names of those that killed your father. The telephone number was that of police Captain Arif Basra of the West Papua provincial police. Another SMS message from a different number said: Boy, Your father is already over (dead). With you and the Secretary General (Thaha Alhamid) that s easy. So be prepared too. Boy reported the threats the day the messages arrived. He said that prior to his father s death he had been constantly followed by a number of persons. Among them were persons known to him as members of Kopassus, he said. 74 ELSHAM (2), Ibid, ELSHAM (12), Boy Eluay, Putra sulung Theys Hiyo Eluay Mendapat Ancaman Melalui Telpon Gelap, press release, 4 Desember 2001. 100 Appendix United Nations Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms General Assembly resolution 53/144 The General Assembly, Reaffirming the importance of the observance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations for the promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons in all countries of the world, Taking note of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/7 of 3 April 1998, See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1998, Supplement No. 3 (E/1998/23), chap. II, sect. A. in which the Commission approved the text of the draft declaration on the right and responsibility of individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, Taking note also of Economic and Social Council resolution 1998/33 of 30 July 1998, in which the Council recommended the draft declaration to the General Assembly for adoption, Conscious of the importance of the adoption of the draft declaration in the context of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217 A (III). 1. Adopts the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, annexed to the present resolution; APPENDIX 101 2. Invites Governments, agencies and organizations of the United Nations system and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to intensify their efforts to disseminate the Declaration and to promote universal respect and understanding thereof, and requests the SecretaryGeneral to include the text of the Declaration in the next edition of Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments. 85th plenary meeting 9 December 199 102 APPENDIX ANNEX Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms The General Assembly, Reaffirming the importance of the observance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations for the promotion and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons in all countries of the world, Reaffirming also the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights2 and the International Covenants on Human Rights Resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex. As basic elements of international efforts to promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the importance of other human rights instruments adopted within the United Nations system, as well as those at the regional level, Stressing that all members of the international community shall fulfil, jointly and separately, their solemn obligation to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction of any kind, including distinctions based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and reaffirming the particular importance of achieving international cooperation to fulfil this obligation according to the Charter, Acknowledging the important role of international cooperation for, and the valuable work of individuals, groups and associations in contributing to, the effective elimination of all violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of peoples and individuals, including in relation to mass, flagrant or systematic violations such as those resulting from apartheid, all forms of racial discrimination, colonialism, foreign domination or occupation, aggression or threats to national sovereignty, national unity or territorial integrity and from the refusal to recognize the right of peoples to selfdetermination and the right of every people to exercise full sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources, Recognizing the relationship between international peace and security and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and mindful that APPENDIX 103 the absence of international peace and security does not excuse noncompliance, Reiterating that all human rights and fundamental freedoms are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated and should be promoted and implemented in a fair and equitable manner, without prejudice to the implementation of each of those rights and freedoms, Stressing that the prime responsibility and duty to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms lie with the State, Recognizing the right and the responsibility of individuals, groups and associations to promote respect for and foster knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels, Declares: Article 1 Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels. Article 2 1. Each State has a prime responsibility and duty to protect, promote and implement all human rights and fundamental freedoms, inter alia, by adopting such steps as may be necessary to create all conditions necessary in the social, economic, political and other fields, as well as the legal guarantees required to ensure that all persons under its jurisdiction, individually and in association with others, are able to enjoy all those rights and freedoms in practice. 2. Each State shall adopt such legislative, administrative and other steps as may be necessary to ensure that the rights and freedoms referred to in the present Declaration are effectively guaranteed. Article 3 104 APPENDIX Domestic law consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other international obligations of the State in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms is the juridical framework within which human rights and fundamental freedoms should be implemented and enjoyed and within which all activities referred to in the present Declaration for the promotion, protection and effective realization of those rights and freedoms should be conducted. Article 4 Nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as impairing or contradicting the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations or as restricting or derogating from the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights3 and other international instruments and commitments applicable in this field. Article 5 For the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, at the national and international levels: (a) To meet or assemble peacefully; (b) To form, join and participate in non-governmental organizations, associations or groups; (c) To communicate with non-governmental or intergovernmental organizations. Article 6 Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others: (a) To know, seek, obtain, receive and hold information about all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including having access to information as to how those rights and freedoms are given effect in domestic legislative, judicial or administrative systems; APPENDIX 105 (b) As provided for in human rights and other applicable international instruments, freely to publish, impart or disseminate to others views, information and knowledge on all human rights and fundamental freedoms; (c) To study, discuss, form and hold opinions on the observance, both in law and in practice, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms and, through these and other appropriate means, to draw public attention to those matters. Article 7 Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to develop and discuss new human rights ideas and principles and to advocate their acceptance. Article 8 1. Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to have effective access, on a non-discriminatory basis, to participation in the government of his or her country and in the conduct of public affairs. 2. This includes, inter alia, the right, individually and in association with others, to submit to governmental bodies and agencies and organizations concerned with public affairs criticism and proposals for improving their functioning and to draw attention to any aspect of their work that may hinder or impede the promotion, protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Article 9 1. In the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the promotion and protection of human rights as referred to in the present Declaration; everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to benefit from an effective remedy and to be protected in the event of the violation of those rights. 2. To this end, everyone whose rights or freedoms are allegedly violated has the right, either in person or through legally authorized representation, to complain to and have that complaint promptly reviewed in a public hearing before an independent, impartial and competent judicial or other authority established by law and to obtain from such an authority a decision, in accordance with law, providing redress, including any compensation due, 106 APPENDIX where there has been a violation of that person's rights or freedoms, as well as enforcement of the eventual decision and award, all without undue delay. 3. To the same end, everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, inter alia: (a) To complain about the policies and actions of individual officials and governmental bodies with regard to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, by petition or other appropriate means, to competent domestic judicial, administrative or legislative authorities or any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, which should render their decision on the complaint without undue delay; (b) To attend public hearings, proceedings and trials so as to form an opinion on their compliance with national law and applicable international obligations and commitments; (c) To offer and provide professionally qualified legal assistance or other relevant advice and assistance in defending human rights and fundamental freedoms. 4. To the same end, and in accordance with applicable international instruments and procedures, everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to unhindered access to and communication with international bodies with general or special competence to receive and consider communications on matters of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 5. The State shall conduct a prompt and impartial investigation or ensure that an inquiry takes place whenever there is reasonable ground to believe that a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms has occurred in any territory under its jurisdiction. Article 10 No one shall participate, by act or by failure to act where required, in violating human rights and fundamental freedoms and no one shall be subjected to punishment or adverse action of any kind for refusing to do so. Article 11 APPENDIX 107 Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to the lawful exercise of his or her occupation or profession. Everyone who, as a result of his or her profession, can affect the human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of others should respect those rights and freedoms and comply with relevant national and international standards of occupational and professional conduct or ethics. Article 12 1. Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to participate in peaceful activities against violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 2. The State shall take all necessary measures to ensure the protection by the competent authorities of everyone, individually and in association with others, against any violence, threats, retaliation, de facto or de jure adverse discrimination, pressure or any other arbitrary action as a consequence of his or her legitimate exercise of the rights referred to in the present Declaration. 3. In this connection, everyone is entitled, individually and in association with others, to be protected effectively under national law in reacting against or opposing, through peaceful means, activities and acts, including those by omission, attributable to States that result in violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as acts of violence perpetrated by groups or individuals that affect the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Article 13 Everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to solicit, receive and utilize resources for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means, in accordance with article 3 of the present Declaration. Article 14 1. The State has the responsibility to take legislative, judicial, and administrative or other appropriate measures to promote the understanding by all persons under its jurisdiction of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. 108 APPENDIX 2. Such measures shall include, inter alia: (a) The publication and widespread availability of national laws and regulations and of applicable basic international human rights instruments; (b) Full and equal access to international documents in the field of human rights, including the periodic reports by the State to the bodies established by the international human rights treaties to which it is a party, as well as the summary records of discussions and the official reports of these bodies. 3. The State shall ensure and support, where appropriate, the creation and development of further independent national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all territory under its jurisdiction, whether they be ombudsmen, human rights commissions or any other form of national institution. Article 15 The State has the responsibility to promote and facilitate the teaching of human rights and fundamental freedoms at all levels of education and to ensure that all those responsible for training lawyers, law enforcement officers, the personnel of the armed forces and public officials include appropriate elements of human rights teaching in their training programme. Article 16 Individuals, non-governmental organizations and relevant institutions have an important role to play in contributing to making the public more aware of questions relating to all human rights and fundamental freedoms through activities such as education, training and research in these areas to strengthen further, inter alia, understanding, tolerance, peace and friendly relations among nations and among all racial and religious groups, bearing in mind the various backgrounds of the societies and communities in which they carry out their activities. Article 17 In the exercise of the rights and freedoms referred to in the present Declaration, everyone, acting individually and in association with others, APPENDIX 109 shall be subject only to such limitations as are in accordance with applicable international obligations and are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. Article 18 1. Everyone has duties towards and within the community, in which alone the free and full development of his or her personality is possible. 2. Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations have an important role to play and a responsibility in safeguarding democracy, promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and contributing to the promotion and advancement of democratic societies, institutions and processes. 3. Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations also have an important role and a responsibility in contributing, as appropriate, to the promotion of the right of everyone to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can be fully realized. Article 19 Nothing in the present Declaration shall be interpreted as implying for any individual, group or organ of society or any State the right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms referred to in the present Declaration. Article 20 Nothing in the present Declaration shall be interpreted as permitting States to support and promote activities of individuals, groups of individuals, institutions or non-governmental organizations contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. This document was created with Win2PDF available at http://www.daneprairie.com. The unregistered version of Win2PDF is for evaluation or non-commercial use only.