While virtually all scholars of corporate governance agree that national differences exist in corporate governance practices and their efficacy, debate continues regarding the relevant dimensions of difference and how to best explain them. In this essay, the authors argue that the strong conceptual and empirical link between law and finance as proposed within the legal origins theory and fully launched in a series of articles by LLSV is inaccurate, incomplete, and yet important. One could take multiple routes to illustrate the principle that looking simply at the characteristics of the legal system to explain economic outcomes is incomplete. LLSV's research purporting to demonstrate the importance of the legal origins of a country for its stock market development and ownership dispersion, mediated through the protection of minority shareholders as against directors, has been subjected to enough further, careful analysis that the authors can see both the inaccuracies and the importance of their research. In this essay, they have suggested that economic sociology has much to add to the raw facts of ownership patterns within countries.