Al Qa ida and United States Competition - chamberlain

Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management Volume 4, Issue 3 2007 Article 14 Systems Dynamics Model of Al-Qa’ida and United States “Competition” Todd Chamberlain∗ ∗ National Guard Bureau, todd.chamberlain@ngb.ang.af.mil Copyright c 2007 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved. Systems Dynamics Model of Al-Qa’ida and United States “Competition” Todd Chamberlain Abstract Since the late 1980’s, al-Qa’ida expanded from a small group of mujahadeen freedom fighters combating the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to a highly sophisticated, distributed terrorist network able to conduct large-scale, international acts of terrorism. The terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 brought to the fore a group of people who had a competing, devastatingly lethal philosophy to modern societies around the world. A systems dynamics model was created in order to better understand how this group attained its current status and what possible strategies the United States could take to counter al-Qa’ida’s efforts. The model consists of six sub-models: one to replicate the actions taken by the United States and five to describe how al-Qa’ida recruits new members, trains these recruits, sustains their capabilities, and then executes terrorist attacks. The model was first validated by establishing that its output data closely resembled the behavior of al-Qa’ida and the United States over the period 1990-2002. Two different United States strategies are being tested against two different al-Qa’ida strategies for the period 2002-2010 to determine possible outcomes the United States may face. Results from the model indicate that despite potential successes in capturing 9,000-13,000 members of al-Qa’ida and preventing most of their attacks, the United States could still potentially suffer at least 3 additional terrorist attacks before 2010 resulting in the loss of a minimum of 2,000 lives. Even though these results are not predictive, they do pose additional questions that the United States should be asking and answering; questions such as: Will the American people “accept” 2,000 additional deaths as a cost of the global war on terrorism? and what else could and should the United States federal government be doing to ensure the security of the American people? KEYWORDS: terrorism, simulations, homeland security Chamberlain: Al-Qa'ida and United States "Competition" 1 INTRODUCTION Since the late 1980’s, al-Qa’ida expanded from a small group of mujahedeen freedom fighters combating the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to a highly sophisticated, distributed terrorist network able to conduct large-scale, international acts of terrorism. The terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 brought this fact home to the average American citizen and started, at least for the United States, a long-term struggle in the resulting global war on terrorism. It became apparent that historical attention to homeland security, or lack thereof, had created a society vulnerable to terrorist attacks. There are a number of approaches that can be taken to better understand dynamic, complex problems. The use of metaphors and analogies can help to provide a common frame of reference to concisely describe a new, unfamiliar situation to a potentially unrelated, but familiar situation. Recent writings have drawn on different analogies to describe al-Qa’ida. Some authors have used a business analogy to describe al-Qa’ida1 while others used a network organizational analogy to describe al-Qa’ida2. This paper uses an approach called system dynamics modeling to better understand how al-Qa’ida is able to “produce” terrorists who are willing to risk and, at times, sacrifice their lives and then deploy these individuals to carry out terrorist attacks. Systems dynamics was first developed by Jay Forrester in the 1950’s at Massachusetts Institute of Technology as a way to analyze complex, dynamic, inter-active systems and “is grounded in the theory of nonlinear dynamics and feedback control.”3 Systems dynamics modeling provides the ability to graphically represent the cause-and-effect interactions of the critical aspects of a complex system (causal loop diagrams) and to track both the flows (such as material, money, people) and where accumulations may occur (stock-and-flow diagrams). The diagrams in this paper are a combination of these two diagram types. (Figure 1 contains a tutorial on how to “read” these diagrams.) By combining causal loop and stock-and-flow diagrams, feedbacks and delays in the system can be identified. Also, by quantifying the various aspects of the system using a systems dynamics modeling software called Vensim®, a simulation model showing the historical behavior pattern of al-Qa’ida was developed. By replicating the growth of al-Qa’ida during the 1990’s, a better understanding of the growth of al-Qa’ida was gained. The model was then used to investigate two possible strategies the United States could take to prevent future terrorist attacks as a result of two possible al-Qa’ida strategies. The results of the model indicate the current US strategy is an effective approach to the global 1 2 Kempe, 2001; McCoy and Cauchon, 2001. Stewart, 2001; Lesser et al., 1999. 3 Sterman, 2000, pp. 4-5. Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007 2 JHSEM: Vol. 4 [2007], No. 3, Article 14 war on terrorism. However, the model also indicates that, regardless of the US strategy followed, al-Qa’ida will be able to conduct at least 3 additional terrorist attacks, resulting in at least 2,000 additional US citizen deaths before 2010. Such results should lead to some additional questions: Will the American people "accept" 2,000 additional deaths as a cost of the global war on terrorism? What else could and should the United States federal government be doing to ensure the security of the American people?4 At the highest-level abstraction, the current situation can be framed as a battle between two competing philosophies: 1) al-Qa’ida’s use of terrorism to establish a fundamentalist Islamic caliphate and 2) the United States’ use of democracy to establish a safe and secure global environment. This dynamic "competition" between the United States and al-Qa’ida is best illustrated by the causal loops in Figure 1. These four loops reflect two common system dynamics archetypes: the Success to the Successful archetype, illustrated by the bottom two Rewards Go To Success loops and the Escalation archetype, illustrated by the top two loops, Success Leads to Complacency and Failure Demands Action.5 In a Success to the Successful archetype, if the US increases the resources devoted to its strategy (Resources to United States), it has a higher likelihood of succeeding (Success of US Approach). This success justifies devoting more resources, in the form of support to the United States, by additional countries (Support of United States Instead of Al-Qa’ida). This support to the US, however, has a detrimental effect on al-Qa’ida’s Rewards Go to Success loop. As more countries support the US, fewer resources are available to support al-Qa’ida (Resources to Al-Qa’ida), thus reducing al-Qa’ida’s success (Success of Al-Qa’ida Approach). In the Escalation archetype, one party takes actions that are perceived by the other as a threat. In the context of our problem, the United States’ promotion of democracy and individual rights (Success of US Approach Relative to Al Qa’ida Approach), is perceived as a threat to al-Qa’ida’s goal of establishing a fundamentalist Islamic caliphate. This perceived threat has caused al-Qa’ida to resort to terrorist actions as its response to the increasing influence and success of the US. Successful al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks are an increased threat to the United States (Threat to US National Security) leading to additional security actions by the United States, thus resulting in actions that al-Qa’ida perceives as a threat. Combining the two balancing loops in Figure 1 into a figure-8 pattern produces an overall reinforcing loop leading to an escalation of adversarial activities by both the United States and al-Qa’ida. 4 5 Hart and Rudmen, 2002. Senge, 1990. http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss3/14 Chamberlain: Al-Qa'ida and United States "Competition" 3 Escalation S Threat to US National Security O S Threat to Al-Qa'ida Goals S Security Activity by United States S B Success of US Terrorist Ac tivit Approac h Relative to Failu re Dem ands by Al-Qa'ida Al Qa'ida Approac h Action S S Success of Success of O S Al-Qa'ida Approach US Approac h O Success Leads to Com placency B S Resourc es to United States R Rewa rds Go To Success S Support of United States Instead of Al-Qa'ida R Rewa rds Go To Success Resourc es to Al-Qa'ida S O Success to the Successful Causal Loop Tutorial: There are two general types of causal loops: 1) Reinforcing Loops (Designated by an R in the diagrams), show growth and decay in a system: They allow a system to grow or enter a "death spiral". 2) Balancing Loops (Designated by a B in the diagrams), show balance within a system: They cause the system to seek equilibrium. How to "Read" Causal Loops: (1) An "S" next to an arrow indicates that, as the factor at the tail of the arrow increases or decreases, the factor at the head of the arrow will move in the same direction. For example, in Figure 1: As the “Threat to US National Security” increases, the “Activity by United States" also increases or if the “Threat to US National Security" decreases, the “Activity by United States" also decreases. (2) An "O" next to an arrow indicates that, as the factor at the tail of the arrow increases or decreases, the factor at the head of the arrow will move in the opposite direction. For example, in Figure 1: As the "Success of United States Approach Relative to al-Qa’ida Approach" increases, the "Threat to US National Security" decreases or if the "Success of United States Approach Relative to al-Qa’ida Approach " decreases, the "Threat to US National Security" increases. Figure 1: Strategic Framework Using these two archetypes as a framework, a systems dynamics model, consisting of six sub-models (shown as rectangles with rounded corners in Figure 2), was Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007 4 JHSEM: Vol. 4 [2007], No. 3, Article 14 developed to replicate the activities taken by the United States, the activities taken by al-Qa’ida, and the competing interrelationships between the two. S Terrorist Ability to Sustain Operational Capacity S Terrorist Ability to Train S B Prevention Terrorist Ability to Execute Operations I S O B Hit Them First Terrorist Ability to Execute Operations II O B Protect the Borders S Successful Incidents S S Terrorist Ability to Recruit O United States Activities R Required Consequence Management Measures S S R Fear Erodes Legitimacy S Satisfied Public Incident Deaths S Satisfaction with Current Political/Social Structure Fear O Figure 2: Sub-Model Interactions UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES SUB-MODEL DESCRIPTION The United States Activities sub-model illustrates the actions taken by the United States to ensure the success of its society (See Figure 3). United States activities taken in response to the threat posed by al-Qa’ida’s terrorist activities can be grouped into four broad categories. Three of the categories—providing resources to prevent the rise of disenfranchised populations (Allocation to Preventive Measures), providing resources to eliminate the terrorist threat (Allocation to Offensive Measures), and providing resources to secure US borders and protect http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss3/14 Chamberlain: Al-Qa'ida and United States "Competition" 5 critical infrastructure (Allocation to Defensive Measures)—seek to prevent al-Qa’ida from being able to conduct terrorist attacks. The fourth category (Allocation to Consequence Mgt) provides resources to minimize the detrimental impact from a successful terrorist attack. US Activities O B Terrorist Ability to Recruit O S Terrorist Ability to Sustain Operational Capacity S O S Terrorist Ability to Execute Operations II S Successful Incidents S Incident Deaths R Fear Erodes Legitimacy Allocation to Prevention Preventive Measures B Allocation to Offensive Measures Hit Them First B Protect the Borders Allocation to Defensive Measures Consequence Management Delivery Delay S O Gross Domestic Product S Taxes Consequence Management Implemented Backlog Consequence Consequence Mgt Management S Measures Required Desired B Consequence CM Management S Delivery Rate Fulfillment Funding for S Government Consequence Revenue Management Consequence Mgt Allocation to Expenses Consequence Mgt S B R S S Tax Ratio Satisfied Public S Maximum Consequence Management Expenses Stockout O Fear O S Satisfaction with Current Political/Social Structure Figure 3: United States Activities Sub-Model Diagram The loop Prevention shows how allocating resources to preventive measures will indirectly impact al-Qa’ida’s ability to recruit new members. Preventive measures (i.e., humanitarian assistance, economic development, educational system assistance, population control, political system development, etc.—in a word, nation-building) can be used to improve the health of current and potential "host" nations and prevent them from becoming failed nation-states. Al-Qa’ida Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007 6 JHSEM: Vol. 4 [2007], No. 3, Article 14 relies on failed nation-states to provide 1) willing recruits to its cause, 2) a safe haven to conduct its training activities, and 3) the freedom to act as it pleases. Prior to 9-11, the United States devoted approximately $11 billion a year toward nation-building type activities—the $17 billion dedicated in 2001 by the US Federal budget less the $6 billion allocated to the State Department, which in all likelihood largely supported employee salaries.6 Current United States budget plans for the future indicate that this amount will remain the same. The loop Hit Them First shows how allocating funds toward offensive measures will decrease al-Qa’ida’s ability to sustain its operational capacity by capturing or killing members of the terrorist group, seizing its funding and assets, disrupting its ability to communicate, and destroying its training infrastructure. Prior to 9-11, the United States allocated approximately $1.2 billion a year toward offensive measures. The majority of this funding was provided to the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation, Joint Terrorism Task Force for intelligence collection activities and terrorist prosecutions. In 2002, the allocation to offensive measures increased to approximately $22.8 billion with a projected increase to $23.6 billion for 2003 and future years. These figures include increased budgets for the Department of Justice to continue its intelligence collection and terrorist prosecution ($1.2 billion),7 for the Department of Treasury’s Customs Service’s Operation Green Quest for seizing terrorists’ financial assets, and for the Department of Defense for the global war on terrorism ($20 billion—the approximate cost for the pay and allowances for 60,000 soldiers as well as the estimated costs for world-wide movements of personnel and equipment and sustainment costs for these soldiers (food, supplies, ammunition, etc.)).8 The loop Protect the Borders demonstrates that the allocation of resources to defensive measures provides a secure environment in the United States and prevents al-Qa’ida from being able to conduct activities within the US. Protecting critical infrastructure, conducting border security, conducting operational intelligence activities, and deterring/defending against strategic attack are all geared toward preventing terrorists from entering the United States. Prior to 9-11, the Federal government spent approximately $13 billion for border and transportation security and critical infrastructure protection (Immigration and Naturalization Service: $1.3B, Customs Service: $2B, 2% of the overall US Coast Guard budget for border protection: $1M, Transportation Security Administration: $1B, lines of communication security: $8.7B, and the Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Investigative Service: $7M). In 2002, this amount increased to $23 billion a year and included the amount of funding from an increase to the Department of Justice’s Immigration and Naturalization 6 7 US Government, 2001. Department of Justice, 2001; Department of Justice, 2003. 8 Weisman, 2002, pg. 7. http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss3/14 Chamberlain: Al-Qa'ida and United States "Competition" 7 Service; the Treasury Department’s Customs Service; the Department of Transportation’s Transportation Security Administration, $6.7B;9 20% of the United States Coast Guard overall budget;10 and the National Guard’s airport and border security missions.11 Current budget projections show this amount increasing to $26 billion a year for 2003 and the future. In the event that the first three measures fail and al-Qa’ida is able to conduct a successful attack on the United States (Successful Incidents), then funding for a fourth set of actions, consequence management measures, is required (Consequence Management Required). These measures are geared toward fixing the damage caused by successful terrorist attacks and entail many different activities including physical security and law enforcement; command, control, and communication; logistics and medical support; and infrastructure repair. Prior to 9-11, the majority of the funding for consequence management was provided to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to mitigate the effects of natural disasters as well as some limited funding to train first responders. During the period 1990-1999, FEMA spent an average of $2.6 billion per year to mitigate the effects of natural disasters (Allocation to Consequence Management).12 Current budget projections show the amount for all consequence management activities increasing to $8.1 billion in 2003. This increased funding by the US federal government is for training state and local first responders how to better respond to terrorist attacks and for increasing the resources of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile.13 The two loops CM Fulfillment and Stockout model the delivery of consequence management assistance (in the form of funding) over the months that follow a terrorist attack.14 Since all consequence management measures require time to complete, initially there will be a difference between the level of consequence management measures required and the level of consequence management measures completed (Implemented Consequence Mgt Measures), resulting in both a backlog of work (Consequence Management Backlog) and a delay in service (Consequence Management Delivery Delay). The loop Satisfied Public illustrates that as long as the funding to fix the consequences are received promptly, the public will remain satisfied with the current political/social structure (Satisfaction with Current Political/Social Structure) and will continue to pay taxes (Tax Ratio). 9 Weisman, 2002. Philpott, Tom. 2002. 11 Pentagon, 2002. 12 FEMA, 2001. 13 Office of Homeland Security, 2002, pp. 44-45. 14 Sterman, 2000, pp. 711-725. 10 Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007 8 JHSEM: Vol. 4 [2007], No. 3, Article 14 The public’s satisfaction, however, is also impacted by the fear of being killed by a terrorist attack (Fear). The loop Fear Erodes Legitimacy shows the impact a successful attack and resulting deaths (Incident Deaths) have on diminishing public satisfaction. The degree to which people are satisfied has an impact on their willingness to pay taxes. Since, historically, most people in the United States have been satisfied with their political and social structure, a historical tax rate of twenty percent was obtained by dividing the US Annual Federal Budget ($1.8 Trillion) into the US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($9 Trillion).15 However, the actual tax rate in the model (Tax Ratio) is dependent on the combined effects of the two loops Fear Erodes Legitimacy and Satisfied Public. The challenge for the United States is to properly allocate its resources toward the four categories of actions in order to minimize or eliminate the success of al-Qa’ida’s terrorism. AL-QA’IDA ACTIVITIES Al Qa’ida has undertaken terrorist activities in order to attain its desired goal of establishing a fundamentalist Islamic caliphate. In order to conduct these terrorist activities, al-Qa’ida needs to recruit members, provide training to these recruits, obtain funding to support its operations, and then undertake successful operations. To replicate this process in the model, five al-Qa’ida activity sub-models were created. TERRORIST ABILITY TO RECRUIT SUB-MODEL DESCRIPTION The first of the five al-Qa’ida activity sub-models (Figure 4) illustrates how al-Qa’ida seeks to increase its numbers by recruiting from a disenfranchised population. The number of new recruits (Recruitment Rate) is dependent upon the attractiveness of belonging to al-Qa’ida (Recruitment Fraction), the current number of al-Qa’ida members (Total Terrorists), the number of disenfranchised individuals in the population (Disenfranchised Population), and the number of disenfranchised individuals each terrorist contacts per month (Contact Rate - assumed to be five disenfranchised contacts per terrorist per month).16 Since the model time frame begins in 1990, data from the 1990 census was used to determine the initial disenfranchised population. This population was selected to be unemployed, illiterate, Muslim males, ages 15-29, located in critical countries (Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, and 15 16 US Government, 2001. Sterman, 2000, pp. 302-308. http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss3/14 Chamberlain: Al-Qa'ida and United States "Competition" 9 Yemen), identified by their historical association with terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism—typically the population from which al-Qa’ida recruits its members.17 Increases to this disenfranchised population (Rate of Dissatisfaction) was assumed to be in line with the average growth rate as the remainder of the third world (3.5% per year), as illustrated by the Population Growth reinforcing loop. However, the rate of dissatisfaction could be reduced by the United States allocating additional funding (Allocation to Preventive Measures) to improving the living conditions of this sector of the population, as illustrated by the left portion of the Prevention balancing loop. Terrorist Ability to Recruit Rate of Diss atisfaction S Disenfranchised Population R Popu lation Growth S Recruitment Rate S S Recruits Total Population Total S Terrorists Recruitment S Frac tion B Prevention Contact Rate R O Allocation to Preventive Measures S O Success Breeds Recruits Success ful Incidents Figure 4: Terrorist Ability to Recruit Sub-Model Diagram In addition to the impact this funding has on reducing the number of disenfranchised individuals, the increased well-being of the general population also decreases the attractiveness of belonging to al-Qa’ida (Recruitment Fraction), thus decreasing al-Qa’ida’s ability to recruit, as illustrated by the right side of the Prevention balancing loop. Al-Qa’ida is able to counter these US activities and increase its attractiveness by conducting successful attacks (Successful Incidents), as illustrated by the Success Breeds Recruits reinforcing loop.18 TERRORIST ABILITY TO TRAIN SUB-MODEL DESCRIPTION The second sub-model (Figure 5) captures the al-Qa’ida recruit training process.19 The balancing loop, Brake on Training, is used to constrain the number of recruits 17 18 Stern, 2001, pg. 15. Kempe, 2001. 19 Sterman. 2000, pp. 801-810. Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007 10 JHSEM: Vol. 4 [2007], No. 3, Article 14 allowed to begin training (Acceptance) to the amount of resources available to support training (Training Funding). An assumption was made that Bin Laden would initially allocate more funding toward training (Percent of Funding Devoted to Training—initially set to be 80% of all funding then decreasing the percentage at six years by 20% a year for the next 2 years and remaining at 40%) until sufficient recruits were trained and then gradually reallocate more funding toward terrorist operations. Terrorist Ability to Train S Recruits Recruitment Rate S Training Capacity O People Capacity S S Training O Funding S S Funding Revenue Expenses S Losses Allocation to Offensive Measures S Training Duration S Recruits in Acceptance Training Graduates B Brake On Train ing S S S Safe Havens Total Cost to Train Recruit S Training Cost Per Recruit Training Costs S Salary Costs S Operational Costs Perc ent of Funding Devoted to Training S Contributions Figure 5: Terrorist Ability to Train Sub-Model Diagram S In order for any recruit to begin training, sufficient funds need to be available to complete the training. To determine the amount of money required to train a single recruit (Total Cost to Train Recruit), the monthly cost to cover facilities, food, medical support, etc. (Training Cost per Recruit—estimated at $1000 per month) was multiplied by the number of months required to complete the training (Training Duration—estimated as three months—the same duration as it takes to train a US soldier in basic skills). By dividing this figure into Training Funding, the maximum number of recruits (People Capacity) that can be accepted over the Training Duration is obtained. In order for terrorists to conduct their http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss3/14 Chamberlain: Al-Qa'ida and United States "Competition" 11 training, however, they require a location where they are free to operate.20 The factor Safe Havens prevents recruits from being accepted into training until after 1993 (the first availability of training camps for al-Qa’ida) or after November 2001 (the last availability of training camps for al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan). By dividing Training Duration into People Capacity, the maximum number of Recruits that can be accepted per month (Training Capacity) is obtained. Once recruits are accepted for training (Acceptance), al-Qa’ida incurs training expenses (Training Costs) equal to the number of recruits multiplied by the Total Cost to Train Recruit. This sub-model also captures the funding so critical to al-Qa’ida’s ability to support operations. Even though some al-Qa’ida members have used illegal activities to support themselves, the majority of al-Qa’ida’s funding (Contributions) has come from sympathetic people around the world.21 McCoy (2001) estimated that Bin Laden historically received $10 million a year.22 The two categories of drains on al-Qa’ida’s funding are “business” costs (Expenses) and the amount of money seized or frozen by the United States (Losses). Expenses consist of funding to support training (Training Costs— discussed above), funding to conduct terrorist attacks (Operational Costs— calculated and discussed in more detail under the Terrorist Ability to Execute I sub-model), and funding for al-Qa’ida member salaries (Salary Costs). Al-Qa’ida paid salaries of $500-$1200 per month to some of its members.23 The Salary Costs in the model was derived by providing 20 percent of al-Qa’ida members with an average salary of $600 per month, thus accounting for a small number of top aides, a moderate number of middle managers, and a large number of working members. The amount of Losses is a function of how much money the United States allocates to offensive measures (Allocation to Offensive Measures). Historical data from the efforts of the Department of Commerce’s Operation Green Quest and FBI activities were used to determine the impact that funding allocation toward offensive measures had on the amount of al-Qa’ida money seized or frozen. TERRORIST ABILITY TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONAL CAPACITY SUBMODEL DESCRIPTION The third sub-model (Figure 6) captures al-Qa’ida’s ability to sustain trained members capable of conducting terrorist attacks. Within this sub-model, al-Qa’ida members who complete training (Graduates, from the Terrorist Ability to Train 20 21 Arnold, 1988; Seib, 2001; and McGeary, 2001. McCoy and Cauchon, 2001; Elliott, 2002, pg. 33. 22 McCoy and Cauchon, 2001. 23 McCoy and Cauchon, 2001; Elliott, 2002. Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007 12 JHSEM: Vol. 4 [2007], No. 3, Article 14 sub-model) and the 300 experienced hard-core terrorists gained in 1998 from alQa’ida’s merger with Egyptian Islamic Front (Experienced Terrorist Recruitment Rate) are first placed into a waiting status (Terrorists in Waiting). Al-Qa’ida members remain in this status until the al-Qa’ida leadership directs (Incident Initiation Rate, from the Terrorist Ability to Execute II sub-model) a group of them (Engagement Rate) to start attack planning and execution. At this point, these members are placed into an operation execution status (Terrorist Executing). Once these members have completed their operation, they return to a waiting status (Return Rate) to await further execution orders, unless they are captured or killed during the attack. S Allocation to Offensive Measures Captured Terrorists Detection Rate Experienced Terrorist Recruitment Rate Graduates Execution S Length Return Rate S Terrorists in Waiting S Engagement Rate S O S S Terrorist Executing Suicide Deaths Terrorist Losses S Manpower Operational Capacity Incident Initiation Rate Terrorist to Incident Ratio Terrorist Ability to Sustain Operational Capacity Figure 6: Terrorist Ability to Sustain Operational Capacity Sub-model Diagram Al-Qa’ida experiences a reduction in its manpower capability through captures (Captured Terrorists) and deaths from suicide attacks (Suicide Deaths). The ability of the United States to detect and capture al-Qa’ida members (Detection Rate, Terrorist Losses, and Captured Terrorists) is dependent upon the number of Terrorists in Waiting or the number of Terrorists Executing and the amount of funding the United States allocates to capturing them (Allocation to Offensive Measures). http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss3/14 Chamberlain: Al-Qa'ida and United States "Competition" 13 An analysis of the five successful al-Qa’ida attacks (the first World Trade Center bombing, the Khobar Towers bombing, the Embassy bombings, the USS Cole bombing, and the 9-11 attacks) indicates a direct correlation between what could be assumed as al-Qa’ida’s desired lethality from an attack (the number of United States deaths) and the length of time to conduct reconnaissance, plan, and gather the assets for an attack (Execution Length); the number of terrorists required to conduct the attack (Terrorist to Incident Ratio); the percentage of terrorists that will die during the attack (Suicide Deaths); and the amount of money required for the operation (Monthly Cost Per Incident—in the Terrorist Ability to Execute I sub-model). Figures for all of these factors were derived from the results or estimated values attributed to these historical attacks. This sub-model calculates the maximum number of incidents that could be undertaken at any given time given the available manpower (Manpower Operational Capacity) by dividing the number of Terrorists in Waiting by the Terrorist to Incident Ratio. (This information is used within the Terrorist Ability to Execute I sub-model). TERRORIST ABILITY TO EXECUTE I SUB-MODEL DESCRIPTION The fourth sub-model (Figure 7) captures the terrorist incidents and the factors required for al-Qa’ida to carry out these attacks. The balancing loop, Incidents Diminish Operational Capacity, constrains the number of incidents that can be initiated (Incident Initiation Rate) to the minimum of either the funding (Maximum Incidents per Month) or manpower (Manpower Operational Capacity) available for operations (Maximum Operational Capacity). The model assumes that al-Qa’ida would ensure sufficient funding and manpower would be available to complete an operation before the approval to start attack planning and execution would be given. To determine the maximum number of incidents al-Qa’ida could conduct based on the funding available for operations (Maximum Initiated Incidents), current al-Qa’ida assets (Funding), less the amount of funding required for training (Percent of Funding Devoted to Training), is divided by the average total costs to conduct an operation (Total Cost of Incident). By dividing this number by the Execution Length, the Maximum Incidents per Month is derived. As incidents are initiated, al-Qa’ida expends funding (Expenses) on executing the operation (Operational Cost), equivalent to the number of incidents initiated multiplied by the Total Cost of Incident. This expense decreases its monetary reserves and, thus, decreases its capacity to initiate further incidents. The Total Cost of Incident is simply the Monthly Cost Per Incident multiplied by the Execution Length (discussed above in the Terrorist Ability to Sustain Operational Capacity sub-model). Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007 14 JHSEM: Vol. 4 [2007], No. 3, Article 14 The reinforcing loop, Rewards Go To Success, demonstrates the impact successful execution of terrorist attacks has on increasing Contributions to al-Qa’ida. Since little information is available to quantify this impact, the simplified assumption in the model has monthly contributions doubling as the number of successful incidents grows to ten. Funding S S Operational Cost S Monthly Cost Per Incident R Expenses O Total Cost of Incident S S Contributions O Execution Length Perc ent of Funding Devoted Maximum to Training Initiated Incidents S Revenue S O S B Incidents Dim inish Op eration al Capacity S Rewa rds Go To Success Maximum Incidents per Month Manpower S Operational Capacity Maximum S Operational Capacity Success ful Terrorist Incidents Incidents Terrorist In-Progress Attacks S Incident Initiation Rate Terrorist Ability to Execute I Figure 7: Terrorist Ability to Execute I Sub-Model Diagram TERRORIST ABILITY TO EXECUTE II SUB-MODEL DESCRIPTION The final al-Qa’ida activity sub-model (Figure 8) illustrates the critical factors that contribute to al-Qa’ida’s desire and ability to carry out attacks. The reinforcing loop Success Breeds Desire shows that Successful Incidents are a critical factor in increasing al-Qa’ida’s desire for future incidents with higher lethality.24 Critical factors that impact al-Qa’ida’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks (Terrorist Attacks) are its knowledge of operations planning and execution (Operational Competence), its access to "weapons" and "knowledge" (Access), and the "security" of the target population. 24 Hoffman, 1999, pg. 21. http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss3/14 Chamberlain: Al-Qa'ida and United States "Competition" 15 S Civil Liberties O Success ful Incidents B Protect the Border Allocation to Defensive Measures O Access S B Attacks Reduce Access R Terrorist Attacks S O B Learn By Failing Terrorist Incidents In-Progress Incident Initiation Rate S Learn By Success Operational Competenc e S Tactic al Adjustments Effec t of Success on Desire S S Failed Terrorist Incidents Failed Incidents S S Desired Incidents Awareness of Weaknesses R Success Breeds Desire S Terrorist Ability to Execute II Figure 8: Terrorist Ability to Execute II Sub-model Diagram The two loops Learn By Success and Learn By Failing demonstrate how al-Qa’ida is able to learn from both its successes and failures to improve its ability to conduct future attacks. Al-Qa’ida is able to gain an appreciation of flaws in its execution (Awareness of Weaknesses) and make appropriate modifications to future plans (Tactical Adjustments), thus "becoming demonstrably more adept in their trade craft of death and destruction; more formidable in their abilities of tactical modification, adjustment and innovation in their methods of attack".25 An increase in civil liberties within the United States and the ubiquity of the Internet has increased the availability of the means and methods of modern terrorism. The Internet provides an unprecedented amount of easily accessible information, which the terrorists can use to increase their operational knowledge as well as increase their access to weaponry.26 The balancing loop Attacks Reduce Access illustrates the heightened effect attacks against US targets (Successful 25 26 Hoffman, 1999, pg. 46. Hoffman, 1999, pp. 39-41. Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007 16 JHSEM: Vol. 4 [2007], No. 3, Article 14 Incidents) have on United State citizens’ willingness to subordinate their civil liberties (Civil Liberties) to security requirements. This reduction in open access to information causes a corresponding reduction in al-Qa’ida’s access to knowledge and weapons. In this model, the US Civil Liberties prior to 9-11 is rated as a 0.8 (on a scale of 0-1: 0 denoting completely closed borders, martial law, and complete censure of all information; 1 denoting totally open borders, no restrictions on the access to information and complete freedom of speech and dissension; 0.1 would be the value for Afghanistan under Taliban rule). As long as the number of successful terrorist incidents does not exceed 1 every year, Civil Liberties will remain at 0.8. Higher incident rates cause the emphasis on civil liberties to gradually decrease until the scale reaches a value of 0.2 when the incident rate equals 6 per year. As the US allocates additional funding to tightening borders and protecting critical infrastructure (Allocation to Defensive Measures), the Protect the Borders balancing loop reduces the ability of terrorists to execute attacks. By combining these six sub-models together, a single systems dynamics model was created to determine possible outcomes the United States might face before 2010. MODEL VALIDATION AND RESULTS Given the dynamic nature of systems dynamics models, the lack of hard data for many of the variables, and the purpose of the model being to enhance understanding rather than give a definitive answer, a typical statistical validation and results presentation was not used. Instead, various system dynamic model validation techniques were used during model development, such as 1) ensuring critical factors were endogenous to the model, 2) developing the model structure to reflect what is known about the US and al-Qa’ida, 3) testing sub-model behaviors against known system behavior, and 4) conducting sensitivity analysis.27 Combining these techniques allows a model to be constructed that replicates the overall behavior pattern of a system even when the data to quantify individual factors is scarce or unreliable. This approach also allows values or a range of values that are educated estimates to be assigned to factors in the model. As a final test of model validity, the model was simulated from 1990-2001 to determine if the model produced results that were consistent with the actual behavior of the United States and al-Qa’ida over the same time period. The graphs in Figure 9 demonstrate that the model produced results that were very similar to those witnessed in the real world. 27 Sterman, 2000, pp. 858-891. http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss3/14 Chamberlain: Al-Qa'ida and United States "Competition" 17 16,000 12,000 8,000 4,000 Total Terrorists $70M $50M $30M $10M Funding ($ Million) 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Year Successful Terrorist Incidents 5 3 1 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Year Terrorist Deaths 25 15 5 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Year Incident Deaths 3000 2000 1000 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Year 7 5 3 1 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Year Failed Terrorist Incidents 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Year 70 50 30 10 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Year Terrorist Captures LEGEND Actual Model Figure 9: Model Results Compared to Actual, 1990-Sept 2001 The overall model produced results in the growth of al-Qa’ida that appear to replicate its growth in membership and financial resources; a review of the literature indicates that the total number of terrorists trained by al-Qa’ida, as of September Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007 18 JHSEM: Vol. 4 [2007], No. 3, Article 14 2001, was between 10-20,000 people28 and that its financial resources were approximately $30 million.29 The model also produced similar results for the number of incidents conducted by al-Qa’ida, the number of deaths attributed to al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks, and the number of captured and dead al-Qa’ida members. Research indicates that from 1990 until September 2001, al-Qa’ida attempted 12 terrorist attacks, of which 5 were successful (including the 9-11 attacks) and 7 were failures. These attacks resulted in 3266 deaths and the suicide of 25 terrorists. During the same time period, 49 al-Qa’ida members were captured. These graphs show that the overall results at the end of the period reflect the results from the actual system, but they do not necessarily mirror the behavior of the system during any given sub-timeframe. However, there are two graphs, Successful Terrorist Incidents and Terrorist Captures, which do closely mirror the system behavior throughout the period. One has to take into account the fact that a systems dynamics model based on a continuous time approach rather than a discrete event approach will produce results that typically show a "smooth" behavior rather than the "stair-stepped" discrete change behavior exhibited by the actual system, especially when those discrete changes are small in number. Once it was demonstrated that the model was a fairly good representation of the historical dynamics between the US and al-Qa’ida, five future possible scenarios were explored to determine possible outcomes facing the US from October 2001 until 2010. The first scenario, referred to as the baseline scenario, attempts to get an understanding of what might have happened had the United States done nothing after the 9-11 attacks. This scenario used the historical values for United States’ Allocations to Preventive Measures, Offensive Measures, Defensive Measures and Consequence Management Measures and the historical values for al-Qa’ida’s desired incident rate and desired lethality. Four additional scenarios were created to look at the four possible combinations resulting from the two different US and al-Qa’ida strategies outlined in Table 1. Factor US Strategy al-Qa’ida Strategy Table 1: Coding Chart The two US Strategies have two different allocation policies (Table 2). The first US Strategy, Offensive Focus, reflects the current projected allocations to 28 29 Offensive Focus (Current) Current Desired Incident Rate (1/year) Preventive Focus High Desired Incident Rate (4/year) Elliott, 2002, pg. 32; Kelley, 2002, pg. 1; Schmidt and Priest, 2002, pg. 1. Kelley, 2002, pg. 1. http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss3/14 Chamberlain: Al-Qa'ida and United States "Competition" 19 measures as outlined in the various United States government agency reports on their support to the global war on terrorism.30 The second, Preventive Focus, reflects a shift in the allocation of funding toward preventive measures in order to explore the potential impact of spending more US resources on nation-building and less on warfare. By reducing the amount of funding currently projected for offensive measures by $6 billion (which would still provide an increase of $16 billion over historical values) and defensive measures by $5 billion (which would still provide an $8 billion increase over historical values), we could double the amount of money allocated to preventive measures. Offensive Focus (Current US Policy) $11.0 Billion $23.6 Billion $26.0 Billion $ 8.1 Billion Preventive Focus $22.0 Billion $17.6 Billion $21.0 Billion $ 8.1 Billion Allocation to Preventive Measures Allocation to Offensive Measures Allocation to Defensive Measures Allocation to Consequence Mgt Table 2: Projected United States Annual Funding Allocations The results of the five scenarios can be seen in Figure 10. Before discussing what the results might suggest, a discussion of the baseline results is needed. The baseline scenario shows Total Terrorists increasing rapidly until shortly after 2003 at which time it increases at a much lower rate while its funding during that same time falls to nearly zero. This scenario also shows that al-Qa’ida is able to attempt only five additional terrorist attacks, of which three are successful. These results do not seem to reflect what would be expected based on historical trends. An examination of the additional details in the model indicates the apparent causes of these behaviors. The model assumes that al-Qa’ida will pay salaries to a certain percentage of its members and will continue to train additional recruits, regardless of how many members it has. This simplified assumption causes the salary costs to out-strip the amount of contributions shortly after 2003. Most organizations would not allow this behavior to occur and would either slow down the rate at 30 Figures for the current allocation to various measures were taken from the 2002 Performance Reports for all the relevant government departments (Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, Department of Agriculture, and Treasury Department. Commerce Department) as well as figures outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002. Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007 20 JHSEM: Vol. 4 [2007], No. 3, Article 14 which they accepted new members and/or reduce the amount of money paid out in salaries. Based on this analysis, the baseline results probably overestimate Total Terrorists and underestimate the remaining results. Total Terrorists 25,000 15,000 5,000 2002 2004 2006 Year 2008 2010 $35M $25M $15M $5M 2002 2004 2006 Year 2008 2010 Funding ($ Million) Successful Terrorist Incidents 14 10 6 2 2002 2004 2006 Year 2008 2010 35 25 15 5 Failed Terrorist Incidents 2002 2004 2006 Year 2008 2010 Captured Terrorists 14,000 10,000 6,000 2,000 2002 2004 2006 Year 2008 2010 35,000 25,000 15,000 5,000 Incident Deaths 2002 2004 2006 Year 2008 2010 Baseline Current Current - High Preventive Preventive - High Figure 10: Model Scenario Results: 2002-2010 http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss3/14 Chamberlain: Al-Qa'ida and United States "Competition" 21 An examination of the results indicates clearly that doing something, following either the Current Strategy or the Preventive strategy, is better than doing nothing at all (the Baseline Strategy). However, the results indicate that shifting funding currently projected for defensive and offensive measures toward preventive measures would impair the United States’ ability to prevent attacks, if al-Qa’ida chooses to adopt an increased rate of attacks, but would not appreciably change the number of future recruits compared to the number of recruits under the current strategy. This may suggest that the impact of nation-building activities is not properly represented in the model, that the "pay-back" period for those types of investments are not realized within the model’s timeframe, or that there is a certain "threshold" amount of funding that must be met in order to get beneficial results. Further investigation and analysis would need to be conducted to determine which, if any, of these explanations are correct. All four scenarios show relatively the same number of Total Terrorists—between 2,000-6,000 people—and the same amount of funding—between $31-$36 million in 2010. These figures represent a rather significant capability in terms of people and money. What cannot be determined, however, is how effective this group of people would be. Would the loss of 9,000 - 13,000 of its members cause al-Qa’ida to become dispirited and lose focus, effectively destroying its ability to carry out terrorist attacks, thus further hindering its ability to obtain contributions from around the world? Or would a hard-core set of followers still be able to pose a significant threat to the US? Even though this model is not able to provide insight into the answers to these questions, the results of the model do help to focus the types of questions which the United States should be asking and answering. REFERENCES Arnold, Terrell E., The Violence Formula: Why People Lend Sympathy and Support to Terrorism, 1988, Lexington, MA: D.C. Health and Company – Lexington Books. 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Hoffman, Bruce, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Analysis of Trends and Motivations, 1999, Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Kelley, Jack, “Al-Qaeda Fragmented, Smaller, But Still Deadly”, USA Today, September 9, 2002. Kempe, Frederick, “Busting The Bin Laden Trust”, Wall Street Journal Europe, September 26, 2001. Lesser, Ian O., Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism, 1999, Santa Monica, CA: RAND. McCoy, Kevin and Dennis Cauchon, “The Business Side of Terror”, USA Today, October 16, 2001, pg. 1B. McGeary, Johanna, “Can Al-Qaeda Find A New Nest”, Time, December 24, 2001. Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, pp. 44-45. Pentagon. “National Guard Troops To Aid Civilian Agencies In Securing U.S. Borders”, Inside The Pentagon, January 31, 2002, pg. 1. Philpott, Tom, “Coast Guard Shift Into Homeland Security Is ‘Right On’”, Newport News Daily Press, June 14, 2002. Schmidt, Susan and Dana Priest, “U.S. Fears Low-Level Al Qaeda Attacks”, Washington Post, September 9, 2002. Seib, Gerald F., “U.S. Must Prevent Another ‘Afghanistan’ Where Terrorists Can Find Safe Harbor”, Wall Street Journal, December 12, 2001. Senge, Peter, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, 1990, New York: Currency Doubleday. Sterman, John D., Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World, 2000, Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill. Stern, Jessica, “How Terrorists Hijacked Islam”, USA Today, October 1, 2001. Stewart, Thomas A, “America’s Secret Weapon”, Business 2.0, December 2001. http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol4/iss3/14 Chamberlain: Al-Qa'ida and United States "Competition" 23 US Government, "A Citizen’s Guide to the Federal Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2001", 2001, obtained at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2001/guide02.html. Weisman, Jonathan, “Troops Aside, ‘War’ Effort Is Expanding”, USA Today, June 18, 2002. Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007