Police Response to the Office of Independent Review Report

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					      Pasadena Police Department

Police Response to the Office of
 Independent Review Report

   Leroy Barnes, Jr. Shooting Incident

               February 1, 2010




              Christopher O. Vicino
             Interim Chief of Police
                                                                                      207 N. Garfield Avenue
Christopher O. Vicino                                                                   Pasadena, CA 91101
Interim Chief of Police                                                                      (626) 744-4501


                                          February 1, 2010




        Dear Community Members,

        On February 19, 2009, two Pasadena police officers conducted a traffic stop on
        Mentone Avenue in the City of Pasadena. This encounter resulted in an armed
        confrontation between Leroy Barnes, Jr. and police officers.

        In an effort to inform the community of the facts surrounding this incident and to ensure
        a high level of transparency, the department requested an independent investigation by
        the Office of Independent Review (OIR). The OIR report was provided to the
        department in late October and immediately distributed to the community via the
        department’s web page.

        Today, I am releasing the department’s response to the OIR report. This document
        reviews each of the OIR recommendations and outlines the department’s actions. As
        you will see, we have implemented 13 of the 14 suggestions from the OIR. It is my
        belief these modifications will serve to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of our
        police department.

        The enormous trust afforded to our police officers by the community members of this
        great city can not be overstated. We recognize and respect that trust, and will never
        take it for granted. It is in keeping with this department’s long standing tradition of
        community policing and openness that I am presenting this response to you.


                                          Sincerely,




                                          CHRISTOPHER O. VICINO
                                          Interim Chief of Police


                                     Excellence ● Innovation. ● Integrity
Table of Contents
Letter to the Community

Introduction                                                                    1

The Office of Independent Review                                                2

OIR Recommendations and Police Responses                                        3

Tactical Issues                                                                 10

Summary and Conclusion                                                          17

Appendix A: Los Angeles District Attorney’s report                              19

Appendix B: Officer Involved Shooting Policy/Procedure                          22

Appendix C: Chief’s Bulletin regarding witness transportation                   29

Appendix D: Mobile Audio Video Policy                                           30

Appendix E: Media Procedure                                                     33

Appendix F: Chief’s Bulletin regarding critical incident debriefing             40

Appendix G: Officer Involved Shooting Protocol (agreement)                      41

Appendix H: Chief’s Bulletin regarding critical incident debriefing (updated)   44
Introduction
On February 19, 2009, two Pasadena police officers conducted a traffic stop on
Mentone Avenue in the City of Pasadena. This encounter resulted in an armed
confrontation between Leroy Barnes, Jr. and police officers. Barnes armed himself with
a handgun and was shot by police. He died at the scene.


In an effort to inform the community of the facts surrounding this incident and to
ensure a high level of transparency, the department requested independent
investigations of this officer involved shooting by the following four agencies1:
     1.    The    Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office (LACDA)
     2.    The    Los Angeles County Department of Coroner (LACDC)
     3.    The    Office of Independent Review (OIR), and;
     4.    The    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)2


The LACDA, LACDC, OIR and the FBI are independent organizations that are not
affiliated with the Pasadena Police Department. The independent investigations by
these organizations provide the public with additional layers of accountability.


The LACDA, Justice System Integrity Division, investigate the criminal aspects of every
officer involved shooting in Los Angeles County. Investigators from this agency respond
to the crime scene when the incident occurs and begin their investigation. They have
access to all investigative files, evidence, and any other material pertinent to the
investigation. On October 21, 2009, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office
issued a decision, concluding the police officers in the Barnes’ case acted lawfully and in
self defense when they used deadly force (see Appendix A).




1
  The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office and Los Angeles County Department of Coroner were asked to investigate this case on
February 19, 2009; the Office of Independent Review was asked to investigate this case on March 4, 2009; and, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation was asked to investigate this case on March 5, 2009.
2
  It is not known when the FBI will release their findings regarding this incident; however, the police department is committed to releasing this
information when it is available.




                                                                         1
The LACDC, Operations Bureau, investigate and determine the cause and manner of all
sudden, violent, or unusual deaths in the county. Investigators from this agency
respond to the scene of an officer involved shooting when a death occurs. They have
access to all investigative files, evidence, and any other material pertinent to the
investigation. In the Barnes’ case, personnel from the LACDC came to the scene and
performed an investigation. At the autopsy, it was determined that Barnes’ sustained 10
or 11 gunshot wounds with six of these being fatal.


The OIR is a civilian advisory group that monitors and ensures that allegations of police
misconduct are thoroughly investigated. On October 23, 2009, the OIR released their
findings regarding the Barnes’ case in a report that included 14 recommendations that
were suggested to improve current Pasadena Police Department practices. The
constructive suggestions provided by the OIR do not mean the department’s practices
were deficient or incorrect in any way.             The department will utilize these
recommendations as a tool to improve.


The Office of Independent Review
Created in 2001 by the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, the OIR was initially
intended to review and investigate cases associated with the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department. Currently, the OIR also contracts with other police agencies to
investigate officer involved shootings, offering recommendations to improve upon
tactics, investigations, training and policies. For further information regarding the OIR,
please refer to their website (http://www.laoir.com/).


The Barnes OIR report was prepared by Chief Attorney Michael Gennaco and Deputy
Chief Attorney Robert Miller over a seven month period. During this time, the OIR had
complete access to all police reports, internal documents, photographs, videos,
interviews and forensic evidence. The OIR interviewed command staff, administrators,
supervisors, detectives, training personnel, and technical staff.




                                             2
The OIR report applauded the department for allowing “unfettered” access and
complete cooperation during the investigation. The OIR stated the level of openness
toward transparency and reform was a testament to the traditions of the Pasadena
Police Department.      This acknowledgment by the OIR affirms the values of the
department and clearly conveys the commitment to a best practices approach in the
delivery of quality police services to the community.


OIR Recommendations and Responses
The OIR report to the City of Pasadena includes 14 recommendations.                     Each
recommendation has been evaluated and the department’s response is included.


Recommendation #1: We recommend that the Department modify its officer-involved shooting
protocols to ensure that training personnel are part of the rollout team (OIR report page 13).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #1:                 The inclusion of training
personnel on the rollout team of an officer involved shooting investigation presents
many challenges. There are personnel who possess expertise in a variety of areas
(weapons, tactics, self-defense, etc.). Knowing which expert to summon to the scene
of an officer involved shooting would require accurately predicting the specific area of
expertise needed before understanding the entire event. Additionally, these experts
would need to be placed on call 24-hours per day, 7-days per week in order to properly
fulfill this recommendation. These issues make this recommendation impractical.


In our effort to locate a best practices approach to this recommendation, the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Long Beach
Police Department, Anaheim Police Department, Glendale Police Department, Torrance
Police Department, and Burbank Police Department were contacted to determine if they
had implemented a similar policy. It was discovered that none of these agencies
included training personnel on the rollout teams when investigating an officer involved




                                              3
shooting. As a result, the department concluded involving training personnel on the roll
out team is not a best practices model.


In addition to recommendation #1, the OIR report listed the following areas of concern
specific to the Barnes’ investigation:
        a.      On-site supervisor did not obtain a public safety statement.
        b.      The command post was placed too close to the scene.
        c.      Body screens should have been used earlier to shield the body.
        d.      Placing a sheet over the body introduced contamination.
        e.      An inaccuracy in one report was missed by reviewing supervisors.
        f.      Vital signs of the deceased were not checked.
        g.      Inaccurate information to the media added to the confusion and
                mistrust by some members of the community.


For the listed areas above (a-g), the department has implemented the following
solutions: (1) created a curriculum for a Crime Scene Response and Management
Course, incorporating each of the areas identified by the OIR; (2) mandated this course
for all sergeants lieutenants, and command staff; and (3) purchased two additional
body screens and placed them inside supervisors’ patrol cars in order to make such
equipment more accessible when needed.


Recommendation #2: We recommend that investigators assigned to conduct interviews of personnel
in officer-involved shooting investigations be trained in the deleterious consequences of leading questions
in these investigations. We further recommend that the investigators’ supervisors be tasked with
reviewing interviews of officers involved in shootings to ensure that such a practice does not occur (OIR
report page 18).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #2: The Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office is providing training for police personnel who are assigned to
investigate officer involved shooting cases to increase their level of interview skills.
Additionally, the officer involved shooting procedure has been altered to increase
supervisory oversight of these interviews.              This procedure directs sergeants and/or
lieutenants to periodically monitor and review on-going interviews of victims, witnesses,
and suspects of officer involved shooting investigations (see Appendix B).




                                                    4
Recommendation #3: We recommend that the Department formalize its protocols for promoting the
cooperation of witnesses while acknowledging their rights under the prevailing circumstances. One option
is to use a form and waiver system that clarifies the status of witnesses and their options about traveling
to the station to be interviewed. We further recommend that investigators assigned to officer-involved
investigations be debriefed on the investigation’s purpose and instructed to refrain from using certain
interrogative techniques in interviewing potential witnesses to the incident (OIR report page 19).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #3:                                    A Chief’s Bulletin3 has been
implemented requiring police personnel to obtain consent from a witness prior to
transporting him or her to the police station by utilizing either video or audio recording
methods (see Appendix C). A video or audio recording offers a more complete
understanding of the conversation that occurred between the involved witness and
police. After a shooting or other serious crime, important witnesses are often
transported to the police station for further questioning. The removal of such witnesses
from the crime scene reduces the level of influence and intimidation they undergo by
others who are present, thereby, increasing their level of participation, truthfulness, and
safety.


Recommendation #4: We recommend that the Department modify its officer-involved shooting
investigative protocols so that interviewers routinely use diagrams to obtain a permanent account of the
sequential positioning of involved personnel and civilians (OIR report page 20).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #4: Utilizing a diagram of the crime
scene for interviews is not operationally possible. Personnel involved in a shooting
incident, along with witnesses and suspects are usually interviewed within hours.
Detailed diagrams of these crime scenes are not typically available for at least one week
due to the complicated nature of the crime, necessary detail, and allotted number of
personnel assigned to these duties. As an option to this recommendation, digital photos
will be taken from a police helicopter to provide the most accurate and timely
reproduction of the crime scene for the purpose of identifying the sequential positioning
of the suspects, witnesses and police officers during the incident. Investigators utilizing
these photos of the crime scene will be able to have witnesses mark their positions and


3
    A chief’s bulletin may be an information item or directive once it is issued.




                                                                            5
movement directly on the photos. These photos will be utilized during the interview
process and become part of the investigative case file (see Appendix B).


Recommendation #5: We recommend that PPD investigators eliminate any reference to the
Grossman/Lewinski constructs and focus their interviews on learning the involved officers’ observations,
positioning, actions, decision making and state of mind using basic open-ended and fact neutral who,
what, when, where, how and why questions (OIR report page 22).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #5: The Grossman/Lewinski force
doctrine protocols have been used by Professional Standards Unit investigators to try
and determine a police officer’s state of mind and his or her level of perceived threat
from the beginning of the incident until conclusion. This practice only occurred for
administrative interviews. After a thorough review of this tool, this practice has been
eliminated.


Recommendation #6: The Department should develop consistent protocols on whether, prior to being
interviewed, involved personnel will be shown video capturing the incident. One possible protocol for the
Department to consider would be to interview the involved personnel during a walkthrough of the event,
allow them to view the video, and then follow up by asking if the video caused them to refresh their
recollection about the incident (OIR report page 23).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #6: Police personnel are allowed to
review the recordings that are captured by the Mobile Audio Video (MAV) device that is
installed in each police car. This is true for any case that occurs and has been a
consistent practice since the installation of the MAV. Thus far, officers have only utilized
this option for vehicle pursuits in order to refresh their memory about the incident in
order to prepare accurate police reports (see Appendix D).


Recommendation #7: We recommend that the Department continue its commitment to transparency
in providing timely information to the public, but redouble its efforts to ensure that such information is
completely accurate before doing so (OIR report page 24).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #7:                      On two separate occasions,
inaccurate information was given to the media regarding this case. To keep this from
happening again, an updated media procedure has been implemented that will provide



                                                    6
both accurate and timely information to the public in the aftermath of an officer
involved shooting (see Appendix E). This procedure will immediately confirm if an
officer involved shooting has occurred and the level of injuries. However, it will disallow
comment on the facts of the investigation for the first four hours following the incident.
This time span will allow police officials to properly analyze and vet the incoming
information.


The procedure provides media updates every four hours until the conclusion of the field
investigation at the crime scene. Informing the public on important matters is an
essential aspect of community policing. However, a rush to provide information should
never outweigh the mandate to ensure the information is accurate.


Recommendation #8: We recommend that internal supervisory protocols be developed to ensure that
the administrative presentation to command staff initiate identification of tactical issues, that use of
diagrams, trajectory of bullets, location of casings and other forensic evidence be used to assist in
explaining the positioning of individuals at various times during the evidence, that the reference to “force
science” issues be eliminated, and that the presenter has a mastery not only of the presentation itself but
the complete investigative file so that questions raised by command staff can be adequately addressed
(OIR page 26).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #8: Personnel assigned to conduct
the executive briefing to command staff in the aftermath of an officer involved shooting
will undergo a rigorous preparation process at the direction of the Administrative
Services Section lieutenant. This process will include, but not be limited to, a mock
presentation, a review of the material to be presented to a member of the City
Attorney’s office, and a peer review by members of the section.                           The assigned
presenter will focus on the facts of the investigation and the evidence present at the
scene, along with the interviews of victims, witnesses, and suspects. If the presenter is
unable to answer a question posed by command staff, he or she will provide a time and
date when the answer will be provided.




                                                     7
This recommendation also included the elimination of the Grossman/Lewinsky force
doctrine. This issue was already identified in the OIR report as recommendation #5.
Thus, it is a repetitive recommendation and is not mentioned in this response.


Recommendation #9: In order for the Department to benefit from past shooting incidents, it should
ensure enforcement of its officer involved shooting investigation retention policy so that such
investigations are preserved at least throughout the career of each officer. In addition, the administrative
review should routinely closely examine past officer-involved shootings or other relevant history of
involved officers to identify any commonalities of tactical decision making and decisions to deploy deadly
force (OIR page 27).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #9: Every officer involved shooting
investigation is retained indefinitely; however, this has never been codified in policy.
The officer involved shooting policy has been altered to incorporate language that
retains these investigations for the duration of the officer’s career (see Appendix B). In
the Barnes’ case, a prior shooting investigation from 1998 involving one of the officers
was not located. As a result, the OIR concluded there was no comparison being done
between a former shooting by an officer and a recent shooting. This assumption is
incorrect. It has been a practice to always review prior shooting cases when
determining the policy and operational implications of the shooting under review.


Because a missing file from an officer involved shooting was identified in the OIR
report, an audit was conducted of these files. The results of this audit revealed 47 of
the 48 cases, dating back to 1990, were appropriately retained. The only investigative
file not located was the same one identified by OIR. The audit was completed by the
Professional Standards Unit. The department is researching the possibility of saving
such files electronically in order to preserve and easily access them in the future.




                                                     8
Recommendation #10: We recommend that in officer-involved shooting reviews, training staff be
involved in the identification of tactical issues to be presented by Professional Standards investigators and
be part of the subsequent discussion and assessment of the tactical decision making by involved
personnel (OIR page 28).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #10: The officer involved shooting
procedure has been amended, assigning training personnel as part of the internal
review process in order to discuss and assess all aspects of the incident (see Appendix
B). The issue of involving training personnel in an officer involved shooting investigation
was previously identified in the OIR report as recommendation #1.


Recommendation #11: We recommend that each member of the executive review team be provided
access to the officer involved shooting investigative file prior to the executive review (OIR page 28).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #11:                           The Administrative Services
Section will provide command staff personnel a copy of the entire investigative file at
least one week in advance of the executive review process (see Appendix B).


Recommendation #12:           The Department should require that a timely and robust action plan be
devised in every officer involved shooting. The plan should address issues that may have presented
themselves in each of the following areas: shooting scene/rollout response, investigative issues,
individual accountability (potential violations of policy), tactical issues, supervisory issues, training issues,
equipment issues, and information to the public. In addition to incorporating different strategies and
methods to address each issue ranging from policy development to discipline, training, and counseling,
the action plan should ensure that each impacted unit or individual where issues have been identified is
briefed about any concerns raised during the executive review process. The Department should further
ensure that an effective and timely feedback loop be devised so that the executive review
recommendations incorporated into the action plan are implemented (OIR page 30).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #12: An electronic review form and
tracking system has been developed and implemented that will capture all issues
identified during the review process. This will include action steps and assigned
personnel for follow up with due dates for completion. These action steps will be
reviewed every 30-days, or earlier, at the direction of the Chief of Police or Deputy
Chief of Police, until each item is resolved or implemented. When complete, the review
will be signed off by the Chief of Police. To ensure follow up and accountability the
review will become part of the administrative investigative file.



                                                       9
Recommendation #13:          We recommend that the Department require that a training bulletin be
devised for every officer involved shooting that addresses issues identified through the review process
(OIR page 31).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #13: Prior to this recommendation,
the department initiated a debriefing protocol for police personnel described in a Chief’s
Bulletin (see Appendix F). This bulletin has been amended to include the creation of a
training update (see Appendix H). This will be circulated to all members of the
department to provide better communication regarding the facts of such a major case.


Recommendation #14:          The Department should develop protocols that provide a mechanism to
carefully assess the status and assignment of officers involved in officer-involved shootings during the
pending investigation (OIR page 32).


Police Department Response to Recommendation #14:                       In collaboration with the
Pasadena Police Sergeant’s Association and the Pasadena Police Officer’s Association, a
new procedure was created to guide the police department in the assessment and
status of police officers involved in a shooting incident (see Appendix G).


Tactical Issues
Police tactics are situational, as every contact on the street is different. The dynamics of
tactics and force are fluid and can unfold within seconds into a life-or-death
confrontation. In most cases, officers are instantaneously reacting to the actions of the
suspect. The United States Supreme Court has determined the reasonable standard of a
particular use of force by a police officer must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer at the scene of the incident, 4 recognizing that officers are forced to
make split-second decisions about the level of force to be used in a particular situation.
The Supreme Court made it clear in their decision that hindsight is inappropriate when
attempting to judge an officers use of force. As the tactics in the Barnes’ case are
evaluated, this Supreme Court standard of reasonableness must be considered.
4
    Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-387 (1989).




                                                      10
The OIR report (pages 32-38) provided an analysis of the tactics used by the police
officers in the Barnes’ case.         This portion of the report analyzed six specific areas,
without offering any recommendations. They are as follows:
       a.   The   officers’ approach to the vehicle
       b.   The   first shot
       c.   The   subsequent shots
       d.   The   firearm
       e.   The   perceived and articulated threat for the subsequent shots
       f.   The   reasonable analysis


Additional aspects and perspectives of the tactics used by the police officers in the
Barnes case are important to understand when considering the OIR tactical analysis.


            a.      The officers’ approach to the vehicle


According to the OIR report, the police officers used sound tactics when they initially
stopped the car, but “when the officers approached the car together, their procedure
was not as clear, consistent, or focused”. OIR investigators concluded this for three
reasons:
                    1. The officers noticed a person in the back seat who disappeared;
                    2. The officers did not initiate a felony car stop or at least order the
                       occupants out of the car at gunpoint
                    3. One of the officers removed his handgun, pointing it downward in a
                       ready position, while the other did not.

When the officers in this case made the decision to stop the vehicle, it was for an
infraction. They saw the car driving on the wrong side of the road. This is an offense
where only a ticket may be issued and an arrest cannot be made. While it is certainly
dangerous for the officers to have someone in the car disappear from their view, the
necessity of a felony car stop or ordering the occupants out of the vehicle at gun point
is an unreasonable consideration based on what the officers knew at that point in time.5


5
    Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-387 (1989).




                                                      11
On any given traffic stop, the driver or passenger may disappear from the officer’s view
for a variety of reasons. Consider the act of removing one’s registration from the glove
box or reaching for a wallet or purse that is on the floorboard. When a driver does
either of these, they may disappear from the view of the officer. If the department
accepted the suggestion from the OIR report, it would be common practice for officers
to order persons out of their car at gunpoint during traffic stops. This is not an
acceptable solution for the department or the community.


In regards to one officer approaching the car with his handgun drawn while the other
did not, the OIR report fails to discuss the differences between a “contact officer” and a
“cover officer” during traffic stops by a two-person patrol car. The driver of a two-
person patrol car is the designated contact officer while the passenger is the cover
officer. The contact officer’s responsibility is to approach from the driver’s side of the
suspect’s car and speak with the driver. This is the officer that generally issues a ticket.
The cover officer’s responsibility is to take a position of advantage on the passenger
side of the suspect’s vehicle, protecting the approach of the contact officer. It is the
cover officer who would most commonly draw his or her handgun during a traffic stop,
as he or she is expected to provide greater safety for the contact officer. This is a basic
concept for any law enforcement agency and very pertinent to this discussion. The
officers performing the traffic stop in the Barnes’ case made the approach differently
based on their responsibilities as “contact officer” and “cover officer”, not because they
were practicing inappropriate tactics as denoted in the OIR report.


OIR investigators stated the officers placed themselves in greater jeopardy when they
opened the rear doors of the car, causing them to focus on Barnes, and ignoring the
driver. OIR explained the engine of the car was allowed to remain running while Barnes
shouted to the female driver to accelerate and drive away, thus, placing the officers in
greater danger and a position of disadvantage. It is suggested by OIR the officers had
the option of backing off and reassessing the situation.




                                            12
In response to the observations by OIR, the department has created a scenario-based
training regiment for its patrol officers beginning in February 2010. Officers will be
placed in high stress situations in order to increase their level of tactics and responses
in a variety of situations. This program will provide 10 hours of training every other
month, 60 hours annually per officer. It will focus on field tactics, including but not
limited to, traffic stops, building searches, less lethal weapon deployment, and other
high risk occurrences in order to increase safety for both police officers and community
members. As the best professional sports teams practice their plays over and over
again, so will Pasadena police officers as they undergo this new training program.


      b.     The first shot


The OIR report described the first shot fired by officer 2 (cover officer) as “necessary
and justified under the circumstances”. The report praised officer 2 for moving away
from the suspect after he fired the first shot, “creating distance and seeking cover”
from the suspect. The placement of the first shot is not described in the OIR report, but
it is critical and should be understood when considering the tactics used by officer 2.
The evidence from the Los Angeles County Department of Coroner concluded this shot
was fired downward, striking Barnes in the abdomen. This downward shot selection
ensured the safety of the driver who was still seated in the front seat and officer 1 who
was directly across from officer 2. In a moment of extreme stress and split second
decision making, officer 2 displayed clarity of thought, decisiveness, and good judgment
by firing his weapon in a direction where only the suspect would be hit.


      c.     The subsequent shots


The officers fired a total of eleven shots. Officer 2 fired four shots in 6.4 seconds.
Officer 1 fired seven shots in 1.8 seconds. The shot sequence, time elapsed and
identified officer is summarized in the table below. The time elapsed of the shots fired
were calculated by utilizing the digital video of the incident. The video speed is 29.97



                                           13
frames per second. While watching the video in slow motion, the frames may be
counted after the officers’ fire their weapons. Thus, time elapsed between each shot
may be accurately calculated. This table is most crucial when one considers the
“reasonableness analysis” section of the OIR report.


 Shot #               Seconds Elapsed    Officer #
                      Since Last Shot

 One                  —                  2
 Two                  2.4 secs.          2
 Three                1.2                1
 Four                 0.2                1
 Five                 0.5                1
 Six                  0.3                1
 Seven                0.3                1
 Eight                0.2                1
 Nine                 0.2                2
 Ten                  0.1                1
 Eleven               1.0                2
OIR report, page 9.




           d.         The firearm


The OIR report concluded there was a handgun next to Barnes’ body at the crime
scene. The report stated the gun was loaded but it had not been fired.


           e.         The perceived and articulated threat for the subsequent shots


According to the OIR report, the involved officers believed Barnes was a continuing
threat to them. The OIR said each officer continued to fire until Barnes was no longer a
threat. As summarized by the table above, officer 2 fired the first shot then additional
shots with delays of 2.4 seconds, 2.4 seconds and 1.1 seconds, respectively. This officer
fired, fired, retreated, fired, retreated, and then fired his last shot. It is clear from his
actions, time span between shots and tactics utilized that he is continually assessing the




                                                     14
threat, firing throughout the event as he feared the suspect. The actions of this officer
matched the statements he articulated to investigators.


After retreating from the suspect’s car, officer 1 fired in rapid succession until he felt
the threat was stopped. As summarized in the table above, officer 1 fired his shots with
delays of 1.2 seconds, .2 seconds. .5 seconds, .3 seconds, .3 seconds, .2 seconds, and
then .3 seconds. This officer retreated, fired, fired, fired, fired, fired, fired, and then
fired his last shot. The actions of this officer matched the statements he articulated to
investigators.


In the Barnes case, the involved officers’ shots were compatible with the threat they
both articulated. Officer 1 fired rapidly through the entire event and Officer 2 fired at a
slower pace, but through the entire event. They both perceived the threat and fired
their weapons until they did not perceive the threat anymore.


If an officer is in fear of his or her life, or fears that someone’s life may be in jeopardy,
and such threats are eminent, the officer may use deadly force to stop the threat.6 The
use of deadly force by an officer, or the need for an officer to fire additional shots, must
be judged by the individual officer’s state of mind and the threat he or she perceives.
For a police department to devise a policy that governs the use of force in any other
way would be outside existing law and place officers in great jeopardy. Officers must be
allowed the discretion that is prescribed to them by law.7


           f.      The reasonableness analysis


The Barnes’ incident was viewed by the department as one continuous episode. The
OIR report discussed the possibility of viewing this as either one or two shooting
incidents. However, with the entire sequence only lasting 6.4 seconds and

6
    California Penal Code, Section 197.
7
    Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-387 (1989).




                                                      15
understanding the idea that each officer must be viewed independent of the other, it is
hard to imagine anyone believing this case is anything but a singular shooting.


When any suspect is shot by police, a thorough investigation and explanation must be
given to the community. This was particularly important in the Barnes case as many of
the shots struck him in the back. As the OIR report stated, officers shot at the suspect
because they believed he was a threat. They continued firing, even though he was lying
on the ground, because they continued to view him as a threat. Officers are trained to
shoot at “center mass” (the upper torso) as it provides the largest target. In this case,
they focused on Barnes’ back area as it was the only center mass target available to
them.


When analyzing the shots that struck Barnes, a review of the table created by the OIR
is of great importance. Based upon the LACDC report, the different caliber of guns fired
by the officers, the position of the suspect as it corresponded to the officer’s position,
along with statements from officers and witnesses, it may be accurately theorized the
first possible shot that struck Barnes’ back was number “Four”, and the last possible
shot that struck Barnes’ back is “Ten”.


 Shot #               Seconds Elapsed   Officer #
                      Since Last Shot
 One                  —                 2
 Two                  2.4 secs.         2
 Three                1.2               1
 Four                 0.2               1
 Five                 0.5               1
 Six                  0.3               1
 Seven                0.3               1
 Eight                0.2               1
 Nine                 0.2               2
 Ten                  0.1               1
 Eleven               1.0               2
OIR report, page 9.




                                                    16
Considering there was only 1.5 seconds between these shots, the officers may have
been physically unable to stop firing by the time they realized the threat ended. The
following excerpt is from a study of officer involved shootings. The issues of reaction
time should be taken into consideration when one reviews this case or future officer
involved shootings.


          Scientific and practical limitations governing human performance must be
          taken into account when evaluating an officer’s performance. Reaction
          time includes both the processing of information as well as the time it
          takes to physically respond. In a shooting scenario, processing takes
          about four times longer than the actual response phase. This applies to
          both the initial processing of information that ultimately drives the officer’s
          actions as well as the processing of any change in information intended to
          cease the officer’s current course of action.8


Summary and Conclusion
The OIR report has provided the department with several recommendations that will
serve to improve training, policies, and investigations, and create greater transparency
to the public. As a result, the City of Pasadena may utilize the OIR in future officer
involved shooting cases when a death occurs and/or at the discretion of the City
Manger or the Chief of Police.


The department has implemented 13 of the 14 recommendations. However, since the
recommendation that was rejected is nearly identical in nature to one of those
accepted, all aspects of the suggestions from the OIR should be considered as utilized.
All of the impacted policies and/or procedural manuals that require updates because of
these recommendations have been completed. These are located in the appendices of
this report.


Enhanced training for personnel will be conducted through the purchase of a new
firearms simulator for approximately $75,000. Currently, there are two companies that

8
 Honig, Audrey, PhD. and Lewinski, William J. “A Survey of the Research on Human Factors related to Lethal Force Encounters: Implications
for Law Enforcement Training, Tactics, and Testimony”, Law Enforcement Executive Forum, 2008 8 (4), page 140-141.




                                                                   17
manufacturer this type of equipment and they have been scheduled to complete
product demonstrations to the department during the month of February 2010. With
consideration for the procurement process, delivery, installation and training, it is
projected this new equipment will be available on or before June 1, 2010.


Additional training and community engagement is planned for members of the patrol
section. Beginning in February 2010, officers will undergo a 10-hour scenario training
every other month under the direction of the department’s Training Unit and Field
Training Officers. The scenarios will imitate high risk situations, sometimes under
simulated gunfire, which will allow officers to increase their tactical awareness and
better understand variable responses. During non-training months, patrol officers will
participate in a 10-hour community day. This will be a regular work day where an entire
patrol team will be assigned community policing projects in order to enhance police-
community relationships. These projects will range from working at the Police Activities
League (PAL) with local students, walking foot beat in a local business area or
neighborhood, to working with neighborhood associations to fight crime and
neighborhood decay.


The department is committed to improving its internal mechanisms and strengthening
its relationship with the community. The implementation of the OIR report underscores
the value placed on these two important ideals. Moving forward, the department will
continue to embrace transparency with the community, along with its long standing
community policing principles in order to properly fight crime and make neighborhoods
safe.




                                          18
APPENDIX A




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20
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APPENDIX B




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23
24
25
26
27
28
 APPENDIX C




APPENDIX D (Mobile Audio Video Policy)




                                  29
APPENDIX D




             30
31
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APPENDIX E




             33
34
35
36
37
38
39
APPENDIX F




             40
APPENDIX G




             41
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APPENDIX H




             44