Deontology for the Judiciary and the Proposals for Ethic Codes : towards a common Position of MEDEL ?(Colloquium Bremen 3/2004) Thesis 1 MEDEL has several reasons to discuss „Ethics“: a. In 2002 the UN and the EU presented their Rules for professional conduct in the judiciary. We have to decide whether or not take position to them. It might be better to ride the tiger (for quoting Christoph Strecker – or was it Mao ?). And much more important : b. The post–war modell of the rule of law in a social state is eroding in many western european countries. It is subject to to a strange pression for „modernization“ and „economization“ whose historic aims and models of society do not make a very civilized impression to me. In the newcoming EU-countries the governments of the „old members“ (and America !) send groups of experts to develop the rule of law there. This interests the judiciary, it seems necessary that she does her part to defend and re-define the rule of law in a social state in this century against a crude „modernization“ and „effectivation“ process (as far as possible respect to her binding to the – new - laws). This goes against Berlusconi, Haider or Perben, but it has much more depth than actual (bad) politics.
Thesis 2 The judiciary can oppose an erosion of the (said „ineffective“) rule of law only in cooperation with the civil society – what our italian colleagues can vividly describe. For the citizens the rule of law in a social state (as constitutional, i.e. legal, orientation !) is what the prosecutors and the judges show them. Citizens will only defend the principle if it is credible for them, convincing and if they trust in justice - beyond any technical aspects (these are our problems). We have to let them make good experience with the whole of the courts, with the opening times and informations, the letters they get, the timing and the contents of the procedures, they way they feel treated – especially if they do not „win“ their cases or if they get punished or subject to extradition, p.e. In these occasions „justice“ has to be at least understandable. For the points that can be influenced by magistrates (not. p.e. buildings, number of personnel etc.) we are responsable, no one else.
For the german situation p.e. I see deficits in the way many judges and prosecutors explain their procedures and decisions to the interested parties and their representatives (and not only to colleagues, presidents etc). They seem to have „contact-difficulties“ on this side. It is held „unprofessional“ (!) .
This is not because we all want to be „nice“ and graceful (!), but because the citizens any way are subject to our power and because we decide „In the Name of the People“.
Thesis 3 We have to discuss, whether such „codices“ (or the discussion on them...) help to reach the aim (confidence in the judiciary), what risks and advantages we see in them. What consequences are likely to occur if MEDEL rejected the projects ? Could we suggest other means to optimate the work of the judiciary in these times with regard to the citizens ? Starting with the risks : H.-Ernst Böttcher wrote in an e-mail „the governing ethics are always the ethics of the governing“, so expressing the idea that „Codices“ could help to condition magistrates, aiming on their „homogenization“ (to political aims ?) instead of pluralism. They could threaten indipendence in its whole, though they normally underline it on the paper.
It may not be casually that the executive powers (incl. CCJE and UN organs) started the discussion on ethics in the judiciary (see the french example, text 3. and 4. of the Docu). The CCJE-Document (text 1a. and 1.b. of the Docu) shows the dilemma : while it underlines in ist first part, that „principles of conduct should remain independent of the disciplinary rules applicable“ (p. 9 sub 48 i), it formulates in the second part (B., p. 10) rules on the criminal, civil and disciplinary liability of judges (they always forget the prosecutors – we should not do so). There is a risk to take part in the creation of ethically „overformed“ disciplinary rules. Franco Ippolito (text 6 Docu) sets out the difficulty to avoid a „Codex“ becoming a standard model for the disciplinary – instead of legal norms. But in precise terms we should have clear that in difference to rules of behaviour an ethical codex is not a disciplinary instrument. Not fulfilling the model cannot be punished by law, but only infractions of penal, administrative or disciplinary norms (being subject to the reserve of law). There is no difference for magistrates in respect to all other citizens (exept special penal norms or such of civil liability that are not really interesting in our discussion). In these terms, an ethical codex describes the „ethical maximum“, defined by judicial organs, whereas the disciplinary describes the „ethical minimum“, defined by administration. If we participate in the discussion, we should try to avoid the mutation of one in the other p.e. by stressing the following items (see text 13 Docu/Canada,1998)
Formulating an „ethical maximum“ does not preclude reasonable disagreements or imply that departures from them warrant disapproval of what nature ever. The priciples are advisory in nature. Their goals are to assist judges with the difficult ethical and professional issues which confront them and to assist members of the public to better understand the judicial role. They are not and shall not be used as a code or a list of prohibited behaviours. They do not set out standards defining judicial misconduct.
On the other hand : I cannot see that rational rules about judicial duties per se threaten indipendence – if they are true and good and not combined with the lightest idea of sanction. This would alter their substance. Ethical orientation requests freedom of will and self-binding decisions. For their nature it is so impossible to implement ethical ideas by any sort of punishment (see Ippolito, loc.cit., text 6/Docu). And why should we rest on the „ethical minimum“ respect to the citizens ? Thesis 4 We certainly know and observe lots and lots of ethical principles, they compare for example in the fundamental rights and in many laws, much older than the CCJE or Banglore papers (see the appendices to those text 1.a. and 1.b. Docu).Those principles need the eyes and hands and brains of the „justice workers“. I recognize one problem of the discussion in the existence of lots of wellknown rules (sometimes of a certain banality) - of what origin ever – and a reality that does not fit to them. To identify the points that stand at the origins of this difference could be – for me – the sense of the debate, avoiding to get lost in a jungle of singular „prescriptions“ (see the examples in the Bangalore paper, text 2 Docu). The common law systems seem to suffer under such irritating overregulation, even of issues of only local or temporary interest and conditions. Maybe we will not reach consens in all questions – for example the political engagement of magistrates and its limits. Some eastern europe costitutions literally forbid to engage in political parties (due to bad historic experience) or to release comments on „non-judicial“ politics, in common law countries we can even find restrictions of the right of election for judges (prosecutors too ?). This depends on the question how far the separation of powers
is driven – to the private life or with respect to the office, the magistrates as citizens or as a separate group ? Thesis 5 I suggest to discuss along the order that appears in the „Conclusions on the standards of conduct“ of the CCJE and to reject any combination with liability or disciplinary ideas. (the english version is not available as normal file copy, but only can be read in the internet version (pdf), at least for my capacities, sorry)
3°) Conclusions sur les normes de conduite 49. Le CCJE est d’avis : i) que des principes déontologiques devraient guider l’action des juges, ii) que ces principes devraient proposer aux juges des lignes de conduite leur permettant de résoudre les difficultés auxquelles ils sont confrontés au regard de leur indépendance et de leur impartialité, iii) que ces principes devraient émaner des juges eux-mêmes et rester distincts du système de discipline des juges, iv) qu’il serait souhaitable que soient mis en place dans chaque pays un ou des organes ou une ou des personnes au sein du corps judiciaire ayant un rôle consultatif de conseil pour les juges confrontés à un problème touchant à la déontologie professionnelle ou ayant une hésitation sur la compatibilité d’une activité privée avec leur position de juge. 50. Le CCJE est d’avis en ce qui concerne les règles de conduite de chaque juge: i) chaque juge devrait chercher par tous les moyens à maintenir l’indépendance judiciaire tant sur le plan institutionnel que sur le plan individuel, ii) qu’il devrait adopter un comportement intègre dans ses fonctions et dans sa vie privée, iii) que le juge devrait en toutes circonstances adopter un comportement à la fois impartial et qui apparaît comme tel, iv) qu’il devrait s’acquitter de sa tâche sans favoritisme, un préjugé effectif ou apparent, ou prévention, v) que ses décisions devraient être prises en fonction de toutes considérations pertinentes pour l’application des règles appropriées de droit, en excluant toute considération étrangère ; vi) qu’il devrait manifester la considération voulue à toutes les personnes participant à l’activité juridictionnelle ou affectées par celle-ci, vii) qu’il devrait exercer ses fonctions dans le respect de l’égalité des parties, en évitant tout parti pris et toute discrimination, en maintenant l’équilibre entre les parties et en veillant au respect du principe de contradiction, viii) qu’il fasse preuve de réserve dans ses relations avec les médias, qu’il préserve son indépendance et son impartialité en s’abstenant de toute exploitation personnelle de ses relations éventuelles avec les médias et de commentaires injustifiés sur les dossiers dont il a la charge, ix) qu’il devrait veiller à maintenir un haut niveau de compétence professionnelle, x) qu’il fasse preuve d’une conscience professionnelle élevée et d’une diligence répondant à l’exigence d’un jugement prononcé dans un délai raisonnable, xi) qu’il consacre l’essentiel de son temps de travail à ses activités juridictionnelles, y compris des activités connexes, xii) qu’il s’abstienne de toute activité politique de nature à compromettre son indépendance et à porter atteinte à son image d’impartialité.
Sabine Stuth, Admin. Trib. Bremen/Germany, Febr. 2004