Digitally manipulating memory: Effects of doctored videos and imagination in distorting beliefs and memories

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Digitally manipulating memory: Effects of doctored videos and imagination in distorting beliefs and memories Powered By Docstoc
					Memory & Cognition
2009, 37 (4), 414-424
doi:10.3758/MC.37.4.414




                               Digitally manipulating memory:
                          Effects of doctored videos and imagination
                              in distorting beliefs and memories
                                             RobeRt A. NAsh ANd KimbeRley A. WAde
                                                University of Warwick, Coventry, England
                                                                   ANd

                                                          d. stepheN liNdsAy
                                       University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada

                In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fic-
             tional events and have been exposed to false evidence that indicates that the fictional events occurred. But what
             are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction?
             In the present study, subjects observed and copied various simple actions; then they viewed doctored videos that
             suggested that they had performed extra actions and they imagined performing some of those and some other ac-
             tions. Subjects returned 2 weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient
             to cause belief and memory distortions; in combination, they appeared to have additive or even superadditive
             effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and
             clinical applications of these findings.



   Memory scientists have amply demonstrated the malle-                judgments by relying on environmental cues (e.g., official
ability of people’s memories for nonrecent (e.g., Lindsay,             records and documentation; see Wade & Garry, 2005) and
Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004; E. F. Loftus & Pick-                 various qualitative and quantitative cues from memory
rell, 1995) and recent (e.g., E. F. Loftus & Palmer, 1974;             itself. For instance, real memories typically contain more
Thomas & Loftus, 2002) events. Although methodologies                  sensory information (such as smells, sounds, and visual
have varied from study to study, a substantial number of               details) and more contextual cues (information about the
false memory experiments show that the act of imagining                time and location) than do imagined events (Johnson,
is key to false memory development (Goff & Roediger,                   Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Real memories often also
1998; Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Mazzoni &                      contain details that act as a marker of their veracity; for in-
Memon, 2003). Yet current research suggests that fabri-                stance, one would expect a real memory of a conversation
cated evidence can produce a similar response (Garry &                 with a friend to contain auditory records of the friend’s
Wade, 2005; Nash & Wade, 2009; Wade, Garry, Read,                      voice rather than another person’s voice. However, source-
& Lindsay, 2002). In the present study, we examine how                 monitoring errors can occur when internally generated
imagination and false evidence work individually and in                images are rich with memory-like characteristics such as
combination to produce false beliefs and false memories.               vivid sensory detail and event-consistent information.

Source Monitoring                                                      Laboratory-Based False Memories
   Johnson and colleagues’ source-monitoring framework                    Memory scientists have developed numerous paradigms
(SMF) can be used to make predictions about a wide range               for examining false memory phenomena in the labora-
of false memory phenomena (Johnson, Hashtroudi, &                      tory (for partial reviews, see Pezdek & Lam, 2007; Wade
Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Lindsay, 2008).                   et al., 2007). Some studies have distorted memories for
According to the SMF, remembering is an inferential pro-               nonautobiographical experiences (e.g., Deese/Roediger–
cess: People must attribute mental experiences, such as                McDermott [DRM] studies, Roediger & McDermott, 1995),
thoughts, images, and feelings, to particular origins (al-             whereas others have distorted memories for self-involving,
though, typically, such attributions are made quickly and              moderately significant autobiographical experiences (e.g.,
without conscious deliberation). False memories arise                  Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007). The latter literature reveals
when mental events from one source are misattributed                   two techniques that are commonly used to induce false
to another (erroneous) source. People can make source                  memories: encouraging individuals to imagine counterfac-


                                                   K. A. Wade, k.a.wade@warwick.ac.uk


© 2009 The Psychonomic Society, Inc.                               414
                                                                               DoctoreD ViDeos anD imagination             415

tual events and presenting individuals with false evidence         fect was that the photo enabled subjects to form vivid and
that implies that the counterfactual events occurred.              perceptually detailed images of their teachers, their class-
   With respect to imagination, we know that merely imag-          mates, and themselves that could be combined with prod-
ining a fictitious event can lead people to report that they re-   ucts of imagination to create compelling false memories.
member doing something that they never did (Garry, Man-               False evidence may also foster false memories by in-
ning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Hyman & Pe
				
DOCUMENT INFO
Description: In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fictional events and have been exposed to false evidence that indicates that the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? In the present study, subjects observed and copied various simple actions; then they viewed doctored videos that suggested that they had performed extra actions and they imagined performing some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned 2 weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause belief and memory distortions; in combination, they appeared to have additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical applications of these findings. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
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