Memo on the Upcoming Defense Ministerial of the Americas
Joy Olson, Gaston Chillier, and Laurie Freeman Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) August 2004 The context for the Sixth Hemispheric Defense Minister’s meeting in November is one in which the definitions of security and terrorism, and the very role of the military as an institution, are all in play. The OAS has broadened its definition of security threats to include social, economic, environmental, and public health problems; while the U.S. military is promoting a nebulous definition of what constitutes a potential terrorist threat. There is no question that a new hemispheric security agenda is much needed; however, the way the concepts of security and terrorism are evolving could redefine the very nature of the military’s role in the Americas in the decades to come. We believe that these concepts and redefinitions should be the subject of serious civil society debate. This brief memo describes a few of the issues that we hope will be raised and debated both before and during the November defense ministerial meeting. The intersection of the new hemispheric definition of security with the U.S. redefinition of counter-terrorism as the number one priority for the U.S. military could seriously weaken democracies in the region – without effectively addressing the problems of security. In particular, we believe that the upcoming Defense Ministerial should avoid expanding the mission of the militaries of the Americas. Failure to do so will undo important advances regarding the role of the military in a democracy and its relation of subordination to elected civilian authorities, as well as be an obstacle for efforts to democratize the public security systems in countries throughout the region. Risks Inherent in the New OAS Definition of Security Last October, the OAS Special Conference on Security adopted a new concept of hemispheric security that is “multidimensional” and includes traditional as well as new threats and challenges to the security of the states of the hemisphere. This concept, as explained in the Declaration on Security in the Americas, expanded the traditional concept of security to one that incorporates new and non-traditional threats, including political, economic, social, health, and environment concerns. At the same time, the Declaration recognized states’ sovereignty by allowing them the flexibility to determine how they will respond to this new scenario. This definition has been praised for moving from a vision of security limited to the protection of the state from external threat, to one that sees security as more than just the physical integrity of a nation but the overall well-being of its citizens and the environment.
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The Declaration describes the following as security threats: “[E]xtreme poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors of the population, which also affect stability and democracy[…,] erode… social cohesion and undermine… the security of states; natural and man-made disasters, HIV/AIDS and other diseases, other health risks, and environmental degradation; trafficking in persons; attacks to cyber security; the potential for damage to arise in the event of an accident or incident during the maritime transport of potentially hazardous materials, including petroleum and radioactive materials and toxic waste; and the possibility of access, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists.”i Under this new definition of security, what were once considered social, economic or health problems and did not invoke a security response, have now been defined as security threats. Where there were once fairly clear lines between “public security” (policing) and “national security” (protection of the state from external threats), the new concept has left open the question of what state institutions are now responsible for combating security threats. Important achievements were made during the Conference in order to differentiate the types of approaches states should use to respond to the above-listed threats, and the new OAS framework, if applied in a stable, more equitable, and fully democratic hemisphere in which power is more balanced among states, has strong potential for the future. Nonetheless, given the regional and global context in which this new system could be implemented, the OAS did not fully take into account the risk that the multidimensional security threats will be addressed using the more “traditional” (military and law enforcement) responses. Because the OAS definition is now the operative security definition for the hemisphere, great caution should be used in how it is applied in order to avoid the securitization of political and social issues. Particular attention should be given to the role of the region’s militaries. Overly Broad and Vague Definition of Potential Terrorist Threat In his March 2004 annual report before the U.S. Congress, Southcom Commander General Hill declared that “Terrorists throughout the Southern Command area of responsibility bomb, murder, kidnap, traffic drugs, transfer arms, launder money, and smuggle humans.”ii According to this statement and others, Southcom’s definition of terrorism, and in particular potential terrorist threat, goes well beyond insurgents and paramilitaries in Colombia, or terrorist financers in the tri-border region. By equating transnational organized crime (such as the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and human beings) with terrorism, Southcom finds “terrorists” or potential terrorists threats throughout Central and South America and the Caribbean – and implies that there is a role for the military in combating their illicit activities. Since 9-11, the U.S. military has defined itself in relation to the war on terror, making counterterrorism its number one priority. This makes sense in areas of the globe where Islamic terrorists have planned or executed attacks against the United States. Although this is not true of Latin America or the Caribbean, Southcom has adapted its mission and vision of the region to stay in line with the U.S. military’s overarching counter-terror priority. Fighting terrorism has replaced combating drugs as Southcom’s main mission (although the two remain very linked), and Southcom now sees its area of responsibility through the lens of terrorism. Drug traffickers are “narco-terrorists,” and any illicit cross border activity represents a potential terrorist threat. Southcom officials routinely describe how the same routes used by drug and human traffickers can be used by terrorists to smuggle a dirty bomb into the United States, and warn that “Islamic radical groups, narcoterrorists in Colombia, and urban gangs across Latin America all practice many of the same illicit business methods.”iii
While there is a degree of truth to this analysis, defining the criminal and social problems facing the hemisphere today as potential terrorist threats does little to clarify their causes or to find possible solutions. It does, however, allow the possibility of a military response to problems that have been conflated with the ultimate security threat--terrorism. Enduring Friendship For a number of years Southcom has been discussing “Enduring Friendship,” a proposal to coordinate maritime intelligence and operations in the hemisphere. In 2001 this idea, often referred to as a “Latin American Navy,” was seen as a way to fill the security and drug interdiction gap created when U.S. naval assets were redeployed from the region to defend the U.S. coastline after 9/11. In its current incarnation, Enduring Friendship aims to create a multinational operational maritime force of the Americas, led by the United States. Enduring Friendship seeks to combine regional navies and coast guards assets in coordinated response to transnational and asymmetrical threats on the high seas, such as drug and weapons trafficking, terrorism, uncontrolled migration, fish poaching and other threats to marine life, hazards to navigation, and humanitarian emergencies. Certain training exercises are already being seen as precursors to Enduring Friendship. The Panamax exercise is described this way. Panamax involves the United States, Chile, and Panama in an exercise to defend the Panama Canal from a terrorist attack. The establishment of a regional operational maritime force with an extremely broad mandate, as described above, should be a matter for serious discussion because it could be a big step toward erasing the line between police and military roles in the maritime and intelligence management arenas. If its mission ranges from combating terrorism to transnational crime to fish poaching and environmental protection, its role would go well beyond military functions. While there should be greater cooperation within the hemisphere to stop crime, care needs to be given so that these efforts are not led by the military. Gang Violence Gang activity is a serious, dangerous, and growing problem in a number of Latin American countries, particularly in Central America. Many young people in Central America face limited opportunities, which, coupled with the prevalence of family disintegration, makes them particularly vulnerable to the appeal of youth gangs that offer a sense of belonging and power. The violent legacy of armed conflict in much of the region has also contributed to this phenomenon. Latin American justice systems are criticized for not doing enough to control gang crime and violence, and in response, laws have been passed criminalizing gang membership and the wearing of tattoos. In some countries, such as Brazil, the military has been brought in to quell gang violence. In Guatemala, the military continues to participate with the police in joint patrols, in part a response to gang violence. Hard-line anti-gang measures are taken in a spirit of “desperate times call for desperate measures.” However, these measures do not appear to be rooted in a serious analysis of the causes of gang violence, nor are they likely to contribute significantly to their solution, but they do have disturbing implications for civil liberties and human rights. The degree to which the U.S. military has begun publicly discussing gang violence in Latin America offers the impression that they see a potential role for military structures in response to this problem. For example, Gen. Hill stated that “The narcoterrorist influence is bleeding over into what we see as a second and increasing threat to the region: growingly sophisticated
criminal gangs. … This…threat faced by many Latin American countries is difficult and complex because it falls precisely on a seam between law enforcement and military operations.”iv In general, the public security systems in Latin America were not part of the institutional reform processes undertaken during the transitions to democracy from authoritarian regimes or armed conflict. Instead, random reforms have been carried out in the past decade, and with very poor results. Most of the public security systems across the region are currently in crisis, and given the lack of clear democratic public policies to address crime and insecurity, it is no surprise that governments are increasingly turning to the military to crack down on the gang problem. The solution to the problem of gang violence will not be found in the military. Relying on the military to respond to gang violence, even in the short-term, makes it less likely that countries will explore and dedicate the resources necessary to other potentially more effective policing, legislative, sentencing, and social work strategies. Impact on Democracy The hemispheric redefinition of security, and the U.S. military’s definition of potential terrorist threats, is creating an environment in which military roles could be significantly expanded. This undermines democratic institutions, particularly the police and judiciary. The involvement of armed forces in domestic issues has led to the anti-democratic regimes that ruled many Latin American countries during the second half of the last century. The democratization wave that took part during the 1980s and 1990s is still in process, and there are many pending tasks before real civilian control over the armed forces can be achieved. Nevertheless, in many Latin American countries, militaries have taken on counter-drug or law enforcement roles because police institutions were corrupt, incompetent, short-staffed or underequipped. Such roles were intended to be temporary – during which time there would be serious police reform – but governments squandered this opportunity to strengthen and clean the police, leaving militaries permanently entrenched in police functions. Every time a responsibility is taken away from a civilian institution and turned over to the military, the civilian government is weakened. Once the transfer takes place, the resources to solve the problem are dedicated to the military and the military begins to be seen as the appropriate institution for getting the job done. And the resources needed to strengthen the civilian institution so that it can re-claim its role are almost never made available. In the United States we are seeing a similar phenomenon. The Pentagon is displacing the State Department in foreign policy-making and is increasingly evading congressional oversight. Nowhere is that more evident than in Iraq, where the U.S. military not only led the war effort, but is at the helm of re-construction as well. U.S. humanitarian assistance programs are easier to fund through the Pentagon’s budget than the State Department’s. And in Latin America, twothirds of U.S. military training last year was paid for and managed by the Pentagon instead of the State Department, where such programs are traditionally administered to ensure that they are in accordance with overall U.S. foreign policy goals. The U.S. Congress has gotten into the habit of funding and relying on the military to respond to crises around the world, and does not question the implications of having the military as the U.S. government’s main message-bearer around the globe. Relinquishing police and other civilian functions to military institutions should be done only in the most exceptional of circumstances, and only with a clear timeline and exit strategy for removing the military from these duties. Simultaneously, there should be major investment in
police reform and capacity building, so that the police can resume their role by the appointed time. Conclusion The world is changing, and the definitions of security and terrorism -- concepts that will determine how our nations should respond to the post-9/11 reality -- are in flux. The broad definition of potential terrorist threat being put forth by Southcom, combined with the OAS’s expanded definition of hemispheric security, could be used to justify military involvement to respond to social problems or crime. Civilians should be careful not to inadvertently weaken civilian police and judicial institutions by relying more heavily on the military to combat domestic and international crime. The region’s governments must decide how best to address the internal and external problems and threats their nations face. The challenge is to recognize the complex new reality without automatically new assigning roles to the military. The best way to address these new threats is to strengthen civilian democratic institutions, such as law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, and the judiciary, and improve coordination among them at the domestic and regional levels.
Declaration On Security in the Americas, adopted at the third plenary session of October 28, 2003. United States Southern Command, General James T. Hill, Commander, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Washington, March 24, 2004. http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-03-24hill.html iii Ibid. iv Ibid.
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