SHOULD A CLAIM FOR THE LOSS OF A CHANCE OF FUTURE EARNINGS SURVIVE DEATH?
Report No. 76
December 1998
ALBERTA LAWREFORMINSTITUTE
EDMO NTON, ALBERTA
SHOULD A CLAIM FOR THE LOSS OF A CHANCE OF FUTURE EARNINGS SURVIVE DEATH?
Report No. 76
December 1998
ISSN 0317-1604 ISBN 1-8960-7824-9
ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE
Th e Albert a L aw Reform In st itu te wa s est ab lish ed on J an ua ry 1 , 1968, by t he Gover n m en t of Alber t a , t h e U n ive r si t y of Alb er t a a n d t h e L a w S ociet y of Alb er t a for th e pu rp oses, am ong oth ers , of cond uctin g legal r esea rch a nd recomm end ing reform s in th e la w. Fu nd ing of th e In st itu te 's oper at ions is pr ovided by t he G ov er n m e n t of Al be r t a , t h e U n iv er s it y of Al be r t a , a n d t h e Al be r t a La w F ou n d a t ion .
The members of the In stitut e's Board are The Hon. Mr. Ju stice B.R. Burrows; C.W. Dalt on; A. de Villar s, Q.C.; The H on. J ud ge N.A. Fla tt ers ; W.H. H ur lbur t, Q.C.; H.J .L. Irw in; P .J .M. Lown, Q.C. (Director); Dr. S.L. Ma rt in, Q.C.; Dr. D.R. Owra m; The H on. Mada m J ust ice B.L. Rawlins ; N.C. Witt ma nn , Q.C. (Ch a ir m a n ); a n d P r ofes sor R.J . Wood .
Th e I n st it u t e's lega l s t a ff cons is t s of P .J .M. Low n , Q. C. (D ir ect or ); R.H . Bow es ; C. Ga uk ; J. H end ers on-Lypkie M.A. Shon e; an d V. Steven son. W.H. H ur lbur t, Q.C. is a con s u lt a n t t o t h e In s t it u t e .
The Inst itut e's office is located at : 402 La w Cen tr e, Un iver sit y of Alber ta , Ed mon ton , Alber ta , T6G 2H 5. Ph one: (780) 492-5291; F a x: (780) 492 -1790 . The Institu te's electronic mail address is: reform@alri.ualberta.ca.
This a nd oth er In stit ut e report s ar e ava ilable t o view or download a t t he ALRI we bs it e: htt p:/ / ww w.law .ualberta.ca/ alri/ .
PREFACE WHAT THIS REPORT DOES AND WHY
Those who suffer loss from wrongful acts should be compensated by dam ages. Th is Re por t de a ls wit h t h e lega l con se qu en ces of t r a gedi es . A wr on gd oer ’s w r on gfu l a ct h a s ca u se d t h e d ea t h of a n ot h er pe r son . Th is is a t r a gedy for t h e vict im wh o h a s died . It is a tr a gedy for t he victim ’s fa mi ly m em ber s wh o su rv ive.
A wrongdoer should pay compensation, in th e form of money damages, to a victim who is in jur ed by t he w rongd oer’s wr ongful a ct. The pu rp ose of th e compen sa tion is t o pl a ce t h e vict im , in sofa r a s m on ey ca n do s o, in a s g ood a pos it ion a s i f t h e w r on g ha d never been comm itted.
Th e com pe n sa t ion sh ou ld go t o t h ose wh o su ffer in ju r ies. Mon ey da m a ges for persona l injuries can compen sat e a living victim . Money da ma ges can compen sat e su rvivin g fam ily mem ber s for th eir loss of econom ic supp ort from a deceas ed victim . Money dama ges can a lso give recognition t o the su rvivors’ hu rt an d berea vement an d for t he loss of th e deceased victim ’s compa nionship a nd car e. Money da ma ges ca n n ot com p en s a t e a d ece a se d v ict i m or m a k e a de ce a se d v ict i m ’s li fe ea s ie r or m or e comforta ble.
The Fatal Accidents Act com pensates survivors The Fatal Accidents Act pr ovides for t he p aym ent of comp ens at ion t o sur viving fam ily mem ber s. It does so in t wo ways. F irs t, it pr ovides th at a s pouse, child , par ent or sibling of the deceased victim can claim d am ages, th at is, money compen sat ion, from t he wr ongdoer wh o cau sed th e victim ’s deat h. These m oney da m a ges i n clu de com pe n sa t ion for t h e loss of a ll fin a n cia l exp ect a t ion s w h ich t h e sur vivors h ad from t he deceased per son. Second, th e Act pr ovides th at a spouse, child or parent can claim from th e wrongdoer, as of right, specified amounts of compen sat ion for th e loss of the guida nce, compan ionship an d care of the deceased pe r son . Th e s u r viv or s d o n ot h a ve t o pr ove a n y los s. Th e s pe cifie d a m ou n t s a r e $40 ,000 to t he spou se; $4 0,00 0 t o th e pa re nt s; a nd $25 ,000 to a child .
The Fatal Accidents Act’s wa y is t h e b es t wa y t o com pe n sa t e s u r viv or s. It giv es ea ch of t h e m a di r ect cl a im a g a in s t a w ron g doe r wh o h a s ca u s ed a vi ct i m ’s d ea t h . Th e su rvivor s a re n ot dep en den t on mon ey going in to t he victim ’s est at e a nd , th rou gh t h e e st a t e, t o t h e s u r viv or s, a pr oces s w h ich m a y le a d t o som e or a ll of t h e s u r viv or s
losing out. In ALRI’s view, the Fatal Accidents Act does what is needed for sur vivors, or, if it does not, it sh ould be cha nged so th at it will. The Fatal Accidents Act appr oach is the r ight one: th e best wa y to compensa te su rvivors is to give th em direct claims against wrongdoers.
Dam ages are assessed by “looking... into the crystal ball” Th is R epor t is a bou t clai m s for on e k in d of mon ey comp en sa t ion. I f an in jur y sh ort ens a victim ’s life expecta ncy, or if it wh olly or p ar tia lly dest roys a victim’s ab ility t o ear n, t he cour ts will aw ar d da ma ges t o th e victim for wh at is va rious ly ca lled los s of e a r n in g ca pa cit y, l oss of a bilit y t o ea r n , or los s of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ear nin gs. Th e aw ar d is n ecessa rily a gues s a bout two scen ar ios, one which is hypothet ical and one wh ich lies in the fut ur e. The hypoth etical scenar io is wha t t he v ict i m wou l d h a v e e a r n ed t h r ou g h ou t t h e ir l ife t im e bu t for t h e in ju r y . T h e fu t u r e sce n a r io is h ow m u ch less t h e vict im will ea r n in vie w of t h e in ju r y. T h e p r oces s of deciding on th e am ount ha s been a ppropria tely described by one judge as “lookin g...in to t he crys ta l ba ll.”
Dam ages to an estate do not compensate the victimand are a less efficient way of compensating survivors The que st ion a ddr essed by th is Repor t is whe th er, if a vict im of a wr ongful a ct dies, t h e vict im ’s e st a t e s h ou ld be a bl e t o m a ke t h e s a m e cla im for da m a ges for t h e loss of a cha nce of futu re ea rn ings as th e victim could h ave m ade in th eir lifetime. The recomm end at ion wh ich th e Report ma kes t o th e Govern men t, is t ha t t he vict im’s est at e sh ould n ot be a ble t o ma ke su ch a claim.
Th e b a si c r ea son for t h e R ep or t ’s r ecom m en da t ion is t h a t da m a ges for t h e loss of a chan ce of fut ur e ear nings can not ben efit a victim who is not alive to use t he m oney, and t hey do not replace any property which th e victim had. That mean s tha t th e da m a ges w ill s im pl y flow t h r ou gh t o t h e b en eficia r ies or cr ed it or s w h o be n efit fr om th e esta te, who ha ve not suffered an y loss (except for sur viving fam ily member s who will be compensa ted u nder th e Fatal Accidents Act). The n eed to compen sat e a living victim an d pr ovide th em w ith th e mon ey necess ar y to m ain ta in a n a pp r opr ia t e lifest yle ju st ifie s a cr ys t a l-ba ll a wa r d of d a m a ges t o t h e livi n g vi ct im for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r n in gs . I n ALR I’s view , t h e la w s h ou ld n ot go t o t h e sa me len gth s t o provide m oney for t he ben efit of whoever claim s t hr ough th e victim ’s esta te.
If ther e were no bett er wa y to compensa te su rviving family mem bers, th e paym ent of dama ges to a victim’s estat e might be necessary. However, direct awards of dam ages u nder th e Fatal Accidents Act a re a bet te r w a y t o comp en sa te th em .
Table of Contents
PART I — SUMMARY OF REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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1. Reason for report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2. Reasons and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
PART II — REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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A. History and Conduct of Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 B. Question Addressed By This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 C. History and Developm of the Law of Survival Of Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ent 1. R against survival of personal actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ule 2. Survival legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 a. First round of survival legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 b. The Uniform Survival of Actions Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 c. The Alberta Survival of Actions Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 d. O jurisdictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 ther D. History and Development of Claims of Survivors Under the Fatal Accidents Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1. Comm law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 on 2. The “dependency” claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3. C s for grief and loss of guidance, care and com laim panionship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4. R elationship between estate claim and survivor claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 s s E. Effect of the Present Law Relating to Death Wrongfully Caused . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 F. Nature and Amount of Claim For Loss of Chance of Future Earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1. N ature of the claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 a. Characterization of the claim by the jurisprudence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 b. Characterization of the claim as loss of “earning capacity” or as loss of a “chance” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 c. Characterization of the loss as a present loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2. Substantial damages are awarded for loss of earning capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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G. Should an Estate Be Able to Recover Dam ages for the Deceased Person’s Loss of a Chance of Future Earnings? 21 1. Damages for the loss of a chance of future earnings are and should be com pensatory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 a. The general rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 b. The exceptions to the com pensation principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 c. Conclusion as to purpose of dam ages for loss of chance of future earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2. An aw to an estate of dam ard ages for a deceased person’s loss of a chance of future earnings is not com pensatory 27 a. The loss of a chance of future earnings is personal to the victim and its loss does not affect the victim’s estate . . . 27 b. An award of damages cannot compensate the injured person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 c. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3. Justice does not require that damages for loss of a chance of future earnings be awarded for any purpose other than compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 a. Justice does not require that a wrongdoer be punished by an award of dam ages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 b. Justice does not require an award to be made to the estate of a deceased person on the sole grounds that an award would have been m to a living plaintiff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 ade c. Justice does not require an award to be m on the grounds that earning capacity is a “working-man’s” capital . 34 ade d. Justice to surviving family mem bers should be done under the Fatal Accidents Act and does not require an estate claim for loss of future earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 4. The policy reasons behind the heritability of property do not apply to a claim for the loss of a chance of future earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5. An award of dam ages which cannot be properly quantified should be made only in order to compensate a living person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 H. Conclusion and Summation on Survival of the Claimfor the Loss of a Chance of Future Earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 I. Transitional Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 J. Some Additional Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 1. W hether the extinguishment of a claim for damages for the loss of a chance of future earnings gives a potential incentive for defendants to delay proceedings, and whether the existence of that potential incentive is sufficient grounds for allowing the claim for damages for the loss of future earnings to survive either at all events or, alternatively, for allowing an a plaintiff’s estate to continue such a claimraised in an action commenced during the plaintiff’s lifetim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 e. 2. Effect on insurance premiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 3. W hether the claimshould be allowed on the grounds that it should not be cheaper to kill than to maim . . . . . . . . . 54 4. Distributive justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 5. Whether the possible effect that the loss of a deceased person’s chance of future earnings might have on ii
beneficiaries and creditors justifies the award . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 6. Unless something else is done, damages for the loss of a chance of future earnings will in som cases duplicate e “dependency” damages under the Fatal Accidents Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 K. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
PART III — LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
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APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A - 65
APPENDIX B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B - 67
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PART I — SUMMARY OF REPORT
1. Reason for report Un der t he common law, a p erson wh o is injur ed by a wr ongful a ct can claim m oney dam ages from th e wrongdoer as compensa tion for ea rn ings which t he inju red per son m ight ha ve received in th e fut ur e bu t will n ot h ave a cha nce of earn ing because of the injury. These damages ma y be substant ial. The dam ages are va r iou sl y s a id t o be for los s of e a r n in g ca pa cit y, l oss of t h e a bi lit y t o ea r n , or los s of future ear nings. In our view, what is lost is a chance of futu re earn ings.
Section 2 of the Su rvival of Actions Act 1 pr ovides th at “a ca us e of action vest ed in a per son su rvives for t he b ene fit of his est at e.” Section 5 , however , provides t ha t “only th ose dama ges th at resu lted in a ctua l fina ncial loss to the deceased or h is esta te a re re covera ble.”
W h en t h e Su rvival of Actions Act was enacted in 1978, it was th ought tha t th e loss of a cha nce of futu re ea rn ings is not a n “actua l fina ncial loss.” It wa s, ther efore, th ought th at s. 5 would p reven t a deceas ed in jur ed per son’s est at e from claim ing da m a ges for t h e loss of fu t u r e e a r n in gs , t h a t is , it wou ld pr even t su ch a cla im for da ma ges from s ur viving t he d eat h of th e inju red per son. H owever, in Duncan Estate v. Bad deley, 2 t h e C ou r t of App ea l of Alb er t a h eld t h a t a los s of e a r n in g ca pa cit y, or a l os s of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs , i s a n “a ct u a l fi n a n ci a l l os s ” u n d er s . 5 a n d t h a t th e claim for da ma ges th erefore su rvives an d can be br ought by t he deceased in jur ed p er son ’s es ta te .
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R . S . A. 1 9 8 0 , c . S - 3 0 .
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D u n c a n E s t a t e v. B a d d eley (199 7), 19 6 A.R . 161 , 50 A lta . L.R . (3d) 2 02, 1 45 D .L.R . (4t h ) 708 (C.A.) [ h e r e i n a f t e r D u n c a n v. B a d d eley]. All r efer en ces be low a r e t o th e r ep or t i n th e Alb er ta Re por ts .
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The qu estion a ddress ed by th is report is wha t t he policy of th e law sh ould be: should a claim for da ma ges for t he loss of a cha nce of futu re ea rn ings su rvive th e dea th of th e in jur ed p er son , or s hou ld it not ? When th e qu est ion is a ns wer ed, t he Su rvival of Actions Act sh ould be a men ded s o th at th e Act will clea rly r eflect its i n t en t i on .
2. Reasons and conclusions Th is r ep or t giv es r ea son s for a n u m be r of con clu si on s a bou t qu es t ion s w h ich a r e r a i se d i n t h e d is cu s s ion .
F ir st , t h e b a si s for a wa r di n g m on ey da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea rn in gs is a nd sh ould be comp en sa ti on for t he in jur ed p er son .
Second, money da ma ges cannot compensa te a deceased person, a nd a deceased person’s loss of a chan ce of fut ur e ear nings h as n ot caused a ny loss to the deceased pe r son ’s e st a t e, so t h a t , if t h e in ju r ed pe r son h a s d ied, da m a ges for t h e loss of a chan ce of fut ur e ear nings can not go to compensa te a nyone.
Th ir d, ju st ice doe s n ot r eq u ir e t h a t da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea rn ings be a wa rd ed for a ny p ur pose oth er t ha n comp en sa tion . More sp ecifically, just ice does not r equ ire t ha t s uch d am ages sh ould be a wa rd ed t o pun ish th e wrongdoer (or a n em ployer, par tn er, car-owner or insu rer of th e wrongdoer who actually pays the dam ages); justice does not require tha t a deceased person’s estat e sh ould be ab le t o recover da ma ges m ere ly becau se t he decea sed p ers on could h ave obta ine d a judgm en t if t he y ha d lived u nt il th e t ria l of a law su it cla imin g th e dama ges; and just ice does not require an a ward t o be made to a deceased person’s estat e on th e grounds t hat the chan ce of future ear nings is a “working-man’s” ca p it a l.
Fou rt h, ju st ice to sur viving fam ily mem ber s does n ot r equ ire t ha t a n es ta te b e ab le
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to claim dam ages for the deceased person’s loss of a chance of futu re earn ings. Un der t he Fatal Accidents Act, pr es cr ib ed list s of s u r viv in g fa m ily m em be r s ca n r ecover da m a ges for t h e loss of expe ct ed fin a n cia l s u pp or t or se r vice s fr om t h e deceased person a nd for grief and t he loss of guidan ce, compa nionship a nd car e. Th a t i s t he dir ect w a y a nd th e effective wa y t o do jus ti ce to s ur vivors .
Fifth, a chan ce of fut ur e ear nings is n ot her ita ble property, a nd pr operty doctr ines do n ot r eq u ir e t h a t a se con da r y r igh t – a cla im for da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs – b e h e r it a b le wh e n t h e ch a n ce on w h ich i t is ba s ed is n ot he ri ta ble.
Si xt h , in or de r t o a ss es s d a m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r n in gs a cou r t m u st , in t h e w or ds of Ch ief J u st ice B r ia n Dicks on , “ga ze. ..in t o t h e cr ys t a l ba ll;” enga ge in “specula tion ;” rely on act ua ria l eviden ce th e re liabilit y of which is “i ll u si on a r y ” i n r el a t ion t o a s p eci fi c ca s e; a n d en g a ge in “a r b it r a r y ” d et e r m in a t i on s . Su ch a pr ocess is just ifiable in order to en su re t ha t a living pla int iff is pr operly compen sat ed, but it is not just ifiable when th e dam ages can not go to compensa te a livin g per son .
Th e r epor t t he n s ta te s in gen er a l t er ms wh a t, i n ALR I’s vie w, t he la w sh ould be. A claim for dam ages should survive if the da mages will compensa te an injured person or th e injur ed person’s esta te. The t est is wh eth er t he loss for wh ich dam ages a re claim ed is a ctu a l, in th e se ns e of bein g fact ua l or r ea l a s opp osed t o pote nt ia l, a nd wh et h er t h e loss is fin a n cia l, i n t h e s en se of be in g or pe r t a in in g t o a m on ey or pr ope r t y los s w h ich will a ffect t h e in ju r ed pe r son ’s h er it a bl e p r ope r t y. T h e loss of a chance of futu re earn ings may be char acterized as “actual”, but as a “finan cial loss,” in ALRI’s view, it is only potent ial. As we have said a bove, in ALRI’s view, dama ges for t he loss of a cha nce of futu re ea rn ings awa rded t o the est at e of th e injur ed pe r son wi ll n ot be com pe n sa t ion t o t h e in ju r ed pe r son , a n d t h e in ju r ed pe r son ’s herita ble property is th e same wh ether or not the injur ed person has su ffered th e loss.
4
For t hese r easons, t he r eport concludes t ha t s. 5 of th e Su rvival of Actions Act sh ou ld be a m en de d t o pr ovid e t h a t a cla im for da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs s h ou l d n ot s u r vi ve for t h e be n efi t of a d ece a se d p er s on ’s es t a t e . T h e a m en dm en t sh ou ld a pp ly i n a ll ca se s i n wh ich t h e ca u se of a ct ion a r is es a ft er t h e am ended section comes in to force.
5
PART II — REPORT
A. History and Conduct of Project
In April 1997 th e Cour t of Appeal de livered its judgm ent in Duncan v. Bad deley, 3 in which th e Court h eld th at a claim for dam ages for what it var iously cha ra cterized in t he judgm ent s as loss of ability t o earn , 4 l os s of e a r n in g ca p a ci t y5 and loss of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs ,6 su rvives th e dea th of th e per son wh o ha s su ffere d t he loss. S hort ly t h er ea ft er , ALRI de cid ed t o u n de r t a ke a pr oject t o de t er m in e w h et h er or n ot t h e cl a im s h ou l d s u r vi ve , t h ou g h, for r e a son s gi ve n la t e r in t h is r ep or t , w e t h i nk t h a t it sh ou ld be ch a r a ct er ize d a s a cla im for da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea rn in gs.
AL RI u n d er t ook t h e pr oje ct for t w o r e a son s . T h e fi r st w a s t h a t Duncan v. Bad deley reversed t he policy on which s. 5 of the Su rvival of Actions Act was ba sed. Tha t rever sa l su ggest ed t ha t t he s ubject sh ould be r econsider ed t o deter min e wh eth er it is t h e or igi n a l p olicy or t h e p olicy of Duncan v. Bad deley wh ich sh ou ld be t h e p olicy of t h e la w . T h e s econ d wa s t h a t it n ow a pp ea r s t ha t s . 5 ca n b e i nt e rp r et e d i n a t lea st t wo d iffer en t wa ys a n d s h ou ld be a m en de d s o t h a t it will clea r ly r eflect whichever policy is adopted.
3
I bi d . Th e m a jor it y ju dg m en ts we r e d eliv er ed by Ke r a n s J .A. a n d b y C ôté J .A., t h e la tt er of wh om concu rr ed w ith Ker an s J .A. an d d eliver ed s up plem en ta ry re as ons . Liebe rm an J .A. diss en ted , hold ing t h a t t h e i n t e n tio n o f th e L eg is lat u r e w a s to e limina te th e c la im of a vic tim w h o die s ins ta nt a n e ousl y, an d t h at su ch a vict im does n ot s u ffer a n “actu al fina n cial loss.”
4
I bi d ., pe r Ke r a n s J .A. a t p a r a . 7, r efer r in g t o G a l a n d E s t a t e v. S t e w a r t ( 1 9 9 2 ), 1 3 5 A .R . 1 2 9 , [1 9 9 2 ] 6 A l t a . L . R . (3 d ) 3 9 9 , [1 9 9 3 ] 4 W . W . R . 2 0 5 , w h i c h f o r e s h a d o w e d D u n c a n v. Ba dd e le y.
5
Ibid ., per Côté J .A. at p ara . 62.
6
I b i d . , p e r K e r a n s J . A . a t p a r a . 2 . P a r a . 3 r e fe r s t o “t h e f u t u r e l o s s o f e a r n i n g s . ”
6
7
In Augu st 199 7 ALRI iss ue d Con su lt a ti on Me mor a nd um No. 4, S hould a Claim for Loss of a Chance of Future Earnings Survive Death? In December 1997, after subm issions ra ised th e quest ion of possible duplication between dam ages a war ded to an est at e for the loss of a cha nce of futu re ear nings an d dam ages awar ded to sur viving fam ily member s un der t he Fatal Accidents Act, ALRI circulated a supplement ary m emorandu m ent itled Will Dam ages for a Lost Cha nce of Futu re Earn ings Duplicate Damages for Loss of Depend ency?
AL RI s en t cop ie s of C on s u lt a t i on M em or a n d u m N o. 4 t o a n u m b er of l a wy er s wh o frequ en tly e nga ge in per sona l inju ry lit igat ion on be ha lf of pla int iffs a nd to la wyer s wh o m or e fr eq u en t ly a ct for de fen da n t s. We in vit ed com m en t fr om t h e ch a ir s of t h e sections of the Cana dian Ba r Associat ion, Alberta Bran ch who might be expected to be in t er es t ed in t h e t opi c. We a ls o a dv is ed t h e lega l p r ofes si on gen er a lly of t h e exist en ce an d a vaila bilit y of Cons ult at ion Mem ora nd um No. 4 t hr ough th e Ben cher s’ Advisory. We se nt copies t o some orga niza tion s of th e in su ra nce in du st ry. We r ece ive d 1 6 r es pon se s, wh ich r eflect a br oa d d ivi si on of opi n ion a s t o wh et h er or not th e claim sh ould s ur vive. Th ese r espon ses ca nva ssed th e issu es t hor ough ly an d we t h in k t h a t , a s a r es u lt , we a r e in a pos it ion t o for m u la t e r ecom m en da t ion s.
B. Question Addressed By This Report
Un de r t h e com m on la w, a pe r son wh ose ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r n in gs is ext in gu is h ed or redu ced by the wrongful act of another ha s a claim for dam ages a gainst th at other pe r son . Th e in ju r ed pe r son m a y a ls o h a ve a cla im for t h e d a m a ges a ga in st som eon e ot h e r t h a n t h e p er s on w h o com m i t t ed t h e w r on g fu l a ct , wh o m a y be in n oce n t of wr on gd oin g bu t is lega lly r es pon si bl e for t h e w r on g, s u ch a s t h e e m pl oyer or pa r t n er of a w r on g doe r , t h e ow n er of a ca r w h ich h a s ca u s ed d a m a ge , or t h e di st r i bu t or of a fa u l t y p r od u ct m a n u fa ct u r e d b y a n ot h e r .
As we have sa id above, when th e Su rvival of Actions Act wa s en act ed in 1978, it wa s t h ou gh t t h a t t h e e ffect of s. 5 w a s t h a t a cla im for da m a ges for t h e loss of a chance of futu re earn ings was not an “actua l financial loss” as th e term is used in s. 5 a nd th er efore w ould not su rv ive t he dea th of th e pe rs on wh o su ffers t he loss. I t
8
wa s t he in ten tion of th e Conferen ce of Comm issioner s on U niform ity of Law in Can ada (now the Un iform Law Conference of Can ada ), which dra fted th e Un iform Act on w h ich t h e Su rvival of Actions Act wa s b a se d, t h a t t h e cla im wou ld n ot sur vive. It wa s also th e inten tion of th is Inst itu te (th en t he In stit ut e of Law Res ea rch a nd Reform ), whi ch , in our 197 7 Rep ort 24, S urvival of Actions and Fatal Accidents Act A m e n d m en t, r ecom m en de d t h e a dop t ion of m ost of t h e Uniform Act, t h a t t h e cla im wou ld n ot su r viv e. Th e L egis la t u r e a ccep t ed ALR I’s r ecom m en da t ion an d ena cted th e Su rvival of Actions Act recommended by ALRI with some chan ges wh ich a r e n ot r eleva n t t o t h e s u bje ct of t h is r ep or t .
However , in Duncan v. Bad deley, t h e C ou r t of Ap p ea l h el d t h a t a l os s of e a r n in g ca p a ci t y w a s a n “a ct u a l fi n a n ci a l l os s ”, so t h a t t h e es t a t e of t h e cl a im a n t cou l d b r in g a n a ct ion for da m a ges for t h e loss . Th e C ou r t ba se d i t s d ecisi on on it s i n t er pr et a t ion of s. 5 of th e Su rvival of Actions Act, but th e me mbe rs of th e ma jority clear ly th ough t t ha t t he ir d ecision r eflects t he ap pr opria te lega l policy.
Th is r ep or t is n ot a bou t t h e in t er pr et a t ion of s. 5. Ra t h er , it is a bou t t h e p olicy which th e law should adopt. The question which it addresses is therefore th is: should a deceased person’s esta te be en tit led to claim from a wrongdoer or other r es pon si bl e p er son da m a ges for t h e loss of t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n in gs ? Th a t is , s h ou ld a cla im for da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n in gs su r viv e t h e d ea t h of t h e p er son wh o h a s s u ffer ed t h e loss ? Th e d is cu ss ion applies t o intent ional tort s as well a s to negligence.
This is a fairly n ar row, th ough im port an t, lega l que st ion. To un der st an d it s s ig ni fi ca n ce a n d t h e fa ct or s wh ich s h ou ld be t a ke n in t o a ccou n t in w or k in g ou t a n a n sw er t o t h e q u es t ion it is n ece ss a r y t o ou t lin e t h e lega l b a ckgr ou n d a ga in st wh ich it arises.
C. History and Development of the Law of Survival Of Actions
9 1. Rule against survival of personal actions Th e com m on la w of E n gla n d a n d C a n a da in clu de d a r u le t h a t a “per son a l a ct ion ”, including an a ction for dam ages in tort, did not sur vive the deat h of the person ent itled to brin g the a ction, so tha t t he deceased per son’s esta te could not sue a wr ongdoer , or a nyon e re spon sible for t he wr ongdoer ’s a cts, for a per sona l inju ry t o t h e d ece a se d p er son . Th e r u le a pp lied wh et h er or n ot it wa s t h e w r on gfu l a ct wh ich ca u s ed t h e v ict i m ’s d ea t h . Th e effe ct of t h e r u le wa s t o d en y t o b en e fi ci a r ie s a n d creditors of a victim’s esta te t he ben efit of claims for dam ages for personal in juries su ffere d by t he vict im.
2. Survival legislation a. First round of survival legislation The r ule a gainst th e sur vival of persona l actions was p erceived as un just. In 1886, Ont ar io intr oduced legisla tion to r evers e it. 7 The On ta rio section was widely copied in Ca n a di a n pr ovin cia l a n d t er r it or ia l legis la t ion , in clu di n g s . 11 of t h e O r di n a n ces of th e North west Ter ritories 1903 (2nd session) which became pa rt of th e law of Alb er t a . S ect ion 11 wa s con t in u ed in Alber t a ’s T r u st ee Act 8 a n d la t e r in t h e Ad m in i st r a t ion of E s t a t es Act .9 Section 51 of th e la tt er Act w as to t he sa me lega l effect a s t h e 1 88 6 O n t a r io s ect ion . Sect ion 51 r ea d a s follows:
51.
(1) The legal representative of the estate of a deceased person may maintain an action for any tort or injury to the person or to the real or personal estate of the deceased except in cases of defamation, in the same manner and with the same rights and remedies as the deceased would if living have been entitled to do.
(2) The damages when recovered form part of the personal estate of the deceased.
7
S t a t u te A m e n d m e n t A ct , S.O. 1 886 , c.16, s.23, w hich su bst itu ted a n ew s . 8 in T h e R e v i s ed S t a t u t e R esp ectin g T ru stees an d E xecu tors an d th e Ad m in ist ra tion of E sta tes .
8
R . S . A. 1 9 2 2 , c .2 2 0 , s .2 8 .
9
R . S . A. 1 9 7 0 , c .1 .
10
It will be s een th at th e sect ion did not crea te a ca us e of action or he ad of dam age s for w r on g fu l ly ca u s in g de a t h .10 No such cause of action or h ead of dama ges existed be for e t h e s ect ion wa s e n a ct ed . Th e e ffect of t h e s ect ion wa s t o pr ovid e for t h e su rviva l of any cla ims wh ich exist ed a t t he dea th of a decea sed p ers on a nd to give th e decea sed’s est at e a ny r em edies wh ich t he decea sed could ha ve claim ed if living. Section 51 a nd its coun te rp ar ts wer e, howeve r, ver y sign ificant pr ovisions, coverin g, as th ey did, a ll tort claims except d efam at ion claim s.
For a long time it was n ot realized in Can ada tha t t he sur vival section caused th e su rviva l of a n um ber of claims for d am ages for n on-pecun iar y losses wh ich could be a ss er t ed by livin g p la in t iffs . Th es e in clu de d cl a im s for t h e loss of expe ct a t ion of life , loss of a me ni ti es, a nd pa in a nd su fferin g.
In 19 34 , E n gla n d a dop t ed su r viv a l legis la t ion si m ila r t o t h e C a n a di a n pr ovis ion s. 11 It wa s s oon r ea lized t h er e t h a t a n a ct ion cou ld be br ou gh t on be h a lf of a n es t a t e for th e loss of the deceased per son’s expectat ion of life,12 t h ou g h t h e E n gl is h cou r t s aw ar ded only m odera te conven tion al a mou nt s of dam ages . The E nglish exam ple was soon followed in Cana da, but Cana dian court s made larger awar ds. In Crosby v. O’Reilly,13 t h e S u pr em e C ou r t of Ca n a da u ph eld a n a wa r d of $ 10 ,000 for los s of e xp ect a t i on of l ife wh i ch t h e Al be r t a Ap p el la t e Di vi si on h a d s u bs t it u t e d for a ju r y a wa r d of $ 90 ,000 . Th e S u pr em e C ou r t obs er ved t h a t , wh ile t h e Ap pe lla t e D ivi si on ha d n ot been righ t in sa ying t ha t $1 0,000 wa s t he u pper limit , a t ria l judge s hou ld
I n E n g la n d v. L a m b ( 1 9 1 8 ) 4 2 O . L . R . 6 0 , it w a s a r g u e d t h a t t h e O n t a r i o s e ct i o n h a d c r e a t e d a r i g h t of a ct i on f or c a u s i n g d ea t h , b u t t h e a r g u m e n t f a il e d .
11
10
L aw R eform (M iscel la n eou s P rov isi on s) A ct , 2 4 & 2 5 G e o . 5 , c. 4 1 .
12
Se e, e.g ., Flin t v. L o vell, [193 5] 1 K .B. 3 54 (C .A.), R o s e v. F o r d , [193 7] A.C . 826 (H .L.), B e n h a m v. G a m b li n g, [194 1] A.C . 157 (H .L.), Y o r k s h i r e E l e ct r i c i t y B o a r d v. N ay lor , [19 68 ] A.C . 52 9 (H .L.).
13
( 1 9 7 4 ), [1 9 7 5 ] 2 S .C . R . 3 8 1 , [ 1 9 7 4 ] 6 W . W . R . 4 7 5 .
11
instru ct a jury in light of the circumst ances, “tha t a figure beyond a part icular su m, wh ich m a y be les s t h a n $1 0,00 0, m a y be r ega r de d a s e xcess ive .” Th e a ss es sm en t of da m a ges for los s of e xp ect a t ion of life in volv ed a n a ss es sm en t of t h e d egr ee of ha ppi ne ss t he decea sed per son woul d h a ve be en lik ely t o exper ien ce.
Claims u nder th e sur vival section wer e also ma de by esta tes for deceased persons’ loss of “amen ities”, that is, the loss of capacity to enjoy life because of physical in ju r y. C la im s for los s of a m en it ies for pe r iod s b efor e deat h su rvived victim s’ deat hs under t he survival legislation. In Crosby v. O’Reilly, 14 however, th e Sup rem e Court of Cana da h eld tha t t he asser tion of a claim for loss of amenities for a per iod a ft e r de a t h wa s a “du pl ica t ion of t h e r ecogn ize d cl a im for sh or t en ed expe ct a t ion of life , even if it be t h e ca se t h a t in a livin g p er son si t u a t ion los s of t h e a m en it ies of l ife ma y call for a la rg er a wa rd th a n w ould be giv en for loss of exp ecta ti on of life a lone .” Th is su gge st s t h a t t h e cla im for da m a ges for los s of a m en it ies for t h e p er iod a ft er dea th su rvived un der th e su rviva l legisla tion but could not be a sser ted alon g with a cla im for da m a ges for los s of e xp ect a t ion of life .
b. The Uniform Survival of Actions Act By t h e e a r ly 1 96 0s , pr ovin cia l legis la t ion , a ccordi n g t o t h e C on fer en ce of Commissioners on U niform ity of Legislation in Ca na da (now th e Un iform Law Con fer en ce of C a n a da ), sh owe d “a con si de r a bl e va r ia t ion in t h e ca u se s of a ct ion t h a t a re a llowed to s ur vive for t he ben efit of an d a ga in st est a te s.”15 I n 1 96 3, t h e C on fe r en ce a dop t ed a U n ifor m Su rvival of Actions Act a n d r ecom m e n de d i t s enactment by the provinces.16 T h e U n i for m Act i s i m por t a n t t o t h e pr e se n t discussion becau se th e presen t Alberta Su rvival of Actions Act is ba sed on it .
14
I bi d .
15
P ro c ee d i n g s o f th e F o r ty-T h ir d A n n u a l Me e ting of the U nifor m La w C onfe r e nc e of C an ad a (Regin a: ULCC , 1961) Appendix L at 108.
16
P ro c ee d i n g s o f th e F o r ty-F ifth A n n u a l Me e ting of the U nifor m La w C onfe r e nc e of C an ad a (E d m o n t on : U L CC , 1 9 63 ) A p p en d i x Q a t 1 3 6-3 8 .
12
The Un iform Act p rovides t ha t, wit h a few exceptions, a ll caus es of action “vested in a p ers on” survive t he d eat h of th e per son. H owever, it goes on to sa y th at “only da m a ges t h a t h a ve r es u lt ed in a ct u a l p ecu n ia r y los s t o t h e d ece a se d p er son or t h e es t a t e a r e r ecover a bl e”, a n d i t sp ecifica lly exclu de s fr om r ecover y “pu n it ive or exem pl a r y d a m a ges or da m a ges for los s of e xp ect a t ion of life , pa in a n d s u ffer in g or physical disfigur emen t, or for t he loss of am enities”.
At t h e t im e of t h e a dop t ion of t h e U n ifor m Act , li vi n g p la i n t iffs we r e a b le t o a s s er t cl a im s for l os s of e a r n in g s or e a r n in g ca p a ci t y or a b il it y . T h e U n i for m Act d oe s n ot r efe r sp ecifica lly t o su ch cla im s. Th e Albe r t a Com m is si on er s, wh ose r ep or t s t o t h e Conferen ce of Comm issioner s r esu lted in t he a doption of th e Un iform Act s aid in t h e ir 1 96 1 r e por t :17
At least one of the provinces excludes damages for death and compensation for expected earnings subsequent to death. We think this exclusion is not necessary because these items are not included in the first place; they are not surviving rights.
Tha t is, claims for da ma ges for t he loss of “expected earn ings su bsequen t t o death ”, ar e not specifically excluded by th e Un iform Act becau se th e Commissioners thought t hat they were not included in its general terms.
c. The Alberta Survival of Actions Act In 19 77 , t h is In st it u t e (t h en kn own a s t h e I n st it u t e of L a w R es ea r ch a n d R efor m ) recomm end ed t ha t Alber ta ad opt t he U niform Su rvival of Actions Act. 18 T h e In st it u t e’s r ep or t di d n ot m a ke a n y s pe cific r efe r en ce t o cla im s for da m a ges for los s of e a r n in g s or e a r n in g ca p a ci t y, bu t i t wa s t h e I n s t it u t e ’s vi ew a t t h e t i m e t h a t t h e l os s of e a r n in g s or e a r n in g ca p a ci t y w a s n ot i n cl u de d i n t h e t e r m “a ct u a l pe cu n i a r y
17
Su pra note 15 at 110.
18
Se e I n st it u t e of L a w Re se a r ch a n d R efor m , R ep or t 24 : S u r v i v a l o f A c t i on s a n d F a t a l A c c id e n t s A m e n d m e n t A ct (Ed m ont on: I LR R, Ap ril 197 7).
13 l os s ” a n d t h a t a cl a im for d a m a ge s for s u ch a l os s wou l d t h e r efor e be ex cl u de d fr om th e claim s t ha t wou ld su rvive t he d eat h of a claim an t.
In 1978, t he Legislat ur e ena cted th e Su rvival of Actions Act. 19 Secs. 2 and 5 of the Act ar e as follows:
2
A cause of action vested in a person who dies after January 1, 1979 survives for the benefit of his estate.20
5
If a cause of action survives under section 2, only those damages that resulted in actual financial loss to the deceased or his estate are recoverable and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, punitive or exemplary damages or damages for loss of expectation of life, pain and suffering, physical disfigurement or loss of amenities are not recoverable.
I t w il l b e s ee n t h a t :
(1) Un der s. 2, a ll cau ses of act ion su rvive th e dea th of the p ers ons in wh om t he y ar e “vested.” The t erm “vested” is not defined bu t pr esum ably includes every caus e of action which a deceased person could ha ve enforced at th e time of their d eat h.
(2) However, und er s. 5, th e esta te of a deceased person can not r ecover da ma ges un der a su rviving vested cau se of action un less “th e dam ages” resulted 21 i n “a ct u a l
19
S . A . 1 9 7 8 , c. 3 5 , n o w R . S . A . 1 9 8 0 , c. S - 3 0 .
20
Th e U n ifor m Act wou ld h a ve e xclu de d fr om su r viv a l ca u se s of a cti on in a du lt er y, s ed u cti on a n d i n d u c i n g o n e s p o u s e t o l e a v e a n o t h e r . T h e A l b e r t a A ct doe s n ot e xclu de th es e ca u se s of a cti on .
21
“D a m a g e s ” d o n o t r es u l t in l os s . R a t h e r , t h e y a r e c om p e n s a t i on f or l os s . T h e w or d i n g o f t h e s ec t io n is t h er efor e n ot e n ti r ely a pt . It is, h owe ver , clea r th a t w h a t t h e s ect ion m ea n s is th a t d a m a ges ca n n ot
14 fina ncia l loss.”22
The se a re t he p rovisions w hich w ere int erp ret ed in Duncan v. Bad deley. 23
d. Other jurisdictions24 Th e Albe r t a , N ew Br u n sw ick , P E I, a n d Yu kon su r viv a l s t a t u t es r es t r ict t h e dam ages r ecoverable by est at es to actu al pecunia ry or finan cial loss an d ma ke no s pe ci fi c r e fe r en ce t o d a m a ge s for t h e los s of a ch a n ce of e a r n in g s; t h e in t e r pr e t a t ion of Albert a’s s. 5 in Duncan v. Bad deley is therefore relevant t o all of those jur isdict ions. Th e Nova Scotia section per mit s r ecovery only of “da ma ges t ha t h ave re su lt ed in a ctu a l pecu ni a ry loss t o th e es ta te .” 25 Th e Ne wfound lan d su rviva l sta tu te r estr icts recoverable da ma ges to “actu al m oneta ry loss to the est at e”, but pr ovides th at th e da ma ges r ecovera ble a re t o be calcula ted in t he s am e ma nn er a s if th e deceas ed per son wer e living a nd ha d br ought th e act ion. The Brit ish Colum bia a n d S a sk a t ch ew a n su r viv a l s t a t u t es sp ecifica lly exclu de da m a ges b a se d on fu t u r e ear nings. Th e Man itoba, North west Ter ritories a nd On ta rio survival st at ut es pr ovid e for su r viv a l of a ct ion s i n gen er a l t er m s w it h n o sp ecific r es t r ict ion t o a ct u a l
be r ecover ed for a loss w h ich is n ot a n “actu al fina n cial loss.”
22
S ect ion 5 su b st it u t ed “fin a n cia l” for t h e w or d “p ecu n ia r y ” w h ich w a s u s ed in t h e U n i for m A ct . T h e su bs ti tu ti on di d n ot ch a n ge t h e m ea n in g of t h e s ect ion .
23
Se cti on 6, w h ich pr ovid es in effect th a t a su r viv in g cla im is t o be ca lcu la te d w it h ou t r efer en ce t o a g a in or los s t o t h e e st a t e, w a s a ls o in t e rp r et e d b y t h e C ou r t of A pp ea l. N o is su e a r is es fr om t h e Cou r t’s de cisi on th a t s . 6 d oes n ot a pp ly t o a cla im for d a m a ges for t h e los s of a ch a n ce of fu tu r e ea r n in gs or e a r n in g ca pa cit y. T h e r ea son th e C ou r t g a ve for th a t d ecis ion is t h a t t h e los s is a loss to th e d ecea sed pe rs on a n d is n ot a sp ecia l cla im by t h e es ta te .
24
Th e s u r viv a l s t a t u t es r efe r r ed t o in t h is pa r a gr a ph a r e a s fol low s: S urv ival of Actions Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-3 0; Es ta te A d m in ist ra ti on A ct, R.S .B.C . 19 96, c.12 2, s . 59 (2); The Trustee Act., R.S .M. 1 987 , c. T-1 60, s.5 3(1); S urv ival of Actions Act, R.S .N. B. 1 973 , c.S-1 8, s s.5 (1), 5 (2); Su rvival of Actions Act, R.S.N 1990, c. S-32, s.4, s.1 1(g); S urv ival of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 453, s.4; Trustee Act, R.S .N. W.T. 198 8, c. T -8, s s.3 1-33 ; Trustee Act, R.S .O. 1 990 , c.T.2 3, s .38 (1); S urv ival of Actions Act, R.S .P .E .I. 198 8, c.S -11, ss .5(1 ), 5(2 ); Su r v iv a l of A ct i on s Act. S .S .1990-19 91 c. S -66.1, s.6 . S urv ival of Actions Act, R.S.Y. 1986 c. 166, s.5.
25
See infra note 65.
15 fi n a n ci a l l os s a n d n o s p eci fi c e xce pt i on for d a m a ge s for l os s of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ear nin gs; however , th e On ta rio Cour t of Appeal h as held 26 th at a claim for dam ages for “loss of future ear nings or loss of earn ing capacity” is a claim for “dama ges...for th e deat h” of the deceased per son which is precluded by s. 38(1) of th e Onta rio Trustee Act.
The Un ited Kingd om su rviva l st at ut es a pplicable to Scotla nd an d E ngla nd exclude dama ges in relat ion to future ear nings.27
D. History and Development of Claims of Survivors Under the Fatal Accidents Act28
1. Comm law on The common law ha d another r ule about the consequences of death . It was th at one pe r son cou ld n ot r ecover da m a ges fr om a n ot h er pe r son for ca u si n g t h e d ea t h of a t h ir d. Th is r u le m ea n t t h a t a de pe n da n t or ot h er pe r son wh o wa s l ik ely, b u t for a de cea se d p er son ’s d ea t h , t o r ece ive fin a n cia l b en efit s fr om t h e d ece a se d p er son , cou l d n ot r e cov er d a m a ge s fr om a w r on g doe r wh o ca u s ed t h e d ece a se d p er s on ’s dea th . The r ule a lso preven ted depen da nt s or fam ily mem ber s from r ecoverin g da ma ges for ber ea vem en t a nd an y loss of non-pecun iar y ben efits w hich th ey m ight suffer by reason of a victim’s death . This rule, in combinat ion with t he rule against t h e s u r viv a l of p er son a l a ct ion s, pr even t ed de pe n da n t s a n d fa m ily m em be r s fr om r ecover in g d a m a ges r es u lt in g fr om a de cea se d p er son ’s d ea t h eit h er di r ect ly, or ind irect ly th rough th e deceas ed per son’s est at e, so th at th ey ha d n o recours e at all for th e wrongful deat h of the deceased.
26
B a l k o s v . Cook (19 91 ) 75 O.R . 59 3,5 97 , pe r Ca tz m a n J .A. gi vin g t h e ju dg m en t of t h e cou r t.
27
Da m ag es (S cotla n d ) Act , 19 76 , 19 76 S. U .K ., c 1 3, s . 2; Ad m in ist ra tion of J u sti ce Act , 1 9 8 2 , 1 9 8 2 S . U . K . , c. 5 3 , s . 4 .
28
T h e h i s t o r y a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e Fa ta l A ccid en ts A ct is can va sse d m uch m ore t hor ough ly in A L R I ’s R e p o r t f o r D i s cu s s i o n N o . 1 2 , N on -Pecu n ia ry D am ag es in W ron gfu l D eat h Act ion s – A R evi ew of S ection 8 of t h e F a t a l A c ci d e n t s A c t ( E d m o n t o n : A L R I , 1 9 9 2 )
16 2. The “dependency” claim under the Fatal Accidents Acts Th e r u le t h a t on e p er son cou ld n ot r ecover da m a ges fr om a n ot h er for t h e d ea t h of a th ird wa s par tly revoked long before sur vival legislat ion was ena cted. The inst ru men ts of part ial revocation were t he Fatal Accidents Act 1846 (U.K.) an d the Ca n a di a n pr ovin cia l a n d t er r it or ia l legis la t ion wh ich copi ed it or follow ed t h e s a m e pa tt ern . Albert a in her ited th e legisla tion from t he N ort hwe st Ter rit ories, a nd it is now included in t he Fatal Accidents Act RSA 1980 c. F-5.
Sections 2 an d 3 of th e Albert a Fatal Accidents Act provide, in effect, th at specified cl os e fa m i ly m em b er s of a p er s on w h os e d ea t h h a s b ee n ca u s ed by a wr on g fu l a ct ca n r e cov er d a m a ge s fr om t h e wr on g doe r or ot h e r r es p on s ib le pe r son , t h ou g h on l y i f t h e d ece a se d p er son cou ld t h em se lf h a ve r ecover ed da m a ges, a n d s u bje ct t o de du ct ion for t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s con t r ib u t or y n egligen ce. A cl a im for su ch da m a ges i s com m on ly r efe r r ed t o a s a “dep en de n cy” cla im , t h ou gh it is n ot ne cessa ry t o show a ctu al d epen den cy.
The dama ges recoverable under t he “dependency” claim un der ss. 2 and 3 are “those da m a ges t h a t t h e cou r t con si de r s a pp r opr ia t e t o t h e in ju r y r es u lt in g fr om t h e de a t h .” Th e d a m a ges t h a t t h e cou r t con si de r s a pp r opr ia t e gen er a lly r ela t e t o t h e fi n a n ci a l con t r i bu t i on s a n d se r vi ce s t h a t t h e li st e d fa m i ly m em b er s cou l d r ea son a bl y h a ve expe ct ed t o r ece ive fr om t h e d ece a se d p er son bu t for t h e w r on g fu l ly -ca u s ed d ea t h . 29
The fam ily member s who can n ow claim da ma ges un der t he Act are children , hu sban ds an d wives, 3-year h eter osexual coha bita nt s held out as consorts, pa ren ts (including step-parents) and gran dparent s, brother s and sisters.
29
I n H u v. W a n g (1997 ) 197 A.R . 386, 4 7 Alt a L .R(3d ) 77, th e Alber ta Qu een ’s Be nch he ld t ha t t he d a m a g e s u n d e r t h e Fa ta l A ccid en ts A ct c ou l d i n c l u d e d a m a g e s f o r t h e l o s s o f a c h a n c e t o e m i g r a t e t o Ca n a da , th e los s h a vin g b ee n ca u se d b y t h e d ea th of a d ece a se d p er son wh o wa s t h e s on of on e plaint iff an d th e father or an other. It w as t he economic aspect of the loss, however, which ap pear s to h a ve b ee n th e b a sis of th e d ecis ion .
17 3. Claim for grief and loss of guidance, care and com s panionship In our 197 7 r epor t, Su rvival of Actions and Fatal Accidents Act Amendment, t h is In st it u t e r ecom m en de d s pe cifica lly t h a t cla im s for da m a ges for los s of e xp ect a t ion of life be exclud ed from su rvivin g th e dea th of the cla ima nt . The In st itu te recognized , however, tha t t hese da ma ges were often th e only sour ce of what might be perceived as comp ens at ion for, or as recognit ion of, th e loss occas ioned t o th e imm edia te family by, the wrongful deat h of a deceased person. This wa s par ticular ly likely to be tr ue in t he case of the deat h of a child who had n ot am assed an esta te a nd wa s not a s ource of supp ort to t he p ar ent s for th e loss of which th ey could claim com p en s a t or y da m a g es . T h e I n s t it u t e t h er e for e r ecom m e n de d, a n d t h e Le gi sl a t u r e a cce pt e d t h e r ecom m e n da t i on , 30 tha t a n a ward of damages for bereavemen t be ma de a va ila bl e t o m em be r s of a de cea se d p er son ’s i m m ed ia t e fa m ily on t h e b a si s of t h e fa m i ly r el a t ion s h ip wi t h ou t p r oof of l os s . I t r ecom m e n de d t h a t t h e t ot a l a m ou n t a wa r de d b e in sp ecific a m ou n t s w h ich we r e t h ou gh t t o r eflect t h e a m ou n t s t h a t h a d previously been awa rded t o estat es for loss of expectation of life.
The a moun ts of dama ges for ber eavemen t pr escribed by the 1977 Act were con si de r ed t oo low. I n 19 94 , foll owin g a fu r t h er r ep or t of ALR I, 31 th e Fatal Accidents Act wa s fu rt he r a me nd ed t o pr ovide for m ore s ub st a nt ia l compe ns a ti on for w ha t s . 8 of t h e Act n ow ch a r a ct e r iz es a s “g r ie f a n d los s of g u id a n ce , ca r e a n d com p a n ion s h ip of t h e de ce a se d p er s on . ”32 Un der s. 8 a s it n ow stan ds, where d eat h is cau sed by wrongful condu ct $40,000 is payable to th e spouse of th e deceased person (un less separ at ed), or to a 3-year h eter osexual coha bita nt of th e deceased person wh o was h eld ou t a s t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s con sor t ; $4 0,00 0 i s p a ya bl e t o t h e p a r en t s of t h e deceased person if th e deceased is a m inor child or, being between 18 an d 26 year s of a ge, wa s n ot livin g wit h a coh a bi t a n t ; a n d $ 25 ,000 is pa ya bl e t o a ch ild of t h e
S u rv iv al of A ction s A ct, S . A . 1 9 7 8 , c . 3 5 , s . 1 1 , a m e n d i n g t h e Fa ta l A ccid en ts A ct , inte r alia , b y a d d i n g s . 9 , w h i c h l a t e r b e c a m e s . 8 o f t h e Fa ta l A ccid en ts A ct R S A 1 9 8 0 c . F - 5 .
31
30
Rep ort 66, N o n - P ec u n i a r y D a m a g e s i n W r o n g f u l D e a t h A c t i o n s – A R e v i ew o f S e ct i o n 8 o f t h e F a t a l A cci d en t s Act , A L R I , 1 9 9 3 .
32
S.A. 1994 c. 16 s. 5.
18
deceas ed per son wh o is a m inor or , being u nd er t he a ge of 26, wa s n ot living wit h a coh a b it a n t . Se ct i on 8 (2 ) of t h e Act r e qu i r es t h e cou r t t o a w a r d t h es e s u m s “w it h ou t r efe r en ce t o a n y ot h er da m a ges t h a t m a y be a wa r de d a n d w it h ou t evid en ce of dam age.”
4. Relationship between estate claim and survivor claims s The “dependency” claims of sur viving fam ily member s depend on, a mong other t h in gs , t h e e xp ect ed ea r n in gs of t h e d ece a se d p er son . S o do e st a t e cla im s for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs . T h er e is t h er e for e a pos s ib il it y t h a t , i f b ot h cl a im s are a llowed by law, a wrongdoer or other r esponsible person may be compelled to pa y d a m a ges t o t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s e st a t e for t h e loss of expe ct ed ea r n in gs of t h e person a nd m ay a lso be compelled to pay dam ages t o the depen dan ts for th e loss by th em of the b en efit of all or p ar t of th e sa me expect ed ea rn ings . The cour ts ha ve tr adit ionally dealt wit h t his possibility by requirin g persons wh o assert “dependen cy” claims un der t he Fatal Accidents Act t o b r in g in t o a ccou n t s u m s r ece ive d fr om t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s e st a t e b y r ea son of t h e w r on gfu l a ct . 33 We will discuss th is subject more complet ely below.34
E. Effect of the Present Law Relating to Death Wrongfully Caused
The relevant present law may be summ arized as follows:
1. A d ece a se d p er s on ’s es t a t e ca n n ot r e cov er d a m a ge s fr om a w r on g doe r for w r on g fu l ly causin g the p erson’s deat h.
33
I n t h e r e c e n t c a s e o f B r o o k s a n d B r o o k s E s t a t e v. S t e f u r a [19 98 ] A.J . 73 1, on lin e: Q L (AJ ) (Q.B .).
Se e t h e d iscu ss ion u n de r h ea di n g J .6. U n les s s om et h in g el se is d on e, if d a m a ges for t h e los s of a cha nce of futu re ea rn ing s ca n b e claim ed b y th e est at e of th e in jur ed p er son , th e da m ag es w ill in s o m e c a s e s d u p l i c a t e d e p e n d e n c y d a m a g e s u n d e r t h e Fa ta l A ccid en ts A ct .
34
19
2. A deceased per son’s esta te can sue on a ny cause of action “vested” in t he deceased p er s on .
3. In a n a ction on a ny su ch cause of action, however, a deceased pers on’s esta te can not recover da ma ges except for “actu al finan cial loss” to th e deceased or to th e esta te, a n d s pe cifica lly ca n n ot r ecover da m a ges for , a m on g ot h er t h in gs , los s of e xp ect a t ion of life or loss of am enit ies.
4. If Duncan v. Bad deley is r igh t ly d ecide d, a cla im for da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n in g s i s a cl a im for d a m a ge s for “a ct u a l fi n a n ci a l l os s”, s o t h a t a deceased person’s estat e can claim such dama ges; tha t is, the claim sur vives the d ea t h of t h e de ce a se d p er s on .
5. A child, spouse, 3-year het erosexua l cohabitan t held out a s a consort, par ent, steppa ren t, gr an dpa ren t, br oth er or sist er of a de ceased per son is en tit led t o claim dam ages from a wr ongdoer wh o has cau sed th e deat h of the deceased per son, based on the claima nt’s reasonable expectations of futu re finan cial contr ibutions or services from t he deceased per son. These ar e referred t o as “dependen cy” claims but do not depe nd on a ctu al d epen den cy.
6. The h usba nd or wife of a deceased person, or a 3-year het erosexual cohabita nt who h a s b ee n h eld ou t a s t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s con sor t , is en t it led, wit h ou t evid en ce of l os s , t o cl a im fi xe d s t a t u t or y a m ou n t s of d a m a ge s fr om a p er s on w h o w r on g fu l ly ca u s ed t h e d ea t h of t h e de ce a se d p er s on . So i s a ch i ld or p a r en t i f t h e su r v iv in g or deceas ed child w as a m inor or , being u nd er 2 6 yea rs of age, wa s n ot living wit h a coh a b it a n t . Th e da m a g es a r e for g r ie f a n d t h e l os s of g u id a n ce , ca r e a n d
20
compa nionship.
7. “Dependen cy” claims ar e based in par t on t he deceased per son’s chan ce of fut ur e ea r n in gs , s o t h a t if a n es t a t e ca n cla im da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n in gs , t h er e w ill b e a n over la p a n d t h e w r on gd oer m a y h a ve t o pa y t wice for t h e sam e element of loss. Where t he claima nt s un der t he Fatal Accidents Act a n d t h e ben eficiar ies u nd er th e es ta te a re th e sa me , wh ich is th e m ost comm on ca se, t he overla p is r esolved, at leas t in pa rt , by set tin g off aga ins t a “depen den cy” claim be n efit s r ece ive d fr om t h e e st a t e b y t h e s u r viv or by r ea son of t h e w r on gfu l a ct . Wh er e t h e e st a t e goes t o cr ed it or s or ot h er be n eficia r ies, t h er e ca n be du pl ica t ion of dama ges.
F. Nature and Amount of Claim For Loss of Chance of Future Earnings
1. Nature of the claim a. Characterization of the claim by the jurisprudence In cases of person al in jur y cau sed b y wr ongful condu ct, t he cour ts aw ar d da ma ges to a pla int iff aga ins t t he w rongd oer or oth er r espons ible per son for wh at is va r iou sl y ch a r a ct er ize d a s l oss of “ea r n in g ca pa cit y”, los s of “a bi lit y t o ea r n ” or “los s of futur e earn ings.” The court s ha ve referred t o the loss, however it is cha racterized, as t he loss of a pr esent capita l asset . 35 Th e va lu e of t h e a ss et , is , h owe ver , ba se d on th e pr esen t va lue of th e ea rn ings w hich t he p lain tiff, before t he in jur y, could r ea son a bl y h a ve expe ct ed t o r ece ive du r in g t h e t im e of t h e p la in t iff’s l ife expe ct a n cy a s i t st ood a t t h a t t im e. If t h e in ju r y h a s r es u lt ed in t h e r ed u ct ion of t h e p la in t iff’s life expecta ncy, th e poten tia l ear nin gs wh ich th e court s will va lue in clude t he ear nin gs wh ich th e pla int iff could rea sona bly be expect ed t o ha ve received d ur ing th e “lost yea rs ” as well a s du rin g th e yea rs of th e pla int iff’s life expecta ncy as it
S e e R . v. J e n n in g s [196 6] S.C .R. 5 32 a t 5 46, 5 7 D .L.R . (2d) 6 44. p er J u ds on J . J u ds on J . wa s sp ea ki n g on ly for h im se lf. S ee . a lso A n d rew s v. G ra n d & T oy [197 8] 2 S .C.R . 229 at 257 ,83 D .L.R . (3d) 452 [h ere ina fter cited t o S.C.R.], per Dicks on C J , spea kin g for th e cour t. Se e als o per Ker an s J .A. in D u n c a n v. B a d d e l ey , s u p r a n o t e 2 a t p a r a . 1 0 .
35
21
st a n ds a t t h e t im e of t h e t r ia l. T h e cou r t s m a ke d ed u ct ion s fr om t h e va lu e of t h e l os t ea r n i n gs t o cov er v a r iou s con t i n ge n ci es . T h e d a m a ge s a w a r d ed wi ll be t h e pr es en t va lu e of t h a t por t ion of t h e e a r n in g ca pa cit y, a bi lit y t o ea r n , or fu t u r e ear nings, t ha t h as been lost, less the dedu ctions for cont ingencies.
The qu estion whet her or not a living plaint iff whose life expecta ncy has been r ed u ced by a n ot h er pe r son ’s w r on gfu l a ct sh ou ld be a wa r de d d a m a ges for t h e loss of a cha nce of ear nings du ring t he “lost years ” is outside t he scope of this rep ort. The quest ion addr essed by th is report is whet her , acceptin g tha t su ch dam ages will be awa rded for th e compen sat ion of a living plaintiff, th e claim should su rvive th e claiman t’s deat h for the ben efit of the claima nt ’s esta te.
b. Characterization of the claim as loss of “earning capacity” or as loss of a “chance” The ter m “loss of ear nin g capa city” ha s r eceived rep eat ed jud icial re cognit ion a t a ll levels of cou r t s. We do n ot t h in k, h owe ver , t h a t it r eflect s t h e r ea lit y of t h e sit ua tion . While t he ch ar act eriza tion of a loss m ay n ot dicta te t he p olicy of th e law i n r el a t ion t o t h a t l os s , w e t h i n k t h a t , in t h e in t e r es t s of p r op er a n a l ys is , ca r e sh ould be t a ke n t o recogn ize wh a t i s in volved.
To take a n exam ple at one extrem e, we do not t hink th at a n ewborn infan t, however g r ea t t h e pot e n t ia l of a n y h u m a n be in g for m a t u r i n g i n t o a n i n com e -e a r n in g ind ividu al m ay b e, can rea sona bly be s aid to h ave a p res en t e ar nin g capa city, capability, faculty or power. At t he oth er extr eme, even a middle-aged ten ur ed un iversity pr ofessor, while th ey ma y ha ve a st rong probability of continu ed ea r n in gs , a t lea st over t h e n ea r t er m , dep en ds for t h ose ea r n in gs n ot on ly u pon th eir inbu ilt capabilities bu t a lso upon th eir cont inuin g healt h a nd t he em ploymen t en viron me nt in w hich th ey find t he ms elf. The u se of th e t erm “ea rn ing ca pa city” suggests th at a capa bility of ear ning m oney is a qua lity which is inbu ilt int o every in di vid u a l, i n clu di n g bot h t h e n ew bor n in fa n t a n d t h e u n ive r si t y p r ofes sor , re ga rd less of th e circu ms ta nces in wh ich t he in divid ua l m a y find th em self, a su ggest ion wh ich we do not th ink is jus tified. Th e sa me is tr ue of th e te rm “ab ility t o e a r n .”
22
Som et im es t h e loss or da m a ge is ch a r a ct er ize d a s “los s of fu t u r e e a r n in gs .” Us e of t h is t er m su gge st s t h a t , a t t h e t im e of t h e w r on g d on e t o t h e p la in t iff, fu t u r e ea r n in gs exis t ed in a sce r t a in a bl e a m ou n t s, or t h a t t h eir fu t u r e occu r r en ce w a s i n ev it a b le , b u t t h is is n ot s o: t h e r e i s n o w a y of k n ow in g wh e t h er a n d h ow m u ch a person will earn in the futu re or would have earn ed but for an injury. There is at most a n int era ction bet ween a n ind ividual’s qua lities an d th eir environm ent – con t in u ed h ea lt h a n d t h e a va ila bi lit y of job s, for exa m pl e – t h a t m a y or m a y n ot m a ke a pe r son ’s s er vice s or en t r ep r en eu r ia l q u a lit ies of v a lu e a t a giv en fu t u r e tim e. We th ink th at th e th ree ter ms – “loss of fut ur e ea rn ings”, “loss of ear nin g cap a city” an d “abi lit y t o ear n” – a re a t b est im pr ecise a nd a re lik ely t o mis lea d.
I n Duncan v. Bad deley, Kerans J .A. said this:36
“...in my view the settled law is that a claim for loss of any future earnings is to be assessed on a simple probabilities basis, as a loss of a chance.”
We agree with th is stat ement . We agree th at the claim should be assessed a s a claim for t he loss of a cha nce. That is because we t hink th at th e claim is a cla im for l os s of a ch a n ce . W e t h i n k t h a t t h e be st ch a r a ct e r iz a t ion of w h a t a n in d iv id u a l h a s in r ela t ion t o fu t u r e e a r n in gs is a “cha n ce” – a pos si bi lit y or pr oba bi lit y of somet hin g ha ppen ing: a s dist inct fr om a cert ain ty 37 – th at th e ear nings will be received. Th at is, th e ind ividua l will receive ea rn ings in th e fut ur e if th ey live; if th ey continu e to be in sufficiently good hea lth ; if th ey have or will acquire qu alities th at will enable th em t o earn money by ma king t hings, by ren derin g services, or by enga ging in ent rep ren eur ial a ctivity; a nd if the y choose to work or ot her wise t ur n th ose qua lities to a ccoun t. Th is is a possibilit y in t he ca se of the infa nt . It is a pr obabilit y in t he ca se of the un ivers ity p rofessor. Bu t in both cases it is a poss ibilit y or p roba bilit y – t ha t i s, a cha nce – th a t cer ta in even ts will occur .
36
Su pra note 2 at p ara . 4.
37
T h e O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y , 2d ed ., s . v . “c h a n c e .”
23
This cha ra cterizat ion – “a cha nce of futu re ea rn ings” – seems t o us to be an accur at e des cript ion of wha t a per son h as . Desp ite th e differen t t erm inology th at h a s b ee n u se d, “loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r n in gs ” see m s t o u s t o be a n a ccu r a t e description of wha t t he courts h ave been va luing. The a ssessm ent alwa ys comes dow n t o wh a t t h e livi n g p la in t iff or de cea se d p er son , a ft er a llowin g for t h e vici ss it u de s of l ife, m igh t h a ve be en expe ct ed t o ea r n bu t for t h e w r on gfu l a ct t h a t depr ived t he m of th at cha nce. H owever, w e will u se t he te rm “ea rn ing ca pa city” wh en descr ibin g th e exist ing la w a nd as an alt ern at ive in discu ssin g lega l policy. Th e d iffer en ce in t er m in ology will n ot u su a lly le a d t o a di ffer en ces in con clu si on s, bu t we t h in k it de si r a bl e t o kee p i n m in d w h a t is t h e t r u e s u bje ct of di scu ss ion .
c. Characterization of the loss as a present loss The courts cha ra cterize th e loss of earn ing capacity as a pr esent loss. However, we th ink t ha t t he a ctua l fina ncial loss will be experienced only in t he fut ur e, when t he inju red or decea sed p ers on does n ot r eceive ea rn ings wh ich t he y would h ave received bu t for t he in jur y or dea th . The a sses sm ent of da ma ges m eas ur es only wh at would h ave fallen in in th e fut ur e bu t for t he wr ongdoin g; dete rm inin g th e pr es en t va lu e of fu t u r e e a r n in gs m er ely r ecogn ize s t h a t m on ey pa id t oda y is wor t h mor e t ha n m oney pa id t omor row.
I n Duncan v. Bad deley, 38 Ker an s J .A. drew a n a na logy between a loss of ear nin g capacity an d th e loss of fut ur e ren ta ls in resp ect of ren ta l propert y destr oyed by a t or t fea sor . We do n ot t h in k t h a t t h e a n a logy is pr ecise . Th e p r ope r t y of a n own er of ren ta l pr opert y includ es a n a sset which is r ealiza ble in th e pr esen t a nd which will become pa rt of th e owner ’s est at e if th e owner dies. Th e loss of the r ent al p roper ty is ther efore an imm ediate loss which is experienced in the pr esent. On t he other h an d, an ind ividu al w ho h as ea rn ing ca pa city or a cha nce of fut ur e ea rn ings does n ot h ave an as set which is r ealiza ble in th e pr esen t, n or do th ey ha ve an as set which will become pa rt of th eir es ta te if t hey d ie. The e ffect of the loss ca n be exper ienced only i n t h e fu t u r e .
38
Su pra note 2 at p ara . 7.
24 It is t ru e th at th ere is a sense in which th e char acter ization of th e loss as a pr esent l os s is a ccu r a t e : a n i n di vi du a l doe s h a v e a p r os p ect or ch a n ce of e a r n in g s i n t h e fu t u r e , a n d d ea t h or a n i n ca p a ci t a t in g in ju r y wh ol ly or p a r t ia l ly de pr i ve s t h e i n di vi du a l of t h a t p r os p ect or ch a n ce in t h e pr e se n t . T h a t is t h e b a s is of t h e li vi n g p la i n t iff’s cl a im for l os s of e a r n in g ca p a ci t y. H ow ev er , t h e ch a r a ct e r is t ics of t h e a ss et a s ou t lin ed in t h e p r ece di n g p a r a gr a ph a r e, we t h in k, m a t er ia l t o t h e d is cu s s ion .
2. Substantial damages are awarded for loss of earning capacity Aw a r ds of d a m a ge s for l os t ea r n i n g ca p a ci t y m a y be su b st a n t i a l. In t h e 19 78 t r il og y of S u p r em e Cou r t d eci si on s , for e xa m p le , t h e da m a g es we r e fi xe d a t $ 70 ,0 00 for a 23 -yea r old a pp r en t ice CN R ca r m a n ;39 $61,000 for an 18-year old boy who had been a h i gh s ch ool st u d en t a t t h e t im e of t h e a cci de n t ;40 an d $54,00 0 for a 4 1 /2-year old girl. 41 More recently, to take some other examples:
1. I n Toneguzz o-N orvell v Burn aby Hospital 42 th e Supr eme Court of Can ada confirmed th e tr ial ju dge’s a sses sm ent of $292,000 in d am ages for t he loss of th e ea rn ing capacity of a n ewborn ba by who sust ain ed birt h inju ries, but applied t o it a 50% allowance for living expenses, pres um ably resu lting in a n a war d of $146,000.
2.
39
An drews, su pra note 35.
40
T h orn ton v. T r u s t e es o f S c h o o l D i s t r i c t N o . 5 7 ( P r i n c e G e o r g e ), [1 9 7 8 ] 2 S .C . R . 2 6 7 , 8 3 D L R ( 3 r d ) 480.
41
A rn o l d v. T e n o [ 1 9 7 8 ] 2 S . C . R . 2 8 7 , 8 3 D . L .R . (3 d ) 6 0 9 .
42
[1994] 1 S.C.R. 114., 110 D.L.R. (4th) 289.
25 I n Brown et al. v. Un iversity of Alberta Hospital et al. 43 , Marceau J . of the Alberta Que en’s Ben ch a sses sed t he d am ages of a 3 -mont h old ba by for loss of ear nin g capacity at $196,000.
3. I n Brooks and B rooks Estate v. S tefura, 44 Belzil J . awar ded $171,000, subject t o set off of Fatal Accidents Act de pe n de n cy cla im s, in t h e ca se of a 37 yea r old wh o h a d been ea rn ing $33,000 per year .
The size of awa rds does not h ave a nyth ing to do with t he legal pr inciples involved other th an th ose of the a ssessm ent of dam ages. These a moun ts do demonst ra te, howe ver , th a t t he dis cus sion in volves s ign ifican t l ega l a nd econom ic int er est s.
G. Should an Estate Be Able to Recover Damages for the Deceased Person’s Loss of a Chance of Future Earnings?
Th e q u es t ion wh et h er or n ot a cla im for da m a ges for a los s of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ear nin gs – or for a loss of ear nin g capa city – sh ould su rvive t he cla ima nt ’s dea th is con t r ov er s ia l . F or ce fu l a r gu m e n t s ca n b e m a d e for s a yi n g t h a t t h e cl a im s h ou l d su rv ive. F orcefu l a rg um en ts can be m a de for s a yin g t ha t i t s hou ld n ot.
We th ink th at th e discus sion sh ould st ar t by a ddr essin g a n um ber of ba sic qu est ions. Wh at is t he pu rp ose – or, wh at ar e t he pu rp oses – of tort da ma ges? Why does t he law confer a cla im for d am age s for t he loss of a cha nce of fut ur e ea rn ings on a living plaint iff? Do th ose reasons a pply with equ al force to conferring th e claim on th e esta te of the pers on who suffered t he inju ry? Does th e doctr ine of her ita bility of p r op er t y a n d r i gh t s m a n d a t e t h e su r v iv a l of s u ch a cl a im ? I s t h e s u r vi va l of t h e cl a im n e ce ss a r y i n or d er t o a v oi d a r b it r a r in e ss in t h e la w ? I s it n e ce ss a r y i n or d er t o
43
(199 7) 19 7 AR 237 (Q.B .)
44
Su pra note 33.
26
do ju st ice? F or con ven ien ce a n d r ea da bi lit y we w ill d ea l wit h t h es e q u es t ion s u n de r hea din gs wh ich a nn oun ce our conclusions . After dea ling wit h t he q ues tion s, we will pu t for wa r d a Con clu si on a n d S u m m a t ion on t h e p r in cip a l q u es t ion .
1. Damages for the loss of a chance of future earnings are and should be com pensatory a. The general rule Tor t da m a ges, in ou r vie w, a r e com pe n sa t ion t o a vict im for t h e con se qu en ces of wr ongdoin g. 45 We thin k th at th at is wha t t he la w of tort dam ages is. It is a lso what we t h in k t h e la w of t or t da m a ges s h ou ld be . H owe ver , in vie w of Duncan v. Bad deley we t hin k it necess ar y to discus s both th e exist ing la w a nd th e ap pr opria te policy of th e la w a t s ome len gth .
I n Duncan v. Bad deley, 46 Ke r a n s J .A. t ook is su e w it h t h e p r opos it ion t h a t t or t da ma ges a re comp en sa tor y:
[14] ...those who argue on the basis that tort law is only about compensation must...answer the challenge that some aspects of tort law (e.g. punitive damages) are emphatically about something other than compensation...47
[15] Arguments based on the notion of compensation assume that the gods have decided that compensation is the talisman for tort recovery. That is a social-policy choice open to the legislators, but it has never been the law. Other values also underpin the law, as explained by Professor Klar in his work Tort Law (Carswell) from p.10. And there are other social-policy choices available to the legislature, like the notion of rational maximization of low-risk costs as suggested by the economic theory of the law.
Bu t De a n Kla r m a kes it clea r t h a t compe n sa t ion is t h e r em ed y p r ovid ed by t or t la w:
45
E x c ep t i on a l ca s e s a r e d ea l t w it h b e lo w .
46
Su pra note 2 at p ara s. 14, 15.
47
W e w i l l co m e b a c k t o t h i s p o i n t l a t e r .
27
It is trite to point out that a fault-based compensation law compensates victims only where their injuries have been caused by the fault of others. It is important to stress, though, that compensation, for its own sake, is not the purpose of tort of law but rather the remedy offered by it, after liability based upon fault has been established. The reasons why the law compensates victims of wrongdoing are what accurately describe the objectives of a fault-based civil justice system.48
Dean Klar goes on to discuss other pur poses of tort law.
In discussing justice, he says that
[Tort law’s] theoretical underpinning – that a wrongdoer who injures another ought to be required to repair the damage and restore the victim – is clearly an integral part of our system of values. 49
Tha t is, repa ir a nd r estora tion ar e par t of the th eoretical un derpin ning of tort law. Th ese a re compe ns a tor y n otion s.
He goes on t o say:
The justice component of traditional tort law principles includes several different, but related, values. It involves the question of fairness, i.e., that it is fair that a person who causes a loss should repair it. The punishment of the wrongdoer and the consequent appeasement of the victim are bound up in it. Personal accountability and responsibility, the ability to control one’s own destiny and make one’s own choices, are values which are meaningful only if one assumes responsibility for one’s own choices and actions. 50
48
L. K la r, T o r t L a w 2 n d e d . ( S c a r b o r o u g h : C a r s w e l l , 1 9 9 6 ) a t 1 0 - 1 1 .
49
Ib id . a t 1 2 .
50
I bi d . [em ph a sis a dd ed ].
28 And la te r, h avin g point ed out th at wh ere liab ility in su ra nce a pplies it is us ua lly th e lia bi lit y in su r er wh o pa ys , Dea n Kla r goes on :
Looking at the principle of justice from the perspective of the victim, different considerations arise. Notwithstanding who pays for the injuries caused through the wrongdoing of a defendant, tort law allows victims to be fully compensated for their injuries. 51
D ea n K la r g oe s on 52 t o di scu ss ot h er fu n ct ion s of t or t la w: d et er r en ce, e du ca t ion , and a n ombudsma n-like function. He refers to other purposes and functions th at ha ve been pu t forwa rd for t ort law: a grieva nce m echa nis m; a n “int ers tit ial bon din g agent ”, an “inter stit ial resolver of individua l conflict...in a free, an d sometim es t u r bu len t soci et y; a n or m a t ive fu n ct ion ; r ed u ct ion of occur r en ce, a n d s ever it y, of injury-causing events; protecting entitlement s; responding to representat ions; pr otectin g expecta tion s; qua lita tive r econciliation of individ ua l an d social in ter est s; pr oviding r ela tive clear st an da rd s of condu ct; an d r econciliat ion t hr ough a ba la n cin g p r oces s of com pe t in g in t er es t s. Bu t , wh a t ever a dd it ion a l fu n ct ion s t or t la w m a y p er for m , it s r em ed y a s s t a t ed by De a n Kla r is com pe n sa t ion .
K er a n s J . A. in Duncan v. Bad deley, 53 wa s “impr esse d wit h t he excellent his tor y an d a na lysis offer ed b y S.M. Wa dda ms in hi s La w of Dam a ges (2n d E d. 19 95).”54 But Pr ofessor Wa dda ms equ at es da ma ges wit h compen sa tion . Wha t h e sa ys in t he pr eface to t he fir st edit ion of his work , which is pu blish ed wit h t he t hir d edit ion, is this:
51
I bi d . [em ph a sis a dd ed ].
52
I bi d . a t 1 4 - 1 8 .
53
Su pra note 2 at p ara . 17.
Th is w ork is n ow in its th ird ed ition : S. M . Wa dd am s, T h e La w of Da m a g es , 3 d ed . (T or o n t o: Ca n a da La w B ook, 19 97 ).
54
29
Where compensation in money has to be made for a wrong, a set of principles is needed to govern the assessment of the proper money sum. These principles constitute the law of damages.
And Pr ofessor Wadda ms’ chapt er on P ersona l Injur ies 55 , wh ich a pp ea r s i n a pa r t of his book entitled “Compensa tory Damages”, commences with th ese words”
Compensation for personal injuries involves, to a large extent, compensation for loss that will not yet have occurred at the time of trial. The common law system of assessing damages has always been as a single, once-and-for-all lump sum...
Professor Waddam s thu s equates da mages for wrongs, including personal injuries, with comp ens at ion, an d h is cha pt er is ba sed on t he p rem ise t ha t compen sa tion is th e pu rp ose of da ma ges.
A pass age fr om t he ju dgm ent of Dickson CJ in A n d rew s v. Grand & Toy Alberta L t d .56 , a de cis ion wh ich de a lt a m on g ot h er t h in gs wit h da m a ges for t h e loss of ea r n in g ca pa cit y, s t a t es t h e b a si c pr in ciple of tor t da m a ges:
The basic principle was stated by Viscount Dunedin in Admiralty Com’rs v. S.S. “Susquehanna” [1926] A.C. 655 at p. 661 (cited with approval in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, [1964] A.C. 326 at p. 345), in these words:
...the common law says that the damages due either for breach of contract or for tort are damages which, so far as money can compensate, will give the injured
55
I bi d . a t 1 5 7 , p a r a . 3 . 1 0 .
A n d r e w s s u p r a , n ote 35 a t 2 40 . Re fer en ce m igh t a lso b e m a de to t h e la te r ca se of W a t k in s v. Ol af son [ 1 9 8 9 ] 2 S . C . R . 7 5 0 at 7 5 7 , 6 1 D .L.R . (4th ) 577 a t 58 1 w h e re M c La c hlin J ., de live ring th e ju d gm e n t of t h e S u p r em e C ou r t , r e fe r re d a t p . 5 81 t o “t h e fu n d a m e n ta l p r in cip le s u p on w h ich t h e a ss es sm en t of d a m a ges for p er son a l in ju r y a r e fou n de d – th e b a sic con cep ts of r e s t i t u t i o i n i n t e g r u m an d fu ll bu t fa ir com pen sa tion ,” and to t he jud gm en t of McL ach lin J ., spea kin g for t he m ajor ity, in R a t y c h v. B loom er [ 1 9 9 0 ], S . C .R . 9 4 0 , 9 6 2 -9 6 3 , 9 8 1 .
56
30
party reparation for the wrongful act...
The principle was phrased differently by Lord Dunedin in the earlier case of Admiralty Com’rs v. S.S. “Valeria”, [1922] 2 A.C. 242 at p. 248, but to the same effect:
...in calculating damages you are to consider what is the pecuniary sum which will make good to the sufferer, so far as money can do so, the loss which he has suffered as the natural result of the wrong done to him.
The principle that compensation should be for full pecuniary loss is well-established: see McGregor on Damages, 13th ed. (1972), pp. 738-9, para 1097:
The plaintiff can recover, subject to the rules of remoteness and mitigation, full compensation for the pecuniary loss he has suffered. This is today a clear principle of law.
So, in our view, the tort-law gods have indeed decided that tort dam ages -- that is, t h e r em ed y gi ven by t or t la w on ce lia bi lit y h a s b ee n es t a bl is h ed -- a r e b a se d on compensa tion, that is, on a warding a n a mount of money “which will make good to th e sufferer, so far as m oney can do so, the loss which he h as su ffered a s th e na tu ra l re su lt of th e wr ong d one t o him .”
F u r t h er , in ou r vie w, da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r n in gs – or of ear ning capa city – not only are ba sed on compen sat ion but ough t to be based on com p en s a t ion , 57 tha t is to say, upon th e notion th at a wrongdoer or those responsible for a wrongdoer’s condu ct should ma ke am ends t o a person inju red by t h e w r on gfu l con du ct , or , s o fa r a s p r a ct ica bl e, r es t or e t h e in ju r ed pe r son t o t h e pos it ion in wh ich t h e in ju r ed pe r son wou ld h a ve be en bu t for t h e w r on g. W e d o n ot see an y other a ppropria te ba sis for t he a war d of dam ages u nder a fau lt-based sy st em of t or t la w, or , in pa r t icu la r , for a n a wa r d of d a m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of future ear nings.
57
T h e O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y , 2n d e d., s . v . “com p e n sa t ion ”: “2 .a . T h a t wh ich is giv en in r ecom pe n se , a n eq u iva len t r en de r ed , r em u n er a ti on , a m en ds ; 2.b . Am en ds or r ecom pe n se for l oss or dam age.”
31 b. The exceptions to the com pensation principle I n Duncan v. Bad deley, Keran s J .A., in a pa ssage qu oted above, att acked th e pr opos it ion t h a t t or t da m a ges a r e com pe n sa t or y on t h e b a si s t h a t “som e a sp ect s of tort law (e.g. pun itive dam ages) are em pha tically about somet hing oth er t ha n com p en s a t ion .” T h er e is n o s u gg es t ion i n hi s ju d gm e n t t h a t Duncan v. Bad deley is a ca s e for p u n it i ve da m a g es ; t h e r efe r en ce t o p u n it i ve da m a g es is on l y t o u n d er m i n e th e gen er a l pr oposit ion t ha t t ort da ma ges a re compe ns a tor y.
Here are a couple of statements from Professor Waddams’ book:58
An exception exists to the general rule that damages are compensatory. This is the case of an award made for the purpose not of compensating the plaintiff but of punishing the defendant. Such awards have been called exemplary, vindictive, penal, punitive, aggravated, and retributory, but the expressions in common modern use to describe damages going beyond compensatory are exemplary and punitive damages....
The theoretical justification for an award of exemplary damages has long been debated, for it appears anomalous for a civil court to impose what is in effect a find for conduct it finds to be worthy of punishment, and then to remit the fine, not to the State Treasury, but to an individual plaintiff who will, by definition, be over-compensated. The arguments in favour of exemplary damages are that deterrence, as well as compensation, is a legitimate aim of the civil law and that conduct worthy of punishment may often not fall within the scope of the criminal law, or may not be thought to justify prosecution, or if prosecuted, may be insufficiently punished. A reason given more commonly in earlier times than recently is that an award of exemplary damages suppresses the likelihood of duelling and private vengeance.
Th e exist en ce of pu nit ive da ma ges, of cour se, pr oves th at not all t ort da ma ges awa rds a re m erely compen sat ory. It says n othing, however, to cont rovert t he existence of a r ule th at dam ages a re t o be compensa tory except in rest ricted exceptiona l circum sta nces which call for an other ru le. Indeed, th e very existence of a r ule p erm itt ing n on-comp ens at ory da ma ges a s a n a cknowledged exceptiona l ru le sh ows t h a t t h e gen er a l r u le exis t s; t h is m a y be a ca se in wh ich it is cor r ect t o sa y
58
Su pra note 54 at 483, pa ras. 11.10 and 11.20.
32 th at th e exception pr oves th e ru le, eith er in th e sen se t ha t it pr oves th at th e ru le exists, or in th e sense t ha t it test s th e ru le.59
Pr ofessor Wadda ms gives add itional exam ples of exceptiona l kinds of awar ds 60 , in clu di n g d a m a ges m ea su r ed by be n efit s d er ive d b y d efe n da n t s fr om wr on gfu l a ct s 61 , nominal dam ages and contem ptuous dam ages.62
Non e of t h es e s pe cia l cir cu m st a n ces a pp ly t o ca se s of l oss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n in gs . I n ou r vie w, it is t h e b a si c pr in cip le of da m a ge a ss es sm en t , wh ich Professor Waddam s characterizes as “compensa tory,” which applies.
c. Conclusion as to purpose of dam ages for loss of chance of future earnings In ou r opi n ion , for t h e r ea son s g ive n a bove, da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs – or for l os s of e a r n in g ca p a ci t y – a s a ge n er a l r u le a r e a n d s h ou l d be compen sat ory, and da ma ges for t he loss of a cha nce of futu re ea rn ings fall und er th a t g en er a l r ul e, n one of t he re cognized except ions bein g a ppl icab le.
2. An award to an estate of dam ages for a deceased person’s loss of a chance of future earnings is not com pensatory a. The loss of a chance of future earnings is personal to the victim and its loss does not affect the victim estate ’s
59
T h e O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y , 2d ed ., s . v . “pr ove”: “1 . T o m a k e t r i a l o f, t r y, t es t .”
60
P r o f e s s or W a d d a m s a l s o d is c u s s e s l iq u i d a t e d d a m a g e s s u p r a n ote 54 , 44 5 ff. W h er e t h es e a r e n ot in va lida te d t h ey a re of cour se a re m ed y con tr act ed for b y t h e p ar tie s.
61
I bi d . a t 4 6 5 - 4 7 0 .
62
I bi d . a t 4 7 7 - 7 9 , 4 8 1 .
33 I n Duncan v. Bad deley, 63 Kera ns J .A., in his discussion of s. 6 of th e S urviv al of Actions Act, r ecog n iz ed t h a t t h e los s of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs – or of e a r n in g capacity – is a loss to th e injur ed person bu t is n ot a loss to th e esta te:
I would agree that the section would deprive the estate of a claim if the loss of ability to earn is a loss to the estate as a result of the death. But the loss of the ability to earn as I have said is a loss to the deceased, not a special claim by his estate. Section 6 forbids special awards to the estate simply for the fact of death. 64
We a gr ee t h a t t h e loss is pe r son a l t o t h e d ece a se d p er son . Th e ch a n ce of fu t u r e ear nin gs, or ea rn ing cap acit y, is not somet hin g th at th e deceas ed per son could dispose of while living or by will, and its loss is not a loss to th e esta te. 65
Kerans J .A., in a passa ge quoted below, used as an example two deceased persons, one whose Cart ier watch is destroyed and one whose ability to earn is destroyed. This is a useful exam ple.66
63
Su pra note 2 at p ara . 23.
64
Se ct ion 6 r ea ds a s fol low s:
“If the death of a person was caused by an act or omission that gives rise to a cause of action, the damages shall be calculated without reference to a loss or gain to his estate as a result of his death,... except for funeral and disposal expenses.”
65
I n L a m e y v . W e n t w o r t h V a l l e y D e v el o p m e n t s L t d ., [1998] N .S.J . N o. 411, W right J . of th e N ova S c ot i a S u p r e m e C o u r t d i st i n g u i sh e d D u n c a n v. Ba dd e le y o n t h e g r ou n d s t h a t t h e N o va S c ot i a c ou n t e r p a r t t o s . 5 of t h e S u r v iv a l of Ac t io n s Ac t p r ov id e s t h a t “o n ly d a m a g e s t h a t h a v e r e su l t e d in a ctu a l p ecu n ia r y los s t o th e es ta te a r e r ecov er a ble ”, wh ile A lbe r ta ’s s . 5 a llow s “a ctu a l fin a n cia l los s t o th e d ecea sed or h is es ta te .”
66
I n G a l a n d E s t a t e v. S t e w a r t ( 1 9 9 2 ) 1 3 5 A. R . 1 2 9 , [1 9 9 3 ] 4 W W R 2 0 5 a t p a r a . 2 4 , C ôt é J . A . u s e d t h e e xa m p le of a n in com e -p r od u cin g m a ch in e a n d s a id t h a t it is cle a r be yon d q u es t ion t h a t th e wr on g fu l des tr uct ion of su ch a m ach ine wou ld give th e de ceas ed a cau se of act ion a nd a s ur vivin g rig ht to fu ll c om p e n s a t i o n . T h e d i f f e r e n c e t h a t w e s e e b e t w e e n a n i n c o m e - p r o d u c i n g m a c h i n e a n d t h e i n c o m e p r o d u c i n g a s p ects o f an in d iv id u a l, is th a t , un like th e la tt e r, s u c h a m a c hin e w ould be s om e th ing t h at c ou l d b e b o u g h t a n d s o l d , w h i c h w o u l d b e o f v a l u e t o o t h e r s , a n d t h e l o s s of w h i c h w o u l d r e d u c e t h e i n d i v i d u a l ’s e s t a t e .
34
Cons ider firs t t he sit ua ti on wh ich w ill exi st if no wr ongfu l condu ct is in volved. T he dest ru ction of the Car tier wa tch w ill red uce t he d eceased per son’s h erit ab le pr opert y an d will t hu s r edu ce th e am oun t of proper ty in th e est at e, which will a ccord in gly su ffer a loss t hr ough th e de st ru ction of th e wa tch . Howe ver , th e destr uction of th e other d eceased person’s ability t o earn will not redu ce tha t deceased person’s her ita ble property a nd will not r educe th e esta te.
Con si de r n ext t h e s it u a t ion wh ich wou ld exis t if wr on gd oer s ca u se d b ot h de a t h s a n d th e destr uction of th e Car tier wa tch, an d if each estat e is ent itled to recover da m a ges fr om it s ow n wr on gd oer . Th e d a m a ges r ecover ed by t h e fir st es t a t e for t h e de st r u ct ion of t h e C a r t ier wa t ch will com pe n sa t e t h e e st a t e for t h e loss of t h e w a t ch . H owe ver , d a m a ges r ecover ed by t h e s econ d e st a t e for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n in gs will n ot com pe n sa t e t h e s econ d e st a t e for a los s b eca u se t h e s econ d e st a t e did not su ffer a loss thr ough th e deceased person’s loss of tha t cha nce. The dam ages pa id t o th e se cond es ta te will b e a win dfa ll t o th a t e st a te .
While the loss of a chan ce of future ear nings is treat ed as a present loss, it is defined by even ts which will occur, or w hich w ill not occur, in th e fut ur e, th at is, it is define d by t he fu tu re n on-receipt of income wh ich would h ave b een received in th e futu re bu t for the wr ongful a ct. The only person who can be sa id to suffer t ha t los s i s t h e d ece a se d p er son .
For th ese r eas ons, it is our view th at th e loss of a chan ce of fut ur e ea rn ings is per sona l to t he vict im a nd its loss does n ot a ffect t he vict im’s est at e. The re is th er efore n oth in g for wh ich t he est a te can be comp en sa te d by d a ma ges.
b. An award of damages cannot compensate the injured person B y t h e ve r y n a t u r e of t h i n gs , a n a w a r d of d a m a ge s for t h e los s of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ear nings – or of earn ing capacity – cann ot compen sat e a deceased per son or be en joyed by a decea sed per son .
35
If t h e cla im for da m a ges s u r viv es t h e d ea t h of t h e cla im a n t , t h e p r ocee ds of t h e awa rd m ust inevita bly go th rough t he deceased per son’s esta te, which did n ot suffer t h e loss , t o som e p er son or pe r son s w h o di d n ot su ffer t h e loss . Da m a ges w h ich cannot go to the per son who has suffered th e loss an d must go to persons who did not su ffer t he loss can not , in ou r vie w, be compen sa tor y.
I n Duncan v. Bad deley, Ke r a n s J .A. s a id t h is : 67 at p. 166:
The only thing different about this compensation is that we know it will not go directly to the victim personally. It confuses the issue to describe that fact as non-compensatory.
It seem s t o us t ha t t his differen ce is a d iffere nce in kin d. Som et hin g th at will n ot go to a victim per sona lly can not comp en sa te th e victim for a loss su ffere d by t he victim. Something tha t will go to a person’s estat e, which ha s not suffered a loss, cannot be called compensatory, because t here is nothing for which to compensa te th e es ta te .
K er a n s J . A. sa i d l a t er :68
I would only add that I see no justice in a rule whereby the respondent need not offer compensation because Duncan can no longer enjoy it. In my view, what shall happen to the award after it is made is essentially irrelevant in a tort suit. Were that not so, each trial must canvass what likely will happen to the award after it is received. Will the claimant later not enjoy the fruits of his suit because he is bad with money or has some personality defect? These issues have never been seen as part of tort law.
It is qu it e t r u e t h a t a for eca st of wh a t a pl a in t iff will d o wit h t h e p r ocee ds of a n
67
Su pra note 2 at p ara . 14.
68
I bi d . a t p a r a . 1 7 .
36
a wa r d of d a m a ges i s n ot a legit im a t e con si de r a t ion in de cid in g wh et h er or n ot a p la i n t iff i s e n t it l ed t o com p en s a t ion . B u t we do n ot t h in k t h a t t h e p os si bi li t y of a p la i n t iff’s fu t u r e im p r u d en ce is a fa ct or of t h e sa m e k in d , for p ol icy pu r p os es , a s t h e fa ct t h a t a n a w a r d ca n n ot p os s ib ly se r ve t h e on l y p u r p os e for w h ich t h e la w wou l d a n d s h ou ld a wa r d i t , t h a t is , t h e com pe n sa t ion of t h e in ju r ed pe r son .
An award t o an estat e therefore cannot, in our view, be justified on th e basis of compensa tion, which, as we have noted, is and, in our view ought to be, the basis of da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r n in gs , or of ea r n in g ca pa cit y. I f t h e su rv iva l of th e a wa rd is t o be ju st ified, it mu st be ju st ified on som e oth er ba sis .
c. Conclusion In ou r opi n ion , da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r n in gs , if t h ey go t o a de cea se d p er son ’s e st a t e, will n ot be com pe n sa t or y beca u se t h ey will go t o t h e es t a t e, wh ich h a s n ot su ffer ed a n in ju r y, a n d ca n n ot go t o t h e in ju r ed pe r son .
3. Justice does not require that damages for loss of a chance of future earnings be aw arded for any purpose other than compensation Ke r a n s J .A. d id n ot sp ecifica lly id en t ify t h e p u r pos es ot h er t h a n com pe n sa t ion t h a t aw ar ds of tort da ma ges m ay h ave, n or did h e sa y how a ny oth er p ur poses would affect t he quest ion of survivability. He did say, in a passa ge which we ha ve already quoted: 69
“I would only add that I see no justice in a rule whereby the respondent need not offer compensation because Duncan can no longer enjoy it.”
This passage appears t o recognize that dama ges are “compensa tion”, but suggests t h a t “jus t ice” is a va lu e w h ich m ilit a t es in fa vou r of t h e s u r viv a l of t h e cla im for
69
I bi d .
37
da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r n in gs . Th e ot h er m em be r of t h e ma jority, Côté J .A., made a more exten sive appea l to the ju stice value: 70
[60] I wish to close my remarks with what seems to me the most powerful argument for permitting this recovery of damages for the lost earning years.
[61] The issue is not limited to cases of instant death. It applies equally to persons who are seriously injured by tortfeasors, linger for some time, and then die of their injuries.
[62] Nor is the issue whether there should be substantial damages for lost earning capacity when life expectance is shortened. The Supreme Court has made it plain there is such a head of damages: Andrews et al. v. Grand & Toy (Alberta) Ltd. et al., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229... . Where the injured person survives until judgment, he is given substantial damages. The fact that he dies the day after judgment does not reduce the damages, nor remove his beneficiaries’ right to inherit them. Indeed the very reason for the damages is the accurate foresight that he would thus die young. Nor is that new law: it can be traced back to Phillips v. L. & S.W. Ry. (1879), 5 Q.B.D. 78 (C.A.), as Oliver v. Ashman shows.
[63] Why should the tortfeasor escape scot-free if the plaintiff dies the day before judgment is pronounced.? Worse still, why should the tortfeasor who has made death imminent escape scot free if he manages to drag out the litigation long enough that he produces the very death in question, before judgment?
[64] In my view, the issues here transcend questions of social utility of inheritance. They involve justice.
Th er e a re tw o “jus ti ce” poin ts ma de h er e.
First, it is unjust t hat a wrongdoer will escape scot free, which suggests tha t da m a ges s h ou ld be a wa r de d for pu n it ive , or a t lea st m or a l-d is a pp r ova l, r ea son s. Second, it is u njust th at a pla int iff who lives unt il tria l will receive dama ges while a pl a in t iff wh o doe s n ot live u n t il t r ia l will n ot . Th es e p oin t s a n d J u st ice Côt é’s reference to “quest ions of social ut ility of inher ita nce” ar e th e only point s ra ised by
70
I bi d ., a t p a r a s . 6 0 - 6 4 .
38
th e m ajor ity t ha t a re n ot ba sed on th e n otion of tort da ma ges a s compen sa tor y. We w il l d is cu s s ea ch of t h e ju s t ice poi n t s n ow a n d r e t u r n t o i n h er i t a n ce la t e r .
a. Justice does not require that a wrongdoer be punished by an award of damages As we h a ve sa i d a b ov e, w e t h in k t h a t t or t d a m ag es ot h e r t h a n p un it iv e d a m a ge s ar e an d sh ould be compen sa tor y. Tha t is , th e only r equ irem ent of just ice is th at a wron gdoer, or a per son r espons ible for th e act ions of a wr ongdoer, sh ould compen sat e th e victim for t he loss or injury cau sed by th e wrongdoing. We will, h owe ver , s t op t o di scu ss t h e q u es t ion wh et h er it sh ou ld be a pr in cip le of t or t dam ages t ha t a tort feasor not be allowed to get off scot free, tha t is, th at dam ages sh ou ld be a wa r de d a ga in st a wr on gd oer a s a for m of pu n is h m en t or m or a l disa ppr oval sim ply beca us e t he wr ongdoer ha s don e wr ong.
The very u se of the ter m “tort feasor” or th e te rm “wron gdoer” implies d isa ppr oval: th e tort feasor or wrongdoer ha s done someth ing wrong which sh ould be disappr oved of or punished. However, it must be remembered tha t th e ran ge of torts or wrongs of wh ich t or t la w t a kes n ot ice ext en ds fr om t h e m ost egr egiou s con du ct t o comm onplace moment ar y failures t o live up t o the st an dar d of care of a r easona ble per son. Th is point wa s n oted by McLa chlin J . in Rat ych v. B loom er, 71 w h er e sh e r efe r r ed t o “th e m ode r n t r en d i n t h e la w of d a m a ges a wa y fr om a pu n it ive a pp r oa ch wh ich e mp ha size s t he wr ong t he tor tfea sor ha s comm it te d.”
P u n it ive da m a ges a r e a va ila bl e for t h e e gr egiou s ca se s i n wh ich t h e k in d of con du ct ha s been describ ed by “a wide va riet y of colourfu l words a nd ph ra ses”, includin g “malicious, high-handed, arbitra ry, oppressive, deliberate, vicious, brut al, grossly fr a u du len t , evil , ou t r a geou s, ca llou s, di sg r a cefu l, w ilfu l, w a n t on , in con t u m eliou s disr egar d of the p lain tiff’s r ight s, or in disr egar d of “ordin ar y st an da rd s of mora lity or d ece n t con d u ct .”72 Condu ct wh ich can be des cribed in th is wa y ma y be dese rvin g
71
Su pra note 560 at 963.
72
Su pra note 54 at 491, pa ra. 11.210.
39
of pu nis hm ent by an aw ar d of pun itive d am ages which will go to a victim who is alr eady fully compensa ted by a n a war d of compen sat ory dam ages. But in cases which fall sh ort of cond uct w hich ca n be so described , it would , in our view, be qu ite wr on g for a cou r t t o im pos e on a wr on gd oer wh a t is r ea lly a fin e p a ya bl e t o a pr iva t e p er son wit h ou t t h e s a fegu a r ds of t h e cr im in a l la w. A ca r dr ive r , for exam ple, m ay p roper ly be re quir ed t o pay h uge d am ages to compen sa te a victim in ju r ed by t h e d r ive r ’s n egligen ce, a lt h ou gh t h e n egligen ce con si st ed on ly of a mom ent ’s in at ten tion beh ind th e wh eel, bu t t her e is n o just ificat ion in la w or in p ol icy for r e qu i r in g t h em t o d o m or e t h a n is n ece ss a r y t o r e pa i r a n d r e st or e t h e victim .
It m u st a ls o be r em em be r ed t h a t t or t la w oft en im pos es vica r iou s l ia bi lit y for los s or i n ju r y on p er s on s wh o a r e n ot t h e m se lv es wr on g doe r s, su ch a s em p loy er s , p a r t n er s a n d ca r -own er s, a n d t h a t m a n y a wa r ds a r e p a id by in su r er s. Wh ile t h er e a r e good lega l r ea son s for im pos in g li a bi lit y on a n em pl oyer , pa r t n er or ca r -own er wh o h a s no per sona l conn ection wit h a tor t a nd no a ctua l res ponsibilit y for a ny s yst emic failur e wh ich cau sed a n in jur y, an d wh ile th ere ma y be good rea son for re quir ing in su r er s t o in de m n ify i n su r ed s a ga in st lia bi lit y, t h ose r ea son s d o n ot ext en d b eyon d com p en s a t ion .
Ou r con clu si on h er e is t h a t ju st ice is sa t is fied b y com pe n sa t ion , r ep a ir or r es t it u t ion , a n d d oes n ot r eq u ir e t h a t a wr on gd oer be pu n is h ed by a n a wa r d of dama ges.
b. Justice does not require an award to be made to the estate of a deceased person on the sole grounds that an award would have been made to a living plaintiff In t he pa ssage qu oted above, Côté J .A. said, in effect, tha t it is un fair th at an awa rd wi ll be m a de if t h e in ju r ed pe r son lives u n t il ju dg m en t bu t will n ot be m a de if t h e injur ed person dies before judgment . At first blu sh, ma king a n a war d if the injur ed per son lives, bu t n ot m ak ing a n a wa rd if the inju red per son dies , seem s be t rea tin g like ca se s d iffer en t ly, a s t h e in ju r ed pe r son ’s d ea t h doe s n ot ch a n ge t h e fa ct s w h ich con s t it u t e t h e i n ju r y .
40
B u t t h e re is , i n ou r vi ew , a fu n d a m en t a l d iffe r en ce in t h e t w o ca s es . D a m a ge s p a id to a living p lain tiff for t he loss of a cha nce of fut ur e ea rn ings , or of ear nin g capa city, ar e compen sa tor y. Dam ages pa id t o an est at e ar e not . If th ere is a n a nom aly, it is not t ha t a claim for su ch dam ages will not su rvive for t he ben efit of the est at e. R a t h er , t h e a n om a l y i s t h a t a ju d gm e n t ba s ed on t h e cl a im will sur vive. The fact th at a ju dgm ent ha s been obta ined will not ma ke t he d am ages comp ens at ory in t he h a n ds of t h e e st a t e if t h ey wou ld n ot h a ve be en com pe n sa t or y in t h e a bs en ce of a judgmen t.
In so s a yin g, w e d o n ot su gge st t h a t a ju dg m en t giv en in fa vou r of a livin g p la in t iff should become invalid if the plaintiff dies. The judgment ha s in law changed th e na tu re of the plain tiff’s claim from a per sonal claim t o one fully recognized by law, an d a r ule which inva lidated a judgm ent because of the deat h of the judgmen t creditor would ha ve highly inconvenien t consequences. A judgm ent brings a new set of l eg a l d oct r in e s i n t o p la y , a n d t h ey a r e s u ffi ci en t t o ju s t ify t h e a n om a l y t h a t a ju dg m en t su r viv es t h e d ea t h of t h e ju dg m en t cr ed it or a lt h ou gh t h e cla im on wh ich th e judgmen t is ba sed would not h ave su rvived but for t he judgm ent .
A situ at ion in w hich a n a wa rd ma y be m ad e if an inju red per son is livin g but not if th ey ha ve died is not un ique . A plain tiff who, at th e tim e of a tr ial, is livin g but is ser iously in jur ed, m ay obt ain a ju dgm ent coverin g su pport for a lifetim e th at is expect ed t o cont inu e for ma ny ye ar s, wh ere as if th e pla int iff dies b efore jud gme nt no such a war d will be made. If th e forecast of th e plaint iff’s lifespan tu rn s out t o be wrong and t he plaint iff dies the da y after th e judgment becomes final and t he money is paid, the defendan t will not be able to get th eir money back. This is also an appa ren tly ar bitra ry distin ction bet ween t he legal t rea tm ent of a pla int iff who lives t o judgm ent an d one wh o does not t ha t is just ified by legal d octr ines comin g from different directions.
A si t u a t ion in wh ich a n in ju r ed pe r son will r ece ive a n a wa r d i f a live bu t n ot if d ea d is not elegan t. But elegance should n ot be pur chased eit her by denying just ified relief t o a living p lain tiff or by allowin g an est at e to br ing a n ot her wise
41
u n ju s t ifi a bl e cl a im .
Ou r con clu si on h er e is t h a t ju st ice doe s n ot r eq u ir e a n a wa r d t o be m a de t o t h e esta te of a deceased person solely on t he groun ds th at an awa rd would h ave been m a de t o a livin g p la in t iff
c. Justice does not require an award to be m on the grounds that earning capacity is a ade “working-man’s” capital Ker an s J .A. mad e a d iffere nt just ice point: 73
[16] In any event, I want no part of a definition of compensation that puts value on physical but not intellectual capital. Those who argue that I here go beyond compensation.... are driven to say that, if two people are killed by the same tortfeasor, the estate of the wealthy one who never worked in his life but who lost his Cartier watch as well as his life would recover the value of the watch (so the heirs could say that ill wind blew some good) because, of course, the tortfeasor destroyed not just the life but also the property. But the estate of the victim, who is a “working man”, and who must rely on his ability to earn, would receive nothing on the ground that to treat the loss of his ability to earn as the loss of property separable from his death would be to go beyond compensation of him and create a “windfall.” In my view, to label the claim of the first estate as just compensation and of the second estate as a non-compensatory “windfall” is unwarranted, and reflects certain social attitudes that are not part of the law. In sum, I say that to recognize the capital of the propertied person but not that of the un-propertied person is to make an invidious class distinction, and I want no part of it.
The first t hing t o note is tha t we do not su ggest th at compen sat ion should be rest ricted to compen sat ion for th e loss of physical capita l. The distin ction t ha t we wou ld m a ke is n ot be t we en da m a ges for t h e loss of ph ys ica l ca pi t a l a n d d a m a ges for t h e loss of in t ellect u a l ca pi t a l, b u t be t we en da m a ges w h ich com pe n sa t e for los s or injury an d dam ages which do not compensa te for loss or injury. An awar d of da ma ges for th e loss of a chan ce of fut ur e ea rn ings is comp ens at ion if it compensa tes, which it does in th e case of a living plaintiff. An awa rd of dama ges is not comp ens at ion if it does n ot compen sa te, wh ich, in our view, it d oes not d o in
73
Su pra note 2 at p ara .16.
42 cases in which th e injured person cannot be compensa ted. 74
Th e n ext t h in g t o n ot e is t h a t bot h we a lt h y a n d p oor pe opl e t en d t o h a ve bot h ph ys ica l p r ope r t y a n d a ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r n in gs . Th e in cid en ce of p eop le wh o a r e so wealt hy t hey d o not n eed t o work is n ot likely t o be grea t, a nd even a wea lth y person wh o has n ever worked in t heir life might well be able to earn in t he fut ur e. Th en , th e cha nce of fut ur e ea rn in gs of a w ea lt hy per son su ch a s a hocke y st a r, a su ccessfu l en tr epr en eu r, or th e chief execut ive officer of a la rge corp ora tion ma y be a h un dr ed t ime s t hose of a “workin g ma n.” A “work ing m an ” is qu ite likely t o ha ve a wa t ch , if n ot a Ca r t ier , a n d i s e n t it led t o be com pe n sa t ed for it s w r on gfu l de st r u ct ion . Wh a t ever t h in gs of econ om ic va lu e m a y be lost be ca u se of a wr on gfu l a ct , r ich pe opl e a r e lik ely t o h a ve m or e of t h em t h a n poor pe opl e. Th e p r in cip le of t or t da m a ges i s t h a t a n yon e, r ich or poor , wh o su ffer s a los s fr om a wr on gfu l a ct sh ou ld be com pe n sa t ed for t h eir los s. An yon e, r ich or poor , s h ou ld n ot r ece ive m on ey wh ich ca n n ot be com pe n sa t ion eit h er be ca u se t h ey ca n n ot be com pe n sa t ed or becau se t her e is n oth ing t o compen sa te for. U nt il th e wh ole foun da tion of tor t la w is ch a n ged, a wa r ds , in ou r vie w, sh ou ld be m a de in or de r t o com pe n sa t e for los s, n ot t o provide money on grounds of class.
d. Justice to surviving family mem bers should be done under the Fatal Accidents Act and does not require an estate claimfor loss of future earnings The dea th of a s pouse, p ar ent or child often ha s pr ofoun d effects on t he s ur viving spous e, childr en or pa ren ts . It ma y als o ha ve a p rofound e ffect on oth er close fam ily me mb er s su ch a s si blin gs, gr a nd pa re nt s a nd gr a nd child re n.
Th e e ffect of t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s d ea t h m a y be fin a n cia l. T h e d ece a se d p er son ma y ha ve been in t he h abit of cont ribut ing to th e support of th eir spouse, children,
It is, w e t h in k, n ot in a pp rop ri a te to ch a ra cte ri ze a s a “win dfa ll” to a n est a te a su m of m on ey w h ich does not comp en sa te t he decea sed per son an d w hich does n ot r epla ce pr oper ty w hich th e est at e wou ld h a v e h a d b u t f or a w r o n g f u l a c t . H o w e v e r , w e d o n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e d e b a t e s h o u l d c e n t r e o n w h e t h e r o r n ot t h e r e i s a “w i n d fa l l. ” W e t h i n k t h a t t h e d is cu s s i on s h o u l d fo cu s o n w h e t h e r o r n ot a n a w a r d o f da m a ges for t h e los s of a ch a n ce of fu tu r e ea r n in gs is com pe n sa ti on for a loss .
74
43
pa r en t s or si bl in gs , or som e or a ll of t h em m a y h a ve h a d r ea son a bl e e xp ect a t ion s of futu re ben efits, for exam ple, in th e case of par ent s who might rea sonably expect th eir child to support th em in old age. 75 In su ch cases, the dea th of th e deceased person h as cau sed loss to the su rviving family mem bers for which th ey should be com p en s a t ed by a wr on g doe r wh o h a s ca u s ed t h e d ea t h of t h e de ce a se d p er s on . On e su bm is si on wh ich we r ece ive d g a ve a s a r ea son for su r viv a l of t h e cla im for los s of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n in g s t h a t , i n a dd it i on t o a l os s of fi n a n ci a l a n d pa r e n t a l su pp or t , r em a in in g fa m ily m em be r s a ls o los e t h e ch a n ce of in h er it in g fr om t h e deceased person a nd t ha t a llowing th e esta te t o claim da ma ges for t he deceased pe r son ’s l oss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r n in gs is on e w a y t o com pe n sa t e for t h e loss of th at chan ce.
In st ea d of, or in a dd it ion t o, fin a n cia l effect s, t h e e ffect of t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s de a t h m a y be in t a n gib le a n d e m ot ion a l: s or r ow for t h e d ece a se d p er son ; fee lin gs of grief or ber eavemen t; or the loss of wha t is r eferred to in t he Fatal Accidents Act a s th e “guid a nce, ca re a nd compa ni ons hi p” of th e de ceas ed p er son . In su ch ca ses , th e su r viv in g clos e fa m ily m em be r s h a ve su st a in ed n on -econ om ic in ju r ies for wh ich th ey sh ould be compen sa ted by th e wr ongdoer. Th ere is a lso a n at ur al h um an fe el in g t h a t t h e d ea t h of a s p ou s e, ch i ld or p a r en t s h ou l d r e ce iv e r e cog n it i on b y t h e l a w, a n d t h e on l y for m of r e cog n it i on w h ich ca n b e m a d e a v a il a bl e, a pa r t fr om criminal penalt ies, is a m oney award.
Th es e con si de r a t ion s m ilit a t e s t r on gly in fa vou r of a lega l r eq u ir em en t of com p en s a t ion t o s u r vi vi n g cl os e fa m i ly m em b er s . T h is is t r u e com p en s a t ion for a wr ong w hi ch h a s ca us ed t he su rv ivors per son a l loss, e conomic or em otion a l. On e a r gu m en t t h a t is oft en m a de in fa vou r of t h e s u r viv a l of a cla im for t h e loss of a chan ce of fut ur e ear nings, or ear ning capa city, is th at th e awa rd of dama ges will res ult in a pa ymen t t o th e est at e an d in th e compen sa tion of imm edia te fa mily me mb er s t hr ough th e es ta te , th a t i s, t hr ough th e will or in te st a cy of th e de ceas ed.
Or even , as in H u v. W a n g , s u p r a n o t e 2 9 , i n t h e c a s e o f a p a r e n t a n d a c h i l d o f t h e d e c e a s e d p e r s o n wh o , b ecau s e o f th e d eceas e d p er s on’s w r ongful de a th , los t t he ir c ha n c e s of e migr a t ing to C a n a d a a s m e m b e r s o f a f a m i l y cl a s s .
75
44
However , if compen sa tion for su rvivor s is – as we t hin k it sh ould be – a n objective to be achieved, we do not t hink th at th e law sh ould try t o achieve it indirectly by allowin g th e decea sed p ers on’s est at e t o obta in a n a wa rd of dam age s. F or one t hin g, if the objective is to do one t hin g – th e compen sa tion of su rvivors – th e law sh ould r eq u ir e t h a t t h in g be d on e r a t h er t h a n r eq u ir e t h a t som et h in g els e – t h e m a kin g of an awa rd t o an est at e – be done. For an other , the in direct rout e will somet imes lead in t h e w r on g d ir ect ion . I f t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s e st a t e is i n sol ven t , t h e p r ocee ds of an aw ar d of dam age s t o th e est at e will n ot go to t he su rvivor s. Most people lea ve t h eir pr ope r t y t o su r viv or s b y will, b u t a will m a y n ot lea ve t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s pr ope r t y t o a ll of t h e s u r viv or s w h o sh ou ld be com pe n sa t ed . I f t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s spou se is t he sole ben eficiary, a s is n ot u ncomm on, da ma ges will n ot pa ss t hr ough th e es ta te to t he child re n, p a re nt s or sibl in gs wh o ar e en ti tl ed t o comp en sa ti on. I f th e spou se a nd childr en ar e a ll th e ben eficiarie s, da ma ges will n ot pa ss t hr ough th e est at e to pa ren ts or siblin gs of the d eceased per son wh o ha ve “depen den cy” claims . If t h er e is a n in t es t a cy, p a r en t s a n d s ib lin gs will n ot t a ke if t h e d ece a se d p er son left a s pouse or child, a nd th e division be twe en s pouse a nd childr en m ay n ot be in proportion to th eir “dependen cy” claims. The Family Relief Act m a y re su l t in e st a t e di st r ib u t ion s t h a t cover a ll “dep en de n cy” cla im s, bu t a ga in it m a y n ot .
The dir ect route t o the compen sat ion of survivors is the Fatal Accidents Act. That Act provides for compensation for financial losses to surviving spouses, cohabitant s, pa r en t s a n d s t ep pa r en t s, ch ildr en a n d s t ep ch ildr en . I t pr ovid es for a dd it ion a l com p en s a t ion i n sp eci fi ed a m ou n t s for g r ie f a n d los s of g u id a n ce , ca r e a n d compan ionship to surviving spouses, paren ts an d children, without pr oof of loss. As not ed a bove, t he spe cified a mou nt s a re : $40,0 00 t o a s pou se or coha bit a nt ; $40,0 00 to a pa re nt or p a re nt s; a nd $25 ,000 to ea ch ch ild.
The Fatal Accidents Act approach ha s its own difficulties. However, it does provide for com p en s a t ion for t h e fi n a n ci a l l os s es a n d for t h e in t a n g ib le a n d e m ot i on a l in ju r ies i n flict ed on t h e m em be r s of t h e im m ed ia t e fa m ily by t h e d ea t h of t h e de cea se d p er son , a n d i t doe s r ecogn ize t h e im por t a n ce of t h e d ece a se d p er son a n d th eir dea th . We think th at th is is th e best a pproach a nd t ha t if ther e ar e deficiencies with it, t hose de ficiencies s hou ld be r ectified in t he Fatal Accidents Act.
45
We t hin k t ha t t he dir ect a ppr oach is to be p refer red to a llowing a n e st at e t o recover da ma ges a s a sou rce of compe ns a ti on for t he su rv ivors .
For t hese r easons, we th ink t ha t just ice to sur vivors sh ould be done directly under th e Fatal Accidents Act an d n ot in dir ectly a nd ina ccur at ely t hr ough allowin g an est at e claim for loss of fut ur e ea rn ings
4. The policy reasons behind the heritability of property do not apply to a claim for the loss of a chance of future earnings Th e b a si c a r gu m en t in fa vou r of t h e s u r viv a l of a cla im for los s of e xp ect a t ion of life , wh ich m ay b e a pplied to t he su rviva l of claim s for lost ch an ce of fut ur e ea rn ings , has been powerfully stated as follows:
...the pain that a victim has experienced in the weeks or months before his death, and the loss of expectation of a happy life, does represent a real and actual damage – a real and actual personal right which has been taken away. When the victim loses his expectation of a happy life, he has suffered something which can be estimated in terms of money, no matter how difficult that process is. While we have a system of law which allows a man to bequeath property to his adult children or to other beneficiaries, there would seem to be no reason why those rights which are damage claims should not also be bequeathed.76
Professor Waddam s has st ated t he ar gument as follows:77
...the purpose of the survival legislation is not to compensate survivors for their own losses – that is the function of the Fatal Accidents Act – but to enable the estate to inherit the wealth represented by the deceased’s own right of action. This, it is submitted, is no more a “windfall” to the estate than is any inheritance of wealth. If the deceased lives to obtain a judgment (even though it is not satisfied before death occurs), the estate will inherit the right to enforce it in full. It is anomalous that the plaintiff’s death just before the trial should have the effect of depriving the estate of wealth represented by a valuable
76
J . H . L a y c r a f t , “S u r v i v a l of C l a i m s f or L o s s o f E x p e c t a t i on o f L if e ” ( 1 9 6 4 ) 3 A l t a . L . R e v . 2 0 2 a t 2 0 3 [em ph a sis a dd ed ].
77
Su pra note 54 at 515, pa ra. 12.90.
46
cause of action.
The same view underlies Duncan v. Bad deley. For example, Kerans J .A. said this:78
I acknowledge that a distinction may be made respecting those heads of damages that are very personal to the victim, especially any award for pain and suffering. That award does not seek to replace lost property but rather to offer some sense of consolation and retributive justice to the victim. There is some logic in the statutory denial of an award in a case where the victim cannot enjoy that consolation or sense of justice. This explains the exception under review, but not its extension to the loss of property.
An d la t e r 79 :
“In my view, the loss of the ability to earn a livelihood is not only real and palpable but can be valued in commercial terms. Indeed, Judson, J., in Ontario Minister of Highways v. Jennings, [1966] S.C.R. 532, at 546, described the ability to earn a living as a “capital asset.” The conception of this ability as intangible property helped drive the Canadian decision to award damages for its loss. [Reference to Andrews v. Grand & Toy]. In sum, I agree with Lord Scarman when, in Pickett v. British Rail Engineering, [1979) 1 All E.R. 774 (H.L.), he said:
“Whether a man’s ambition be to build up a fortune, to provide for his family, or to spend his money on good causes or merely a pleasurable existence, loss of the means to do so is a genuine financial loss.”
That is,
(1)
78
Su pra note 2 at p ara . 9.
79
I bi d . p a r a . 1 0 .
47 A fun dam ent al policy of th e law is th at “propert y” is her ita ble.80
(2) A p er s on ’s cl a im for d a m a ge s for t h e los s of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs – or e a r n in g ca p a ci t y – is a r ig h t in t h e n a t ur e of p r op er t y.
(3) The per son’s claim should t her efore be h erita ble like oth er pr operty recognized by law a nd sh ould go to th eir est at e.
Th er e is, h owever a not he r s ide.
C on s id er fi r st t h e n a t u r e of a p er s on ’s ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs , or e a r n in g capa city. In th e pa ssa ge qu oted a bove, Kera ns J .A. trea ted it a s pr opert y, referr ing t o “th e con cep t ion of t h is a bi lit y a s i n t a n gib le pr ope r t y”, a n d s a yin g t h a t con cep t ion ha s “helped d rive th e Can adia n decision to awa rd da ma ges for it s loss.” But a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs , or e a r n in g ca p a ci t y, is n ot l ik e a n yt h i n g t h a t i s u s u a ll y ch a r a ct e r iz ed a s p r op er t y, a n d it d oe s n ot h a v e t h e ch a r a ct e r is t ics of p r op er t y. Conside r t his st at eme nt from J owitt :81
In its largest sense property signifies things and rights considered as having a money value, especially with reference to transfer or succession, and to their capacity of being injured. Property includes not only ownership, estates, and interests in corporeal things, but also rights such as trade marks, copyrights, patents, and rights in personam capable of transfer or transmission, such as debts.
80
T h e O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y , 2d ed ., s . v . “h e r i t a b l e ” : “1 . C a p a b l e o f b e i n g i n h e r i t e d , i n h e r i t a b l e . ”
81
J owi tt ’s D ict ion a r y of E n glis h La w, 2 d e d., (Lon don : Sw ee t & Ma xw ell, 1 97 7) s . v . “prope r ty” [em ph a sis a dd ed ].
48
A ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs , or e a r n in g ca p a ci t y, is n ot a t h i n g or r i gh t . It d oe s n ot h a ve a m on ey va lu e w h ile it s “own er ” “pos se ss es ” it. Wh ile t h er e is a se n se it wh ich it has a “capacity of being injured”, the same is tr ue of such things as chan ces of fu t u r e in h e r it a n ce , w h ich a r e n ot r e ga r d ed a s pr op er t y t h e l os s of w h ich t h r ou g h t h e de a t h of t h e p r osp ect ive be n eficia r y gi ves r is e t o a cla im for da m a ges. It is n ot ownership, an est ate, or an int erest in a corporeal thing. It is not a right such as a t r a de m a r k, copyr igh t or pa t en t . I t is n ot a r igh t in pe r son a m . I t is n ot ca pa bl e of tr a ns fer or tr a ns mi ssi on. I t i s n ot of th e sa me na tu re a s a deb t.
A ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs , or e a r n in g ca p a ci t y, is n ot a r i gh t t o w h ich a n y on e mu st give e ffect. No on e is obl iged to a fford a not he r p er son a cha nce t o ear n. A per son can not sell ea rn ing cap acit y or a ch an ce of fut ur e ea rn ings. I f a per son dies , th eir cha nce of fut ur e ea rn in gs or ea rn in g cap a city d oes n ot go t o th eir est a te , a nd no one can succeed to it. Ea rn ing capacity ha s been cha ra cterized as a n “asset” and even a “capital asset”, but it is not an a sset tha t ha s any of the chara cteristics of wh a t a pp ea r s on ba la n ce s h ee t s u n de r t h a t h ea di n g or on a n y p er son a l lis t of a sse ts . Wh a t a per son ha s is a n a ggr ega ti on of per son a l cha ra cter ist ics wh ich, s o l on g a s ci r cu m s t a n ce s a r e a n d r e m a in p r op it i ou s , w il l e n a bl e t h e ir p os s es s or t o e a r n mon ey. Tha t a ggrega tion of per sona l cha ra cter ist ics is somet hin g which is en tir ely personal to its possessor. It does not fall within t he class of property “in its largest sen se.”
In our opinion , rea sonin g th at comm en ces wit h t he lega l not ion of proper ty a nd a pp lies t h e lega l in cid en t s of t h a t n ot ion t o ea r n in g ca pa cit y or a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ear nin gs will go ast ra y. Ea rn ing cap acit y or a ch an ce of fut ur e ea rn ings is sim ply som et hi ng differ en t fr om wh a t t he la w r ega rd s a s pr oper ty .
H owe ver , if a wr on gfu l a ct de pr ive s a pe r son of som e or a ll of t h eir ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n in gs , or ea r n in g ca pa cit y, t h e la w a llows t h e p er son t o obt a in a n a wa r d of da m a ges a ga in st t h e w r on gd oer or ot h er r es pon si bl e p er son a s a r em ed y for t h e per sona l inju ry w hich ha s been done t o th e victim . The qu est ion t ha t is rel eva nt to t h e q u es t ion of su r viv a l of a ct ion s i s w h et h er , a ft er t h e in ju r y bu t be for e a cou r t
49
m a kes a n a wa r d of d a m a ges, t h e w r on ged p er son ’s cl a im for da m a ges i s p r ope r t y or wea lt h w hi ch t he la w sh ould a llow t o descen d t o th e wr onge d pe rs on’s es ta te . Th a t i s, sh ou l d a s econ d a r y cl a im for d a m a ge s t h a t a r i se s u p on t h e de pr i va t i on of som et h in g t h a t is n ot h er it a bl e b e it se lf h er it a bl e, t h u s cr ea t in g a n et a dd it ion t o th e a ccum ula tion of herit ab le pr opert y?
W e t h i nk t h a t t h e a n s we r is n o. A ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n in g s, or e a r n in g ca p a ci t y, i s not pr opert y or wea lth . It is en tir ely per sona l, an d a claim for da ma ges for its loss is en t ir ely p er son a l. I t s l oss h a s n ot r ed u ced t h e in ju r ed pe r son ’s e st a t e. We do n ot th ink th at th e la w of succession compe ls, t hou gh it ma y per mit , an affirm at ive a n sw er t o t h e q u es t ion of su r viv a l. W e t h in k t h a t t h e a n sw er t o t h e q u es t ion depen ds on w ha t is rea lly ha ppen ing h ere . As we ha ve sa id ea rlier , we th ink th at an awa rd t o the est at e will not be compensa tory an d will be a bonus over an d above th e “p r op er t y ” of t h e de ce a se d p er s on .
For t hese r easons, we do not th ink t ha t a chan ce of fut ur e ear nings is or sh ould be her ita ble pr opert y or th at a cla im for it s loss is or s hou ld be h erit ab le pr opert y un til th e cla im ha s pa sse d in to ju dgm en t.
5. An award of damages w hich cannot be properly quantified should be made only in order to compensate a living person I n An drews v. Grand & Toy, 82 Dickson CJ used a vivid simile to describe th e process of a s se ss in g da m a g es for a l os s of e a r n in g ca p a ci t y:
“We must now gaze more deeply into the crystal ball. What sort of career would the accident victim have had? What were his prospects and potential prior to the accident? It is not loss of earnings but, rather, loss of earning capacity of which compensation must be made: The Queen v. Jennings... A capital asset has been lost: what was its value?
82
An drews, su pra note 35 at 251.
50 La te r, 83 aft er d escribin g th e var ious contin gencies for wh ich a llowan ce should be made – un employment, illness, accidents an d business depression – he said th is:
The figure used to take account of contingencies is obviously an arbitrary one.
H e r efe r r ed t o t h e con t in gen cies t a ken in t o a ccou n t wit h r es pe ct t o t h e cos t of fu t u r e care a s “in lar ge meas ur e pur e speculat ion.” And ear lier, 84
The apparent reliability of assessments provided by modern actuarial practice is largely illusionary, for actuarial science deals with probabilities, not actualities....actuarial evidence speaks in terms of group experience. It cannot, and does not purport to, speak as to the individual sufferer.
I n Duncan v. Bad deley, 85 Keran s J .A. said
...the law does not assume that the trier of fact has superhuman powers. We accept that we do not know the future. But we can, nevertheless, realistically attempt to assess the chances of any future event. I suppose it is true that we guess. Indeed, Chief Justice Dickson in Andrews v. Grand and Toy used the image of the crystal ball to emphasize the difficulties. But we guess in rational terms, not by intuition or emotion. We seek the help of actuaries, who can tell us by careful application of the laws of chance what is the general likelihood of a future event. We seek the help of statisticians, who can tell us with what frequency some events occur. And we discount any guess by the weakness of the chance that it might occur. This is a daily occurrence in our courts, and it should be wellunderstood.
In our opin ion, Dickson CJ wa s r ight in cha ra cter izing t he p rocess of asses sin g
83
I bi d . a t 2 5 4 .
84
I bi d ., a t 2 3 6 .
85
S u p r a n ot e 2 a t p a r a . 9
51 da ma ges for th e loss of earn ing cap acit y as lookin g int o a cryst al ba ll; in ch a r a ct e r iz in g t h e a s s is t a n ce of a ct u a r i a l s ci en ce a s “i ll u si on a r y ” i n r el a t ion t o t h e len gt h of t im e a sp ecific in di vid u a l will live ; a n d i n ch a r a ct er izi n g a llowa n ces for other deductions as “arbitrar y” and “more or less pure speculation.” A court mu st m u lt ip ly on e gu es s (t h e p la in t iff’s p r osp ect ive life-s pa n ) by a n ot h er (t h e p la in t iff’s e xp ect e d a n n u a l e a r ni ng s), b y a n ot h e r (a d is cou n t r a t e), a n d m u st a ll ow pe r ce n t ag e de du ct ion s w h ich a r e a lm ost cer t a in t o be in a ccu r a t e b eca u se t h e cor r ect a llowa n ce would be zer o if a cont ingen cy is not r ealized , or 100% if the cont ingen cy is realized.86
As noted, Keran s J .A. thought t ha t a ctuar ies can give the genera l likelihood of a fu t u r e e ven t – p r es u m a bl y t h e t im e of t h e d ea t h of t h e p la in t iff – bu t Dickson CJ ch a r a ct e r iz ed t h e r e li a bi li t y of a ct u a r i es ’ p r ed ict i on s a s “i ll u si on a r y ”, a s t h e y d o n ot sp ea k t o t h e in di vid u a l s u ffer er . An a ct u a r y ca n giv e a r ea son ed for eca st of t h e aver age of th e nu mbe r of year s t ha t a su fficient ly lar ge group of per sons t hen living w il l l iv e, bu t t h a t for e ca s t d oe s n ot m a k e it l ik e ly t h a t a n y on e m em b er of t h e gr ou p will li ve for a ppr oxima te ly t ha t p er iod or for a ny oth er spe cific period .
The re is a fu rt her difficult y. In or der to r ealize fu tu re e ar nin gs a pla int iff would h a ve h a d t o live. Bu t it cost s m on ey t o live. S o, if a n a wa r d i s m a de for a pl a in t iff’s future care, or if an awar d is made to an esta te for a deceased’s persons loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs , i t is n ece ss a r y, in or d er t o a r r i ve a t t h e l os s of t h e pl a in t iff or de cea se d p er son , a n a llowa n ce for t h e cos t of t h e p la in t iff’s h yp ot h et ica l l iv in g . B u t h ow t o d et e r m in e t h e a m ou n t of t h a t a l low a n ce is a ve xe d q u es t ion .
Th e Su pr em e Cou rt ap pea rs to h av e sa id in R . v. J e n n in g s, s u p r a n ot e 3 5, a n d in A n d rew s v. G r a n d & T o y , s u p r a n ote 35 a t 2 51 -52, t h a t n o al lowa n ce sh ou ld b e m a de for t h e in com e t a x w h ich th e de ceas ed p er son wou ld h av e pa id on pr ospe ctive e ar nin gs. K er an s J .A. in D u n c a n v. Ba dd e ley, supra note 2 pa ra . 42, said tha t an allowance m ust also be ma de for the income t ax th e injured p e r s o n wo u l d h av e p a id o n fu tu re ea rn in gs a nd s e e m s to s ugge s t th a t J e nn ings did not a pply a n d th a t t h e S u pr em e C ou r t s h ou ld re con sid er it s p osit ion . Th e p oin t i s r ele va n t h er e b u t w e d o n ot p r o p o s e t o d e v e l o p i t fu r t h e r .
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52 I n Duncan v. Bad deley, 87 Kerans J .A. said this:
I have already said that the tortfeasor should pay only what is lost. If the tortfeasor kills me, I have lost much, but I have not lost what I would have spent on non-capital items had I lived. A major adjustment to awards of this kind must be made for the off-setting savings during the expected life of the victim; for example, for the savings of personal living expenses. That is the rule in Tongenuzzo-Norvell et al. v. Savein and Burnaby Hospital, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 114...
Ke r a n s J .A. con si de r ed t h r ee a pp r oa ch es t o de t er m in in g t h e a m ou n t of t h e d ed u ct i on :
1. Limit th e aw ar d t o a calcula tion of th e expected lifetim e-savin gs of the victim . This for m u la wou ld m in im ize t h e a wa r d. Ke r a n s J .A. r eje ct ed it on t h e gr ou n ds t h a t “[m]y life-savings would not tell one wha t I sp ent dur ing my life on m y pleasu re, as opposed to wha t I h ad t o spend in connection with t he ea rn ing of my income.”
2. Calculate t he offsetting saved expenses using the yardstick of “basic necessities”, wh ich Ke r a n s J .A. ch a r a ct er ize d a s “som e s or t of pov er t y-li n e ca lcu la t ion – t h e am oun t r equ ire d t o spen d t o avoid st ar vat ion a nd rem ain su fficient ly he alt hy t o work.” This form ula would m axim ize th e aw ar d. Alth ough h e agr eed “tha t, a t firs t sight, wh at I spen d in a given year is wh at I would not h ave spen t if I ha d not been ar oun d t o spend it”, he sa id t ha t t he S up rem e Cour t’s decision in A n d rew s, t h ou g h it u sed t he te rm “ba sic necess itie s”, mea nt “th e t ypes of expen ses t ha t w ould h ave been incu rr ed in an y even t.” So, he did not agr ee wit h t he ba sic-necessit ies pover tyline form ula either .
3.
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S u p r a n o t e 2 a t p a r a . 3 3 . T h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e d e d u c t i o n f or l i v i n g e x p e n s e s c on t i n u e s t o p a r a . 4 4 .
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Calcu lat e th e aw ar d on t he b as is of the “ava ilable su rp lus ” th at th e victim would ha ve ha d, an d t hu s “calcu lat e th e expen ses t ha t t he vict im wou ld h ave in curr ed in th e cours e of ear nin g th e livin g we pr edict h e would ea rn ”, which su m “will var y with th e kin d of employmen t, a nd th e st at e in life of the vict im.” The “availa ble sur plus” would pr esum ably be grea ter th an th e “life-savings” of th e victim , but would be less tha n t he su rplu s which would resu lt from th e “basic-necessities” for m u l a . K er a n s J . A. a cce pt e d t h e “a v a il a bl e s u r p lu s ” for m u l a . W h en cou p le d w it h a deduction for t axes (concerning which Ker an s J .A. though t “the chan ce is about 90 per cent he would pa y ta xes of in t he a rea of 30 to 40 percent of his income), Keran s J .A. thought t ha t a total deduction of 50% to 70% is suggested by the cases and “is an apt ra nge”, though a n ew tr ial was gran ted in order t ha t expert advice might be a va ila ble on th e qu est ion.
Per ha ps t he “ava ilable su rp lus ” form ula is t he b est form ula th at is a vaila ble. But it re qu ir es a re ma rk a ble le vel of ab st ra ction .
Tak e th e case of a living individua l who has actu al income an d actu al expendit ur es, so th at we h ave p erfect k nowledge of th e ba sic facts of income a nd expen dit ur e. E ven wi t h t h a t kn owled ge, we d o n ot t h in k t h a t it is pos si bl e t o a sce r t a in h ow m u ch of w h a t t h e i n di vi du a l sp en d s on food is s pe n t in or d er t o k e ep t h e i n di vi du a l ’s i n com e -e a r n in g m a ch i n e fu n ct i on i n g a n d h ow m u ch of i t is r ea l ly pa r t of t h e ind ividua l’s pr ofit from th eir in come w hich is spen t be cau se t he in dividu al lik es g ood food a n d lot s of i t ; or w h a t pa r t of w h a t t h e i n di vi du a l sp en d s on cl ot h i n g i s spent for t he su rvival of th e income-ear ning m achine, wh at par t is spen t t o earn income by impressing customers, and wha t par t is spent for comfort a nd to impress fr i en d s; or w h a t pa r t of w h a t t h e i n di vi du a l sp en d s on v a ca t i on s is sp en t t o ma int ain th e income-ea rn ing m ach ine b y relievin g st res ses on it , an d h ow mu ch is for s h ee r pl ea s u r e. Wh e n t h e d is cu s s ion m ov es t o t h e h yp ot h e t ica l in d iv id u a l w h o wi ll n ever r ece ive t h e h yp ot h et ica l in com e p r oject ed for fu t u r e yea r s or m a ke t h e h yp ot h et ica l exp en di t u r es pr oject ed for t h ose yea r s w e t h in k t h a t t h e ca lcu la t ion loses a ll tou ch wit h r ea lity.
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On e ca n sy m pa t h ize wit h a cou r t wh ich m u st de t er m in e h ow m u ch of a h yp ot h et ica l i n com e is in t h e n a t ur e of p r ofi t ov er a n d a bov e s om e pa r t of t h e h yp ot h e t ica l in di vid u a l’s u n di ffer en t ia t ed h yp ot h et ica l exp en di t u r es . Th e cou r t h a s t o do somet hin g. It ca nn ot t ell th e pa rt ies t ha t t he job is t oo difficult to do. But it s hou ld be r ecognized th at it is not possible t o come u p wit h a res ult th at does a nyt hin g mor e th an expr ess t he cour t’s view a s t o th e am oun t of comp ens at ion t ha t it is rea sonable t o expect a wr ongdoer or other responsible pers on to pay to an injur ed per son by wa y of comp ens at ion.
It is qu it e t r u e, a s K er a n s J .A. s a id a t pa r a gr a ph 29 of Duncan v. Bad deley, t h a t t h e pr ocess of ass essin g futu re e vent s – wh ich he cha ra cter ized a s “guess[ing] in ra ti ona l t er ms , not by in tu it ion or em otion ” – “is a da ily occur re nce i n ou r cou rt s.” It is qu ite t ru e als o th at it is th e pr ocess wh ich is gone t hr ough in th e case of living pla int iffs wh o claim da ma ges for loss of ear nin g capa city.
Wher e an inju red pla int iff is living, st rong a rgu men ts can be m ad e for going thr ough a process of guessing at t he appropriate a mount of dama ges:
1. Th er e is a ri sk , wh ich m a y r a ng e from a poss ibilit y t o a s tr ong p roba bilit y, t ha t t he pla int iff will lose ear nin gs, ra ngin g from sm all a mou nt s t o very consider ab le amount s.
2. The wron gdoer is r espons ible for th e inju ry, a nd a w rongd oer or a nyone legally responsible for t he wr ongdoer’s wrongful act sh ould not be hea rd t o say th at th ey sh ou ld n ot h a ve t o com pe n sa t e a livin g p la in t iff for a los s for wh ich t h e w r on gd oer is r espon sible, m ere ly becau se it can not be qu an tified a ccur at ely.
3. Th e pla in ti ff, who is t he in jur ed p er son , will r eceive t he pr oceeds of t he a wa rd .
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Th a t is t o sa y, t h er e is a st r on g p olicy ju st ifica t ion for doi n g wh a t t h e la w ca n do t o ma ke a living p lain tiff whole in case t he y do su ffer a n a ctu al loss of earn ings .
We do n ot t h in k t h a t t h e s a m e p olicy ju st ifica t ion exis t s w it h r es pe ct t o a de cea se d v ict i m . I t is on e t h in g t o q u a n t ify t h e u n q u a n t ifi a bl e i n or d er t o com p en s a t e t h e victim of a wrongful act, and to do everything within the power of the law to make t h a t vict im wh ole. I t is a n ot h er t h in g t o go t o t h e s a m e len gt h s t o pu t in t o t h e v ict i m ’s es t a t e , for t h e be n efi t of ot h e r s, a n a m ou n t t h a t w il l a l m os t ce r t a in l y n ot be a r a n y r ea l r ela t ion sh ip t o a los s s u ffer ed by t h e vict im t h em se lf. A p r oces s w h ich req uir es a cour t t o “gaze ...in to t he cr yst al ba ll”; to enga ge in “specula tion ”, to rely on evide nce t he rel iab ility of whi ch is “illusion ar y”; an d t o enga ge in “ar bit ra ry” deter min at ions ma y be justified when t he pu rpose is to compen sat e a wr onged pe r son . We do n ot t h in k t h a t it is ju st ifie d w h en t h e p u r pos e is t o pu t m on ey in t o a wr onge d pe rs on’s es ta te for t he ben efit of oth er s.
H. Conclusion and Summation on Survival of the Claim for the Loss of a Chance of Future Earnings
We have now gone th rough th e woods tree by tree. It is time to stan d back and look a t t he woods a s a wh ole.
We think th at wh at sh ould be heritable and descend to a deceased person’s estat e ar e claim s for losses which th e Su rvival of Actions Act at tem pted t o describe by usin g the words “actu al finan cial loss”, which we will also use. Wha t we m ean by “a ct u a l88 fina ncia l 89 loss” is a loss which is a r eal finan cial loss experienced at th e t im e of t h e loss , a s op pos ed t o a pot en t ia l loss , fin a n cia l or ot h er wise . A ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r ni ng s i s a p ot e n ti a l source of financial gain in the sense in which we use
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T h e O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y , 2d ed ., s . v . “a c t u a l”: “E x i st i n g i n a ct or f a ct . .. .r e a l;--o pp os e d t o pot en tia l, pos sib le, vir tu al , th eor et ical , ide al .”
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T h e O x f o r d E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y , 2d ed ., s . v . “f i n a n c i a l ” : “o f, p e r t a i n i n g , o r r e l a t i n g t o f i n a n c e o r money m atter s.”
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t h e wor d s , n ot a n a ct u a l finan cial component of a person’s property or wealth. Its los s a ccordi n gly h a s a pot en t ia l for a dv er se ly a ffect in g t h e a ct u a l fin a n cia l p osi t ion of t h e in ju r e d p er s on i n t h e fu t u r e , b u t t h e l os s doe s n ot a ffe ct t h e in ju r e d p er s on ’s actual financial position at the t ime of the loss. The same would be true of the loss of a cha nce of a fut ur e inher ita nce or a chan ce of winning a lottery wh ich will be held in t he fut ur e.
An a ct u a l fi n a n ci a l l os s , a s we a r e u s in g t h e t e r m , i n vol ve s a l os s of w ea l t h or pr ope r t y. An a ct u a l fin a n cia l loss is a los s of s om et h in g wh ich is h er it a bl e a n d for which compen sat ion can an d should be m ade. We th ink t ha t it is appr opriat e th at a cl a im for d a m a ge s for a h e r it a b le a n d com p en s a b le los s sh ou l d d es ce n d t o t h e injur ed per son’s est at e an d to th ose who are en tit led to th e benefit of the est at e. But wher e th e injur ed person h as died t he sit ua tion with respect t o a claim for da ma ges for t he loss of a cha nce of futu re ea rn ings is differen t. The in jured per son cann ot be com p en s a t ed be ca u s e t h e y a r e de a d. Th e in ju r e d p er s on ’s h er i t a bl e p r op er t y is t h e same a fter the loss of the chan ce as it was before th e loss of the chan ce so that t he l os s of t h e ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs h a s n ot r e du ce d t h e es t a t e . W e d o n ot t h i n k th at th e policy of th e law sh ould r equ ire a wron gdoer t o pay m oney wh ere th ere is n o los s of h er it a bl e p r ope r t y a n d w h er e t h er e is n o on e w h o ca n be com pe n sa t ed for the loss or restored to their position by the pa yment of dama ges.
The ana lysis can be applied in a nu mber of steps.
F ir st , a pe r son wh o wou ld h a ve ea r n ed m on ey du r in g a cer t a in t im e p er iod wh ich h a s e xp ir ed , bu t wh o wa s u n a bl e t o ea r n t h a t m on ey du r in g t h a t t im e p er iod becau se of an inju ry h as su ffere d a n a ctu al fin an cial loss. E ar nin gs would ha ve com e t o t h e m bu t for t h e in ju r y , a n d d id n ot com e t o t h e m , s o t h a t t h e y h a v e h a d less in come for t he p eriod t ha n t hey w ould h ave h ad but for t he in jur y. Qua nt ifying th e loss requires a n a ssessm ent of a h ypothetical likelihood, th at is, tha t t he inju red per son would ha ve ea rn ed t he m oney du rin g th e per iod but for t he in jur y, but th is can be done t o quite a h igh degree of probability. The a ssessm ent of such da ma ges is d one a t t h e t im e of tr ia l for t h e t im e pe ri od t h a t h a s el a ps ed b et wee n t h e in jur y
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an d th e tr ial. This st ep is un exceptiona ble as it d eals with actu al experien ced fin a n cia l loss .
The n ext st ep is to qua nt ify an injur ed person’s loss of earn ings in a dvan ce and t o mak e a lump-sum a ward. The court s are obliged to tak e this step because, as a ma tt er of law or a dmin istr at ion, the law d oes not requir e or perm it t he inju red person t o come in once in every year or other tim e period to demonst ra te t ha t t hey h a ve su ffer ed a los s of e a r n in gs du r in g t h a t t im e p er iod . I n m ost ca se s a dv a n ce qu a n t ifica t ion of t h e loss t o a n y s t a n da r d of a ccu r a cy is im pos si bl e b eca u se of t h e imponder ables t ha t a re n ecessarily imported int o the a ssessm ent process. However, given t ha t d am ages mu st be a sses sed once a nd for a ll becau se per iodic qua nt ification is not per mit ted, th e cour ts h ave t o make t he a ssessm ent in order t o com p en s a t e t h e in ju r e d p er s on for t h e pe r iod ic l os s es t h a t t h e in ju r e d p er s on m a y rea sona bly be expect ed t o suffer, wit h d edu ctions for contin gencies. Th e deficiencies of t h e cr y st a l -b a ll a ss es s m en t p r oce ss h a ve t o b e a cce pt e d b eca u s e t h a t i s t h e on l y w a y t h a t com p en s a t ion ca n b e m a d e for los se s t h a t t h e i nju r ed pe r son ca n rea sonably be expected to experience.
Th e n ext st ep t h a t t h e la w t a kes is m or e d ou bt fu l, t h a t is , t h e a ss es sm en t of da m a ges for t h e in ju r ed pe r son ’s l oss of ea r n in gs du r in g t h e yea r s d u r in g wh ich t h e in ju r ed pe r son wou ld h a ve be en expe ct ed t o live bu t for t h e in ju r y a n d i s n ot n ow expe ct ed t o live be ca u se of t h e in ju r y, t h a t is t h e yea r s w h ich a r e r efe r r ed t o a s “t h e l os t ye a r s. ” T h e cr y st a l -b a ll a ss es s m en t i s n ow m or e u n ce r t a in t h a n e ve r , a s it h a s to ba se it self on tw o differe nt expected lifetim es, t he on e th e inju red per son would h a ve h a d b u t for t h e in ju r y a n d t h e on e t h e in ju r ed pe r son will h a ve be ca u se of t h e i n ju r y. B u t m or e t h a n t ha t , t h e da m a g es a r e for a l os s w h ich , i f t h e a ss es sm e n t of t h e in ju r ed pe r son ’s a ct u a l life expe ct a n cy is cor r ect , t h e in ju r ed pe r son will n ot experience as a n a ctua l fina ncial loss becau se th ey will be dead. Th is step can be ju st ifie d a s p r ovid in g a dd it ion a l com pe n sa t ion t o a pe r son wh o h a s cl ea r ly s u ffer ed injury for which th ey should be compensa ted.
Th e fin a l s t ep , a n d t h e on e u n de r di scu ss ion in t h is r ep or t , is t h e p a ym en t t o t h e
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in ju r ed pe r son ’s e st a t e of d a m a ges for t h e in ju r ed pe r son ’s l oss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea rn in gs.
W e h a v e t r i ed t o s h ow a n u m be r of t h i n gs . F i r st , a m on e y p a ym e n t t o t h e in ju r e d pe r son ’s e st a t e ca n n ot com pe n sa t e t h e in ju r ed pe r son , t o wh om n o com pe n sa t ion can be made, and th ey do not compensa te th e injured person’s estat e, because compensa tion in the context of dama ges is necessarily compensation for a loss or inju ry a nd th e est at e h as not su ffere d a loss or in jur y. Thu s, t he da ma ges do n ot go for compensa tion to an y person, an d th e Fatal Accidents Act is there t o provide di r ect com pe n sa t ion t o t h ose wh o sh ou ld be com pe n sa t ed . N ext , t h e d oct r in e of h er it a bi lit y d oes n ot r eq u ir e t h a t t h e in ju r ed pe r son ’s cl a im for da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs d es ce n d t o t h e in ju r e d p er s on ’s es t a t e , b eca u s e t h e ch a n ce wa s s om e t h in g pe cu l ia r l y p er s on a l t o t h e in ju r e d p er s on w h ich d id n ot in volv e lega l r igh t s or pr ope r t y r ecogn ize d b y la w, a n d i t s l oss wa s n ot t h e loss of a n asset th at affected t he inju red per son’s actu al finan cial position. We have a lso tried to show th at justice cannot be done t o a deceased person by a n a war d of dam ages which mu st necess ar ily be en joyed by other s. Th e re as ons for a llowing t he cla im t o su rvive a ppea r t o us t o be weak at best , an d in su fficient to jus tify aw ar din g cryst alba ll da m a ges for a los s w h ich will n ot a ct u a lly be e xp er ien ced by t h e in ju r ed pe r son or by t he in jur ed per son’s est at e an d t hose wh o claim th rough it.
RECOMMENDATION No. 1 We recommend
(1) That a claim for the loss of a chance of future earnings should not survive the death of the claimant.
(2) That s. 5 of the Survival of Actions Act be amended to achieve that result.
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Th e s u bs t it u t ion for t h e p r es en t s. 5 of t h e d r a ft s. 5 i n Sch ed u le A wou ld giv e e ffect to t hi s r ecomm en da ti on.
I. Transitional Provision
Th e n ext qu est ion is t his : to wha t ca ses s hou ld t he pr oposed a me nd ed s. 5 ap ply?
If D u n ca n v. Bad deley is good law, every person who is injured before t he a men ded section comes in to force an d wh o suffers a loss of a ch an ce of fut ur e ea rn ings w ill ha ve an exist ing claim for da ma ges which is capable of sur viving the in jured per son’s dea th . We do not t hin k t ha t t he e na ctm ent of an am end men t t o s. 5 shou ld ret roa ctively depr ive an inju red per son of such a claim. We t her efore th ink th at th e a m en dm en t sh ou ld pr ovid e t h a t t h e a m en de d s ect ion a pp lies on ly t o ca se s i n wh ich th e cau se of action on t he cla im is ba sed a ris es a fter th e am end men t comes in to for ce.
It follows from t his pr oposal t ha t, if D u n ca n v. Bad deley is good la w, cla im s for dam ages for the loss of futu re ea rn ings in existen ce when th e am endm ent comes i n t o for ce wi ll su r v iv e t h e de a t h s of t h e in ju r e d p er s on s . T h is is con t r a r y t o ou r recomm end at ion. However , we th ink th at th e pr inciple t ha t cha nges in t he la w sh ould a s a gener al r ule oper at e only pr ospectively sh ould overr ide t he p rin ciple th a t s uch claim s sh ould not su rv ive.
RECOMMENDATION No. 2 We recom mend that the proposed amended s. 5 of the Survival of Actions Act apply only to cases in which the cause of action arises after the amended section comes into force.
Th e pr oposed dr aft of an a me nd ed s. 5 (3) which a ppea rs in App en dix A would give effect t o th is r ecomm en da ti on.
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J. Some Additional Questions
We have set out a bove th e factors and an alysis which a ppear to us t o be decisive on t h e p r in cip a l q u es t ion de a lt wit h in t h is r ep or t , t h a t is , wh et h er or n ot a cla im for dam ages for the loss of a cha nce of futu re ea rn ings sh ould sur vive the injur ed pe r son . H owe ver , s u bm is si on s w h ich we r ece ive d r a is ed a dd it ion a l con si de r a t ion s a n d q u es t ion s w h ich a r e r eleva n t a n d m a t er ia l a n d w h ich sh ou ld be r a is ed for consider at ion. We will discuss t hem her e.
1. W hether the extinguishment of a claimfor dam ages for the loss of a chance of future earnings gives a potential incentive for defendants to delay proceedings, and whether the existence of that potential incentive is sufficient grounds for allowing the claimfor damages for the loss of future earnings to survive either at all events or, alternatively, for allowing an a plaintiff’s estate to continue such a claim raised in an action comm enced during the plaintiff’s lifetime. Un der our r ecommen da tion s, a p lain tiff’s dea th will extin guish th e pla int iff’s claim for d a m a ge s for t h e los s of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs . I t s ee m s l ik e ly t h a t t h is ci r cu m s t a n ce wi ll gi ve a de fe n da n t a n i n ce n t iv e t o d el a y or ob st r u ct a n a ct i on i n or d er t o m a x im i ze t h e ch a n ce t h a t t h e p la i n t iff w il l d ie be for e t r ia l . S u ch a n in cen t ive , of cou r se , will a pp ly on ly i f t h e p la in t iff is livin g, a n d i t is likely t o be significan t only if there is some r eason t o think th at th e plaint iff will not sur vive for a p eri od longer th an it w ill ta ke t o dispose of th e pr oceedin gs.
Let us as su me t he w orst : th at some d efenda nt s will dela y an d obst ru ct la wsu its in th e hope th at th eir plain tiffs will die before tria l. Let us a lso assum e, as t he posed question would not otherwise come up, th at we are right in saying th at an awar d to an est at e of dam age s for t he loss of the decea sed p ers on’s cha nce of fut ur e ea rn ings is n ot ju st ifiab le.
Should t he existen ce of a likely incent ive to delay and obstru ct drive th e law t o pr ovide a wa rd s of dam age s t ha t a re ot he rw ise u nju st ifiable? We do n ot t hin k so. We do not t hin k t ha t t he im position of un just ified liabilit y for d am ages in a ll cases in wh ich pl a in t iffs h a ve di ed sh ou ld be u se d a s a r em ed y for t h e a dop t ion of ina ppr opria te lit igat ion t act ics in som e cases . The lit igat ion syst em s hou ld pr ovide
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su ch r em edie s. Th e su bst a nt ive la w sh ould not be d ist ort ed for t he pu rp ose.
H a vin g s a id t h a t , we s h ou ld n ot e t h a t we h a ve lit t le or n o evid en ce a bou t t h e in ciden ce of such ta ctics.
The incent ive to delay or obstr uct existed from t he en actm ent of th e S urviv al of Actions Act in 19 78 t o th e pu blicat ion of the d ecision in Duncan v. Bad deley in 1997, as it wa s t hou ght du rin g th at tim e th at a p lain tiff’s dea th did ext ingu ish th e claim for d a m a ge s for t h e los s of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs . At p a ge 11 of ou r Consulta tion Memora ndu m N o. 4 we put forwa rd t he possibility tha t a wrongdoer m a y b en efit fr om m a n a gin g t o dr a g li t iga t ion ou t lon g en ou gh t o giv e t h e p la in t iff tim e to die be fore ju dgm ent , an d wen t on to r ais e an issu e as to wh eth er, if it is de cid ed t h a t t h e cla im sh ou ld n ot su r viv e a n in ju r ed pe r son ’s d ea t h , a n excep t ion sh ould be m ad e if an inju red per son h as comm enced a ction on it du rin g th eir lifet im e, wh ich w ould ext in gu ish th e pa rt icula r i ncen ti ve in qu est ion. O ne comm ent at or said: “We all know defence counsel who employ the s tr at egy of “dragging out th e litigat ion” (p.11) hoping the plaint iff will drop the action or die be for e ju dg m en t , a n d t h is is h igh ly u n ju st .” Anot h er com m en t a t or t ook t h e ot h er side of th e issu e, sa ying t ha t “such a r ule would r esu lt in law yers filing t he Sta temen t of Claim in all accident cases the da y after th ey have been reta ined” to avoid a pr ofessiona l ne gligen ce claim, a nd th at “Th e costs a ssociat ed wit h filin g a Sta tem ent of Claim is n ot alwa ys requ ired.” These wer e th e only references by commen tat ors to the possibility of foot-dragging or to the suggestion th at a n esta te could continu e a deceased pla int iff’s claim for da ma ges for t he loss of a cha nce of fu t u r e e a r ni ng s, a n d we do n ot t h in k t h a t t he y e st a b li sh t h e e xi st e n ce of a m a jor problem in t his regar d.
As w e h a ve sa id , a n a lt er n a t ive t o a llowin g t h e cla im for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fut ur e ea rn ings t o sur vive in a ll cases w ould be t o allow an est at e to contin ue a laws uit comm enced by t he in jur ed per son in th eir lifet ime. S uch a pr ovision would not n ecessarily rem ove all incent ives to delay or obstr uct litigat ion, as a defenda nt ma y th ink th at th e dea th of th e pla int iff will wea ken th e eviden ce ava ilable at tr ial
62 or t h a t a n e st a t e m a y b e a l es s s ym p a t h et i c p la i n t iff t h a n a li vi n g v ict i m , b u t it wou ld r em ove a n y in cen t ive wh ich wou ld a r is e s olely fr om t h e e xt in gu is h m en t of t h e cla im for da m a ges u pon t h e d ea t h of t h e p la in t iff.
W e d o n ot t h i n k, h ow ev er , t h a t t h e com m e n ce m en t of a n a ct i on s h ou l d e ffe ct t h e su rv iva l of th e cla im for da ma ges for th e loss of a cha nce of fut ur e ea rn in gs. I t wou ld n ot ch a n ge t h e b a si c si t u a t ion t h a t da m a ges, if a wa r de d, wou ld n ot compensa te th e plaintiff, and would go to other persons who had n ot suffered loss for w h ich t h e y s h ou l d b e com p en s a t ed . E v er y t h in g we h a ve sa i d i n t h is r ep or t would a pply equ ally t o all cases , whet her or not act ion ha d been comm enced in th e plaint iff’s lifetime. 90
2. Effect on insurance premiums On e p oin t m a de a ga in st t h e s u r viv a l of cla im s for los s of t h e ch a n ce of fu t u r e ear nin gs in t he s ubm issions we r eceived is t ha t t he p aym ent of su ch claim s will req uir e incr eas es in ins ur an ce prem ium s. Not all cla ims for wr ongful dea th ar e pa id by ins ur ers , but most ar e, includ ing a lmost all m otor veh icle accident claims th at a r e n ot u n d er w or k e r s’ com p en s a t ion .
In pr epa ri ng ALRI’s Re por t 5 6, N on -Pecu n ia ry Da m ag es in Wron gfu l D eat h Acti on s – a Review of Section 8 of the Fatal Accidents Act, we con du ct ed a n a n a lys is of t h e probable effect on insu ran ce premium s of the pr oposals which we ultimat ely made
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In our Re por t N o. 57, S e ct i o n 1 6 o f t h e M a t r i m o n i a l P r o p er t y A c t [ E d m o n t o n : A L R I , 1 9 9 0 ] w e w e r e i n fl u e n ce d b y t h e t e n d en c y o f t h a t s e ct i on a s i t t h en s t oo d t o e n co u r a g e d e la y a n d ob s t r u ct i on de sig n ed to i n cr ea se th e ch a n ce t h a t a cla im a n t s pou se wou ld di e b efor e t r ia l. O u r re com m en da ti on wa s t h a t a de cea se d s pou se ’s e st a te sh ou ld be a ble to con ti n u e a m a tr im on ia l p r ope r ty a cti on com m en ced in th eir lifet im e. T h er e a re tw o diffe re n ces h er e. O n e is th a t t h er e w a s s ign ifica n t e v i d e n c e o f f oo t - d r a g g i n g u n d e r t h e t h e n s . 1 6 . B u t , m o r e i m p o r t a n t , a l l ow i n g a m a t r i m o n i a l p r o p e r t y a c t i o n t o c on t i n u e a f t e r t h e d e a t h o f t h e c l a i m a n t s p o u s e w o u l d a v o i d t h e l o s s o f w h a t i s i n t h e n a t u r e o f a p r o p er t y r i gh t t o w h ic h t h e d ec ea s e d s p ou s e h a s b e co m e en t i t le d on m a t r i m o n ia l b r ea k d o w n du r in g t h eir lifet im e, s u bje ct on ly t o a ju di cia l d iscr et ion a s t o a m ou n t, a n d w ou ld be tt er ca r r y ou t t h e b a s i c p o l ic y of t h e M at rim on ia l Pr oper ty A ct . H er e, in ou r vie w, p er m it ti n g t h e con ti n u a ti on of a c l a i m f o r d a m a g es fo r th e lo s s o f a ch an c e of futu re e a rn ings w ou ld be c ontra ry to good le ga l poli cy.
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for t h e st a t u t or y a wa r d of d a m a ge s t o s p ou s es , p a r en t s a n d ch i ld r en for g r ie f a n d th e loss of guidance, car e an d compa nionship r esult ing from a wr ongfully-cau sed de a t h . Ou r con clu si on wa s t h a t t h e com pe llin g p olicy r ea son s for t h e s t a t u t or y aw ar d overr ode th e det rim ent flowing fr om t he lik ely incre as e in a ut omobile in su ra nce p re mi um s.
We h a ve n ot con du ct ed a si m ila r a n a lys is in t h is ca se . We h a ve r ea ch ed ou r con cl u si on t h a t cl a im s for t h e los s of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs s h ou l d n ot s u r vi ve t h e p la in t iff’s d ea t h on ot h er gr ou n ds a n d w it h ou t r efe r en ce t o t h e e ffect of su ch claims, if th ey were to be allowed, on ins ur an ce premium s. If a decision is ma de, eith er b y act ion or in act ion, to lea ve th e ru le in Duncan v. Bad deley u n t ou ch e d, t h e quest ion of increa sed insu ra nce prem ium s would become r elevant . However, we dou bt th a t i t s hou ld be decis ive.
As we h a ve a r gu e d a t le n gt h e ar li er in t h is r ep or t , t h e ba s is of t or t d a m ag es la w is th at a w rongd oer or oth er p ers on re spons ible for th e wr ongdoer’s condu ct sh ould com p en s a t e a n i n ju r e d p er s on for t h e in ju r y su ffe r ed by t h e l a t t er . Th a t i s, t h e focu s is on th e merits of the situ ation between two parties. It may be tha t th is basis has be com e u n r ea l, a t lea st in m ot or veh icle a ccid en t si t u a t ion s, be ca u se it is n ot t h e wrongdoer who pays t he compensa tion but th e wrongdoer’s insu rer , which passes its cost s on t o th e pr emiu m-pa ying pu blic. But un til t he w hole ba sis of tort law da ma ges is r eth ought to give effect t o th e consequ ences of th is r ealit y, we th ink th at th e gen er a l pr in ciples of tort la w sh ould a ppl y t o th e cas e u nd er dis cus sion . If ju st ice r eq u ir es t h a t a de cea se d p er son ’s e st a t e r ecover da m a ges for t h e loss of a chan ce of fut ur e ear nings (which we do not th ink it does), then th e esta te sh ould be a ble t o recover th e da ma ges, a nd th e in su ra nce con seq ue nces will h a ve t o be bor ne .
3. W hether the claimshould be allowed on the grounds that it should not be cheaper to kill than to maim It is often s aid th at it s hou ld n ot be “chea per to kill t ha n t o ma im,” tha t is , it is morally offensive that a wrongdoer should pay less for causing deat h, which is the grea tes t in jur y of all, t ha n t hey w ould pa y for ca us ing a lesser inju ry. Th e ap horis m
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ra ises th e spectre of a wrongdoer who, having r un a per son down an d injur ed th em, ga in s a fin a n cia l a dv a n t a ge by r ever si n g t h eir a u t om obi le t o com pl et e t h e job by ru nn ing over th e in jur ed pe rs on a gain in or der to cau se de at h a nd th us to m inim ize th e wr ongd oer’s lia bilit y for da ma ges.
As we have sa id above, however, th e pur pose of tort da ma ges is to compensa te a n in ju r ed pe r son for in ju r ies ca u se d b y wr on gd oin g. I t is n ot t h e p u r pos e of t or t da m a ges (e xcept in t h e e gr egiou s ci r cu m st a n ces t h a t a t t r a ct pu n it ive da m a ges) t o pu n is h t h e w r on gd oer or t o m a ke a m or a l p oin t . Th ose fu n ct ion s a r e left t o t h e crimin al la w, an d t he le gal s an ctions a gain st killin g will be im posed by t he cr imin al law.
Fu rt her mor e, th ere is n o prin ciple th at it m us t n ot be chea per to kill t ha n t o ma im. In some cas es it is in dispu ta bly chea per to kill t ha n t o ma im. 91 The largest a wards of t or t d a m a ge s for p er s on a l in ju r i es go t o p er s on s wh o h a v e b ee n di sa b le d t o t h e e xt e n t t h a t t h ey ca n n ot ca r e for t h e m se lv es a n d m u st b e ca r e d for b y ot h e r s. In s u ch a case, a wr ongdoer or other responsible pers on will escape wit h m uch lower da m a ges i f t h e in ju r ed pe r son di es be for e t r ia l. T h is r es u lt s fr om t h e w or kin g of t h e com p en s a t ion p r in ci pl e: a w a r d s for fu t u r e ca r e ca n g o t o t h e com p en s a t ion of a n inju red per son by pr oviding t hem with th e car e th at will pa lliat e th e effects of th eir i n ju r i es , e ve n t h ou g h n ot h i n g ca n con s t it u t e a de qu a t e com p en s a t ion .
4. Distributive justice One su bmission sa id th at th e pur pose of both th e Fatal Accidents Act a n d t h e Su rvival of Actions Act is pol it ica l, t o lea ve som et h in g t o su r viv or s b y wa y of dist rib ut ive jus tice; th e a ppr opria te concer n fr om t he point of view of dist rib ut ive ju st ice is wh a t cla ss es a r e ju st ly ow ed , n ot wh a t on e p r iva t e p a r t y m a y owe a n ot h er . In t h is vie w, cor r ect ive ju st ice, t h a t is , com pe n sa t ion , is n ot t h e p u r pos e of t h e t wo Acts.
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Se e K la r, s u p r a n ote 48 a t 3 80 -81 , sp ea ki n g in a n oth er con te xt : “...da m a ges for s er iou s p er son a l in ju rie s a re gen er al ly h igh er th an da m ag es a wa rd ed in cas e of de at h .”
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We do not t hink th at th e pur pose of survival legislation is or should be t o tra nsfer we a lt h fr om on e cla ss of pe r son s – wr on gd oer s a n d p er son s r es pon si bl e for wr on gd oer s’ cond u ct – t o a n ot h er cla ss – t h ose wh o be n efit fr om es t a t es – on t h e g r ou n d s t h a t t h e d es er t s of t h e se con d cl a ss a r e g r ea t e r t h a n t h os e of t h e fi r st a n d apa rt from any wr ong havin g been done by a m ember of th e first class to a m ember of the second. We think th at wh at is behind sur vival legislation, and rightly so, is th e notion th at it is un just t ha t t he owner of property or right s should lose th em becau se of th e owner ’s dea th , inclu din g a r ight to compen sa tion , th at is, a righ t t o cor r ect ive ju st ice. We h a ve giv en r ea son s for sa yin g t h a t , in ou r vie w, it is n ot a pp r opr ia t e t o a pp ly t h e n ot ion of h er it a bi lit y t o cla im s for da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r ni ng s, b u t we t h in k t h a t t ha t n ot ion is a t t h e r oot of s u r vi va l legis la t ion wh er e t h e legis la t ion doe s a pp ly, a s t h e e ffect of t h e legis la t ion is t o t r ea t claims for dam ages as par t of the property of deceased persons which descends to th eir est at es for dis tr ibu tion am ong t hose e nt itle d t o receive t ha t p roper ty.
It can be ar gued t ha t a war ds un der t he Fatal Accidents Act a r e a for m of di st r ib u t ive ju st ice t r a n sfe r r in g wea lt h fr om t h e cla ss of wr on gd oer s a n d r es pon si bl e p er son s t o t h e cla ss of su r viv in g m em be r s of t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s fa m ily. E qu a lly, h owe ver , dep en de n cy a wa r ds ca n be r ega r de d a s com pe n sa t ion for t h e loss of pr osp ect ive be n efit s a n d s . 8 a wa r ds ca n be r ega r de d a s com pe n sa t ion for grief a nd th e loss of guidan ce, car e an d compa nions hip .
B u t , b e t h a t a s it m a y , w e d o n ot t h i n k t h a t t h e r e i s a n y r ea s on for t h e la w t o h ol d th at th e desert s of th e class of persons who benefit from esta tes a re grea ter th an th e de se r t s of w r on gd oer s a n d p er son s r es pon si bl e for wr on gd oer s a n d t h a t be ca u se of t h is im ba la n ce t h e la t t er sh ou ld h a ve t o m a ke p a ym en t s for t h e b en efit of t h e for m e r a s a m a t t e r of d is t r ib u t iv e ju s t ice . W e t h i n k t h a t t h e t or t d a m a ge s s h ou l d g en e r a ll y b e com p en s a t or y a nd t h a t n o u l t er i or p u r pos e s h ou l d b e i n t rod u ce d i n t o this aspect of tort dam ages.
5. W hether the possible effect that the loss of a deceased person’s chance of future earnings might have on beneficiaries and creditors justifies the aw ard
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On e s u bm is si on wh ich we r ece ive d g a ve a s a r ea son for a llowin g t h e a wa r d of dama ges for the loss of a chance of futu re earn ings that rema ining family members, i .e ., t h os e w h o ca n n ot cl a im t h e los s of fi n a n ci a l a n d p a r en t a l su p p or t , a ls o l os e t h e op p or t u n i t y t o i n h er i t a n d t h i s i s on e wa y t o com p en s a t e for t h a t . Som e wh a t t h e sam e line of th ought wa s expressed by Côté J .A. in Gala nd E sta te v. Stewa rt :92
One can easily imagine a situation in which the executor and beneficiary of the deceased is the only close kin of the deceased, and is much younger than the deceased. He is the natural and only beneficiary, though he is not a dependent and so cannot sue under the Fatal Accidents Act. The deceased may well not have spent all his earnings, but instead steadily saved the excess. That is true of many people. Therefore, the deceased’s earnings steadily augmented his estate. In such a case, the premature death of the deceased clearly deprived the beneficiary of part of his inevitable inheritance (though giving it to him earlier). There is a plain financial loss. This is no more a windfall to the beneficiary than would be the inheritance itself if the deceased instead lived out his full span of years.
A somewh at differen t bu t r elat ed point wa s ma de by one subm ission, which point ed ou t t h a t t h e r e m a y be pe r son s a ffe ct e d b y d ea t h w h o h a v e a n e n t it l em e n t fr om t h e es t a t e, e.g., cr ed it or s w h o h a ve giv en cr ed it in a n t icip a t ion of t h e in ju r ed pe r son bein g alive to ea rn income w ith wh ich t o repa y th e cred it, a nd wh o, of cour se, h ave no recour se un der t he Fatal Accidents Act.
We do n ot t h in k t h a t t h es e e xa m pl es lea d t o t h e con clu si on t h a t a cla im for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs s h ou l d s u r vi ve t h e d ea t h of t h e cl a im a n t .
Fir st , we agr ee wit h t he gen era l ru le st at ed by Ker an s J .A. in Duncan v. Bad deley:93
In my view, what shall happen to the award after it is made is essentially irrelevant in a tort suit. Were that not so, each trial must canvass what likely will happen to the award
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Su pra note 66 at p ara . 21.
93
Su pra note 2 at p ara . 17.
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after it is received.
W e d o n ot t h in k t h a t it w ou l d b e a p pr op r ia t e for a n y t r ia l t o ca n v a ss wh a t w il l likely happen t o an awar d of dama ges for the loss of a chance of futu re earn ings in or d er t o s ee wh e t h er or n ot t h e pr oce ed s wi ll go t o a b en e fi ci a r y or cr e di t or of t h e de cea se d p er son ’s e st a t e w h o h a s s u ffer ed econ om ic los s fr om t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s pr em at ur e dea th . We do not th ink th at it w ould be ap pr opria te to m ak e or de ny a n aw ar d t o an est at e becau se of the mer its , or lack of th em, of th ose who will ben efit from the est at e.
Second, we do n ot t hin k t ha t t he la w, ins tea d of inquir ing in to t he in dividu al m erit s of th ose who will tak e un der a n est at e, should allow all esta tes t o recover da ma ges for t h e los s of ch a n ce s of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs on t h e gr ou n d s t h a t , i n som e ca s es wh i ch ma y be few or m an y, th e a wa rd will go to ben eficiarie s or cre dit ors wh o ha ve su ffere d economic loss from t he d eceased per son’s pr ema tu re d eat h. Th e law sh ould not req uir e A to pay ot her wise u nju st ified dam ages in one case in order to est ab lish a lega l pr in ciple w hi ch wi ll r equ ir e B t o pa y jus ti fied d a ma ges i n a not he r ca se.
Th ir d, a s w e h a ve sa id ea r lier in t h is r ep or t , 94 if t h e la w is t o m a ke p r ovis ion for t h e pa ym en t of da m a ges for econ om ic los s s u ffer ed by t h ir d p a r t ies, it sh ou ld , in ou r opinion, do so directly. The Fatal Accidents Act giv es a di r ect r em ed y t o t h e su r viv in g fa m ily m em be r s l is t ed in t h e Act . I f ju st ice su gge st s t h a t cr ed it or s of insolvent est at es, or expecta nt legatees wh o are n ot now included un der t he Fatal Accidents Act, s h ou ld be com pe n sa t ed for t h eir los se s of e xp ect a t ion s of fu t u r e ben efits from deceas ed per sons’ est at es, t hen th ey sh ould be br ought with in t he scheme of the Fatal Accidents Act or similar legislation, which can be st ru ctur ed so tha t it will achieve the desired objectives.
94
S e e a b o v e , u n d e r J . 3 ( d ), “J u s t i c e t o s u r v i v or s s h o u l d b e d o n e u n d e r t h e Fa ta l A ccid en ts A ct a n d does n ot r equ ire an est at e cla im for los s of fu tu re ea rn in gs.”
68 6. Unless something else is done, damages for the loss of a chance of future earnings will in some cases duplicate “dependency” damages under the Fatal Accidents Act If claims for loss of a chance of futu re earn ings survive, there will be a risk th at a wr on gd oer or ot h er r es pon si bl e p er son will h a ve t o pa y t wice for a de cea se d p er son ’s l os s of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs . T h a t is be ca u s e a s u r vi vi n g fa m i ly m em b er ’s “d ep en d en cy ” cl a im u n d er t h e Fatal Accidents Act, which w ill be pa id t o th e su rvivin g fam ily member, ma y be based at least in par t on the sa me expected future ear nings as th e est at e’s claim for d am ages . We do not t hin k t ha t t his possibilit y is a ba r t o allowing a claim for dam ages for the loss of a cha nce of futu re ea rn ings to sur vive, but it does re qu ir e som e a dju st me nt in th e la w if it is d ecided th a t t he claim is t o su rv ive.
It would be p ossible t o ta ke t he p osition, a nd one su bmis sion wh ich we r eceived did so, that th e wrongdoer, by one wr ongful a ct, committ ed two differen t wr ongs to two di ffer en t pe opl e or cla ss es of pe opl e a n d s h ou ld , t h er efor e, be r eq u ir ed t o pa y da m a ges t o bot h even if t h is wou ld a m ou n t t o pa yin g t wice for t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s loss of a chan ce of fut ur e ear nings. We th ink, however, th at a wr ongdoer or other r es pon si bl e p er son sh ou ld n ot h a ve t o pa y d a m a ges m or e t h a n on ce for t h e loss of th e chan ce.
The cour ts ha ve alr ead y ta ken st eps wh ich will a void overlap an d du plicat ion in ma ny cas es. Côté J .A. put t he p res ent law p ith ily in Duncan v. Bad deley:95
[58] Besides, calculation of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act traditionally involves a deduction of any accelerated or increased inheritance...
Th er e a r e com pl exit ies i n de t er m in in g wh a t is in clu de d i n t h e d ed u ct ion or se t off, but to th e extent th at a listed family mem ber r eceives accelerat ed or increased benefits from th e esta te becau se of th e wrongful act, th e wrongdoer or other res ponsible per son is n ot r equ ired to pa y twice for loss of fut ur e ea rn ings. Th is is
95
Su pra note 2 at p ara . 58.
69
likely t o be by fa r t h e m ost com m on ca se , pa r t icu la r ly a ft er t h e a pp lica t ion of t h e Family Relief Act, as Côté J .A. noted.96
However , if the e st at e is in solvent , th ere will be n o set off becau se t he s ur vivors will n ot r ece ive a n yt h in g fr om t h e e st a t e w h ich ca n be se t off a ga in st t h eir de pe n de n cy cla im s. Or t h ose wh o t a ke u n de r t h e d ece a se d p er son ’s w ill or in t es t a cy m a y n ot be th e sa me as th ose wh o ha ve “depen den cy” claim s, pa rt icula rly a s a “depe nd en cy” claim d oes not d epen d u pon a ctua l depen den cy. For exa mp le, an ad ult child m ay recover “depen den cy” da ma ges for th e loss of reas ona bly-expected volun ta ry fi n a n ci a l b en e fi t s fr om a p a r en t d u r in g t he pa r e n t ’ li fe t im e , t h ou g h t h e pa r e n t ’ s s wi ll lea ves t h e e n t ir e e st a t e t o t h e s pou se so t h a t t h er e w ill b e n o be n efit fr om t h e est at e to t he a du lt child to be se t off. Pa ren ts or siblin gs m ay a lso ha ve rea sona ble expectations of fina ncial benefits from th e deceased person du ring t heir lifetime, but ma y ha ve no claim u nder a will or intest acy. In all of th ese cases, dam ages ba sed u pon expe cted fut ur e ea rn ings m ay be du plicat ed if th e law is a s st at ed in Duncan v. Bad deley. Th e t ot a l n u m er ica l in cid en ce of s u ch ca se s i s n ot likely t o be great , but we t hink th at th e likely incidence is sufficient to suggest t ha t st eps be t a ken t o gu a r d a ga in st t h e d u pl ica t ion of da m a ges b a se d on t h e loss of expe ct ed ea rn in gs.
In t he r ecent case of Brooks and B rooks Estate v. S tefura, 97 Belzil J . effectively r ever se d t h e s et off. H e fir st h eld t h a t , in a ss es si n g d a m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of futu re ea rn ings, or earn ing capacity, expected “obligations” of the deceased per son sh ould be d edu cted from th e exp ecte d ea rn in gs of th e de ceas ed p er son . He th en h eld th at th e deceased person’s supp ort obligations to family mem bers wer e “obligations” which should be deducted from t he expected ear nings. This approach poses some ana lytical difficult ies – Fatal Accidents Act “dependency” claims, for exa mp le, can inclu de exp ected volun ta ry b en efits w hich would n ot h ave been
96
I bi d . a t p a r a . 5 9 .
97
Su pra note 33.
70 “ob li ga t i on s ” – a n d w e t h i nk t h a t it i s ou t s id e t h e Ca n a d ia n m a i ns t r ea m .98
Th e On ta ri o La w Refor m C omm iss ion, in it s 19 87 Re por t, Compensat ion for Personal Injuries and Death, m a de a n ot h er su gge st ion t o de a l wit h t h e p r obl em of duplication and some other problems. The Commission’s suggestion was t hat a claim by t he est at e for lost “workin g capa city”99 be subst itu ted for th e Fatal Accidents Act claims, and t hat the proceeds of any damages awa rd for th e loss of working capa city be divisible among a dependen t spouse, depen dent children a nd de pe n de n t pa r en t s fr ee of cla im s b y cr ed it or s a n d of e st a t e a dm in is t r a t ion cost s. As th ere would be only one a war d an d one divisible amount , duplication would be a void ed . Wh ile t h is sol u t ion wou ld in m a n y ca se s w or k efficien t ly, we do n ot recommend it for Alberta . For one th ing, it would not pr ovide th e dam ages for grief a n d t h e loss of gu id a n ce, ca r e a n d com pa n ion sh ip wit h ou t pr oof of da m a ge wh ich ar e now prescribed by s. 8 of th e Fatal Accidents Act, n or wou ld it pr ovid e for pa ym en t s t o fa m ily m em be r s i n t h e a bs en ce of loss of wor kin g ca pa cit y, w h ich n ot ever y decea sed p ers on h as . Fu rt he r, we th ink th at it is bet te r for t he law to a chieve its objectives directly – in t his case t hr ough th e Fatal Accidents Act, m a ki n g ch a n ge s i n t ha t Act i f i t is n ot t h ou g ht t o b e w or k in g pr op er l y – t h a n in d ir e ct l y th rough a legal str uctu re wh ich does not sit too easily with usu al pr inciples of law. F in a lly, t h is sol u t ion wou ld en d u p i n som e ca se s w it h da m a ges g oin g in t o es t a t es of per son s wit h n o spou se, m in or or dep en den t ch ildr en , or d epe nd en t p a re nt s.
Another s olution, if an esta te is t o be able to recover da ma ges for loss of a cha nce of
Th oug h P rofes sor Wa dd am s, s u p r a not e 54 a t 5 23, p oint s ou t t ha t “red uct ion of th e est at e’s claim b y t h e a m o u n t t h e d e c e a s e d w o u l d h a v e s p e n t o n d e p e n d a n t s ” is a s o l u t i o n t h a t a p p e a r s i n s e v e r a l Au st r a l i a n cas es , th o s e cited b ein g S k elt on v. C ollins (19 66 ) 11 4 C om m n . L. R. 94 (H C); J a c k son v. S t o t h a r d [19 73 ] 1 N .S .W .L .R . 29 2 (N .S .W .S .C ., C .L . D iv. ); a n d G a n n on v. G r a y [197 3] Q d. R . 411 . H e ra ises tw o objection s: 1. th at su ch a n e xclus ion of da m ag es w ould not ap ply in th e cas e of a livin g p la i n ti ff; a n d 2 . t h a t it w ou l d r e qu i r e a d is t in ct ion b et w ee n ca s es in w h ich t h e de fe n d a n t w a s a n d w a s not re spon sible for th e de ceas ed p er son ’s de at h, a s r edu ction of th e est at e’s claim wou ld be jus tifia ble on ly w h er e a n a cti on wa s a va ila ble u n de r th e fa ta l a ccid en ts leg isl a ti on .
99
98
Un d e r t h e C o mm is s io n ’s u s ag e, “w o rking c a p a c ity” w ould inc lude e a rn ing c a pa c ity, ca pa c ity t o g i v e ca r e a n d g u i d a n c e , c a p a c i t y t o p r o v i d e h o u s e h o l d s e r v i c es , a n d l o s s of e n t i t l e m e n t u n d e r a pens ion, ann uity, or similar instr um ent .
71
fut ur e ea rn ings , would b e t o provide b y st at ut e some me an s of avoidin g th e du plicat ion of dam age s. Th is could in volve a p rovision th at th e a mou nt pa yab le by a wr on gd oer t o a de cea se d p er son ’s e st a t e for su ch da m a ges w ou ld a lwa ys be se t off aga inst th e wrongdoer’s liability for “dependency” claims un der t he Fatal Accidents Act. Altern at ively, it could involve a provision t ha t t he a moun t pa yable by a wrongdoer un der t he Fatal Accidents Act for “dependency” claims would alwa ys be se t off a ga in st t h e w r on gd oer ’s l ia bi lit y t o t h e e st a t e. Th e ch oice wou ld de pe n d on wh ich claim sh ould be en tit led t o prior ity over th e oth er a s a ma tt er of lega l policy, bu t e ach would give ris e t o problem s t ha t w ould h ave to be r esolved by le gisla tive fi ne -t u n in g. A fu r t h er a lt e rn a t iv e w ou ld be t o p r ov id e s om e sor t of a for m u la .
Th e p r obl em of t h e p oss ib ilit y of d u pl ica t ion of da m a ges i s n ot in su r m ou n t a bl e. As Côté J .A. point ed out in Duncan v. Bad deley100
The solution, surely, is to do something about the overlap, not to abolish one of the causes of action or heads of damage.
However , if th e la w la id down by Duncan v. Bad deley is t o sta nd , somet hin g sh ould be don e t o a void t h e d u pl ica t ion of da m a ges u n de r a n es t a t e cla im for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r ni ng s a n d a Fatal Accidents Act “dependen cy” claim. As Belzil J said in th e B rook s case:101
[247] The Fatal Accidents Act and the Survival of Actions Act are silent on the interrelationship of the two types of claims, and specifically are silent on the issue of which claim has priority in the event that there are insufficient funds to satisfy both claims.
[248] This legal void cries out for legislative clarification.
100
Su pra note 2 at p ara . 57.
101
S u p r a n o t e 3 3 a t p a r a s . 2 4 7 -4 8 .
72
Th is di scu ss ion is n ot a n a r gu m en t a ga in st a llowin g t h e s u r viv a l of cla im s for los s of ch a n ce s of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs . T h e p oi n t be in g m a de h er e is s im p ly t h a t , i f, con t r a r y to th e prin cipal recomm enda tion of th is report , an est at e is to be able to recover da m a ges for t h e loss of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e e a r n in gs , or ea r n in g ca pa cit y, s om e legisla tive m eas ur e sh ould be a dopted to pr otect t he w rongd oer or oth er r espons ible person against th e payment of double dama ges.
K. Conclusion
For a ll the r easons given a bove, ALRI recommend s th at th e law sh ould be clar ified to pr ovide th at a cla im for da ma ges for th e loss of a chan ce of fut ur e ea rn ings w ill not su rvive th e deat h of the injur ed person, a nd t ha t t he Su rvival of Actions Act sh ould be am en ded a ccordin gly.
73
74
PART III — LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
RE COMM EN DATIO N N o. 1 We recomm end (1 ) T h a t a cl a im for t h e los s of a ch a n ce of fu t u r e ea r n i n gs s h ou l d n ot s u r vi ve t h e d ea t h of t h e cl a im a n t . (2 ) T h a t s . 5 of t h e Su rvival of Actions Act be a men ded t o achieve t ha t r esu lt. . . . 49
RE COMM EN DATIO N N o. 2 We recomm end t ha t t he pr oposed am ended s. 5 of the Su rvival of Actions Act ap ply only to cases in which th e cause of action ar ises after th e am ended section comes in to force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
75
These r ecomm enda tions a nd t he a ccompan ying policy decisions wer e appr oved by th e Board a t it s meet ing in November 1998.
B.R. BUR ROWS C.W. DALTON A. S. DE VILLARS N.A. FLATTERS W.H. HURLBU RT H.J.L. IRWIN P.J .M. LOWN S.L. MARTIN D.R. O WRAM B.L. RAWLINS N . C. WI T TMAN N R.J. WOOD
CHAIRMAN
DIRECTOR
December 1998
APPENDIX A
DR AFT S UR VIVAL OF ACTIONS AMENDME NT ACT
5
(1)
If a cause of action sur vives under s. 2, only those damages tha t resu lted in a ctua l fina ncial loss to the deceased or h is esta te a re re covera ble.
(2)
Wit hou t r est ri ctin g t he gen er a lit y of sub sect ion (1), t he following a re n ot r ecovera ble:
(a )
punitive or exemplary dama ges,
(b)
dam ages for loss of expecta tion of life, paid and su ffer in g, p h ys ica l d is figu r em en t or los s of a m e n it i es , a n d
(c)
da ma ges in rela tion fut ur e ea rn ings, in cludin g da m a ges for los s of e a r n in g ca pa cit y, a bi lit y t o ea r n or chance of futu re earn ings.
(3)
This section app lies only to cases in wh ich the cau se of action ar ises after th is section comes into force.
A - 76
APPENDIX B
IND IVIDUALS WHO PR OVIDED RES P ONS ES TO OUR CON S UL TATIO N M EMO RAN DU M N O. 4
1.
Fr an k de Walle , de Wa lle & McDona ld, Let hb rid ge
2.
Ma r k C. F r ee m a n , Roy a l I n su r a n ce, E dm on t on
3.
W. Dona ld Goodfellow, Q.C., Calga ry
4.
Walt er W. K ub itz, S te ngl E vera rd , Calga ry
5.
Alan D. Ma cleod, Q.C., Macleod Dixon, Ca lgar y
6.
Don Marsha ll, Allstat e Insur an ce, Edmonton
7.
J ohn G. Ma rt lan d, Q.C., Ben ne tt J ones Ver cher e, Ca lgar y
8.
Daphn e Matth ews, President Can adian In sura nce Claims Mana gers’ As soc., E d m on t on
9.
J .W. McF a dz en , Alb er t a J u st ice, Ci vil La w B r a n ch , E dm on t on
10.
Don a ld J . McG a r vey, M cLe n n a n Ros s, E dm on t on
11.
Sh elley L. Mi ller , Q.C. , Cr u ick sh a n k Ka r vella s, E dm on t on
B - 78
12.
B la i r A. P e t t er s on , Ve r n ka t r a m a n & As soci a t es , E d m on t on
13.
Ke n n et h M. R owe , J a ckson Ar let t e M a cIv er , E dm on t on
14.
Ros t yk Sa dow n ik , Wh ea t ley S a dow n ik , E dm on t on
15.
Con st a n ce I . Ta ylor & Ron a ld H . H a gge t t , Cook Du ke C ox, E dm on t on
16.
J . P h ilip Wa r n er , Q.C. , Bi sh op & McK en zie , E dm on t on
B - 79
ISSN 0317-1604 ISBN 1-8960-7824-9