Get documents about "TO HELP OR NOT TO HELP— CIMIC AND PROJECT
Document Sample
The Army Lessons For Soldiers By Soldiers
Learned Centre
Vol 11 No 1
In This Issue…
To Help or Not to Help—CIMIC and Project Management
The Evolving Role of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
Operations in International Settings
KMNB V Information Operations—An Effective Combat
Multiplier Against an Asymmetrical Threat in a Complex
Environment
Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and
Reconaissance Coordination Centre (ISTAR CC)—
Providing the Commander's Situational Awareness
TO HELP OR NOT TO HELP—
CIMIC AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT
By Major A. Demers, G9 KMNB, Op ATHENA Roto 1
Refs: A. B-GG-005-004/AF-023 Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War
B. AJP-9 NATO CIMIC Doctrine
C. Op ATHENA KMNB Roto 0 CIMIC Lessons Learned
D. Annex W to KMNB OP O 18
E. KMNB CIMIC SOPs
INTRODUCTION
I
f you ask the question "what is civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC)?" to most soldiers,1 you will probably get "CIMIC does
projects" or "CIMIC provides humanitarian aid to the locals" as an answer. Yet those answers only scratch the surface of
CIMIC operations (see figure 1). The primary intent of CIMIC operations, according to Canadian (CA) doctrine, is to support
civilian authority, population, international organizations (IOs) and/or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in order to assist
in the pursuit of a military objective.
When we turn to AJP-9 NATO CIMIC Doctrine, the implementation of a civil plan. The long-term purpose
immediate purpose of CIMIC is to establish and of CIMIC is to help create and sustain conditions that
maintain the full co-operation of the NATO commander will support the achievement of alliance objectives in
and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies operations. Finally, looking at the core CIMIC
and population within a commander's area of functions at the tactical level, we can see that projects
operations (AOO) in order to allow him to fulfill his are a sub functions of the support to civil environment
mission. This may include direct support to the line of activity:
1. "Soldiers" is a generic term that includes officers, senior NCOs and junior ranks.
Figure 1. Types of Civil-Military Cooperation (from B-GG-005-004/AF-023, page 1-10).
Civil Military Liaison and Assessments. Advise Support the Force. Maximize civil support for the
commanders on local activities as they may timely entrance, conduct of operations and orderly
influence their mission and their responsibilities withdrawal of alliance forces, and reduce civil
towards the civil populace. Also, carry out interference on operational matters.
continuous assessments of the local civil Support the Civil Environment. Where necessary
environment, including local needs, in order to [emphasis added], commit resources to create
identify the extent of any vacuum and how that void conditions that facilitate the execution of operations,
might be filled. and where possible hasten a return to normalcy.
Figure 2. KMNB Project Flow Chart (from KMNB SOP 903).
2 The Bulletin
From the previous paragraph, we can readily see that priorities.3 If approved, by KMNB, the project was
projects are only one part of CIMIC work. The question submitted for approval by the donors. Once the funds
that remains is why do projects take on such prominence were allocated, the CIMIC team implemented the
in the eyes of both the population and our own forces? project with or without the help of the activity cell,
The aim of this paper is to explore CIMIC projects and see depending on the scope of the endeavour. Figure 2
how we can execute project activities, while at the same summarizes the KMNB project management process.
time managing the expectations of all the different actors
Various sources of funding were available to KMNB V.
in a theatre of operations where the population is in need
Money was rarely a factor in the project approval process.
of everything.
It was essentially a question of identifying valid projects
supporting the commander's intent. The following table
KABUL MULTINATIONAL BRIGADE PROJECT ACTIVITIES gives a summary of what type of funds were available for
CIMIC activities in the Kabul area:
For the duration of KMNB V, the aim of CIMIC projects
was to support the commander's mission within the AOO
Source of
by establishing goodwill, trust, credibility and a measure Amount Remarks
funding
of positive reinforcement in support of the local
authorities. CIMIC projects would only be undertaken to
support an increase in overall force protection by gaining Actual figure was
1 000 000 Euros for one
the support of local populations in areas which posed the Approximately
EU year, so about half was
greatest threat in the brigade "forward defence" concept.2 500 000 Euros
available for new projects for
Consideration was given to focus CIMIC projects in those KMNB V
geographic areas that would support this objective.
Particular attention was given to increasing project Roto 0 had difficulties
activities north of Kabul, in the Shamali plain area, in the spending its own allocation
Eastern district and in the southwestern portion of the due to various administrative
problems. Roto 1 completed
AOO. Other than force protection, KMNB CIMIC project
CIDA KMNB 500 000 CA $ four Roto 0 projects. Some
supported the regional economic development (by buying of that amount (90 000 US $)
supplies locally and using local workers in contract work). was spent by ISAF for
Furthermore, project activities would generally fall within provincial reconstruction
one of the following categories: team (PRT) in Kunduz
Social projects included support to education, public
CIDA CA BG 250 000 CA $
health and sports programs.
Infrastructure improvements projects included water, 3 000 US $—
electricity and any minor repair or re-construction of US CERP Funds
Others
physical structures. Other national
funds
Regardless of the line of CIMIC activity, KMNB projects
always tried to bolster support for the Afghan Transition The final part of the implementation was the handover
Authority (ATA) at the local level. of the project to the local government and the
The KMNB project cycle was a simple process that community during an official ceremony. As part of the
started with the CIMIC team leaders identifying information operations (Info Ops) campaign, such
possible projects during the normal day to day project activities were featured regularly in venues like
framework operations. The tactical teams always ISAF News or a local newspaper like the Kabul Times.
identified the most urgent needs of the population in a This allowed KMNB CIMIC to get the maximum effect
given area and produced a project proposal, which on the population from each project. Such good news
was submitted to the KMNB activity cell. At that level, stories played a key role in shaping the perception of
the project was evaluated in order to ensure that the the Afghan population towards the reconstruction
funds were available, that the project did not go efforts and promoted the legitimacy of the ATA,
against the donor's guidelines and, most importantly, supported by ISAF, through the display of visible and
that the project proposal was in line with the brigade tangible results on the ground.
2 Extending the "outer" ring of protection around Kabul.
3 Other project guidelines during the planning included detailed consideration of the sustainability of the project since KMNB did not support CIMIC
projects that would result in subsequent or ongoing involvement of military resources. There must be no ongoing maintenance or other support
costs for equipment attributable to KMNB or donors. The beneficiary must accept full responsibility for the equipment or infrastructure including
maintenance. Projects that facilitate timely transition to the appropriate civilian organization or authority are sustainable in the long term and
emphasize self-reliance as opposed to dependency are to be undertaken. Collectively, the projects throughout the KMNB AOO involved and
benefited a broad spectrum of ethnic groups and both genders. Finally, infrastructure projects were conducted in accordance with local standards.
Projects provided the minimum necessary infrastructure and actively involved the local community (self-help or locally employed labour).
February 2005 3
ISAF News—Issue 58
Kabul Times—15 June 04
Figure 3. Examples of CIMIC products for KMNB IO campaign.
MANAGEMENT OF EXPECTATIONS always be carefully balanced with the need to be seen
as a key player in the field, able to provide some
When dealing with projects, CIMIC teams are usually direct help to the population.
victims of their own good press. Since January 2003, The first rule of how to manage project expectation is
KMNB CIMIC teams have completed 344 projects,4 and to never promise anything to anybody. The second
another 204 are either planned rule is to always ask if your force is the best suited
or ongoing. It is easy to see why the expectations are organization to provide the required help. Thirdly, one
so high. Soldiers, especially the ones from Western should always look at the long-term impacts. For
armies, like to help people in need. This "need" is at example, the distribution of humanitarian aid (HA) by a
the heart of the project dilemma: having the military force should only be done in an emergency
willingness and the means to do something versus the situation, as it will usually be counter productive in the
needs of the mission and the possible long term- long run: people will always expect more, and you will
impact of executing a project. In a complex only make life harder for the next force that will come
environment, second and third order effects are very in after you. Finally, before starting a project,
hard to predict. Are we helping or hindering the commanders at all levels (assisted by the G9 Staff)
emancipation of young women by building a school should ask themselves the following set of questions:
for girls in a remote village still under the influence of Who's asking for help?
religious traditions? Are we making the water
Are they the people who need it the most?
situation worse, on a macro level (impact on the water
table), by digging wells (cheap, small, quick impact What do they need?
projects)? Should we help the police instead of
When do they need it?
helping the population at large? As well, all those
project activities are time consuming, and they can Who will do the work?
shift the CIMIC team focus away from other key
When should the task be completed?
CIMIC tasks. This is where project priority is key in
managing which projects will be executed and which What is the payoff for our forces, and is the need
project will be cancelled. In the end, there is no easy actually confirmed by the CIMIC team's assessment
answer. The need to curb our enthusiasm must of the area?
4 CA BG CIMIC counted all projects (including the minor ones) into the database. As well CA BG CIMIC enjoyed the use of 250 000 CA $ from the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) for implementation of projects exclusively in the CA BG AOO.
4 The Bulletin
Figure 4. KMNB Project SITREP Jan 2003–June 2004.
As noted in the previous paragraph, the case of CONCLUSION
humanitarian assistance 5 must also be carefully
managed, lest CIMIC accidentally supplant or even In the case of KMNB V, CIMIC activities had to result in an
replace an NGO/IO. It is vital to maintain a co-operative increase of the force protection level, i.e., implementing a
relationship with these civilian organisations in order to project to "win the hearths and minds of the population."
avoid having CIMIC dragged into a permanent or semi- That was the real payoff for our troops. Implementing
permanent role of delivering aid to certain segments of projects and providing HA are only one part of CIMIC
the population. The direct delivery of humanitarian aid operations, albeit, the most visible and attractive one. It
can have unexpected or undesirable consequences. In must be managed carefully if we are not to fall prey to
some cases, this can cause resentment and civil unrest mission creep7 and become enamoured with only the final
in parts of the population that know that this has result of a project, forgetting why we executed that project
happened but have received nothing. In cases where in the first place.
this occurs, a safe and secure environment is sacrificed It must be understood that CIMIC projects are a small
in favour of humanitarian action. In other cases, the portion of the many functions required. Assessments,
involvement or distribution of aid may be against the liaison and contributions to Info Ops were by far the most
stated policy of government organisations (GOs) or IOs, significant and important contribution of KMNB CIMIC to
such as United Nations High Commission for Refugees the overall effectiveness of the mission. In the end, we
(UNHCR) policy with regards to displaced persons, must always remember that CIMIC is not, after all, an
refugees and evacuees (DPRE) camps in Kabul.6 NGO in uniform.
5 This includes donations from charitable organisation back in the home country. Although these HA campaigns are full of good intentions, the
logistics of such small aid projects are usually inversely proportional to the actual benefits on the ground. As well, these small HA drives create an
expectation that more free help should come. They also contribute to the "hand out" mentality that can attract people to stay close to potential aid
distribution point instead of working towards a more normal way of life.
6 From Ref C, para 4.6.
7 One definition of mission creep is derived from situations in which the military moves from well-defined or achievable missions to ill-defined or
impossible ones. For further discussion on mission creep see Adam B. Siegel, "Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood?" Joint Force Quarterly
No. 31 (Summer 2002), pp. 112-115.
February 2005 5
T H E E V O LV I N G R O L E O F C I V I L - M I L I TA R Y C O O P E R AT I O N
( C I M I C ) O P E R AT I O N S I N I N T E R N AT I O N A L S ET T I N G S
By Lieutenant Alden Skidd
More often than not, the center of gravity will be an intangible, essential element of the political and moral forces
that keep our enemies in the fight against us.
—U.S. Marine Corps DP1, Warfighting
BACKGROUND
C
ivil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is an important, but frequently misunderstood, area of operations in both domestic
and international missions. Many see CIMIC as the military equivalent of humanitarian organisations. This ill-
conceived perception neglects the important military role CIMIC can and does play. It has become clear from recent
missions that the need for further discussion and analysis of the current CIMIC doctrine, which is still evolving, is
required to help strengthen this significant operational tool. Indeed, when CIMIC activities are well orchestrated, they
become a combat multiplier, which plays an important role in the campaign to "win the hearts and minds" of the civilian
population. This article seeks to examine several of the lessons learned from Operation ATHENA in Kabul,
Afghanistan, from a CIMIC perspective and offers several ideas for enhancement of the current doctrinal guidelines.
In terms of doctrine, CIMIC has often been regarded as assess the needs of the local population as a whole. The
the embodiment of the government's 3-D approach to question thus became, where exactly could the limited
international affairs: it seems to exemplify the cohesion resources allotted be best expended to achieve the
of defence, diplomacy and development policy under maximum effect? Would it be better to construct a well in
one umbrella.1 Unfortunately, the vision of the CIMIC an area devoid of proper infrastructure or next to the home
operator as a humanitarian actor building schools and of an influential figure in the local community? In a country
distributing much-needed supplies to those in need where the educational infrastructure has been destroyed,
disregards the operational value of a CIMIC organisation illiteracy is commonplace and many citizens are unable to
in enhancing force protection. While these functions, no recognize signs, let alone national flags. Added to this is
doubt, contribute to a mission and the overall the multiple non-government organizations (NGOs), each
government direction, it is important to frame the with their own slick logo. While many Afghanis understand
purpose of CIMIC through a military lens: each the symbol of the International Security Assistance Force
successive act of apparent benevolence is carefully (ISAF), the question that begs asking is, is it safe to
orchestrated to bring about the maximum impact with assume a Canadian flag attached to a well will be
the minimum expenditure of resources. interpreted any different than the logo of an NGO?
Consequently, there is a great need for careful
assessment of the terrain in any CIMIC operation to
determine both the needs of the local populace and the
mechanism for spreading information. CIMIC, after all,
contributes significantly to the information operations
campaign. This is not to say that the humanitarian motive
is sidelined or sacrificed to the military objectives; on the
contrary, the doctrinal guidance points towards the need
for harmonization of military activities with both the
desires of the local government and the activities of the
rest of the international community (IC). Indeed, military
and humanitarian imperatives are rarely mutually
exclusive, despite the apparent aversion of certain
Consider the case of Afghanistan, where a small group of organizations to cooperate with any military activity.
CIMIC operators are striving to enhance force protection It should be noted that CIMIC is not a panacea for needs
and guard the commander's centre of gravity—to win and of the local population, although it will likely be viewed as
maintain the support of the local population. In a country such. In Afghanistan, especially in the wake of the
destroyed by 23 years of conflict, it was not difficult to Taliban's fall from power, a plethora of international
1 For a good overview of this policy in Afghanistan, see http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/menu-en.asp.
6 The Bulletin
Some have argued Afghanistan remains a forgotten war,
but this overlooks the potential impact for CIMIC activities,
especially in areas where NGOs may not operate
because of operational security reasons. CIMIC can and
does aid in the fostering of a more secure environment by
working in concert with the local authorities to both secure
the area in question and begin the arduous task of
reconstruction. This is one of the reasons CIMIC teams
are often deployed as a component of provincial
reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, and why
Civilian Affairs personnel are invariably meshed with
Special Forces by the United States. Indeed, all US Army
Civilian Affairs personnel come under the jurisdiction of
the Commander in Chief of the United States Special
Operations Command (SOCOM).2 The criticism comes in
with the inability of locals to distinguish between military
and humanitarian actors.3 This is a legitimate concern.
However, in many areas, humanitarian actors are not able
to provide support, and the choice becomes simple:
assistance from the military or no assistance at all.
CIMIC acts as a significant force multiplier, especially in
theatres of peace support operations such as with ISAF in
Afghanistan. As such, it is paramount that sufficient funds
be allocated for CIMIC operations. At present, Canadian
CIMIC doctrine provides for the "establishment of funding
arrangements between DND and OGDs for specified
CIMIC tasks in CF international operations."4 Currently,
a certain amount of funds is earmarked through the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to
target specific projects in line with both DND and CIDA
objectives. In terms of force protection, however, this
alignment may not always be present. As such, funds
ought to be allotted for CIMIC operations under a "force
protection" umbrella. Force protection is defined as
organizations entered the country with visions of "comprising all measures taken to contribute to mission
grandeur. Many promises were made, from the basic success by preserving freedom of action and operational
(repair of infrastructure) to the obscene (hotels and golf effectiveness through managing risks and minimizing
courses). Alas, as with many things, what began as a vulnerabilities to personnel, information, materiel, facilities
great vision soon revealed itself as a delusion, replete and activities from all threats5." A small-scale project can
with broken promises, unfilled mandates and relocation to often do wonders in improving relations with locals and
flashier areas of reconstruction (most recently, Iraq). reassuring them of our role as keepers of the peace rather
There is a veritable surplus of studies on everything from than an occupation force. As those who are familiar with
infrastructure to information-technology; unfortunately, Afghanistan's history can attest, foreigners have never
most of the recommendations therein have not been been particularly welcome, making our job all the more
implemented. The government is desperate to realize its challenging but equally important.
own plan of action, but many of the NGOs are untrusting
and have circumvented the local authorities with their own One of the lessons learned throughout rotations 0 and 1
agendas. The result is a country full of micro projects but in Afghanistan has been the need for expedited project
no central organization or database of activities. The implementation over the spectrum of deployment and
donor community seems to trust the NGOs more than the not just at the end of a given rotation. The reality on the
Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA), and so again the ground is that the period between project identification
money is siphoned off without a central tracing and implementation can be considerably drawn out due
mechanism and without a clear, over-arching vision. to the lengthy administrative oversight required to utilize
2 US Marine Corps, MAGTF Civil-Military Operations, Coordinating Draft 01-21-01, pp. 31.
3 K. Gannon, "Afghanistan Unbound," Foreign Affairs May/June 2004.
4 Draft CF Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Policy-14 Apr 04
5 Ibid.
February 2005 7
CIDA funds. Projects identified at the start of tour were commanders at all levels to enhance the effects of CIMIC
implemented (at best) by the third and fourth month, activities. It is extremely optimistic to rely solely on the
whereas projects under the force protection umbrella CIMIC element attached to a formation to deal with the
were completed in a much shorter time span. While the local population, as often every member of a patrol will
government's 3-D approach stresses coordination, it come into contact with the host nation on a regular basis.
does not imply subservience of one branch to another. It behoves commanders to be "as familiar with employing
At all times, the military mission must retain primacy. CIMIC assets as they are with employing engineers or fire
There is an unfortunate tendency in some personnel to support.9"
"go native," especially given the natural human desire to With CIMIC currently a forerunner in the Land Force
alleviate suffering when confronted by scenes of Reserve Restructure (LFRR) as a task destined for the
extreme poverty and suffering.6 However, we must Reserve Force, we must carefully evaluate the desire to
avoid becoming maligned. In the words of US Army move away from the ad hoc arrangements governing
Lt-Col Jacobs, "to cross the line between civil and CIMIC formations.10 While it is indeed commendable that
military operations is to cease providing support to the LFQA is moving in the direction of a permanent CIMIC coy
military commander."7 In sum, military objectives often that will train and deploy as a unit, there are certain
supersede the humanitarian agenda. For a proper benefits to be gleaned from the merger of skills and
CIMIC organisation to operate effectively, it requires its knowledge of both Regular and Reserve Force personnel
own realistic and self-contained funding apparatus in in a CIMIC setting. While there is some truth to the myth
addition to any cross-governmental arrangements. that reservists bring important project management and
civilian interaction skills to the table, it is equally important
to include personnel who are used to working within an
operational environment and who have a well-established
ability to work and persuade those Regular Force
personnel in command positions. This arrangement
would minimize the potential for marginalization of
Reserve Force personnel and likely increase the
efficiency and performance of the CIMIC organization as
a whole.
Enhancing CIMIC activities is in keeping with the
doctrinal shift towards manoeuvre warfare. As this
doctrine continues to evolve, careful attention should be
given to the potential benefits of CIMIC activities in
international operations. As stated earlier, CIMIC is not
In terms of doctrine, CIMIC also involves respecting the a cure-all but rather a force multiplier, providing another
needs of other civilian organizations operating within an means for the commander to achieve his end state. In
area of operations (AOO). In many cases, civilian the truest sense, CIMIC exemplifies the manoeuvre
agencies may be able to provide similar services to locals warfare approach of entering into an opposing force's
with lower overhead costs, while leaving projects dealing decision cycle and disrupting their operations. It lowers
with security, disarmament and the protection of human animosity and increases force protection. It should be
rights for military organizations and our respective areas treated as any other military asset in that CIMIC
of expertise.8 This can help to protect against mission activities in international operations require a clear and
creep and harmonize CIMIC efforts with the international defined military mandate, a proper (but not
community, thereby reducing the possibility of disproportionate) budget and a mix of both Regular and
competition. This highlights the importance of CIMIC as a Reserve Force personnel. As the doctrine is still
command responsibility. Indeed, it is not only those who emerging, this article has sought to offer some
are qualified "CIMIC operators" who undertake civil- suggestions to fine-tune the current CIMIC mechanism.
military operations (CMO); rather, it is every soldier on the In cases where the centre of gravity is that intangible
ground that communicates with the local populace and element of local support, CIMIC is a vital task in
governing authorities. As such, it is important that CIMIC bolstering force protection that deserves further
training, or at least awareness, be made available to discussion and analysis.
6 AJP-01A Civil-Military Cooperation, Chapter 20.
7 J. Jacobs, "Civil Affairs in Peace Operations," Military Review, July-August 1998.
8 J. Walter, "Security and Keeping the Peace," Afghanistan: Crossline's Essential Field Guides to Humanitarian and Conflict Zones 2nd ed. (Geneva:
2004).
9 J. Jacobs, "Civil Affairs in Peace Operations," Military Review, July-August 1998.
10 B-GL-300/005/FP-001 Information Operations, Chapter 8, "Civil-Military Cooperation," pp. 103.
8 The Bulletin
K M N B V I N F O R M AT I O N O P E R AT I O N S — A N E F F E C T I V E C O M B AT
M U LT I P L I E R A G A I N S T A N A S Y M M ET R I C A L T H R E AT I N A
COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT
By Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Tremblay, DCOS KMNB
Guerilla leaders spend a great deal more time in organization, instruction, agitation, and propaganda work than
they do fighting, for their most important job is to win over the people.1
—Mao Tse-Tung
BACKGROUND
T
he guerilla principles and tactics developed and employed by Chairman Mao during the last century continue to
influence conflicts waged around the world. The Opposing Military Forces (OMF)2 in Afghanistan, for example, put
the Maoist military lessons into practice on a regular and bloody basis against major actors such as the Afghan
Transitional Authority (ATA), the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA), various international Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the US Coalition and, to a lesser extent, the Canadian-led International
Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. This should not come as a surprise. As Mao would have argued, the
marked imbalance in resources that are available to the various in-theatre adversaries inevitably pushes the less
fortunate among them, in this case the OMF, to adopt guerilla tactics.
In modern parlance, we speak of unconventional methods INTEGRATION OF IO WITHIN THE COMMANDER'S INTENT
of warfare pursued by the weak to accommodate their
limitations while facilitating their ability to attack their A complex and dynamic "information environment" results
opponent's overwhelming conventional advantages as when a large number of actors with divergent interests
"asymmetrical".3 For the NATO forces in Kabul, this operate in a hotly contested theatre of conflict. The
asymmetry of force is compounded by a complex, built- absence of unity of command between the US Coalition
up, multi-ethnic milieu and the fact that OMF attacks vary and ISAF, and that the unity of effort between major
significantly over time in their origin, intensity and intent. international players is not easily synchronized,
To further complicate the situation, unity of effort among compounds the challenges they collectively face to bring
players on all sides of the conflict is occasionally fleeting peace and stability to the country. It must be understood,
and opportunistic, but most often absent. moreover, that the information environment is not limited
merely to the physical plane, but also encompasses moral
In such a complex environment, the provision of and electro-magnetic dimensions.
superior, timely information is key to ensuring success in
operations. Information operations (IO) are not only a The OMF's aim has been to persuade as many people as
combat function but are an essential combat multiplier, possible to join their cause by employing all the
one of the few effective tools available to the "information means" at their disposal. The KMNB's
objective has been to understand the in-theatre
commander of a conventional military force to protect his
environment and master it to the extent required to
own center of gravity (CoG) while attacking that of his
effectively counter the OMF's activities. IO have been the
asymmetrical adversary. To demonstrate how and why
key to the KMNB's success.
this is so, the paragraphs below describe how IO were
integrated into the Kabul Multi-National Brigade (KMNB) As a combat function, it is critical that IO facilitate the
commander's concept of operations, the range of IOs sharing of information among key actors, but not at the
employed, and their usefulness against a strong expense of operational security (OPSEC). In a
asymmetrical threat deployed in complex environment, knowledge-based, command-centric operation such as
such as that found in Kabul, Afghanistan during the that undertaken by ISAF, IO is the key by which
period January to August of 2004. knowledge is attained and the advantage gained while
1 Tse-Tung, Mao, On Guerilla Warfare, (New York and Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1961), p. 8
2 The term used in Afghanistan to designate Enemy combatants from all backgrounds.
3 Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, Asymmetry and US military strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts, (US Army War
College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001), pp. 5-6. According to American strategist Steven Metz, asymmetry is a way of acting, organizing,
and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages, exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain
greater freedom of action.
February 2005 9
denying the same to the enemy. Many in-theatre IO If this was the case, the most important task for KMNB
initiatives have attempted to reconcile the interests of staff was to determine the most effective means of
various international actors in order to increase unity of preventing the OMF from adjusting the political
effort. KMNB planners have met regularly with environment to the right "temperature;" and to make
international organizations at the regional and municipal appropriate recommendations to the KMNB Commander
level in order to synchronize activities and enable to counter the activities of the OMF.
development efforts to go forward in a secure
Mao theorized that, to be successful in guerilla warfare,
environment. However, this has proved to be a difficult
the "fish" [the OMF in this case] must repeatedly "explain",
task to undertake and to maintain. KMNB has enjoyed
"persuade", "discuss" and "convince" the population. The
some significant successes, but, at end-tour, there
KMNB Staff quickly came to understand that these action
remains much to be done.
verbs represented recurrent themes played upon by the
Op HERMES is one example of a well-conducted OMF in order to win over the people and effect the correct
operation that was designed to project KMNB V's "change in temperature" to expand their sphere of
presence outside its area of operations (AOO) with a view influence. KMNB Headquarters, therefore, was faced
to increasing force protection and supporting voter with the dilemma of determining what actions should be
registration (VRE). It was driven by the KMNB undertaken to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan
Commander's intent. people while serving to "paralyze," "disorganize," and
"degrade" the OMF.5
To facilitate success, it was critical for the KMNB
commander to clearly identify his and his adversary's
CoGs and to develop ines of operation (based upon his
intent) in order to determine and maintain priority of effort
and to appropriately shape the areas of responsibility and
interest. It is too easy in a complex environment for a
headquarters to get distracted by the amount of
information being thrown about by a large number of
actors. Such distraction could result in mission failure.
The focus of the commander's "decision-action cycle"
must be to achieve his desired end-state while protecting
his CoG and attacking that of his adversary.
Consequently, the two ("friendly and foe") CoGs must be
the key planning considerations for the commander and
his staff in developing courses of actions. OP HERMES
was successfully implemented because it was solidly
based upon the commander's intent and met these criteria. The ability of a commander to act and achieve the desired
The KMNB commander estimated that the OMF's CoG effect in a timely and efficient manner depends upon
was its ability to penetrate and influence the local battle visualization. A commander's capacity to optimize
populace. Conversely, the KMNB's CoG was viewed to visualization is fraught with many challenges at the best of
be its ability to safeguard a perception of security in its times. This is even truer when the Commander is
own AOO. Realistically, if the most important job of the engaged on a peacekeeping mission in a "three-block
OMF was to win over the people to its cause, the KMNB war" being conducted in a highly complex environment
staff reasonably assumed that the OMF was undertaking against an asymmetrical enemy.6 In order to be able to
act effectively, the commander must know his enemy and
many activities to further their objective. To borrow Mao's
successfully identify his CoG. This requires the
analogy:
employment of a wide range of capabilities as well as the
…if the political temperature is right, the fish [in this ability to effectively protect one's own assets. Intelligence
case the OMF], however few in number, will thrive enabling functions such as understanding and assessing
and proliferate. It is therefore the principal concern friendly and enemy vulnerabilities are paramount. At the
of all guerilla leaders to get the water [Afghans] to the critical center of it all, however, are intelligence,
right temperature and to keep it there.4 surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance
4 Tse-Tung, Op.Cit. p. 8
5 Tse-Tung, Ibid., p.8 and also DAD 5, Land Force Information Operations, Ottawa, 1999, Internet http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/ael/pubs/300-005/B-GL-
300-05/FP-001/B-GL-300-005-FP-001.pdf , accessed 21 June 2004
6 The three-block war paradigm was best described by former USMC Commandant, General Charles Krulak and was employed across the theatre
to describe existing conditions.
10 The Bulletin
(ISTAR) sub-systems, which are the key to gathering of the lines of operation ensured that during the "decision-
current intelligence. action cycle," KMNB could "…enhance battlefield
visualization, improve designation of [the] main effort,
For ISTAR to be effective, the KMNB had to steer the
improve control of [the] operational tempo and improve
collection effort of all available sensors. Based on his initial
synchronization."8 Commander KMNB V's IO's intent
guidance, the commander initiated battle procedure and
"…was to deter, disrupt and degrade our opponents'
conducted his mission analysis. He drove the collection
ability to impede progress in Afghanistan while
effort by providing his commander's critical information
maintaining a balance between Force Protection and
requirements (CCIR). Based on the CCIR, an intelligence
contact with the local populace."9
collection plan (ICP) was produced, which further
developed the intelligence requirements and tasked the
sensors. Once all the information provided by the sensors
was collected and analyzed, the intelligence was
disseminated. This, in turn, enabled the commander's
"decision-action cycle," which repeated itself on a regular
basis. In order to optimize the commander's cycle,
however, the staff also had to take measures to enhance
battlefield visualization. Consequently, in addition to
situational awareness, environmental visualization and
asset visibility had to be developed.7 It soon became
evident that, as the headquarters' understanding of the
enemy improved, the commander's ability to effectively act
was considerably enhanced.
A staff, of course, cannot act in isolation, particularly not in
an environment such as that present in Kabul.
Accordingly, it was critical that the KMNB V commander
provide clear guidance and centrally coordinate the
activity of the headquarters and subordinate KMNB units.
To make certain this took place, the KMNB staff was
thoroughly briefed on his intent, which was, of course, in
line with the previously determined CoGs. As a result,
three lines of operation were developed, which ensured
that KMNB activities were synchronized in a coordinated
effort to achieve the desired end state. Several decisive
points were also selected related to the three lines of
operation. These were specific objectives that were to be
achieved in accordance with a coordinated timeline,
designed to maintain the brigade's unity of effort while To support the lines of operation, KMNB had to manage
protecting its CoG (and, of course, attacking the OMF's). Information to its advantage. In Afghanistan, operations
It was through the process described in the paragraphs were conducted under the glare of public scrutiny. With
above that the KMNB V commander developed his intent this in mind, Commander KMNB V effectively used a
and successfully organized and led operations based monthly" soldier's theme card" to inform soldiers about
upon the effective employment of IO in concert with the where they fit within the ongoing mission (and its lines of
"decision-action cycle." The remainder of this paper operation), what was expected of them, and what issues
describes how IO were actually employed in operations. they should emphasize in discussions with the populace.
Similarly, public affairs (PA) provided balanced and
RANGE OF IO AND ITS USEFULNESS credible messages to support the KMNB lines of
operation using various communication media to target
different audiences, including the Afghans, the public in
Armed with a solid operational plan, knowledge of the
Canada, and the international community.
OMF and its physical environment, timely Situational
Awareness required to achieve information superiority, For example, in support of one line of operation designed
the KMNB had only had one more piece of the puzzle to specifically to support the Afghan democratic process, a
integrate; and that was IO. The integration of IO within "non-lethal target list" was developed. It formed part of the
7 Environment visualization includes space, geospatial information, geography, meteorology, the electromagnetic spectrum, sociology and legal
aspects. Asset visibility provides an accurate status of human, materiel and information resources.
8 DAD 5, Op.Cit., p.18
9 G3 Plan, Kabul Multinational Brigade V Operation Order 018 Campaign Plan
February 2005 11
formal KMNB targeting process, which provided guidance Lastly, the physical destruction of weapons caches and
to KMNB units on the non-lethal effects desired on specific "direct action" taken against key OMF actors served to
target audience. As part of the KMNB Information further neutralized OMF operations.
Operation and Targeting Board (IOTB), the main forum at
Through the successful employment of Defensive IO
which IO concepts and ideas were regularly exchanged
measures, KMNB was able to prevent the OMF from
between staff and KMNB units, IO actions or initiatives
successfully using offensive IO against NATO troops. By
were developed to support this and other lines of operation.
keeping the initiative and progressively attaining the
In addition, based on the commander's intent, the civil- decisive points associated with each line of operation,
military cooperation (CIMIC) function within KMNB, itself KMNB V maintained its aim and moved steadily towards
an IO support component, provided a regular interface its desired end state. Most importantly, the brigade stayed
with key in-theatre actors and the populace. This served inside the OMF's "decision-action cycle" by conducting
to enhance force protection through the conduct of offensive IO and denying freedom of maneuver to the
ongoing liaison, IO and various projects and activities enemy. Through its strong efforts to promote NATO's
designed to positively influence the behavior of the local actions and mission using PA and effectively countering
population. The CIMIC function and KMNB liaison teams, the effects of the adversary's propaganda, KMNB V
both principal players on the IOTB, had an important role further reduced the ability of the OMF to attack its CoG.
to play in maintaining, influencing or "exploiting" diverse Finally, by ensuring that brigade personnel and the
target audiences. population at large were well informed, KMNB
successfully maintained its unity of command and effort.
The final but very important IO actions undertaken by
KMNB staff to protect the formation's CoG while attacking
that of the OMF's were offensive and defensive IO. The CONCLUSION
elements of offensive and defensive IO utilized in
Afghanistan were broad and included: operational KMNB faced a significant challenge in its efforts to
security (OPSEC), counter-intelligence operations, maintain battle visualization in the face of an
deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, asymmetrical threat operating in a complex environment.
and physical destruction. In order to "paralyze," "disorganize," and "degrade" the
OMF, the brigade was required to carefully synchronize its
In theory Offensive IO elements focus their effects on the IO activities to achieve synergy and success. At the same
"…adversary's C2 [command and control] infrastructure time, the KMNB had to ensure that it won the battle for the
and information flow to produce a lower quality and slower hearts and minds of the Afghan people.
decision-making cycle."10 However, in practice this proved
easier said than done against an asymmetrical enemy in a The formation believes that its efforts were successful,
highly complex environment. It was difficult to get an largely owing to its ability to effectively align its operations
accurate battlefield damage assessment (BDA), on the with the Commander's intent. As stated in the Land Force
physical or moral plane, against such an opponent. For Information Operations manual, "…to be effective, IO
example, it was not particularly easy to pinpoint and needs to be fully integrated into the commander's concept
destroy command and control, communications, computers of operations and coordinated."11 The IOTB had a critical
and intelligence (C4I) nodes and instantly get a video feed role to play in the synchronization of operational activities
of the damage inflicted, as might take place in a more while successfully protecting the brigade's CoG. By
conventional conflict. As a BDA measure of success, employing the full spectrum of IO in a coordinated effort,
therefore, KMNB attempted to monitor and assess the the KMNB was able to follow its Lines of Operation
intent and ability of the OMF to cause destruction. towards the achievement of its desired End State.
It was believed that the ISTAR system through the use of To return to Mao's analogy, despite their best efforts to
its sensors had, over time, successfully impaired or follow his prescription, the OMF ["fish"] were provided with
degraded the OMF information flow by disrupting its minimal opportunity to alter the temperature of the
surveillance capability, while simultaneously enhancing proverbial water. During the tour of KMNB V, the OMF
KMNB V's ability to operate. Deception, OPSEC and was patently unsuccessful in their bid to cause their
counter-ISTAR elements further reduced the OMF's ability numbers to "thrive and proliferate." As a result, they also
to formulate and implement decisions while degrading its failed in their aim to significantly destabilize the political
information collection ability. Defensive IO methods, such environment in and around Kabul. It was to a large extent
as the avoidance of discernable patterns and the periodic due to the range and successful synchronization of IO
modification of the modus operandi of KMNB units and activities employed by the KMNB within theatre that
elements successfully inhibited the decision-making cycle NATO forces were able to so successfully operate against
of the OMF leadership and their ability to strike effectively. a potentially formidable asymmetrical enemy.
10 DAD, Op.Cit., p. 97
11 DAD 5, Op.Cit., p. 87
12 The Bulletin
I N T E L L I G E N C E S U R V E I L L A N C E TA R G ET A C Q U I S I T I O N A N D
R E C O N A I S S A N C E C O O R D I N AT I O N C E N T R E ( I S TA R C C ) —
P R O V I D I N G T H E C O M M A N D E R ' S S I T U AT I O N A L AWA R E N E S S
By Captain D.C. Buchanan, CD
BACKGROUND
F
rom the onset of battle, possessing more knowledge of your adversary than he knows about you is a key element
to success. In order to gain this advantage, the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance
(ISTAR) concept was developed. The role of ISTAR is "…to integrate the intelligence function with surveillance, target
acquisition (TA), reconnaissance and other information-generating assets in order to improve a commander's
situational awareness (SA), streamline decision-making processes and cue manoeuvre, strike and/or other ISTAR
assets."1 Over the last 10 years, the capability to gather more information on an adversary and improve the
commander's SA has increased significantly due to technological advances and the subsequent development of highly
capable ISTAR assets. The problem with these assets is not the quantity of the information they gather, but rather the
"how" and the "when" the system gathers the information. As a result, there is a necessity to synchronize ISTAR assets
in order to collect the right information at the right time so that information exploitation occurs throughout the decision-
action cycle. In order to synchronize ISTAR assets, the Canadian Army has developed an organization, the ISTAR
Coordination Centre (ISTAR CC), which "…is responsible for managing the collection efforts of the formation through
the synchronous tasking and active re-tasking of collectors in support of the collection effort. These efforts include all
collectors integral to the formation and those placed under its control."2 Op ATHENA Roto 0 and 1 marked the first
occasions where a Canadian formation headquarters deployed on an overseas operation using an ISTAR CC as part
of its organization as well as the ISTAR process.
AIM ISTAR needs to be in very close physical proximity with all
the cells and the formation operations centre in order to
The aim of this paper is to outline the lessons learned manage the dynamic tasking and re-tasking of assigned
regarding the employment of ISTAR and an ISTAR CC ISTAR assets. The G3 ISTAR must maintain SA on
during operations in order to provide a better current operations because he "…is the officer in the
understanding of the challenges of incorporating ISTAR ISTAR CC who acts as central authority for tasking or
and the ISTAR CC into a formation headquarters (HQ). retasking decisions…"4 and he must possess
"…complete SA and be intimately familiar with the friendly
DISCUSSION Concept of Operations (CONOP)."5 Without complete SA
or CONOP familiarity, the G3 ISTAR is unable to make an
Physical Layout. It is essential that the ISTAR CC have educated decision with respect to ISTAR tasking.
its own space located between the current ops and all ISTAR Organizational Structure. During Op ATHENA,
source cell (ASC).3 Inherent with this point is that the 2 CMBG and 5 GBMC had clearly different outlooks on
ISTAR CC should also contain a working area for each of ISTAR and its employment. 2 CMBG employed a new
the key Brigade (Bde) ISTAR assets, such as the organization—the ISTAR company. In contrast to this,
reconnaissance squadron, aviation squadron, electronic Roto 1 has approached ISTAR as a process, rather than
warfare troop, and the surveillance target acquisition as an organization. This outlook comes from the idea that
battery (STA Bty), with its integral tactical unmanned information is the key and that with the expedient
aerial vehicle and counter battery radar troops. The close passage of information, a quicker decision-action cycle
proximity of all these cells, essentially composed of a occurs. In order to facilitate this, the Roto 1 ISTAR CC
liaison team, is critical so that the ISTAR CC can acquired the added role and functions of the target
expediently task or re-task ISTAR assets. As well, the acquisition coordination centre (TACC), for which Roto 0
ISTAR CC and its individual cells must be capable of had a completely separate agency. This more robust
operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. As well, the G3 structure for the ISTAR CC worked extremely well during
1 CFP 352-001 Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance, p. 1.
2 Ibid, p.27.
3 Ibid, p.33.
4 Ibid, p.28.
5 Ibid, p.28.
February 2005 13
Figure 1. ISTAR Organizational Structure Rotation 1.
Roto 1 because subject matter experts (SMEs) on handle the vast amounts of information nor provide any
surveillance target acquisition (STA) artillery, in particular type of solid analysis. As a result, expedient information
counter-battery target acquisition radar (CBTA Rdr) and processing into the Bde HQ did not occur. As well, the
tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV), and armoured ISTAR company was not able to coordinate airspace
reconnaissance experts were in the ISTAR CC. Since the effectively with the Bde airspace coordination centre
ISTAR CC and TACC are so closely linked already, and (ASCC) nor synchronize its activities easily with other
deal with ISTAR as an integral part of their job, it was Bde ISTAR assets, which are ISTAR CC roles. Finally,
sound for the two cells to be merged into one with the introduction of a new organizational structure
coordination centre. This enabled one organization to came new command relationships, which will be covered
plan and task all the major Bde ISTAR assets, to easily in detail later in this paper.
synchronize all their efforts, and to receive all information ISTAR CC Structure. Over the course of Roto 1, the Bde
gathered directly. As part of this process, the staff recognized that the ISTAR CC structure did not
experimental ISTAR Company died and the include just the core cell itself but other cells and their
reconnaissance squadron with attachments returned to representatives such as the G3 air and aviation, and the
life, which resulted in the Roto 1 organizational structure fire support coordination centre (FSCC) (Figure 2). The
shown below (Figure 1). This change occurred because ISTAR CC required a representative from all of the ISTAR
the ISTAR Company was not equipped to properly assets employed on Op ATHENA in order to conduct
Figure 2. ISTAR CC Structure.
14 The Bulletin
effective planning, as well as to ensure synchronization of
all ISTAR assets. Also, when additional ISTAR assets were
added to the brigade, an SME was also required to advise
and coordinate that ISTAR asset so that it could be
properly integrated into the ISTAR plan. For example, the
provision of AH-64 Apaches from the Netherlands required
a liaison staff at Brigade Headquarters in order for the
ISTAR CC to exploit the added capabilities of this system.
Proposed Core ISTAR CC Structure. The core
ISTAR CC requires a proper balance of personnel with the
crucial knowledge on each of the major ISTAR assets in
order to function efficiently and effectively task and to re-
task ISTAR assets. As such, the armoured, infantry, and
artillery possess the majority of ISTAR assets and require
representation in the core ISTAR CC in order to conduct
effective planning and coordination as well as ensure that
the ISTAR CC functions optimally.
As previously described, the ISTAR CC for Roto 1 added Figure 3. Proposed ISTAR CC Core Structure
the roles and functions of the TACC, which doctrinally is
a separate ISTAR radio net, based on the experiences of
the surveillance & target acquisition battery headquarters
Roto 1.
(STA Bty HQ). The STA Bty HQ is responsible to plan and
task the artillery STA assets, TUAV and CB radars, as well G2 and G3 ISTAR Relationship. The G3 ISTAR must
as provide the artillery intelligence cell to the formation work closely with the G2 since the latter is the analysis
HQ. This cell inserts into the formation HQ exactly the component and the G3 ISTAR is the action component of
same way the FSCC does. The ISTAR CC for Roto 1 ISTAR on behalf of the chief of staff and commander. It is
functioned as the STA Bty HQ throughout both training and important to emphasize that the G3 ISTAR is a member of
in theatre in both symmetrical and asymmetrical the operations staff of the HQ, and is therefore the
environments. The STA Bty HQ personnel possess most of authority for the tasking and re-tasking of formation ISTAR
the requisite knowledge and skills of ISTAR in order to assets. Thus under the operations primacy of Canadian
form the ISTAR CC. First, they possess surveillance and doctrine, while the G2 and G3 ISTAR must work closely
target acquisition knowledge and skills due to their together, the G2 is not the tasking authority for actual
experience and training in fire effects detachments as well ISTAR sensors. Instead, he is responsible for accurately
as CB Rdr and TUAV troops. Second, they are intimately identifying priority information requirements (PIRs) and for
familiar with intelligence and the intelligence cycle due to the development of the Essential Elements of Information
their training and experience as artillery intelligence (EEIs) to support these PIRs.
technicians. However, the STA Bty HQ is missing a
Employment of ISTAR Assets. The ISTAR plan should
familiarity with reconnaissance, but this deficiency is easily
be formulated by Bde planners and "…an effort must be
rectifiable. The permanent augmentation of an Infantry and
made to fully exploit the range of capabilities to ensure that
armoured officer with staff training and reconnaissance
a synergistic 'mix' is deployed." From the onset of training,
experience to the STA Bty HQ would enable it to function
it was apparent that the experience of the majority of the
effectively as the ISTAR CC. Therefore, this merger and
Bde staff, and some units using an enhanced complement
use of the STA Bty HQ and augmentation (Figure 3) as the
of ISTAR assets, was very limited. This is completely
ISTAR CC would achieve synergy and make use of an
understandable because most Canadian soldiers' and
existing structure that already focuses on ISTAR and is
officers' knowledge is limited to that learned at Canadian
capable of operating as an ISTAR CC and STA Bty HQ
Land Force Command and Staff College and other army
simultaneously.
courses such as the Artillery Operations Course. As a
Communications. A key component of ISTAR operations result, there was a propensity to use the TUAV and AH for
is that the information collected arrives promptly at the surveillance of the objective area and an embedded desire
ASC and ISTAR CC. If the ISTAR CC possesses all of the to watch the operation unfold. It must be emphasized that
cells described above, and they possess communications this type of use of long-range ISTAR assets is a complete
resources that allow them to talk with their parent waste of their capabilities. The more appropriate method
organizations and their integral assets, the sharing of of employment would have the assets actively operating in
information becomes simple and very effective. As well, it areas unreachable by those available to close combat
is paramount that the ISTAR CC possesses proper manoeuvre forces that may have a negative influence on
information and technology hardware and software to objective area activities. This lack of knowledge also led to
quickly manage and filter information that is routed to the reluctance by some units to request the support of Bde
FSCC for targeting. Therefore, there is no requirement for assets. In addition, the ISTAR CC received requests hours
February 2005 15
or minutes before an operation, which for some ISTAR Control of ISTAR Assets. The two components of ISTAR
assets is not practical due to the planning and coordination are analysis and action and it is clear that the ASC provides
required—especially TUAV. Moreover, there was a the analysis and the ISTAR CC provides the action.7
tendency to over task the Bde Recce Squadron and focus Employing this as the basis of the relationship between
too many assets looking at the same NAI at the same time. these two organizations, the control of ISTAR assets is
There is no problem with duplication of effort in order to clear. The G3 ISTAR is a member of the operations staff
avoid loss of coverage, but anything more than that is and "…is the officer who acts as a central authority for
complete misuse of resources. Despite the lack of tasking and re-tasking decisions."8 Furthermore, it is
knowledge and experience with an enhanced suite of important to highlight that not all ISTAR assets are solely for
ISTAR assets, the Bde HQ and units improved drastically the ISTAR role. The reconnaissance squadron is an
over time and were able to create a more synchronized example of a Bde asset that is both manoeuvre and ISTAR.
and effective Bde surveillance plan. As well, the G2 collection coordination information
requirements manager (G2 CCIRM) is to manage the
Command of ISTAR Assets. When planning the command collection effort, is responsible to identify information gaps
relationship of an organization, planners must take into in the ISTAR matrix, and may recommend sensor tasking.9
consideration the five organizing fundamentals: unity of Thus, it is clear that the control of ISTAR assets resides
command, cooperation, balanced structure, responsive with the G3 staff and not the G2 staff. This does not change
procedures, and dynamic organization.6 The retention of the the concept that operations are command centric
major ISTAR assets under Bde command provides excellent knowledge-based but instead enables the operations staff
unity of command and cooperation because the ISTAR CC, to make operational decisions based on the information
on behalf of the Commander, ensures clarity, unity of effort, provided by the intelligence staff. As well, it does not hinder
and effective decision-making by synchronizing all the ISTAR the ability of the ASC to acquire information that is more
assets. As well, there are responsive procedures already detailed in order to improve SA, but rather emphasizes the
established by the various assets that facilitate the need to have the approval of G3 ISTAR "…since only the
maintenance of the tempo and provide the commander with ISTAR CC, based on G2/G3 coordination, has the authority
timely SA so that he can execute a prompt decision-action to move or re-task sensors."10 Last, it is also imperative that
cycle. The TUAV, the commander's primary beyond line-of- "…the ISTAR CC shall be informed of all ASC originated
sight (BLOS) ISTAR asset, is a very good example of an amendments/retaskings as they happen and shall retain
asset that has responsive procedures, but was unable to authority to override or cancel. "11
exploit this when it was OPCON to the ISTAR company
during Roto 0. Doctrinally, the TUAV would provide CONCLUSION
information directly into the formation HQ through the artillery
intelligence communication link and facilitate a faster Two Canadian Bde HQs formed a Bde HQ for OP ATHENA
decision action cycle. However, the OPCON command in a complex environment faced an asymmetric threat and
relationship of TUAV used on Roto 0 enabled the OC ISTAR doing three block war scenario and operated with an ISTAR
company to assign missions and tasks to one of the CC as an integral part of the infrastructure. During the time
commander's ISTAR assets without consultation to the Bde 5 GBMC formed the nucleus of the HQ, there was a
HQ. Thus, the TUAV is responding to a low level commander examination of the ISTAR CC formally undertaken in order
rather than the needs of the formation commander. In to validate its roles and functions. One of the major points
essence, this command relationship placed the TUAV into that 5 GMBC learned from its time using the ISTAR CC was
OC ISTAR company's hands to employ as he saw fit, which that ISTAR was a process and not a structure. The
was clearly an inappropriate command relationship to meet employment of this philosophy resulted in some drastic
the needs of the commander's critical information changes, including the resurrection of the Reconnaissance
requirements. To address these shortcomings, within the first Squadron from the ashes of the ISTAR company and the
month of Roto 1 operations the command relationship fusion of the ISTAR CC and TACC into one entity. More
changed in order to facilitate faster information processing importantly, the realization that the ISTAR CC is in fact a
using proven doctrine. The Bde HQ treated the TUAV multitude of organizations working together to fuse
organization the same as the recce sqn or similar assets and information into a useful tool to provide the best possible SA
operated it under the direct control of the Bde HQ. This to the Commander must be emphasized. However, in order
situation (Figure 1) created a dynamic organization that for synchronization to occur it requires a sole voice to
could adapt and better accommodate the different tactical ensure that all parts work towards the common goal and that
situations that the Bde HQ confronted. is the commander or his ISTAR representative, G3 ISTAR.
6 B-GL-300-003-FP-000 Command, p.43 and 44.
7 CFP 352-001 Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance, p. 27.
8 Ibid, p.28.
9 Ibid, p.12.
10 Ibid, p.31.
11 Ibid, p.32-33.
16 The Bulletin
HOW TO CONTACT
The Army Lessons Learned Centre
CFB Kingston (613) 541-5010 Extension xxxx
CSN 271-xxxx
Director Voss LCol CR@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
LCol CR Voss—4909 voss.cr@forces.gc.ca
SO Operations Boule Maj M@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
Maj M Boulé—5440 boule.m@forces.gc.ca
SO Training Corriveau Maj NPM@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
Maj N.P.M. Corriveau—4816 corriveau.m@forces.gc.ca
SO Reserve Rankin Maj SR1@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
Maj SR Rankin—5117 rankin.sr1@forces.gc.ca
SO Coordination McDonnell Maj IP@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
Maj IP McDonnell—4813 mcdonnell.ip2@forces.gc.ca
S U B M I T T I N G E X P E R I E N C E S T O T H E B U L L ET I N
Do you have an experience that others might benefit from? HOW TO SUBMIT AN ARTICLE TO ALLC
Would you (or others) like to see your name in print? Send copy to:
Then submit an article to the Bulletin today! Lieutenant-Colonel C.R. Voss
On any subject concerning current Army activities Director ALLC
Operations Fitness Mail
Training Etc. Army Lessons Learned Centre
Land Forces Doctrine and Training System
Any format (letter, memo or Email) is acceptable PO Box 17000 Station Forces,
However, if possible, electronic format preferred Kingston, ON K7K 7B4
Length—less than three typed pages or approximately Email
1000 words preferred
(DIN) Voss LCol CR@LFDTS HQ@Kingston
Photos appreciated, but not mandatory (Internet) voss.cr@forces.gc.ca
February 2005 17
Related docs
