INTERNAL AUDIT INVESTIGATION REPORT

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					WMO                                                                  Confidential
Internal Audit and Investigation Service




                  INTERNAL AUDIT INVESTIGATION REPORT




                            “Handling of WMO Cheques by C/FEL”


                                             FINAL REPORT


                         Summary and Overview of the Investigation




29 April 2005 (Rev. 11 May 2005)



Maria do Rosário Veiga
Chief, Internal Audit and Investigation Service
WMO


Final Report Investigation – 29 April 2005
“Handling WMO Cheques by C/FEL”
Summary and Overview of the Investigation
WMO                                                                 Confidential
Internal Audit and Investigation Service
______________________________________________________________________________


FINAL REPORT
SUMMARY and OVERVIEW of the INVESTIGATION
Table of Contents

                                                                          PAGE
I - Preface                                                                 4
II - Introduction                                                           4
III - Overview of the Investigation
   A. Mandate                                                                 6
   B. Policies and Procedures                                                 6
   C. Staff                                                                   7
   D. Documentary and Electronic Evidence                                     7
   E. Witnesses Interviews                                                    8
   F. Brief Overview of the Fellowship Programme                              8
   G. The Scope, Approach and Development of the Investigation                12
   H. Limitations of the Internal Investigation at WMO                        16
IV - Summary of the Findings and Conclusions
   A.The Secretary-General’s Decision to Turn over the Case to the            19
      Swiss Authorities and the Interaction and Cooperation with the
      Swiss Authorities
   B. Mechanisms of the Fraud and the Facts Brought to Light                  25
   C. The Motivations Underlying the Fraud                                    29
   D. The Role of Relevant WMO Staff Members in Connection with the           30
       Motivations Underlying the Fraud
   E. The Total Amounts Defrauded Discovered as at 31 March 2005              34
   F. The Specific Cases of Egypt, Syria, Poland, Kenya and Nigeria           38
   G. Mr. Hassan: Confession, Escape and Forged Death Certificate             42
   H. The Outsiders Associated with Mr. Hassan’s Fraudulent Activities        44
   I. The Assessment of the Conduct of some WMO Staff Members in              45
       connection with the Mechanisms and Motivations of the Fraud
V - The Overall Conclusions and Recommendations Arising from the              50
     Investigation
VI - The Internal Disciplinary Process and Recovery                           60
VII - Final Remarks and Recommendations                                       61

. Annexes                                                                     63
. Acronyms                                                                    65



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Summary and Overview of the Investigation
___________________________________________________________________


I –Preface
This report presents, in a consolidated and summarized manner, the overview of the entire
investigative work since 10 July 2003, the day C/IAIS was mandated by the Secretary-General to
conduct the investigation, through 31 March 2005.



II – Introduction
The Secretary-General and the Audit Committee in its session of 22 February 2005 decided that
the investigation should be closed by the end of March 2005 and the Final Report consequently
released.

This Final Report is being issued following its draft versions released on 15 April 2005. This
Final Report presents the status of the findings and conclusions reached as at present, taking into
consideration the information available at the end of March 2005.

The reporting of the results of the investigation was done progressively through the release of
nine Interim Investigation Reports, which corresponded to the coverage of specific and
determined areas of the investigation.




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III – Overview of the Investigation


     A. Mandate
The investigation was commended by the Secretary-General (SG), Mr. G.O.P. Obasi, on
10 July 2003 to the Chief, Internal Audit and Investigation Service (C/IAIS) and initiated on
11 July 2003. The basis for the investigation, as referred in the Secretary-General’s confidential
Inter-Office Memorandum addressed to the C/IAIS and dated 10 July 2003, is the information
provided by the Director Resource Management Department (D/REM), Mrs. Kathleen Charles,
and the Deputy Secretary-General (DSG), Mr. Michel Jarraud, that suggests the possibility of
fraud and/or serious misconduct of Mr. Mohamed Hassan, C/FEL.

The original allegation of misconduct by Mr. Mohamed E. Hassan concerned potential
mishandling of WMO funds through unusual endorsements of cheques drawn on WMO bank
accounts and transmitted to some WMO fellows as well as to some Meteorological and
Hydrological Services of several countries constituted the object of the mandate of the present
investigation.



     B. Policies and Procedures
The WMO Internal Audit Charter, included in WMO Financial Regulations, establishes the
following with respect to investigations:

               •     “IAIS shall be responsible for investigating all allegations or presumptions of
                     fraud or mismanagement.”
               •     “Upon completion of the investigation, the IAIS shall submit a confidential report
                     to the Secretary-General with recommendations for further action which may
                     result in initiating the disciplinary process.”
               •     “The IAIS shall ensure that final disciplinary decisions are enforced and that
                     appropriate recovery is made.”

In carrying out the investigative work, we also complied with the United Nations Uniform
Investigation Guidelines endorsed by the 4th Conference of International Investigators –
April 2003.

Throughout the investigation process, issues of fairness have guided the investigator’s approach.
All individuals approached and interviewed have been invited to produce any relevant
information and documents to the C/IAIS’ consideration of the matters under investigation.

C/IAIS remains interested in any evidence – no matter where located – of illicit behavior by any
individuals and entities involved in affairs with Mr. Hassan and connected with WMO affairs.
Some national authorities have cooperated with C/IAIS in certain aspects of the investigation.

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     C. Staff
The investigation was led and carried out solely by one professional staff, the Chief Internal Audit
and Investigation Service (C/IAIS). At the end of 2003 a recruitment process for an assistant
secretary to C/IAIS was launched internally. The outcome of this process was that none of the
candidates met the requisites for the job. The job description was revised and subsequently
classified. The internal recruitment process was re-launched during the third trimester of 2004.
The consequence of these difficulties was that during the year 2004 there were periods when
C/IAIS did not have any type of assistance at all. To overcome the recruiting difficulties, the
Secretary-General made available other general administrative staff who, most of the times, have
added the IAIS work to their normal work. Words of recognition to all of them are due. The staff,
that supported C/IAIS during different moments of the investigation, are: Mr. Galen Pope,
AA/ASG (G6 level), Mrs. Nell Alegre, AA/ETR (G6 level), Mrs. Teresita Concepcion
AA/DSPLA (G5 level), Mrs Lisbette Rainer AA/DSG (G7 level) and since mid November 2004,
Mr. Alexander Dénis, assistant to C/IAIS (G6 level).



     D. Documentary and Electronic Evidence
During the first week of July 2003, D/REM, Mrs. Kathleen Charles and an officer of the ISY
division, following the authorization of the DSG, Mr. Michel Jarraud, collected the C/Drive of Mr.
Hassan right after the information on potential mishandling of WMO cheques by Mr. Hassan
came to D/REM’s attention. In the absence of a lock in Mr. Hassan’s office and the difficulties
on placing it overnight, C/IAIS, with the help of D/REM, Mrs. Kathleen Charles, collected all the
documentation and materials stationed in Mr. Hassan’s office in the night of 14 July 2003. The
material was then inventoried.

C/IAIS did not have the means to electronically scan the documentation, which could have greatly
helped facilitate the targeted search and capture all the relevant information. C/IAIS manipulated
thousands of documents and this fact has caused great difficulties and time consuming.

C/IAIS has had access to the current and archived records related to the Fellowship Programme
and realized that some important files were missing: e.g. training activities in Poland since the
beginning of 1999, several study tours, various correspondence files connected to several
activities on different countries.

In addition, C/IAIS has received or conducted an on-site review of large numbers of documents
from various sources within WMO and from the Swiss Investigating Judge.

As part of the process of capturing all relevant information, the Secretary-General, as previously
agreed with C/IAIS, gave phased out access to the electronic messaging system of some selected
staff members’ e-mail accounts, a total of 19, as follows:
     •    On 21 April 2004 – access to seven e-mail accounts;
     •    On 31 August 2004 – access to two additional e-mail accounts;
     •    On 16 February 2005 – access to ten additional e-mail accounts.


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Considering the extent of the investigation, the number of people potentially involved and the
complexity of the issues coming to light, the C/IAIS had the perception that her physical integrity
could be at risk. On several occasions during the investigation, at the expense of WMO, the
Secretary-General authorized C/IAIS to stay overnight in different places far from her home,
taking also into account her family situation.

Some measures to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the documentation were suggested
by C/IAIS, which in some cases took long delays to be implemented, obliging C/IAIS herself to
find other solutions (the key to her office and safe boxes, stamps, etc. are examples of simple
actions with lengthy implementation timeframes). The control of the access to WMO building of
close family members of Mr. Hassan has never been effective and several times his sons and other
close friends of his were seen in the building, bringing Mr. Hassan’s claims for reimbursement of
travel to Registry.



     E. Witnesses Interviews
To date C/IAIS has conducted approximately 65 interviews with 39 WMO former and current
employees (some were interviewed more than once). Transcribed records of the interviews were
taken whenever C/IAIS has had an assistant to take the written record during the interview. The
list of the transcribed records available is attached as Annex I. C/IAIS has pondered on the need
for disclosure of witness’s names. The interests of transparency require that C/IAIS identify
witnesses by name whenever it is possible to do so.

C/IAIS emphasizes that the fact that the name of a witness appears in this Report is not in itself
any indication that the witness engaged in wrongdoing. In addition, the fact that one witness’s
recollection may differ from the recollection of another witness, or from a particular document,
does not indicate – unless otherwise noted – a view that the witness has been intentionally
dishonest in statements during the interviews. C/IAIS praises the witnesses for offering their time
and perspectives to enhance the understanding of the Fellowship Programme.



     F. Brief Overview of the Fellowship Programme
The process and procedures of the funded training activities (individual fellows or study tours of
Permanent Representatives, the sharing of costs with NMHS/RMTCs to organize courses, the
sharing of costs of meetings organized by any NMHS or other entities such as the League of Arab
States) developed under the managerial responsibility of the Education and Training Department
through its Fellowship Division and included funds of the General Fund, Holdback Fund and
Extra-Budgetary Funds.




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During the period 2000 – 2003 the budget and the expenditure were the following:

                       General Fund           Extra Budgetary            TOTALS

                Expenditures Budget Expenditures Budget           Budget      Expenditures

2000-2001             1,572,586 1,766,014    1,335,689     0      1,766,014     2,908,275
2002-2003             2,542,322 2,603,531    2,512,536     0      2,603,531    5,054,858
  Total               4,114,909 4,369,544    3,848,225     0      4,369,544    7,963,133


        The operational process and the staff

At the time the fraud unfolded, on 7 July 2003, Mr. Hassan, C/FEL at P5 level, headed the
Fellowship Division and was assisted by the consultant Mr. Ozga-Zielinski (son of the PR of
Poland) under successive Special Service Agreements, and by three fellowship clerks,
Mrs. Elizabeth Gacuca, Mr. Danilo Salvador and Mrs. Patricia Mckay. The Director of the
Education and Training Department (D/ETR), Mr. K. Konaré, who supervised C/FEL, was “under
the overall policy guidance and supervision of the Secretary-General and with the guidance and
coordination of the Director Coordinator for Support to Scientific Programmes” (DC/SSP),
Mr. Workeneh Degefu.

The decision process of awarding funds to a certain training activity usually starts by a request of
any PR of any Member country of WMO and finishes either with the disbursement by the Finance
Division of the funds awarded, or by the refusal of the request for funding of the activity proposed.

The PR’s request, the placement of fellows, the acceptance of the host institution and the
confirmation by the PR for acceptance of placement, are carried out through letters exchanged
between the PR and the WMO Secretary-General. The Registry Unit, under the authority of the
Director External Relations, registers the incoming correspondence.            The outgoing
correspondence is prepared by the departments and dispatched by the Common Services Division
within the Resources Management Department.

After the acceptance of the PR’s request, a “Budget Request” is prepared based upon the data and
information contained in the letters mentioned above by the clerks in the Fellowship Division.
This is the fundamental internal document used for the authorization and approval by the
hierarchy of the activity proposed and the funds entrusted. The process of authorization/approval
involves seven different staff members’ signatures.

Whenever tuition fees are involved, there is an invoice sent by the training institution, which is
submitted to the Finance Division for effecting payment, together with the “Budget Request”
approved for payment by C/FEL.

Before the payment is effected, the Fellowship Clerks prepare the award documents to be
transmitted to the fellows for their entitlements, and which are then dispatched.


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The Finance Division is responsible for effecting the payment, preparing the receipts, dispatching
both to the beneficiaries, and recovering the receipts countersigned by the recipients of the funds.

The table below summarizes the role and responsibilities of the staff involved in the various
activities underlying the entire processing of the documentation supporting the transactions. An
organizational chart is attached in Annex II for easy reference.

      NAME of STAFF                          POSITION          Role and Responsibility in Processing the
                                                                Support Documents of the Transactions
Sobrasshandra Chacowry                  D/EXR and D/CER       Supervising the Registry Unit
                                        (17 April 2000 to
                                        present)
Sheila Dombouya                         C/RGA                 Chief of Registry Unit- registering incoming
                                        (1st November 1992    mail.
                                        - 10 September        Registered many letters, faxes and some
                                        2004)                 invoices hand carried by Mr. Hassan.
Patricia McKay                          Fellowship Clerk      Processing of all correspondence and
                                        under authority of    documentation related to the fellowship
                                        C/FEL                 awarding, including the preparation of the
                                        (1st December 2002    Fellowship Budget Request to be submitted to
                                        to present)           the hierarchy. Requests were forwarded to
                                                              C/FEL for signature.
Elisabeth Gacuca                        Fellowship Clerk      Processing of all correspondence and
                                        under authority of    documentation related to the fellowship
                                        C/FEL                 awarding, including the preparation of the
                                        (20 September 2000    Fellowship Budget Request to be submitted to
                                        to present)           the hierarchy. Requests were forwarded to
                                                              C/FEL for signature.
Danilo Salvador                         Fellowship Clerk      Processing of all correspondence and
                                        under authority of    documentation related to the fellowship
                                        C/FEL                 awarding, including the preparation of the
                                        (1st April 2000 to    Fellowship Budget Requests to be submitted
                                        present)              to the hierarchy. Requests were forwarded to
                                                              C/FEL for signature.
Florence Groscefield                    Fellowship Clerk      Processing of all correspondence and
                                        under authority of    documentation related to the fellowship
                                        C/FEL                 awarding, including the preparation of the
                                        (26 February 2000 -   Fellowship Budget Requests to be submitted
                                        30 April 2002)        to the hierarchy. Requests were forwarded to
                                                              C/FEL for signature.
Mohammed Hassan                         C/FEL                 Deciding to whom award fellowships.
                                        (1st May 1990 –       Submitting Fellowship Budget forwarding
                                        20 July 2003)         them to D/ETR. Approving payment of
                                                              invoices and Budget Requests. Indicating:
                                                              means of payment, currency, bank account
                                                              addresses and, in case of bank cheque that it
                                                              should be hand to him for further “dispatch or
                                                              hand carry to the PR”.
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     NAME of STAFF                 POSITION        Role and Responsibility in Processing the
                                                   Support Documents of the Transactions
Bogdan O. Zielinski (son FEL external            Acting on behalf of C/FEL performing the
of PR of Poland)             Consultant          same as referred above for Hassan but without
                                st
                             (1 February 2003 - having proper delegation of authority.
                             31 December 2003)
Gustavo Necco                D/ETR               Supervising      Hassan.       Approving    the
                             (7 December 1985 – submissions of Budget Requests made by
                             31 October 2002)    Hassan and then forwarding them to DC/SSP
                                                 or D/TCO (depending on the source of funds:
                                                 general or VCP funds) for further approval.
Kaliba Konaré                D/ETR               Supervising      Hassan.       Approving    the
                             (11 November 2002 submissions of Budget Requests made by
                             – 3 April 2005)     Hassan and then forwarding them to DC/SSP
                                                 or D/TCO (depending on the source of funds:
                                                 general or VCP funds) for further approval.
Harouna Diallo               D/TCO               Approving the use of VCP funds for
                                st
                             (1 September 2000 fellowship a related activity. Forwarding the
                             - 19 November       Budget Requests for further approval by
                             2004)               DC/SSP.
Workneh Degefu               DC/SSP              Supervising Konaré and Hassan. Approving
                                st
                             (1 November 2000 the fellowship activity and the allocated funds.
                             - 30 September      Forwarding approved Budget Requests to
                             2003)               Hassan.
Tomiji Mizutani              SBO and C/BO        Certifying funds available for the approved
                             (14 October 2000 to Budget Requests.           Forwarding Budget
                             present)            Requests to Ah Kim Lee Choon for further
                                                 certification.
Ah Kim Lee Choon             C/FIN               Certifying funds available and effecting
                                st
                             (1 April 1997-      payments as second signatory (cheques and
                             3 April 2005)       bank transfers). Authorized bank cheques
                                                 given to Hassan after his signature.
                                                 Forwarding the voucher/cheque for second
                                                 signature to the SG through D/REM for a
                                                 disbursement of USD 40,000 and above.
Luckson Ngwira               Accountant          Supervising the preparation of the payment
                             (29 May 1998 to     vouchers including verification of supporting
                             present)            documents. Certifying funds available before
                                                 the recruitment of SBO signing bank cheques
                                                 and transfers as first signatory.
Jean-Jacques Gerbier         Finance Officer     Verifying validity supporting documentation
                             (1st July 1985 –    and signing bank cheques and transfers as first
                             31 August 2004)     signatory.
Parvis Pourkiani             Accounts Clerk      Processing support documents received from
                             (1 April 99 - 31    Hassan, preparing payment vouchers,
                             March 2004)         maintaining fellows files within finance
                                                 division, handing signed cheques to
                                                 Mohammed Hassan or Ozga Zielinskki.
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       NAME of STAFF                 POSITION       Role and Responsibility in Processing the
                                                    Support Documents of the Transactions
Workneh Degefu                    AD/REM          Directing and supervising the Finance/Budget,
                                  (from 1/9/1999 Human Resources, Information Systems and
                                  - 14/11/1999    Common Services divisions. Submitting, after
                                  and 1/10/2003 - approval, the memorandum (voucher/cheque)
                                  31/05/2004)     to the SG for final approval of a disbursement
                                                  in case of USD 40,000 and above.
Kathleen Charles                  D/REM           Directing and supervising the Finance/Budget,
                                  (15/11/1999 -   Human Resources, Information Systems and
                                  30/09/2003)     Common Services divisions. Submitting, after
                                                  approval, the memorandum (voucher/cheque)
                                                  to the SG for final approval of a disbursement
                                                  in case of USD 40,000 and above.
Alexandre Zaitsev                 ASG             Final approving of budget and specific related
                                  (20 September activity and authorizing payments as first
                                  1992 - 31 July signatory in case of amounts of USD 40,000
                                  2001)           and above.
Hong Yan                          ASG             Final approving of budget and specific related
                                     st
                                  (1 October      activity for all funds except holdback.
                                  2001 - 22 June
                                  2004)
Michel Jarraud                    DSG             Final approving of budget and specific related
                                  (2 January      activity and authorizing payments as second
                                  1995 - 31       signatory in case of amounts of USD 40,000
                                  December        and above, in the absence of ASG.
                                  2003)
Godwin Obasi                      SG              Approval of use of Holdback Funds. Final
                                  (1st January    approving of budget and its specific related
                                  1984 - 31       activity.
                                  December 03)



     G. The Scope, Approach and Development of the Investigation
The chronology of relevant events connected with the investigation is presented in Annex XX.

            The facts of the discovery

On 18 June 2003, C/FEL, Mr. Hassan, returned WMO cheque No 60709441 drawn on UBS on
24 April 2003 for an amount of CHF 5,831.00 and payable to Mr. Y. Al-Qawasma, Director of
Meteorological Office of Palestinian National Authority as WMO contribution to the cost of his
study tour to Meteo-France and WMO Secretariat from 15 to 30 June 2003 to the Accountant
Mr. Luckson Ngwira (Finance Division)

The cheque had not been honored by UBS because it had been endorsed to Mr. A.H. Elkalil, with
a bank account in Credit Suisse Geneva. UBS only pays cheques presented as collection items to
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the beneficiary stated on the cheque. Mr. Hassan, acting on behalf of Mr. Al-Qawasma, requested
the Finance Division to issue a replacement cheque and provided it with a copy of the advice
which the endorsee, Mr. Elkalil, received from his bank, Credit Suisse, Geneva.

At the end of the day of 1 July 2003 Mr. Luckson Ngwira found the signed WMO cheque
No 60709513, drawn on UBS on 5 May 2003 for an amount of USD 1,488.00 and payable to
Mr. Malam da Silva, Permanent Representative to WMO of Guinea Bissau, lying face down on
the desk of one of the Accounts Clerks, office No 7J62. The handwritten in the reverse of the
cheque was blacked out. This fact draw the attention of Mr. Luckson Ngwira. Although the
endorsee details, the name, the bank account identification and the signature had been blacked out,
it was possible to identify that the cheque had been endorsed to Mr Elkalil, with a bank account in
Credit Suisse Geneva. UBS did not honor the cheque for the same reasons stated above. Mr.
Hassan also returned this cheque during the day to Mrs. France Langin, one of the Accounting
Clerks.

In the meantime, Mrs. Y. Gedamu, Senior Financial Assistant responsible for bank account
reconciliations, had realized that UBS credited on 2 June 2003 the amount of USD 1,488.00 to
cancel the debit related to WMO cheque No 60709514 drawn on UBS on 5 May 2003 and
payable to Mr. J.L. Tchedna, Chief of Climatology Department in Meteorological Service of
Guinea Bissau. UBS credit advice stated that the bank does not accept cheques endorsed in
favour of third parties.

Despite of the facts just described, Mr. Hassan insisted on requesting replacement cheques to be
drawn. The observations of these facts made Mr. Luckson Ngwira suspicious about the practices
by Mr. Hassan to handle cheques and the D/REM, Mrs. Kathleen Charles, decided that other
cheques returned to that date in the current biennium (2002-2003) should be examined and results
reported.

The investigation developed in five phases as follows:


        1st Phase - The Preliminary Investigation

The internal investigation started on 11 July 2003. The preliminary investigation has dealt with
the allegation that Mr. Mohamed E. Hassan has mishandled WMO funds through inappropriate
endorsements of cheques drawn on WMO bank accounts and deposited in private bank accounts
in Geneva.

The preliminary investigation sought to establish the facts of the matter by obtaining information
and evidence –both inculpatory and exculpatory – to substantiate or refute allegations.

The 1st Interim Investigation Report with the results of the preliminary investigation with nine
recommendations was released on 6 August 2003. It was concluded that the allegations were
substantiated by sufficient evidence and that the investigation should continue.


        2nd Phase – Forensic Analysis of the expenditure - period 1 January 2000 –
        31 July 2003

The scope of the investigative work during this phase was to cover relevant matters such as:
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    • Forensic document examination;
     •    Potential misappropriation of WMO funds, amounts of WMO’s potential financial losses,
          liabilities and recovery;
     •    Determination of the period to be covered in the analysis regarding collection of
          accounting records and support documentation that would allow more precision in
          determining the amounts involved.
     •    Establishment of official contacts with Meteorological Services, Governments,
          administrative and legal authorities and individuals to enable the investigation of some
          aspects or situations where there occurred active involvement of third parties and where
          the investigation could be carried out with their cooperation.

The 2nd Interim Investigation Report was released on 4 November 2003 with six
recommendations, which included the recourse to the Swiss Judiciary Authorities. At that time
C/IAIS foresaw that the investigation would develop through three additional subsequent phases:

     •    3rd Phase – Operational audit of the internal control procedures of the fellowship
          operations;
     •    4th Phase – Investigation of potential involvement and responsibilities of other staff
          members and third parties
     •    5th Phase – Closure of the investigation.


         3rd Phase – Audit of the Internal Control Procedures of the Fellowship Operations

The objective was to identify the weaknesses of the current internal control practices, which, if
improved or changed, could help minimize the current level of the financial and fraud risks
attached to the above-mentioned operations.

We have reviewed the operations carried out under the responsibility of the Fellowship and
Finance Divisions through out the period 1 January 1997 to 31 July 2003. The review was
conducted from 10 July 2003 to 30 November 2003.

The 3rd Interim Investigation Report was released on 5 February 2004 with 22
recommendations.


         4th Phase – Investigation of the Responsibilities of Other Staff within WMO
         Secretariat

On 29 October 2003, following the 2nd Interim Investigation report and the IAIS’ question on
whether it should proceed with the investigation of responsibilities of other staff within WMO,
the Secretary-General, Mr. Obasi, answered yes. On 13 February 2004, following the 3rd Interim
Investigation Report, the Secretary-General, Mr. Jarraud, confirmed that the investigation should
proceed on the following two aspects:
    1. “To investigate possible involvement or implication of other staff members through
        negligence, gross negligence or even complicity.
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    2. To pursue as far as documentation and information allows retrospective analysis of the
        fraud case.”

The objective of this phase was to identify other staff members, besides Mr. Mohamed Hassan,
who could have carried responsibility on the events or could have been involved or implicated in
the perpetration of the fraud.

We have reviewed the fellowship related activities carried out throughout the period of
1st January 2000 to 31 July 2003. The period covered by the analysis coincided with the period
scrutinized under the first and second reports released on 6 August and 21 October 2003
respectively.

The work of this fourth phase of the investigation developed from 15 March through
30 June 2004 and the results of the work were reported on a preliminary way to the Secretary-
General on 15 July 2004. During this period, C/IAIS interrupted the investigation several times to
allow her efforts be focused on:
     •    The up-dating and monitoring of the Action Plan;
     •    The development and preparation of the Internal Audit Plan 2004;
     •    The closure of a small investigation on a staff member case;
     •    The preparation of the report to EC-LVI.

During September, October and the first half of November 2004 C/IAIS developed the extra
investigation work (as well as other work included in the Internal Audit Plan), which consisted on
searching the e-mail accounts of two additional staff members.

The 4th Interim Investigation Report, which was released on 19 November 2004, focused on
the staff members that were still working at WMO and contains four recommendations.


         5th Phase – Closure of the investigation

During the second meeting of the Audit Committee, on 22 February 2005, it was agreed that the
present investigation should be closed by the end of March 2005 and consequently, the final
report on the investigation released.

The 9th and last Interim Report was released on 12 April 2005 with four recommendations. It
concerns the results of the investigative work carried out since the release of the last unforeseen
interim investigation report dated 10 February 2005 and deals with the following aspects:
     •    The motivations of the fraud;
     •    The results of the analysis of the evidence provided by the Swiss Investigating Judge on
          Mr. Hassan’s case;
     •    The conduct of Mrs. Iwona Rummel-Bulska, SLA, and of Mr. Chacowry, D/CER.



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        Unforeseen Investigative Work and Reports

In the meantime, as a consequence of unforeseen events related to the evolvement of the
investigation, the IAIS was called upon to respond to specific requests of both the Secretary-
General and the Deputy Secretary-General, preparing four extra, unforeseen, interim reports in
connection with this investigation. They are as follows:
        o         Interim Investigation Report dated 17 November 2004 –- “Payments effected by
                    WMO to the Egyptian Meteorological Authority (EMA) in relation to RMTC
                    Cairo training courses and BADEA funding”;
        o         Interim Investigation Report dated 18 January 2005 –- “Egyptian
                    Meteorological Authority – Waiver of tuition fees of Ad-Hoc Class III Climatology
                    course”;
        o         Interim Investigation Report dated 10 February 2005 –- “Comments on the
                    responses of Mr. Kaliba Konaré, Mr. Workeneh Degefu and Mr. Ahkim Lee
                    Choon to the Secretary-General’s letter of allegations addressed to these staff
                    members dated 6 January 2005”.
        o         Interim Investigation Report dated 7 March 2005 – “Payments effected by WMO
                    to the Egyptian Meteorological Authority in relation to RMTC Cairo training
                    courses”.


     H. Limitations of the Internal Investigation at WMO

There are fundamental aspects of this case that could not be adequately investigated by means of
an internal investigation, but could be investigated by recourse to the competent Swiss authorities
as well as other national judiciary authorities. The following matters fall into this category:
     1. Verification of the delegated power of authority of the Permanent Representatives to
        WMO in their respective countries/institutions regarding financial matters;
     2. Verification of, if and how, the banks in Geneva verified the authenticity of the signatures,
        of foreign individuals and institutions, of the endorsements made on WMO cheques when
        cashing them. Access to information regarding deposit of WMO cheques and movements
        of the accounts of Mr. Hassan;
     3. Verification on whether the funds that WMO paid to training institutions abroad entered in
        the home country of the beneficiary institution and have been recorded in those
        institutions’ accounts;
     4. Verification of the effective implementation of the training activities in the host
        institutions;
     5. Investigation of third party responsibilities and involvement on the fraud of WMO funds
        and outsider co-conspirators;
     6. Information about Mr. Hassan’s assets and the legal possibility to freeze his assets for
        recovery purposes;


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    7. Verification of Mr. Hassan’s private business and affairs, their connection with his
        position as a WMO staff member as well as other possible ramifications;
     8. Scientific study and examination of certain details and elements of the documentation in
        order to identify for instance the authenticity of signatures. In this regard, the advice of
        the Investigation Division of the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services has
        been followed, i.e., not to contract this service from a private consultant in order not to
        compromise, interfere with or contradict any possible future results of expertise that the
        local Swiss authorities may need to carry out.




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IV – Summary of the Findings and Conclusions
    A .The Secretary-General’s Decision to Turn over the Case to the Swiss
      Authorities and the Interaction and Cooperation with the Swiss
      Authorities
On 4 November 2003 the Secretary-General decided to turn over the case to the Swiss Authorities
after the release of the second interim report of the investigation on 21 October 2003 during a
meeting chaired by the Secretary-General and attended by the following staff: DSG,
Mr. Michel Jarraud, ASG, Mr. Hong Yan, AD/REM, Mr. Workeneh Degefu and SLA, Mrs Iwona
Rummel-Bulska.

SLA and the private Swiss lawyer, Mr. Hornung deposited WMO criminal complaint against
Mr. Hassan on 6 November 2003. SLA transmitted a copy of the two first Interim Investigation
Reports to the “Procureur Général” to support the complaint.

The cooperation between WMO and the Swiss Investigating Judge has been excellent. The
Secretary-General has waived the immunities of both documentation and staff as soon as it was
necessary or specifically required by the Judge. In this line, the Secretary-General transmitted to
the Judge all relevant documents and reports as soon as available.

The Secretary-General waived the immunity of both SLA and C/IAIS to act as WMO lawyer and
witness respectively on behalf of WMO. In these capacities both SLA and C/IAIS participated in
the first hearing on 5 December 2003 to confirm the complaint against Mr. Hassan.

During the year 2004 C/IAIS interacted with the Investigating Judge and the Inspectors of the
Police several times to provide the documentation and information as per instructions of the
Secretary-General.

On 24 February 2005, IAIS accessed the investigation files of Mr. Hassan’s case in the Tribunal
of Geneva. The Investigating Judge provided copies of selected documents and gave permission
to C/IAIS to report thereof in the context of the internal investigation.

The highlights of the content of the documents follow:

    A .1. The Judge’s order to arrest Mr. Hassan and Mr. Hassan’s escape
     •    6 November 2003 – Letter from the Swiss Mission addressed to Mr. Daniel Zappelli,
          Attorney General, received by the Judge on 7 November 2003 deposited the same day,
          informing that WMO Secretary-General has requested the waiver of the immunity of
          Mr. Hassan as a consequence of the criminal complaint against him.
     •    10 November 2003 (Monday) - Note of the “Greffier” stating that Mrs. Iwona
          Rummel-Bulska called to inform that WMO has received a phone call from Mr. Hassan,
          on Sunday, 9 November 2003 at 11:30 am. She said Mr. Hassan indicated that he should
          go to Kartoum, Sudan, because his wife was sick. Mrs. Rummel-Bulska also added that
          she was afraid Mr. Hassan would soon be leaving Switzerland.

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    •     10 November 2003 (Monday) – The Investigating Judge gives the order to arrest
          Mr. Hassan.
    •     10 November 2003 (Monday) – Swiss police inspectors perquisite Mr. Hassan’s house.
          Mr. Hassan’s son, Ahmed Hassan declares that his father has left Switzerland the day
          before, 9 November 2003, around noon, to Egypt and it was possible that he will reach
          Sudan afterwards. He also stated that they had family in both Sudan and Egypt and that
          Mr. Hassan has a private import-export company headquartered in Cairo which was
          previously located in Sudan. He added that his mother has left Switzerland to go to
          Sudan, which was at least four years ago, and that he and his brother were living in
          Switzerland with their father. He added that he did not know about his father having
          another woman.

    A.2. Business Partners of Mr. Hassan: Mr. Ali Hassan Elkalil and
         Yamouni, SARL and Dawood Hossan
Mr. Ali Elkalil is Sudanese and a business partner of Mr. Hassan with respect to the restaurant
“Corso”, where Mr. Hassan was taking some PRs to WMO and other Delegates. During the
interview with the Judge he stated that Mr. Hassan was giving him WMO cheques to pay some of
Mr. Hassan’s private invoices.

Mr. Ali Hassan Elkhalil and Mr. Yammouni received, through endorsement, seven WMO
cheques (USD 24,131 and CHF 7,419, a total amount of about USD 30,472); and received four
cheques (USD 67,606) respectively. These cheques were drawn in PR’s or RMTC’s names and
have been identified defrauded in the context of the present investigation.

In his interview with the police, Mr. Yamouni1 stated that Mr. Hassan was his customer and that
he frequently booked and paid for rented apartments used by members of WMO.

In a fax message written in Arabic addressed by Mr. Hossan Dawood on 7 November 2003 to Mr.
Hassan’s private fax number (home), Mr. Hossan informs Mr. Hassan that he is leaving Germany
to Alexandria, Egypt, the same day, and that he retransferred USD 40’000 to Mr. Hassan’s
account in Egypt. This transfer refers to a biding process with the Ministry of Internal affairs.
This person signs “your son Hussam”.

    A.3. Records Mr. Hassan’s mobile telephone
The Swiss Authorities collected the records of Mr. Hassan’s mobile telephone from 12 May 2003
through 10 November 2003. A summary of the telephone calls made and received by Mr. Hassan
regarding WMO staff during the period 7 July (the date around which internal discussions on the
Accountant’s findings started) and 10 November 2003 (the date Mr. Hassan escaped to Egypt) is
attached in Annex VI. Mr. Hassan maintained contacts during this period with the following


1
    Mr. Seeman (Symon)Yamouni is a Lebanese established in Geneva and shareholder of YAMOUNI, SARL, a
    company that rents apartments and provides catering services in Geneva. According to documents found in
    Mr. Hassan’s office this company supplied catering services to the lunch held on 10 May 2003 at the house of the
    former Secretary-General, Mr. Obasi.
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WMO staff: Mr. Obasi, Mrs. Rummel-Bulska, Mr. Workeneh Degefu, Mr. Konaré, Mr. Michaud,
Mr. Bogdan Zielinski and Mrs Elizabeth Gacuca.
In particular IAIS has analyzed the period between 21 October 2003 (the date IAIS releases the
draft of the second interim report which led to the turn over the case to the Swiss Authorities) and
10 November 2003 (Mr. Hassan escaped to Egypt on 9 November 2003). The table with this data
is presented in Annex VII. From this analysis it became evident that there were private telephone
contacts with three WMO staff members: Mr. Degefu, Mr. Bogdan Zielinsky and Mrs. Iwona
Rummel-Bulska as follows:
     o Mr. Bogdan Zielinski called from his home Mr. Hassan on 7 November 2003, Friday, at
       20:04:41 for 2 minutes16 seconds ; Mr. Hassan called Mr. Bogdan Zielinski home on 8
       November 2005, Saturday, at 10:02:19 for 14 minutes and 13 seconds.
     o Mr. Hassan called Mr. Degefu on 8 November 2003, Saturday, at 14:14:01 for 12 minutes
       and also on 9 November 2003, Sunday, at 12:21:49 for 6 minutes 42 seconds.
     o Mrs. Iwona Rummel-Bulska called from home Mr. Hassan on 9 November 2003 (see also
       point A.1 above for her phone call to the Greffier on 10 July 2003), Sunday, at 19:32:36
       for 15 seconds (the record of the call is a voice-mail message).

Mr. Hassan escaped to Egypt on 9 November 2003 by plain he took at Geneva airport at 13:53
pm, Egyptair flight to Cairo. Mr. Hassan has paid the on way ticket in cash at the last moment.

    A.4. Statements of the UBS bank account in the name of Syrian
         Meteorological Department
Mr. Nafie Al Shalabi, the PR of Syria to WMO, opened a bank account in USD with UBS in
Geneva on 21 October 1999 in the name of SAR – Syrian Meteorological Department, and
address in PO Box 4211 Damascus, Syria.

This account was closed on April 2002.

The summary of the movements of this account is the following (currency: USD):

                       Transaction                   2000          2001          2002       Totals
            Receipts from WMO                       535’500        33’000       140’000     708’500
            Payment to Radar Technologies          -360’000
            Payments to Hossan Dawood2             -145’200
            Payment to French Arabian               -30’000
            Industries
            Payment to Dardanelle3                                -33’000
            Payment to Dawood/Alamia4                                          -139’800

2
    Hossan Dawood is Mr. Hassan’s business partner located in Germany. See also III B) above and First and
    Second Interim Investigation Reports dated 6 August and 4 November 2003.
3
    Dardannelle is the name of one of the companies, located in Egypt, operated by Mr. Hassan. See First and
    Second Interim Investigation Reports dated 6 August and 4 November 2003.
4
    Alamia is the name of one of the companies, located in Egypt, operated by Mr. Hassan. See First and Second
    Interim Investigation Reports dated 6 August and 4 November 2003.
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       A.5. Statements of Mr. Hassan’s bank account with BNP Paribas in Geneva
   This account was opened on 29 December 1999 in the name of Mr. Hassan and his second wife
   Aliaa. To open this account Mr. Hassan declared himself as an engineer, a businessman being the
   Michelin Representative in Sudan with an income of USD 800’000 a year.

   Some selected transactions in this account, which are summarized below, show the type of
   activities Mr. Hassan was developing, the entities he was dealing with and the purposes of those
   transactions. The most relevant transactions are shown in bold:


           Transaction (currency: USD)                 1999     2000   2001    2002       2003        Totals
-Receipts
From cheques                                               51’000             216’000 258’000         525’000
From 10 transfer from 6 Kenyan persons, in Kenya 100’000                                              100’000
From Private Business                                                         239’000                 239’000
From S.A.R. Switzerland5                                  360’000                                     360’000
From Permanent Mission of Kenya,
Switzerland (on 5 June 2003. Description:
"Reimbursement of logistical exp. Incurred during
the campaign of Mr. Evans Mukolwe for Sec. Gen.
World Meteorological Organization")                                                       248’000 248’000
- Payments                                        1999     2000    2001         2002       2003     Totals
To private business                                      -595’000 -41’000     -201’000   -292’000 -1’129’000
                                        6
To Mr. Babiker Yassien Mustafa in UAE                    -278’000                                   -278’000
To Dardanelle in Sudan (on 15 July 2003)                                                 -500’000 -500’000
To Mr. M. Hassan in Egypt (on 15 July 2003)                                              -203’000 -203’000
To Mr. M. Hassan, France (on 17 January 2002)                                   -9’000                -9’000
To Danwood in UK                                                               -75’000               -75’000
To Dawood/Alamia in Germany                                                    -90’000               -90’000
To L.M. Michaud in Switzerland
(on 22 February 2002)                                                          -10’000                 -10’000
To Dr. Medhat Arafa in Egypt
(on 19 and 27 March 2003 and 6 June 2003)                                                 -48’000     -48’000’




   5
       See also A.4 – SAR Account with UBS.
   6
       Former WMO staff member – retired on 30 November 2000.
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     A.6. Statements of Mr. Hassan’s bank account with UBS in Geneva
This bank account was the one where Mr. Hassan was receiving his salary from WMO. Some
selected movements are shown below:


        Transaction (currency: USD)                       1999     2000     2001     2002       2003        Totals
-Receipts
From H. Diallo7                                            2’000 1’000 23’000 18’000             25’000 70’000
From deposits in cash                                    213’000 17’000                          95’000 325’000
From Mr. A. Bejjani (on 24 June 2002)                                          2’000                      2’000
From M. Hassan in Offenbach Germany (dated
22 April 1999. Description: "Inst. Meteologit.
Prof. Jelenski RG.")                                      37’000                                             37’000
From M. Hassan in Switzerland
(dated 17 July 2001 and 21 March 2002)                                      53’000 40’000                    93’000
From Perm. Mission Burundi
(on 12 December 2001 and 31 January 2003)                                   15’000               15’000      30’000
From cheques                                                       60’000                        12’000      72’000

- Payments                                                1999     2000     2001     2002       2003        Totals
Through cheque remittance (endorsed on
12 October 1999)                                        -140’000                                        -140’000
Through cash withdrawals                                 -20’000            -70’000 67’000       49’000 206’000
To El Hajaz (on 23 November 2000)                                 -3’000                                  -3’000
To private businesses                                    -31’000 -64’000 -7’000 -23’000                 -125’000
To L.M. Michaud in Switzerland
(on 27 January 2003)                                                                            -10’000 -10’000




7
    Mr. Diallo was D/TCO at WMO. See also Annex II and IV D).
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    A.7. Statements of Mr. Yamouni’s bank account with Credit Suisse

Mr. Yamouni is a Lebanese businessman who was renting some of the “Studios” contracted by
some of WMO staff to accommodate Permanent Representatives and other Delegates during
WMO meetings (see also point A.2 above). A summary of selected transactions on this account
are presented below:

               Transaction (currency: USD)                       1999     2000      2003       Totals
      - Receipts
      From Met. Inst. Poland (on 11 May 1999.
      "Description: Invoice 1614-Cost of monthly
      accommodation Delegates to the congress of
      WMO from developing countries")                            26’000                          26’000
      From WMO Cheques (deposited on
      23 March 2000, 26 February 2003 and
      17 April 2003)                                                      40’000    58’000       98’000


    A.8. Statements of and Mr. Salah Elhagaz’ and Mrs. Aliaa Hassan
         Modathir Elhagaz’ bank account with Credit Suisse
Mr. S. Elhagaz (Sudanese and family member of Mr. Hassan’s wife) was studying in the
University of Wales, Cardiff, United Kingdom, with a scholarship granted by WMO from
25 September 1996 through 31 July 2003. Mrs. Aliaa Hassan Elhagaz is the second wife of
Mr. Hassan, according to the information contained in Mr. Hassan’s WMO personal file.


                                   Transaction (currency: USD)             1999
                      Transfer from Met. Inst. Poland (on 15
                      September 1999. Description: "Payment for 14
                      air tickets following the list on the attached
                      invoice")                                            37’000
                      Transfer to M. Hassan (on 23 September 1999)        -37’000


    A.9. Judge’s requests for waiver of immunity of WMO staff
The list of staff that has immunity waived in connection with the Judiciary Process are:

               -     SLA, Mrs. I. Rummel- Bulska, WMO lawyer
               -     C/IAIS, Mrs. M. Veiga, WMO investigator
               -     AC/FIN, Mr. L. Ngwira
               -     Former D/ETR, Mr. K. Konaré
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           - Former DC/SSP, Mr. W. Degefu
               -     Former C/FIN, Mr. A. Lee Choon
               -     D/CER, Mr. S. Chacowry
               -     Mr. Bogdan Zielinski, former WMO Consultant working with Mr. Hassan
               -     Mr. L. Michaud, former WMO staff member and WMO Consultant



    B.        Mechanisms of the Fraud and the Facts Brought to Light
The mechanisms used to commit the fraud are quite basic in their essence. They were in place
since, at least, the period prior to the 1999 Congress. Documents showing the signs that
Mr. Hassan was carrying out illicit activities in connection with the elections were brought to the
attention of Mr. Jean-Pierre Matras (WMO Chief Internal Audit and Investigation Service from
1st September 1997 to 31 July 2001) in 1999 according to the testimony of Mrs. E. Tarry, a retired
staff member of ETR, interviewed by C/IAIS during the present investigation. The witness stated
that the former C/IAIS was of the opinion that photocopies were not a good proof of the facts and
that therefore nothing could be done.



    B.1. Mechanisms used to commit the fraud
The fraud was possible because:
          1- It was perpetrated to serve a shared purpose among some high rank WMO staff: the use
          of the misappropriated funds to exercise political influence over PRs and/or Delegates with
          power of attorney to vote in elections;
          2- The mechanisms were orchestrated by Mr. Hassan in such a way that he had the
          processes under his control;
          3- Those sharing the purpose and helping Mr. Hassan, in one way or another, were high
          rank WMO staff (see points D and I below) and possibly also certain PRs;
          4- Mr. Hassan took advantage of the situation also misappropriating some funds for his
          own personal benefit;
          5- Lax practices in the banks in Geneva where Mr. Hassan had his bank accounts and the
          possible collusion with a local bank officer.


The operational aspects of the fraud

         Forgery of all types of training activities and related expenditures: study tours of PRs,
         technical courses in meteorology related subjects, tuition fees, travel, hostel and canteen
         expenditures, etc.

         Forgery of all types of documentation and information supporting the transactions:
         letters, invoices, WMO receipts, documents transmitted by fax, attendance certificates,
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      credentials with power of attorney for voting purposes, identification of bank accounts of
      certain NMHS and RMTCs both in Switzerland, Geneva, and in some countries benefiting
      from WMO funds.

        Falsification of signatures: posted to endorse WMO bank cheques, signatures posted on
        letters, receipts, invoices, certificates, PR’s requests, etc.

        Overriding of internal regulations and rules: this was current practice in respect to the
        documentation supporting fellowship related transactions regarding procedures connected
        with lack of register of incoming and outgoing correspondence, lack of original accounting
        vouchers, staff regulations and rules, delegation of financial authority, etc.

        Mr. Hassan’s direct access to WMO bank cheques ready to cash: WMO cheques given
        by the Finance Division to Mr. Hassan, instead of the beneficiaries.

        Lack of due diligence within the Finance Division: requests of Mr. Hassan were always
        satisfied and the authenticity of supporting documentation for disbursements was not
        verified.


The organizational and control environment of the fraud

        The privileged positioning of Mr. Hassan within WMO Secretariat: C/FEL was vested
        at the same time with the power of decision to choose whom to award with the fellowship
        and to approve its payment, and so he was positioned to control the beginning and the end
        of the decision making process. When a WMO staff member questioned a fellowship
        related transaction, he used to mention that he was acting according to his prior agreement
        with the Secretary-General or state that he will report to the Secretary-General of the
        “non-agreeable” responses to his requests. He took advantage of the situation, internally, by
        leveraging his perceived powerful position within WMO and, externally, by maneuvering
        his relationship with some PRs with WMO.

        The absolute control of the process: The key control and supervision positions with
        respect to the processing of the fraudulent transactions were occupied by staff either
        associated with Mr. Hassan in pursuing the fraudulent activities and/or with the purposes
        underlying the fraud such as DC/SSP, D/ETR, D/CER, D/TCO and C/FIN.


        The unclear borderlines relative to the role, authority and responsibilities of the
        Permanent Representatives with WMO: There is the assumption that PRs are also vested
        with powers to sign alone for financial transactions on behalf of their respective institutions.
        WMO is not well aware of the level of delegated authority in financial matters by the
        Governments to the PRs with WMO.




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Collusion with in and outsiders:

        The role of certain WMO staff members: Without the facilitation of some key positioned
        WMO staff members the magnitude of the fraud could not have been so important. See
        point IV D below.

        The active role of certain PRs: At least five PRs could have been active accomplices of
        Mr. Hassan (see points IV F and G below and Annex XIV).

        The role of the BNP Paribas in Geneva: BNP Paribas was the bank where Mr. Hassan
        was able to cash the highest number of WMO cheques drawn on foreign public institutions’
        names (PRs, RMTCs, NMHS’, individual fellows) based upon presentation of “invoices” of
        a great variety of business transactions without being questioned about their validity and the
        links between Mr. Hassan and WMO.

        The role of Private Business Partners: Mr. Elkalil, Mr. Yamouni and Mr. Babiker are
        some of Mr. Hassan’s business partners (see point A.2). Mr. Hassan has maintained
        important business activities in many countries: Germany, Singapore, Romania, Russia,
        Poland, Sudan, Egypt, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Syria.



        B.2. Major facts brought to light by the investigation
The funds entrusted to the management of the Education and Training Department through its
Fellowship Division included Funds of the General Fund, Holdback Fund and Extra Budgetary
Funds.

The specific facts of the present investigation are those deriving from the analysis of the entire
process and procedures of funding each and every training activity scrutinized during this
investigation such as: individual fellows or study tours of Permanent Representatives (PRs), the
sharing of costs with NMHS/RMTCs to organize courses, the sharing of costs of meetings
organized by any NMHS or other entities such as the League of Arab States, meetings and
workshops, on the job training courses, etc.

These facts were reported in detail through the first three interim reports of this investigation
(dated 6 August 2003, 4 November 2003 and 5 February 2004) and can be summarized as follows:

     1. During the period of 1 January 2000 through to 31 July 2003, 438 “Budget Requests” for
        disbursement of funds of the fellowship program were approved based on false
        information and forged documentation. The tables in Annex VIII show which WMO staff
        members, and how many times they signed for the authorization/approval of the
        438 “Budget Requests”, bank cheques and bank transfers.


     2. The total number of disbursement made was 194: 152 bank cheques and 42 bank transfers.
        The Finance Division gave the cheques to Mr. Hassan that he, or his friends, cashed in
        Geneva, whereas 24 bank transfers were made to a bank account in Geneva in the name of
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        the Syrian Meteorological Organization and 19 transfers to a bank account in Egypt in the
        name of EMA.


     3. Most of the above-mentioned payments were supported by forged documentation, often
        faxes or photocopies instead of originals and, in many cases, relevant documents related to
        the transactions are missing. For instance, the master files containing the original
        correspondence and other documents relative to the training courses that supposedly were
        held in Poland since 1999 are missing.


     4. Signatures of non-authorized persons were posted in some “Budget requests” to authorize
        the transactions of defrauded funds such as the signature of Mr. Bogdan Zielinski.


     5. There is no evidence or trace whatsoever related to the process of selection of the fellows
        awarded nor to their placements.


     6. Award documents were not systematically sent to fellows, and they were thus not
        acknowledged, nor were the fellows informed about the amounts they were entitled to
        receive.


     7. There was no evidence or possibility of tracing the total number of requests for
        fellowships received by WMO.


     8. Mr. Hassan gave the information on the amounts of tuition fees to be included in the
        “Budget Requests” to the Fellowship clerks orally or by e-mail. These amounts were not
        further crosschecked, during the approval process, by anyone in WMO through valid
        documentation.


     9. Many valid original documents related to the confirmation of acceptance of a certain
        country to receive a PR of another country to attend a study tour, do not exist.


     10. The standing instructions concerning the procedures of registry of correspondence,
         incoming and outgoing on one hand, were not being followed systematically and, on the
         other hand, are not comprehensive: leaving out important documents such as invoices and
         correspondence from the banks.


     11. Evidence of effective oversight and coordination of the management and use of the funds
         entrusted to the fellowship program was at WMO Secretariat level.


     12. There is a lack of clear communication from governments to WMO related to the powers
         of authority vested in the PRs concerning financial transactions. The notification of
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        designation of the PRs of most countries does not specify the financial issues and the
        capacity of a PR to commit his country in these matters with their sole signatures. On the
        other hand, within WMO, there is the assumption that PRs are also vested with powers to
        sign alone for financial transactions on behalf of their respective institutions.


     13. Mr. Mohamed Hassan was engaged in private business not related to his official WMO
         work. He developed for a long time (more than five years) unauthorized recurring
         commercial and other activities using WMO premises, computers, telephone and fax as
         well as some staff without having been denounced.




    C.        The Motivations Underlying the Fraud
Two different corroborating sources of documentation allow us to conclude on the motivations
and the purposes of the fraud inflicted to WMO funds during a period of at least four and a
half years (1999- July 2003):
          o The documentation (paper and electronic files) collected internally by C/IAIS during
            the investigation as well as the statements of about 40 people during their interviews
            with C/IAIS;
          o The documents collected by the Swiss Judiciary Authorities, under the instruction of
            the “Juge d’instruction”, and which C/IAIS had access to on 24 March 2005.

From the documentation available as at today, it is clear that at least three motivations underlined
the fraud:
              1- Mr. Hassan steeling WMO money for personal use including financing his private
               businesses, with the probable complicity of an officer at BNP Paribas as well as some
               PRs with WMO of certain countries;

              2- Mr. Hassan, in association with Mr. Degefu, Mr. Chacowry, Mr. H. Diallo,
               Mr. Konaré, Mr. Bogdan Zielinsky and Mr. Mukolwe and the conscious facilitation of
               Mr. Lee Choon in his position as Chief Finance Division, deviating WMO money to
               exercise political influence over some PRs and having had the probable complicity of
               some PRs of certain countries to WMO;

              3- Mr. Mukolwe’s campaigning for the election as WMO Secretary-General in 2003.
               On 5 June 2003, Mr. Hassan received in his bank account with BNP Paribas
               USD 248,000 from the Kenyan Mission to the UN in Geneva as “Reimbursement of
               logistic exp. incurred during the campaign of Mr. Evans Mukolwe for Sec. Gen.
               World Meteorological Organization”. See point IV A.5 above.

The documentation shows that Mr. Hassan was, so far, the most active person orchestrating the
fraud but, as stated below, he was possibly acting with the knowledge of the former Secretary-
General and in association with both some WMO staff members and some of the PRs with WMO
as well as the possible complicity of an officer of the BNP Paribas in Geneva.

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The mechanism consisted basically (see point IV B above for further details) on forging training
expenditure to deviate funds which then would be used to pay for travel, accommodation and
pocket money of PRs and Delegates of certain countries with WMO in the presuppose that the
delegates would then vote and act according to Mr. Hassan’s and other WMO staff members’
(associated in the “affair” with Mr. Hassan, see point IV D below) instructions. The
misappropriated funds were also used to pay the minimum contributions of some countries to
allow them to recover voting rights and also to share with some PRs having closer relationship
(business or private) with Mr. Hassan (possibly the case of Mr. Salahu – see point IV D below).

Within the electronic files stored in Mr. Hassan’s C/Drive and floppy disks there are documents
that indicate that Mr. Hassan was possibly informing Mr. Obasi (former WMO Secretary-General
until 31 December 2003, see Annex IX for Prof. Obasi’s response to IAIS’ 3rd Interim
Investigation Report) as well as Mr. Degefu, Mr. Konaré, Mr. H. Diallo and Mr. Chacowry on
most of the facts related to the deviation of the WMO funds through the Fellowship Programme
to the purposes above mentioned. Some other electronic documents indicate that Mr. Hassan was
probably also managing money he would have received from entities of one certain country to
develop election campaigning.

We also found some evidence within Mr. Hassan’s documents that the misappropriation of WMO
funds to support election campaigns (e.g. Mr. Mukolwe’s campaign) and the stay in Geneva of
certain PRs and Delegates during Council and other meetings was happening, at least, since 1999.

From the documents available and also from confirmation statements of Mr. Chacowry during his
interview with C/IAIS on 22 March 2005, we understood that some staff members (Mr. Hassan,
Mr. S. Chacowry, Mr. H. Diallo, Mr. K. Konaré, Mr. W. Degefu) were pulling out certain
amounts of private funds, which were collected by Mr. Hassan and that Mr. Hassan was calling
“Staff Fund” used also to exercise political influence over certain PRs and Delegates in parallel
with the funds misappropriated from WMO. According to the evidence found (see Annex X) this
money was put together with part of the money misappropriated from WMO and then all together
used for the purposes referred to above: renting studios in Geneva, organizing lunches, giving
pocket money to Delegates, paying for travel, paying arrears of certain countries, etc.
Mr. Chacowry also stated that the former Secretary-General, Mr. Obasi, was also contributing to
the “Staff Fund”.

Although we have found some evidence showing the names of the staff and of the amounts they
have given to Mr. Hassan as contributions to the so-called “Staff Fund”, IAIS does not have
jurisdiction to access the bank accounts of the staff and could not identify the exact source of this
money: private or misappropriated from WMO through the mechanisms of the fraud.


    D.        The Role of Relevant WMO Staff Members in Connection with the
              Motivations Underlying the Fraud
The analysis of the flow of the e-mail messages of nineteen staff members (see point III D above)
allowed, on one hand, to verify among whom messages connected with the motivations of the
fraud were circulating and, on the other hand, who were the staff members associated with
Mr. Hassan’s wrongdoings. This, together with the facts found through out the investigation -
mainly during its three first phases - helped formulating the conclusions.
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The table below shows the following:
               A) The identification of the staff members for which evidence of their involvement in
                  the motivations of the fraud was found;
               B) A summary of the facts found that link the staff members with the facts of the
                  motivations of the fraud.

The information contained in the table summarizes the elements of involvement of the staff and
was collected through the following sources:
               A) Mr. Hassan’s C:/Drive and floppy disks;
               B) Content of e-mail messaging system;
               C) Fact findings of the investigation;
               D) Documents collected by the Swiss Authorities.

                 NAME                          POSITION            ROLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
                                                                    MOTIVATIONS OF THE FRAUD
Mohammed Hassan8                             C/FEL             Was the main actor and perpetrator of the
                                             (1st May 1990 -   fraud. Orchestrated Mr. Mukolwe’s election
                                             10 July 2003)     campaign and misappropriated WMO funds
                                                               for that purpose as well as other trafficking
                                                               influence activities. Misappropriated WMO
                                                               funds to fund his private business.
Bogdan O. Zielinski                          FEL               Assisted Mr. Hassan on the FEL Division.
                                             Consultant        Established the link between his father, the PR
                                             (1st February     of Poland, Mr. Hassan and WMO. Was
                                             2003 - 31         handling fellowship files including those
                                             December          relative to courses held in Poland. Collected
                                             2003)             some WMO cheques on behalf of Mr. Hassan.
                                                               Telephoned Mr. Hassan on 7 November 2003
                                                               after the WMO private lawyer has informed
                                                               Mrs. Rummel-Bulska,SLA, on the fact that the
                                                               Judge was appointed
Kaliba Konaré9                               D/ETR             Did not supervise Mr. Hassan and did not
                                             (11 November      denounce Mr. Hassan’s fraudulent activities.
                                             2002 - 3 April    Helped Mr. Hassan misappropriating WMO
                                             2005)             funds. Contributed to the “Staff Fund”, which
                                                               together with funds misappropriated from
                                                               WMO were used to secure the expenses of
                                                               Mr. Mukolwe’s election campaign as well as
                                                               other activities of exercising influence.
                                                               Helped Mr. Hassan with the logistics of the
                                                               “studios”.


8
    WMO deposited a criminal complaint against Mr. Hassan on 6 November 2003.
9
    The case of Mr. Konaré was subject to disciplinary procedure between 6 January and 31 March 2005.

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                 NAME                          POSITION           ROLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
                                                                   MOTIVATIONS OF THE FRAUD
Harouna Diallo (Passed away                  D/TCO          Helped Mr. Hassan misappropriating WMO
on 20 November 2004)                         (1st September VCP funds. Contributed to the “Staff Fund”,
                                             2000 - 19      which together with funds misappropriated
                                             November       from WMO were used to secure the expenses
                                             2004)          of Mr. Mukolwe election campaign as well as
                                                            other activities of exercising influence.
                                                            Helped Mr. Hassan with the logistics of the
                                                            “studios”.
Workneh Degefu10                             DC/SSP         Did not supervise Mr. Konaré and Mr. Hassan
                                             AD/REM         and did not denounce Mr. Hassan’s fraudulent
                                             (1/9/1999 -    activities.          Helped       Mr.    Hassan
                                             14/11/1999 and misappropriating WMO funds. Contributed to
                                             1/10/2003 -    the “Staff Fund”, which together with funds
                                             31/05/2004)    misappropriated from WMO were used to
                                                            secure the expenses of Mr. Mukolwe’s
                                                            election campaign as well as other activities of
                                                            exercising influence. Helped Mr. Hassan with
                                                            the logistics of the “studios”.
                                                            Telephoned to Mr. Hassan on a regular basis,
                                                            after Mr. Hassan has been suspended
                                                            including the day before and the day that
                                                            Mr. Hassan escaped on 9 November 2003, see
                                                            Annex VII..
Ah Kim Lee Choon11                           C/FIN (1 April Authorized 152 WMO cheques to be given to
                                             1997 - 3 April Mr. Hassan instead of the beneficiaries.
                                             2005)          Satisfying all of Mr. Hassan’s requests
                                                            including the choice of the currency of
                                                            payment and the identification of the bank
                                                            accounts      to    process     the   payments.
                                                            Systematically gave information on arrears to
                                                            Mr. Hassan. Was knowledgeable on the fact
                                                            of the misappropriated funds being used to
                                                            exercise political influence through travel,
                                                            accommodation, pocket money and payment
                                                            of arrears of certain countries.
Parvis Pourkiani12                           Accounts Clerk Helped Mr. Hassan by handing him WMO
                                             (1st January   cheques and maintaining him informed on the
                                             1984 - 31      status of the Budget Requests and payments.
                                             March 2004)    Helped Mr. Hassan on logistics connected
                                                            with the visits of certain PRs and other private
                                                            favors.



10
     The case of Mr. Degefu was subject to disciplinary procedure between 6 January and 31 March 2005.
11
     The case of Mr. Lee Choon was subject to disciplinary procedure between 6 January and 31 March 2005.
12
     Left WMO on the basis of an early retirement programme.
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                 NAME                          POSITION            ROLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
                                                                    MOTIVATIONS OF THE FRAUD
Godwin Obasi                                 SG                Mr. Hassan was apparently and possibly
                                             (1st January      informing him on the issues about the use of
                                             1984 - 31         WMO funds for election campaigns as well as
                                             December          other activities of exercising influence. .
                                             2003)             Telephoned Mr. Hassan on several occasions
                                                               after Mr. Hassan has been suspended and in
                                                               particular after interviews with C/IAIS and
                                                               release of interim investigation reports (see
                                                               Annex VII).
Soobasschrandra Chacowry13                   D/EXR and         Contributed to the “Staff Fund”, which
                                             D/CER             together with the misappropriated funds from
                                             (17/0402000 to    WMO were used to secure the expenses of
                                             present)          Mr. Mukolwe’s election campaign as well as
                                                               other activities of exercising influence Helped
                                                               Mr. Hassan with the logistics of the “studios”.
Iwona Rummel-Bulska14                        SLA               Telephoned Hassan on 9 November 2003, the
                                             (5 December       day Hassan escaped to Egypt. Could have
                                             2000 - present)   called the police to arrest Hassan before
                                                               deposit the complaint with the “Procureur
                                                               Général” but did not.
Y. Salahu15                                  D/RAF             Forged documentation for non-existing
                                             (22 April 2003    courses when he was PR of Nigeria in 2000
                                             - 18 October      and shared the money with Mr. Hassan.
                                             2003)
Evans Mukolwe16                              DC/STP            While WMO staff member used WMO staff
                                             (18 December      and funds to execute and finance his election
                                             2000 - 12         campaign for the position of Secretary-
                                             October 2003)     General in 2003. In WMO the orchestrator of
                                                               his election campaign was Mr. Hassan.


Mustafa Babiker17                            Scientific        Maintained important private business with
                                             Officer           Mr. Hassan. Received in Germany significant
                                             (11 January       amounts of money from Mr. Hassan.
                                             1981 - 30
                                             November
                                             2000)


13
     The case of the conduct of Mr. Chacowry was reported through 9th Interim Investigation Report dated
     12 April 2005.
14
     The case of the conduct of Mrs Rummel-Bulska was reported through 9th Interim Investigation Report dated
     12 April 2005.
15
     Findings reported on the 2nd Interim Investigation Report dated 5 November 2003. Mr. Salahu resigned from
     WMO as a consequence of IAIS findings.
16
     Mr. Mulkowe resigned from WMO after having lost the election campaign. He joined WMO on
     18 December 2003. Recent news about his conduct have been released recently in the press. See Annex XII.
17
     See also IV A.5
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The graph attached to this report as Annex XI illustrates the flow of information and the linking
interests among the different actors in connection to the fraud.

Staff members still working at WMO listed in the table above have had their conduct assessed,
analyzed and reported in the Investigation Interim Reports dated 19 November 2004 and
12 April 2005. The Secretary-General, bearing in mind the possibility of a future recovery,
should evaluate the possibility of assessment of the conduct of all the other cases in the context of
the judiciary investigation. In this line, the case of Mr. Mukolwe appears to be the most critical
one, among all the others.


    E.        The Total Amounts Defrauded Discovered as at 31 March 2005
We developed a detailed analysis of all the supporting documentation, available in three different
locations and filing systems. The objectives of this highly detailed and time-consuming analysis
were twofold: to verify the validity of the documentation/implementation of the training activity
and therefore of the payment made and, to review the operational processes supported by the flow
of this documentation.

Concluding whether a certain disbursement of WMO funds, made as a result of an internal
process of approval to fund a training activity initiated by Mr. Hassan, in his capacity of C/FEL,
was based upon criteria. The criteria used are a combination of facts well documented which
should be present for each single disbursement - valid accounting documents, originals, that
adequately and simultaneously support the transaction on its fundamental dimensions:
                  •     request for funding an activity from the beneficiary;
                  •     approval of the activity and allocation of funds within WMO;
                  •     award of funds by WMO to the individual fellow or the institution whichever is
                        the case;
                  •     implementation of the activity by the host training institution;
                  •     assurance that disbursement was correctly effected by WMO and;
                  •     funds reached the correct beneficiary (WMO sent payment to the correct
                        beneficiary and he acknowledged this fact being an individual fellow or a
                        training institution (e.g. Meteorological Service, University), not a specific
                        individual of an institution, whichever the case.

In cases where one of the fundamental dimensions of the transaction failed to be validated, the
disbursement was considered not justified and therefore the funds disbursed defrauded. In the
absence of one of the original documents supporting the six actions above, it is not possible to
ensure that the process was valid and that the activity was actually implemented (e.g., absence of
a PR’s request, absence of the receipt of the funds).

Corroborative information and data was obtained by means of exchange of letters with a
significant number of training institutions. Two different letters were sent: one to request
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information/confirmation on the presence of PRs with WMO visiting usually three
Meteorological Services in three different countries during the same study tour; another one,
requesting information/confirmation on all other types of cost-shared training activities. The aim
of these letters was to obtain independent information on whether the training activities cost-
shared by WMO had taken place and whether the funds disbursed by WMO to pay for those
training activities had been received by the institution.
In addition we made telephone calls to individual fellows as well as to both the Egyptian and
Syrian Meteorological Services where, according to our records, one-year courses should be
underway and for which tuition fees had been paid by WMO. As a result of this exercise it was
possible to prove that there were no courses and therefore WMO funds had been defrauded.
The contracting of a private specialized company to provide information services regarding the
private business of Mr. Hassan.

The table below shows the amounts that were found misappropriated throughout this investigation
by means of the fraudulent mechanisms during the period of 29 September 1999 through
31 July 2003.


                                                  DEFRAUDED FUNDS

                                                          CHF         GBP         EUR       TOTALS
                                              USD      Conv in USD Conv in USD Conv in USD Conv in USD
Fellowship Programme                         2,492,834 170,640        272,146     37,095     2,972,715
Hold Back Funds                                218,000                                         218,000
Extra Budgetary Funds                          193,034     4,868       44,617                  242,518
Totals in Orig. Currency                     2,903,868 175,508        316,762     37,095     3,433,233



The disbursements of the misappropriated funds were made through the following means:
     •    152 WMO bank cheques - USD 2’268’733 (dated between 1 January 2000 and
          30 June 2003), made out to National Meteorological and Hydrological Services,
          Regional Meteorological Training Centers, Permanent Representatives and
          individual fellows’ names and in strong currencies (such as USD, CHF, EUR). They
          were given for the most part to Mr. Mohamed Hassan and a few to Mr. Bogdan Zielinsky
          (the son of the Permanent Representative of Poland working with Mr. Hassan as a
          consultant), instead of the beneficiaries. All of these beneficiary entities are located
          abroad. These 152 cheques were intended to pay for WMO fellowship related activities.
          These 152 cheques were endorsed by Mr. Mohamed Hassan (the majority) or by his
          personal friends. These cheques were deposited or cashed either by Mr. Hassan in his
          personal bank accounts in Geneva or in his friends’ bank accounts.
     •    24 Bank transfers effected by WMO to a bank account in UBS in Geneva in the
          name of the Syrian Meteorological Department - USD 708,500. Mr. Kamil Ercheid,
          Director of Research and Technical Affairs at Syrian Arab Republic Meteorological
          Department, stated in an interview with C/IAIS on 28 October 2004 (see Annex XIII) that

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        “I was surprised to learn of this. It is strictly illegal for any Syrian Government organ to
        maintain a bank account abroad.”


     •    18 Bank transfers effected by WMO to a bank account in the Bank of Alexandria in
          Cairo, Egypt - USD 456,000. 13 out of 19 bank transfers occurred between
          29 September and 31 December 1999 and totalize an amount of USD 381’000. Based on
          the information recently received from EMA (30 January 2005) we concluded that the
          amount of USD 381,000 was not included in the previous amount of USD 3,000,000
          reported as the approximate total amount of the fraud as at 4 November 2004. Therefore,
          as at 31 March 2005 the total defrauded amount discovered was brought to
          approximately USD 3,433,233.


The total defrauded funds discovered as at present represent 78.5% and 1.5% of the 4-year budget
of the Fellowship Programme and of WMO Regular Budget respectively. The details per year
and per currency are the following:

                                                            CHF         GBP         EUR       TOTALS
                                              USD        Conv in USD Conv in USD Conv in USD Conv in USD
                     1999                      381,000                                           381,000
                     2000                      919,380      13,046                               932,426
                     2001                      322,412       4,868       59,109                  386,389
                     2002                      591,275      14,350      248,554     37,096       891,274
                     2003                      689,800     143,244         9,100                 842,144
Totals in Orig. Currency                     2,903,867     175,508      316,762     37,096     3,433,233




A table showing the details of the above amounts per country where the apparent beneficiary
entities were located is attached in Annex XIV. The entities most awarded fellowship funds were
located in the following countries:

                                                                     Amount
                                                Country               (USD)
                                      Egypt                            976,610
                                      Syria                            802,544
                                      Poland                           251,153
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                           Nigeria               180,000
                                  18
                           Kenya                 144,511
                           Tanzania              102,331
                           Lesotho                99,079
                           Others                877.006
                                         Total 3,433,233

It is to be noted that final conclusions on whether collusion with organizations and
individuals in the various countries existed, cannot be drawn without the cooperation of the
national judiciary authorities where those entities are located.


The distribution of the above-mentioned total defrauded funds by nature of the training
expenditure is the following:


                                               Type              Amount (USD)
                                     Tuition                       2,236,533
                                     Stipend                         529,975
                                     Study Tours                     487,178
                                     Travel                           63,047
                                     Others                          116,500
                                                           Total   3,433,233


                                             Payment            Amount (USD)
                                     Cheques (152)                2,268,733
                                     Bank Transfers (42)          1,164,500
                                                                  3,433,233



     F.       The Specific Cases of Egypt, Syria, Poland, Kenya and Nigeria
In reference to Annex XV, during the period 29 September 1999 through 31 July 2003, the
payments to the five countries referenced in title account for a total amount of USD 2,354,818.
This amount represents 69% of the total amount discovered defrauded as of today.

In July 2003, C/IAIS inquired these four countries about the absence from WMO files of receipts
of some of the amounts paid to those countries. Three countries, Egypt, Kenya and Syria


18
     We still have doubts on an additional amount of USD 162,587 in bank transfers during the year 2000 to IMTR
     Kenya that we did not include in the total of the defrauded amounts. The verification of the validity of these
     transactions and bank transfers require the cooperation of the Judiciary Kenya Authorities.
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confirmed by fax receipt of the funds by cheque, cashed in Geneva through Mr. Hassan’s account
40487/2W BNP Paribas Geneva. Poland refused to reply.

However we had doubts on the authenticity of the fax received in the name of Mr. Imad Eddin
Al Beik, the PR of Syria with WMO, dated 25 July 2003. Not only his signature is completely
different from the one received on 15 October 2003, but also all the other elements of the letter
(e.g. font of letter, stationary, location of the signature within the letter, spacing, style) are
discrepant. We suspect that the fax received in the fax machine located in IAIS office was forged
and, most probably, by Mr. Hassan. We sought for clarification on this matter and we obtained
the confirmation, directly from Mr. Imad Eddin Al Beik, in his fax 10139 dated 28 October
2003, that indeed the fax IAIS received under his name, dated 25 July 2003, is forged.

We noticed that the replies received from Egypt, Syria, Poland and Kenya to letters sent by the
C/IAIS in August/September 2003 were practically the same: refusal to answer and unwillingness
to cooperate.

On 13 October 2003 it came to our knowledge that two of the 12-month Ad-hoc Class IV/III
training course in Meteorology at the RMTC in Cairo (1st March 2003 to 28 February 2004) and
at the School of Meteorology in the Syrian Meteorological Department in Damascus
(1st May 2003 to 30 April 2004), were not taking place as they should be.

On 13 October 2003 C/IAIS made unannounced enquiries through the telephone to both RMTC
Cairo and Syria and confirmed that the courses funded by WMO that should have been running at
the time in both places, simply did not exist. In a fax from the PR of Syria addressed to the
C/IAIS dated 15 October 2003, the PR of Syria confirmed the outcome of the telephone call and
also informed that since the year 2000 there were no courses funded by WMO. In his fax, the PR
of Syria, recently appointed in his position, showed his willingness to cooperate with the
investigation.


The forensic examination of the documentation supporting the transactions of the period 1
January 2000 through 31 July 2003 allowed observing patterns of corroborative evidence of
irregularities for the transactions with entities of these four countries. Examples of the results of
this examination follow:


      Egypt –USD 976,610
Invoices paid by WMO Finance Division are exactly the same as those found in the C:/drive of
Mr. Hassan’s computer. The invoices paid by Finance are forged.


        Kenya- USD 144,511
PR’s signatures posted on the back of four different cheques differ blatantly from each other; the
letter dated 10 June 2002, registered as incoming mail in WMO shows a photocopied signature
and no signs of having been faxed. The font and the style used in this letter are the same as the
ones used on the forged letters “addressed by the British Council” referred to above. The letter
dated 26 November 2002 has the same font and spacing style as those referred to for Egypt.


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       Poland – USD 251,153
Various features of letters and invoices like some signatures of Mr. Jan Zielinski, PR of Poland
with WMO and their location within the letters as well as the date, the addressee, etc (right in the
original and left in the forged) are forged. We have asked the son of Mr. Zielinski,
Mr. Ozga Zielinski, who was working with Mr. Hassan as a consultant within the Fellowship
Division, to identify the various signatures of his father and discrepancies were observed. The
font and stationary of the original letters and forged letters are completely different. The blue
color of the letterheads of the original and forged letters is completely different, besides other
features. The invoice dated 4 March 2002 has the same type, style, etc., as those of Syria and
Egypt. The invoice dated 5 July 2001 is different from that of 4 March and its style is similar to
the original letter dated 29 September 2003.

In connection with these enquiries by C/IAIS the PR of Poland sent a letter to the Secretary-
General dated 12 November 2003, which is attached in Annex XVI. IAIS verified the content of
the letter of the PR of Poland and could not find any trace or register of the letters and
correspondence connected with the training referred to by Mr. Zielinski in his letter.

It is to be noted that the specific files related to the meetings organized by the Institute of
Meteorology and Water Management, Poland, that should exist in ETR are missing. This
therefore does not allow us to examine the supporting documentation. In the absence of the
fundamental documents, we concluded that the payments made to Poland for which files are
missing do not meet the validation criteria. Mr. Bogdan Zielinski who was working in ETR until
31 December 2003, was also handling these files.


        Syria – USD 802,544
Invoices paid by Finance are exactly the same as those found in the C:/drive of Mr. Hassan’s
computer. The invoices paid by Finance are forged. On 28 October 2003 we addressed a fax to
the Director General of the Syrian Meteorological Department to enquire on the authenticity of a
specific invoice. Mr. Imad Eddin Al Beik, Director General, replied as follows: “Invoice
No. 23/03 has not been issued from our S.M.D. I would like also refer to the signature declaring
that it is not belonging to my predecessor Mr. Nafia ALShalabi saying at the same time that the
samples of these letters are not used by us”.




      Nigeria – USD 180,000.00
The Nigerian Meteorological Services Department appears as beneficiary of five cheques totaling
an amount of USD 180’000.00 dated back to the year 2000. According to Mr. Hassan,
Mr. Salahu and Mr. Boulama the training course did not take place.

On 9 September 2003, during an interview with C/IAIS, Mr. Hassan identified these five cheques
having been defrauded by him.



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At that time the Director of the Meteorology and the PR of Nigeria with WMO was Mr. Y. Salahu.
Mr. Salahu was appointed WMO Director for Africa on 22 April 2003.

To help clarify the matter we interviewed Mr. Salahu, in his capacity as WMO staff member, on
three different occasions: 18 September and 1st and 2nd October 2003.

Mr. Salahu declared that he only endorsed two out of five cheques. Mr. Salahu identified his
original signatures by observing the original cheques sent to WMO by the bank after the cheques
had been cashed to Mr. Hassan’s bank account. Copies of the front and back of the original
cheques presented to Mr. Salahu are attached to the record of the interview held on
2 October 2003. He affirms that the signatures posted on the endorsements of the other three
checks are forgeries of his signature. He also declared that he gave those cheques to Mr. Hassan
after endorsing them, and that he never received the money for them.

In his turn, Mr. Hassan declared in an interview held on 16 October 2003 that Mr. Salahu made
all the endorsements as well as the signing all of the receipts. To the question as to where the
money is, Mr. Hassan said he paid it to Mr. Salahu. He added that he accepted responsibility to
repay the money to WMO to help solve the problem.

Mr. Salahu referred to Mr. J. Adejokun as the person who conveyed his letter to Mr. Hassan. In
an interview held on 1st October 2003, Mr. J. Adejokun corroborated the fact but stated that he did
not read the letter and that he simply conveyed the letter to Mr. Hassan. Our observation of the
facts point to the strong possibility that three of the signatures posted in three of the cheques are
forged.

Mr. Boulama was also interviewed to help clarify the authenticity of a letter of confirmation of
the 20 participants for the course. We confronted Mr. Boulama with a copy of the document
found in the files regarding this course, for identification. Mr. Boulama stated that the document
is forged as well as his signature and that his style of writing, and the way he uses to
communicate internally has nothing to do with the document. We could never find the original of
the document in any of the filing systems (Accounting Unit, Mr. Pourkiani or ETR). The style of
the document, the font, the spacing, the layout, etc., seem to be a document prepared by
Mr. Hassan where he posted, by photocopying, the signature of Mr. Boulama.


         More recent developments – Syria and Egypt

Syria
The Syrian Meteorological Department has been cooperating with WMO to help clarify the
situation. On 28 October 2004 C/IAIS interviewed Mr. Kamil Ercheid, Director at the Syrian
Meteorological Department (see Annex XIII). During this interview Mr. Ercheid informed that
the former PR of Syria with WMO was in prison, and that since 1999 there have been no courses
supported by WMO and that it is strictly illegal for any Syrian Government organ to maintain a
bank account abroad.

On the other hand the Swiss Investigating Judge added reached findings relating to Mr. Shalabi
and the bank account with UBS in Geneva (see point VI A.4 above).


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The Secretary-General and the C/IAIS continue to pursue the cooperation with the Syrian
Meteorological Department and Authorities in view of a possible clarification of the
responsibilities in the misappropriation of WMO funds with the possible collusion between
Mr. Hassan and Mr. Shalabi. WMO also pursues future recovery of misappropriated funds.


Egypt
BADEA funded the course Climatology Technical Assistance held in 2002 in RMTC Cairo and
WMO was the intermediary agency. The accounts between BADEA and WMO are still open.
On 29 September 2004 BADEA addressed a letter to WMO Secretary-General claiming that
“Despite a series of contacts (faxes dated 23April 2003, 13 July 2003 and 28 December 2003),
BADEA has not yet received the final settlement of the accounts for this grant and substantiating
documents. We highly appreciate an immediate action”.

An amount of USD 45’000 regarding tuition fees of the above mentioned course are included in
the amounts defrauded. WMO drew a cheque in the name of EMA to pay for tuition fees. Mr.
Hassan cashed the cheque in his bank account with BNP Paribas in Geneva and the invoice
supporting the transaction recorded by WMO has been proved forged.

The Secretary-General requested IAIS to verify the information and data and help clarify the
situation. The three unforeseen interim investigation reports dealing with the results of this work
were released on 17 November 2004, 18 January 2005 and 7 March 2005 and concerned not only
BADEA course but also other transactions given the fact that the current PR of Egypt with WMO
has been cooperating with IAIS to help clarify the overall situation with EMA. Previous contacts
with EMA and the former PR, early in the investigation, in July and October 2003, were not
fruitful and the replies at that time were even misleading.

As a consequence of the last reply of EMA to our enquiries, the Secretary-General requested
C/IAIS to perform additional work, which will be carried out only after this report is released due
to severe time constraints and resources.

In the meantime the new appointed PR of Egypt, Mr. Mourah Shawky provided WMO with new
data that, after being analyzed and crosschecked with WMO records and documents, allowed for
some clarification and indication of additional fraudulent transactions and payments by WMO
back to 29 September 1999 totaling USD 381,000.

The Secretary-General and the C/IAIS continue to pursue the cooperation with the EMA in view
of possible clarification of the responsibilities in the misappropriation of WMO funds as well as
future recovery. C/IAIS recommended that no further payment to EMA should be made before
the situation is completely clarified.




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     G. Mr. Hassan: Confession, Escape and Forged Death Certificate

Brief Biography
Mr. Mohamed Elfatih Hassan was born on 9 March 1941 in Medani, Sudan. He joined WMO on
5 August 1972 as Technical Officer at P2 level. As from 1st March 1983 he was promoted to P3
as Scientific Officer and as from 1st June 1982 he was promoted to P4 still as Scientific Officer.
He was finally promoted as Chief Fellowships Division at P5 level on 1st April 1990. He was
maintained as Chief Fellowships Division until he was summary dismissed, effective date
1st November 2003. The WMO contribution to the pension fund and the health insurance were
stopped.

During his tenure of 31 years with WMO Mr. Hassan was granted a special leave without pay
from 1st July 1988 to 31 July 1989

The investigation started on 10 July 2003 and Mr. Hassan was suspended with pay pending
investigation effective date 21 July 2003. On 28 October 2003 he was suspended from duty,
without pay. He was summary dismissed, effective date 1st November 2003.

On 15 July 2003, Mr. Hassan transferred from his bank account with BNP Paribas in Geneva an
amount of USD 203,000 to his bank account in Egypt and USD 500,000 to his bank account in
Sudan (see point IV A.5).

On 4 November 2003 the Secretary-General decided to turn over the case to the Swiss Authorities.
On 9 November 2003, Mr. Hassan left Switzerland at around 13:00 pm taking a plane to Egypt
from the Geneva airport. The following WMO staff members (see point IV A.3) were in
telephone contact with Mr. Hassan between 7 November 2003, Friday(the day following the
deposit of the complaint with the Geneva Attorney General) and 9 November 2003, Sunday, the
day Mr. Hassan escaped to Egypt:

     o Mr. Bogdan Zielinski called from his home Mr. Hassan on 7 November 2003, Friday, at
       20:04:41 for 2 minutes16 seconds ; Mr. Hassan called Mr. Bogdan Zielinski home on 8
       November 2005, Saturday, at 10:02:19 for 14 minutes and 13 seconds.
     o Mr. Hassan called Mr. Degefu on 8 November 2003, Saturday, at 14:14:01 for 12 minutes
       and also on 9 November 2003, Sunday, at 12:21:49 for 6 minutes 42 seconds.
     o Mrs. Iwona Rummel-Bulska called from home Mr. Hassan on 9 November 2003 (see also
       point A.1 above for her phone call to the Greffier on 10 July 2003), Sunday, at 19:32:36
       for 15 seconds (the record of the call is a voice-mail message).

Mr. Hassan escaped to Egypt on 9 November 2003 by plain he took at Geneva airport at 13:53
pm, Egyptair flight to Cairo. Mr. Hassan has paid the on way ticket in cash at the last moment.

In the meantime C/IAIS obtained the information that Mr. Hassan had permanent residence both
in Egypt and Sudan where he and his wife have a great deal of private businesses. The
information on the addresses were conveyed to the Swiss Authorities in due time.

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On 7 April 2004 the UNDP office in Kartoum sent an e-mail message to an officer of WMO
Human Resources Division communicating that Mr. Hassan had passed away and that his wife
had approached UNDP concerning the pension fund. A scanned copy of a “death certificate” in
Arabic was attached to the messaged together with a scanned copy of a United Nations
“laissez-passer” bearing Mr. Hassan’s and his wife names.

On 27 May 2004 an envelop dispatched through DHL services coming from Sudan was received
in WMO with an “original” document that looked the same as the scanned copy of the death
certificate received by e-mail from the UNDP office two months before. Together with this
document there was a letter addressed to the WMO Secretary-General signed Alia Hassan (the
handwritten letter looked like Mr. Hassan’s handwriting) stating that Mr. Hassan had passed away
on 25 November 2003.

The Secretary-General requested the Swiss Authorities to verify the veracity of the “death
certificate” and on 12 November the Investigating Judge informed WMO that after the
investigation, the conclusion was that the document was forged.

On 17 March 2005 a Swiss private lawyer, Mrs. Susannah L. Maas, addressed a letter to the
Secretary-General informing that she was mandated to represent Mrs Alia Hassan. The lawyer
refers to the statements by WMO in some newspapers about the doubts around Mr. Hassan death
and requests WMO to inform her how WMO came to the conclusion that the death certificate is
forged and what is the situation about Mr. Hassan’s pension fund.


Interviews, Response and Confession
In an interview held on 16 October 2003, Mr. Hassan wrote a letter on “Confession of
misconduct” addressed to the Secretary-General, a copy of which is attached to Annex XVII. In
his confession statement, Mr. Hassan says: “I confirm my agreement to reimburse WMO the full
amount of each of the cheques listed in the Annex. This sum amounts USD 393’974, GBP
151’240 and CHF 33’582. If there are other doubtful cases from the four sets, I will be ready to
consider reimbursing them”.

The fact that Mr. Hassan collected and then deposited/cashed 152 cheques in his or his friends/
private business partners’ bank accounts, constitutes a fraudulent act. The fact that these acts
were repetitive and pursued for a long period of time constitutes a gross unlawful act of fraud.

On one hand, we have exhaustively examined in detail the documentation available in WMO files
related to 152 cheques handled by Mr. Hassan and amounting USD 1,739,368, GBP 316,762,
CHF 175,508 and EUR 37,096. On the other hand, we did not obtain any satisfactory
confirmation from the training institutions in their replies to our letters. This evidence leads to the
conclusion that these amounts were not used for the intended purposes, and were, therefore,
misappropriated and should be recovered.              We also obtained confirmation from the
Meteorological Department of the Syrian Arab Republic that ”since the year 2000 until 2003, we
have not received any trainee awarded by the WMO…” which leads to the conclusion that the
amount of USD 708,500 paid to this institution by means of bank transfer to a bank account with
UBS in Geneva was misappropriated and should be claimed for recovery.


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Moreover, Mr. Hassan has mishandled WMO cheques and misappropriated WMO funds by
misrepresenting, forging and concealing documents, which led to the potential loss for WMO of
at least USD 3’433’233.

We consider that, based on Mr. Hassan’s job description as C/FEL, it is of his primary
responsibility to refund WMO of the funds misappropriated. In his capacity of C/FEL he had
“Overall responsibility for all functions and work of the Fellowship Division”, including “to
approve payments in connection with fellowship implementation”. Mr. Hassan abused authority
by approving false training documents, and in particular invoices or documents for payment,
breaching the fiduciary obligations vis-à-vis WMO, and failed to comply with professional and
related ethical standards.


Mr. Hassan accepted to act upon request of fellows and PRs of countries to WMO according to
his own declarations in several occasions during the interviews. He failed to comply with Staff
Regulation 1.4 and paragraph 8 of the United Nations Standards of Conduct.

Mr. Hassan’s confession is not complete. He did admit to a smaller part of the offences
committed against WMO, but not to the major part of them. Mr. Hassan admitted to his
misconduct in mishandling the cheques by depositing them in his own bank accounts (see
Annex XVII and Annex XVII) as per interviews held on 9 September 2003 and 16 October 2003,
but not to the misappropriation of the funds by means of forgery and misrepresentation of
documents and abuse of power.

Mr. Hassan also confessed to “grave misconduct” for having engaged in private business not
related to his official WMO work (see Annex XVIII, interview held on 9 September 2003).

Mr. Mohamed Hassan was able to project the perception that he was very powerful and
therefore his requests and wishes should not be questioned. According to some staff members, he
used to suggest that he could influence staff members’ promotions (see Annex XIX for Mr. Saho
case and the current C/FEL) to those who did not wish to comply with his wishes regarding the
help on some of his external and unauthorized activities or any unusual activities (for example
asking the staff members to use their own private car to shuttle some PRs to or from the airport).
Also, when a staff questioned a fellowship-related transaction, he used to mention that he was
acting according to his prior agreement with the Secretary-General or state that he will report to
the Secretary-General of the “non-agreeable” responses to his requests.



    H.        The Outsiders Associated with Mr. Hassan’s Fraudulent Activities
Instances of probable collusion of some PRs with Mr. Hassan were found. However IAIS
findings require corroborative analysis and the access to information and people that are not
reachable by IAIS. In this regard, the judiciary authorities of the countries where these PRs
belong, could cooperate with the Swiss Judiciary Authorities.



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IAIS also found some evidence indicating that it is possible that Mr. Hassan was in possible
collusion with an officer at the BNP Paribas. The information was passed to the Swiss
Investigating Judge in due time and the results of his investigation in this regard are not yet
known.



    I.        The Assessment of the Conduct of some WMO Staff Members in
              connection with the Mechanisms and Motivations of the Fraud
The criteria upon which the facts of the conduct of the staff members was evaluated and
contextualized regarding what constitutes negligence, gross negligence and complicity are the
following:


Gross Negligence

According to report A/54/793 of the United Nations General Assembly dated 13 March 2000,
“what constitutes gross negligence in any particular instance is fact-specific and requires a
case-by-case review of the particular circumstances involved. Generally, “gross negligence”
has been defined in a legal opinion contained in the United Nations Juridical Yearbook as
“negligence of a very high degree involving willfulness, recklessness or drunkenness and, in
consequence, manifest disregard for the safety of life and property”.

In the present case the particular circumstances involved and the fact-specificity of those
circumstances, to conclude whether “gross negligence” has occurred or not, are presented in
point IV below.

In addition, in paragraph 4 of this same report, the United Nations Administrative Tribunal’s
definition of “gross negligence” is stated as follows: “Gross negligence involves an extreme and
reckless failure to act as a reasonable person with respect to a reasonably foreseeable risk. Thus,
to establish gross negligence, a far more aggravated failure to observe the “reasonable person”,
standard of care must be shown than in the case of ordinary negligence”.

More recently, the United Nations adopted an Administrative instruction (ST/AI/2004/3 dated
29 September 2004) on “Financial responsibility of staff members for gross negligence” where
“Gross Negligence” is defined as follows: “Is negligence of a very high degree involving an
extreme and willful or reckless failure to act as a reasonable person in applying or in failing to
apply the regulations and rules of the Organization”. Moreover, it also determines that
“disciplinary action and recovery action for financial losses shall be consolidated wherever
grounds exist to initiate both actions”.


Negligence and Complicity

From “The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary”, general accepted definitions of
“negligence” and “complicity” are given as:

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    • Negligence - “Lack of attention to what ought to be done; failure to take proper or
        necessary care of a thing or person; lack of necessary or reasonable care in doing
        something, carelessness”. In the present case negligence is the systematic lack of attention
        to the documents supporting fellowship transactions and acceptance of faxes and
        photocopies instead of originals, failure to comply with standing instructions, staff rules;
        non fulfillment of duties established in ones job description, such as adequate coordination,
        supervision and oversight.


     •    Complicity – “Partnership or involvement in wrongdoing”. In the present case,
          complicity, direct knowledge, facilitation and active participation in any of the actions
          connected with either the fraud or the misuse of the funds defrauded


      The case of Mr. Kaliba Konaré
Mr. Kaliba Konaré failed to fulfil the responsibilities entrusted to him by WMO through his job
description and acted, on many occasions, with disregard to WMO funds, putting them at risk,
and allowed and facilitated the fraudulent behavior of the C/FEL, Mr. Mohamed Hassan, who
misappropriated at least USD 883’600 under his direct supervision, from November 2002 until
31 July 2003.


      The case of Mr. Workeneh Degefu
Mr. Degefu failed to fulfill the responsibilities entrusted to him by WMO through his job
description and acted, on many occasions, with lascivious disregard to WMO funds and to
WMO’s public image. He allowed and facilitated the fraudulent behavior of C/FEL leading to
WMO losses of at least USD 1’743’773 during his tenure as DC/SSP, from November 2000
through September 2003. He is also the staff member who, together with Mr. Ah Kim Lee Choon,
was best positioned to prevent the fraud from happening. Please see Annex XXI for Mr.
Degefu’s response to the decision of the Secretary-General following the decision of the JDC.


       The case of Mr. Ah Kim Lee Choon
Mr. Ah Kim Lee Choon failed to fulfill the above-mentioned responsibilities entrusted to him by
WMO through his job description and acted, on many occasions, with manifest disregard to
WMO funds and discredit of the WMO image, putting them at risk, and facilitated the defrauding
of at least USD 3’000’000 during at least four years, a very long period of time.


      The case of Mr. Sobahssandra Chacowry
Mr. Chacowry admitted that the “staff contributions” were to fund some “social events” and that
the money was given to Mr. Hassan. According to the documents found in Mr. Hassan’s office
and computer, this money was spent to pay for the accommodation in Geneva of some PRs, to
pay for the cocktail party in Mr. Obasi’s house on 10 May 2003, to pay for the lunch “offered” by
Mr. Mhita (PR of Tanzania and President of Region Africa) to the PRs of the Africa Region and
so on. Mr. Chacowry voluntarily associated himself to the activities of Mr. Hassan, namely those
of exercising a political influence over some Permanent Representatives and Delegates of certain
countries, violating WMO Staff Regulations 1.1, 1.3, 1,4 and 1.8.

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      The case of Mrs. Iwona Rummel-Bulska
Mrs. Rummel-Bulska denied the evidence of the fact that she called, from her home on Sunday 9
November 2003, the private mobile of Mr. Hassan, the day Mr. Hassan escaped to Egypt
according to the records the investigating Judge provide to IAIS. She hided this fact from the
Secretary-General from the Investigating Judge and from C/IAIS. If proven that the purpose of
her telephone call to Mr. Hassan was to favour him, she seriously damaged WMO interests with
her conduct and misused her office by misusing privileged information regarding the evolvement
and timing of the judiciary procedures in favour of Mr. Hassan. In this case, Mrs. Rummel-
Bulska also violated Staff Regulations 1.5 and 1.6.


The overall conclusion is that the fraud was possible and lasted for at least four years, based on:

     1.    The actors
          Their shared motives: to secure the political support of some PRs.


          Mr. Hassan’s motives: funding of private businesses requiring large amounts of capital,
          together with his family’s money exigencies, could have been some of the additional
          underlying pressure factors motivating the fraud.


          The Opportunity:
           -      Mr. Hassan was a senior official within WMO, considered trustworthy and
           someone who abused his authority in such a way that he could contravene staff rules and
           standing instructions without adequate supervision.
           -      The subject had worked in WMO for more than 25 years and he very well knew
           the weaknesses of both the internal control system and the attitudes and personalities of
           some of the staff members who should have forced compliance with staff rules and
           standing instructions, but did not do so.

           -      C/FEL was about to retire. He should have retired on 31 December 2000, thus it is
           possible that he thought that he would not be caught before retiring.


          Lack of Integrity: Mr. Hassan perpetrated the fraud by taking advantage of his position,
          both internally by leveraging his perceived powerful position within WMO and
          associating with other staff, and externally by maneuvering his relationship with some
          Permanent Representatives with WMO and by abusing the authority entrusted to him by
          the management.

     2. Lack of a Code of Conduct and insufficient disciplinary framework

     3. Lack of adequate procedures and controls both within the Education and Training
        Department and the Finance Division.

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     4. Lack of due diligence within the Finance Division.

     5. Inadequate supervision over Mr. Hassan.

     4. Unclear borderlines related to the role, authority and responsibilities of the
        Permanent Representatives with WMO regarding the relationships with the subject, the
        Education and Training Department through Fellowship Division, the Finance Division
        and WMO Secretariat as a whole.




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V – The Overall Conclusions and Recommendations Arising from the
    Investigation
Following are the recommendations addressed to the Secretary-General throughout the
investigation:



        V.1.        Recommendations          First   Interim      Investigation       Report         –
                    6 August 2003
1- To consider the findings of fact and conclusions from the investigation in arriving, at your
   decision, as to whether misconduct occurred and what disciplinary measures, if any, to impose.

2- Any disciplinary action should be decided and implemented without prior obtaining adequate
   legal assurance and clearance from the Legal Adviser for all legal aspects and implications the
   case may raise, including the steps and actions prior to the present investigation as well as the
   steps forward regarding further investigation of the matter.

3- That adequate and timely legal advice and consideration has to be taken to evaluate as to
   whether Mr. Hassan’s conduct falls into civil legal responsibility so that it makes it possible to
   determine the actions to be developed that better protect WMO’s assets and image.

4- That the treasury position and function be created, as soon as it is possible, within Finance
   Department implementing a longstanding recommendation of the External Auditor, so that
   only this person is authorized to physically effect all payments and receipts under the
   responsibility of the Chief Finance Division. No other officer in WMO should be allowed to
   physically process payments or receipts on behalf of WMO.

5- That payments by cheque be eliminated, or reduced to the minimum possible, and priority is
   given to bank transfers, from a WMO bank account to the beneficiary bank account, and in
   case a bank transfer is not possible use the UNDP network facilities.

6- To consider that the present investigation has not dealt with and therefore does not cover
   relevant matters such as: potential misappropriation of the WMO funds; potential involvement
   and responsibilities of other staff members and third parties; amounts of WMO’s potential
   financial losses, liabilities and recover.

      These matters warrant detailed and deep investigation that should proceed after this first
      phase of the investigation process is complete, i.e., as soon as the following steps are
      complete:
      -Determination of the period that has to be covered in the analysis regarding collection of
      accounting records and support documentation that will allow determining with more
      precision the amounts involved. This work is in course but takes long time as Finance
      Division struggles with lack of resources;

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      -Evaluation by a legal expert counselor of all legal aspects and implications surrounding this
      case;
      -Establishment of Official contacts with banks, Meteorological Services, Governments,
      administrative and legal authorities and individuals so that the investigation of some aspects
      or situations where there were active involvement of third parties, can be carried out with
      their cooperation.

7- To consider that extra financial resources will be required to acquire external expert resources
   in the following areas: forensic analysis of relevant documentation, restore of e-mail of
   Mr. Hassan, travel, Arabic translation. These services are required in case the investigation
   continues so that the accuracy and the quality of the results of the investigation can be
   protected.

8- If determined that misconduct was committed already, to consider appropriate actions with
   respect to Mr. Hassan continuing to be under WMO jurisdiction for further investigation and
   he reimburses WMO of the amounts he spent on his private calls.

9- If the decision is to continue the investigation regarding the matters indicated in point 6 above,
   all the files and materials stationed in Mr. Hassan’s office should be kept under WMO
   jurisdiction and IAIS restrict access and control.



         V.2.      Recommendations              Second        Interim         Investigation          Report          –
                   4 November 2003

1- To consider the findings of fact and conclusions from the investigation and initiate the
   machinery to impose disciplinary measures upon Mr. Mohamed E. Hassan. In doing so, the
   following aspects should be considered:
     •    That this is a matter of urgency considering that the staff member enjoys diplomatic status,
          his contract expires on 31 December 2003 and he is in the process to retire;
     •    That the staff member did not give WMO a complete confession of the offenses he
          committed;
     •    That the offenses Mr. Hassan committed against WMO are of criminal nature and have
          been repeated for an extended length of time;
     •    That the loss inflicted to WMO is substantial in kind (misuse of staff, premises, equipment,
          official position for personal and private business) and money (potential best approximate
          total loss known as of today is around USD 2’998’778,0019);
     •    That the misconduct of Mr. Hassan also may have a negative impact in the public image
          of WMO;

19
     This total amount was calculated considering the UN exchange rates for October 2003 and it is represented by:
     • Total (set 1, 2, 3 and 4 of cheques endorsed) – USD 2’197’778,83;
     • Bank transfers to UBS Geneva – USD 792’000,00.
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     •    That disciplinary measures should be compatible with the gravity of the offenses
          committed and should be perceived by WMO staff in general, as exemplary;
     •    That the disciplinary measures imposed should also be compatible to those imposed in
          other similar cases within the United Nations System.

2- To consider addressing immediately the matter of recovery of the loss by exploring and
   evaluating all possibilities, including the recourse to the Swiss judiciary authorities,
   implementing measures that adequately and timely assure that WMO is in the position to
   legally freeze all the assets of Mr. Mohamed E. Hassan (bank accounts, properties, pension
   fund20) and recover as soon as possible so that no further financial prejudices to WMO occur.

3- To acquire adequate and timely specialized legal advice regarding the preparation of all
   materials and legal documents necessary to implement Recommendation 2 above.

4- To bear in mind that the present report has not dealt with and therefore does not cover relevant
   matters such as: potential involvement and responsibilities of other staff members and third
   parties, corrective measures regarding the internal control system supporting the operations in
   the Education and Training Department as well as the Finance Division. The report with the
   recommendation of corrective measures regarding the internal control system supporting the
   operations in the Education and Training Department as well as the Finance Division will be
   submitted soon after the present report, and hopefully within a timeframe of two weeks.

5- If it is decided that the investigation should continue, relative to potential involvement and
   responsibilities of other staff members, a specific mandate would be desirable and addressed
   to the C/IAIS with copy to the Departments and Divisions concerned.

6- To consider be taking measures with immediate effect to stop the placement of fellows in
   Egypt, Kenya, Poland and Syria until the situation be clarified and all the ongoing training
   activities be ascertained and revised.



         V.3.      Recommendations              Third        Interim         Investigation          Report         –
                   4 February 2004

The Environment

                            The subject’s positioning within WMO
      1: Staff in general should be encouraged and reassured not to be fearful to report to
management any behavior, which is noncompliant with staff rules and the code of conduct of civil
servants. A “hot line” should be created within the Internal Audit and Investigation Service for
this purpose.

20
     An expert on legal issues would find out if in case a staff member is dismissed he still would have right to the
     separation grant).
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                       Unclear borderlines between roles of staff and PRs
      2: Staff should be assured by management that the rules and regulations in force are to be
applied at any time without exception. Staff should be reminded that it is not proper to receive
instructions from Member States or its Representatives according to the code of conduct of civil
servants. Whenever an exceptional circumstance arises, staff should address the request in
writing to their supervisors to inform on the matter.

      3: WMO Secretariat should maintain an up to date master file with original notifications of
each and every Permanent Representative (PR) with WMO showing the original specimen of the
signature of the officially designated PR. A copy of this notification should be made available
and maintained up to date in the Resource Management Department as well as any other
Department requiring the dealing with authorities and PR’s responsibilities.

     4: Each time a Permanent Representative is designated by his/her government, the
government should be invited to communicate officially to WMO the powers vested in their
permanent representatives and, in particular those powers required dealing with financial matters.
This could be done taking into due consideration the guidelines of Chapter 2, point 2.4.3 Role of
Permanent Representatives, Role at International Level contained in the “Reference Guide for
Permanent Representatives of members with WMO on Relevant Procedures and Practices of the
Organization”, WMO No. 939, 2002 edition.


                              Misleading communication practices
       5: Clarify within WMO the channels of communication regarding financial matters. In
principal, general administrative matters are dealt with by the services of the institutions and not
by the persons who are heading them. It is advisable to treat administrative matters between
institutions, based on communications from institution to institution and not, as personal matters,
from person to person. In this regard, the information of the identification number and address of
bank accounts to which national authorities of Members request WMO to send the funds should
be indicated officially to WMO by the competent authorities of Members. The original of this
communication would be kept in the Master File mentioned in Recommendation 3.


     6: Due consideration should be given to the revision of the contents of the “Reference Guide
for Permanent Representatives” by the legislative bodies of WMO, who could study the
possibility of adopting Chapter 2 – Designation and Role of the Permanent Representatives - as an
appropriate legislative text to be incorporated within WMO Constitution or in the General
Regulations.


Within the Education and training Department

                       Lack of supervision and segregation of duties
      7: Revise C/FEL job description in the light of the redesign of the process of awarding
fellowships (see recommendation No 11 below). The decision making power should be vested in
an Awarding Fellowship Committee.          The responsibility of close monitoring of the

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implementation of the funded training activities would remain vested in C/FEL. D/ETR would
supervise closely C/FEL and monitor all funded activities of the Department.

                    Operations supported on invalid and falsified documents
      8: WMO should accept only originals of requests duly signed by the officially authorized
persons. To facilitate and speed up the analysis of the requests, and only exceptionally, ETR
launches the internal process by considering a document transmitted by fax, but the conclusion of
the transaction will be pending until the receipt in good order of the original documents.

     9: Only requests addressed to the SG should be accepted by the Registry Unit. All
incoming requests should be sequentially numbered and the data input immediately in the
database.

      WMO/ETR should acknowledge receipt of each and every request by a returned official
standard mail. In this communication, the reference number attributed electronically and
sequentially by the database to each of the incoming Fellowship Nomination Forms should be
communicated as the reference number for all the subsequent communications and documents
(internally and externally).

       10: In order to improve budgetary management, traceability of the process and the use of
staff time, ETR could define the schedules and deadlines for receiving and processing requests for
funding training activities, and inform Member countries thereon by means of a circular letter. If
requests could be received according to pre-determined specific schedules, e.g. four times a year,
there would be four cycles of processing requests for funding training activities, and more
specifically fellowships.

      11: Submission of Fellowship Nomination Forms should be compulsory. A request should
not be accepted for processing if these forms are not attached to it.


                       Inefficient process of approval of “Budget Requests”
        12: Redesign the decision-making process regarding awarding of fellowships.
     A Fellowship Award internal Board or Committee could be created for this purpose. The
main role and responsibility of this Committee would be to produce a recommendation to the
Secretary-General on the awarding of the funds allocated to the Fellowship Programme.
      The Committee would be composed of three members at least (D/ETR, a representative of
one technical department concerning the scientific area of the training in question and the
representative of Strategic Planning, whose role would be to bring consistency and alignment with
the organization strategic objectives for the fellowship programme).

     For the Committee to work properly and efficiently, the preparation of all documentation
and prior analysis should be assured both by FEL and FIN.

      The Committee would meet, for instance at least four times a year (see above the proposal
for submission of requests cycles), and would have to be provided with: a summary table of the
request numbers, the candidates for the training programs, placements, cost estimates (total and
WMO shared), schedules for implementation and the reference to the activity plan of the budget.
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At this stage if funds are available for reimbursement, the budget office could register a
commitment for disbursement pending the approval of the Secretary-General of the
recommendation of the Committee.

        There are two different aspects that concern the financial activities of this process:
             •    The verification of the previous plan of activities (objectives underlying the budget).
                  This is to be managed by the ETR Department, within a decentralized budget
                  implementation system, as it concerns implementation of programme activities;
             •    The availability of liquidity, funds for disbursement - a short-term budget control
                  responsibility. This is to be verified by the Budget function, as it is a budgetary
                  function.

      The “Budget Request” form as it stands today should be redesigned according to the
requirements of the new process.


                              Deficient and inaccurate filling system
     13: Make a single staff member responsible and accountable for the filing system. Maintain
a master file for each single action containing all the relevant documents and communications of
each and every fellow. This master file should be available to the work of the Fellowship
Awarding Committee.


                                Deficient use of fellowship database
      14: Discontinue the use of the current Fellowship Database as of 31 December 2003.
Maintain the historic data on backups and make it available for consultation and future reference
only. Restart the input of data as from 1 January 2004, and take this opportunity to revisit the
structure of information and determine whether it corresponds to the requirements of the
operations as well as reporting and introduce the changes required. Use the database to produce
the statistics of requests received and requests satisfied as well as a cross reference and control
system to the accounting records.


                         Non-existent monitoring and follow-up system
      15: Monitoring and follow-up of training activities funded by WMO should include the
following actions: direct contacts with fellows; unannounced visits to training institutions while
training is underway; reports from students sent directly to WMO.



Within the Finance Division and Resources Management Department

                   Inadequate and illegal accounting support documentation
      16: FIN should only be accepting original documents for processing receipts and payments
as well as accounting records. This requirement is generally and legally accepted and usually
there is no need to state it clearly in standing instructions. However, within the current context
and taking into consideration the past practice in WMO, it would be appropriate to communicate

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this requirement both internally to all staff members and externally to National Meteorological
Services and all training institutions benefiting from WMO funds.


                          Violation of internal rules and regulations
     17: Standing instructions should be revised to include specific regulations to govern
awarding of fellowship and funding of training activities.


                             Unauthorized practices and procedures
      18: FIN should make sure that only authorized personnel submit requests for funds or
approves payments. On doing so, it should return back to the sender any document being signed
with at least one unauthorized signature.


               Lack of due diligence putting WMO at risk (finance and reputation)
      19: The current level of risk attached to the financial matters could be drastically reduced
through clear communication of its members to WMO Secretariat of the best channels and means
to address the weaknesses point out above. In this regard see also Recommendation 3 above.


                           Unsatisfactory segregation of duties within FIN
       20: The function of treasury should be created and should function independently from the
accounting division as already recommended in the first report dated 6 August 2003, having at
least the following duties:
       -Determining daily cash position
       -Investing excess cash with major banks
       -Executing payments including wire transfers
       -Ensuring that payments reach the correct beneficiaries
       -Dispatching correspondence in connection with treasury transactions
       -Acknowledging of receipts
       -Monitoring and keeping updated with money market and general economic conditions
       -Cash planning and forecasting
       -Ongoing bank reporting and transaction/account reconcilement
       -Assisting with maintaining and managing banking relationships
       -Preparing multiple treasury reports for Treasury and Finance management
       -Assisting with liquidity management efforts
       -Ensuring bank transactions are properly done, recorded and reconciled to bank records
       -Ensuring that accounting has proper documentation (originals) to record transactions
       -Assisting with the execution, the administration and the reporting of foreign currency
       transactions
       -Ensuring that the responsibilities of the position are carried out in accordance with the
       WMO’s regulations and standing instructions, operating and performance standards, and
       ethical and professional values, paying special attention to the fiduciary responsibility and
       accountability of the position.
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      21: WMO should introduce the rule of procedure to establish that one of the two signatories
obliging WMO with its banks must be that of an officer that does not work in the Finance
Division. As soon as this rule is implemented internally, it should be communicated to each and
every bank with which WMO does business.


                                   Deficient filling system
      22: A master file under FIN responsibility and control containing the original accounting
vouchers should also contain the originals of the transactions supporting documents (receipts,
invoices, budget requests, etc). Only in this way the accuracy and completeness of the filing
system within FIN can be assured.



        V.4.       Recommendations Fourth           Interim      Investigation       Report         –
                   19 November 2004
     1- To assess the gravity of the facts herewith reported for each of the staff members and
decide if their conduct should be sanctioned through the disciplinary measures and/or if their
conduct should be object of further investigation by the Swiss judiciary authorities.

     2- To consider obtaining specialized legal clearance for all the implications of the
conclusions herewith presented. In particular legal clearance should be obtained for the
preparation of the letters of allegation and to make sure that all the legal and administrative
procedures are compliant with the Staff Regulations and any other applicable laws.

      3- To evaluate and consider recovering, either partially or in full, from the gross negligent
staff members the financial losses inflicted to WMO in the line of the United Nations policies and
practices.

      4- To transmit immediately to the “Juge d’instruction” the present report as well as all the
new documents and information specifically collected during this fourth phase of the internal
investigation, in the line of WMO’s commitment of full cooperation with the investigation of the
judiciary Swiss authorities.



    V.5. Recommendations 5th, 6th and 8th Unforeseen Interim Reports – Egypt
      1-       To send, as soon as possible, a letter to EMA requesting the data and information
related to the waiver of tuition fees during the year 2002 according to EMA’s letter dated
31 December 2001. Namely, WMO should ask for the following: name of the courses held by
RMTC Cairo for which tuition fees were waived, timeframe, identification of WMO fellows
attending those courses. WMO should not pass any information or data to EMA, but rather
should request and get from EMA all the information and documentation necessary to clarify the
situation.

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      2-      To request the Swiss Authorities to verify the authenticity of the signatures posted
in the endorsements of the WMO cheques drawn on EMA’s name as well as the invoices and
other documentation connected with the transactions under dispute.

     3-       To disclose in WMO Balance Sheet, the amounts under investigation and dispute
regarding both BADEA and EMA, by creating specific debtors accounts for this purpose and,
prepare an explanatory note to the accounts.

      4-      To not effect any payment to both BADEA and EMA until the situation is clarified
and a reasonable level of assurance regarding protection of WMO assets and image is obtained.

      5-        To consult the judge before taking any decision or otherwise obtain specialized
legal advice to follow up closely the evolvement of the situation and help resolve the matter in the
best interest of WMO.

      6-       In the light of the above-mentioned facts and the evidence currently available, I am
of the opinion that tuition fees are not due and therefore should not be paid by BADEA to EMA.
WMO is intermediary in the process, with limited effective means to verify the accuracy and
validity of the information provided by EMA. In this regard, I would suggest that the WMO
Secretary-General addresses a letter to the Egyptian Financial Authority requesting clarification
and confirmation of EMA’s claim of the tuition fees.

      7-      In any case and independently of the near future developments, to improve
safeguarding of the interests of WMO member states, WMO should not accept to pay the tuition
fees to EMA until the case is not resolved by the Swiss Authorities.

    8-     To take all the necessary steps to clarify the validity of all the payments WMO
made to EMA during the period 2000-2003 before making any further payment to EMA and
BADEA.

      9-      To transmit this memorandum to Judge M. Tapollet, who is investigating the case
of Mr. Hassan, as well as any further relevant information to be supplied to WMO by EMA in the
near future.

      10-     To request the Swiss Authorities to investigate with the BNP Paribas in Geneva
and any other relevant entities to find out who are behind the endorsements of these cheques as
well as what purpose the money, deposited in Mr. Hassan’s BNP Paribas account, was used and
to whom payments were made trough this bank account.



    V.6. Recommendations 9th Interim Investigation Report - 12 April 2005
     1- To assess the gravity of the facts herewith reported for Mr. Chacowry and decide if his
        conduct should be sanctioned through the disciplinary measures and/or if his conduct
        should be object of further investigation by the Swiss judiciary authorities.


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    2- To continue to investigate the facts connected with Mrs. Iwona Rummel-Bulska telephone
        calls to Mr. Hassan with the help of the Swiss Judge, also requesting her active
        cooperation, until the situation is clarified. Until the clarification is not effective, Mrs.
        Rummel-Bulska should continue to be kept aside of dealing with the legal matters arising
        from this investigation.

     3- To consider obtaining specialized legal clearance for all the implications of the
        conclusions herewith presented. In particular legal clearance should be obtained for the
        preparation of the letters of allegation and to make sure that all the legal and
        administrative procedures are compliant with the Staff Regulations and any other
        applicable laws.

     4- To consider informing the governments, one by one, of the countries of those Permanent
        Representatives that associated with Mr. Hassan and other WMO staff to defraud WMO
        about the specific facts related to their countries, and request their cooperation on possible
        recovery of the defrauded funds.

     5- To immediately transmit to the “Juge d’instruction” the present report as well as all the
        new documents and information specifically collected during this phase of the internal
        investigation, in the line of WMO’s commitment of full cooperation with the investigation
        of the Swiss judiciary authorities.




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VI - The Internal Disciplinary Process and Recovery
On 22 December 2004 the Secretary-General appointed the JDC, following the release of the
4th Interim Investigation Report dated 19 November 2004.

On 6 January 2005 the Secretary-General addressed a letter with charges for disciplinary
procedure to Mr. Degefu, Mr. Konaré and Mr. Lee Choon.

On 21 January 2005 the Secretary of the Joint Disciplinary Committee, Mrs Desiree Khoury,
addressed three memorandums to C/IAIS with the following content:

      •    “Please find attached the response of Mr…to the charge made against him including the
           following annexes…”;
      •    “You are kindly requested to provide your response to this submission, in writing, to the
           JDC by Friday 28 January, 12 a.m., at the latest”.

On 28 January 2005 C/IAIS conveyed the draft of the report “comment to the responses of Mr.
Kaliba Konare, Mr. Workeneh Degefu and Mr. Ahkim Lee choon to the Secretary-General’s
letter of allegations addressed to these staff members dated 6 January 2005” to the Secretary of
the JDC.

On 10 February 2005, after editing work, the final version was released.

The report contained four recommendations addressed to the Chairman of the JDC, as follows:

     1- To consider obtaining specialized legal advice to support the Internal Audit and
        Investigation Service on the proceedings related to the functioning of the Disciplinary
        Committee as well as any other relevant legal issues arising from both the internal and the
        judiciary investigation;
     2- To immediately transmit to the “Juge d’instruction” this memorandum as complementary
        information to IAIS’ report on the “Responsibilities of other staff members within the
        WMO Secretariat” in connection with the investigation of “Handling of WMO Cheques
        by C/FEL” in the line of WMO full and continuous cooperation with the Swiss
        Authorities;
     3- To take into consideration that the facts reported trough IAIS report” Responsibilities of
        Other Staff Members Within WMO Secretariat” in connection with the investigation of
        “Handling WMO cheques by C/FEL” are a result of all the investigative work being
        carried out since 10 July 2003 as at today. Thus, the detailed facts brought to light through
        the previous three interim investigation reports dated 6 August 2003, 19 October 2003 and
        6 February 2004 should be considered for the evaluation of the conduct of the staff
        members involved in the matter;
     4- Finally, I noticed that the results of the interviews, included in the IAIS-report as
        Annexes III, IV, V and XXI, of about 30 staff members were not given to the three staff
        members, which are currently alleged of misconduct and have had responsibilities in the
        matter. It is recommended that the Disciplinary Committee take into consideration the
        content of those testimonies while assessing the disciplinary cases.

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Recovery of the amounts defrauded should be pursued, at first from Mr. Hassan and also from
gross negligent staff as well as certain PR acting in their personal capacity. As to the loss
inflicted by the latter to WMO, the recovery of certain amounts could be pursued through
diplomatic channels and negotiations.



VII – Final Remarks and Recommendations
This investigation was initially planned to develop through five phases, i.e.: preliminary
investigation, forensic analysis of the expenditure of the period 1 January 2000 through
31 July 2003, operational audit of the internal control of the fellowship operations (including the
financial procedures); investigation of the involvement and responsibilities of other staff members,
closure of the investigation.

The Internal Audit Plan 2004 approved by the Secretary-General on 24 May 2004 indicated that
the closure of the investigation should ideally be effective by the end of October 2004. The
internal investigative work has been closed on 31 March 2005.

The deviations from the plans are due to the following main facts:
   1. C/IAIS was the only professional staff member assuring the investigation;
   2. During 2004 C/IAIS had some periods of time without any type of administrative
      assistance. The first attempt of internal recruitment failed and the process had to be re-
      launched. Temporary solutions were made available, but which could not provide
      continuity;
   3. C/IAIS has had to assure other activities of the Audit function not related to the
      investigation (e.g. contribution to the preparation of the Action Plan, support management
      on other activities, recruiting staff, reporting to the Audit Committee and the WMO
      Bureau etc.);
   4. Unforeseen events connected with some aspects of the investigation drastically increasing
      the investigative work with the inevitable change of schedules: BADEA and Egypt cases,
      work done in the context of the JDC.

The forensic analysis of the expenditure covered the period 2000-31 July 2003. The LVI Council
provided guidance to the Secretary-General and the C/IAIS not to focus the efforts of the
investigation on continuing the retrospective analysis prior to the year 2000, but rather
considering a high priority the investigation of potential involvement and responsibilities of other
staff members still employed at WMO Secretariat.

The forensic analysis performed led to a total discovered defrauded amount to approximately
USD 3,450,000 (see point IV E). As the retrospective analysis was not pursued, it is not possible
to conclude when the fraud could have started and the total magnitude of the fraud. Some
documentation found in Mr. Hassan’s office indicates that the fraudulent activities probably
started before 1999.

IAIS did not interview the former Secretary-General to the extent that C/IAIS was subordinate to
his authority until 31 December 2003, thus, in this specific case the condition of having the
necessary independence required for both the Secretary-General and the C/IAIS was not satisfied.
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At present the independence condition is re-established and C/IAIS could eventually interview
him if the Secretary-General and the Executive Council consider it necessary also by concerns of
fairness and completeness on the search of the truth.



        Final Recommendations
     1. To convey the present Final Report to the “Juge d’instruction”, in the line of WMO’s
        commitment, of full cooperation with the investigation of the judiciary Swiss authorities.

     2. To evaluate the opportunity to change staff regulations to include a clause to make it
        compulsory that staff members who are candidates to positions scrutinized through
        elections would have to suspend their functions in the WMO Secretariat during a
        reasonable period of time before the election takes place.

     3. To explore all the possible means to recover the defrauded funds from Mr. Hassan, from
        gross negligent staff members and from outsiders that collide with Mr. Hassan.

     4. To consider adopting a policy on rotation of some management positions.

     5. To anticipate and plan an external and internal communication policy on the results of the
        investigation as well as measures taken then on, in order to give coherency to the message
        and to safeguard the image and the reputation of WMO.




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FINAL REPORT
ANNEXES
______________________________________________________________________________


I                    List of Persons Interviewed
II                   Organizational Chart
III                  Mission Report to Vienna
IV                   Mission Report to New York
V                    Articles in the New York Times and Fox News
VI                   List of Telephone Calls between Mr. Hassan & Some WMO Staff
                     Members between 7 July and 10 November 2003
VII                  List of Conversations of Mr. Hassan around interviews with C/IAIS
                     and as from 4 November 2003 through 10 November 2003
VIII                 Tables of Signatories’ Authorizations of Cheques and Bank Transfers
IX                   Response Prof. Obasi to IAIS’ 3rd Interim Investigation Report
X                    Statement of Accounts of “Staff Contributions”
XI                   Chart on the Flow of Information and Insight in Relationships in
                     Connection with the Motivations of the Fraud
XII                  Recent News on the Conduct of Mr. Mukolwe
XIII                 Interview with Mr. Kamil Ercheid dated 28 October 2004
XIV                  All Endorsed Cheques and Bank Transfers by Country
XV                   All Endorsed Cheques and Bank Transfers of Egypt, Syria, Poland,
                     Nigeria and Kenya by Year
XVI                  Letter of the PR of Poland to the Secretary-General dated
                     12 November 2003
XVII                 Interviews with Mr. Hassan and Mr. Hassan’s Confession dated
                     2 October 2003 and 16 October 2003
XVIII                Interviews with Mr. Hassan on 20 August 2003 and 9 September 2003
XIX                  Influence of Mr. Hassan in the Case of the Promotion of Mr. Saho
XX                   Chronological Events Connected with the Investigation




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FINAL REPORT
ACRONYMS
AA/ASG                                       Administrative Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General
AA/DSG                                       Administrative Assistant to the Deputy Secretary-General
AA/DSPLA                                     Administrative Assistant to the Director Strategic Planning
AA/ETR                                       Administrative Assistant in Education and Training Department
AD/REM                                       Acting Director, Resource Management Division
AD/WWW-A                                     Acting Director, World Weather Watch – Applications Department
ASG                                          Assistant Secretary-General
BADEA                                        Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
BNP                                          Banque National de Paris
C/BO                                         Budget Office
CF                                           Call Forwarding
C/FEL                                        Chief, Fellowships Division
C/FIN                                        Chief, Finance Division
C/RGA                                        Chief, Registry and Archives Unit
CHF                                          Swiss Franc
C/IAIS                                       Chief, Internal Audit and Investigation Services
D/CER                                        Director, Cabinet and External Relations
D/REM                                        Director, Resource Management Department
DC/SSP                                       Director Coordinator Support to Scientific Programmes
DC/STP                                       Director Coordinator Scientific and Technical Programmes
D/EXR                                        Director, External Relations
D/RAF                                        Director, Regional Office for Africa
D/RAM                                        Director, Regional Office for the Americas
D/RAP                                        Director, Regional Office for Asia and the South-West Pacific
DSG                                          Deputy Secretary-General
D/TCO                                        Director, Technical Co-operation Department
EC                                           Executive Council
EMA                                          Egyptian Meteorological Authority
ETR                                          Education and Training Department
EUR                                          Euro
EXR                                          External Relations Office
FEL                                          Fellowships Division
FIN                                          Finance Division
GBP                                          Great Britain Pound
IAIS                                         Internal Audit and Investigation Services
IMTR                                         Institute for Meteorological Training and Research
JDC                                          Joint Disciplinary Committee
MO                                           Mobile Originating
MT                                           Mobile Terminating
NMHS                                         National Meteorological and Hydrological Services
PM                                           Programme Manager
PR                                           Permanent Representative
RCF                                          Roaming Call Forwarding
REM                                          Resource Management Department
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RMTC                          Regional Meteorological Training Centre
SAR                           Syrian Arab Republic
SBO                           Senior Budget Officer
SG                            Secretary-General
SLA                           Senior Legal Adviser
SPLA                          Strategic Planning
SAR                           Syrian Arabic Republic
TCO                           Technical Co-operation Department
UBS                           Union Bank of Switzerland
UN                            United Nations
UNDP                          United Nations Development Programme
USD                           United States Dollar
VCP                           Voluntary Co-operation Programme
WMO                           World Meteorological Organization




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