Iraqi ForceDevelopment A Progress Report by veb95503

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									Center for Strategic and International Studies
     Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
      1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006
         Phone: 1 (202) 775-3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457-8746
                  Web: http://www.csis.org/burke




Iraqi Force Development:
   A Progress Report

              Working Draft




           Anthony Cordesman
  Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

With the assistance of Samantha Lomeli


                    August 23, 2007
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Executive Summary
Iraqi force development is only one aspect of a successful effort to bring security and
stability to Iraq. If Iraq is to avoid split-up and full-blown civil war, it must do far more
than create effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). No effort can succeed without an
integrated strategy to forge a lasting political compromise between its key factions: Arab-
Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurd – while protecting other minorities. Political conciliation
must also address such critical issues as federalism and the relative powers of the central
and regional governments, the role of religion in politics and law, control over petroleum
resources and export revenues, the definition of human rights, and a host of other issues.
There are also major risks in any effort to deal with Iraq’s present problems. It is all too
possible that neither US nor Iraqi government plans may dominate Iraq’s future. The
current combination of insurgency, Sunni Arab versus Shi’ite Arab sectarian conflict, and
Arab versus Kurdish ethnic conflict could easily cause the collapse of the current political
structure, leading to a Shi’ite or Shi’ite-Kurdish dominated government, with strong local
centers of power, and an ongoing fight with Iraq’s Sunnis. It could escalate to the break
up of the country, far more serious ethnic and sectarian conflict, or violent paralysis. It
has already led to widespread ethnic cleansing in urban areas by militias and death squads
of all three major ethnic and religious groups.
Nevertheless, the creation of effective Iraqi Security Forces remains a key to putting an
end to Iraqi violence, terrorism, and civil conflicts. It is the only lasting answer to giving
the central government the tools it needs to contain and defeat the Sunni insurgency and
Shi’ite militias. It is also the key to an orderly reduction in US and Coalition forces, and
to ensuring that local security forces bring security rather than support sectarian and
ethnic cleansing.
The Need for Realism
Success depends on realism and resources. Overly optimistic conceptions of ISF
development already have done much to breed a climate of distrust and fuel the pressure
to withdraw. There is also a serious risk that both the US and Iraq will rely on false
optimism and illusions for very different political reasons. The US increasingly wants
out; the Iraqi government increasingly wants the US presence altered and reduced to
support its own internal political objectives.
This has already led to fundamentally false time scales for action, unrealistic
expectations, and growing pressure for withdrawal when impossible promises are not
kept. For example, Gen. Casey speculated in August 2006 about Iraqi forces achieving
self-sufficiency within 18 months, while staying committed to event-driven US force
reductions:
     “I don’t have a date, but I can see over the next 12 to 18 months the Iraqi security forces progressing
     to a point where they can take on the security responsibilities for the country with very little
     coalition support. (…) The future coalition presence, 12 to 18 months from now, is going to be
     decided by the Iraqi government”1
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In September 2006, President Talibani suggested a similar schedule, saying that the Iraqi
Army would be ready to face its challenges on its own “within two years”.2 Two months
after the original statement, Casey said at the end of October that 2006 it would be
“another 12 to 18 months or so till, I believe, the Iraqi security forces are completely
capable of taking over responsibility for their own security, still probably with some level
of support from us (…).”3
On January 18, 2007, Prime minister Nouri al-Maliki stated that the need for American
troops would “dramatically go down” in 3 to 6 months if the United States accelerated
the process of equipping and arming Iraq’s security forces.4 On January 19, 2007,
General Casey even suggested that US troops could begin withdrawing by “late summer”
[2007].5 These sunny predictions were made despite the constantly increasing levels of
violence.
However, both Iraqi and US officials had become more pessimistic by the spring of 2007.
By May, Iraqi national security adviser Mowaffak al Rubaie acknowledged that “to be
able to defend Iraq cannot be done overnight, or in months. It will take decades to build
an air force and to build a navy.”6 He criticized American policymakers for establishing
unrealistic, abbreviated deadlines, and declared that “people are trying to fit or to sync the
Iraqi clock to the Washington clock,” when in fact, “we need to sync the Washington
clock to the Baghdad clock.”7
Top American military officials agreed the proposed deadlines were unrealistic.
According to Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, senior American ground commander in Iraq,
the summer deadline for ISF autonomy was not feasible. He speculated that it would take
until at least fall to establish security, although the transition “was always going to be
conditions driven.”8 Coalition officers on the ground agreed, insisting that “we were way
too optimistic” in such short deadlines.
High-level diplomats agreed that American impatience for progress in Iraq had hindered
progress. The U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Ryan C. Crocker, remarked that “A concern I
have had is that there are two clocks, and the Washington clock is running a lot faster
than the Baghdad clock is.”9
The Need for Resources
Money has become a growing an issue. Iraq cannot yet afford to create and sustain the
forces it needs and meet its other objectives for government services and economic
development. The cost of creating Iraqi forces has, however, risen with the level of
violence they must deal with.
Total US financial assistance for Iraqi security grew from $3.24 billion in January 2004
to about $19 billion through 2007. 10 Although most of the funds for rebuilding the
military and security forces had come from US sources and had been administered by
international forces or contractors, the new Iraqi government was expected to begin
playing a greater role in the budgeting and equipment procurement process.11
The Bush administration’s 2008 budget request for FY 2008 envisions a 64% drop in
funding for the ISF, from $5.5 billion to $2.0 billion. The need for this drastic funding
cut is presumably the current (and future) success in developing the ISF. The FY 2008
budget request also envisions that, “by FY 2008, the Government of Iraq will have taken
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on the primary financial responsibility for sustaining the ISF.”12 FY 2007 was the first
year Iraqis spent more ($9 billion total) than the US ($4.5 billion total) on Iraqi security.
Yet Iraq is still far from fully funding the development of its own forces.13
Some MNF-I experts do believe that it is feasible that the Government of Iraq will be
able to sustain the existing force structure of the ISF by 2008. Such experts do note,
however, that Iraq will not be able to modernize their force or add additional capabilities
without other or US outside financial support. Many analysts of progress to date, ethnic
and sectarian tensions, and weaknesses of the Iraqi government are less optimistic –
particularly about the government’s ability to manage the Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior, and manage any aspect of large-scale expenditures with efficiency
and without massive corruption.
Moreover, many military experts – including some of the most senior US officers on the
scene – believe that Iraqi force modernization and the need for additional ISF capabilities
will grow steadily unless Iraq makes major progress in political conciliation and in
sharply reducing the level of existing civil conflict.
The Pace of Iraqi Force Development
Progress in the development of Iraqi security forces is difficult to gauge. Far too much of
the unclassified US government and MNF-I public affairs reporting on the ISF
exaggerates progress, ignores or understates real-world problems, downplays sectarian
and ethnic problems, and promises unrealistic timelines. Much of the media reporting,
however, focuses largely on the cases where Iraqi forces fail – often in cases where they
come under the greatest stress and where new units have not yet had time to gain
experience and “shake out” their leadership and personnel.
There are some very real success, and positive trends in the regular Iraqi Army. Some
units do fight well, and many units can perform important security roles with US support.
At the same time, the lack of transparency in the unclassified US government reporting
on the war has made it almost impossible to distinguish success from failure, and reality
from spin.
 The US Defense Department has stopped releasing detailed unclassified material about
Iraqi Army, Police, and Border Enforcement readiness and manning levels, only giving
vague information about how many units are “ready and equipped” and “in the lead.”
These are vague, if not almost meaningless categories. “In the lead” does not indicate the
level of independence from US support. Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs)
(now[Operational Readiness Assessments (ORAs)], the other tool used to assess the ISF,
were inconsistent over time and evaluated only combat readiness and not combat
effectiveness.
Similarly, Administration political leaders have constantly emphasized the number of
regular military and police that have been trained and equipped as a key measure of
success although the Department of Defense reporting stated in its March 2007 report on
“Measuring Stability and Security” in Iraq that that the MNF-I and Iraqi commanders
have never known not how many “ready and equipped” soldiers quit or deserted the
force.14 MNF-I does believe that approximately 50,000 soldiers and policemen have
been lost to attrition (killed, wounded, separated, and deserted) over the past two years,
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but notes that reporting by Iraqi ministries remains inconsistent, particularly on all
elements of the police.
US military personnel who train or operate with Iraqi units give mixed anecdotal
assessments of their quality. There seems to be a consensus among trainers that several
years of continued US training, embedded advisors, and partner units are in order to
achieve some semblance of stability in Iraq, but also that it would still take years to
succeed with a meaningful political compromise between sects and factions.
There are numerous stories of abuse, corruption, and mixed loyalties, as well as stories of
individual courage, commitment, and success. Some individual units said to be “in the
lead” are described as highly capable and politically neutral, while others are sectarian
and ethnic in character and some are tied to sectarian and ethnic cleansing. Other units
are said to be in the lead that ineffective, burnt out, tied to local missions and loyalties, or
had high desertion rates that effectively disbanded the unit.
Some Iraqis are truly motivated. Many are not, but are asked to fight as if they were truly
motivated to support the national government when they signed up to earn a living and
survive. Serious problems still exist in producing an adequate number of officers and
noncommissioned officers are being addressed by both security ministries, but enduring
solutions to the growth of leaders will take years not months to overcome. In many cases,
Iraqi combat troops are asked to take on an unfamiliar concept of maintenance and
support at the same time. They lack the experience to maintain their weapons and
equipment, and lack the in unit capability and outside support to do so. A flood forward
and replacement oriented military culture is asked to sustain its equipment as if it were
Western or American.
There is a continuing need for efforts to change Iraq’s previous military culture, and give
maintenance, logistics, and sustainability a priority that Iraqi forces had never previously
seen as necessary even during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars. MNSTC-I seems optimistic in
reporting that, “the Iraqi Army and police are self-reliant in matters of life support, The
Coalition provides limited support in fuel and repair parts but most other support is Iraqi
controlled and executed.”
MNSTC-I experts seem optimistic in reporting that,
       The training base which supports the recruitment and initial entry training for both individual
       replacements and new unit growth has been transitioned to Iraqi control and is effectively
       functioning…We have assisted both the MoD and the MoI to develop a contract-supported
       logistics architecture as an interim step until they can perform most logistic functions themselves.
       This architecture is in place, and the Ministries have a budget adequate to the task of sustaining it.
       Both Ministries have adopted a “Concept of Support” with milestones and metrics for
       performance. Measurable progress toward logistic self-reliance exists in all classes of supply and
       across all logistics functions
Reporting from the unit to the Ministry level indicates that progress may be significantly
slower than MNSTC-I hopes, and Iraqi officials and officers may be both slow to adapt
and suffer from significant levels of corruption. Ongoing pay problems, corruption, a lack
of adequate facilities and equipment, a lack of proper medical care, a lack of proper
support for families, and problems with death and disability payments, often result in the
poverty and unemployment of Iraqi young men. The ISF has major effectiveness,
desertion, morale, motivation, and future retention problems.
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Forces are still being committed to combat in ways that use up unready or over-
committed units in spite of adding US embeds and partner units. Men who did not
volunteer for demanding combat missions, particularly in complex sectarian or ethnic
environments or outside their home areas, are being pushed into combat. They often have
poor facilities, equipment and weapons that are sharply inferior to their US counterparts,
and are at least partly excluded from the command and intelligence loops to preserve
security. They are sometimes treated as second best or unreliable partners. On the other
hand, their equipment is usually on a part with – or better than -- that of their enemies, y
have their own human intelligence networks and, in many cases, know the local culture,
power structures, and terrain far better than any coalition unit.
Ethnic and sectarian issues remain a serious problem. Shi’ite militia infiltration does
continue throughout the ISF, especially in the National Police and regular police force.
Militias also intimidate individual members of the security forces to secure their
cooperation or at least forestall action against them. Mixed loyalties not only exist at the
level of individual policemen or officers, but also inside the relevant ministries.
As one senior MNSTC-I officer notes:
       The has been an erosion of trust both within the government and within the population at large
       over the past year, and it manifests itself in everyone believing the worst about everyone else. To
       be sure, there has been infiltration. It should be noted, however, the Government of Iraq has
       encouraged young men to disavow their allegiance to sectarian militias and – if qualified – to enter
       the security forces as individuals and not as groups.
       The more important issue in assessing the cohesion and loyalty of Iraqi Security Forces is the
       presence of sectarian influence. This influence plays out in two ways: actively and passively.
       Active sectarian influence is criminal conduct. Passive sectarian influence is sympathy for those
       conducting criminal acts on the basis of sect.
       We assess that incidents of active sectarian influence in the Army are minimal, in the National
       Police are moderate, and in the local police are significant – notably in Baghdad and Basra. We
       assess that incidents of passive sectarian influence in the Army are low and in all the police forces
       are high. Reducing active sectarian influences requires transparent investigations and actual
       prosecutions by courageous leaders. Reducing passive sectarian influence will depend upon
       further political progress towards reconciliation.
The problems affecting the overall development of the ISF have also been affected by
concern over US force withdrawals and efforts to further accelerate the build-up of Iraqi
capabilities. Statements by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki, and the impact of
the US election, have accelerated US and allied scheduling. Expanding Iraqi forces has
become a political necessity, as it seems to be the only way for the US to stay for a
significant period, and the only way to make an Iraqi takeover seem credible.
Little about Iraqi performance in the field, however, indicates that the army, security
forces, and police are “75% complete” as some US spokesmen stated in 2006 in talking
about an 18-24 month time period for a full scale shift of responsibility to Iraqi forces.
For all its progress, the ISF will require a very substantial aid and advisory effort, and
significant if diminishing support from US combat forces, far beyond the start of 2008. A
realistic timeframe is closer to 3 to 5 years.
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                                                                       8/23/07                           Page vii




I. PROGRESS IN IRAQI FORCE DEVELOPMENT.............................................................................. 1
   TRANSFERRING RESPONSIBILITY TO IRAQIS ............................................................................................... 1
      US Assessments of ISF Transition: Unrealistic Timelines and Doubtful Iraqi Readiness.................... 2
      Delaying Transition To Make Room for US Combat............................................................................ 3
      Transition Teams: Overtaxed and Underequipped ............................................................................... 4
         Transition Teams.............................................................................................................................. 4
         Civilian Training Teams: PRTs and EPRTs..................................................................................... 6
      Key Challenges to US Advisors ............................................................................................................ 8
      Expanding the Iraqi Security Forces .................................................................................................... 9
   FINANCING ISF DEVELOPMENT ................................................................................................................ 10
   CHALLENGES TO ISF SELF-RELIANCE ...................................................................................................... 11
      Impact of Manning Problems.............................................................................................................. 11
      Dealing With Injury, Illness, and Retirement...................................................................................... 12
      Sectarianism........................................................................................................................................ 12
      Corruption .......................................................................................................................................... 13
      Poor Governance................................................................................................................................ 13
      Major Shortfalls in Logistics Capacity ............................................................................................... 14
      Lack of Equipment .............................................................................................................................. 15
   ABSENCE OF A RULE OF LAW ................................................................................................................... 16
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR................................................................ 17
   THE INTERIOR MINISTRY .......................................................................................................................... 17
     Weak Ministerial Capacity.................................................................................................................. 18
   SHI’ITE INFILTRATION .............................................................................................................................. 19
   IMPROVING MOI ACCOUNTABILITY ......................................................................................................... 20
   SHORTFALLS IN MOI LOGISTICS, EQUIPMENT, AND SUSTAINMENT ......................................................... 21
     A Lack of Equipment........................................................................................................................... 21
     A Lack of Equipment Accountability................................................................................................... 22
     Transitioning Logistics to the MOI ..................................................................................................... 23
   THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE ...................................................................................................................... 23
     Training the IPS: PTTs ....................................................................................................................... 24
     Sectarian Infiltration in the IPS .......................................................................................................... 26
     Diminished Accountability As the IPS Grows.................................................................................... 27
     The Failure To Reform the IPS ........................................................................................................... 28
   THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE .............................................................................................................. 29
     Training the NP: NPTTs ..................................................................................................................... 29
     Sectarian Infiltration in the NP........................................................................................................... 29
     Efforts to Reform the NP..................................................................................................................... 30
     The Failure To Reform the NP............................................................................................................ 30
     Diminished NP Accountability As Security Transitions..................................................................... 31
   THE DEPARTMENT OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT (DPE AND DEPARTMENT OF PORTS OF ENTRY (POE) .... 31
   THE FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE ..................................................................................................... 32
   THE NATIONAL INFORMATION AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY (NIAA) .................................................... 33
   PROVINCIAL SECURITY FORCES ............................................................................................................... 33
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ................................................................ 34
   EXPANDING MOD FORCES ....................................................................................................................... 34
   EMBEDDED ADVISORY SUPPORT .............................................................................................................. 35
   TRANSITIONING OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE MOD................................................................ 35
   NATIONAL COUNTER-TERROR CAPABILITY ............................................................................................. 36
ARMY AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ................................................................................. 36
                                  Locations of Iraqi army Divisions .................................................... 37
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   EXPANDING THE IRAQI ARMY TO COMBAT ATTRITION ............................................................................ 37
   THE US TRAINING EFFORT SUMMER I THINK THIS WAS 2006.................................................................. 38
   ASSESSMENTS OF IRAQI ARMY CAPABILITIES.......................................................................................... 39
   OPERATIONAL PROGRESS ......................................................................................................................... 40
   REGIONAL SECTARIANISM ........................................................................................................................ 41
   A LACK OF SKILLED LEADERSHIP ............................................................................................................ 42
   A LACK OF NCOS .................................................................................................................................... 42
   EQUIPMENT ISSUES {/EQUIPPING THE FORCE: THE EFFECTS OF AN INCREASED BUDGET} ...................... 43
   SPECIAL OPERATIONS ............................................................................................................................... 45
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IRAQI NAVY ...................................................................................... 46
V. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IRAQI AIR FORCE............................................................................. 47
VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE.................................................................. 49
VII. ISF DEVELOPMENTS AND PERFORMANCE IN THE BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN ...... 51
   A US FORCE BUILD-UP LEADS THE WAY ................................................................................................. 51
   THE IRAQI FORCE COMPONENT ................................................................................................................ 52
   IRAQIS “IN CHARGE”................................................................................................................................ 53
      Giving Iraqi Forces More Responsibility ........................................................................................... 54
      Slow Deployment of ISF Troops ......................................................................................................... 54
   ISF MANPOWER SHORTAGES ................................................................................................................... 55
   “UNEVEN” ISF PERFORMANCE ................................................................................................................. 55
   SECTARIAN INFLUENCE IN ISF OPERATIONS ............................................................................................ 57
   THE “GATED COMMUNITY” STRATEGY .................................................................................................... 57
   HEAVY ISF CASUALTIES .......................................................................................................................... 58
   TACTICAL VICTORY, OR STRETCHING TOO THIN...................................................................................... 58
VIII. ISF DEVELOPMENTS AND PERFORMANCE .......................................................................... 61
   OPERATION PHANTOM THUNDER ............................................................................................................. 61
   OPERATION ARROWHEAD RIPPER ............................................................................................................ 61
   OPERATION MARNE HUSKY ..................................................................................................................... 63
IX. THE LOCALIZATION OF SECURITY: THE PROVINCIAL SECURITY FORCES............... 64
   PROGRESS IN SECURING ANBAR PROVINCE AND A SHIFT TO RELYING ON TRIBAL FORCES ..................... 64
     The Localization of Security ............................................................................................................... 64
     Limited Accountability ........................................................................................................................ 65
     A Sharp Decline in Violence ............................................................................................................... 65
     The Implications of Localizing Security.............................................................................................. 67
     Challenges To The Anbar Tribal Alliance .......................................................................................... 68
     Applying the “Anbar Model” Elsewhere ............................................................................................ 69
        Progress in Central and North Central Iraq .................................................................................... 70
        Efforts in the Baghdad Area........................................................................................................... 70
        Efforts in Diyala............................................................................................................................. 71
        Widening the Local Security Effort ............................................................................................... 71
     Changing the Paradigm for ISF Development?.................................................................................. 72
IX. IMPROVING THE ISF....................................................................................................................... 73
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I. Progress in Iraqi Force Development
Iraqi force development is only one aspect of a successful effort to bring security and
stability to Iraq. If Iraq is to avoid split-up and full-blown civil war, it must do far more
than create effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). No effort can succeed without an
integrated strategy to forge a lasting political compromise between its key factions: Arab-
Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurd – while protecting other minorities. Political conciliation
must also address such critical issues as federalism and the relative powers of the central
and regional governments, the role of religion in politics and law, control over petroleum
resources and export revenues, the definition of human rights, and a host of other issues.
There are also major risks in any effort to deal with Iraq’s present problems. It is all too
possible that neither US nor Iraqi government plans may dominate Iraq’s future. The
current combination of insurgency, Sunni Arab versus Shi’ite Arab sectarian conflict, and
Arab versus Kurdish ethnic conflict could easily cause the collapse of the current political
structure, leading to a Shi’ite or Shi’ite-Kurdish dominated government, with strong local
centers of power, and an ongoing fight with Iraq’s Sunnis. It could escalate to the break
up of the country, far more serious ethnic and sectarian conflict, or violent paralysis. It
has already led to widespread ethnic cleansing in urban areas by militias and death squads
of all three major ethnic and religious groups.
Nevertheless, the creation of effective Iraqi Security Forces remains a key to putting an
end to Iraqi violence, terrorism, and civil conflicts. It is the only lasting answer to giving
the central government the tools it needs to contain and defeat the Sunni insurgency and
Shi’ite militias. It is also the key to an orderly reduction in US and Coalition forces, and
to ensuring that local security forces bring security rather than support sectarian and
ethnic cleansing.

Transferring Responsibility To Iraqis
The plan to transfer security responsibility to Iraqis consists of four phases: implement
partnerships, establish Iraqi Army Lead, transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)
status, and then create Iraqi security self-reliance.
DOD reporting on completion of this plan painted an optimistic (if somewhat vague)
picture of ISF transition. DoD reported that the first phase (implement partnerships) had
been completed. By June 2007, 95 of 101 Iraqi Army battalions were listed as “in the
lead” in their areas of responsibility.15 As of June 2007, seven of Iraq’s 18 provinces
transitioned to PIC status: An Najaf, Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Dahuk, Irbil, and
Sulaymaniyah.16
The Department of Defense also noted that it had turned over three more forward
operating bases (FOBs) to GoI (the government of Iraq) as of May 2007. By June 2007,
61 FOBs out of a total of 122 had been transitioned to the Iraqi government or closed.”17
These statistics suggested that Coalition troops were able to reduce their presence and
allow newly competent Iraqi units to “stand up” and assume operational control.
The June 2007 report also set a deadline for complete security transition: “no later than
March 2008.”18 President Bush had previously identified November 2007, but the
Pentagon later delayed the deadline for the remaining provinces to assume PIC status.19
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  US Assessments of ISF Transition: Unrealistic Timelines and Doubtful
                           Iraqi Readiness
The reality of the situation is different. Large sections of the Iraqi forces will not be ready
for independence by early 2008. Years, not months, are required for the ISF to assume
complete responsibility.
Senior military officials have repeatedly reported that the ISF will not be ready to assume
responsibility within such a timeframe. In May 2007, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, the
retiring MNSTC-I Commander and head of ISF training for 22 months, reported that the
ISF had made substantial progress:20 Dempsey conceded that the ISF’s “being completely
self-reliant is a ways off.”21 Dempsey speculated that full ISF self-reliance would take at
least five years, and would require a long-term military cooperation with the United
States. Although the ISF could assume more responsibility for tactical operations, it was,
at minimum, a half-decade away from autonomy. {Nonetheless, Dempsey did note
progress in preparing the ISF: He projected that by the end of 2007, the ISF would be
able to defend itself everywhere except for Baghdad and Diyala provinces, with the help
from Coalition aircraft and intelligence.22 Transition of “most” of the remaining
provinces to PIC status could “potentially” be achieved before 2008.}
Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard also stressed that ISF transition was on a timescale of years, not
months. Gen. Pittard noted that “it’ll take years” for the ISF to be truly self-reliant, and
that it would be at least two years before the forces can “fully take control” of Iraq, even
with extensive Coalition logistical support. Pittard rejected US proposals to complete
security transition by spring 2008 as unrealistic and dangerous.
He compared a US withdrawal to the withdrawal from Diyala in 2005 and 2006, when
US forces cut back its troops by two-thirds, handed over responsibility “way too soon” to
the ISF, and subsequently witnessed the resurgence of insurgent activity in the
province.23 He warned that “we cannot be in a hurry to withdraw our coalition forces,”
lest they suffer a repeat.24 “A lesson learned is…do not draw down too quickly when
there’s a glimmer of success.”25
Other senior military officials echoed this warning. Maj. Gen. W.E. Gaskin, US
commander in Anbar province, said that it would take two years until the Iraqi Security
Forces were “self-sufficient.” Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, who commands two of the five US
Army brigades that were part of the surge, agreed that the ISF was not nearly ready to
operate independently. He said that a 2007 US withdrawal would be premature and allow
extremist groups to regain control of the ISF.26 Maj. Gen. Lynch, said that the ISF would
not be able “to meet that sustained security presence” until next summer, 2008.27
Senior officials in the American and Iraqi intelligence community echoed these
projections. In a July 2007 testimony, Thomas Fingar, the US deputy director of national
intelligence and chief of the National Intelligence Council, reported that Iraqi forces were
not ready to assume full responsibility for Iraqi security for years.28
Retired Maj. Gen. John Landry, a member of the intelligence council, reported that the
Iraqi security forces were so plagued by sectarianism, poor logistics, and weak support
capabilities that they would not be able to successfully transition control.29 When asked if
Iraqi forces were capable of providing “some sort of successful closure” to US
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involvement in Iraq, Landry stated this was “not likely” and that Iraqi military leadership
and capability needed “years to develop, not months.”30
Iraq’s national security advisor stated that it was unlikely the ISF would be able to
assume full control of security responsibilities by the end of 2007.31 He stated:
        “We had hopes and intentions to take over security in all provinces and command of all army
        divisions before the end of the year. But there are difficulties and challenges that appeared along
        the way, in arming, equipping, recruiting and training our armed forces. I think it is very difficult
        to predict a certain time [for fully shifting control to ISF]. This depends on the level of threat,
        whether regional or local. But we are not talking about weeks, or not even months. More than
        months.”32
US congressional reports also asserted that the ISF forces were too undeveloped to take
responsibility. The July midterm benchmark report stated that progress was
“unsatisfactory” towards creating an independent, sectarian-free Iraqi security force. The
House Armed Services Committee July report also concluded that the ISF was “not yet
ready to take full responsibility for their nation’s security. ISF units are in various states
of readiness. Some units are willing and capable of engaging the enemy, while others,
particularly the Iraqi Police Services, are less effective.”33
               Delaying Transition To Make Room for US Combat
As military operations in 2007 intensified, the focus shifted from preparing ISF troops for
independence to more conventional military operations. Transition and ISF development
was delayed in favour of US combat operations.
In July 2007, Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard reported that the US had “changed its focus” and
slowed its training of the ISF. US troops focused on providing security rather than
preparing the ISF to become independent. Pittard noted that “transition [to Iraqi control]
is not a main priority, but it’s still a priority.” He said that as the ISF participated in major
operations in Baghdad and Diyala, they gained combat experience but delayed progress
in improving their logistics capabilities. He noted that, “I think it’s just temporary. We’re
not seeing the kind of progress we’ve seen in the past…I think we’ll see it in the
future.”34
Lt. Gen. Dempsey noted that ISF transition was delayed in favour of US security
operations. He said that before the Baghdad security plan was launched in early 2007,
“the balance had tipped a bit too precipitously to transition” but that “in the near term,
[during the surge], we had to ensure the population was secured.”35
The House Armed Services Committee also reported that military operations were
delayed transition to ISF responsibility. A Committee staff report state that the
“operational shift” to providing security in Baghdad, which “is emphasizing US forces
taking the lead in securing Iraqis,” “will likely slow the transition to the ISF, at least in
the short term.”36 It reported that the DOD’s 2006 Joint Campaign Plan, which is
believed to be the guiding framework for DOD action on the ISF, also “lowers the
priority the Coalition places on developing the ISF.”37 A senior DOD official reported
that, “officials now dismiss the 2004-2005 years…as a fruitless ‘rush to transition.’ ‘As
they stand up, we’ll stand down,”…has been all but banished from the Green Zone, as
has the notion of measuring US progress in Iraq by the number of Iraqi troops trained or
by changes in US casualty counts.”38
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       The Committee cited an April 2007 McClatchy report, which said that “military
planners have abandoned the idea that standing up Iraqi personnel will enable American
personnel to start coming home soon and now believe that US personnel will have to
defeat the insurgents and secure control of troubled provinces…Evidence has been
building for months that training Iraqi troops [for self-reliance] is no longer the focus of
US policy.”39 The HASC concluded that “The security forces are not capable of taking
over security responsibility, as timelines for transition are repeatedly extended” in the
wake of military campaigns.40
        {A May 2007 Washington Post article described in the HASC report also noted
that the US Embassy JCP plan “shifts the immediate emphasis of military operations
away from transitioning to Iraqi security forces- the primary focus under the former top
US commander Gen. George W. Casey Jr. – toward protecting Iraq’s population in
trouble areas, a central objective” of the surge.41 Frederick Kagan also noted that
“American forces are partnered with Iraqi units where possible, but are focused primarily
on securing the Iraqi population rather than on pushing the Iraqi Security Forces in the
lead.”42}
The New York Times also reported that the number of Iraqi security forces which could
operate independently declined since January, “partly because of troops killed in combat
and a shortage of officers.”43 As the Baghdad security plan continued, fewer ISF units
could truly take the lead.
Even the DOD suggested that its transition deadlines might have been premature. DOD
noted in its July 2007 Quarterly Report that “while ministries made some progress in
developing capacity to manage these forces, in particular taking ownership of basic
training, continued efforts will be required to build the capacity of the forces and the
ministries to sustain themselves without Coalition support and to operate independently
without the full range of Coalition combat enablers.”44
                Transition Teams: Overtaxed and Underequipped
Process has been made since 2006, but the military and civilian advisory effort is still
understaffed and faces significant problems.

                                      Transition Teams
Transition Teams are the main forces responsible for training, preparing, and developing
Iraqi forces. Over 6,000 advisors in more than 500 teams assisted all levels of the Iraqi
Security Forces and were overseen by MNC-I.45 According to the Pentagon, TTs advise,
coach, teach and mentor the ISF, develop and improve Iraqi leaders, support unit training
and assist with logistics and support.46 TT units consisted of Military Transition Teams
(MiTTs), National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs), Border Transition Teams (BTTs),
and teams advising the Iraqi Navy and Air Force. TTs advised the MOD and MOI to
build their ministerial capacity.
The numbers of embedded advisory teams were as follows:
           -   Military Transition Teams – approximately 140 as of December 2006. 47
           -   Border Transition Teams – approximately 25 as of December 2006.48
           -   National Police Teams – approximately 35 as of December 2006. 49
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                                    8/23/07                Page 5

                                                                                50
           -    Police Transition Teams – approximately 222 as of June 2007.
           -    Other Transition Teams – approximately 60 (“Other” teams provided basic training,
                education etc. There were also Transition Teams embedded at the MOD and the MOI to
                assist Iraqi command and control officers.51
The teams are better trained. The US military launched a new training program in 2006
conducted in Ft. Riley, Kansas. The program trained transition teams working with the
Iraqi Army. As will be discussed later, the Ft. Riley program marked a new, consolidated
effort to fully train and prepare ISF advisors. Another sign of progress in the ISF advisory
effort was the expansion of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The increase in
civilian personnel has aided US efforts to improve Iraqi rule of law, reconstruction, and
ministerial capacity.
Despite these achievements, the Transition Teams remain undertrained, overtaxed, and
undermanned. TTs are critical to Iraqi force development, but they have not assumed top
priority in real world US military plans. Even as late as June 2007, General Peter Pace,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted that the TT effort was anaemic. He noted
that “we do need to do more training with the Iraqis, we do need more opportunities to
have embedded units with them.”52
One problem with Transition Teams seemed to be that they were too small. With only 10-
15 personnel on each team, individual advisors were often overburdened. The Pentagon
reported that advisory teams were a heterogeneous, “mix of personnel with combat and
combat support specialities that include operations, intelligence, logistics,
communications, engineering and supply.” 53This division of labor meant that one
advisor would be tasked with consulting for the entire logistics effort for an ISF unit, a
heavy ask.
The House Armed Services Committee noted that:
       “Some experts believe that the size of the teams is inadequate to the mission and variety of tasks
       that they must perform. TT veterans also have raised concerns about the size and composition of
       the teams. One brigade leader said that the standard MiTT staying unit (10-12), with each member
       trained for a distinct role, does not work well in actual operations, which could result in mission
       failure…Size is an issue. According to some current members and veterans of TTs, there was
       nearly unanimous agreement that teams are too small.”54
The Committee report also concluded that the ISF “lack sufficient standing military
advisory capability to meet current, and potential future, requirements for this mission.”55
Efforts to make the ISF self-reliant were stalled by small, overburdened TTs.
TTs were also limited by some remaining problems in deploying qualified personnel. TT
staffing has improved since 2004 and 2005. At that time, as the House Armed Services
Committee noted, staffing “was not well planned or executed…Selection was ad hoc and
resulted in sending trainer who generally had not previously deployed and had little or no
combat experience…Those initially selected by the Army were not the best qualified.”56
Since then, the Committee concluded “improvements have been made, but challenges
remain.”57
Staffing capabilities were sometimes so limited that TTs were misassigned. The
Committee found that “TT members, while selected for a specific function based on their
occupation specialty, do not necessarily perform their assigned functions when
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deployed.” 58 TT personnel were also assigned posts not appropriate for their rank. 59 The
combination of incomplete and poor staffing has challenged the integrity of the
Transition Team. Even a former MiTT leader reported that, “quality of manning is the
most fundamental MiTT challenge facing us today.”60
One of the challenges to effective staffing was the negative image of transition teams
among potential TT candidates. TT jobs are viewed as career stallers, if not career
suicide. A Los Angeles Times report cited by the Committee noted that TT candidates
expected “marginal career prospects” and “no one is sent after [TT work] a successful
command.”61 The perception that “TT service is not career enhancing has hampered the
US’ ability to provide competent and talented staff.”
Efforts by the DoD to incentivize TT jobs were reported to be “improving,” but TT
staffing was still the result of limited options.62 The House Armed Services Committee
reported that, “Army TT selections are frequently based on availability. Thus individuals
with limited advisory aptitude or no background in logistics, intelligence, and
communications, can be assigned to these functions.” 63
This lack of qualified personnel complicated an already difficult job. TTs face a difficult
task – they are expected to operate in an unclear, often conflicting chain of command,
and need to be consistently creative in their operations. The House Armed Services
Committee report observed that Transition Team members “need SOF-like skills” to
accommodate an uncertain training environment, but at the same time must negotiate a
“problematic ” command and control structure” with “overlapping lines of authority” and
extensive “confusion of roles and authority.” 64 This complex task was harder to
accomplish since many TT personnel were hired based on necessity and not skill.
TTs evidently only had limited performance review. The Committee reported that MNF-I
“does not specifically measure TT effectiveness.” 65 This lack of accountability was
concerning, given that it has prevented the US military from fully assessing the impact of
its transition teams, or identifying key areas for reform. What was clear to the House
Armed Services Committee was that Transition Teams needed more interpreters,
logisticians, and specialists in detainee operations, civil affairs, and administration. 66
Transition Teams still have many obstacles to overcome before they can be considered a
robust training force. Appropriate manning and sufficient staffing levels were universal
problems for MiTTs, PTTs, NPTTs, ministerial TTs, and BTTs alike. A July 2007 House
Committee on Armed Services report noted that,
        “Improvements have been made recently” in the “US advisory mission…but much more remains
       to be done. The [Defense] Department must now improve selection, training, and utilization of
       Transition Teams. The Department must also create appropriate incentives to attract the best
       personnel to Transition Teams and ensure that advisors remained competitive for promotion.
       While Police Transition Teams are critical to counterinsurgency, their employment has been the
       lowest priority.”67

                       Civilian Training Teams: PRTs and EPRTs
The military training effort is only part of the story. The military aspect of ISF transition
is supposed to be complemented by civilian aid efforts that have a major potential impact
on local and regional stability and the ability to achieve a rule of law. These efforts
include Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The PRTs consist of civilian advisors
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who specialized in rule of law, governance, communication, reconstruction, and
economic development projects. These advisors engage in local community-building
projects and mentored Iraqis in reconstruction operations. Some PRTs are also being
integrated with the military and are getting military support and protection. These forces
are called Embedded PRTs
The Administration has stressed the value of the PRTs as a vital component in providing
security and stability to Iraqis. The Pentagon has insisted that PRTs are “central to the US
support of these efforts” of reconstruction and security. DOD has proclaimed PRTs as the
“mainstay of US efforts to build the capacity of Iraq’s local, municipal, and provincial”
governments.”68 It has claimed that PRTs “play a leading role in coordinating US
programs” to “foster Iraqi self-sufficiency.” 69 President Bush has cited PRT successes in
Anbar in strengthening the rule of law for detainee trials, assisting officials in Ramadi in
passing a $100 million reconstruction budget, and supervising micro-finance loans in
Kirkuk. 70 He reported that the PRT in Ninewah province had created over 1,000 jobs for
reconstruction projects.
Many PRTs, however, have only limited access to the province they are supposed to
operate in, language skills and prior qualifications are lacking or limited, and small teams
that cannot really cover areas as large as the ones they are assigned are often understaffed
or still in formation. PRT staffing levels have increased in the past few months. The
number of PRTs embedded into Brigade Combat Teams has increased from 290 to 600. 71
The Pentagon reported that 250 of these embedded PRTs were operational in Iraq by
summer 2007. By June, “just under 90% of initial staffing of the new PRTs” was
achieved.72 The State Department confirmed that 99% of its positions in regional
reconstruction teams had been filled.73 Ambassador Crocker reported that 10 new PRTs
had been created in 2007, with four more due in September.74 This would bring the total
of PRT teams to 24 with some 600 personnel at some point after mid-September 2007. 75
It is clear, however, that claims for serious success and that a “civilian surge” were not
valid. Law and reconstruction advisors, for example, did in fact double, but only from 10
to 20. 76 Many experienced personnel and linguistics experts were leaving Iraq by 2007.
July 2007 progress reports by the Pentagon found that PRT expansion was behind
schedule, and “only about half of the approximately 300 additional PRT personnel” were
deployed.77
PRT staffers were also underqualified: In summer 2007, Ambassador Ryan Crocker
informed Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice that hiring of embassy officials was
haphazard, and not enough qualified staff members were operating in the field. Crocker
reported that “the big issue for me…was simply not having enough people…I need more
people” in Iraq. DoS did double the personnel devoted to political and economic analysis.
The embassy added 11 political officers to the original 15 and expanded the economic
staff from 11 to 21.78 Yet this was far too small an effort to address the Herculean task of
Iraqi reconstruction.
It should be stressed that the PRTs are not designed to solve the broader problems of
unemployment, inflation, etc. themselves or making the central government function.
Their job is to leverage the local government—still a challenge—and get them to
effectively execute budgets and get work done. Nevertheless, the PRTs had to operate in
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                          8/23/07            Page 8


an environment with massive economic problems -- under and unemployment in excess
of 50% and inflation – that they were too small to address. All had problems in getting
action out of the central government, and in dealing the government’s slow execution of
its budget, although the government did finally did spend 100% of the provincial budget
for 2006 by Augyst -- some 7 months behind schedule The PRTs also face a morass of
local, provincial, and tribal politics.
A number of reports also indicated that the PRTs faced similar challenges to the military
Transition Teams. PRT careers were seen as risky and a career misstep: Ambassador
Crocker noted that only about 30% of the State Department’s Arabists were willing to
take posts in Iraq with any risk.
PRT efforts were also poorly coordinated, and the chain of command and responsibility
was unclear. PRT efforts were not integrated with other transition teams, as there was
little coordination within the PRT, EPRT, CERP (CERP is a fund, the other two are
personnel teams—probably should not mix), or Iraqi effort. There was no master plan to
synchronize operations, and Iraqi efforts were judged on whether they spend their 2006
and 2007 budgets, without regard to what they were really spending the money on.
Success was thus largely local and compartmented. Success was possible, and often
occurred at the local or project level, but happened in spite of a lack of any meaningful
planning and management in Washington, or as yet in Iraq.
The EPRT concept seemed promising, but only a few were staffed to the effort, their
mission was not coordinated, and it is far too early to judge their effectiveness.
In sum, PRTs and EPRTs remain badly undermanned and have limited scope and
effectiveness, even in the provinces where they can actually operate and move with some
degree of freedom. It will be months – if ever – before the US military gets anything
approaching the level of civilian partners that they need. PRTs are too small a force to
genuinely address the massive problems throughout Iraq.
                           Key Challenges to US Advisors
US advisors faced many major challenges in shaping the decades old military culture of
Iraqi armed forces. Saddam’s army was trained largely to counter other large, static
formations. US advisors face an uphill battle in adapting strategy and tactics to suit the
more fluid dynamics of counterinsurgency warfare.
One persistent problem was Iraqi soldiers tendency not to take cover when fired upon.
This problem was reinforced by the Iraqi “death blossom” technique, wherein Iraqi
soldiers fire wildly immediately after receiving enemy fire. This tactic, in addition to
wasting a large amount of ammunition, was also extremely dangerous to nearby friendly
forces.79
Other dangerous behavior common to Iraqi soldiers is abandoning a vehicle when it
comes under fire. US soldiers are trained to provide cover to a vehicle when it is
attacked. Iraqis usually “just haul butt out of there” leaving the vehicle to face enemy
fire unsupported.80 This virtually guarantees casualties.
These tactical problems were coupled to suspect loyalty. As Marine Commandant
General James Conway lamented, “are we training former insurgents as security forces?
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                                      8/23/07                 Page 9


There’s no doubt about that.”81 More generally, however, many Iraqi Army and National
Police units that were actively in combat in areas like Baghdad had officers with clear
ties to the Shi’ite militias and were involved or tolerated sectarian cleansing.
Kurdish units serving the central government also had their primary loyalty to Kurdish
leaders, but this has been far less of a problem to date because they have not had to
operate in areas with ethnic clashes between Arab and Kurd. In fact, some Iraqi Army
brigades that were formally in the Kurdish areas have been among the best performing
Brigades in Baghdad.
The regular police were almost all more loyal to local leaders, tribes, sects, and their
ethnicity than the central government.
                          Expanding the Iraqi Security Forces
Expanding the Iraqi Security Forces continued to be a key US military objective. The
2007 Campaign Action Plan stressed that ISF expansion was a primary goal of Iraqi force
development. Senior military officials stated that the ISF must be expanded so that Iraqis
could assume greater security responsibilities. Lt. Gen. Dempsey stated that “Iraqi
security forces will require growth in scope and scale…in order to protect the population
throughout Iraq.” 82
In July 2007, Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch remarked that additional ISF forces were needed to
address the “security void” south of Baghdad. He noted that ISF “are getting better every
day,” but:
       “There just aren’t enough [Iraqi] forces here. There is a void of Iraqi security forces right now, and
       we are filling that void with coalition forces. But coalition forces aren’t going to stay here
       forever… In some areas, the Iraqi army is full of capable military professionals, but there are other
       places where there are literally no Iraqi security forces.”83
Lynch suggested that an additional 2,500 Iraqi soldiers and 1,500 Iraqi police in the south
(Babil, Karbala, Najaf) were needed for the ISF to assume responsibility.84 He
recommended increasing the ISF by a third, with seven more Iraqi army battalions and
five more Iraqi police units to secure the area.85
The Pentagon set steadily more ambitious goals for expansion. In the June 2007
Quarterly Report, the DOD reported that it wanted to increase manning levels to 390,000
personnel.86 At that time, current ISF forces were reported at 346,500 “trained and
equipped.” These goals followed proposals by Lt. Gen. Dempsey to increase the ISF by
at least 50,000 troops.87 Dempsey recommended adding 20,000 soldiers to the Iraqi Army
so that each battalion would be filled to 120% of its official capacity. 88 This replaced
previous efforts to expand the Iraqi Army by 10%.89 Dempsey also projected that an
effective police force would require 195,000 personnel, a 40% increase from 2003
estimates.90
In addition to setting manning goals of 120% for the Army and 110% for the police to
compensate for the large number of men on leave or who had deserted, the ISF also
increased its number of units. The ISF added a brigade-sized operational reserve,
consisting of a mechanized battalion from the Army, a National Police battalion, and a
Special Forces company, further boosting the Objective Civil Security Force (OCSF).91
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According to US military officials and Lt. Gen. Dempsey, this increase was intended to
grant US troops more flexibility to conduct counterinsurgency, and allow Iraqis to
assume greater responsibility for tactical patrol and checkpoint missions. 92 It also,
however, meant training raw units while they were actually engaged in combat. As a
number of senior US officers put it, this was like try to do major repairs on an aircraft in
mid-flight.

Financing ISF Development
As of June 2007, the US had spent over $19 billion to train, equip, develop, and sustain
the Iraqi Security Forces.93 Rep. Martin Meehan of Massachusetts noted that this
investment amounted to $55,000 per Iraqi recruit.94 $13.4 billion of these funds were
obligated by March 2007, while $6.0 billion remained unspent.95 President Bush
requested $2 billion for FY 2008, which would bring the total US commitment to ISF
development to $21 billion.96
Iraq recently assumed more financial responsibility for developing its security forces. It
provided $5.4 billion in CY 2006 and $7.3 billion in CY2007 for security. By 2007,
according to Lt. Gen. Dempsey, Iraqis spent more than the US on the ISF.97
However the real increase in Iraqi Government funding was less than it appeared to be.
37% funding increase was due mostly to the extensive appreciation of the Iraqi dinar, and
that the actual budget increase was around 15%.98
Much of the budget increase was used mainly to increase government salaries rather than
better equip or train the ISF. The MOD expended 76% of funds allocated for salaries but
only expended 1% of funds allocated for capital goods such as weapons, ammunition,
and vehicles. The MOI spent 82% of funds allocated for salaries, while only spent 15%
of the funds it had allocated for capital goods. The HASC concluded that “expenditure
for non-financial assets” including vital ISF equipment “actually decline for the MOD in
2007 at both a constant and appreciated exchange rate.”99
The Iraqi Government failed to execute much of its budget for the ISF. A full quarter of
the $34 billion GOI budget for 2006 was unspent through mid 2007, and Iraqi has a
calendar fiscal year.100 There were also serious questions about where much of the money
went, and particularly as to whether it was properly and quickly allocated to units in the
field, particularly units with Sunni officers or operating against Shi’ite militias.
 DOD reported in its March 2007 Quarterly Report that “budget execution and corruption
problems continue to hamper the GOI’s ability to perform and turn good intentions into
results.”101 The July 2007 House Committee on Armed Services ISF report concluded
that “The Government of Iraq is not yet capable of fully funding its security forces.102
Despite these failures, the government of Iraq was projected to assume “primary financial
responsibility” for ISF development in 2008.103
Fortunately, the US Foreighn Military Sales (FMS) program has compensate for some of
these problems. Spending through the FMS program has had three benefits: First, it has
expended the Iraqi’s own funding for their own defense. Second, it has made them
spendit in a non-corrupt manner—since the FMS system has built in U.S. anti-corruption
standards. Third, it has increased the U.S. defense industry and economy—which is
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                          8/23/07             Page 11


good for American workers. Unfortunately, as is discussed later, FMS has also been
slow to deliver.

Challenges to ISF Self-Reliance
The performance of the Iraqi Security Forces was uneven, and the ISF only made limited
progress towards true self-reliance. In his July 2007 assessment, Lt. Gen. Dempsey
acknowledged that many challenges remained in forging a successful national ISF force.
Dempsey noted that the ISF was “still immature” and not ready for real transition.104 His
conclusions were echoed by reporting by the staff of the House Armed Services
Committee, which stated that, “the quality and capability of the ISF is very uneven.” 105
                            Impact of Manning Problems
Several key challenges continued to exist in ISF self-reliance. Absenteeism and corrupt
staffing hindered force development. While the US military has reported official numbers
of “trained and equipped,” the true number of ISF was unknown. In Lt. Gen. Dempsey’s
July 2007 assessment of the ISF, he noted that the true size of ISF forces was often far
below what was reported.
Over-estimating manning levels was a constant problem in both the Iraqi Army and
police. Dempsey noted that Iraqi Army commanders would sometimes over-report their
troop levels “so that he [the commander] gets a payroll share more than he deserves and
there pocket it.” Or, Iraqi Army commanders would have to add heavily wounded
soldiers to the payroll as a form of health care and injury compensation, further inflating
manning levels.106
“Ghost” personnel were a serious problem in the Iraqi police. Lt. Gen. Dempsey noted
that of the 32,000 Iraqi police lost from the original trained 188,000 in 2005 to 2006,
more than 14,000 were killed or severely wounded, 5,000 deserted, and the rest, a full
13,000, were “unaccounted for.”107 Iraqi police officials also hired more police than were
necessary due to corruption or to provide employment.108 Lt. Gen. Dempsey cited
Karbala and Najaf as extreme examples, reporting that the two cities had “padded the
rolls” by “something between 60,000 and 75,000 policemen on the payroll over the
authorization.” Of these, 10 to 20 percent “will be ghosts that are just there for payroll
purposes.”109
These problems with manning continued to lead to high attrition rates among all elements
of the ISF. In June 2007, Lt. Gen. Dempsey estimated that annual Iraqi Army attrition
rates stood at 15 to 18%, and that the Army could muster “85% boots on the ground in
Baghdad when they’re needed.” 110 These attrition rates forced the DoD to set manning
levels at well over 100%, in order to replenish troop levels. Dempsey estimated that
overall ISF troop levels were at 75 percent strength. This was an improvement from the
January ISF military operations of the surge, where the first instalment “came in at
between 50 and 60 percent strength” – since “10 to 15 percent…just simply refused to
deploy” and 25% were on leave to remit the pay to their families.111
Attrition in the police forces was higher. The DOD estimated that attrition among Iraq
police was one in six.112 Lt. Gen. Dempsey reported attrition was at 20 to 22 percent.113
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                   Dealing With Injury, Illness, and Retirement
The lack of retirement pay and injury compensation remained a major problem. ISF
officers had to “employ” severely wounded soldiers as a form of medical and retirement
compensation.114 The problems in injury compensation were also greatly exacerbated by
the poor state of Iraq’s medical infrastructure, and sectarian problems when Sunnis had to
rely on Shi’ite controlled medical facilities and services. While a system of military
hospitals was maintained under Saddam, these were looted during the American invasion
and most of the doctors fled. Wounded ISF members have since been sent into the highly
corrupt and overburdened civilian medical system. Some wounded ISF members were
initially treated at sophisticated US facilities, but were quickly transferred to Iraqi care.115
The construction of 15 new military health care facilities in Iraq was intended improve
soldiers’ welfare.116 In 2007, nearly 7,000 medical staff members were added to the
military health care system. By May 2007, twelve clinics were opened and treated over
114,000 patients in 2006.117 According to Brig. General Samir, the Surgeon General for
the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, “Iraq’s military medical system is not equal to its US
counterpart, but is improving on a daily basis.”118
By August, Iraqis had assumed complete responsibility for the operation of 13 medical
clinics, with only a handful of clinics left to be handed over. US military officials, such as
MNSTC-I Health Affairs official and U.S. Navy Lt. Rodney Wilson, remained confident
that the transition was acceptable, that Iraqis “are fully capable of providing appropriate
levels of care.” It was unclear whether Iraqis had fully assumed responsibility. While
MNSTC-I funded “all initial medical Class VIII supply needs,” the MOD “fully funded
medical needs for FY2007, with a US $32 million budget.”119
The effects of these new facilities remain to be seen. However, progress still needs to be
made in injury compensation and retirement financing to ensure that manning levels are
not artificially inflated.
Progress has been made in improving the pay system for the army. In August 2007,
Major General Rick Lynch reported that “now the pay system seems to be working
properly.”120 Visits to the field, however, indicated that payment for new replacements,
promotions, and newly rotated forces still presented major problems.
                                       Sectarianism
Pervasive sectarian tension has prevented the creation of a truly national Iraqi security
force. The Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and most elements of the ISF were
perceived as Shi’ite dominated and marginalizing Sunnis.
The Iraqi army has some truly national units, but others have ties to sectarian cleansing in
the areas where there is serious fighting or sectarian pressure. There was broad consensus
that the Army was far less actively involved in sectarian cleansing than the National
Police or regular police.
However, senior and other Iraqi army officers and units either support or tolerate
sectarian cleansing in Northwest Baghdad and south of Baghdad, particularly to the east
of the river in the areas near the arch of Cestiphon area. Sectarian problems are critical in
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                          8/23/07             Page 13


northwest Baghdad where the Sunni insurgents, largely Al Qa’ida, were losing to the
JAM even before the US surge hit them hard.
Despite serious attempts at reform, both the local and National Police are plagued by
sectarianism. Sectarianism was far more entrenched in the police than in the Army. The
extent of sectarianism in both the Iraqi Army and Iraqi police services will be discussed
later in further detail.
                                       Corruption
Corruption has drained resources critical to the development of the ISF. The SIGIR
reported in April 2007 that corruption was a “major impediment to Iraq’s development
and growth,” and exacted a $5 billion toll on the country. The March 2007 DoD quarterly
update reported that “corruption remains an actor at both the unit and ministerial level,”
affecting the MoD, MOI, and Ministry of Oil.121
Corrupt ISF units were involved in activities ranging from biased detention practices,
smuggling, to thievery of crude oil. In one instance, an entire brigade, the Strategic
Infrastructure Battalion (SIBs) was disbanded due to allegations of corruption. In June
2007, all 17 battalions were dismantled and absorbed into the regular Iraqi Army forces.
122
    The DOD had found that the SibS, which guard pipelines, “are sometimes suspected
of being complicit in interdiction and smuggling” of black-market oil.123
The Facilities Protective Service (FPS), another ISF unit that guards Iraqi infrastructure,
was also riddled by corruption. According to Lt. Gen. Dempsey, the FPS was an
“unmonitored, decentralized” unit plagued by “cronyism and sectarianism.” Efforts to
monitor the FPS under the MOI and standardize training did not come to fruition.124
Attempts continued to be made to combat corruption. However, the Special Inspector
General in Iraq (SIGIR) reported that many of Iraq’s anti-corruption agencies were
politicized, undertrained, and undercoordinated. Nonetheless, the House Armed Services
Committee noted that, “anticorruption efforts by the United States continue to move
forward,” citing the Iraqi government’s Joint Anti-Corruption Council as a potential for
turnaround.125
                                     Poor Governance
Some of what is interpreted as sectarianism and corruption was the result of the
incompetence of Iraq’s ministerial bureaucracy. As elsewhere in the region, sectarian and
ethnic dominance, corruption, nepotism, lack of qualified personnel, and a fear of
decision making are not uncommon problems.
Progress is taking place, but very slowly and is still limited by the fact that many
relationships are not clear because of problems in the constitution, delays in the
Provincial Powers Act, and gaps and flaws in basic procedures. It must be stressed that
expenditure of an annual budget in this system is a weak measure of merit -- since few
can relate those expenditures back to the initial requirements or account for an end
product.
Governance is challenged at multiple levels. The GoI and some provincial governments
have failed to venture outside their protected areas. In addition, the culture, the lack of
trust in a banking system and fear of the accusation of corruption have led to
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cumbersome accounting and acquisition procedures that can produce problematic
misallocation and misuse of money, or in the case of the MOD, gridlock in the letting of
contracts.
Information flow is vertical, slow and often failed in a system where information is
power. Efforts to automate on a large scale have reached resistance resulting in a ledger-
oriented system where at times only ministers or governors can make decisions.
Incompetence, a culture of diffusing and hiding responsibility, as well as sectarian
agendas all combine to make the mere running of the security ministries very, very
difficult. Both the Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI) are years away from
becoming efficient and effective.
                        Major Shortfalls in Logistics Capacity
Lt. Gen Dempsey conceded in June 2007 that weak Iraqi ministerial capacity had made
logistics a serious problem for security forces. He commented: “What the Iraqi Army
needs the most help with in the future is administration and logistics…They can attack,
they can defend, but they have a very immature system of administration and
logistics.”126 Major General Rick Lynch agreed, and stated in August 2007 that, “there
have been improvements” in ISF sustainment capabilities, “but they have a long way to
go.”127
The House Armed Services Committee report concluded that “lack of a fully capable
logistics system is a primary reason for Iraqi Armed Forces units not achieving a
Transition Readiness Assessment Level 1 status, which is necessary for transfer of
security responsibility to the Ministry of Defense.128 It reported that “MOI forces will not
make significant contributions to the security and stability of Iraq until the logistics
system, and the MOI and provincial institutions responsible for logistics support,
improve.”129 Overall, the committee report concluded that:
       “Logistics, contracting, intelligence and ministerial capacity have lagged far behind generation of
       the security forces. While this may be partly by design, these areas must develop significantly in
       order for the Iraqi forces to operate truly ‘independently.’ We find that ministerial capacity for
       logistics and personnel accountability are critically deficient.”130
These findings reinforced Pentagon reports, which identified major shortfalls in ISF
logistics operations. In its June 2007 Quarterly Report, the DoD found that the MoD was
only “partially effective” at logistics, ministerial capacities, and “managing ministry
functions such as personnel management, budgeting, acquisitions and contracting, and
plans and policies. MOD was far from autonomous at carrying out its administrative
functions: “fielded forces often do not get the support they require without substantial
Coalition assistance.”131 According to the Quarterly Report, poor logistics also stalled
operational independence in the MOI.
The US and ISF have taken measures to combat problems with logistics, which will be
outlined in later chapters. The Iraqi Army is slowly developing a skeletal logistics
capability. The Iraqi police forces are not. In part, the police rely on local supplies and
maintenance-problematic in a war zone; in part, coalition forces “transitioned”
maintenance and logistics to the Ministry of Interior control before they had an actual
capability. Logistics and maintenance remain problematic at best.
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Nevertheless, poor logistics remained a critical obstacle on the path to Iraqi self-reliance.
As the House Armed Services Committee report concluded, the sustained “failure to
develop logistics capability could lead to a prolonged US and Coalition presence and
potentially unravel progress and investments made up to this point.”132
The March 2007 DOD Quarterly Report noted that “the most significant shortcoming in
both MOD and MOI forces’ capabilities is in planning and executing logistics and
sustainment requirements.”133 The report also found that “These ministries lack the
capacity to execute their budgets,” and that “the ISF does not have critical enablers like
intelligence and logistics systems and processes that permit independent planning and
operations.” 134
                                     Lack of Equipment
Equipping the Iraqi forces was a slow and controversial process. The Iraqi Ambassador to
the US, Samir Sumaida’ie, said that the delivery of weapons and vehicles to the ISF was
seriously delayed. He noted that:
       “There is general frustration in the Iraqi government at the rate in which Iraqi Armed Forces are
       being equipped and armed…It is difficult to understand why the equipping of our forces has been
       so slow. The Iraqi government requested weapons and equipment for its forces from the
       Americans and was ready to pay with its own money for them. We have been waiting and waiting
       and waiting…Americans are fully protected with the latest equipment and we are just cannon
       fodder.”135
The Department of Defense stated, however, that there were minimal equipment deficits.
It reported that the Iraqi Army was issued over 100% of its initial equipment
authorizations and the Iraqi police was issued 89% of critical equipment. 136 However,
“equipment issued” does little to indicate actual equipment levels still present in the Iraqi
security forces. The DOD did acknowledge that equipment was scarce among certain ISF
units due to equipment fatigue. It reported in the June 2007 Quarterly Report that “some
Army units and police stations may have current equipment shortfalls…due to battle
damage, normal wear and tear and theft.” 137
The lack of equipment for Iraqi forces has been exacerbated by a lack of equipment
accountability. The July 2007 House Armed Services Committee found that “the
[Defense] Department cannot account for whether Coalition-issued weapons have been
stolen or turned against US forces. The Department must focus on personnel and
equipment accountability systems.”138
A July 2007 GAO report also stated that the US program to equip the Iraqi forces had
major accountability problems. It found that “DOD cannot ensure that US-funded
equipment has reached Iraqi Security Forces.”139 It reported that DOD experienced
“continuing problems with missing and incomplete records” tracking equipment and as a
result, “MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces’ receipt of equipment.” It was
unclear how much the billions spent in equipping the ISF ended up in the hands of
insurgents, civilians, or sectarian elements of the ISF. DOD also refused to specify which
accountability programs its train-and-equip programs were subject to: “MNF-I does not
currently have an order…specifying accountability procedures for equipment distributed
to the Iraqi security forces.” 140 This meant that accountability by MNF-I was unlikely to
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improve, since equipment distribution was not subject to any recognizable form of
accounting or regulation.

Absence of a Rule of Law
The lack of an effective criminal justice system and prison system were responsible for
another set of major problems limiting progress in shaping the ISF. Both kinds of systems
are essential for true progress in creating an effective police force and establishing local
security and trust in the government.
This shortfall added to the problems in transferring real responsibility that were created
by an ineffective police and by increasingly more effective organized crime that often
had ties to Shi’ite factions and militias and/or local political leaders in many areas. It is
almost impossible to for police and military forces to function effectively where it is
difficult or impossible to conduct fair trials, and process detainees through a separate
justice system. Police and security abuses become virtually certain, and many detainees
are effectively “warehoused” in ways that expose them to ideological and terrorist
training from fellow inmates while alienating their friends and families. Military forces
can “win,” but only the right combination of police, paramilitary forces, a rule of law,
and government services can “hold” and “build.”
There was still little meaningful rule of law at the provincial and local levels, and it was
clear that it would be several years before current advisory efforts can create them -- if
the courts and justice system could be protected and integrated increasingly into areas at
the national level. The current aid effort is far too limited to cover the country, and it is
probably too late to expand, even if qualified personnel could be recruited and protected.
The US mission did make yet another attempt to organize an effective effort to aid Iraq in
developing a rule of law in June 2007, and individual aid efforts have had considerable
success in limited areas at the national level – but the current aid effort is far too limited
to cover the country, and it is probably too late to expand, even if qualified personnel
could be recruited and protected.
While the US had made major improvements in its own detainee efforts, incarceration by
the ISF was still sectarian. Shi’ite detainees were often freed by corrupt Shi’ite ISF
officers or under pressure from Shi’ite militants. Sunnis were warehoused. In one case
reported by Lt. Col. James George, the acting American commander in Diyala province,
Iraqi army and police targeted Sunni Arabs for detention and held them for at least ten
months without trying them.141
These problems were particularly acute because ongoing military operations led the
MNF-I to estimate the number of detainees would rise from around 18,000 in June to
35,000 by the end of 2007 and to 50,000 by the end of 2008.
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II. Developments In The Ministry of Interior
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) consists of the Iraq Police Service (local police, or IPS),
the Iraqi National Police Force (NP), and supporting police forces. The actual size of the
MOI is unknown. The June 2007 DOD Quarterly Report stated that the MOI consisted of
approximately 194,200 “trained and equipped” personnel: 135,000 local police (IPS),
26,300 National Police, 28,400 border enforcement agents, 500 in the dignitary
protection unit, and 4,000 in the MOI forensics unit.142
These figures, however, give little indication of the actual size of MOI forces. As noted
before, “trained and equipped” is meaningless as a measure of real-world capability and
the number of active personnel. The June 2007 Quarterly Report estimated that 40 to
70% of the total Objective Civil Security Force trained were still serving with the MOI.
Yet it also admitted that, “there is currently no reliable data on how many of the OCSF
are still serving with the MOI.”143 In its June 2007 Quarterly Report, the DOD conceded
that it “is unknown how many of the more than 320,000 employees on the ministry’s
payroll are present for duty on a given day.”144
The July 2007 House Armed Services Committee report on the ISF commented that real
manning levels were entirely unknown. Attrition, padding the rolls, and a lack of
employee accountability had obscured any real estimates of the MOI’s size. The report
stated:
       “Several additional force generation-related problems, which the Department itself reports,
       include: (1) the Department cannot tell “how many of the 306,000 MOI employees on the
       ministry’s payroll are present for duty on a give day,” (2) there are now many ‘extra’ IPs. Lt. Gen.
       Martin Dempsey and Major General Kenneth Hunzeker informed members of a congressional
       delegation that the number of IPS personnel had unaccountably grown from the planned 135,000
       end strength to 195,000 (which is in line with the DOD reporting that all provinces (except al
       Anbar) have “more personnel than agreed,” some of whom may be ghost employees); (3) “Many
       of these ‘extra’ police are put on the job with minimal or no training,” which makes it possible,
       despite the Coalition’s efforts, that the IPS may be a largely untrained force; and (4) there is
       uneven coverage in terms of programmed Coalition-trained IPs in the provinces. That is, of the
       135,000 planned personnel, some provinces have more IPs than authorized. Others have a shortage
       of Coalition-trained police.”145
The DOD did implement employee accountability procedures, including an automated
payroll system. Yet this system was in Phase I of III as of June 2007. The sheer size of
the MOI meant not just that, “the MOI does not yet have accurate personnel
accountability and reporting procedures,” but that it will not have this accountability in
the near-term future.146

The Interior Ministry
Some reports indicate that the Interior Ministry was so plagued by sectarianism and
factionalism that the MOI office resembled a war zone. The Los Angeles Times reported
that each floor was controlled by a heavily armed, rival faction. Police officers at the
MOI were assassinated “probably by fellow officers” at a rate of one or two a week,
“until recently.” 147
       The article noted that:
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       The second floor was controlled by Gen. Mahdi Gharrawi, a former national police commander
       who in 2006 controlled a base in Baghdad with 1,400 mostly Sunni prisoners, many showing signs
       of torture. The third and fifth floors were dominated by Maliki’s Shi’ite Dawa party. The sixth
       floor was controlled by Depute Ministry Ahmed Khafaji of the Badr Organization Militia, who
       allegedly ran secret prisons. Territory in the seventh floor, designated for intelligence, was split
       between the Badr Organization and armed Kurdish groups who vied for dominance, which
       culminated in death threats against the Kurdish deputy minister of intelligence. The ninth floor
       was controlled by the MOI inspector general and general counsel, both Shi’ites whose “offices
       have been at the center of efforts to purge the department’s remaining Sunnis.” The previous
       counselor was a Sunni, who was killed. Employees on the tenth floor were accused of smuggling
       in explosives, possibly “to attack the US advisors stationed directly above them on the top
       floor.”148
The leader of the MOI, Jawad Bolani, made serious attempts to improve the MOI through
the NPTT transformation program and by firing senior sectarian MOI leaders. Jabr
replaced senior MOI leaders three times from March to June 2007 alone.149 Nonetheless,
the MOI has become increasingly Shi’ite under his watch. The Los Angeles Times
reported that three of the MOI’s longest-serving Sunni generals were killed in the past
year, and parties representing Sunnis “have been almost entirely purged from the ministry
in the last two years.”150
The size and complexity of the Interior Ministry also contributed to the difficulty in
reform. Over 2,000 Ministry of Interior employees have been fired, forcibly retired,
relieved, or arrested, but sectarianism remains.
                                     Weak Ministerial Capacity
Incompetence, a culture of diffusing and hiding responsibility, as well as sectarian
agendas all combined to make the mere running of the Interior Ministry very, very
difficult. Improving the MOI was the top priority of the Coalition. In its 2007 Campaign
Action Plan, MNSTC-I declared that improving, building, and sustaining MOI
institutional capacity is its “main effort” for 2007.151 MSNTC-I attempted this by
deploying a Transition Team at the MOI (MOI-TT) consisting of over 100 advisors. 152
These advisors worked with MOI officials to improve their skills in executing plans,
budgets, policies, intelligence, personnel management and logistics.153
Despite this effort, the MOI remained institutionally weak and in need of massive
improvement. MOI Transition Teams reported in May 2007 that the MOI’s capacity was
“effective” in only 2 of 15 categories; the other 13 were characterized as “ineffective” or
“effective with limitations.”154 DOD in June 2007 found only a “marginal improvement
in the MOI’s ability to perform key ministry functions such as developing and
implementing plans and policies, personnel management, logistics, communications, and
budgeting.”155
The MOI also faced serious problems executing its budget, in handling emergency or
sudden requests for funding, and even in managing routine expenditures. . The Defense
Department noted “inconsistent” financial reporting that “results in difficulty for the MOI
to budget centrally and execute funds effectively and transparently.” A March 2007
investigation by the House Armed Services Committee found that as of November 2006,
the MOI had spent 82% of its salary budget for CY 2006, but only 49% of its budget for
goods and services, 15% of its capital good budget, and 11% for capital projects.156
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Overall, the House Armed Services Committee report found that the MOI was “only
partially effective in performing key ministry functions, such as developing and
implementing plans and policies, intelligence, personnel management, logistics,
communications and budgeting.”157

Shi’ite Infiltration
The MOI forces have led to the biggest -- and perhaps irredeemable – failures of the Iraqi
government and Coalition forces to create truly national security forces. The MOI is
plagued by sectarian infiltration, equipment shortages, and incompetence, despite
measures to eradicate all three. MOI’s performance was uneven at best.
Creating a nonsectarian police force was vital to US goals of stability and security in Iraq.
General Petraeus said that forging a “capable Iraqi Security Forces, relatively free of
ethnic and sectarian bias” was second in priority only to providing security for Iraqis.158
Nonetheless, sectarian influence and corruption remained a serious problem.
Yet, the regular police remain a mess at the national level, and are there were no
prospects of creating a truly national police force or one that can both perform regular
police duties and deal effectively with militias and insurgents – except for some
specialized elements. In the real world, the regular police is already divided up into
elements under local control with strong sectarian and ethnic ties, has links to insurgents
and militias in many areas, and lacks the paramilitary capabilities to resist local threats.
Reform of the National Police has failed. Even some "reblued" units – like those with
missions south of Baghdad -- are seen as tolerating or aiding the [Shi’ite militia] JAM.
Numerous reports noted widespread sectarian infiltration throughout the MoI. The House
Armed Services Committee, in its July 2007 ISF assessment, concluded that, “there is
strong evidence that many of the police are operationally ineffective, and their
organization is riddled with corruption and sectarian influence.”159
The DOD acknowledged that corruption and sectarianism had significantly undermined
the MOI. It found that:
        “Corruption, illegal activity and sectarian/militia influence constrain faster progress in developing
       MOI forces…Although the primary concern of the Government of Iraq remains the Sunni
       insurgency, multiple allegations of tolerance of an influence exerted by Shi’a militia members
       within the MOI are troubling. Militia influence impacts every component of the MOI, particularly
       in Baghdad and several other key cities.”160
Senior military officials reported similar critical infiltration. In his July testimony,
General Petraeus stated that “the police remain a challenge” in creating an effective,
unbiased ISF.161 He said that within the ISF, “not all of those are the same level of
effectiveness, and some of the police undoubtedly are of limited effectiveness.”162
Defense Secretary Gates commented in July 2007 that no one has “ever made any bones
about the fact that the training and the capability and the reliability of the Iraqi police was
very uneven and in some areas a real concern.”163
After allegations that MOI personnel had participated in the kidnapping of five American
soldiers in Karbala, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace remarked in July
that: “The fact of the matter is that there are elements of the Iraqi police and elements of
the Iraqi army that are infiltrated.” 164 General Bednarek noted of the police:
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       “That has been our most difficult task [in dealing with] the Iraqi security forces. As we stand up
       and grow and sustain them for the long-term, can they, in fact, take over the security of this
       country? It’s going to be a long road ahead and we are clearly not there yet.”165
Major General Rick Lynch, MNF-I commander, reported that these problems persisted as
of August 2007. He said that “The issue is the police – they’re nonexistent or they’re
corrupt or they’re incapable in general terms. The problem is working with the Iraqi
police.”166
Iraqi officials also reported extensive sectarian influence in the ministry. Foreign Minister
Hoshyar Zebari reported that Shi’ite infiltration into the MOI was so extensive that “It
had been a known fact for sometime time that the Interior Ministry police, security units
and forces are corrupt, are penetrated.”167

Improving MOI Accountability
The US and Iraqi government made efforts to improve screening and vetting of MOI
personnel to combat misconduct. This included formal investigations of corruption and
sectarianism. In the July 2007 Quarterly Report, the DOD reported that:168
   •   From January 1, 2007 through March 31, 2007, MOI Internal Affairs opened 1,954 new
       corruption-related investigations. The investigations resulted in the firing of 854 employees, the
       forced retirement of 13, referral to the Commission of Public Integrity of 16 for further
       investigation, and internal disciplinary action against 255. The other 816 cases remain open. The
       Internal Affairs Directorate conducted 41 human rights-related investigations. Of these, two
       resulted in disciplinary punishment and 39 remain open.
   •   The Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) project identified 1,200 cases making
       false applications for the reporting period of January 1, 2007 through March 31, 2007. Of these
       1,200 cases, the Minister dismissed 92 employees who committed the most serious violations. The
       Minister also dismissed 824 cases from the December 2006 list. As of March 31, 2007, 916
       employees have been dismissed since the beginning of the year.
   •   In March 2007, the Government of Iraq screened 280,000 MOI employees, checking their
       fingerprints in criminal and Ba’ath databases. The DOD reported that of 8,000 possible derogatory
       matches, the GoI took action against approximately 3,400.169
Despite these measures, sectarianism and ethnic ties remained critical problems within
the Ministry of Interior, National Police, and many elements of the regular police. The
House Armed Services Committee reported that, for embedded US officers who reported
sectarianism in their assessments, “their view is that, more often than not, neither MOI
nor MNC-I takes remedial action. If action is taken, it usually results in the transfer or
promotion of problem actors, not their removal, a problem recognized by General
Dempsey in his [June] testimony before the [HASC] subcommittee.”170 Embedded US
police advisors also noted that the MOI was not proactive in combating sectarianism.
Testimony to the Armed Services Committee revealed “there is a dearth of support
in…making appropriate personnel changes from MOI.”171
Reluctance to fire sectarian personnel was exacerbated by a complete lack of screening
for militia members. The House Armed Services Committee reported that “because of the
decentralized nature of the militias, a database on militia members is not maintained, and
there is currently no screening process specifically designed to ascertain militia
allegiance.”172
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As of March 2007, the US had turned over vetting, screening, and basic training to the
MOI.173 Since then, both sectarian and ethnic divisions and corruption appear to have
worsened. As MOI personnel were increasingly held less accountable for their actions,
sectarian behavior became entrenched.

Shortfalls in MOI Logistics, Equipment, and Sustainment
Logistics operations for the National Police are overseen by the MOI headquarters for the
National Police. DBE and POE logistics are headed by local commanders who assume
unit responsibility in their areas of operation. Logistics for the IPS also was headed by
local provincial authorities, namely the Provincial Directors of Police (PDOP).174
According to the July 2007 DoD Quarterly Report, “MOI’s logistics and sustainment
capacity require continued development.” The House Armed Service Committee was
more frank, insisting that, “MOI forces will not make significant contributions to the
security and stability of Iraq until the logistics system, and the MOI and provincial
institutions responsible for logistics support, improve.”175
                                     A Lack of Equipment
The MOI was supposed to be fully equipped by early 2007.176 Yet the Defense
Department noted “key shortfalls” in MOI equipment and equipment maintenance in the
July 2007 Quarterly Report. 177 These equipment shortfalls included:
           •   Uniforms: The House Armed Services Committee cited reports by US advisors that local
               police “personnel barely have uniforms and do not have IPS identification badges.”

           •   Weapons: The HASC noted that local police weapons were frequently confiscated by ISF
               or Coalition forces, which suspected the weapon-bearers of sectarianism. The Committee
               noted that many Iraqi police were left with substandard or insufficient equipment. This
               included unarmored vehicles highly susceptible to IEDs and small arms fire.178
               Equipment problems such as non-secure or distance-limited IPS radios were also
               reported.179

           •   Fuel: Reports from the House Armed Services Committee noted a shortage of fuel due to
               MOI corruption and poor governance. While testifying to the HASC, Marines said that:
                   “Fuel was also an issue that grew as the police gained more vehicles. MOI did not
                   have a plan to provide fuel support for the IP in Al Anbar. Even if a plan and
                   appropriate funding were available, Al Anbar did not have secure facilities for
                   holding and distributing this fuel. Additionally, the lack of it across the province
                   created a large black market for fuel. Corruption within the police often resulted in
                   the police stealing and selling their own fuel, often from their own gas tank.”180

           •   Ammunition: The House Armed Services Committee reported that:
                   “Many stations lack sufficient ammunition. The MOI is starting to take responsibility
                   for ammunition replenishment to the NP…However, the Coalition complains that for
                   unknown reasons the MOI consistently denies these requests for ammunition,
                   resulting in the Coalition supporting them.”181

           •   Spare parts: The US has distributed only 1% of required spare parts through FMS
               contracts.182
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The lack of suitable equipment was exacerbated by poor equipment maintenance by MOI
forces. The House Armed Services Committee report stated that, “the biggest problem for
the MOI forces among all the TRA categories evaluated is maintenance of vehicle,
communications equipment, and weapons.” It noted that the Coalition issued equipment
that was too sophisticated and required advanced technical expertise and tools to
maintain. Yet the US also issued “only a few” cleaning and spare parts kits.183 As a
result, MOI forces were forced to cannibalize equipment to provide repair parts for US-
issued equipment, since there was a shortage of spare parts. The committee noted that this
cannibalization had rendered “a large number of IPS vehicles…inoperable.”184
The MOI also failed to take the initiative to address equipment maintenance problems.
The House Armed Services Committee report indicated that, “MNSTC-I believes that a
key source of these maintenance problems is that MOI is not willing to accept
responsibility for…maintainability of equipment. 185
It also was not willing to allocate the necessary funds for equipment procurement. The
Committee reported that: “The operational readiness of some equipment and
infrastructure systems suffered because maintenance supplies, spare parts, and
sustainment funding were never provided by the Coalition and are not currently provided
by the GOI.” 186
                        A Lack of Equipment Accountability
The House Armed Services Committee noted, “there is inadequate reporting on the status
of equipment issued and logistical support provided to the MOI forces.”187 Since MNF-I
reporting only covered approximately half of the 1,100 local police stations, equipment
accountability by the US was challenged.
The burden for equipment accountability was also not assumed by Iraqi forces: The
Defense Department reported that, “due to the immaturity of the MOI’s equipment
accountability system, there are no reliable figures on how much of [the IPS] equipment
remains in service.”188 The House Armed Services Committee also reported that, “MOI
forces cannot account for a significant amount of Coalition-issued equipment.”189 It
stated that, “MNSTC-I believes that a key source of these maintenance problems is that
MOI is not willing to accept responsibility for accountability… of equipment.” 190
A vast amount of equipment was unaccounted for. By July 2007, the Defense Department
reported that it had issued all authorized vehicles and weapons to the NP and distributed
89% of critical equipment to the local police.191 Yet it stated that, “a significant portion of
the equipment may no longer be in MOI inventories.”192
For the local police, only around 50% of issued pistols, machine guns, and body armor
were on-hand and only about 25% of handheld and vehicle radios issued remained on
hand.193 It was unclear how many of these weapons were confiscated by ISF forces and
how many had been distributed to sectarian or civilian elements. The National Police had
the highest percentage of authorized equipment reported “on hand” at any given time.
This was due to the centralized command structure of the NP, which allowed for greater
monitoring and transparency.194
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                           Transitioning Logistics to the MOI
Responsibility for logistics was supposed to be transferred to the MOI as outlined in the
MNSTC-I 2007 Campaign Action Plan. The plan mandated adopting a November 2006
Concept of Support and Logistics Action Plan, and focused on transitioning contracting
capabilities to the MOI. 195 DoD cited some progress in MOI logistics self-reliance,
namely the central purchasing of vehicles and repair parts through self-generated FMS
contracts, ammunition purchases through FMS contracts, and assuming responsibility for
all life support contracts, with the exception of the Baghdad police college.196 MNSTC-I
claimed that the MOI as a whole was 75% self-sufficient in logistics operations.197
In the real world, the MOI has not developed any real logistics capabilities. In part, the
police relied on local supplies and maintenance - problematic in a war zone This has been
less problematic for the police than for Army units, particularly now that MNF-I and the
Iraqi government have shifted to concept of local policing. The police do have to learn to
supply themselveswith local supplies and maintenance—the same way that LAPD,
NYPD and all other big police departments function. Most still cannot d this effectively
or at all, but it is implementation rather than the force structure and operational concept
that is the problem.).
In any case, Coalition forces did try to “transition” maintenance and logistics to the
Ministry of Interior control before they had an actual capability. The House Armed
Services Committee noted that, “The MOI does not sufficiently support its forces in the
field, especially the IPS.”198 The Committee also concluded that the National Police’s
“maintenance system is not sufficiently mature” to provide units for logistics support:199
       “Key challenges for equipping the MOI…include the lack of approved plans and the lack of
       reliable reporting on the status of these forces. Both of these challenges can partly be attributed to
       the fact that responsibility for plans and reporting is not centralized within the MOI. Furthermore,
       the MOI logistics directorates lack capacity and have some of the lowest TRA ratings of any of the
       ISF ministerial organizations.
A lack of reporting on logistics transition sustained MOI inertia. The House Armed
Services Committee reported that:
       “The status of equipment and logistics support to MOI forces is poorly understood because of a
       lack of adequate reporting…The level of reporting on MOI logistics development effort does not
       match the significance of these efforts, and Congress is not adequately informed about progress
       toward MOI self-reliance…More oversight is required to ensure the development of this
       capacity.”200

The Iraqi Police Service
The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is the largest element of the civil security force under the
MOI and is considered by DOD to be “the foundation of the Ministry of Interior security
forces.”201 The IPS consists of 135,000 personnel, including patrol, traffic, station and
highway police in addition to specialists. 202 Blackwater USA reported that the IPS was
structured into a headquarters and 18 Provincial police departments that covered a total of
147 police districts. Each provincial department has a provincial headquarters police
station, a provincial police director, and a varying number of police stations. 203 Each
province also had district station with 35 policemen and a major general in addition to a
headquarters.
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The Army Combat Studies Institute explained the structure of the IPS. Police stations
were of three sizes: 204
   •   Small – 1 IPS major, staffed with 76 policemen with patrol shifts consisting of ten patrolmen
   •   Medium – 1 IPS major commander, 112 policemen with patrol shifts of 20 patrolmen each
   •   Large – 1 IPS lieutenant colonel, 230 policemen and patrol shifts of 40 patrolmen each
Despite its formal command structure on paper, the IPS has a decentralized command and
control structure that DOD acknowledges is “unclear.” DOD reported in its March 2007
Quarterly Report that “the decentralized nature of the Iraqi Police Service often results in
conflicting guidance and directives coming simultaneous from the central ministry and
the provincial government.” 205 This convoluted chain of command had lead to decreased
accountability and diminished IPS performance.
                                       Training the IPS: PTTs
Training was aided by embedded advisory support, in the form of police training teams
(PTTs). PTTs mentor the Iraqi police and conduct joint patrols. 206 They were under the
jurisdiction of C-MATT. 222 PTTs were deployed in Iraq, 10 at the provincial police
headquarters level, 65 at the district level, and 149 at the police station level.207 Each PTT
had 12 to 15 officers, 2 to 4 of which were civilian International Police Liaison Officers
(IPLOs), civilian law enforcement officers hired by the State Department.208
PTTs lived on forward operating bases, rotating to different police units within their
specific district or province.209 Deployments to each unit were short. Embedded officers
assessed police with Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) that reported on progress
toward a 150-task police essential task list (PETL).210 PTTs consisted of a Military Police
(MP) squad supplemented by International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs). PTTs MPs
are responsible to MNC-I, while PTT IPLOs are responsible to MNSTC-I and CPATT,
creating an uncertain chain of command.211
These PTTs originally held the responsibility for police training. Yet by winter 2006,
Iraqi forces had formally assumed responsibility for many ISF training operations. By
December 31, 2006, all Iraqi police academies had transitioned to Iraqi control, except
for the Baghdad Police College (BPC) and Jordan International Police College (JIPTC).
The Pentagon reported in July 2006 that the MOI “is now responsible for running the
majority of its training academies and for generating replenishments for the police force.”
The ten-week Iraqi-run training programs were “functioning at full capability” as of June
2007.212 While, “to date more than 3,000 cadets have graduated from Iraqi-run police
training programs,” it was unclear how many of these cadets remained.213 Force
development was thus overseen by both US and Iraqi forces.
PTTs did retrain IPS units in a three-week Transition Integration Program (TIP). TIP
“aims to retrain veteran police officers’ to imbue a “respect for human rights” and also
was “designed to identify personnel who were unsuitable for police service” in addition
to possible IPS leaders.214 This created a screening mechanism to identify and root out
sectarian elements.
The PTTs continued to be undermanned. Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard said that about 200 US
teams were advising the Iraqi police, but he said this number was not sufficient.215 DOD
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noted that “only 5 of Iraq’s 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs” at any given time.216 This
amounted to about 14% of Iraq’s police stations.217 This deficit in PTTs meant that there
were insufficient forces to assess the Iraqi police, and that Coalition training and advising
had fallen short of what was necessary. IPLOs, the civilian element of embedded advisor
teams, were seriously undermanned. The State Department originally recommended that
6,600 IPLOs be sent to Iraq, yet only 690 were operating there as of June 2007.218
PTTs were also sometimes undertrained. The House Armed Services Committee report
stated that:
       “In contrast to other TTs, the effort to train PTTs with common standards has only recently been
       undertaken. Prior to spring 2007, PTT specific training was ad hoc. Most PTT veterans reported
       that they received no specific police advisor training.” 219
Formal PTT training was started when the Army Military Police School at Fort Leonard
Wood, Missouri, created a PTT training program.220 As of March 2007, instructors for
Army PTTs (MPs) attended a one-week program at the MP school, learning about the
role of police advisor, the Iraqi police, and PTT best practices. However “the rigor and
quality of this training has not yet been assessed.”221 IPLOs meanwhile attend a two-
week DynCorp training course.222
Iraqis did assume more responsibility for training their local police. Police academies
transitioned to Iraqi control by December 2006. An Iraqi police training academy was
being constructed and was expected to be ready by summer 2007. 223 The US, however,
still played a critical role in IPS training.
Yet, the US effort was also complicated by the involvement of multiple US government
agencies and contractors, which created an unclear chain of command and hampered IPS
training oversight. The Armed Services Committee noted that, “challenges continue to
arise because multiple agencies are at work in contracting for the training of the ISF with
different role, authorities, and contracting regulations.”224
While the Defense Department assumed responsibility for training the IPS from the State
Department in 2005, other agencies and contractors still played a vital role in training the
Iraqi police. The Committee report noted that:
       “The Departments of State and Justice (DOJ), which typically fulfill the international civilian
       police training function, have remained heavily involved in the IPS effort. Their involvement has
       been primarily through the use of contractor personnel. Since 2004, the Department of Defense
       has provided more than $1.5 billion to the DOS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
       Enforcement Affairs (INL) for various aspects of the police training mission, including 1)
       operation and maintenance of the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC), 2)
       international police liaison officers (IPLOs) contracted through DynCorp International, 3)
       international police trainers (IPTs) provided by the Department of Justice through a contract with
       Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI) under an agreement with INL, and 4) a variety of
       other personnel and logistical support services for those personnel.
Private contractors were used extensively to augment an undermanned police training
force. HASC noted that “The scale of needs for personnel and funding in the police
training mission in Iraq were initially far beyond what the small in-theater INL staff was
prepared to handle. This led the Department of State to increase the size of its contract
oversight staff.” Yet the performance of these contractors was called into question. “The
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Department of State has acknowledged major problems in managing contracts with
DynCorp, and asserts that is has taken remedial action to correct these problems.”225
This approach to training the local police meant that IPS force development was
sometimes incoherent and under-regulated. Iraqis and Coalition troops did successfully
train some local police, but training successes were local. The reality of IPS training
encouraged the House Armed Services Committee to recommend a “new strategy for the
development of the Iraqi Police Service as soon as possible.”226
                                 Sectarian Infiltration in the IPS
Reports on IPS performance suggest that local militias and factions often dominate the
local police. The DOD June Quarterly Report noted that corruption was particularly
pronounced among the IPS. It commented that:
       “Militia infiltration of local police remains a significant problem…Some security forces also
       remain prone to intimidation by, or collusion with, criminal gangs. Even when police are not
       affiliated with a militia or organized crime, there is often mutual distrust between the police and
       the judiciary, each viewing the other as corrupt.”227
        General Petraeus also saw the sectarian character of the police as a significant
challenge to force development. He said that up to 70% of Iraqi police leaders had been
replaced because they had ties to sectarian violence.228 Brig. Gen. Pittard reported that
local police were still susceptible to militia infiltration, and that sectarian loyalty still
needed to be actively addressed among these units. Another Pentagon official noted that
because of sectarian loyalties among IPS officers, “half of them are part of the problem,
not the solution.”229
        Militia infiltration and corruption was the most acute in Baghdad, Diyala, and
Babil provinces. Lt. Gen. Dempsey reported that local police were ineffective and
dominated by militia and tribal interests across Iraq, but especially in Baghdad and
Diyala province. 230 In Babil province near Baghdad, the province police commander,
Gen. Qais al-Mamorrey, reported that in June 2007, 65 policemen were removed from the
force on the grounds of sectarian loyalties. He noted that, “The main problem we face is a
great shortage of police and army soldiers and equipment. We need government support
to purge the police force of bad police elements.”231
       Shi’ite infiltration into local police ranks caused particularly notable incidents:
   •   In late May 2007, Shi’ite militants abducted a British financial analyst and four British
       bodyguards from the Finance Ministry. The abductions were conducted in retaliation for the
       assassination of top Mahdi Commander Abu Qadir the previous week by British and Iraqi Special
       Forces. An investigation concluded that the local police at the MOI ministry were complicit in the
       abductions, if they did not fully collude: Iraqi police disappeared immediately before the
       abduction began, insurgents knew exactly where to find the US officers, and they entered the
       ministry through an unlocked and unguarded back gate. 232 Iran was accused of training the
       kidnappers, who were abducted the officers 1.5 miles away from the Shi’ite stronghold of Sadr
       City.233
   •   Sunni mosques in Basra were destroyed in retaliation for the second bombing of the Shi’ite shrine
       in Samarra in late June 2007. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki fired the police chief in Basra,
       alleging that the local police in the area had not taken action to stop the bombings.234
   •   On July 13 2007, US soldiers US soldiers killed 6 uniformed Iraqi policemen and seven gunmen
       in a street battle in Baghdad that left 11 dead. The Coalition troops had arrested a police lieutenant
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       accused of leading a Shi’ite militia group with ties to Iran’s IRGC, a paramilitary wing that trains
       Iraqi insurgents.235
   •   Reports of sectarian police in Baqubah during Operation Arrowhead Ripper was widespread.
       Officials reported that some Iraqi police abandoned villages right before US operations and were
       cooperating with Shi’ite militias.236
However, some units were less sectarian. Lt. Gen. Dempsey remarked that the local
police were performing well in Mosul. 237
                       Diminished Accountability As the IPS Grows
Shortfalls in vetting and monitoring contributed to widespread militia infiltration in the
Iraqi Police Service. The July 2007 ISF report by the House Armed Services Committee
concluded that, “We are concerned about whether the Department is even attempting to
measure progress adequately for a large portion of the Iraqi Security Forces, notably the
Iraq Police Service.”238 Reporting on the IPS by the DOD was vague and understaffed at
best.
Accountability for IPS personnel diminished when the US government transferred
responsibility for vetting to the Iraqi government in February 2006. Despite the presence
of MNF-I vetting teams to assist in the process in 2005, the DOD inspector general noted
in May 2007 that, “the vetting system may be suspect.”239 DOD also reported that Iraqi
officials “have hired tens of thousands of additional IPs, presumably, without a standard
vetting process.”240 In November 2006, Lt. Gen. Dempsey testified that there were
“between 60,000 and 75,000 policemen on the payroll over the authorization and
untrained by us.”241
Some IPS officers disappeared entirely, contributing to “significant” attrition rates among
the local police.242 The US Commander of the 372d Military Police Battalion commented
on the lack of IPS accountability:
       “That process is very frustrating to us…We would see the recruiting process, sir, from start to end.
       And I can tell you if we sent over 80 IPs to Jordan or Baghdad Academy [for training], we could
       not account, but, I will say, for maybe 50 percent of those IPs at the end of the 8-week training,
       and we just could not get a pulse on what activity was happening at the school that allowed us not
       to…battle-track these IPs. We vetted them, sir. We would go to the recruitment center and ensure
       that these civilians would go through the process, take the test…We wait for them to go to
       training, we can’t find them at the end of the course…we send 80, we can only account for 40.”243
Not only were Iraqi police officers improperly trained or missing, the performance of the
remaining officers was often not evaluated. PTTs, embedded US trainers, have the
primary responsibility for assessing the performance of the Iraqi Police units they
advised. Yet PTTs are seriously undermanned, hindering a thorough assessment of the
IPS. The House Armed Services Committee in July 2007 noted that:
       “TRAs [Training Readiness Assessments] are the only formal method for reporting operational
       readiness to the Coalition…The [Defense] Department reports that the shortage of PTTs limits
       coverage of the IPS in 13 of 18 provinces, which prevents the Coalition from assessing the
       performance of the IPS for a substantial portion of Iraq. Moreover, in those provinces under PIC,
       the Coalition does not routinely assess performance.”244
Tens of thousands of local Iraqi police remained unregulated, untrained, and
unmonitored. As more and more IPS officers are hired by Iraq without appropriate
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training – a certainty given the manning goals of 32,000 new police to “replenish” the
ranks of the MOI – the lack of monitoring is expected to worsen.245
The continuing lack of accountability among the IPS did lead to a new strategy for
training, vetting, and monitoring the local police. The Government of Iraq and Coalition
forces launched new accountability procedures – including fingerprinting and biometric
registering of retinal scans– but it is too soon to determine the effects of these procedures.
What was clear was that the DoD needed to improve its force development efforts to
better target sectarian elements. However, Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard’s vision of a bigger,
better police force remained out of reach. He noted that “our ultimate goal is not for the
Iraqi army to be in the streets of the cities of Iraq,” but “for the Iraqi police to do that, and
that will take some time.”246
                                  The Failure To Reform the IPS
Despite claims that 2006 was to be the “year of the police” and subsequent efforts at
reform, much of the IPS remained sectarian and incompetent. The House Armed Services
Committee summarized the obstacles that prevented the creation of a nonbiased, effective
IPS service:
        Transferring responsibility for the IPS to the Government of Iraq after a single year of focused
        effort on force generation appears to have been premature and ill-advised for the following
        reasons: (1) lack of personnel and equipment data, (2) lack of visibility into the vetting process,
        (3) inability to determine whether police personnel have received appropriate training, (4) lack of
        familiarity with community policing in Iraqi society, (5) immaturity of the MOI and the lack of
        capacity to support the IPS in the field, (6) lack of maturity in the judicial and penal systems to
        support the police work, (7) unclear chain of command between the Ministry of Interior and the
        provincial government, and (8) substantial shortage of Coalition personnel mentoring and
        assessing the performance of the IPS.247
This combination of insufficient training, a lack of accountability, and extensive
sectarianism meant that the transfer of authority to the IPS was premature. The IPS was
not ready to be self-reliant. The House Armed Services Committee report also found that
the US attempted to transfer security responsibility for the IPS to the Iraqi government
too quickly and to limited effect:
        It does not appear that MNF-I is focused on developing the IPS or exploiting their potential
        contributions…This lack of focus is evidence by the rapid transfer to MOI of the tasks related to
        IPS force generation, including vetting, training, mentoring and assessing performance. It is also
        evidenced by the considerable shortage in the number of transition teams mentoring and advising
        the IPS, which, in turn, limits the Coalition’s visibility into how well the IPS are operating. As a
        result, the Coalition is not utilizing a key strategic enabler effectively.248
The premature transfer of responsibility also meant that too little additional progress was
made to reform the IPS. The regular police remained a mess at the national level, and
there were no prospects of creating a truly national police force or one that can both
perform regular police duties and deal effectively with militias and insurgents. No formal
changes have yet taken place to what everyone in the field seems to agree is a failed,
over-centralized structure.
A new strategy was needed to make the IPS a force multiplier rather than a liability for
the Iraqi Security Forces. The House Armed Services Committee report noted that
appropriate “development of the IPS is not the priority it should be…The Coalition has
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not appropriately prioritized this mission… The Coalition should make IPS force
development a higher priority than it currently is.”249 It concluded that “The committee
should require the [Defense] Department to adopt a new strategy for the development of
the Iraqi Police Service as soon as possible.” 250

The National Police Service
The National Police (NP) was originally created by the MoI -- independently of the
MNF-I and MNSTC-I efforts at developing the ISF -- to act as a paramilitary police force
that could also conduct counterinsurgency operations. As of May 2006, the NP consisted
of a National Police Headquarters, 2 National Police Divisions – the Commando and
Public Order Divisions, the 1st National Police Mechanized Brigade, and the Emergency
Response Unit.251 It had 26,300 “trained and equipped” personnel listed in the June 2007
DoD Quarterly Report.252
These forces were formed out of a mix of forces that had strong ties to Shi’ite factions
and militias and which were deeply involved in sectarian cleansing and abuses. Four
brigades were formed from the disbanded SP divisions (1,2,3,7), and four were part of the
Public Order division (4,5,6,8).253
Deployment of the National Police was heavily focused in Baghdad, with all but one of
the nine NP brigades conducting security operations in the capital.254 (The remaining
brigade was retraining at Numaniya Training Facility as part of the NP Transformation
plan.) The NP brigade headquarters were mainly near Baghdad: The 1st and 2nd Brigade
HQ were in northern Baghdad, the 3rd in Samarra, 4th in Salman Pak, 5th in Camp Justice
(Baghdad), 6th brigade in Mashtal (Baghdad), 7th brigade in southwestern Baghdad, 8th
brigade in Walid, and the 1st NP mechanized brigade in western Baghdad. The Prime
Minister also launched an Initiative to create a 10th NP brigade, which will be dispatched
to protect the Samarra shrine reconstruction.255 The brigade was scheduled to be
completed in spring 2007 but remains to be created.256
                               Training the NP: NPTTs
There were 39 National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs) supported the Iraqi police by
“mentoring, training, and facilitating communication with Coalition forces.”257 A
transition team was also placed at each headquarters. NPTTs generally lived with Iraqi
units.258 NPTTs were a crucial component of the JSS effort, however, like their IPS
counterpart, were undermanned.
                               Sectarian Infiltration in the NP
Hard-line elements of the JAM and similar Shi’ite militias were embedded in the NP
from the beginning. The House Armed Services Committee reported that, “since its
inception…the National Police (NP) have been riddled with corruption and sectarian
influence.”259 However, “while it is not entirely clear how the MOI first recruited the NP,
it appears that the ministry pieced it together from Saddam-era Sunni commandos and
Shi’a militia. One expert has found that ‘Badr Brigade [Shi’a] militiamen were organized
into commando-style units, which were incorporated into the Iraq[i] National Police.’”260
This contributed to the initial sectarian nature of the NP.
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                                     Efforts to Reform the NP
The US recognized that Shi’ite infiltration was a large problem for the NP, and created
reform programs in response. The National Police Transformation (or “re-blueing”) plan,
established in 2006, provided a four-week training course that emphasized rule of law,
police skills, and human rights.261 The program, conducted at Numaniyah, southeast of
Baghdad, also re-vetted leaders and implemented background checks. The DOD reported
that five of nine NP brigades had completed retraining by May 14, 2007.
The NP Transformation Plan sparked massive firings. By Auugust 2007, nine of the nine
brigade commanders were removed from the NP, five so for “sectarian biases.”262 Some
27,000 personnel were dropped from the National Police by May 2007, although
sectarianism was not officially cited as the reason.263 17 of 27 police battalion
commanders were replaced.264 Entire brigades - including the 8th brigade, which was
accused of raiding and kidnapping Sunni workers - were removed from operational duty
and sent to Numaniyah. 265 It was unclear exactly how many NP officers were fired, but
Defense Secretary Gates commented in July 2007 that “They’ve gotten rid of as much as
25 percent in some units, put in new recruits, retrained and put them back in the field.”266
The NP reform plan also purged Shi’ite-loyal personnel from the top ranks of the NP.
Brig. Gen. Pittard reported that since October 2006, “most” of the top leaders of the
police hard been fired.267 By June 2007, more than a third of Iraq’s National Police
battalion commanders were Sunni.268 Nonetheless, a full 85% of the National Police were
Shi’ite.269
                               The Failure To Reform the NP
Despite claims of “significant progress,” reform of the national police has failed.270 Hard-
line Shi’ite militia elements were still embedded in the National Police. The NP was far
more involved in sectarian cleansing than the Iraqi Army. Even some "reblued" units –
like those with missions south of Baghdad -- are seen as tolerating or aiding the JAM
when they are not under tight US control and as part of the problem in the southern ring
area.
In their June assessments of the ISF, senior military officials recognized persistent
sectarianism and corruption in the NP Lt. Gen. Dempsey noted that the paramilitary wing
of Iraq’s National Police force was most plagued by sectarianism and corruption.271 Brig.
Gen. Dana Pittard also noted that corruption had lessened but remained a problem for the
National Police, commenting that “there’s still more work to be done” to reform them.272.
Both Dempsey and Gen. Pittard acknowledged that the National Police were perceived as
a vehicle of Shi’ite sectarian warfare. The House Armed Services Committee July 2007
also reported lingering “corruption, illegal activity, and sectarian influence [that] are
serious problems that constrain progress in developing the National Police.”273
Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, a commander who operates in four provinces south of Baghdad,
said extensive corruption had strained an already understaffed NP force. He reported in
June 2007, that about 10% of the territory he commanded had no Iraqi police at all, “And
in many areas where we do have police, we have corrupt police.”274 He noted that these
corrupt National Police impaired the performance of provincial local police, often forcing
them to free detainees as a result of sectarian affiliations.
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                Diminished NP Accountability As Security Transitions
The MOI now holds responsibility for recruiting and vetting new NPs to replace
previously corrupt personnel. This occurred when MNSTC-I handed over all training to
the Government of Iraq in December 2006. The House Armed Services Committee
reported that “it is not clear how the ministry is doing this” vetting, further raising the
prospect of sectarian infiltration.275
One option to solve these problems is to incorporate the National Police into the Army
over time, but this depends on political decisions that have not been taken yet. The NP
also present a major problem because they now have no budget and regular supply chain
from either the MoD or MoI. This means the US forces have to supply the better battalion
elements with at least some of their needs. This failure is a marked contrast to the IA
units that are developing a limited amount of self-sufficiency or "life support," although
this is extremely patchy and uncertain.

The Department of Border Enforcement (DPE and
Department of Ports of Entry (POE)
Foreign fighters have a disproportionate impact on the insurgency, and play a major role
in suicide and other bombings that have done much to divide the country. While only
several dozen foreign fighters a month travel to Iraq, these fighters account for 80-90% of
suicide bombers.276 No border or coastline can ever be fully secured against infiltration
and arms summing, but the DBE and POE could play a role in reducing such infiltration
and critical counterinsurgency.
As of August 2007, the DBE and POE were making progress, but still had serious
problems. They were undermanned, overstretched, and underequipped. As of May 2007,
the DBE had an authorized end-strength of 33,000 personnel -- with 28,360 “trained and
equipped” - formed into 42 battalions.277 MNSTC-I listed 29,660 DBE and PoE
personnel “trained and equipped” by July 2007. 278 However, actual manning levels were
unknown and its was unclear if the DoD had actually met DBE and POE manning goals
of 28,400 as it claimed in the July Quarterly Report.
Existing units were overstretched. The Second Region of the DBE, commanded by Maj.
Gen. Hadi Taah Hasoun al-Mamoori, covers 830 miles of border with Syria, Jordan, and
Saudi Arabia. Yet this vast border, through which many foreign fighters travel, is only
manned by 12,000 men. These men are stationed mostly in the 77 permanent border
forts, some of which are separated by 30 miles.
Facilities remained a problem, although many were being completed. The DBE Director
General stated that the DBE “is building smaller border fort annexes to close the gaps in
areas with a high threat of intrusion.” By May 2007, the Iraqi government had funded
construction for 16 border fort annexes and planned to construct 291 more, which would
bring the total number of forts and annexes to 711. DOD commented that, “Once
complete these should provide adequate facilities to support the forces providing Iraqi
border security.”279
DOD reported that by May 2007, “all Coalition planned border forts are complete and
have been handed over to the Government of Iraq.”280 DOD also asserted that Iraqis had
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assumed control of the ports: As of May 2007, the Iraqi Directorate Ports of Entry (PoE)
operated 13 of the 17 land ports of entry into Iraq, while the other four were closed in
February 2007 to improve security.
DBE and POE units were underequipped: logistical support to the forts was so poor that
many of them had to fend for themselves, buying their own food and fuel. Lt. Col.
Matthew Day, commander of the training team working in the 2nd Region, stated that the
lack of food and fuel “really inhibits their operations. They can’t go beyond the forts.”281
Nevertheless, DBE and POE responsibility was being transitioned to Iraqis.
The DBE and POE still depended on Coalition troops for some degree of logistical
support. The DoD reported in its June 2007 Quarterly Report that of the 42 DBE
battalions, 38 “are supported by a Coalition equipping program.”
Coalition forces continued to aid in training DBE and POE personnel. 28 Coalition
Border Transition Teams (BTTs) supported border and port operations. BTTs generally
rotated to various border stations rather than live with Iraqi units.282 DOD officers also
trained DBEs at three academies with a total capacity of 800 students. DynCorp was
hired to recruit US Border Patrol agents to provide the 120 volunteers for the State
Department to help train Iraqi DBE officers.283
While there are signs of progress, oversight and monitoring of the DBE and POE was
limited. The DOD reported in 2005 that “if tracking for the NP is problematic, DBE and
FPS tracking is worse.”284 Little more has been discovered since this time.

The Facilities Protection Service
Cronyism and corruption continued to plague the FPS, an organization created by the
CPA in 2003 to protect vital Iraqi infrastructure and facilities. While MOI has
encouraged the FPS to standardize, the DOD found that “the FPS remained a loose
confederation of mainly contract security guards” who protect facilities and officials at 27
ministries. Some elements of the FPS were dominated by Shi’ite militia. These elements
controlled local generators and construction projects.
While the Government of Iraq consolidated all FPS personnel under the MOI into a
single unit of 98,000 personnel, funding has not yet been centralized through the MOI.
This decentralized funding has stalled efforts to integrate the FPS into a regulated,
centralized force, and “most ministries remain resistant to this initiative” of
centralization.285 The June 2007 DoD Quarterly Report noted that FPS ministries “have
resisted central control and authority over their guard forces, particularly as political
parties gained control over the ministries and have used the FPS as an employment
opportunity for militia and sectarian interests.”286
Like the DBE and POE, the FPS lacked oversight and monitoring. The House Armed
Services Committee reported that the FPS “is an unknown quantity, largely because of its
decentralized organization and lack of embedded Transition Teams.”287 It also pointed
out that MNF-I does not fund the training or equipping of the FPS, diminishing means of
accountability.288
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The National Information and Investigation Agency
(NIAA)
The National Information and Investigation Agency (NIAA) is still developing. The
DOD reported that the criminal intelligence division of the MoI had 2,700 personnel
currently assigned, well short of the 2008 target goals of 6,000. The organization
comprised a National Headquarters and 15 provincial NIAA Bureaus, all of which except
for Anbar had reached “initial operating capability.” The Kurdish region had its own
MOI and criminal intelligence structure.289
        NIAA intelligence officers were embedded in the National Police Division
headquarters and worked with police in criminal investigations, but were projected to
ultimately work mainly through the NIAA National Headquarters. According to DOD,
“NIAA capabilities are currently assessed as minimal in most areas such as
investigations, analysis, and surveillance.” NIAA was given 95% of its weapons and
body armor, but only 20% of its vehicles.
        Institutional culture has also impeded the development of the NIAA, as “lack of
trust between agencies impedes the exchange of criminal intelligence and collaborative
intelligence products.”290 Sectarian violence had also prohibited NIAA personnel from
operating in some areas around Baghdad.

Provincial Security Forces
The US and Iraqi forces have focused on creating a mix of provincial (PSF) and local
(IPS) police forces that can provide local security to people with the same sect and
ethnicity. These forces can play a major role in dealing with local threats, and tribal
elements have already had considerable success in Anbar. Such forces some training,
have some screening to remove criminals and extremists, and have ties to local leaders to
partially guarantee their loyalty. The expanded role of the PSF will be discussed in later
chapters.
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III. Developments in the Ministry of Defense
The Ministry of Defense is years away from becoming efficient and effective. Many
elements of sectarian behavior exist, but are less severe than in the Ministry of Interior.
The Ministry colluded both actively and passively in ethnic cleansing. However, as was
true of the MOI, what was interpreted as sectarianism in the MOD was often the sheer
incompetence of the ministerial bureaucracy.
The MOD has had sustained problems with budget execution. In June 2007, the Pentagon
reported, “MOD suffers from…an inefficient procurement and budgeting process. A
culture of distrust coupled with incompetence in certain key areas has made committing
and obligating funds very difficult.” The MOD spent 76% of its CY 2006 budget by
November 2006, but had only executed 24% of its budgets for goods and services, 1% of
its budget for capital goods and projects, and 32% of its overall budgets of $3.4 billion.291
Incompetence, a culture of diffusing and hiding responsibility, as well as sectarian
agendas all combine to make the mere running of the security ministries very difficult.
The MOD was so vulnerable to power brokering, corruption, and ethnic and sectarian
manipulation that meaningful reform is challenging at best. [I honestly think that
impossible is too strong]. Transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness will be limited at
the local and provincial level, but almost certainly higher than at the central level.

Expanding MOD Forces
The Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) controls most of the Iraqi forces with serious
warfighting capabilities. As of August 2007, The MoD consisted of a 10-division Army,
the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF), the Air Force, and the Navy (including
Marines), and a Joint Headquarters and MOD HQ that provided strategic direction and
support.
MoD forces continue to expand. As of May 14, 2007, approximately 152,300 personnel
were authorized to serve in MOD forces. 292 The Pentagon June 2007 Quarterly Report
listed the force structure as follows:293

                 Component                                      Operational

                    Army                                          135,800

               Support Forces                                     13,000

             Special Operations                                    1,500

                  Air Force                                         900

                    Navy                                           1,100

                  TOTAL                                           152,300

These, however, statistics said little about actual strength. They indicated little more than
goals for manning, actual manning levels are unknown. The March 2007 Quarterly
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Report noted that, “the actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is about one-half to
two-thirds of the total due to scheduled leave, absence without leave, and attrition.”294
The DOD also reported that unauthorized absence rated exceeded 50% when units were
deployed to combat areas outside their normal areas of operations.
The MOD was attempting to address these high attrition rates by recruiting additional
men. On May 28, 2007, MNSTC-I released a new plan to enlarge the Iraqi Armed Forces
beyond the goals set in 2006. MNSTC-I aimed to increase manning of combat units by
120%, which would create a total growth of 60,000 personnel in addition to the 135,000
already authorized personnel. MNSTC-I did not state who would train, fund, and equip
the soldiers.295 By July 2007, 40,000 of these personnel had not yet been trained or
equipped.296


Embedded Advisory Support
The MOD advisory effort consisted of Transition Teams (TTs) at the unit and national
level. Unit level embeds consisted of 10 personnel per unit. At the national level, two
teams were created with 50 personnel each, one for the civilian leadership of the ministry
(MOD-TT) and one for the Joint Headquarters (JHQ-TT). According to the Pentagon, the
majority of MOD-TT personnel were civilian contractors and 25% were government civil
servant advisors.297
The MOD-TT effort was seriously undermanned. Only 50 civilian advisors, six US
military personnel, and 23 non-US civilian advisors served in the TT advising the
MOD.298 Only two US civilians advised the Ministry of Defense.299 Advisor teams to the
Iraqi Army were also undermanned: General Petraeus noted that “despite the success
achieved by the embedding of transition teams, the current [MiTT] size is insufficient to
meet all operational requirements and permit an optimum level of support.”300
Embedded advisors were also deployed to enhance the MOD’s logistical capabilities. The
13th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) was partnered with Iraqi logistics units and
MNSTC-I’s Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), and embedded
teams at the Taji National Depot to “develop the national supply chain.” Overall,
MNSTC-I has deployed 60 transition teams to facilitate improved logistics and
sustainment.301

Transitioning Operational Responsibility to the MOD
A successful transition to MOD control that will give the ISF elements under its
command real independence will take years. In its assessments of the ISF, MNSTC-I
reported that, “The MoD has a long way to go, as TRA reporting shows that the MOD is
not regarded as ‘effective’ in any category.”302
The JHQ, which was tasked to take responsibility from MNSTC-I, was not ready to
assume responsibility for the MOD. The House Armed Services Committee report noted
that “DOD reporting…describes the JHQ planning and coordination processes as
‘immature’ and ‘currently hampered by bureaucracy, lack of trust and understanding,
lack of experience with strategic planning and dependence on Coalition support and
funding.”303
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The Iraqi Ground Forces Command, which serves as the operational headquarters for the
Iraqi Army, also was not ready to fully transition to Iraqi forces. The IGFC provided
“command and control” for eight of Iraq’s ten divisions and strategic infrastructure force.
The remaining divisions – the 5th and 7th divisions – were still controlled by the MNF-I,
although they were slated to transition to Iraqi control by summer 2007.304 However, the
divisions under IGFC command, “still require substantial Coalition logistics and
sustainment.”305 Overall, Congressional assessments of the ISF concluded that, “units
operationally controlled by the Iraqi Forces Ground Command still require substantial
support from Coalition forces.”306

National Counter-Terror Capability
According to the June 2007 Pentagon Quarterly Report, the drive to implement the
national counterterrorism capability concept was “on track to meet Full Operational
Capability” by December 2007. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was achieved at the
MOD Joint Headquarters Counter Terrorism Command and the ISOF Brigade
headquarters in March, 2007, as was initially planned.
These units had achieved “communications connectivity on the Iraqi Defense Network
with phone, email and VTC capabilities,” and the Counter Terrorism Bureau achieved
IOC in April 2007. Individual training for CT Commanders began in April, with
collective training by a Mitt was scheduled to begin in May 2007.307


       Army and Special Operations Forces
        The Pentagon has described the Iraqi Army (IA) as the “center” of the Iraqi
Armed Forces.308 The Iraqi Army consisted of nine infantry divisions and one
mechanized division. Each light infantry division had three to five light infantry brigades,
with two to five light infantry battalions in each brigade.309 The Army also had 4 logistics
battalions, 2 support battalions, 5 Regional Support Units, and 80 Garrison Support Units
that provided logistics and support for divisions.
As of July 31, 2007, the Iraqi Ground Force Command order of battle structure was
reported to include the following major combat units:310 The location of these units are
shown in the Figure below:
   •   1 Div (Iraqi Intervention Force)
   •   2 Div – Mosul
   •   3 Div – Al Kasik
   •   4 Div (Being upgraded to Mech) – Tikrit
   •   5 Div (Iron) – Balad
   •   6 Div – Baghdad
   •   7 Div (Infantry) – West Al Anbar Province
   •   8 Div (Infantry) – Al Kut
   •   9 Div – (Mech – being upgraded to Armored)
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                            8/23/07          Page 37


   •   10 Div – Basrah
   •   11 Div – East Baghdad
   •   12 Div (Mech) – At Tamim
   •   13 Div – An Nasiriyah/Basrah



                               Locations of Iraqi army Divisions




Expanding the Iraqi Army to Combat Attrition
As of early June 2007, the Iraqi Army had 152,500 “trained and equipped” officers in 36
brigades and 112 battalions. However, as noted before, these statistics do not indicate
actual manning levels.
The Iraqi Army is undermanned. The DOD noted in its June 2007 Quarterly Report that
“only about 65% of authorized personnel are present for duty in fielded units at any time,
and this percentage varies widely among units.” The Pentagon reported that the biggest
reason for such low manpower rates was “a policy that places about one-quarter of all
soldiers on leave at any time to take pay home to their families. 311 Absenteeism was also
a factor, creating absent-without-leave rates of between 5% and 8% for IA divisions.312
As Col. Ricky Gibbs, commander of the 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, noted in July,
“There’s not enough Iraqi Army to go around.”313
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Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Expansion Plan was adopted to combat these low
manpower rates. The Plan would add one infantry division, two division headquarters, six
brigade headquarters, and 24 battalions to the Iraqi Army.314 Authorized manning levels
were increased to 110% and then 120% of authorized levels. The Iraqi government spent
at least US $800 million to increase the IA by 24,000 soldiers.315 As of May 2007, 10,300
soldiers had completed initial training and 17,000 were expected to complete their
training by late June 2007.316
Nevertheless, the Iraqi Army was still badly undermanned late into summer 2007. Major
General Rick Lynch reported that, “The issue of the Iraqi Army is that there’s not enough
of them. I need more battalions, more divisions.”317Lynch reported that the shortage of IA
troops had created security vacuums in some regions in Iraq. He said: “Where are the
Iraqi Security Forces? The Tigris Valley is a sanctuary because no ISF forces were there.
The issue is area of terrain where there are no capable security forces.” Lynch said that
this security vacuum had allowed for insurgent sanctuaries, which necessitated the launch
of Operation Marne Husky to route them out. 318


The US Training Effort Summer I think this was 2006
The US military launched a new IA training program in summer I think 2006. The
program deployed the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division to Ft. Riley, Kansas. This brigade
trained military advisors (MiTTs) that would be embedded in the Iraqi Army. For 60
days, soldiers at Ft. Riley learned intensive Arabic and were trained in combat survival,
counterinsurgency, and advisor skills. They then attended the IAG Phoenix Academy in
Taji, Iraq, for ten days and were deployed into a MiTT team.319 MiTT training totaled
almost 100 days, and by March 2007, 1,400 soldiers had completed training, with 850
still in training.320 These MiTTs then provided basic and specialty training for IA officers
at all levels, and taught Iraqi officers essential counterinsurgency skills.
        Formal responsibility for force generation within the Iraqi Army was transferred
to Iraqi Forces. While Iraqis in May 2007 were “in the lead” in developing the IA, in
reality the embedded advisors assumed a large responsibility for training. 321 By early
2007, the US/Iraqi training effort had grown to considerable size. Iraqi militaries
academies were graduating 600 to 700 lieutenants every 6 months. In addition to the
field training carried out by the US embed effort; on any given day there were about
15,000 Iraqi soldiers in training at an institutional training base.322 The responsibility for
the US advising mission increasingly shifted from US Special Forces to regular Army
and Marine units.
US military officials were optimistic about the quality of the Ft. Riley program. Brig.
Gen. Pittard said that the high quality of advisors at Fort Riley had enhanced the Iraqi
Army’s capabilities.323 The House Armed Services Committee reported that, “trainers at
Fort Riley believe they are now getting highly qualified senior officers and NCOs for the
teams. A greater number have combat experience. These officers and NCOs bring a wide
range of combat and combat support specialties to the teams.”324
However, officers and advisors at the training base noted flaws in the program.
According to Lt. Col. John Nagl, the commander of the training effort at Ft. Riley, the
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program may be too short and concentrated to yield lasting effects. 325 This reinforced
DoD concerns that the “high operational tempo of many units [in Iraq] makes it difficult
for them to sustain their initial training proficiency.”326
Lt. Col. Nagl also reported that not enough trainers at Ft. Riley had experience as
advisors. In June 2007, he said that, “few of the cadre members have been advisors
themselves. One of the four battalions conducting the training has just three former
advisors among its 96 soldiers, most of whom have served in Iraq, but in a conventional
combat role.” He also said that “the training battalions’ rank structure hinders optimal
training, as junior sergeants are out of necessity often assigned to mentor teams
composed of senior sergeants and officers.”327 He also noted that the IA training program
did not have enough economic development experts.328
        Some experts felt the US training effort also needed to focus more on Iraqi
culture. The House Armed Services Committee reported that although “the military has
significantly improved its training emphasis on advisory skills, language and culture…
an even greater emphasis on language, culture, and advisor skills is needed.”329

Assessments Of Iraqi Army Capabilities
As noted before, there are too little meaningful unclassified data to allow reliable
assessments of the Iraqi Army. DOD reports of 95 IA battalions, 9 division headquarters,
and 31 brigade headquarters as “in the lead” do little to indicate actual IA competence or
independence.330
Senior military officials in spring 2007 asserted that the Iraqi Army progress was slow
but steady. Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard remarked that, “in early 2005, there were two
struggling Iraqi army divisions. Now we have 10 very capable divisions, and we're
working on 11 and 12. So over the past two years there has been a huge amount of
progress, but we're not there yet.”331
The Iraqi Army did improve noticeably in some regions. Army Maj. Gen. Benjamin
Mixon reported that the Iraqi Army forces were operating almost independently in
Ninevah province. Mixon suggested shifting the province to PIC status as early as
August.332 Col. John Charlton, commander of the 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, who
leads 6,000 soldiers in Anbar province, reported that by January 2008 the ISF might be
ready to accommodate a 25% US troop cut, if the 6,000-man Iraqi police in the region
were improved.333 Brig. Gen Dana Pittard noted in June 2007 that Iraqi army units had
taken the lead Shi’ite provinces in the south, such as Maysan and Mutthanna, as well as
in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq.334
Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, retiring MNSTC-I Commander and head of ISF training
reported that the ISF had made substantial progress, especially the Iraqi Army. In May,
Dempsey said he was “cautiously optimistic” about Iraqi army proficiency, and that some
units were “highly capable” and ready to assume responsibility for tactical operations
such as manning check points.335 Dempsey said that, “My overall assessment is that
many units, especially the Iraqi army units, have become increasingly proficient and have
demonstrated both their improved capability and resolve in battle."336
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Yet, the Iraqi Army’s capabilities remained a mixed bag. In late summer 2007, Major
General Rick Lynch summarized the Iraqi Army’s capabilities as follows:
       “People want to have a general idea of the Iraqi Security Forces, but it all depends on where they
       are in the battlefield…We can’t go deeper [into insurgent areas in Operation Marne Husky] until
       the government of Iraq generates competent security forces in that area. Having said that, I have
       areas where the Iraqi Security Forces are so capable, we’re doing operations with them in the lead.
       Yusufiya, south Yusufiya – 80 percent of operations are led by the Iraqi Army, because they’re so
       competent...In our battlespace they’re leading many of the operations.”337

Operational Progress
The strain of supporting the Baghdad security plan and other spring 2007 military
operations reduced IA readiness. US military officials reported that the number of Iraqi
battalions rated as capable of operating without American assistance decreased to 6 in
July from 10 in March, shortly after the security plan started.338 Senior officials reported
that as US troops focused on combat operations and providing Iraqi security, training of
Iraqi Army personnel lost priority and slowed down. Marine General Peter Pace, the Joint
Chiefs chairman, said that combination of reduced training, high IA casualties, and
destroyed equipment forced these units to be taken out of operation.339
While there were Army units that worked well in supporting US forces, they were not
ready to assume responsibility for operations. Even the best units – the few that could
really plan and conduct their own operations independently – still needed back up from
US enablers in terms of armor, artillery, air support, intelligence, and emergency
reinforcements. The IA got erratic support, supply and recruiting support from the MOD,
which often favored Shi’ites with limited qualifications.
Many among the US military felt the IA’s performance showed that the transition
timelines for the Iraqi Army would still require many months, if not years. Lt. Gen.
Dempsey remarked in June 2007 that that IA and ISF were “still immature” and not ready
for complete transition. He said, “they have a lack of tactical staying power of sufficient
capability to surge forces locally,” and still needed force development advising to
conduct operations. 340 Dempsey later reported that “most” of the remaining provinces
could be transferred to Iraqis under PIC status by the end of 2007. However, the ISF and
IA “being completely self-reliant is a ways off,” and full independence could not be
expected for at least five years.341
Some US officers advising the IA reported that Iraqi forces would “collapse” without
Coalition assistance. They trainers reported that a relying on the Army to provide
security would breed chaos, noting: "I've seen anarchy, and we're right on the brink of it
right now. If we go in a year or two years, it's going to be a complete mess… We can't
leave here for another five years, minimum."342 A senior Pentagon official commenting
on the IA remarked: “Can they do it without us there? Almost certainly not.”343
Several Iraqi officials agreed that the Iraqi Army was not ready to stand on its own.
President Jalal Talabani reported in June 2007 that the IA was not prepared to fight
without US support until at least the end of 2008.344 Gen. Ali Ghidan Majeed, the
commander of ground troops in the Iraqi Army, declared that, “We’re moving forward
step by step. But my message is we need the Coalition forces here in Iraq. We need them
a lot: to manage our training, to manage our supplies, to manage our army.”345 Real
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progress is taking place, and there are very real opportunities, but an effective effort will
take until 2009 or several years beyond.

Regional Sectarianism
The Iraqi army has some truly national units, but others have ties to sectarian cleansing in
the areas where there is serious fighting or sectarian pressure. US advisors and
commanders in the field made it clear that the Army has some units that can plan and
conduct their own operations and others that are non-sectarian and ethnic and truly severe
the national interest. However, the June 2007 DoD Quarterly Report found that “
       Within many military units, tribal and ethno-sectarian loyalties remain strong and often are the
       basis for relationships between key officers in units and higher-level authorities who are not
       always in the direct chain of command.346
The Army is far less actively involved in sectarian cleansing than the National Police or
regular police. However, senior and other Iraqi army officers and units either support or
tolerate sectarian cleansing in Northwest Baghdad and south of Baghdad, particularly to
the east of the river in the areas near the arch of Cestiphon area.
The non-Kurdish units of the Iraqi Army had mixed loyalties. The extent of sectarianism
in the Iraqi Army varied, depending on the region and unit:
   •   In Baghdad, civilians told the Los Angeles Times that Shiite militias “have the tacit support of the
       Iraqi army unit” in the area.347 In “the large Sunni areas,” according to Sgt. First Class Eric Beck,
       people “distrust the IA because of the number of Shi’as that are in the Army,” who treated Sunnis
       harshly if left unsupervised.348
   •   The Shi’ite commander of Iraq’s Fifth Division (Diyala) was replaced by the government in 2007,
       after American officers protested the commander’s sectarian loyalties, as he arrested and harassed
       Sunnis.349 The Division commander, Brigadier General Shakir al-Kaabi, allegedly cooperated with
       JAM elements and Shi’ite death squads.350
   •   Reports that the Diyala-based 5th division was “enmeshed in sectarian conflict” resurfaced in early
       July 2007. A US military officer reported that some Iraqi Army officers were suspected of
       “facilitating” arms shipments to Sunni fighters linked to AQI and Shi’ite militias.351 JAM
       infiltration was so extensive that “journalists witnessed American advisors patting down IA
       soldiers for cell phones prior to a patrol because they feared the Iraqis would alert their contacts in
       the militia.”352
   •   JAM also infiltrated the IA 6th Division. A TT chief reported to the House Armed Services
       Committee that, “I have to operate under the assumption that within this unit there are people loyal
       to Jaysh al-Mahdi and actively working for Jaysh al-Mahdi.”353
   •   Sectarianism in the Iraqi Army was less pronounced in the ethnically diverse province of Nineveh.
       One of the two Iraqi Army divisions in the province was mostly Kurdish and worked competently
       under a Sunni Arab general.354
   •   On July 17 2007, 125 men dressed in Iraqi army uniforms and carrying standard weapons shot 30
       civilians in Diyala province, according to the Washington Post.355
   •   Aegis Defense Services Ltd., a private security company that provides intelligence to US forces,
       reported that, “There has been collusion with elements of the Basra” security forces, “which has
       increased the capability of the militias.”356
Sectarian infiltration was also affected the senior officers of the Iraqi Army. Lt. Gen.
Dempsey noted that, “the higher up you run in the echelons of command, the more
vulnerabilities in leadership become evident.”357
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Sunnis and Kurds, these groups were over-represented in senior leadership positions.
Shi’ites were adequately represented at the battalion level, but less so at higher echelons.
The reason was primarily the military experience required for higher levels of command,
which a greater number of Sunnis and Kurds had earned in the old regime’s army and the
Peshmerga, respectively. The Defense Department recognized in its March 2007
quarterly report that “political forces in Iraq have influenced senior military appointments
on the basis of sectarian affiliation.”358

A Lack of Skilled Leadership
The Iraqi Army still lacks capable leaders at all levels of operation. In a July 2007
testimony, Lt. Gen. Dempsey reported that leadership was a grave concern for the Iraqi
Army. He said:
       The big challenge in 2008 will be finding an adequate number of leaders to lead this institution
       that is large and increasingly capable. We’ve been growing young second lieutenants through
       military academies for about three years, but it’s really difficult to grow majors, lieutenant
       colonels and brigadier generals. It simply can’t be done overnight. So we’ve had to rely heavily on
       officer recalls and retraining programs. However, the pool of qualified recalls is beginning to thin
       out. Several generations of Iraqi leaders were culled out by the Saddam regime and the Iran-Iraq
       war, and many fine Iraqi military and police leaders have been killed and wounded in the ongoing
       fight. We’re working with both the Ministry of Defense and the Minister of Interior to address this
       challenge.359
Lt. Gen. Dempsey later repeated that the ISF lacked strong, competent senior officers:
leadership was not just “lacking,” but the “scarcest resource” of the ISF.360
These leadership problems have intensified as the MOD quickly expanded. Lt. Gen.
James Dubik, charged with training the ISF after Dempsey, reported that, “We still have
very difficult problems with (Iraqi military unit) leaders – very difficult.” Dubik said that
not enough leaders had the appropriate experience or neutral loyalties. He also reported
that the emphasis on Iraqi force generation had caused delayed the development of IAF
leaders. He said that “What you can’t produce at the same time…(is) leaders. So you end
up with units with about half the number of leaders they really need…But that’s
sufficient. It’s not ideal, but it’s sufficient.361
Furthermore, serious problems in leadership by inexperienced or incompetent Iraqi
officers and NCOs were downplayed or ignored. These problems were compounded by a
US command ethic whose de fact impact was to seek good news, and not receive bad
news from embeds and the advisory teams.

A Lack of NCOs
The Iraqi Army lacked professional non-commissioned officers. Lt. Gen. James Dubik
said that the Iraqi Army and police were growing so quickly that units entered combat
with a shortage of qualified officers. 362 Embedded advisors (MiTTs) reported that,
“inadequate training and lack of experience among NCOs hampers IA’s operating
efficiency.” Some officers in the NCO corps were also diverted to combat as the IA
expanded.
NCOs were not respected by soldiers, who instead were culturally accustomed to
consulting commissioned officers.363 Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard acknowledged that the
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creation of an NCO corps and collective training was especially challenging given Iraqi
military culture. He remarked that, “collective unit training” from the squad level “was
not really a tradition in the Iraqi military,” thus it would take time to fully institutionalize.
364


These problems led the MOD and C-MATT to classify 2007 as the “Year of the NCO” to
address manning and quality shortcomings among NCOs.365 Lt. Gen. Dempsey reported
that the US had adopted new strategies to retain sufficient NCOs to serve as trainers for
new soldiers. He said that the Iraqis “would like to have a US-style NCO corps, but they
realize it’s a long way off.”366
Junior officers also performed poorly in some cases. The House Armed Services
Committee reported that lower ranking officers “generally lacked knowledge of modern
military technique and practice,” encouraging a lack of discipline and competent
performance.367

Equipment Issues {/Equipping The Force: The Effects of
an Increased Budget}
As noted before, weak ministerial capacity in the MoD hampered equipment procurement
and distribution. MoD incompetence, mismanagement, and corruption meant that units in
the Iraqi Army were underequipped. During Operation Arrowhead Ripper, some IA
battalions had to share body armor and helmets in combat.368
The equipment on hand was an awkward mix of different types. The House Armed
Services Committee reported that, “the current inventory of vehicles and weapons were
obtained by a combination of procurements, donations, and capture of existing Saddam
era caches and is a diverse blend of equipment types and age.”369 This inventory
encouraged additional shortages, since these various weapons were difficult to maintain
and repair.
IA forces were also not held responsible for their equipment. As noted before, the GAO
found that “DOD cannot ensure that US-funded equipment has reached Iraqi Security
Forces… MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces’ receipt of equipment.”370 This was
especially troublesome given that the Iraq Study Group found “ample reports of Iraqi
police officers participating in training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform and
ammunition for sectarian violence.”371 The same was true for some IA officers. For
example, the number of weapons and protection equipment reported by MNSTC-I in the
field was more than twice the quantity recorded in the MNSTC-I property book.372
US and the MoD did make efforts to improve weapons inventory and accountability in
2007. As the Iraqi defense budget increased by 26% to $4.1 billion, the MOD secured a
$508 million FMS contract in May 2007. The sale included 276 light armored vehicles or
522 high mobility multipurpose vehicles, reconnaissance aircraft, 400 million rounds of
small-arms ammunition, 170,000 grenades, demolition explosives, 7 million gallons of
diesel, 2.9 million gallons of JP-8 jet fuel, and 56.4 million gallons of motor gasoline.373
The MoD also purchased $1.5 billion in helicopters, American-made M-16s and M-4
rifles under an FMS contract. 374 These rifles replaced the heavier, older AK-47s
previously used by IA forces.375 They were distributed with new security measures to
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improve accountability. M-16s were issued to individual soldiers, whose photographs or
biometric data (fingerprints, retinal scans) were matched to each gun’s serial number and
stored in a centrally located database.376 M-16s were distributed to NCOs while M-4s
were reserved for officers.377
These weapons programs could reduce weapons fraud and trafficking, since the new M-
4s and M-16s could be traced to their original owner and required extensive training,
making them challenging for insurgents to use. The first 1,600 weapons were handed out
to a graduating class of IA recruits in May. The Pentagon reported that MoD had received
2,304 M-4s and 27,238 M-16A4s by May 15, 2007.378
Training and equipping for the new weapons started in May 2007 at the Taji military base
and was expected to take a year. An additional training location at the Besmaya range
opened in July and trained full battalions of 800-900 soldiers. 379
However, these new FMS contracts did not solve the problem of an under-equipped Iraqi
Army. The House Armed Services Committee reported in July that FMS was “falling
behind schedule” and “despite Coalition efforts, many IAF units still lack the equipment
needed for a counterinsurgency mission.” 380 The Committee concluded that, “The Iraqi
Armed Forces will not be able to take on the counterinsurgency mission until they receive
additional equipment or until the level of violence subsides.”381
IA forces were still under-equipped compared to Coalition troops in summer 2007. The
Committee noted that,
       Though the IAF and US forces in Iraq are roughly the same size, there is a great disparity in the
       amount and type of their equipment. For example, the US force has more than 20,000 armored
       high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles, but the IAF have only 2,647 and their current goal is
       only 3,609. Some of the HMMWVs used by the IAF have only ‘Level II’ or base ‘Level I’ armor,
       which does not have the higher level of ballistic protection that is provided by the upgrade
       HMMWVs used by Coalition forces. There are similar disparities in quantities and level of
       protection for tactical trucks, armored personnel carriers, route clearance vehicles, and counter-
       improved explosive device (C-IED) equipment. The IAF also lack artillery and close air support,
       as well as airlift and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.382
The Committee reported that FMS “does not appear to achieve the goal of ‘pure fleeting’
the [IA] equipment,” nor will it solve the “challenges of maintaining the heterogeneous
mix of equipment…in the short term.”383FMS also strained the MOD, exacerbating its
budget execution problems. Spending delays by the MoD slowed the equipping of the
Iraqi Army. While the MoD aimed to spend its entire $1.6 billion CY06 FMS budget by
June 2007, by May 2007 only 10 out of 46 FMS cases and a total of $400.0 million were
approved.384
Weapons accountability remained a problem. The GAO reported in July 2007 that IA
inventory was not only unaccounted for, but it also was unclear which train-and-equip
accountability programs the weapons were subject to. It found that “MNF-I does not
currently have an order…specifying accountability procedures for equipment distributed
to the Iraqi security forces.”385 It reported that DOD experienced “continuing problems
with missing and incomplete records” tracking equipment and as a result, “MNF-I cannot
fully account for Iraqi forces’ receipt of equipment.” 386 It was unclear how much of the
billions spent to equip the Iraqi Army actually equipped Iraqi Army forces.
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Special Operations
The Iraqi Special Operations Brigade (ISOF) consists of a counterterrorism battalion, a
commando battalion, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit.387 The
counterterrorism battalion conducts hostage rescue operations and targets terrorist
organizations. The commando battalion performs raids, airfield and port seizures, and
assists the Iraqi counter-terrorism battalion. The support battalion provides logistics to
ISOF during combat, while the reconnaissance unit provides surveillance of insurgents
and collects information for the ISOF counterterrorism and commando battalions.388
ISOF operates under the command of the JHQ, part of the Iraqi National Counter-
Terrorism Command (INCTC).
The ISOF will expand in the coming months. In spring 2007, ISOF had an authorized
end-strength of approximately 1,500 Iraqis. ISOF will add one commando battalion “with
regionally based companies” in Basra, Mosul, and Al Asad. The first deployment of
commandos to Basra was scheduled to take place in May 2007, and deployments to
Mosul and Al Asad were scheduled to May 2007 and July 2007.389
Embedded advisors from US Special Operations trained ISOF personnel and provided
transition teams for the INCTC. MiTT trained ISOF Brigade commanders and staff.390
Iraqi Special Forces were viewed as competent and ready to operate independently. US-
SOCOM reported in April 2007 that the ISOF were “equal to or better than peer units in
other countries in the region.” The Committee also reported that. “ISOF generally have
been regarded as a success story in the transition of security responsibility to the ISF.”391
Some US military officers in MNF-I feel this judgment, “is absolutely accurate and then
some. The ISOF is exceptionally good and they have several different specialized units
as well.”
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IV. Developments in the Iraqi Navy
As the House Armed Services Committee report noted, the Iraqi Navy, “while small, is
strategically significant.” It guards Iraq’s oil platforms in the Persian Gulf, protecting
95% of the Government of Iraq’s income.392 The Iraqi Navy consisted of an operational
headquarters, two afloat-squadrons, and four marine companies stationed alongside
Coalition forces near offshore oil platforms.393 An assault boat squadron with 24 small
fast boats conducted riverine patrol operations and a small diving detachment conducted
underwater survey and explosive ordinance and IED disposal.394
As of June 2007, the Iraqi Navy consisted of 1,100 trained sailors and marines.395 These
official manning levels were set to increase to 2,500 Navy personnel. Iraqi Naval officers
were trained by embedded UK and US advisors in Naval Transition Teams (NaTTs).
Many of the NaTTs were from the Royal Navy, although the US Navy also
participated.396
In 2007 the United States launched a Capabilities Plan that aimed to modernize and
expand the Iraqi Navy.397 The plan was expected to be fully implemented by 2008.398 It
mandated that all purchase contracts were completed by Iraqis using Iraqi money in an
effort to increase MOD ministerial capacity.
The MOD purchased more sophisticated equipment for the Iraqi Navy in spring 2007. In
May 2007 the Government of Iraq expanded its purchase order from four to thirty-six
patrol vessels, 10 from Italy and 26 from the US.399 The Iraqi Navy also planned to
purchase 21 additional naval vessels, including two offshore support vessels, four patrol
ships, 15 patrol boats and smaller vessels.400 As of June 2007, some purchase orders were
delayed by contract disputes, which were expected to be solved by late 2008. 401
The Defense Department noted that naval planning especially was “maturing and
coherent across acquisition, training, and infrastructure lines of development extending to
2010.”402 However, the Iraqi Navy was scarcely ready for full transition. The House
Armed Services Committee reported that, “although the Iraqi Navy took the lead in
protecting the platforms in February 2006, it still relied heavily on Coalition naval
forces.”403 Responsibilities for many logistics operations were still assumed by Coalition
forces. For example, Lt. Gen. Dempsey said that the Iraqi Navy relied on a British off-
shore support vessel, the HMS Belvedere, to resupply and refuel. 404
The purchase of high-technology naval equipment has also delayed transition. It created
training and deployment problems. The Defense Department reported that, “the Iraqi
Navy faces significant challenges in meeting the individual and collective training needs
for its ambitious acquisition program, including the development of leadership and
technical skills.” Na-TT must still provide embedded advisory support to help the Iraqi
Navy modernize and mature.
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V. Developments in the Iraqi Air Force
The Iraqi Air Force (IqAf) consisted of six small squadrons.405 The Air Force had three
squadrons at Kirkuk Air Base, 1 squadron at Basra, {--?} at Muthanna. 406 It also operated
three light utility helicopter squadrons out of Taji Air Base. 407 1,000 airmen were in the
IqAf by June 2007, and another 900 were anticipated by the end of the year.408 IqAf
manning levels were set at a target of 3,285 airmen by the end of 2007.
In spring 2007, IqAf equipment was a mix of high and low technology: For example, the
23 Squadron at New Al Muthana Air Base relied on three 1960s vintage C-130E
aircraft.409 Squadrons at Kirkuk flew one Cessna 208B Caraban and four SAMA CH-
2000s, while at Basra, the 70 Squadron flew four SAMA CH-2000s and two Sea Bird
Seeker SB7L-360s. 410 Airmen at the Kirkuk air base used four small two-seat CH-2000s
to monitor oil infrastructure, while the Al Basra base used four two-seater CH-2000s and
two Seabird Seekers for intelligence missions.411
The MoD aimed to modernize the force by purchasing more sophisticated equipment.
The MoD ordered 28 Mi-17 multimission helicopters to be fully delivered by December
2007. As of June, the 10 of the 28 already delivered were still not operable due to
“shortfalls” in the defensive systems. 412 The Pentagon estimated that many of these Mi-
17s would be operable by fall 2007, after pilots were sufficiently trained. The MOD also
planned to purchase 29 Soviet-designed M-17 helicopters and six reconnaissance
planes.413 As of May 2007, the Taji Air Base and IqAf doubled its number of helicopters
– all Huey-IIs - to 10, with 6 due the following month.
The IqAf ordered airplanes as well as helicopters. It purchased 6 King Air 350 ER
turboprops through FMS.414 The MOD also requested three additional Excess Defense
Article C-130s from the US government to expand IqAf squadrons to a more ideal size of
six units.415 It also procured three Cessna Caravan interim ISR aircraft between March
and May 2007, which would eventually supply daytime and nighttime intelligence
capabilities.416
Embedded advisory teams (Mi-TTs) were deployed to train the IqAf and assist in
transition and modernization. Training was seriously delayed. Dan Goreschen,
commander of the 370th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group reported that at his airbase,
“we’re really not even getting set up to start the training until this fall…“the training may
not be going at the pace we would like, but it’s still moving forward.”417 Embedded
training was also narrow, and focused mainly on time-intensive training of pilots and not
enlisted officers. 418
Embedded advisors also were dispatched to help the IqAf develop light attack
capabilities.419 The IqAf was originally designed to serve only two functions – light
transport and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). 420 This mission
expanded as a result of MNSTC-I’s 2007 Campaign Action Plan, which ultimately
envisioned “full spectrum air operation capabilities” for the IqAf. 421
The IqAf did make progress in carrying out military operations. The Pentagon noted that
IqAf flew daily intelligence-collecting missions across Iraq, providing “timely,”
“actionable intelligence for both Iraqi and Coalition Ground forces.422 The IqAF took 600
to 900 daily intelligence pictures of Baghdad alone. 423
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During Operation Arrowhead Ripper, IqAf flew daily intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) missions in Diyala and supplied water to Coalition troops without
convoy support.424 Dan Groeschen, commander of the 370th Air Expeditionary Advisory
Group, said that this support “is a real, real positive sign…They have been supporting
their forces as much as possible, but now they’re starting to get it – this is not just about
an Iraqi airplane taking care of Iraqis – it’s an Iraqi airplane taking care of the coalition.”
425
    Immediately after the large car bomb explosions in the Yezidi area of northern Iraq in
August 2007, Iraqi C-130s flew in relief supplies.
Some IqAf also grew more competent in conducting their own operations and
maintaining their own equipment. The Pentagon reported that the while not all of the
IqAf was fully modernized, Iraqi forces were “self-reliant” in “some aerial fields.” It
cited the 23 Squadron at New Al Muthana Air Base, where Iraqis conducted routine
maintenance and an all-Iraqi flight crew was “generally the norm.” 426 DOD noted that
the 23 Squadron’s operational “maturity” had allowed for a reduction in US Air Force
MiTT personnel assigned to the unit.
Nonetheless, the Iraqi Air Force was not close to being ready to assume full
responsibility for operations. IqAf struggled to manage its new, high-technology
equipment, which required extensive training to operate. For example, the IqAf could not
deploy its Mi-17 helicopters because it did not have a sufficiently modern defense system
to use then, requiring an additional US $6 million defense system contract. Commander
Gorschen reported that efforts to purchase more sophisticated weapons such as jet fighter
aircrafts were also delayed. These efforts would be restarted “only when they[IqAf]’re
ready and we feel that they’re up to a standard of training where they can employ a
weapons system like that effectively, efficiently, but more importantly, safely.”427
The IqAf also was not close to assuming responsibility for its own airspace. The House
Armed Services Committee reported that MNSTC-I was “concerned with transferring
responsibility” for airspace, and that transferal would require a prolonged effort to build
command and control facilities and radar surveillance systems. 428 Lt. Gen. Martin
Dempsey had estimated that full transfer of this responsibility would not be possible for
at least several years.429
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VI. Developments in the Ministry of Justice
        There were many problems in the Iraqi justicie system ranging from handling
prisons and detainees to corruption in the enforcement of the law and a lack of an
effective local courst system. The resulting lack of accountability encouraged human
rights abuses among the Iraqi police, Army, and justice officers manning the prisons.
While American-operated prisons faced increased scrutiny and monitoring since Abu
Ghraib, according to Newsweek, “local jails remain black holes,” lacking judicial
oversight and characterized by widespread torture and abuse.430 These “black holes”
undermined the ISF, since they served as a focal point for the insurgency, providing a
network where detainees could communicate, plan, and share tactics.
The scale of tsome abuses increased in the wake of the Baghdad security plan. As
Coalition and ISF forces increased the scale of military operations, the number of Iraqi
detainees nationwide escalated from 7,000 to 18,000 in June and 35,000 by the end of the
year.431 In May 2006, 1,400 prisoners alone were found in a small MoI prison called “Site
4,” many with signs of severe abuse. 432
The June 2007 Quarterly Report summarized MoJ’s corruption and abuse problems. It
reported that:
       “Detainee abuse is a problem in Iraqi pre-trial detention facilities run by both MOD and MOI.
       MOJ’s pre-trial detention facilities and post-trial prisons generally met international standards but
       are overcrowded…US advisors encourage the MOJ to increase the salaries of corrections officers
       to a level equal to that of the Iraqi Police to attract more qualified personnel and reduce
       corruption.”433
Independent reports confirmed that torture and abuse persisted in Iraqi-run jails. Ann
Clywyd, Tony Blair’s special envoy on human rights in Iraq, reported she was “appalled”
by allegations of “ongoing abuse and torture in detention centers run by the Iraqi Ministry
of Interior.”434
Jails were also overcrowded. In one police detention center in northwest Baghdad, 900
suspects were packed into a facility intended for 300. Iraqi detention facilities grew even
more crowded following the surge. The Los Angeles Times reported “grossly unsanitary
conditions” were “common” in the facility, in addition to extortion by guards. Col. Daniel
Britt, head of the US military’s National Police Transition Team (NP-TT) who advised
personnel at the detention center, called the conditions “appalling.” US officials also
reported that Shi’ites were released more quickly then Sunnis.
Sectarian loyalties continued to affect Iraqi treatment of detainees. Iraqi detainees are
required to face a judge within 72 hours of their arrest, but Gen. Kareem Ali Chazrage,
commander of the National Police division that manages a detention facility in Baghdad,
reported that many inmates stayed for two months.435 Shi’ites were released far earlier.
Jail doctors also lacked medication to treat inmates.
The lack of local courts and a criminal justice system added to the problems of
ineffective police and organized sectarian crime. There was no meaningful rule of law at
the provincial and local levels, and it will be several years before current advisory efforts
can create them – if the courts and justice system can be protected and integrated into an
increasingly sectarian and ethnically divided police efforts and governance. The absence
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of a rule of law has almost encouraged biased detainee treatment and human rights
abuses.

Some fairly significant improvments have been
made with the July opening of a Rule of Law
“green zone” in Rusafa—a section of east
Baghdad. Nevertheless, there is a signficant
backlog of cases and signficant problems that
must still be addressed by an extremely immature
justice system that is in need of fundamental
reform.
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                                    8/23/07                  Page 51


VII. ISF Developments and Performance in the
Baghdad Security Plan
On January 10th, 2007, President Bush announced a new security strategy for Iraq that
attempted to respond to many of the ISF development and effectiveness problems
outlined in this report. The new strategy called for a surge of additional American troops
to help stabilize the situation in Iraq. American troops were deployed to provide security
in Baghdad, which in theory would stabilize the political environment and bring national
political reconciliation to Iraq. The “surge” strategy, known in Arabic as operation Fardh
Al Qanoon (“enforcing the law”), also relied on Iraqi Security Forces to “hold” and
“build” on security gains established by American troops.

A US Force Build-up Leads the Way
The plan called for the US to send the equivalent of five combat brigades, or 17,500
troops to Baghdad, raising US troop presence there to a total of 31,000.436 A further 4,000
soldiers were to be added to Anbar. These changes in US deployment plans were
complicated, since they not only involve retraining and moving forces already in theater
as well as adding new forces, but also involve some high capability Army and USMC
units:
   •   2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, based at Fort Bragg, N.C., and currently assigned as the call
       forward force in Kuwait, will move into Iraq and assume a security mission there.

   •   1st Brigade, 34th Infantry Division, Minnesota Army National Guard, will be extended in its
       current mission for up to 125 days and will redeploy not later than August 2007.

   •   The 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, based at Ft. Riley, Kan., will deploy in February 2007.
Three other Army combat brigades were to deploy as follows:
   •   3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, based at Ft. Benning, Ga., deploys in March 2007.

   •   4th Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, based at Ft. Lewis, Wash., deploys in April 2007.

   •   2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, based at Ft. Stewart, Ga., deploys in May 2007.
The Marine Corps was to extend two reinforced infantry battalions for approximately 60
days. The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) remained in Iraq
for approximately 45 additional days. Other combat-support and combat-service-support
units were to be a deployed as necessary once new requirements are assessed. All of
these troop increases were contingent upon the Iraqi government meeting vaguely
defined benchmarks on security and political cooperation.
All these forces were placed under the command of General Petraeus, who was put in
overall command of US forces in Iraq on February 10, 2007 and was confirmed by the
Senate on January 23, 2007. Petraeus had directed much of the effort to create a new US
Army field manual for counterinsurgency operations and was considered one of the
military’s foremost counterinsurgency experts.
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Although this surge meant strengthening the Baghdad security forces, it did not mean
deploying far larger numbers of troops to Baghdad than previous troop commitments.
There were close to 50,000 US troops in Baghdad during the peak of the fighting in
2004-2005, plus more than two brigades, covering an area about half the size of the one
that the US now plans to clear. The surge did, however, put more US troops in Iraq than
ever before, and more troops in Baghdad and the belts immediately outside of Baghdad
than ever before. This included 41,500 for the 8 combat brigades and many more than if
one include all headquarters. In short, the surge did become relatively large has and large
enough to have a measurable effect on violence.

The Iraqi Force Component
The President’s plan hinged on the successful cooperation of the Iraqi Security Forces
and the deployment of three Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad. Col. Andrew Bacevich
reported that, “In effect, Bush is counting on Iraqis to pull our bacon out of the fire” by
providing and sustaining local security in the capital.437
The plan called for an ISF “surge” and an increase in ISF size and effectiveness. The ISF
was scheduled to expand from 10 to 13 Army divisions, 36 to 41 Army Brigades, and 112
to 132 Army Battalions. Additional Iraqi brigades moved to Baghdad to support
operations. 438
The Iraqi government initially deployed 30,000 Iraqi Army and national police officers to
Baghdad.439 By April, three brigade HQ and nine battalions had deployed to Baghdad,
increasing IA total to 4,000. By late May, 25 battalions of U.S. troops and 38 battalions
of Iraqi soldiers and police were stationed in the capital.440 By June 2007, more than
79,000 ISF personnel operated in Baghdad, including 42,000 Iraqi Army soldiers.441 The
surge strategy also relied heavily on the 30,000 men in the Baghdad police forces. As
already discussed, the loyalty of these forces was questionable – at best.
Much of the Iraqi force component was Kurdish. Two of the three Iraqi brigades brought
to Baghdad were Kurdish units formed from the Kurdish Peshmerga militia.442 By April
2007, 2,100 Kurdish troops had arrived in the capital.443 These brigades were recognized
as some of the Iraqi Army’s best-trained forces, with many of its troops veterans of the
Peshmerga independence wars of the late 1990s. The Kurdish brigades were extensively
trained in urban warfare.444
Anwar Dolani, a former Peshmerga commander and commander of one of the two
Kurdish brigades, did warn in January that the Kurdish units might not have been
prepared for urban warfare in the largely Arab Baghdad. He said that “the soldiers don’t
know the Arabic language, the Arab tradition, and they don’t have any experience
fighting terror.”445 In practice, however, the Kurdish forces proved to be some of the
most effective units in fighting in Baghdad.
The loyalty of these Kurdish units was also initially called into question by both US and
Iraqi officials. Mahmoud Othman, a prominent member of the Iraqi Kurdish Coalition,
said that: “There are fears that a fight like this, pitting Kurds against Arabs, is bound to
add an ethnic touch to the conflict. I am against the move . . . and there are many in the
Iraqi parliament who are against it too.” Former US ambassador Peter Galbraith added
that the Kurdish fighters “are ultimately loyal not to the national chain of command or the
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nominal chain of command, but to their political party leaders.”446 However as the
security plan progressed, it was the Kurdish units that proved to be the only Iraqi Army
units in Baghdad that won wide trust from the Sunni population, and that US
comamnders found were free of ties to Shi’ite efforts at sectarian cleansing.

Iraqis “In Charge”
Lt. General Abboud Gambar was chosen by the Iraqi government to command the overall
security plan in Baghdad. He took command of Iraqi forces in Baghdad on February 5th
2007. Gambar was a relatively unknown officer who had not previously worked with
American officials. He was chosen over the objections of US General George Casey.
Gambar was a commander in the navy during Saddam Hussein’s reign, and was taken
prisoner by American forces in the 1991 Gulf War. American commanders were
concerned that Gambar would block attempts to arrest Shi’ite militia leaders.
In practice, however, the US continued to exercise de facto command. The new security
plan focused on providing security in the most dangerous regions of Baghdad through the
establishment of small security stations. 30 to 40 joint security stations (JSSs) were
initially planned across Baghdad’s 10 security framework districts. Each JSS consisted of
an ISF unit) and at least one platoon of US troops in operation, with another platoon on
patrol nearby as backup. 400 to 600 US troops were embedded in the JSSs in Baghdad in
spring 2007. By late June 2007, 68 JSS outposts had been created in Baghdad alone.447
The JSS strategy placed US soldiers in neighborhoods they had previously only
sporadically patrolled. US and ISF soldiers were to isolate a neighborhood and then
secure it, creating a “gated community” of safety and expanding out from there. 448 The
strategy was modeled to some extent on the success of US operations in Tal Afar.
Similar tactics were employed by Col. H.R. McMaster there in 2004, resulting in large
decreases in the level of violence.449 The “gated community” approach to
counterinsurgency warfare has a long history.
The JSS strategy had risks. It called for increasing US troop contact with Iraqi forces and
the Iraqi people, increasing both US and ISF vulnerability to attacks. American troops
had stayed on in relatively secure military bases in and around Baghdad for most of the
conflict before 2007. Units would leave for patrols or offensive operations, but would
eventually return to the relative safety of their bases. They now were to be in much more
intimate contact with Iraqi troops, police, and the Iraqi people, and dependent on US-ISF
joint security sites.
The new security plan also increased the chances of US and Iraqi units fighting protracted
urban battles. This type of fighting has historically resulted in higher casualties for
American forces in Iraq. Protracted urban fighting is generally something most
commanders seek to avoid in conventional wars. However, the spiraling violence in
Baghdad had left US commanders with little choice but to conduct major operations in
urban areas.
Despite these risks, JSSs had the potential to win public support for the US and ISF. By
moving troops to live in the neighborhoods they were supposed to protect, troops could
better integrate with the population and collect more intelligence in-field. As General
Petraeus noted, “you can’t secure a population by commuting to the fight.”450
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As it turned out. the JSS effort also did not produce major new casualtes in July 2007,S
forces in the first full month of the surge. US losses came from the fact that they had
more exposure and risk because 25,000 more Soldiers and Marines were in country, they
were conducting more offensive operations, and they were exposed, as discussed in Joint
Security stations. Nevertheless, the US KIA rate in July wass down from the past several
months, and the number of US KIA from enemy fire was also down in August.
(Tragically two helicopter crashes in August—both likely mechanical—killed 17
soldiers. So far, the JSS and population security strategy not only seems to be working
but has not led to additional casualties.
                       Giving Iraqi Forces More Responsibility
The surge strategy called for the ISF take greater responsibility for JSS operations. The
National Security Council in its Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review characterized the
Baghdad Security Plan as “Iraqi-conceived” and “Iraqi-led.” It insisted that “Iraqis are in
the lead in ensuring success,” while the “US [was] in support role.” 451 President Bush
said that the mission of embedded US JSS advisors was “to help Iraqis clear and secure
neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi
forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.”452 The
Pentagon insisted that the JSS mission was part of the effort to “accelerate transfer of
battlespace and Provincial Iraqi Control to Iraqis.” 453
Testimony by General Peter Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, emphasized
that the Baghdad security plan would rely on the ISF to conduct operations. He said that:
       “In each sector, there will be three or four police stations that will serve as the hub of operations
       from which the forces that are located there -- which will be a mixture of Iraqi army, Iraqi national
       police, Iraqi local police and U.S. and coalition forces -- from which they will do their daily
       patrolling, the door-to-door work to let the population know that they're there, to take census-type
       information and to provide the street awareness and presence that allows security to come to fore.
       From those stations will be conducted the raids that may be necessary, and from those stations will
       be the quick reaction forces should some of the Iraqi forces get into trouble.” 454
       However, as the Baghdad security plan progressed, it became clear that US was
forced to assume responsibility in many operations, and that the ISF was not ready to
execute its own missions.
                             Slow Deployment of ISF Troops
Iraqi forces were slow in arriving in Baghdad to carry out the security plan. A senior
Iraqi General noted in late January that, “preparations are not complete,” perhaps
somewhat understating the lack of Iraqi preparations. 455 According to local Baghdad
commanders, by late January, only 2,000 of the planned 8,000 Iraqi troops had reached
Baghdad. Many of the units that did arrive were around half strength, keeping with
historical manpower levels of Iraqi units deployed away from their home bases.456
Deputy Prime Minister Salam Z. al-Zobaee said in early February 2007, that Iraq was not
even “5- percent” ready to roll out the Baghdad security plan.457
On February 6, 2007, Prime Minister Maliki acknowledged that Iraqi forces were delayed
in enacting the security plan. He said “I feel that we are late. This delay is giving a
negative impression and has led some people to say that we have already failed.”458
However, despite the delays in Iraqi deployments, the Iraqi officers in charge of the plan
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had all been chosen, and by early February a few new checkpoints were erected. The
operational command center officially opened in the Green Zone next to the Prime
Minister’s office on February 5th.459
The slow deployment of the ISF, combined with the partial, stand-down of the Mahdi
Army in Baghdad, created an initial security vacuum. A massive bombing in the market
of the Sedriya neighborhood of Baghdad killed 135 on February 3rd, and was widely
blamed on the slow implementation of the Baghdad security plan.460 It prompted Tariq
al-Hashimi, the Iraqi vice president, to call on the US to speed up the “surge”
deployment, “because people cannot tolerate in fact this sort of chaos and the killing
round the clock.”
The Baghdad security plan started in earnest, however, in spring 2007. By March 7,
2007, 18 battalions of ISF forces had moved into Baghdad. Seven of the battalions
deployed to Baghdad were only at 55 to 65 % of their end strength, and another 7
battalions were at 65 to 85%. Four battalions were deployed at 95% of their end strength.
While not perfect, these deployment numbers represent a significant improvement over
historical manpower rates for units deployed away from their home base.
The first Joint Security Station opened in Sadr city in early March. The US also
announced that by April 20, 2007, 3 “gated communities” were up and running in
Ameriyia, Khadra and Adhamiyah.461 By early May, 2007, 57 joint security stations had
been set up across Baghdad, each staffed by 50 Iraqi soldiers and police officers.462

ISF Manpower Shortages
Iraqi anning levels improved, but were still not sufficient to allow the ISF to take the
lead. Most Iraqi battalions arrived in Baghdad “lacking full manpower.” ISF troops were
also returned to their home regions every 90 days, undermining the ability of the ISF to
“hold” the capital.463 In a disturbing parallel with the failures of Operation Together
Forward, some military officials contended that ISF manpower shortages and poor
performance had directly undermined Coalition efforts. Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks,
deputy commander of the First Cavalry Division, stationed in Baghdad, was strongly
critical of ISF performance. He told the New York Times that progress was not made in
Baghdad partially because the ISF “had not provided all the forces promised.”464
The Department of Defense also acknowledged that manpower shortages were a problem,
but reported that they had improved: “Although the initial battalions had mixed results in
deploying at desired manning levels, units deployed later had sufficient soldiers and
officers to meet operational requirements.”465 The Pentagon noted in the June 2007
Quarterly Report that ISF manning levels increased from around 50% in the beginning of
the Baghdad security plan to closer to 75%. As noted before, 10 to 15% of this attrition
was soldiers who “just simply refused to deploy” and 25% was soldiers on leave to send
pay to their families.466 ISF units were still undermanned in the summer of 2007.467

“Uneven” ISF Performance
Pentagon reporting on ISF performance during the BSP was optimistic but vague. The
DOD claimed that “Iraqi units are generally performing up to expectations.”468 The June
2007 quarterly report said that some Iraqi forces were tactically proficient, and that
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“some Iraqi commanders showed an ability to plan, command, and control relatively
sophisticated joint and/or combined operations.”469 General Lute classified ISF
capabilities as mixed, remarking that “the Iraqi participation in the surge has been
uneven.”470
The the Iraqi Army and police forces failed to provide anything like the support required.
Success among ISF units was local, and not on the level required to implement security in
the capital, let alone the nation. Progress fell well behind schedule as ISF units were
unable to “hold” sections cleared by Coalition troops.
Originally, Baghdad was expected to be fully controlled by the end of July, but officials
were forced to change their expectations in response to slow progress.471 By June 5, only
128 of 457 neighborhoods in Baghdad were listed as “under control.” 472 329
neighborhoods remained to be cleared. By June 18, 2007, Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno
reported that only 40% of Baghdad was under the control of the Coalition and ISF.473 By
June 29, still less than half of Baghdad neighborhoods were under control.474
In practice, it took taken more than six months thus far to establish limited security over
half of Baghdad, and this has not stopped sectarian cleansing. UN Secretary General Ban
Ki Moon also reported that progress in US-ISF operations was “slower than had been
hoped for.”475 Lt. General Odierno acknowledged that “although we’ve made some very
clear progress, there’s still a great deal of work left to do.”476
The inability of the ISF to “hold” neighborhoods also delayed progress. Brig. Gen.
Vincent Brooks reported that the ISF “in some cases have performed poorly…forcing
American commanders to conduct operations to remove insurgents from some areas
multiple times.”477 The Iraqi Security Forces remained underdeveloped and relied on US
forces to secure and resecure key areas.
The concentration of troops in Baghdad also pushed the insurgents and militias into
challenging US and ISF capabilities elsewhere. For example, when a battalion of 300 to
400 Iraqi Army forces in Tarmiyah, a city 30 miles north of Baghdad, were transferred to
Baghdad, security evaporated. Only 50 U.S. troops were left to guard the city of 30,000,
and the entire 150-man police force in Tarmiyah, which operated from a joint patrol
based with American troops, mysteriously disappeared. 478 Coalition forces were forced
to focus on “staying alive” rather than conducting counterinsurgency missions. 479 The
focus on Baghdad also diverted US troops from some areas, creating a security vacuum
that strained the ISF.
While Iraqi force development continued to make real progress in the spring of 2007, real
world progress often fell short of the progress claimed in unclassified reporting by the
Department of Defense. Iraqi forces remained unready to assume full responsibility in
most areas of operation, the number of battalions capable of independent combat
operations remained limited, and major problems remained in getting effective support
from any element of the police forces.
At the same time, the increasing rate of Iraqi operations did improve the situation as
time went on. For example, in August, the Iraqis themselves planned and executed the
entire security operation for the observance of the death of the 7th Imam on 9 August
2007. That event involved a million pilgrims marching to the Kadhimiyah Shrine in
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Baghdad and had been marked by significant violence each of the last 3 years, including
nearly a 1000 who were killed in a stampede in 2005. The Iraqi Security Forces, under
General Gambar, organized everything and it was a great success with no deaths due to
violence.

Sectarian Influence in ISF Operations
Sectarianism in the ISF also undermined security operations during the surge. The DoD
June 2007 Quarterly Report noted that “There have been reports of political involvement
by some leaders in tactical and operational decisions that bypass the standard chain of
command. In addition, sectarian-based decisions have been made within the Iraqi
government and its military and police forces.”480
According to the New York Times, “The heavily Shiite security forces have also
repeatedly failed to intervene in some areas when fighters, who fled or laid low when the
American troops arrived, resumed sectarian killings.” Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks, deputy
commander of the First Cavalry Division stationed in Baghdad, remarked, “Until you
have a presence on the street by people who are seen as honest and who are not letting
things come back in, you can’t shift into another area and expect that place to stay the
way it was.”481 This sectarianism slowed the Baghdad campaign, as it forced Coalition
troops to retake security zones guarded by corrupt Iraqi forces.
Sectarianism was so serious in some regions that ISF troops were distinguishable from
Shi’ite militias in uniform only. Some ISF officers directly collaborated with Shi’ite
insurgents. After a Sunni insurgents bombed a bus station in the contested Baya
neighborhood in Baghdad, Iraqi soldiers and policemen set up checkpoints alongisde
Mahdi Army militants. According to an Iraqi reporter for the New York Times, 20 Mahdi
fighters inspected cars at the checkpoint while Iraqi national police nearby cursed at
Sunni civilians, yelling to them “we are going to finish you!.”482

The “Gated Community” Strategy
The legacy of the joint security stations was mixed. Some US officials worried that heavy
ISF cooperation with US troops would inhibit the ISF’s ability to become self-reliant. Lt.
Gen. Douglas Lute originally criticized the surge plan on the basis that it could establish
dependence. Lute worried that a surge in US forces would hinder efforts to get the ISF to
assume more security responsibility in Baghdad.483 It also raised questions as to how the
ISF would perform in the wake of a reduced US troop presence.
Other military officials, however, argued that the joint security stations had made ISF
units more capable and proficient. US soldiers in Baghdad noted that US participation in
checkpoints had increased the ISF’s confidence and encouraged Iraqi soldiers to not
abandon checkpoints. Sgt. 1st Class Jeffrey Rhodan said that “now they [the ISF] feel
they’re somewhat secure. They’re manning them. They’re learning from increased
exposure to US forces. The difference is that we’re living with them right now.”484
A more serious flaw did emerge in establishing some of the short-term. JSS stations.
Troops had to spend up to half of their time guarding their outposts, reducing their
availability to conduct street patrols, engage with civilians, or provide security. American
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                             8/23/07          Page 58


junior officers and NCOs reported that patrols had dropped to 12 times a month, down
from twice-daily patrols that lasted six to eight hours each.485
Mahdi militia members patrolled neighborhoods more frequently than joint US-Iraqi
troops. This flaw was not recognized at the top level of the military. Higher ranking
officers reported that JSSs were effective in integrating troops with the population. They
also said that JSSs had provided troops with better intelligence.486

Heavy ISF Casualties
The combination of new, vulnerable joint security stations, increased operations in
Baghdad, more lethal IEDs, and new insurgent tactics and weapons led to a heavy
increase in troop casualties. More Iraqi security forces (222) were killed in June than in
May (174), and April to June was the deadliest quarter for US troops in Iraq since the
2003 invasion.487
According to icasualties.org, ISF deaths peaked at 300 in April 2007. The Pentagon
reported in its June 2007 Quarterly Report that “the majority of overall attacks continue
to occur against Coalition forces, while the ISF and civilians continue to suffer the
majority of casualties.”488

                                  ISF Deaths in 2007
           350
           300
           250
           200
           150
           100
            50
             0
                                                  7
                            -7


                                       7


                                                 7




                                                                            7
                            07




                                                              07
                                     -0


                                             r-0


                                               -0




                                                                         -0
                         2-
                         n-




                                                           n-
                                            ay




                                                                      l
                                  ar




                                                                   Ju
                                           Ap
                     Ja




                                                        Ju
                      ry


                                 M




                                           M
                   ua
                br
             Fe




                                     Source: icasualties.org


As noted before, high ISF casualties reduced ISF readiness, degrading the number of
“independent” Iraqi battalions from 10 in March to 6 in July.489 The improvement in
insurgent tactics that contributed to higher ISF casualties – more lethal IEDs and
VBIEDs, improved EFPs and home-made bombs – also reduced ISF COIN readiness.

Tactical Victory, or Stretching Too Thin
A significant reduction in violence occurred in Baghdad in February and March 2007.
Sectarian killings decreased as the Mahdi militia stood down and ISF and American
troops increased their presence in the capital. The number of violent incidents of murder
and/or sectarian violence dropped from 1,400 in January to 500 in March and April.490
Murders in Baghdad decreased by 51%, and the number of civilians killed dropped to
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                            8/23/07             Page 59


1,586 civilians from February to April 14, compared with 2,871 killed in the prior two
months.491
Despite the drop in violence in Baghdad, the overall levels of violence in Iraq did not fall.
A trend emerged in March of attacks shifting from Baghdad to outlying regions. DOD
reporting stated that “The aggregate level of violence in Iraq remained relatively
unchanged…Violence has decreased in the Baghdad security districts and Anbar, but has
increased in most provinces, particularly in the outlying areas of Baghdad Province and
Diyala and Ninewa Provinces. …The overall level of violence in Iraq this quarter
remained similar to the previous reporting period but shifted location.”492 While Baghdad
saw a lull in casualties and sectarian killings in February and March, the rest of Iraq, and
particularly the “belt” of cities that ring Baghdad, all witnessed an increase in violence.
Some smaller cities near Baghdad, such as Haswah, began to witness major violence for
the first time in years.493
Violence grew steadily worse at the national level in late spring and summer 2007.
Civilian casualties climbed to 1,861 in March, from 1,645 in February according to an
Iraqi government report.494 The Associated Press found 1,504 civilian deaths had
occurred outside of Baghdad between February 14 and April 14, 2007, compared with
1,009 killed during the 2 previous months.495 Execution-style killings of Sunnis dropped
at the start of the February surge, “the figures have started to climb again” by June 2007,
according to the Los Angeles Times.496
 June was the most violent month since the start of the war, with the number of violent
incidents averaged 178 per day. Record-high levels of violence in Baghdad, Saladdin,
Diyala and Basra provinces and a dramatic increase in attacks on coalition forces
occurred.497 Suicide bombings were near an all-time high in May and June.498 The
number of unidentified bodies found in Baghdad rose by more than 70% in May
compared to April, a result of a significant increase in Shi’ite death squad activity and
sectarian violence.499 Sectarian cleansing of Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Christians resumed.500
It still was not clear in mid 2007 whether the Coalition and ISF forces were achieving
lasting results or still playing “whack a mole.” Operation in Baghdad sometimes led
insurgents to leave the city and operate elsewhere and that most Sunni militias might
simply stand down, let the US-led forces defeat the insurgents, watch a Shi’ite dominated
government gain power, and resurface once the US was gone. This was evident with the
resurgence of violence in Baghdad.
By June 2007, other limits were apparent to a Baghdad-oriented strategy. The US had to
expand its counterinsurgency operations broadly outside Baghdad in ways that steadily
dispersed limited US and combat-capable Iraqi military forces. Baghdad was still only
30-40% secured, but the fighting not only was dispersing into the Baghdad ring cities, but
into a troubled zone of provinces ranging from Anbar to Diyala. Furthermore, growing
Shi’ite tensions and Iranian pressure in the south, and serious potential problems with
Arab-Kurdish tensions in the north, both had the potential to derail what progress had
been made in the surge.
Neverthless, the overall threat declined in terms of the measures of the worst kinds of
violence. A combination of the “surges” and Sunni tribal operations in Anbar helped
reduce the level of violent ethno-sectarian attacks signficantly, reduce the level of high
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profile attacksf all kinds, and the overall level of attacks According to MNF-I counts, the
level of Iraqi deaths was down nation wide. It was not down as much as MNF-I felt it
needed to be and much more has to be done. However, the last surge Brigade had only
arrived on 15 June, and it was premature to call the developing mix of the surge and the
“tribal awakening” a success or a failure.
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                                   8/23/07                Page 61


VIII. ISF Developments and Performance
The ISF continued to expand its operational capabilities in several major joint offensives
in 2007. Once again, its performance was mixed, but it did make progress in many areas.

Operation Phantom Thunder
The US went on to launch a series of offensive operations in the south and elsewhere in
Iraq. The overall offensive was code-named Operation Phantom Thunder.
As of June 27, 2007, Operation Phantom Thunder consisted of:
   •   Operation Arrowhead Ripper: focused on clearing Baqubah (35 miles northeast of Baghdad) and
       other parts of southwestern Diyala of Al-Qa’ida insurgents. Around 10,000 Coalition troops
       participated in the offensive. Five combat brigades, a combat aviation brigade, and a Marine
       Expeditionary Unit were deployed.501 Three of the five brigades initially deployed to Baghdad
       were rerouted in June to other areas to reign in and root out insurgents who had fled the capital.

   •   Operation Marne Torch: aimed to clear al-Qa’ida bases in Arab Jabour, southeast of Baghdad.
       More than 2,000 American soldiers and 1,000 Iraqi soldiers participated in the operation.502

   •   Operation Marne Avalanche: aimed to clear southern Baghdad (Iskandariyah) of insurgents.

   •   Operation Marne Husky: entered deeper into the Tigris River Valley area, started mid-August,
       2007.

   •   Suboperations included:
           o   An offensive in Al Anbar province in late July massed 9,000 US and Iraqi troops on the
               western side of the Euphrates River
           o   Sub-operations in Fallujah and the area south of Lake Tharthar in Anbar
           o   Continued efforts by Iraqi security forces to combat Shi’ite militias in southern Iraq,
               particularly in Diwaniyah and Nasiriyah
           o   A continued effort by the ISF to maintain order in Mosul and throughout Ninewah
           o   US and Iraqi Special Forces targeted high-value al-Qa’ida operatives;
           o   Continued efforts by US and Iraqi forces to clear and hold areas of Baghdad and continue
               Operation Fardh al-Qanoon
These operations raised questions about both the ability of the US to achieve meaningful
results with the troop levels that had risen as a result of the surge and the readiness of
Iraqi forces to begin fully replacing US units.

Operation Arrowhead Ripper
Operations did intensiy outside Baghdad. Some 3,000 Iraqi soldiers and police were
assigned to Operation Arrowhead Ripper.503 ISF troops were not involved in the initial
assault but were brought in to serve two functions - “hold” and secure the region and
provide humanitarian assistance.504 During “lockdown,” the second stage of Arrowhead
Ripper, Iraqi forces embedded with US troops conducted block-to-block search
operations. 505
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As many as 500 Iraqi soldiers searched Baquba neighborhoods on a given day.506 ISF
forces also provided translations for US teams where they were embedded. The New York
Times reported that the IA provided an “essential” role in Baqubah, since as embedded
troops they “compensated somewhat for the shortage of interpreters” in the US Army.
While under the control of American troops, they acted as a force multiplier in holding
operations. 507
Iraqi Army and police also conducted humanitarian operations after US-led offensives,
combining “hold” with “build” efforts. Lt. Col. Fred Johnson noted in the second week of
the offensive that: “The Iraqi Army and police did the heavy lifting passing out the food
and water and also provided local security…It was the Iraqi soldiers who first identified
the need to provide food to the locals after talking to the citizens about their situation.”508
Iraqi and Coalition forces handed out eight-week rations of rice and flour to crowds of
hundreds of Iraqis.509
It is too early to fully judge the overall performance of the ISF in Arrowhead Ripper.
However, reports suggested that the the ISF effort was undermanned. Only half – 1,500 -
of the ISF personnel expected to report for duty showed up. 510 In Salman Pak, the Iraqi
Army had not deployed a single soldier in the area.511
Reports also suggested that the ISF was not self-reliant and had little ability to “hold”
territory won by US forces. Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno predicted that the ISF would
“sustain and continue to improve their ability to maintain security” during Phantom
Thunder. Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey was less optimistic and said in June 2007 that that
Iraqi units, although improved, “do not have tactical staying power.”512
Lt. Col. Douglas Ollivant, a senior Army planner in Baghdad, agreed, remarking that
“For the control and retain phases, we will need reliable Iraqi security forces in sufficient
numbers. There are clearly not yet enough reliable forces.” 513 Counterinsurgency expert
Andrew Krepinevich, director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
affirmed that Iraqi security forces were “the weak link” in the counterinsurgency
campaign.
Some American commanders on the ground doubted the ISF’s ability to preserve gains
made in Arrowhead Ripper. Brig. Gen. Mick Bednarek, the American commander in
Baqubah, and Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, reported that ISF troops were not ready to hold key
areas. Bednarek and Lynch cited a shortage of trained troops and a lack of basic supplies,
ranging from ammunition to radios and trucks. Referring to overall ISF readiness,
Bednarek reported that “They’re not quite up to the job yet.”514
Other US commanders reported that the ISF fared far better in Baqubah than it had
previously summer. When ISF units were given full security responsibility in 2006,
security broke down and reports of abuses of Sunnis by Shi’ite dominated Iraqi police
and Army units abounded. Yet by June 2007, tensions between civilians and ISF
elements had diminished, and US soldiers even reported that some Sunni Arabs had
welcomed Iraqi soldiers. 515
ISF forces in Operation Arrowhead Ripper did appear more professional than they had
before. As one US commander noted, the ISF “they weren’t a ragtag bunch.” The Los
Angeles Times reported that the Iraqi Army was “making strides” in Baqubah. ISF
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soldiers were in full uniform and body armor, and “most” carried assault rifles. They also
secured actionable intelligence on weapons caches from civilians and cleared
neighborhoods. Iraqi soldiers had also improved their logistics. According to US reports,
ISF officers took charge of distributing food and water supplies to their troops, and did
not rely on US transportation.516 However, US soldiers also noted that ISF troops were
not comfortable conducting military operations on their own.
The use of far more intense combat tactics coupled to broader efforts to seal and secure
urban areas after tactical victories may have a more lasting effect. There is, however, a
serious risk that the US will simply end up playing “whack a mole” on a steadily rising
scale. For example, in Operation Arrowhead Ripper, Coalition troops rarely confronted
AQI leaders, as most had fled Baqubah in advance of the offfense.
Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno and other officials acknowledged that 80 percent of Baquba’s
al-Qaida leadership fled, in addition to the “several hundred low-level” fighters.517 It was
too easy for insurgents to move on to the next area and city, recruit more expendable
volunteers, and exploit the hostility following urban combat operations and large-scale
detainments.

Operation Marne Husky
Senior military officials reported that the ISF had further improved by late summer 2007.
Major General Rick Lynch reported that during Operation Marne Husky, the “Iraqi Army
in my battlespace are much more effective.” Lynch said they also were a more
nationalized force: Iraqi commanders were “Iraqi, they’re not Shi’ite or Sunni - they’re
Iraqi.”518
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IX. The Localization of Security: The Provincial
Security Forces
By summer 2007, there seemed to be a growing consensus that the US would have to
look beyond the creation of national forces and create a mix of provincial and local police
forces that could provide local security to people of the same sect and ethnicity, that had
some training, had some screening to remove criminals and extremists, and had ties to
local leaders to partially guarantee their loyalty. The whole police effort is up in the air
since no formal changes have yet taken place to what everyone in the field seems to agree
is a failed, over-centralized structure.

Progress in Securing Anbar Province and a Shift to
Relying on Tribal Forces
As al-Qaida imposed a harsh shari’a in the western Iraqi province of Anbar, Iraqi tribes
rebelled and switched allegiances in spring 2007. Key tribes, such as the Bu-Faheed,
which had previously allied with Al Qaeda, cooperated in September 2006 to create the
Al Anbar Salvation Council, a coalition backed by the US military against Al Qaeda.519
More than 200 sheiks were part of the alliance.520 By June 2007, all 23 of the major tribes
in and around Ramadi had joined the “Awakening,” the larger political movement for the
Salvation Council.521
This Sunni tribal “awakening” was a major shift in the strategic situation in the main
front, but active tribal and Sunni resistance to Al Qa’ida covered only part of Anbar and
was concentrated largely in the river towns and cities, with some activity in Waleed and
Rutbah. Moreover, Anbar and the north are exceptional in that there is good coordination
between the Iraqi Army and the police, and only minimal elements of the ISF that
cooperate with the JAM and Shi’ite militias. This allowed the Iraqi tribes to better
coordinate with the ISF police force.
                                 The Localization of Security
The “Awakening” movemement recruited thousands for the Iraqi police and army, more
than the US Marines could train.522 Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno reported that, in the first
five months of 2007, 12,000 Iraqis in Anbar had joined the ISF, compared with 1,000 in
all of 2006.523 Approximately 10,000 police officers served in Anbar as of June 2007, an
increase of several thousand in the past year. The New York Times reported that there
were as many as 21,500 police officers in Anbar by June 2007.524 In Ramadi, the
provincial capital, the police force grew from less than 200 to 4,500.525 While the local
police could only recruit 20 Iraqis a year ago, by June 2007 it had 8,000 recruits.526
The tribal coalition also created an auxiliary police force of 2,200 local tribesmen.527
Called the Provincial Security Force, the force aided the ISF in securing the province. By
late June 2007, eight tribal police battalions had been created.528 It allowed illiterate
counterinsurgents who would not have qualified for the Iraqi army or police to fill vital
intelligence-gathering, patrol, and checkpoint operations in the province.
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The deployment of the PSF with the thousands of new Iraqi police recruits created what
US military officials referred to as a “tipping point” that allowed US forces to gain a
foothold against the insurgency.529 By allowing tribal members to protect their own areas,
tribes had more incentive to join, and could grant the capacity to “hold” and “build” in
their local areas.
The PSF was formed from the even less official “emergency response units” in April
2007. The irregular force was composed of a mix of armed family and tribal members,
mostly Sunni, many of whom were waiting for slots in the regular police force or Army.
Many took literacy classes in order to eventually qualify for the regular ISF, and many
were also unpaid. The US army and CPATT worked to establish eight Provincial Police
Force (PPF) units in Anbar province and four PPF units in Diyala province.530
The United States has denied arming Sunni insurgents, insisting that they were already
armed. 531 Odierno said that tribal leaders were given no more than “a little ammo” and
humanitarian aid.532 Yet the Washington Post reported that in one operation, the Iraqi
military provided weapons and ammunition to tribal organizations, while US troops had
provided transporation, food, and handcuffs.533
                                         Limited Accountability
As members of the PSF, tribal fighters were subject to some accountability measures. A
limited effort to track the weapons and register new PSF officers was launched. In Anbar
Province, recruits were issued identification cards and papers. Personnel were vetted and
subject to biometric identification. A Marines Corps officer described the process:
       “In the recruiting process nobody was admitted into it unless they have the proper ID cards or
       papers….Most of them would only join if they could go to their hometowns…That was the appeal
       of the police force, that they could stay home rather than be nationally assigned. When they
       returned [from training], we had handlers assigned. We picked them up at the Baghdad or Al Asad
       [airport]. [They] were Coalition-escorted or –driven to their police districts, to police stations, and
       almost in all cases the PTT [Police Transition Team] was there to receive them to make sure they
       were processed at the station. So we also maintained our own rostering and tracking of all those
       assigned because we tied it to the payroll process. If you do not have a graduation certificate with
       the identification and a hiring order…your name was not added to the payroll.”534
However, responsibility for training and equipping locally hired IPS rested with the MOI
and Iraqi governors. The Defense Department does not track local Iraqi police who are
not mentored by PTTs or who operate in provinces under PIC (Provincial Iraqi Control)
status.535 Some fighters were subject to US intelligence checks. Despite the checks,
elements of the PSF still warned al-Qaida leaders about forecoming operations during
Operation Arrowhead Ripper. 536
                                    A Sharp Decline in Violence
The ISF’s joint operations with tribal leaders and Coalition forces against Sunni
insurgents repelled the majority of Al Qaeda forces. U.S. officials declared that Al-Qaeda
in Iraq (AQI) had been cleared from almost every major town in Anbar, although AQI
had retaliated with large-scale bombings on civilians and police stations.537 The DOD
reported that the additional US troops “aided by increasing tribal resistance to AQI, are
pushing AQI out of many of the population centers, facilitating stability in large parts of
the province.”538
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Once tribal leaders committed to the alliance, according to U.S. Army officers, “attacks
on American forces in that area stopped almost overnight.”539 Attacks against Coalition
and ISF forces plummeted from 500 attacks a week to barely a third of that figure.540
Overall violence dropped nearly 50 percent: In May 2006, 810 incidents of violence or
attacks occurred in Anbar, by May 2007, only 400 incidents of violence occurred.541 225
attacks occurred in June.542 In the capital of Ramadi, there were 254 attacks in May 2006,
and only 30 attacks in May 2007. By June 2007, violence had dropped by 60% from the
previous year.543 200 insurgents had been killed and 600 captured.
The decline of violence in Ramadi created a “two-year low incidents - accounting for the
largest decline in violence levels.”544 According to Lt. Gen. Dempsey, daily attacks in the
Anbar province dropped to the single digits by June, 2007, “which a month ago would
have been inconceivable.”545 Petraeus described the progress in Anbar as
“breathtaking.”546
A US military report documented the decrease in violence as follows:
   •   The total weekly incident totals for MNF-West, which includes most of Anbar, averaged over 400
       from July 2006 to April 2007. By the last week in July, it had dropped to 257 per week over the
       preceding 26 weeks, 157 over the preceding 8 weeks, and totaled only 98 incidents in the third
       week of July.

   •   The number of civilian Iraqi tips or HUMINT on key targets like arms caches in MNF-West had
       been virtually negligible from January 2006 to January 2007. They have since averaged some 40
       per month. More significantly, the number of arms caches discovered had dropped from around 50
       per month in January 2006 to less than 10 in the summer and fall. It rose to early 40 in February
       2007 and has since averaged over 40 per month.

   •   The number of monthly attacks in Fallujah averaged over 100 from March-August 2006, and
       roughly 200 from September 2006 to January 2007. It dropped to below 90 from February to
       May, to less than 30 in June, and was continuing to drop during a visit in late July.

   •   The number of monthly attacks in Ramadi averaged well over 300 from August 2005 to June
       2006, and averaged over 500 from July 2006 to February 2007, and roughly 200 from September
       2006 to January 2007. It dropped to below 450 in March and then fell sharply to below 1000 in
       May, to less than 50 in June, and was continuing to drop during a visit in late July.

   •   The number of monthly attacks in Rutbah had begun to surge from nearly zero to 10-20 in late
       2006, and peaked at 40 in December 2006. They have been well under 10 per month since
       February and are dropping.

   •    The number of monthly attacks in Hit averaged over 70 from February to August 2006, peaked at
       160 in September 2006, and averaged over 100 through January 2007. They dropped to less than
       20 in February, and have been less than 10 since that time, dropping steadily through late July.

   •   The number of monthly attacks in the Haditha Triad averaged over 30 from March-August 2006,
       and averaged over 200 from September 2006 to November. They have since dropped to less than
       30 per month.
Weapons-cache discoveries increased 190%, largely due to information gathered from
tribal members. 547 The Defense Department found that “the Iraqi public in Western Iraq
is increasingly willing to provide intelligence and report weapons caches.”548 Also,
thanks to their local knowledge, intelligence gathered by the PSF has been particularly
useful. According to Lt. Ed Clark, whose Army platoon patrols in west Ramadi: “About
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                                     8/23/07                 Page 67


10% of our intelligence is actionable, while 90% of their [the PSF] intelligence is
actionable.”549
Other factors contributed to the newfound security in Anbar. It was the synergy of
additional US troops, collaboration with the ISF through joint security stations, and the
large degree of tribal cooperation that encouraged success in stemming violence in
summer 2007.
Extra US troops played a particularly important role: Marine Colonel Richard Simcock
said that the 4,000 additional US troops from the surge deployed to Anbar granted
flexibility and extra capabilities that “has allowed me to go into places that my
predecessors just didn’t have the troop levels to do. I can do more because I have
more.”550
MNF-West US Marine Brig. Gen. Charles M Gurganus said that increased US troop
flexibility and capacity, coupled with the creation of 22 joint security stations in Ramadi,
was what helped stabilize Anbar. 551 Both officials were confident that the joint
operations had improved security sufficiently to allow for a US troop drawdown in the
province, and the reassignment of troops in Anbar to Baghdad.
                            The Implications of Localizing Security
The growth of anti-Al Qai’da Sunni tribal and local resistance compensated for the fact
that the ISF were not strong enough, effective enough, or national enough to allow the
surge strategy to work. It allowed the US to work with a combination of the ISF forces
that were effective and with Sunni tribes to make major progress outside Baghdad and to
still deploy enough US forces in Baghdad to make progress.
Sunnis that were shooting Coalition and ISF forces six months ago now want to work
with the central government if the central government will work with them. They will
sign loyalty oaths, join the regular police, and join the army if the government will give
them money, status, and a share of power. The problem is that this shift is tenuous and
depends on reasonably rapid central government action to give the Sunnis what they want
(US officers put the limit of tribal pateince at 130-180 days). The fact remains, however,
that luck has paid off so far and could pay off even more in the future.
US military officials recognized that the tribal elements of the Iraqi Police Service had
aided COIN. The Marines noted that “The Iraqi police initiative in Al-Anbar to date
provides the Coalition the most direct method of Sunni engagement.” Marines reported
that:
        “Iraqi Police Service was not designed similarly to fight an insurgency but is an essential element
        to fighting the insurgency. This required the Coalition and Iraqi Army Forces to set conditions that
        would allow the Iraqi Police to conduct day-to-day operations. Coalition and Iraqi units also
        provided quick reaction forces for the Iraqi police in emergency situations. Today, there are many
        locations throughout al Anbar where our Iraqi Police have established security to a level for
        allowing schools top open for the first time in years.”552
Anbar does seem to represent a growing success against Al Qa'ida, although it is far from
clear how much this success extends to the other Neo-Salafi Islamist extremist groups
supporting the worst elements of the insurgency and Sunni extremism. The positive
aspect of this largely self-initiated Iraqi effort is that at least in Anbar, the tribes are not
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created forces totally under their control. Instead, they are joining the ISF and creating
local security forces registered with the government. These local forces have formal ties
to the government. They are being created in ways that follow a precedent set in creating
similar forces in the Kurdish area. They only get weapons, training and pay if they
formally enroll as supporting the police and swear allegiance to the government. They
also must provide biometric data like fingerprints and retinal scans. This not only allows
them to be clearly separated from unknowns and Al Qa'ida, but also allows them to be
identified in the future.
Nevertheless, the net result is to create a separate Sunni or Shi'ite force whose ties to the
central government are uncertain and opportunistic. It is also to create a force built on
uncertain tribal and local coalitions. This makes it far from clear what kind of political
power such forces will support. As Jeffrey White, a military analyst for the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, noted, “their allegiance is to themselves,” making tribal
leaders potentially unreliable allies.553 For example, in Anbar, it might create the core of
a more effective national Sunni political party or role in the central government. For
example, the leader of the tribal alliance in Anbar, Abdul Sattar Rishawi, even met with
Shi’ites, suggesting a new mode of political progress.554 It also, however, might emerge
as a regional tribal political force that challenged the government or became a new source
of armed opposition to it.
As a result, Anbar exemplifies a growing reliance on local forces that may well be the
coming paradigm for security in Iraq. The continuing failure of the central government's
effort to develop an effective police force, and one that can “hold” the “wins” of
Coalition forces and the Iraqi Army is leading to more and more reliance on sectarian and
ethnic local security forces in other areas, or to reliance on local police under the de facto
control of local political leaders. Almost all of these local political groups and forces are
divided along sectarian and ethnic lines.
                        Challenges To The Anbar Tribal Alliance
Despite these gains, long-term cooperation between the ISF and Coalition forces and
Sunni tribes in Anbar was problematic. The Defense Department recognized that “local
Sunni cooperation with and support to Coalition forces in Anbar Province is not
uniform.”555 The loyalties of Sunni tribes were uncertain and might be short-term: As
Sheikh Jabbar al-Fahdawi, the anticipated future leader of the Salvation Council
explained, “I told my followers to stop attacking the Americans. We consider the
Americans to be our friends at the moment so that we can get rid of the extremists.”556
While some tribes temporarily united against Al Qaeda, tribal support for Al Qaeda
persisted, and some remained loyal to Al Qaeda, dismissing the Salvation Council as a
tool of U.S. occupiers.
Some tribal support for the ISF and Coalition is almost certainly tenuous and could
suddenly change. As Lt. Thomas R. Mackesy, an adviser to the Iraqi army, lamented,
“One day they’re laying I.E.D.’s, the next they’re police collecting a pay check.”557
Some Shiite and Kurdish officials in the Iraqi government also disapproved of, or feared,
any ties to such local forces, tribal elements, and Sunnis. They worried that the
collaboration would empower Sunni militias who were not loyal to the central
government or Colaition forces.
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                          8/23/07             Page 69


Ali Adeeb, a leading Shiite lawmaker, commented, “They are trusting terrorists…People
who have previously attacked American forces and innocent people.”558 Prime Minister
Nouri al Maliki commented that Coalition troops “make mistakes since they do not know
the facts about the people they deal with…We should be well aware of the tribe’s
background and sure that it is not connected with terror” before arming them, he stated.559
Abbas Bayati, a Trukmen Shiite member of parliament, protested the strategy even more
vocally, insisting that “We cannot take weapons from certain insurgents and militas and
then create other militias…You need to open recruiting centers and provide training; now
what is going on is giving weapons and money to the tribes and individuals.”560 Another
senior Iraq official asserted that the strategy was untenable and divisive, commenting
that, “In reality, they are forcing the Iraqi government and the Shia and the Kurds to
reconcile with the Saddamists.”561
Yet, this criticsm was both unfair and impracitcal. The Coalition was not arming or
paying separate militias. It was creating local forces and new elements of the ISF tied to
the central government, More broadly, as one US officer in Iraq pointed out. ”The point
that is often forgotten is that to end a war you don’t need to reconcile with your friends.
To end a war, you must reconcile with your enemies. This is hard, but the example in
Anbar shows that it is possible.”
Furthermore, tribal tensions between the groups could dissolve the Council and halt
Sunni cooperation with Coalition troops. In early June, the Anbar Salvation Council
splintered and was on the verge of dissolving. Twelve Anbar tribal leaders signed an
agreement to form a new coalitionolation to replace the Anbar Salvation Council and
purge Abdul Sattar Abu Rishawi, a Council leader allegedly involved in an oil smuggling
ring.562 Ali Hatem Ali Sauleiman was a leader in the push to create a new rival tribal
coalition.563 While U.S. military officials and some tribal leaders insisted that the Anbar
Salvation Council was intact, internal power struggles attested to the fragility of tribal-
based cooperation, and the dangers of relying on rival groups in the long-term.
The alliance was further strained when an AQI group, the Islamic State of Iraq, bombed a
meeting between tribal leaders at Monsour hotel in late June 2007. The suicide attack
killed Fassal al Gu’od, a founder of the Anbar Salvation Council, three Sunni sheiks from
Anbar and two shi’ite sheiks from Diwaniyah.564 {Two Anbar tribal leaders – one who
had attended a government conference that disussed the counterinsurgency effort - were
killed the following day.}565 Interestingly, however, this has caused the Sunni tribes to
redouble their efforts and are continuing to have meetings to discuss the way forward.
Nonetheless, Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno remained optimistic that the tribal network
could provide security, and that Anbar provinced could be turned over to Iraqi provincial
control (PIC status) by October or November 2007.566
                       Applying the “Anbar Model” Elsewhere
These developments led the US military to consider reaching out to other insurgent
groups and local leaders. According to Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, the
second-ranking US Commander in Iraq, conciliation at the local level was possible: “We
believe a large majority of groups within Iraq are reconcilable and are now interested in
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                           8/23/07             Page 70


engaging with us. But more importantly, they want to engage and become a part of the
government.”567
Lt. Gen. Odierno estimated that 80% of fighters – including Sunni insurgents and Shi’ite
milita members were “reconcilable,” and could be persuaded in negotiations to stop
attacking Coalition and ISF troops.568 He asserted that “there are insurgents reaching out
to us…so we want to reach back to them…We’re talking about cease-fires and maybe
signing some things that say they won’t conduct operations against the government of
Iraq or against coalition forces.” 569

                       Progress in Central and North Central Iraq
The US military extended negotiations to insurgent groups in Anbar outside of the tribal
alliance network. US forces brokered a deal with elements of the 1920 Revolution
Brigades, a Sunni insurgent group that rivaled al-Qaida. 570 The Brigades had previously
been actively involved in the insurgency and fought US troops, until fears of al-Qaida’s
dominance in the region prompted an alliance shift. The US military supplied the
Brigades with uniforms and ruled them exempt from AK-47 weapons seizures.571 The
Associated Press reported that “hundreds” of fighters from the Brigades worked as scouts
and gathered intelligence for Coalition troops in Baqubah.572 Brigades fighters were used
as part of a “ragtag” intelligence network or as scouts for US troops, and were given
“football-style jerseys” to identify them as US allies. The Brigades provided “critical”
information in Baqubah to US troops, giving the exact coordinates of al-Qaida safe
houses and other intellience.

                               Efforts in the Baghdad Area
American commanders held talks with Sunni groups in central and north-central Iraq, the
focal point of the insurgency, to broker a deal to unite against AQI. They negotiated in
the Sunni stronghold of Amiriya in Baghdad, the Triangle of Death, Diyala Province
north and east of Baghdad, and Saldhuddin Province.573 In Salahuddin, 120 tribal sheiks
formed a tentative agreement to create police units along the lines of the FPS to fight Al
Qaeda. 574 They also negotiated in Taji and Iskandariyah, the Arab Jabour region, and
southern Iraq.
The Coalition formed a tentative agreement with ten Iraqi tribes in Baghdad. A tribal
coalition called the Awakening Council was formed. The agreement to oppose al Qaida
was formed in late June 2007.575 According to the Washington Post, US and Iraqi troops
provided transportation to Sunni tribes in Baghdad’s Amiriyah nieghborhood, and gave
them approval to arrest suspected al Qaida insurgents.576
Yet the Anbar model was likely to have less impact in the capital, since tribal groups in
Baghdad were less powerful than in Anbar. Thus, according to Lt. Col. Douglas Ollivant,
chief of plans for the American division in Baghdad, tribal conciliation was “not going to
be the answer. It’s going to be part of the answer.”577
It is also unclear how lasting the success of these tribal alliances in some parts of Babil,
Maysan and Baghdad will be. It is also unclear whether opposition to Islamist extremist
elements like Al Qa’ida can be translated into any form of national unity or support for
the central government. Sheer luck created a major synergy between Sunni willingness
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to attack Al Qai’da and other abusive and hardline Sunni Islamist elements, and far more
effective US efforts at counterinsurgency. This had a major impact throughout Anbar; it
remains to be seen if the same can happen in Baghdad, Diyala, Sulimaniyah, the
Northwest, and some areas in the Baghdad “ring.”

                                     Efforts in Diyala
US forces also attempted to cooperate with tribal leaders in Diyala province. Attempts in
Diyala to create a coalition similar to the Anbar Salvation Council were mixed. The Isnad
(support) Council was created, but it was far less effective given Diyala’s fragmented
tribal arrangements.578
Coalition troops collaborated with a tribal group in Diyala called the Local Committee,
dubbed the “Kit Carsons Brigade,” to collect intelligence and identiy insurgents.579
However, the fragemented tribal structure in Diyala and local Shi’ite government
opposition to a strategy of tribal cooperation prevented US troops from duplicating the
success of Anbar.
The local provincial police in Diyala numbered only 170 as of early July, 2007, with an
unofficial 150 tribal scouts acting as additional guards. 580 Provincial police recruits also
faced targeted insurgent attacks, causing some to quit: nearly 100 of the 180 policemen in
one town quit after discovering the mutilated body of a fellow policemen with a note
“Quit or you’re next.”581 Yet, some reports indicated that ttempts by the Iraqi Army to
enlist volunteer forces in Diyala recruited more than 3,800 volunteers, according to Iraqi
officials.582
In late July 2007, US forces negotiated an agreement between Shi’a and Sunni tribal
leaders in Taji to ally against al Qaeda.583 The arrangement incorporated former
insurgents who “a month ago, every single one of these people was shooting at us.” It
suffered a setback when insurgents bombed a checkpoint near a meeting of tribal leaders,
killing five young men who had volunteered to provide security for the Taji Tribes
Awakening Council.584
US officials also reached out to former members of al Qaida in Iraq in Doura. AQI
fighters horrified by the organization’s excessive violence became informants for the US
military.585

                           Widening the Local Security Effort
Major General Rick Lynch reported that these provincial security forces could
compensate for the security vacuum caused by the ISF absence in the region. He said “we
have Concerned Citizens where there aren’t any Iraqi security forces. There aren’t any
police, there isn’t any army. Those security forces just don’t exist.” Lynch reported that
these forces were trained by the US in search procedures. Lynch also remarked that the
goal was to eventually integrated the Brigade into the ISF. He said, “ideally, we can
create ISF from these concerned citizens…They want to be legitimate members of the
ISF.”586
The US also encouraged the development of a “concerned citizens brigade” and
“neighborhood watch system” in the Tigris Valley area {Lynch’s area of operations}.
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The Citizen’s Brigade consisted of 7,000 Iraqi civilians who provided security at local
checkpoints. They controlled traffick into and out of their local villages.
Furthermore. the US implemented an informal amnesty system, where US troops
occasionally released detained fighters who had attacked Coalition troops. A senior US
official reported that a “very small” number of detainees had been released “on a case by
case basis.” The Washington Post characterized the informal amnesty policy as a “kind of
don’t-ask-don’t-tell pardon system.”587
                 Changing the Paradigm for ISF Development?
In negotiating with leaders on the tribal level, US forces may have recognized the fact
that political realities of Iraq virtually force the US and Iraqi government to place far
more reliance on local forces in spite of their tribal, sectarian and/or ethnic character. As
Faleh Dulaimi, advisor to the leader of the Anbar Salvation Council noted, “in all
countries, you can’t do anything without the people, and the people of Iraq are tribal.”588
The tribal solution may well mean, however, that that past US plans for Iraqi force
development can never be implemented. The regular police will be largely local and
composed of forces that matched the sectarian and ethnic composition of the area with
limited central government control.

If anything, the use of Sunni tribes in the West has created new forms of Sunni vs. Shi’ite
polarization, Shi’ite on Shi’ite fighting and feuding has gotten much worse in the south
and central government, and the uncertainties over oil and a regional referendum on
federalism in the north are increasing Kurdish, Arab, and Turcoman tensions.
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IX. Improving the ISF
The various elements of the Iraqi security forces are making real progress, but the
fundamental question raised by this progress report is whether the rate of improvement
can meet either US or Iraqi needs and expectations. The answer may well be that a slower
and more patient effort could work and create a mix of forces that would bring security
and stability and allow the US to phase out its forces. This answer, however, may require
more time and patience than the US is willing to show and it is dependent on reforms in
the Iraqi government and political leadership that make a far more proactive effort to
reach out to Sunnis and support ISF development with political conciliation and
compromise.
Further changes are clearly required to improve the ISF, and create an effective bridge
between tactical victory and lasting strategic impact, even if political conciliation does
move forward.
Giving Coalition and ISF tactical victories lasting meaning required the following
additional elements:
   1. Iraqi Army forces must begin to take over operations without US embeds and
      US partner units, and dependence on US reinforcement and support. There
      does seem to be increasing Iraqi Army capability here, but Coalition reporting
      does not provide a meaningful picture of progress – merely grossly inflated
      figures on areas of responsibility and total numbers of battalions in the lead.
   2. Iraqi police and local security forces must establish a lasting security presence
      in the areas where tactical victories are won, and do so credibly in ways that
      give ordinary Iraqis security. There can be no “win” without “hold.” So far, the
      US has made claim after claim to have secured cities after winning tactical battles
      to control them, and has never actually established lasting security in even one of
      them. The most critical problem has been the lack of active, combat-capable
      police, without corruption and sectarian and ethnic ties. Fallujah and Samara have
      been the most obvious cases of such failures. Today, with effective local forces,
      Fallujah today is one of the safest cities in Iraq. Samara, is safer than in the past,
      but still problematic.
       Coalition reporting had talked about the number of police posts established or
       with US embeds. It had not reported on the ability provide lasting security using
       Iraqi police in parts of Baghdad or anywhere else. It also has not talked about the
       ability to support police efforts with an effective local criminal justice and court
       system or to screen detainees in ways that do not breed local hostility.
       The Coalition also needs focus on who actually does provide local security, and
       stop treating militias, local security forces, and police hired locally without
       Coalition training, as if it was always hostile or did not exist. In the real world,
       these forces and not the “trained and equipped” police are the real local security
       force in most of Iraq. There has to be a credible plan to use, absorb, or contain
       them.
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   3. The Iraqi government must follow-up security with a meaningful presence and
      by providing steady improvements in services. “Winning hearts and minds” does
      not come from public information campaigns and propaganda. It comes from
      providing real security for ordinary Iraqis, and showing the government cares, is
      present, and can steadily improve services. Once again, promise after promise has
      been made in past campaigns, and the central government has not yet shown it
      can follow up in even a single case. If this is happening even in the “secured”
      areas of Baghdad, no one has yet said so. How it can happen in Diyala or other
      high threat areas is even unclear.
   4. There must also be effective local government. The liberation of various areas
      often has seen the emergence of local leaders willing to work with the Coalition –
      although often with little faith in, or ties to, the central government. In most cases,
      however, they have become targets, and the effort has broken down in local
      faction disputes or because of a lack of effective government support and
      problems in Coalition civil affairs efforts. Once again, if there is progress in
      creating stable, survivable, effective local government; none of the details are
      clear.
   5. There has to be economic aid and progress. Iraqis have to give priority to
      physical security and key services, but unemployment , underemployment, and
      shut or failed businesses affect some 60% or more of Iraqis nationally and the
      figures are even higher in high threat and combat areas. The strategy President
      Bush advanced in January 2007 advanced proposals for accomplishing such an
      effort in Baghdad. Once again, there has been no meaningful Coalition reporting
      on broad progress in such efforts in the secured areas of Baghdad, and past
      promises such aid would be provided in “liberated” cities like Samara and
      Fallujah were not kept.
   6. There must be an end to sectarian and ethnic cleansing and displacement.
      There is no near and perhaps midterm answer to suicide bombings and atrocities,
      to attacks on sacred shrines and critical facilities. No mix of security forces can
      stop even small cadres of extremists from occasional successes. No tactical
      victory has meaning, however, unless Iraqis can be secure in neighborhoods and
      areas where they are in the minority, and can reach across ethnic and sectarian
      lines and barriers in ordinary life.
       One of the greatest single failures of the current US and ISF approach to fighting
       in Iraq is that it did not focus on preventing sectarian and ethnic separation and
       displacement and make ending this on a local and national level at least as
       important as halting major attacks and killings. It may take years to make Iraqis
       secure from Islamist extremists and the worst elements of Shi’ite gangs and
       militias. There can be no meaningful tactical success, however, unless Iraqis can
       be safe from their own neighbors and begin to lead ordinary lives in their own
       neighborhoods.
If Iraq is to avoid split-up and full-blown civil war, however it must do far more than
create effective Security Forces. No such effort can succeed without an integrated
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strategy to forge a lasting political compromise between its key factions: Arab-Shi’ite,
Arab Sunni, and Kurd – while protecting other minorities.
Security cannot come through force alone. The most important developments in making
Iraqi forces effective have nothing to do with the forces themselves, or the nature of the
US support and advisory effort. They are rather the ability to create levels of political
compromise and conciliation that deprive the insurgency and Iraq’s civil conflicts of their
popular base. This means actually implementing:
   •   An oil law and technical annexes that assure all major Iraqi factions of an equitable share of
       today’s oil revenues and the future development of Iraq’s oil and gas resources.

   •   Giving the Sunnis real participation in the national government at every level, and creating
       ministries and government structures that fairly mix Arab Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, Kurd, and other
       minorities.

   •   ReBa’athification and giving a clean slate or amnesty to all who served under the Ba’ath not guilty
       of violent crimes.

   •   Amending the constitution to create a structure that protects the rights of all Iraqis, and which
       creates viable compromises, or clearly defers or omits, areas of critical sectarian and ethnic
       division.

   •   As part of this, working out an approach to federation that will avoid civil conflict.

   •   Creating and implementing local election laws, particularly at the provincial level.

   •   Disbanding or assimilating militias, or creating retraining centers and funding programs to deal
       with members.
At the same time, US, allied, and Iraqi government policy can only succeed if it
recognizes that there is no near term prospect that Iraqi force development will allow
sudden massive reductions in MNF-I forces without serious risk, and that ISF force
development can only succeed if the MNF-I provides active combat support well into
2008 and major advisory and aid support through 2010.
Partisanship and spin, however, can make the all too real possibility of failure a certainty.
The nearly meaningless unclassified metrics and reports of success the Administration
has presented have done far more to discredit the ISF development effort than build
support. Credibility and transparency are the price of any realistic change of victory.
Without them, the twilight of this Administration will end with the US choosing the
wrong options in Iraq, failing to provide adequate time and resources, and US and allied
withdrawals because of political decisions made for the wrong reasons. Like all elements
of a successful US strategy, Iraqi force development needs to be based on honesty and
realism, not “spin,” unrealistic claims, and political expediency.
The Bush Administration can only do more harm to Iraqi force development if it
continues to exaggerate Iraqi capabilities, attempts to expand Iraqi forces even more
quickly in response to American domestic political demands, and actually transfers
responsibility before Iraqi forces can do the job. As in Afghanistan, the US can only win
in Iraq if it is willing to fight a "long war." Rushing Iraqi forces in, and American forces
out, is a strategy where "exit" is given far higher priority than success. It may provide a
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cosmetic rationale to disguise failure and defeat, but it will not prevent it and may well
make them happen
To put it bluntly, this means that US government must stop exaggerating the true nature
of Iraqi readiness and the Iraqi force development, and seek bipartisan agreement on a
longer-term program based on patience, persistence, actual progress, and adequate
resources. As this report describes in detail, there are many very real successes in ISF
development, and the ISF has great potential if the Iraqi political system can achieve the
level of conciliation that makes a military effort both feasible and effective.




1
 Louis Roug and Julian E. Barnes, “Iraqi Forces Not Ready Yet, U.S. General Says.” Los Angeles Times, August 31,
2006
2
    Lally Weymouth, “’Iraq Is Not In Chaos’.” Washington Post, September 25, 2006, p.21
3
    Michael Gordon, “Iraq goal on security seems very distant.” International Herald Tribune, October 26, 2006, p.1
4
    Partlow, Joshua. “Maliki Stresses Urgency in Arming Iraq Forces.” Washington Post January 18, 2007
5
 Cloud, David S. and O’Neil, John. “U.S. May Cut Troops in Iraq by Summer, General Says.” New York
Times, January 19, 2007.
6
    Wright, Robin. “Iraq Seeks Time to Take Steps, but Levin Notes ‘Disconnect.” Washington Post. May 10, 2007
7
    Ibid
8
 Cloud, David, and Cave, Damien. “Commanders Say Push in Baghdad Is Short of Goal.” New York Times. June 4,
2007. Pg. 1.
9
    Rubin, Alissa. “Iraqi Journalist Found Dead As Security Lags.” New York Times. June 18, 2007.
10
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 18.
11
     Ripley, Tim, “Country Briefing Iraq.” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 5, 2006, p.25
12
     Department of Defense, FY 2008 Emergency Supplemental Request. February, 2007. p. 35.
13
     Interview with Lt. Gen. Dempsey. June 8, 2007.
14
     Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, March 2007, p. 25.
15
     Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 30.
16
     Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 29.
17
     Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 29.
18
     Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 29.
19
     Ricks, Thomas. “Military Envisions Longer Stay In Iraq.” Washington Post. June 11, 2007.
20
  Garamone, Jim. “Leadership Crucial To Developing Iraqi Security Forces.” American Forces Press Service. June 13,
2007.
21
     Susman, Tina and Therolf, Garrett. “Generals Fault Iraqi Security Forces.” Los Angeles Times. June 11, 2007.
22
     Robinson, Linda. “The Petraeus Factor.” U.S. News & World Report. May 28, 2007
23
     Tyson, Ann Scott. “General: Iraqi Forces Far From Self-Sufficiency.” Washington Post. June 26, 2007. p. 17
24
     Jelinek, Pauline. “US Notes Progress For Iraqi Forces.” Boston Globe. June 26, 2007.
25
     Jelinek, Pauline. “US Notes Progress For Iraqi Forces.” Boston Globe. June 26, 2007.
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                                                8/23/07                  Page 77




26
   Burns, Robert and Baldor, Lolita. “Generals Want No Cuts In Iraq Until At Least 2008.” Arizona Daily Star. July 21,
2007.
27
 Shanker, Thom and Cloud, David. “White House And Military Say Iraq Report Will Be Ready In September.” New
York Times. July 21, 2007. p. 6.
28
   DeYoung, Karen and Baker, Peter. “White House Gives Iraq Mixed Marks In Report.” Washington Post. July 12,
2007. p. 1.
29
   DeYoung, Karen and Baker, Peter. “White House Gives Iraq Mixed Marks In Progress.” Washington Post. July 12,
2007. p. 1.
30
  DeYoung, Karen and Baker, Peter. “White House Gives Iraq Mixed Marks In Progress.” Washington Post. July 12,
2007. p. 1.
31
 Shanker, Thom and Cloud, David. “White House And Military Say Iraq Report Will Be Ready In September.” New
York Times. July 21, 2007. p. 6.
32
     Reid, Robert. “Baghdad Official Doubts Readiness of Iraqi Forces.” Philadelphia Inquirer. July 21, 2007.
33
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 11.
34
     Michaels, Jim. “General: Training of Iraqis Slows.” USA Today. July 23, 2007. p. 1.
35
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 27
36
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 27
37
   House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 11.
38
     Ricks, Thomas. “Military Envisions Longer Stay In Iraq.” Washington Post. June 11, 2007.
39
   House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 27.
40
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 6.
41
  Ann Scott Tyson, “New Strategy For War.” Rptd. In House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security
Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 27.
42
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 27.
43
     Barnes, Julian. “Key Goals In Iraq Elusive.” Los Angeles Times. July 13, 2007. p. 1.
44
     Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 43.
45
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 127.
46
   House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 130.
47
     ABC News, December 1, 2006
48
     ABC News, December 1, 2006
49
     ABC News, December 1, 2006
50
  Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 30; 50 House
Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted: The
Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 63.
51
     ABC News, December 1, 2006
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52
  Cloud, David, and Shanker, Thom. “Gaps In Training Iraqi Forces Worry Top US Commanders.” New York Times.
July 14, 2007. p. 5.
53
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 131.
54
   House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 131.
55
   House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 140.
56
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 134.
57
   House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 140.
58
   House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 131.
59
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 131.
60
   House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 133.
61
   House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 134.
62
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 135.
63
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 134.
64
   House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 135.
65
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 141.
66
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 131.
67
   House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 12.
68
     Department of Defense. “
69
     Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007, p. 4.
70
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Terror.” June 28, 2007.
71
  White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: Expanded Provincial Reconstruction Team Speed the
Transition to Self-Reliance.” June 28, 2007.
72
     LaFranchi, Howard. “US Civilians Drive Iraq’s Other Surge.” Christian Science Monitor. June 12, 2007. Pg. 1.
73
     Kessler, Glenn. “Embassy Staff in Baghdad Inadequate, Rice Is Told.” Washington Post. June 19, 2007. p. A1.
74
     Sands, David and Carter, Sara. “White House Lowers Bar For Iraq Success.” Washington Times. July 20, 2007. p. 1.
75
     Sands, David and Carter, Sara. “White House Lowers Bar For Iraq Success.” Washington Times. July 20, 2007. p. 1.
76
     LaFranchi, Howard. “US Civilians Drive Iraq’s Other Surge.” Christian Science Monitor. June 12, 2007. Pg. 1.
77
  Cloud, David and Shanker, Thom. “Gaps In Training Iraqi Forces Worry Top US Commanders.” New York Times.
July 14, 2007. p. 5.
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78
     Kessler, Glen. “Embassy Staff in Baghdad Inadequate, Rice Is Told.” Washington Post. June 19, 2007. p. A1.
79
     Lt. Col. Carl D. Grunow, “Advising Iraqis: Building the Iraqi Army.” Military Review, July-August 2006, p.10-11
80
     Susman, Tina. “Trainers Say Iraqi Forces Would Collapse Without US Support.” Los Angeles Times. May 3, 2007.
81
     “Conway on Iraq Disconnect/Afghan Apology/MRAP’s.” ABC.com. {e-mail from Luis Martinez}.
82
     Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost in Iraqi Forces Is Urged.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. P. 1.
83
  Greenwell, Megan and Raghavan, Sudarsan. “Attacks Across Baghdad Kill At Least 25.” Washington Post. July 16,
2007; Frayer, Lauren. “Key Weakness In US Strategy: Iraqi Troops.” Seattle Post-Intelligencer. July 6, 2007.
84
     Frank, Thomas. “Iraqi Leader’s Remarks Downplayed.” USA Today. July 16, 2007. p. 5.
85
     Hennessy-Fiske, Molly. “US Says More Iraqi Troops Are Needed.” Los Angeles Times. July 16, 2007.
86
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 17.
87
     Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. Pg. 1.
88
     Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost in Iraqi Forces Is Urged.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. P. 1.
89
     Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report To Congress, June 2007. P. 30.
90
     Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. Pg. 1.
91
     Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report To Congress, June 2007. P. 31.
92
     Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. Pg. 1.
93
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 18.
94
   Tyson, Ann Scott. “House Report Faults Pentagon Accounting of Iraqi Forces.” Washington Post. June 27, 2007. p.
15.
95
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 41.
96
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 41.
97
     Conference Call with Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey.
98
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 42.
99
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 42.
100
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 42.
101
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 42.
102
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 27
103
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 44.
104
      Conference call with Dempsey
105
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 6.
106
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. p.1.
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107
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. p.1.
108
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. p.1.
109
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. p.1.
110
  Department of Defense. “DoD Press Briefing With Lt. Gen. Dempsey from the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington,
Va.” Press Briefing, June 13, 2007.
111
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. Pg. 1.
112
      Jelinek, Pauline. “US Officer: Iraqi Police Disappearing.” Associated Press. June 13, 2007.
113
  Department of Defense. “DoD Press Briefing With Lt. Gen. Dempsey from the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington,
Va.” Press Briefing, June 13, 2007.
114
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. p.1.
115
      Bruillard, Karin. “For Iraqi Soldiers, A Medical Morass.” Washington Post. May 6, 2007. Pg. 1.
116
   Green, Kimberly A, US. Army Sgt. 1st Class. “Health Care Reform: Transition to Iraqi Authority.” MNSTC-I:
Public Affairs. May 19, 2007.
117
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 39.
118
   Green, Kimberly A, US. Army Sgt. 1st Class. “Health Care Reform: Transition to Iraqi Authority.” MNSTC-I:
Public Affairs. May 19, 2007.
119
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 39.
120
      Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call. Interview With Major General Rick Lynch. August 16, 2007.
121
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 43.
122
    Lt. Gen. Dempsey Conference Call.; Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to
Congress, June 2007. P. 41.
123
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007, Pg. 13.
124
      Lt. Gen. Dempsey Conference Call
125
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 44.
126
      Department of Defense. “Press Briefing With Lt. Gen. Dempsey.” June 13, 2007.
127
      Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call. Interview With Major General Rick Lynch. August 16, 2007.
128
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 117.
129
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 72.
130
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 6.
131
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 37.
132
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 106.
133
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 11.
134
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 11.
135
      Stockman, Farah. “Iraq’s Envoy To US Voices Frustration Over Equipment Delays.” Boston Globe. July 26, 2007.
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136
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report To Congress, June 2007. P. 30.
137
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report To Congress, June 2007. P. 30.
138
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 11.
139
   Government Accountability Office. “Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That US-funded Equipment Has
Reached Iraqi Security Forces.” Report To Congressional Committees. July 2007.
140
   Government Accountability Office. “Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That US-funded Equipment Has
Reached Iraqi Security Forces.” Report To Congressional Committees. July 2007.
141
      Therolf, Garrett. “U.S. Troops Form Uneasy Alliances In Iraq.” Los Angeles Times. June 18, 2007.
142
      Department of Defense. Measuring Security and Stability. Report to Congress, June 2007. p. 30.
143
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007, Pg. 31.
144
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 32.
145
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 60.
146
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 32.
147
      Parker, Ned. “Interior Ministry Mirrors Chaos Of A Fractured Iraq.” Los Angeles Times. July 30, 2007. p. 1.
148
      Parker, Ned. “Interior Ministry Mirrors Chaos Of A Fractured Iraq.” Los Angeles Times. July 30, 2007. p. 1.
149
   Cloud, David and Cave, Damien. “Commanders Say Push In Baghdad Is Short Of Goal.” New York Times June 4,
2007. Pg. 1.
150
      Parker, Ned. “Interior Ministry Mirrors Chaos Of A Fractured Iraq.” Los Angeles Times. July 30, 2007. p. 1.
151
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The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 66.
152
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 33.
153
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 66
154
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 66.
155
      Department Of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. p. 32
156
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 67.
157
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 72.
158
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 57.
159
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 71.
160
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 61.
161
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 57.
162
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 57.
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163
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2007. p. 13.
164
   Greenwell, Megan. “Six Iraqi Officers Die In US Raid Seeking Militiamen In Police.” Washington Post. July 14,
2007. p. 13.
165
      Dagher, Sam. “Too Few Men Hunting Al Qaeda.” Christian Science Monitor. July 9, 2007. p. 1.
166
      Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call. Interview With Majoral General Rick Lynch. August 16, 2007.
167
   Anderson, John War and Nouri, Naseer. “U.S. Hunts for Five Britons Abducted in Iraq.” Washington Post. May 31,
2007. Pg. 12
168
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 32, 33.
169
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 61.
170
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 61.
171
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 66.
172
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 61.
173
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 71.
174
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 68.
175
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 72.
176
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 68.
177
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 34.
178
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 65.
179
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 65.
180
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 65.
181
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 70.
182
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 70, 71.
183
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 69.
184
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 69.
185
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 69.
186
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 70, 71.
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187
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 73.
188
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 65.
189
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 73.
190
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 69.
191
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 34.
192
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 34.
193
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 70.
194
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 70.
195
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 68.
196
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 34.
197
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 68.
198
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 149.
199
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 69.
200
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 73, 149
201
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 54.
202
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 54.
203
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 63.
204
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 63.
205
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 66.
206
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 64.
207
  Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 30; 207 House
Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted: The
Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 63.
208
    Thom Shanker and Edward Wong, “U.S. Military Shifts Troops Into Advisory Roles In Iraq.” New York Times,
December 5, 2006
209
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 130.
210
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 130.
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211
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 66.
212
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 30.
213
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 32
214
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 62.
215
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “General: Iraqi Forces Far From Self-Sufficiency.” Washington Post. June 26, 2007. p. 17.
216
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007.
217
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 64.
218
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 15.
219
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 137.
220
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 137.
221
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 141.
222
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 137.
223
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 62.
224
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 46.
225
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 46.
226
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 151.
227
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 34
228
      Soriano, Cesar. “Petraeus Says Security Crackdown Working.” USA Today. June 14, 2007. p.13
229
   DeYoung, Karen and Ricks, Thomas. “Administration Shaving Yardstick For Iraq Gains.” Washington Post. July 8,
2007. p. 1.
230
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost Is Urged In Iraqi Forces.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. p.1
231
      Rubin, Alissa. “14 Americans Are Killed in Combat in 2 Days.” New York Times. June 22, 2007. p. 10.
232
      Zoroya, Gregg. “Iraqi Police Assisted Gunmen.” USA Today. July 12, 2007. p. 1.
233
      “Captors of Britons In Iraq Linked to Iran: Petraeus.” Reuters. June 21, 2007.
234
      Anderson, John Ward and Dehima, Salih. “Offensive Targets Al-Qaeda in Iraq.” Washington Post. June 20, 2007.
p.1
235
    Greenwell, Megan. “Six Iraqi Officers Die In US Raid Seeking Militiamen In Police.” Washington Post. July 14,
2007. p. 13.
236
      Dagher, Sam. “Too Few Men Hunting Al Qaeda.” Christian Science Monitor. July 9, 2007. p. 1.
237
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost Is Urged In Iraqi Forces.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. p.1
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238
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 147.
239
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 60.
240
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 61.
241
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 61.
242
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 58.
243
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 59.
244
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 64.
245
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 58.
246
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “General: Iraqi Forces Far From Self-Sufficiency.” Washington Post. June 26, 2007. p. 17.
247
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 55.
248
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 55.
249
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 147.
250
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 71, 151.
251
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 82.
252
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. p. 30
253
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 84.
254
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 31.
255
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 84.
256
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 34.
257
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 33.
258
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 130.
259
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 81.
260
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 86.
261
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 83.
262
    Tyson, Ann Scott. “General: Iraqi Forces Far From Self-Sufficiency.” Washington Post. June 26, 2007. p. 17;
Parker, Ned. “Interior Ministry Mirrors Chaos Of A Fractured Iraq.” Los Angeles Times. July 30, 2007. p. 1.
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263
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 84.
264
   Susman, Tina and Therolf, Garrett. “Generals Fault Iraqi Security Forces.” Los Angeles Times. June 11, 2007;
Parker, Ned. “Interior Ministry Mirrors Chaos Of A Fractured Iraq.” Los Angeles Times. July 30, 2007. p. 1.
265
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 83.
266
    Greenwell, Megan. “Six Iraqi Officers Die In US Raid Seeking Militiaman In Police.” Washington Post. July 14,
2007. p. 13.
267
      “Head of U.S. Military Advisers in Iraq Sees Slow Progress Training ISF.” Inside the Army. May 7, 2007. Pg. 1.
268
      Jelinek, Pauline. “US Notes Progress For Iraqi Forces.” Boston Globe. June 26, 2007.
269
      Colvin, Ross. “US General Paints Candid Picture of Iraq Army, Police.” Reuters. June 10, 2007.
270
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 84.
271
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost Is Urged In Iraqi Forces.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. p.1
272
      Department of Defense. “DoD News Briefing With Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard at Pentagon.” June 25, 2007.
273
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 88.
274
      Susman, Tina and Therolf, Garrett. “Generals Fault Iraqi Security Forces.” Los Angeles Times. June 11, 2007.
275
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 86.
276
      Partlow, Joshua. “An Uphill Battle to Stop Fighters at Border.” Washington Post. May 5, 2007. Pg. 12.
277
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 85.
278
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security In Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 35.
279
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security In Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 35.
280
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security In Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 35.
281
      Partlow, Joshua. “An Uphill Battle to Stop Fighters at Border.” Washington Post. May 5, 2007. Pg. 12.
282
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 130.
283
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 87.
284
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 87.
285
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 36.
286
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 36.
287
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 81.
288
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 85.
289
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report To Congress, June 2007. p. 36.
290
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 36.
291
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 105.
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292
    US Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, March 2007, Section
2.3. and 292 US Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007, pg.
42
293
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 95.
294
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 95.
295
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 94.
296
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 115.
297
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 38.
298
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 106, 116.
299
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 116.
300
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 132.
301
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 38.
302
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 106.
303
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 95.
304
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 95.
305
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 95.
306
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 115.
307
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 41.
308
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 37.
309
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 97.
310
      “Iraqi Security Forces Order Of Battle. (OOB)” The Fourth Rail. http://billroggio.com/oob/index.php
311
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 40.
312
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 40.
313
      Burns, Robert. “Empty Enclave Symbol Of Iraq Woes.” Arizona Daily Star. July 22, 2007.
314
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 40.
315
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 40.
316
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 40.
317
      Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call. Interview with Major General Rick Lynch. August 16, 2007.
318
      Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call. Interview with Major General Rick Lynch. August 16, 2007.
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319
    Michael R. Gordon, “Break Point? Iraq and America’s Military Forces.” Survival, Vol. 48, No.4, Winter 2006-07,
p.74
320
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 137, 141.
321
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 40.
322
      Wolff, Terry. “Press Briefing March 5.” MNF-I, March 5, 2007. pg. 11.
323
      “Head of U.S. Military Advisers in Iraq Sees Slow Progress Training ISF.” Inside the Army. May 7, 2007. Pg. 1.
324
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 134.
325
      Interview With Colonel Nagl. June 19, 2007.
326
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 40.
327
  Nagl, John. “Institutionalizing Adaptation: It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps.” Center For A New
American Security. June 2007.
328
      Interview With Colonel Nagl. June 19, 2007.
329
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p. 137, 141.
330
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 37.
331
   Susman, Tina. “Trainers Say Iraqi Forces Would Collapse Without U.S. Support.” Los Angeles Times. May 3,
2007.
332
      Associated Press. “General Would Cut US Force In N. Iraq.” Associated Press. July 23, 2007.
333
      Associated Press. “General Would Cut US Force In N. Iraq.” Associated Press. July 23, 2007.
334
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “General: Iraqi Forces Far From Self-Sufficiency.” Washington Post. June 26, 2007. p. 17.
335
   Tyson, Ann Scott. “Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged.” Washington Post. June 13, 2007. P. 1; Garamone, Jim.
“Leadership Crucial To Developing Iraqi Security Forces.” American Forces Press Service. June 13, 2007.
336
   Garamone, Jim. “Leadership Crucial To Developing Iraqi Security Forces.” American Forces Press Service. June
13, 2007.
337
      Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call. Interview With Major General Rick Lynch. August 16, 2007.
338
   Cloud, David and Shanker, Thom. “Gaps In Training Iraqi Forces Worry Top US Commanders.” New York Times.
July 14, 2006.
339
      Scarborough, Rowan. “US Switches Targets To Flush Out Terrorists.” Washington Examiner. July 14, 2007.
340
   Garamone, Jim. “Leadership Crucial To Developing Iraqi Security Forces.” American Forces Press Service. June
13, 2007.
341
      Susman, Tina and Therolf, Garrett. “Generals Fault Iraqi Security Forces.” Los Angeles Times. June 11, 2007.
342
      Susman, Tina. “Trainers Say Iraqi Forces Would Collapse Without U.S. Support.”
343
   DeYoung, Karen and Ricks, Thomas. “Administration Shaving Yardstick For Iraq Gains.” Washington Post. July 8,
2007. p. 1.
344
      Soriano, Cesar. “June Off To Deadly Start For U.S.: 16 Troops Killed. USA Today June 4, 2007. Pg. 5.
345
      Susman, Tina. “Trainers Say Iraqi Forces Would Collapse Without U.S. Support.”
346
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 37.
347
      Barnes, Julian and Parker, Ned. “US Troop Buildup In Iraq Falls Short.” Los Angeles Times. July 11, 2007. p. 1.
348
      Gordon, Michael. “Sectarian Fears Percolate In An Iraqi Town.” New York Times. June 22, 2007. p. 10.
349
      Gordon, Michael. “Sectarian Fears Percolate In An Iraqi Town.” New York Times. June 22, 2007. p. 10.
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350
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 104.
351
      Dagher, Sam. “Too Few Men Hunting Al Qaeda.” Christian Science Monitory. July 9, 2007. p. 1.
352
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 104.
353
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 104.
354
      Wong, Edward. “Strife in North Iraq as Sunni Arabs Drive Out Kurds.” New York Times. May 30, 2007. Pg. 1
355
      Greenwell, Megan. “An Iraqi Village’s Deadly Nightmare.” Washington Post. July 18, 2007. p. 14.
356
   Fainaru, Steve and Klein, Alec. “In Iraq, A Private Realm of Intelligence-Gathering.” Washington Post. July 1,
2007. p. 1.
357
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 103.
358
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 103.
359
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 102.
360
   Garamone, Jim. “Leadership Crucial To Developing Iraqi Security Forces.” American Forces Press Service. June
13, 2007.
361
      Burns, Robert. “Rapid Buildup Gives Iraqi Agencies A Shortage Of Officers.” Houston Chronicle. July 29, 2007.
362
      Burns, Robert. “Rapid Buildup Gives Iraqi Agencies A Shortage Of Officers.” Houston Chronicle. July 29, 2007.
363
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 102.
364
      “Head of U.S. Military Advisers in Iraq Sees Slow Progress Training ISF.” Inside the Army. May 7, 2007. Pg. 1.
365
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 102.
366
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 102.
367
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 103.
368
      Dagher, Sam. “Too Few Men Hunting Al Qaeda.” Christian Science Monitor. July 9, 2007. p. 1.
369
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 113.
370
   Government Accountability Office. “Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That US-funded Equipment Has
Reached Iraqi Security Forces.” Report To Congressional Committees. July 2007.
371
   Author? “Numbers on Iraqi Weapons Procurement.” (Is that the official title?) Agence France-Press. May 21, 2007.;
Putz, Senior Airman Christie. “Iraqi Army Receives Improved Weaponry.” MNSTC-I: Public Affairs. May 19, 2007.
372
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 114.
373
   Reuters. “proposed $508-Million U.S. Sale Includes Explosives.” Los Angeles times. May 5, 2007; Stockman,
Farah. “Iraq’s Envoy To US Voices Frustration Over Equipment Delays.” Boston Globe. July 26, 2007.
374
      Author? “Numbers on Iraqi Weapons Procurement.” (Is that the official title?) Agence France-Press. May 21, 2007.
375
      Author? “Numbers on Iraqi Weapons Procurement.” (Is that the official title?) Agence France-Press. May 21, 2007.
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376
   Author? “Numbers on Iraqi Weapons Procurement.” (Is that the official title?) Agence France-Press. May 21, 2007.;
Putz, Senior Airman Christie. “Iraqi Army Receives Improved Weaponry.” MNSTC-I: Public Affairs. May 19, 2007.
377
   Putz, Senior Airman Christie. “Iraqi Army Receives Improved Weaponry.” MNSTC-I: Public Affairs. May 19,
2007.
378
    Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 39; Author?
“Numbers on Iraqi Weapons Procurement.” (Is that the official title?) Agence France-Press. May 21, 2007.
p.2
379
   Putz, Senior Airman Christie. “Iraqi Army Receives Improved Weaponry.” MNSTC-I: Public Affairs. May 19,
2007. p.1
380
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 114.
381
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 117.
382
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 114.
383
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 114, 117.
384
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 110.
385
    Government Accountability Office. “Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That US-funded Equipment Has
Reached Iraqi Security Forces.” Report To Congressional Committees. July 2007.
386
   Government Accountability Office. “Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That US-funded Equipment Has
Reached Iraqi Security Forces.” Report To Congressional Committees. July 2007.
387
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 30
388
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 100.
389
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 42.
390
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 130.
391
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 99.
392
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 99.
393
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 99.
394
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 99.
395
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 99.
396
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 99; Department of Defense.
“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 42.
397
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 42.
398
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 42.
399
      Author? “Numbers on Iraqi Weapons Procurement.” (Is that the official title?) Agence France-Press. May 21, 2007
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400
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 37.
401
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 37.
402
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 42.
403
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 99.
404
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 99.
405
   US Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, March 2007, Section
2.3. and 405 US Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007, pg.
42; Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 37.
406
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
407
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
408
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
409
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 43.
410
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
411
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
412
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 43.
413
  Author? “Numbers on Iraqi Weapons Procurement.” (Is that the official title?) Agence France-Press. May 21, 2007;
House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted: The
Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 98.
414
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
415
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 43.
416
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 42.
417
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
418
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
419
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 98.
420
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 98.
421
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
422
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007, Pg. 42.
423
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
424
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
425
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
426
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 43.
427
      “Iraqi Air Force Supporting Troop Surge with ISR, Transport Aircraft.” Inside the Air Force. June 29, 2007. p. 1.
428
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 98.
429
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. p, 99.
430
      Dehghanpisheh, Babak. “Surge of Iraqi Arrests Leaves Questions About Justice.” Newsweek. May 21, 2007.
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                                                8/23/07                   Page 92




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440
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452
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453
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456
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Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                                               8/23/07                     Page 93




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463
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464
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465
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466
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467
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468
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469
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472
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473
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474
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475
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476
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477
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478
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479
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480
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481
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482
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483
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484
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485
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486
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487
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488
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489
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490
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491
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492
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493
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494
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495
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496
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497
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498
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499
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500
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501
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502
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503
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504
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505
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506
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507
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508
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509
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510
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511
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512
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513
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514
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515
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516
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517
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518
      Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call. Interview With Major General Rick Lynch. August 16, 2007.
519
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520
      Michaels, Jim. “Behind Success in Ramadi – An Army Colonel’s Gamble.” USA Today. May 1, 2007.
521
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522
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523
      Semple, Kirk. “Unease Alliance is Taming One Insurgent Bastion.” New York Times. April 29, 2007. Pg. 1
524
      Burns, John. “Showcase and Chimera in the Desert.” New York Times. July 8, 2007. p. WK1.
525
      Semple, Kirk. “Unease Alliance is Taming One Insurgent Bastion.” New York Times. April 29, 2007. Pg. 1
526
      Liu, Melinda. “The Tribes of Iraq: America’s New Allies.” Newsweek. June 4, 2007.
527
      Kraul, Chris. “In Ramadi, A Ragtag Solution With Real Results.” Los Angeles Times. May 7, 2007.
Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development                                                8/23/07                     Page 95




528
      Parker, Ned. “Blast Could Derail A Key Iraqi Alliance.” Los Angeles Times. June 26, 2007.
529
      Kraul, Chris. “In Ramadi, A Ragtag Solution With Real Results.” Los Angeles Times. May 7, 2007.
530
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. P. 34.
531
   Frayer, Lauren. “Sunni Insurgents Aid US Troops in Baquba Offensive.” Associated Press/Arizona Daily Star. June
24, 2007.
532
   Frayer, Lauren. “Sunni Insurgents Aid US Troops in Baquba Offensive.” Associated Press/Arizona Daily Star. June
24, 2007.
533
      Partlow, Joshua. “US Strategy on Sunnis Questioned.” Washington Post. June 18, 2007. p. 11.
534
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 59.
535
    House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg 62.
536
   Frayer, Lauren. “Sunni Insurgents Aid US Troops in Baquba Offensive.” Associated Press/Arizona Daily Star. June
24, 2007.
537
      Anderson, John. “Suicide Blast Kills 15 West of Iraqi Capital.” Washington Post. June 6, 2007. Pg. 16
538
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 20.
539
      Michaels, Jim. “Behind Success in Ramadi – An Army Colonel’s Gamble.” USA Today. May 1, 2007.
540
      Liu, Melinda. “The Tribes of Iraq: America’s New Allies.” Newsweek. June 4, 2007.
541
   Lubold, Gordon. “America’s Iraq Strategy Boosts US Combat Losses.” Christian Science Monitor. June 1, 2007.
Pg. 1.
542
      Burns, John. “Showcase and Chimera in the Desert.” New York Times. July 8, 2007. p. WK1.
543
      Michaels, Jim. “Tribes Help U.S. Against Al-Qaeda.” USA Today. June 20, 2007. p. 1.
544
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 23.
545
      Lt. Gen. Dempsey interview.
546
      Soriano, Cesar. “Petraeus Says Security Crackdown Working.” USA Today. June 14, 2007. p.13
547
      Liu, Melinda. “The Tribes of Iraq: America’s New Allies.” Newsweek. June 4, 2007.
548
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 20.
549
      Kraul, Chris. “In Ramadi, A Ragtag Solution With Real Results.” Los Angeles Times. May 7, 2007.
550
  From Martinez. “Marine ‘Whack a Mole’ in Al Anbar.” ABCTv News Iraq. May 18, 2007.; Department of Defense.
“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pt. 20.
551
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“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pt. 20.
552
  House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. “Stand up and Be Counted:
The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces.” June 27, 2007. pg. 57
553
      Youssef, Nancy. “US Alliance With Iraqi Tribes Poses Risks.” Miami Herald. July 2, 2007.
554
      Zavis, Alexandra. “In Iraq, Role of Tribes is Decisive.” Los Angeles Times. June 23, 2007. p. 1.
555
      Department of Defense. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Report to Congress, June 2007. Pg. 20
556
  Dagher, Sam. “Iraqi Tribal Support is Linked to Drop in Violence in Anbar Province.” Christian Science Monitor.
May 3, 2007. p.1
557
      Semple, Kirk. “Unease Alliance is Taming One Insurgent Bastion.” New York Times. April 29, 2007. Pg. 1
558
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560
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561
      Partlow, Joshua. “US Strategy On Sunnis Questioned.” Washington Post. June 18, 2007. p. 11.
562
      Partlow, Josh and Anderson, John Ward. “Tribal Coalition in Anbar Said to Be Crumbling.” June 11, 2007. Pg. 11.
563
   Anderson, John Ward and Partlow, Joshua. “Shiite Shrine in Samarra Is Hit Against.” Washington Post. June 14,
2007. P. 20.
564
      Oppel Jr., Richard. “Attacker Kills 4 Sunni Sheiks Who Aided US.” New York Times. June 26, 2007. p. 1.
565
      Drummond, Mike. “Two Tribal Leaders Killed.” Miami Herald. June 27, 2007.
566
      Interview with Lt. Gen. Raymond Ordierno. June 23, 2007.
567
      Baldor, Lolita. “US Commanders Seek Cease-Fires With Insurgents.” Boston Globe. June 1, 2007.
568
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “Gates, U.S. General Back Long Iraq Stay.” Washington Post. June 1, 2007. Pg. 11.
569
      Tyson, Ann Scott. “Gates, U.S. General Back Long Iraq Stay.” Washington Post. June 1, 2007. Pg. 11.
570
   Burns, John, and Rubin, Alissa. “U.S. Arming Sunnis In Iraq To Battle Old Qaeda Allies.” New York Times June
11, 2007. Pg. 1.
571
      Therolf, Garrett. “U.S. Troops Form Uneasy Alliances in Iraq.” Los Angeles Times. June 18, 2007.
572
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24, 2007.
573
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11, 2007. Pg. 1.
574
   Burns, John, and Rubin, Alissa. “U.S. Arming Sunnis In Iraq To Battle Old Qaeda Allies.” New York Times June
11, 2007. Pg. 1.
575
      Michaels, Jim. “Tribes Help U.S. Against Al Qaeda.” USA Today. June 20, 2007. p. 1
576
      Partlow, Joshua. “US Strategy on Sunnis Questioned.” Washington Post. June 18, 2007. p. 11.
577
      Michaels, Jim. “Tribes Help U.S. Against Al Qaeda.” USA Today. June 20, 2007. p. 1
578
      Dagher, Sam. “Risky US Alliances In Iraq.” Christian Science Monitor. July 17, 2007. p. 1.
579
      Gordon, Michael. “GI’s Force Sunni tie Iin Bid To Squeeze Militants.” New York Times. July 6, 2007. p. 1.
580
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581
      Dagher, Sam. “Risky US Alliances In Iraq.” Christian Science Monitor. July 17, 2007. p. 1.
582
      Reid, Robert. “Iraqis Told To Arm Themselves.” Boston Globe. July 9, 2007.
583
      Enders, David. “Iraqi Tribes Reach Security Accord.” Washington Times. July 23, 2007. p. 1.
584
      Hennessy-Fiske, Molly. “Tribal Checkpoint Bombed In Iraq.” Los Angeles Times. July 23, 2007.
585
      Haynes, Deborah. “Own Fighters Rat Out Qaeda.” New York Post. July 25, 2007.
586
      Civilian Defense Experts Conference Call. Interview with Major General Rick Lynch. August 16, 2007.
587
      Ricks, Thomas. “Deals In Iraq Make Friends of Enemies.” Washington Post. July 20, 2007. p. 1.
588
      Zavis, Alexandra. “In Iraq, Role of Tribes is Decisive.” Los Angeles Times. June 23, 2007. p. 1.

								
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