[Phoebe Marr] picks up on the increasing salience of sectarianism and, on the back of hundreds of interviews with Iraqi leaders, adds another dynamic between the "insiders," those who stayed under Saddam Hussein's reign, and the "outsiders," who now are in control. Abdel Salam Sidahmed, however, suggests that sectarianism must also be seen as a natural extension of Hussein's al-hamla al imamyyah, or faith drive, as well as the sectarian criteria that the US used to choose Iraq's interim leaders.Aside from a little repetition across the chapters, the volume suffers from two main problems. Publication schedules cannot keep up with the pace of Iraq's developments. Books therefore quickly look dated and this is no exception. Because the authors probably wrote their articles in late 2006, there is no reference to such defining developments as the US troop surge, the Al-Anbar "awakening," Muqtada Al Sadr's stand-down, Prime Minister Malikf s "Basra stand," and the considerable decline in violence, all of which are crucial to the current situation.Sidahmed's cry for "a consensus-based, accommodative, participatory process" is incontestable, but practical policy it is not (84). Pedersen argues that large-scale restructuring is needed to "rejuvenate Iraqis economy" but he also notes that such a restructuring "is likely to add new conflicts to existing one" (67). In that case, what route should Iraq take?