Integrated Operations Executive Summary by aya20861


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Integrated Operations
Executive Summary

              ew of our readers know that        summarizing bullets, but rather to address        international nongovernmental organiza-
              Joint Force Quarterly is deliv-    the So what? question behind the editors’         tions, and private or public local agencies is
              ered to every general and flag     assessment that these submissions are truly       not as important as the intent: to maximize
              officer within the Department of   worth readers’ time.                              efficiency and legitimacy in achieving
Defense, as well as to senior leaders through-         Like Generals Shelton and Myers before      national security objectives. While this has
out the executive branch of the U.S. Govern-     him, General Pace has placed great emphasis       been done in an ad hoc fashion for years,
ment. For decisionmakers, executive sum-         on the importance of U.S. military leaders        the potential value added is so great that,
maries are an essential daily element of time    integrating their plans and operations “with a    like “jointness,” this concept is in need of
management in the face of heavy responsi-        wide variety of actors” in an effort to achieve   formal approaches, starting with institutional
bilities and tight schedules. JFQ is mindful     national objectives in a more holistic fashion.   adaptation.
that national security professionals at every    Whether this involves military organizations             Our first Forum article, “Planning
level face competing demands for their atten-    from more than one country combined with          Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq,” focuses
tion. The purpose of this executive summary      one or more U.S. or foreign governmental          on the contemporary security threat and the
is not to reduce the Forum’s content to a few    agencies, private volunteer organizations,        way in which leaders plan and orchestrate

        JFQ	 /	 issue 41, 2 d quarter 2006                                                                                   n d
                                                                                                                                                jfq forum

diplomatic and military instruments of                        laborating with nontraditional partners is a     rity Council should serve as an aggressive
power to meet this threat. Hailing back to                    necessary component of a successful coun-        arbiter of interagency equities in the war on
the Clausewitzian admonition to understand                    terterrorism strategy. Major Byrd criticizes     terror and force greater synergy on Federal
the nature of the war in question, Joseph                     inflexible planning and other traditional mil-   agencies with contrasting cultures, incen-
Collins focuses on the critical importance of                 itary organizational problems as enemies of      tives, and perspectives. In the aftermath of
interagency partnership in planning for, and                  innovation in the economic arena. Regional       the 1986 Tower Commission’s investigation
subsequently addressing, the fractured envi-                  combatant commanders must anticipate a           of the Iran-Contra affair, many drew the
ronments produced by blunt military power                     future in which more businesses find com-        lesson that the NSC should serve only as
contests. Dr. Collins argues that involving                   petitive arenas in underdeveloped nations        staff and never as an operational agency,
the interagency community in the military                     and seek to cultivate their partnership in       closing the door on any suggestion of a
aspects of the planning process is essential to               defeating terror.                                standing integrated combatant command
achieving security objectives in the postcon-                       Our third Forum feature, “Integrating      headquarters. Colonel Naler points out that
flict (or postcrisis) return to normalcy. He                  Partner Nations into Coalition Operations,”      the immediate chain of command for such an
concludes with eight practical recommenda-                    outlines the techniques, mechanisms, and         organization is a contentious issue, but so is
tions to improve mid-range planning.                          integrated operations successes used by the      leadership of the command itself.
       The second Forum article, “Combat-                     U.S. regional combatant command with the                Henry Stratman’s case study, “Orches-
ing Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Strategy,”                    fewest resources to perform its mission: U.S.    trating Instruments of Power for Nation-
addresses the economic instrument of                          Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).                   building,” concludes the Forum and takes the
national power in the war on terror and the                   This dearth of assets and a perceived absence    opposite approach by focusing on individual
relationship between economic prosperity,                     of strategic threat have inspired great inter-   leaders organizing staffs and liaison ele-
stability, and terror. Miemie Winn Byrd                       agency and partner nation coordination to        ments to overcome myriad impediments to
posits that the traditional argument that                     bring, as General Pace noted in his message      integration and coordination (the “clash of
“market-based solutions cannot lead to                        earlier, a greater array of resources and        cultures”). In this case, the dual challenge
poverty reduction and economic develop-                       expertise to bear on the increasing transna-     is nationbuilding in parallel with counter-
ment” is no longer plausible and that col-                    tional threat. As in other regional areas of     insurgency operations. General Stratman
                                                              responsibility, USSOUTHCOM is working            suggests that perhaps separate but equal
                                                              with its partners to mitigate a growing pan-     agencies with clear mandates and cooperative
                                                              orama of security threats that exploit vast      leadership can achieve better results through
                                                              ungoverned territories and border seams.         careful interaction than a single integrated
                                                              Major Barbara Fick addresses the deliber-        agency with organic interagency expertise.
                                                              ate training and exercise activities that pay    The general is careful to point out that the
                                                              dividends in smoother integrated operations      successes he reports were not attributable to
                                                              during crisis. Notably, USSOUTHCOM is            doctrine, but were products of age-old unity
                                                              the first regional combatant command to          of effort between the chief of mission and the
                                                              incorporate the State Department Office          combined force commander. Should we draw
                                                              of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and        the conclusion that multiple independent
                                                              Stabilization in its exercise program. For his   agencies working cooperatively outperform a
                                                              part, the coordinator is working with the        single, truly integrated combatant command?
                                                              Western Hemisphere Affairs Bureau on Cuba        Unity of effort is essential to successful inte-
                                                              to develop a framework for U.S. strategy         grated operations.
                                                              for the period immediately following Fidel
                                                              Castro’s death. Events will clearly demand              In his guidance to the Joint Staff,
                                                              even more efficient integrated operations in     General Pace underscored the need to
                                                              the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility,           “harness elements of national power” by inte-
                                                              and the implications for state, Federal, and     grating and coordinating Defense Depart-
                                                              international agencies who deal with mass        ment efforts with the work of others. The
                                                              migration, foreign disaster assistance, and      challenge of integrated operations is to build
                                                              even homeland defense, are legion.               trust, synergy, and momentum in realizing
                                                                    In the fourth article, “Are We Ready       national security objectives, but the devil is
                                                              for an Interagency Combatant Command,”           in the details, and efforts to complement and
                                                              Christopher Naler argues that, because the       strengthen other elements of national power
                                                              National Security Council (NSC) is not           depend on leadership, habitual interagency
                                                              optimized for daily strategy implementation,     relationships, and reliable vehicles for com-
                                                              every regional combatant command should          munication. JFQ                         D.H. Gurney
                                                              be reorganized as an integrated combatant
                                                  U.S. Navy

                                                              command. In this serial debate, previous
                                                              authors have opined that the National Secu-
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