The Presidential Pork Barrel and the Conditioning Effect of Term

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					The Presidential
				
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Description: I examine across-state distributions of procurement contracts from 1984 to 2004 to test two hypotheses that a presidential electoral connection explains geographic patterns in federal spending. Both hypotheses are derived from a basic vote-buying theory and are assumed to be conditioned by the president's term. The first hypothesis is that, during first terms, the president will direct a disproportionate amount of procurement dollars per capita to battleground states. The second is that, during first terms, states that gave winning presidential candidates a disproportionately large share of their popular vote will benefit this way. I reject both and, therefore, challenge the generalizability of important extant work. Instead, I find that states that gave presidents disproportionately fewer of their popular votes in the reelection receive more procurement dollars per capita-that is, there is a counterintuitive second-term effect. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
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