Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 1991 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
1991, Vol. 61, No. 5, 708-720 0022-3514/91/S3.00
Affective Influences on Partner Choice: Role of Mood in Social Decisions
Joseph P. Forgas
University of New South Wales
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Does mood influence our information search and decision strategies when choosing a partner? In
Experiment 1 (N = 60), sad Ss preferred rewarding to competent partners and remembered infor-
mation supporting that choice better. In Experiment 2 (N = 96), mood effects on information
selectivity, decision speed, and processing strategy in partner choices were found. In Experiment 3
(N = 42), a computerized stimulus presentation revealed mood-induced differences in the latency,
self-exposure, and eventual recall of interpersonal information. These results are interpreted as
evidence for mood-induced selectivity in information search and decision strategies when making
realistic partner choices. The implications of the findings for research on interpersonal relations
and for contemporary affect-cognition theories are considered.
Feelings often influence the quality of our social judgments, 1990). Such decisions—like most social judgments—usually
a fact well recognized by writers, artists, and philosophers require highly elaborated, constructive cognitive processing
throughout the ages. Descartes (1649/1961) postulated such a dealing with the inferred personal characteristics of others
link between feelings and thinking almost 350 years ago, as did (Heider, 1958). There is now growing evidence that affect can
James (1890) in his classic Principles of Psychology. Yet psycho- play an important role in the way information about another
logical research on this intriguing problem is a relatively recent person is attended to, selected, interpreted, learned, remem-
development and little work has been done so far on the role of bered, and evaluated (Bower, 1981,1991; Clore & Parrott, 1991;
moods in motivating people's interpersonal choices. Fiedler, 1990,1991; Forgas, 1991a; Forgas & Bower, 1987; For-
Making preference choices about people is a recurring fea- gas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984; Isen, 1984; Schwarz & Bless, 1991).
ture both of our private and of our working lives. Selecting a Clinical research also suggests that enduring affective states,
work partner, deciding who to sit next to at lunch today, who to such as depression, have a marked influence on interpersonal
approach at a cocktail party, who to invite to a dinner party, or judgments and decision making (Wenzlaff & Prohaska, 1989).
who to ask for advice on a personal matter are examples of such Depressed people are more sensitive to risks (Pietromonaco &
person preference tasks. Affect can play a major role in such Rook, 1987), are more negative in their social judgments (Roth
affiliative choices, even in superficial relationships (Schachter, & Rehm, 1980), and tend to make more cautious, conservative
1959; Wenzlaff & Prohaska, 1989). The three experiments de- choices than do nondepressives (Weary & Williams, 1990).
scribed here are explorations of the motivational role of tempo- Of course, the role of affect in interpersonal behavior has
rary moods in interpersonal choices and the information pro- been recognized for some time. As Zajonc (1980) argued, affect
cessing strategies used by people in such decisions. Motivated is likely to be the primary medium of interpersonal behavior,
processing is defined here as involving directed search strate- and affective reactions often precede and inform subsequent
gies and selective attentional focus on information that is diag- cognitive elaborations (Clore & Parrott, 1991). Early work by
nostic of potentially rewarding outcomes and involving conse- Schachter (1959) and Sarnoff and Zimbardo (1961) showed that
quent biases in memory as well as choice outcomes. preference for partners in a similar predicament may be part of
a motivated strategy to control an aversive emotional state. In
Affect and Interpersonal Preferences fact, interacting with others in a matching mood may be intrin-
sically satisfying (Locke & Horowitz, 1990). In general, moti-
The decision of whether to engage in an interaction with a vated interpersonal choices can serve to selectively enhance or
potential partner is one of the most common yet complex and impair mood and self-esteem (Tesser, 1986; Wenzlaff & Pro-
demanding tasks in everyday life. Most social relationships by haska, 1989). Despite extensive recent interest in social cogni-
definition involve recurring positive partner choices at every tion, the cognitive processes underlying such motivated partner
level from unilateral awareness to enduring intimacy (Levinger, choices have received little attention.
Support for this research by the Australian Research Council, the Motivated Choice Strategies
German Research Foundation, and ZUMA, Mannheim, Germany,
Models of information accessibility and memory underlie
and comments on an earlier version of this article by Robert Wyer, Jr.,
Klaus Fiedler, and Norbert Schwarz are gratefully acknowledged. most current explanations of social judgmental processes (cf.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Forgas, 1981). However, considerable evidence now also shows
Joseph P. Forgas, School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, that affective states do have a major influence on the processing
P.O. Box 1, Kensington 2033, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia. of social information (Bower, 1991; Clore & Parrott, 1991;
Electronic mail may be sent to forgas@hydra.maths.unsw.oz.au. Fiedler, 1991; Forgas. 1991 a; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Isen, 1984;
708
AFFECT AND PARTNER CHOICE 709
Schwarz & Bless, 1991). There is also a growing recognition that ing potentially problematic or threatening situations and in-
motivation plays an important role in many cognitive pro- forming the individual that particularly careful, effortful, and
cesses, particularly when it comes to realistic social decisions systematic information processing strategies are required
(Erber & Fiske, 1984; Tesser, 1986). Early evidence for moti- (Schwarz & Bless, 1991). In contrast, little is known about mood
vated changes in attitudes and self-perception comes from cog- effects on specific, targeted processing strategies. We expected
nitive dissonance research (Wicklund & Frey, 1981), an empha- that the combination of dysphoric mood and a personally rele-
sis echoed by more recent attitude formulations (Tesser & vant task would be most likely to trigger specific motivated
Shaifer, 1990). Motivated thinking also plays a central role in processing and the associated selective information search and
intergroup behavior (Brewer & Kramer, 1985), stereotyping decision strategies.
(Tajfel & Forgas, 1981), decision making (Janis & Mann, 1977), The interactive role of personal relevance, affect, and motiva-
reasoning (Kunda, 1990), persuasive communication (Petty, tion in social judgments has received some attention in recent
Gleicher, & Baker, 1991), and impression formation (Brewer, years (cf. Tesser, Pilkington, & Melntosh, 1989). Because other
1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). In memory research, Sanitioso, people are perhaps the single major source of rewards—and
Kunda, and Fong (1990) recently found that motivational states occasionally, of punishments—for most of us (Argyle, 1986),
enhanced the accessibility of memories, and Parrott and Sabini interpersonal preferences clearly have a major impact on our
(1990) suggested that motivational factors underlie the selective happiness and well-being (Strack, Schwarz, & Argyle, 1991).
recall of mood-incongruent memories they observed. Even We expected that realistic and personally relevant choices, such
quite subtle changes in motivational objectives may result in as decisions about interpersonal preferences in a dysphoric
dramatic information-processing consequences, as Martin's re- mood, are most likely to involve the kind of motivated informa-
cent set/reset theory suggests (1986). However, little or no work tion processing in which judges selectively look for and find
has been done so far on the role of mood states in motivated information that supports an already established preference
interpersonal choices. (Forgas, 199 Ib). This is a case when, in a sense, preferences
Motivated processing is only one of several alternative strate- indeed do come to guide inferences (Zajonc, 1980).
gies available to people when making social choices. In a recent
multiprocess model of mood effects on social judgments, For-
Predictions
gas (1991b) identified four alternative processing strategies in
everyday judgments: (a) a direct access strategy, when crystal- What are the cognitive consequences of such motivated
lized, preexisting judgments are directly retrieved from mem- choice strategies? In the following three experiments, we ex-
ory; (b) a motivated processing strategy, when preexisting goals plored how mood-induced motivated processing functions in
guide a selective search for and guide use of information to personally relevant interpersonal choices. The interpersonal
serve a motivational objective; (c) a heuristic processing strategy, preference task we used required subjects to choose a partner
when a simplified, effort-minimizing strategy is adopted; and from several available candidates either for themselves (person-
(d) a substantive processing strategy, when subjects deal with the ally relevant condition) or for somebody else (personally irrele-
available information in a relatively unbiased manner, relying vant condition) while experiencing positive, neutral, or negative
on learning, associative, and memory processes to arrive at a mood that was induced in a prior and ostensibly unrelated
novel judgment. Which of these processing strategies is study.
adopted depends on a combination of factors, such as the preex- We expected targeted, motivated processing strategies to be
isting mood state and the personal relevance of the task. Fur- adopted by dysphoric subjects when they were making a per-
thermore, we may distinguish between at least two kinds of sonally relevant choice. Specifically, we hypothesized that moti-
motivated processing: (a) a general motivation, for example to vated processing in dysphoria involves (a) selective search for
minimize effort, to be accurate, or to avoid distortions due to information about the rewarding (interpersonal) qualities of po-
selective priming (Isen, 1984; Martin, 1986; Martin, Seta, & tential partners, (b) longer self-selected exposure to and better
Crelia, 1990); and (b) specific motivation, involving the use of learning of such details, (c) superior recall of information rele-
selective and targeted search strategies to arrive at a particular vant to the motivational goals, (d) use of a global impression
outcome (Kunda, 1990). These experiments focus on the latter formation strategy rather than a systematic comparison-by-fea-
process, particularly on the influence of negative mood and tures strategy when selecting partners, and (e) overall faster and
personal relevance in triggering targeted interpersonal prefer- more efficient choices due to the directed search strategies
ences. used. In contrast, positive mood or a personally irrelevant
Although little work has been done so far on mood effects on choice were not expected to lead to such targeted information
selective information processing, the role of affect in motiva- search and decision strategies.
tion has received some attention. In terms of a mood mainte-
nance model, people in a positive mood may find cognitive
Experiment 1
tasks aversive, motivating them to avoid or simplify problems
and use less effortful decision strategies when possible (Clark & The first study in this series was designed as an initial demon-
Isen, 1982; Isen, 1984; Isen & Means, 1983; Schwarz & Bless, stration of mood effects on interpersonal preferences and the
1991). Furthermore, the experience of positive (and sometimes, judgmental strategies used. In previous work, either no mood
negative) moods may also reduce cognitive capacity, mandating effects on the outcome of complex (albeit hypothetical) choices
simplified processing strategies (Isen, 1984; Mackie & Worth, (Isen & Means, 1983) or somewhat inconsistent, context-speci-
1991). Negative mood may also function as a generic cue signal- fic results (Forgas, 1989) were found. This experiment sought (a)
710 JOSEPH P. FORGAS
to explore whether short-term mood states exert a significant many questions as they can, without worrying about difficult or con-
motivational influence on interpersonal preferences and (b) to fusing items that may need to be revised." After the 5-min interval
assess selective memory effects for the superior recall of inter- allowed for completing the questionnaire, subjects were given a scoring
personal rather than task information, consistent with the hy- sheet that showed the "correct" answers, as well as bogus performance
standards validated for "this group of subjects." For the positive mood
pothesized selective attention to and motivated processing of
group, performance between 7-13 correct answers was described as
such details. Subjects in a happy, neutral, or sad mood were
"average," and over 13 correct answers was described as "above average
provided with information about four potential partners and
—your verbal skills are well above average on this task according to the
were asked to select one partner either for themselves (person- validation standards." For the negative mood group, average perfor-
ally relevant condition) or for somebody else (irrelevant condi- mance was defined as 27-30 correct answers and above average perfor-
tion). The outcome of their choices and their memory for the mance was denned as more than 30 correct answers. Less than 27
details of the targets were assessed to establish the role of mood correct answers was described as "below average—your verbal skills
and motivated processing strategies in such preference choices. are below the average on this task according to the validation stan-
dards."
As all subjects made 14-25 correct answers, those in the positive
Method condition all received above average marks and positive feedback and
those in the negative mood condition received below average marks
Design and subjects. The study is based on a 3 X 2 between-subjects and negative feedback. In the control condition, subjects were simply
design, with mood (happy, control, and sad) and personal relevance thanked for their help and told that their responses would be helpful in
(high and low) as the independent variables. Subjects were 60 under- revising the test. This part of the procedure was concluded by the
graduate students who participated in the study as part of their course administration of a "postexperimental questionnaire" (in fact, a
requirements. Equal numbers of men and women were included in mood-validation measure) asking subjects to rate how they felt on three
each of the three mood conditions. As a preliminary analysis of vari- 7-point scales (happy-sad, good-bad, satisfied-dissatisfied) embedded
ance (ANOVA) revealed no main or interaction effects due to subjects' among six other distractor items enquiring about general reactions to
sex. data for men and women were combined. the experiment. We found these three mood-check scales to be reliable
Stimuli. Four realistic target descriptions, each consisting of 12 and consistent measures of mood in previous studies (cf. Forgas,
short sentences, were constructed. The first and the last statements I991b). Finally, subjects were thanked for their help and the first exper-
were affectively neutral (e.g.. "John lives in an apartment"). Of the re- imenter left the room.
maining 10 statements, 5 contained information about the target's A different experimenter then entered and introduced the prefer-
socioemotional, interpersonal qualities (e.g., friendliness and popular- ence task as a study in problem solving. Subjects were told that for this
ity: "John has many friends") and 5 contained information about task task, each of them was to work closely with another person as a team,
competence (e.g., skill and intelligence: "John usually does well on his and they were told that it was therefore particularly important that they
exams"). So that the characters were realistic and plausible, each charac- should choose their partners from among four people currently present
ter contained either positive interpersonal characteristics and negative in the department who volunteered to help with the study. Each of the
task characteristics (a likable but incompetent person) or the reverse (a available partners was described in a brief personal profile that was
dislikable but competent character). Two parallel character description based on evaluations of that person by friends, acquaintances, and
sets were constructed, and descriptions in the matched sets were iden- colleagues. In the personally relevant condition, subjects were in-
tical in all respects except the substitution of one word that changed the structed to select the most suitable partner for themselves; in the per-
valence of the statement (e.g., good for bad, intelligent for unintelligent, sonally irrelevant condition, they were told, "Because of difficulties in
etc.). The two sets were randomly assigned to individual subjects and scheduling, we decided to ask each student to select a partner for the
occurred with the same frequency within each mood condition. person in the next experimental session."
Mood manipulation and procedure. Subjects were run in small Next, subjects were provided with the four partner descriptions
groups of 2-4 people and were told that two brief but unrelated experi- arranged in random order. They were allowed 10 min to complete this
ments would be conducted during a 1-hr session to save the subjects task, which was sufficient in all cases to select a partner. Subjects were
time. The first experiment (in reality, the mood manipulation) was next asked to answer a questionnaire (in reality, a filler task) before
introduced as a test of verbal abilities. Subjects had 5 min to complete a their free-recall memory for the target characters was assessed. They
series of 33 sentences of the kind "Car is to road as train is to . . . ," were given four blank sheets of paper and asked to "write down, as
with four multiple-choice answer alternatives provided. The sentences accurately as possible, the description of each of the people you have
ranged from easy to difficult, with the last eight questions, although read about. Try to remember the descriptions word for word, but if you
plausible, having no determinate answers (e.g., "Bread is to butter as cannot remember exactly, do the best you can." This task was com-
river is to. . ."). An earlier pilot study (Forgas, 1989) established that pleted in not more than 10 min.
on the average, 19 questions are completed in 5 min, with everyone Debriefing. The procedure was concluded with a detailed debrief-
completing at least 13 questions in that time. ing designed to eliminate the residual effects of the mood induction.
Mood was manipulated through the instructions and feedback pro- Care was taken to explain the aims and rationale of the study in a
vided to subjects about their above average or below average perfor- friendly and informal atmosphere, and the possible perseverance of
mance in a modification of a previous successfully developed and used false feedback manipulations was explained. All subjects accepted and
technique (cf. Forgas & Bower, 1987; Forgas, Bower, & Moylan, 1990). understood the rationale for the procedure, and no evidence of resid-
All instructions and feedback information were provided in writing, ual negative effects was detected. The debriefing also established that
allowing a high level of standardization of the mood manipulation none of the subjects suspected a link between the mood manipulation
procedure. In the negative condition, the cover sheet informed subjects and the decision task and that the mood manipulation was accepted at
that "most people find these questions quite easy and complete all face value by all subjects.
items in the available time." In the positive condition, subjects were
instructed that "most people find these questions increasingly diffi- Results and Discussion
cult and rarely complete more than 10 items in the available time." The Mood validation. The overall ANOVA of the combined
control group members were told that they "should try to complete as mood self-ratings, F(2, 57) = 11.35, p <.025, or control subjects, F(l, 62) = T
7.87, p < .01, although differences between these two groups I
0.1 Jj
were not significant (see Figure 3). A significant interaction O
between mood and the personal relevance of the task, F(2,
90)= 6.68, p < .01, qualifies this result. In a happy mood,
subjects were relatively more efficient in reaching an imper-
N
B
I
0.05
0
1
n
A
sonal rather than a personal decision, ((30) = 6.97, p < .01. This S n f\fi
Happy Control Sad
pattern was reversed in negative moods, when subjects took less
MOOD CONDITION
time to find a partner for themselves than they did for others,
/(30) = 4.36, p < .01. This nonobvious effect is consistent with
our expectation that the generally slower information process- Figure 4. Biased information choice in interpersonal decisions: the
ing often found in dysphoria may be counterbalanced by the effects of mood and personal relevance (positive values indicate prefer-
kind of directed, selective information search strategies charac- ence for task vs. social information).
AFFECT AND PARTNER CHOICE 715
5), showing that the personal relevance of the task had a greater preferences. We found that in selecting a partner, people use
effect on decision strategies in negative moods than in control different information search and decision-making strategies,
or positive moods. depending both on their mood and the personal relevance of
This pattern provides direct evidence that interpersonal the choice. We designed Experiment 3 to provide additional
choice strategies are significantly influenced by a person's evidence about the nature of these processes by using a more
mood and the personal relevance of the outcome. Dysphoric sensitive methodology that allowed the controlled presentation
subjects making a personal choice were more likely than those of stimulus information and the exact measurement of learning
making an impersonal choice to rely on a within-target, impres- and decision latencies.
sion formation strategy, F(l, 30) = 9.31, p < .01. We expected The first objective of Experiment 3 was to replicate the moti-
this group to be most influenced by their self-serving motives vated memory effects observed in Experiment 1, this time in
to find a rewarding partner, and the search for a global impres- conjunction with the careful monitoring of subjects' learning
sion rather than an analytic, comparison-by-features strategy and attention strategies. Second, we substantially improved the
served this purpose well. In contrast, choices by happy subjects procedure developed in Experiment 2 to measure the informa-
and by those making an impersonal choice were more likely to tion selection strategies used. The need for subjects to number
be based on a comparison-by-features process. These results are and rate each of the information cards they encountered was
not necessarily inconsistent with other evidence suggesting somewhat intrusive and may have interfered with the selection
more systematic, detailed information-processing styles in neg- process itself. In Experiment 3, we developed a sensitive com-
ative moods (Forgas & Bower, 1987; Schwarz & Bless, 1991), as puter-administered procedure for presenting target informa-
both the impression formation and the comparison-by-features tion to allow the precise measurement of subjects' preferred
strategies are compatible with detailed, systematic, or simpli- decision strategies without interfering with the process itself. In
fied heuristic processing styles. addition, this procedure allowed the collection of reaction time
In conjunction with the previous results, it seems that dys- data to assess the informational search latencies associated with
phoric subjects focused on identifying interpersonally reward- different moods and task relevance.
ing rather than task-competent partners for themselves, selec- In Experiment 3, we also incorporated revised mood-manipu-
tively looked for interpersonal information, and sought to form lation stimuli. With any particular mood-manipulation tech-
a global impression of potential partners in terms of interper- nique, there is always the possibility that factors other than
sonal features. These findings go a considerable way toward mood—such as personal memories, cognitions, or motivations
establishing the characteristics of motivated choice strategies —are also influenced. One way of controlling for this possibil-
and linking such processes to transient mood states. However, ity is to use a multimethod approach to ensure that findings are
motivated processing should also be reflected in the actual time not artifactual but can be reliably obtained with slightly differ-
spent by subjects consulting various kinds of information cate- ent induction materials. A new set of mood-induction films
gories in making their choices. This was examined in the next were developed and used in Experiment 3 in an effort to in-
experiment, in which the results are replicated and further ex- crease the generalizability of the findings.
tended by using a computer-controlled stimulus presentation
procedure that also allows the measurement of reaction times
and decision latencies. Method
Experiment 3 Overview. Subjects were shown a new set of mood manipulation
films designed to elicit positive, negative, or neutral mood in an ostensi-
The previous two experiments were successful in showing
bly separate experiment. Next, they were again asked to make interper-
that temporary mood has a major influence on interpersonal
sonal choices for themselves or for others. The overall design and
partner descriptions were the same as in Experiment 2. However,
through the computerized presentation of the target information, it
D was possible to measure both the time taken to select and consult each
E
information unit and the precise sequence of the information search
C
I - IMPERSONAL process.
s Subjects. Forty-two female subjects participated in the experiment
as part of their course requirements, with 14 subjects in each mood
0
condition. As no significant sex differences were found in the previous
N
experiments, the use of female subjects only was unlikely to limit the
S validity of the findings.
T Mood manipulation and procedure. The overall experimental de-
R
sign was similar to that in Experiment 2. Subjects signed up to partici-
A
T pate in two "unrelated" studies. The aims of the first study, in reality
E the mood manipulation, were described as the selection of films for
Q later experiments. Subjects were instructed to watch the videotapes as
Happy Control
Y
MOOD CONDITION they normally would at home. This time, the happy film showed scenes
from a different comedy episode, the control film showed a lecture on
Figure 5. Decision-making strategy as a function of mood and per- art, and the sad film showed edited scenes from a film depicting a
sonal relevance (positive values indicate preference for impression for- young woman suffering a debilitating sporting accident. A brief post-
mation vs. comparison-by-features strategies). experimental questionnaire asking for mood self-ratings inserted
716 JOSEPH P. FORGAS
to competent partners was measured the same way as in Exper-
A
R 0.3 • PERSONAL EZHiMPERSONAL
iment 2. Consistent with the previous results, sad subjects once
T again preferred partners with relatively better interpersonal
N than task qualities than did happy subjects, F(\, 26) = 5.93, p <
E
R ^'*- - .025, or control subjects, F(\, 26) = 4.83, p < .05, and did so
more for themselves than for others, F(2, 36) = 7.72, p < .01
p (Figure 6). This pattern confirms the findings of the previous
R 0.1
experiments using a different mood manipulation stimulus and
F
E
R
E
0 fl I
a different selection procedure, thus attesting to the robustness
of mood effects on interpersonal preference choices.
Decision speed. Mood also had a significant effect on deci-
N sion speed (operationalized the same way as in Experiment 2).
C -01
E Happy Control Sad Happy subjects reached a decision faster, in fewer steps, and
MOOD CONDITION with fewer repetitions than did sad subjects, F(l, 26) = 6.92, p <
.025, or control subjects, F(l, 26) = 5.83, p < .025. We also
Figure 6 Interpersonal preference as a function of mood and per- found a significant Mood X Personal Relevance interaction,
sonal relevance (higher values indicate preference for rewarding rather F(2, 36) = 10.06, p < .01. This showed that in a happy mood,
than competent partners). subjects were faster in making impersonal rather than personal
choices, F(l, 12) = 7.32, p < .025, whereas the reverse was the
case in a negative mood, when subjects made personal choices
among distractor questions (inquiring about general reactions to the
in less time than they made impersonal choices, F(l, 12)= 5.40,
study) was administered at the conclusion of the mood manipulation. p < .05 (Figure 7). The fact that sad subjects were faster in
The second stage of the study was introduced the same way as in making decisions with personal consequences may at first ap-
Experiment 2. However, the information about the potential partners pear counterintuitive. However, this outcome is consistent with
was provided on a computer screen rather than in personnel files. processing benefits inherent in motivated processing, as it in-
Information about the targets was presented in a matrix form, with volves a highly directed and selective search for specific kinds of
individual targets in the columns and descriptive features in the rows. information.
Subjects were told that they may view any item of information about Mood effects on information selectivity. Subjects'relative pref-
any target and in any order by selecting the cell corresponding to the erence for interpersonal versus task-related information was
intersection of that target and the feature they wanted to find out calculated by comparing the proportion of interpersonal with
about. For example, to read about Characteristic 2 of Target 3, they
would have to select Cell 23 on the keyboard. After viewing each infor-
the proportion of task-relevant information units looked at by
mation unit, they were asked to press the space bar to get back to the each subject. There were no main effects, and we also failed to
overall matrix before selecting the next information unit they wished to find a Mood X Personal Relevance interaction effect. However,
look at. Subjects were given a number of practice trials to familiarize a clear trend toward dysphoric subjects looking at more inter-
themselves with the procedure. The computer was programmed to personal information than task information when choosing a
record not only the precise sequence in which information units were partner for themselves was evident in the data. There may be at
looked at, but also the time subjects spent studying each item of infor- least two plausible reasons why this interaction was significant
mation, the time it took to make each choice, and the total time spent in Experiment 2 but did not reach significance here. First, the
until arriving at a partner selection choice. Once the choice task was measure of information selectivity used here did not include
completed, subjects were asked to complete a brief questionnaire—in
ratings of the perceived usefulness of each information unit, as
fact an interference task—before a free-recall test was administered. At
this time, subjects were asked to recall and write down as much as they
could about each of the target characters they had read about on each
of eight sheets of paper. The procedure concluded with a debriefing
session along the lines described in the previous experiments. No evi- D 0.5
E -s- PERSONAL IMPERSONAL
dence of subject awareness of the hypotheses or manipulations was
C
detected. I
S 0.4
I
Results and Discussion o
N 0.3
Validation of the mood manipulation. Combined mood self-
S
ratings were subjected to an overall ANOVA, F(2, 39) = 12.22, p 0.2
p < .01. Results showed the expected significant mood differ- E
ences between the happy (M = 3.04) and control groups (M = E
D
3.71), F(l, 26) = 9.43, p < .01, and the sad (M = 4.29) and 0.1
Happy Control Sad
control groups, F(l, 26) = 6.67, p < .025. Consistent with pre-
vious evidence (Forgas et al, 1990), the audiovisual mood ma- MOOD CONDITION
nipulation was again found to be effective in inducing signifi- Figure 7. The effects of mood and personal relevance on the speed
cantly different good or bad moods in subjects. and efficiency of interpersonal choices (higher values indicate faster
Interpersonal preferences. Preference for likable as opposed and more efficient choices).
AFFECT AND PARTNER CHOICE 717
in Experiment 2. Second, the computerized procedure pre-
sented subjects with the layout of the complete information ! 8.5
matrix before and after each choice, thus making the predicted O
thematic bias in selections perhaps less likely to occur. With
I 7-5
this procedure, information selectivity should be more readily
revealed by the amount of time subjects chose to spend looking
at interpersonal versus task information and the time they took
to select each category, rather than the number of such units
examined. We looked at these results next.
Latency of exposure to social versus task information. Read-
ing times were significantly influenced by subjects' mood, F(2,
39) = 23.26, p < .01. Compared with the control group, dys-
phoric subjects were overall slower (6.7 s vs. 7.9 s), F(\, 26) = Hippy Control
11.72, p < .01, and positive mood subjects were faster (5.8 s), MOOD CONDITION
F(l, 26) = 18.46, p < .01, in dealing with one item of informa-
tion. Similar patterns of slower, less efficient information pro-
cessing in dysphoria and faster processing in happy moods have
been found in other studies both with depressed and with nor-
mal subjects (Bower, 1991; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Isen, 1984;
Isen & Means, 1983; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). - SOCIAL INF. -*- TASK INF.
Of greater interest here was the significant interaction found | '•'
between mood and the personal relevance of the choice, F(2,
36) = 5.99, p < .01. Not only were happy subjects generally 7.5
faster in dealing with an information unit, but also this ten-
dency was strongest when the choice was irrelevant (5.2s) rather
than relevant (6.4 s) to them personally, F(1,12) = 6.81, p < .025.
This tends to suggest that reports of more efficient processing
in positive moods (cf. Isen & Means, 1983) may be confounded 5.5
with the lack of personal relevance typical of the decision tasks
studied in the past. The apparent benefits of positive mood
effects for decision efficiency may be reduced or even elimi-
Happy Control
nated as the personal relevance of the task increases. MOOD CONDITION
Consistent with our expectations, we also found a significant
interaction effect between mood, the personal relevance of Figure S. Self-exposure to social versus task information about po-
choice, and selective attention to task or interpersonal informa- tential partners: the effects of mood and personal relevance (in sec-
tion by subjects, F(2, 30) = 7.11, p< .01. When the choice had onds). (Inf. = information.)
no personal consequences, the time spent looking at social or
task information in all mood conditions was approximately the
same (Figure 8). With a personally relevant choice, however, sad taking longer to make a selection (5.31 s) than control (4.88 s)
subjects spent significantly longer examining interpersonal and happy (4.43 s) subjects, F(2, 39) = 14.17, p < .01.
rather than task information (8.2 s vs. 7.2 s), t(l2) = 10.30, p < Once again, we found significant interactions among mood,
.01, and there was a small but nonsignificant trend in the oppo- personal relevance, and latency of choice for interpersonal or
site direction by happy subjects (6.2 s vs. 6.6 s). This pattern task information, F(2, 30) = 5.51, p < .01. As expected, sad
suggests that there is a significant tendency to focus on inter- subjects made up their minds faster to look at interpersonal
personal information that occurs only in dysphoria when rather than task information when the choice was personally
choosing a personal partner. In conjunction with previous re- relevant (4.79 s vs. 5.58 s), F(l, 12) = 6.99, p < .025, but not when
sults, this confirms the existence of motivated choice strategies it was irrelevant to them (5.55 s vs. 5.31 s), F(l, 12) = 1.31, ns.
at the micro level of selective exposure to potentially beneficial Happy subjects had a slight tendency to choose task informa-
information (Figure 8). tion faster than social information both in personally relevant
Latency of selecting task versus social information. In addi- (4.22 s vs. 4.53 s) and in irrelevant (4.24 s vs. 4.75 s) choice
tion to measuring how long subjects take to look at different situations, with similar but smaller differences for control sub-
information units, the computer also recorded the time elapsed jects (4.54 s vs. 4.91 s and 4.92 s vs. 5.19 s). These results are
before making each selection (the time between returning to consistent with the notion that sad subjects, when making a
the matrix and making a new choice). We expected motivated personal choice, were most likely to engage in motivated pro-
processing to involve reduced choice latencies for preferred in- cessing, selectively looking for interpersonal information and
formation. Consistent with evidence for the generally faster pro- taking less time to choose such details.
cessing of information in positive moods, there was a signifi- Recall data. At the end of the decision task, the experi-
cant mood main effect on choice latencies, with sad subjects menters gave subjects a memory test asking them to recall as
718 JOSEPH P. FORGAS
much information as possible about each target. Items recalled
were scored from 0 to 3, ranging from incorrect recall to near
perfect recall by two independent raters who achieved an in-
terrater reliability of .826. Results showed that mood had only a
weak overall main effect on recall performance, with the pro- I
portion of information correctly recalled being somewhat 0.21-
higher in positive (43.5%) than in neutral (38.5%) or sad (40%) S 0.16
moods, F(2,39) = 4.92, p < .025. However, consistent with the T
results of Experiment 1, memory was overall much better for R o.i
A
subjects who made a personally relevant (47%) rather than an T 0.05
irrelevant (35%) judgment, F(l, 40) = 5.93, p< .025, confirming E
that personal relevance is a major factor in facilitating recall. G o
Happy Control
Y
Overall, subjects remembered task (41.25%) and interpersonal MOOD CONDITION
(40.5%) details almost equally well, F(l, 41) = .81, ns.
However, consistent with our expectations, we did find signif- Figure 9. Decision-making strategy as a function of mood and per-
icant interaction effects among mood, the personal relevance of sonal relevance (positive values indicate preference for impression for-
the choice, and memory for task rather than interpersonal de- mation vs. comparison-by-features strategies).
tails, F(2, 30) = 8.29, p < .01. This interaction showed that
when the task was not personally relevant, recall of task and
interpersonal details was not significantly different in happy
(39% vs. 34%), control (36% vs. 32%), or sad (37% vs. 32%) tional objectives (Wenzlaff& Prohaska, 1989). These effects are
moods. When the outcome was personally relevant, however, markedly different from the kind of automatic, dispassionate,
subjects in a positive mood recalled relatively more task infor- and rational processing strategies explicitly or implicitly as-
mation (54% vs. 46%), t(\2) = 6.52, p < .01, and subjects in a sumed by some early models of social cognition (cf. Forgas,
negative mood remembered relatively more interpersonal than 1981). For example, traditional affect-priming models predict
task details (53% vs. 39%), t(\ 2) = 11.07, p < .01. These memory relatively open, unbiased information search and processing
effects are largely consistent with, and are likely to be the conse- strategies and can account fairly well for mood effects on many
quence of, the previous findings showing information selectiv- less personally involving choices (Bower, 1981; Forgas & Bower,
ity and longer self-exposure to interpersonal details by dys- 1987; Isen, 1984). However, it seems that very different and
phoric subjects. more motivated choice strategies may be used when the deci-
Affective influences on decision strategies. Using the index sion becomes personally relevant (Tesser et al, 1989). Many
described in Experiment 2, we found that subjects selecting a everyday social judgments are performed in the service of spe-
partner for themselves were again significantly more likely to cific goals and involve some degree of motivated processing
rely on a within-target impression formation strategy in their (Kunda, 1990; Martin, 1986; Tesser, 1986). Like evidence from
choices, F(l, 39) = 7.52, p < .01, and this tendency was most other fields, our results suggest that specific motivational objec-
marked for subjects in a negative rather than a positive mood tives may play a major role in determining information search
state, F(2, 36) = 16.31, p < .01. The interaction between mood and processing strategies in many real-life judgments and deci-
and personal relevance was only marginally significant, how- sions (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Forgas et al., 1990;
ever, indicating a slight tendency for sad subjects to be more Mackie & Worth, 1991; Petty et al, 1991; Wenzlaif & Prohaska,
likely to adopt an impression formation strategy when making 1989).
choices for themselves, but not for others, F(2, 36) = 3.76, p < Interest in motivated thinking has a venerable history in so-
.05 (Figure 9). This finding is consistent with the results of cial psychology. Explanations of cognitive processes involved in
Experiment 2. The somewhat weaker effects obtained here are decision making (Janis & Mann, 1977), dissonance reduction
probably due to the different choice procedures made possible (Wicklund & Frey, 1981), intergroup behavior (Brewer &
by the computerized presentation of information, making it Kramer, 1985), persuasion (Petty et al., 1991), and stereotyping
relatively easier for subjects to make nonconsecutive selections (Tajfel & Forgas, 1981) have traditionally included a motiva-
from the information matrix. tional component. The role of motivational factors in social
judgments has also been explicitly recognized (Brewer, 1988;
Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Tesser, 1986). More recently, the role of
General Discussion
motivation in memory processes has received growing atten-
The three experiments reported here offer convergent evi- tion (Parrott & Sabini, 1990; Sanitioso et al., 1990). Contempo-
dence for the importance of temporary moods in motivating rary theoretical formulations by Brewer (1988), Fiske and Neu-
selective interpersonal preference choices. It was found that the berg (1990), Kunda (1990), Martin (1986), and Tesser (1986)
combination of sad moods and personally relevant choices have contributed much to incorporate motivated processes in
clearly led to motivated processing strategies involving a di- models of social cognition. Surprisingly, despite considerable
rected search for information relevant to rewarding outcomes, interest in affect and cognition in recent years (Bower, 1991;
self-serving interpersonal choices, and superior memory for Clore & Parrott, 1991; Forgas, 1991a; Isen, 1984; Schwarz &
such thematically salient information. Of course, different Bless, 1991), very little work has been done so far on the role of
judgmental contexts may lead to somewhat different motiva- moods in motivated interpersonal choices.
AFFECT AND PARTNER CHOICE 719
One likely reason why the kind of mood-induced motivated small, recurring choices and decisions partners make. The in-
processing demonstrated here was not documented earlier is terdependence of affect and cognition in relationship mainte-
that few, if any, researchers looked at mood effects on choices nance and development is now receiving increasing attention
with meaningful personal consequences. Yet there is evidence (Fincham & Fletcher, 1991). The kind of microanarysis of indi-
from other fields that personal relevance has a major impact on vidual interpersonal choices presented here offers a promising
various judgmental strategies (Tesser et al., 1989). Consistent experimental paradigm for studying real-life influences on
with our expectations, it was the combination of high personal partner choices and preferences.
relevance and negative mood that was most likely to result in Results from experimental studies such as these are also rele-
motivated choices. Some processing differences due to positive vant to our understanding of chronic mood disorders, such as
or negative mood are predicted both by mood control (Clark & depression. As depression usually involves a complex constella-
Isen, 1982) and by mood-as-information theories (Clore & tion of symptoms, causal links between mood and cognition
Parrott, 1991; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). According to the latter, are difficult to establish. In contrast, in experimental studies
affect may serve as information predisposing people to effortful with normal subjects, we were able to generate "depressogenic"
or effortless or to motivated or dispassionate information pro- cognitions in a variety of memory, judgment, and attribution
cessing strategies (Clore & Parrott, 1991; Schwarz & Bless, tasks in the past (Bower, 1991; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Forgas et
1991). However, neither of these models deals with the issue of al., 1984, 1990). The present results add a new dimension to
personal relevance or specifically predicts the kind of selective, such findings. Instead of demonstrating the usual mood-con-
thematically biased information search and processing we gruent judgmental bias, dysphoric subjects engaged in di-
found here. rected, motivated information search and choice strategies that
It seems that an adequate explanation of mood effects on were consistent with a desire to control or eliminate their dys-
social cognition and judgments may have to take into account phoria. There is similar evidence for motivated strategies in
the variety of alternative processing strategies available to peo- depressive patients directed at avoiding stressful, demanding,
ple when they are dealing with realistic problems. Such a multi- or potentially threatening tasks and situations (Ottaviani &
process model, building on earlier formulations by Brewer Beck, 1988). However, it often appears that motivated strategies
(1988), Fiedler (1990), Petty et al. (1991), and others has been in depressive cognition involve retreat and avoidance of situa-
recently proposed by Forgas (1991 b). This model identifies four tions that could also lead to positive, rewarding experiences
distinct processing strategies (direct access, motivated, heuris- (Weary & Williams, 1990). Such motivated strategies may con-
tic, and substantive) and makes explicit allowance for the joint tribute to the kind of circular pattern of negative thought and
effects of mood and personal relevance in triggering motivated affect that typically characterizes depression. More research
processing strategies. The results of these three experiments exploring in detail the cognitive microstrategies used by depres-
provide clear support for the existence of such targeted choice sives when dealing with similar interpersonal choices would be
strategies. of obvious practical and clinical interest.
Indeed, it may be useful to make a further distinction be- Interpersonal choices are among the most complex and de-
tween processing strategies that are (a) genuinely unmotivated, manding cognitive tasks we face in everyday life. These studies
(b) passively influenced by a general motivational state, and (c) showed that transient mood and the personal relevance of the
actively goal-oriented in service of a specific motivational ob- outcome have significant effects on the way people look for, use,
jective, as was found here. Some basic cognitive processes such and remember information when making such choices. It was
as spreading activation or affect priming seem automatic and also found that motivated processing involving a selective
generally unmotivated and clearly belong in the first category search for rewarding outcomes was most likely to be adopted as
(Bower, 1991). An interesting example of the second kind of a strategy by dysphoric subjects making a personal choice. Fur-
process is Martin's (1986) ingenious set/reset formulation. This ther research on this important topic is likely to be of consider-
model proposed that mood-incongruent biases or "contrast ef- able theoretical, as well as practical, interest to our understand-
fects" may be due to the "suppressed use of primed concepts" ing of interpersonal relationships and the effects of mood on
(Martin et al., 1990, p. 28) as people are motivated to form an cognition.
impression of a target unbiased by their prior exposure to con-
textual stimuli. Thus, a nonspecific motivation for accuracy
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