AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS J. REITZ by gtu20753

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									                     AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS J. REITZ

I.    INTRODUCTION

I, Thomas J. Reitz, being duly sworn, hereby depose and say:

      1.   I am a Special Agent (“SA”) of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (“FBI”).     I have been so employed for the last

13 years.    During these 13 years I have investigated numerous

white collar crime cases and received extensive additional

training in investigative techniques and in identifying

fraudulent schemes.     Prior to becoming an FBI Special Agent, I

was a certified public accountant with KPMG Peat Marwick LLP,

where I worked for eight years in Los Angeles, California,

Munich, Germany, and KPMG’s executive office in New York City.

I am currently assigned to the Los Angeles Field Office, Santa

Ana Resident Agency, white collar crime squad.

II.   THE PURPOSE OF THE AFFIDAVIT

      2.   This affidavit is made in support of a complaint and

arrest warrant charging Danny Pang, also known as Zuchen Pang

(“PANG”), with violations of Title 31, United States Code,

Section 5324 (Structuring Transactions to Evade Reporting

Requirements).    This affidavit is also made in support of a

search warrant for PANG’s home, located at 2681 Crestview

Drive, Newport Beach, California, for evidence of violations

of Title 31, United States Code, Section 5324.

      3.   This affidavit is not intended to, and does not, set

forth all the evidence gathered in this matter.     Rather, it is
intended only to provide sufficient evidence to support a

finding of probable cause that PANG violated the above-

referenced statute.    I make this affidavit based on personal

knowledge and information that I have received from my

participation in this investigation.

      4.   As will be described herein, PANG was the Chairman

and CEO of PEMGroup.    Beginning at least as early as June

2007, PANG used PEMGroup employees, among others, to cash

checks in amounts less than $10,000 to avoid currency

reporting requirements.

III. PREMISES TO BE SEARCHED

      5.   The premises to be searched are located at 2681

Crestview Drive, Newport Beach, California ("SUBJECT

PREMISES").    The SUBJECT PREMISES are further described in

Attachment A, which is incorporated by reference herein.

IV.   SCHEDULE OF EVIDENCE TO BE SEIZED

      6.   A list of the specific items to be seized from the

SUBJECT PREMISES is attached hereto as Attachment B, which is

incorporated by reference.     Based on my training and

experience, as detailed above, there is probable cause to

believe that the items listed in Attachment B will be found at

the SUBJECT PREMISES.

V.    STRUCTURING FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS

      7.   Title 31, United States Code, Section 5313 requires


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financial institutions to issue a currency transaction report

(“CTR”) for all customer currency transactions in excess of

$10,000.    Title 31, United States Code, Section 5324 makes it

a federal crime for persons to structure or assist in

structuring transactions in ways to cause a financial

institution to not file a CTR.       For example, a person who

intentionally causes a financial institution to fail to file a

CTR by engaging in several transactions on the same day or

over a period of days, where each currency transaction does

not exceed $10,000, but the total amount of the transactions

exceeds $10,000, is structuring in violation of Federal law.

VI.   PROBABLE CAUSE

      A.   The Structured Transactions

      8.   On April 27, 2009, I reviewed records maintained by

East West Bank (“East West”), 1881 West Main Street, Alhambra,

California.    On April 28, 2009, I spoke with Krishan Sirimane,

Vice President, East West, and Maria Madden, Vice President,

East West. I learned the following:

      a.   PANG has been known to East West to be the Chairman

      and Chief Executive Officer of PEMGroup, a global private

      equity investment firm.   Ming Hsiang Lee Pang, also known

      as (“A.K.A.”) Sheanna Pang (“Mrs. PANG”) is PANG’s wife

      and has been a restaurant manager and a housewife;

      b. Ricky Yeh (“Yeh”) is also known to East West as Hsiu


                                 3
Feng Yeh, or H. F. Yeh. Yeh was born in 1976;

c.   C. H. Peng is also known to East West as Cheng-Hao

Peng and was born in 1978;

d.   East West checking account 81312266 is a now-closed

demand deposit account for Life Settlement Partners, Inc.

PANG was an authorized signatory on the account;

e.   East West account 21311535 is a demand deposit

account of PANG. Correspondence regarding this account,

including bank statements, are sent to the SUBJECT

PREMISES.    PANG is an authorized signatory on the

account;

f.   East West accounts 91914267 and 91907055 are demand

deposit accounts PANG.    Correspondence regarding this

account, including bank statements, are sent to the

SUBJECT PREMISES.    PANG is an authorized signatory on the

accounts.    Sabrina Fan has power-of attorney over account

91914267;

9.   On April 21, 2009, I reviewed an organizational chart

of PEMGroup, prepared by PEMGroup.    I noted the

following:

a.   Yeh is listed as “Executive Assistant, Chairman’s

Office”;

b.   PANG is listed as “Chairman, Chief Executive

Officer”;


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      c.     Sabrina Fan is listed as "Vice President,

      Chairman's Office and Client Relations";

      d.     Aprilianna Lim is listed as "Executive Assistant,

      Chairman's Office."

      10.    Based on my training and experience investigating

white collar crime for thirteen years, I know that individuals

that structure transactions with the intent to evade reporting

requirements commonly: (1) engage in transactions between

$9,000 and $9,900, (2) engage in multiple transactions between

$9,000 and $9,900 in a single day or over a period of several

days, and (3) use “runners” to engage in currency transactions

on their behalf.         The following spreadsheet is a summary of

certain checks that I reviewed and believe indicate a pattern

of structuring:

   Date      Account Nr. Check #        Cash       Payee           M aker
                                    W ithdraw al
 6/11/2007    81312266    1469     $       9,500   Danny Pang    Danny Pang

 6/11/2007    81312266    1472     $      9,500       H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

 6/14/2007    81312266    1473     $      9,500       H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

 6/18/2007    81312266    1499     $      9,500       H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

 6/20/2007    81312266    1498     $      9,500       H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

 6/22/2007    81312266    1500     $      9,500       H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

  7/3/2007    81312266    1303     $      9,500    Danny Pang    Danny Pang

  7/5/2007    81312266    1311     $      9,500    Danny Pang    Danny Pang

  7/9/2007    81312266    1313     $      9,500    Danny Pang    Danny Pang

 7/11/2007    81312266    1315     $      9,500       H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang



                                          5
7/16/2007    81312266   1327   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

7/17/2007    81312266   1328   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

7/20/2007    81312266   1329   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

7/23/2007    81312266   1396   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

7/25/2007    81312266   1398   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

7/27/2007    81312266   1397   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

7/31/2007    81312266   1405   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

11/8/2007    81312266   1346   $   9,500   C.H. Peng   Danny Pang

11/8/2007    81312266   1345   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

12/12/2007   81312266   1515   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

12/13/2007   81312266   1516   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

12/14/2007   81312266   1353   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

8/29/2008    91914267   1522   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

8/29/2008    91914267   1523   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

10/1/2008    21311535   1299   $   9,600    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

10/1/2008    91907055   1172   $   9,700    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

10/2/2008    21311535   1298   $   9,800    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

11/6/2008    21311535   1458   $   9,800    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

11/7/2008    21311535   1459   $   9,900    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

11/7/2008    91907055   1176   $   9,900    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

11/25/2008   21311535   1505   $   9,700    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

11/25/2008   21311535   1504   $   9,800    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

12/29/2008   21311535   1492   $   9,800    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

12/30/2008   91907055   1003   $   9,500    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

1/22/2009    91907055   1005   $   9,800    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

1/22/2009    91907055   1006   $   9,800    H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang




                                   6
 1/26/2009    21311535   1300   $      9,800       H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang

 1/26/2009    21311535   1508   $      9,800       H.F. Yeh   Danny Pang


     11.      With regard to the thirty-eight transactions

indicated on the above spreadsheet of East West checks made by

PANG, the following can be determined:

     a.      Though PANG is the maker of all the checks, PANG only

     cashed four of them.           The remaining checks were cashed

     primarily by Yeh, PANG's assistant.

     b.      The average value of the checks cashed is $9,597.

     c.      The median value of the checks cashed is $9,500.

     d.      On eight occasions, two checks were cashed on the

     same day.       The average, one-day cash withdrawal for those

     eight occasions was $19,350.

     B.      Attempted Interviews with Executive Assistants to

     PANG

     12.      On April 26, 2009, I attempted to interview Sabrina

Fan, one of PANG's executive assistants.           Fan advised that she

was laid-off from PEMGroup on April 24, 2009 and declined to

be interviewed.

     13.      On April 26, 2009, I attempted to interview

Aprilianna Lim, one of PANG's executive assistants.               Lim

declined to be interviewed.

     14.      On April 26, 2009, I attempted to interview Ricky

Yeh, one of PANG's executive assistants, at Yeh's last known

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residence.    The occupant, Tomas Estolonio, told me that Ricky

Yeh was PANG's cousin, that he had not seen Yeh in a long

time, and that if any one person knew where to locate Yeh, it

would be PANG.

     C.    Interview with the Former President of PEMGroup

     15.    On April 27, 2009, I interviewed Nassar Aboubakare,

the former president of PEMGroup, who told me the following:

     a.    Aboubakare said that when he worked with PANG at

     PEMGroup, PANG routinely engaged in structuring

     transactions in order to avoid currency reporting

     requirements.    PANG had Yeh, among others, cash checks on

     his behalf and give the money to PANG.     Aboubakare

     recalled PANG once advising Aboubakare to do the same in

     order to avoid reporting by the bank of large cash

     transactions.

     b.    Aboubakare said that his wife once saw PANG's father

     at a bank cashing a check.     PANG's father told

     Aboubakare's wife that he was getting cash for PANG.

     c.    Aboubakare said that PANG used the cash from the

     structuring to buy gold bullion that he stores in a safe

     in his bedroom at his home, behind a closet.     PANG had

     the safe installed when he remodeled his home - 2681

     Crestview, Newport Beach, California (the SUBJECT

     PREMISES).    PANG told Aboubakare that the gold bullion


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     was there in the event something bad happened to PANG, he

     would have something to live off of.

     d.    Aboubakare said that he and PANG created Life

     Settlement Partners' East West account 81312266 in order

     to receive "finder's fees" and commissions from

     investors successfully solicited by PEMGroup.    These

     monies were paid by PEMGroup's controlled, investment

     entities that received the investor's funds to account

     81312266.    The fact that Aboubakare and PANG were the

     ones receiving these payments was not originally

     disclosed to anyone at PEMGroup nor to clients.

     e.    Aboubakare never received any of the East West

     account statements for Life Settlement Partners, Inc.

     16.    I know from reading media reports and arbitration

filings of PEMGroup and Aboubakare that Aboubakare engaged in

a kickback scheme while at PEMGroup in which he and a third

party purportedly inflated the purchase price of certain

investments and split approximately $3 million in excess fees.

Aboubakare admitted the scheme and claims he paid back the $3

million to PEMGroup.    Aboubakare was also accused of having an

affair with a PEMGroup employee, conduct which he admitted.

Given this background and the fact that Aboubakare and

PEMGroup are fighting each other in arbitration, I have tried

to corroborate the statements of Aboubakare relied on in this


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affidavit.

     D.      Interview of Securitas employee

     17.     On April 26, 2009, at approximately 2:00 p.m., I

spoke with Nikki Phillips, an employee of the private

security firm Securitas. I learned the following:

     a.    The PANG's residence, 2681 Crestview Drive, Newport

     Beach, California (the SUBJECT PREMISES), lies within

     the guard-gated community known as Dover Shores.

     b.    PANG was in his residence at the moment of the

     interview.

     c.    Phillips recognized a California Department of Motor

     Vehicles (“CA-DMV”) photo of Yeh as a frequent visitor

     to PANG's residence.

     d.    Phillips recognized a CA-DMV photo of Cheng-Hao Peng

     as a frequent visitor to PANG's residence.

     e.      Phillips recognized a CA-DMV photo of PANG as being

     the occupant of 2681 Crestview, Newport Beach,

     California (the SUBJECT PREMISES).

     f.    PANG utilizes extensive security cameras around his

     residence.     PANG is never alone in the residence and is

     often accompanied by persons of large physical bearing.

     g.    PANG's brother, Alex Pang, owns 2671 Crestview

     Drive, Newport Beach, California which is the house

     adjacent to PANG's residence, to the West.


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     E.    Probable Cause to Search SUBJECT PREMISES

     18.    I believe there is probable cause to believe that

evidence relating to structuring will be found in PANG’s home,

based on the following facts related to me: (1) On or about

April 17, 2009, PANG stepped down as the CEO of PEMGroup,

following reports that PEMGroup and PANG engaged in a Ponzi

scheme; (2) on or about April 27, 2009, U.S. District Court

Judge Philip Gutierrez granted a motion filed by the U.S.

Securities and Exchange Commission to freeze the accounts of

PEMGroup and to appoint a Receiver to oversee the company; (3)

the accounts used to negotiate the checks described above were

personally controlled accounts held by PANG, among others, and

were not business accounts of PEMGroup; (4) the address of the

SUBJECT PREMISES is listed on the face of certain checks

negotiated in the transactions set forth in paragraph 10 of

the Affidavit; (5) East West sends correspondence regarding

three of the four accounts set forth in Paragraph 10 of the

Affidavit to the SUBJECT PREMISES (6) both Yeh and Peng, noted

in the chart above, are frequent visitors to the SUBJECT

PREMISES; (7) PANG had a safe built in the SUBJECT PREMISES

where he stored gold bullion purchased with money from the

structuring scheme; and (8) PANG appears to take extensive

physical security precautions at the SUBJECT PREMISES which

are located in an exclusive and safe, guard-gated community.


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In addition, it has been my experience investigating white

collar crime for thirteen years that criminals frequently keep

evidence of crimes in their homes, believing them to be safe

from seizure by law enforcement.

VII.    PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING COMPUTERS

       19.   Based upon my training and experience and

information related to me by agents and others involved in the

forensic examination of digital devices, I know that data in

digital form can be stored on a variety of systems and storage

devices including hard disk drives, floppy disks, compact

disks, magnetic tapes and memory chips.     I also know that

during the search of the premises it is not always possible to

search digital devices for data for a number of reasons,

including the following:

       a.    Searching digital devices can be a highly technical

       process that requires specific expertise and specialized

       equipment.   There are so many types of digital devices

       and software in use today that it is impossible to bring

       to the search site all of the necessary technical manuals

       and specialized equipment necessary to conduct a thorough

       search.   In addition, it may also be necessary to consult

       with specially trained personnel who have specific

       expertise in the type of digital device, software

       application or operating system that is being searched.


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b.   Searching digital devices can require the use of

precise, scientific procedures that are designed to

maintain the integrity of the evidence and to recover

"hidden," erased, compressed, encrypted or password-

protected data.    Digital devices may contain "booby

traps" that destroy or alter data if certain procedures

are not scrupulously followed.    Since digital data is

particularly vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional

modification or destruction, a controlled environment,

such as a law enforcement laboratory, is essential to

conducting a complete and accurate analysis of the

digital devices from which the data will be extracted.

c.   The volume of data stored on many digital devices

will typically be so large that it will be highly

impractical to search for data during the execution of

the physical search of the premises.    A single megabyte

of storage space is the equivalent of 500 double-spaced

pages of text.    A single gigabyte of storage space, or

1,000 megabytes, is the equivalent of 500,000 double-

spaced pages of text.    Storage devices capable of storing

500 gigabytes (GB) of data are now commonplace in desktop

computers.   Consequently, each non-networked, desktop

computer found during a search can easily contain the

equivalent of 240 million pages of data, that, if printed


                           13
out, would completely fill three 35' x 35' x 10' rooms to

the ceiling.   Further, a 500 GB drive could contain as

many as approximately 450 full run movies or 450,000

songs.

d.   Digital device users can attempt to conceal data

within digital devices through a number of methods,

including the use of innocuous or misleading filenames

and extensions.   For example, files with the extension

".jpg" often are image files; however, a user can easily

change the extension to ".txt" to conceal the image and

make it appear that the file contains text.   Digital

device users can also attempt to conceal data by using

encryption, which means that a password or device, such

as a "dongle" or "keycard," is necessary to decrypt the

data into readable form.    In addition, digital device

users can conceal data within another seemingly unrelated

and innocuous file in a process called "steganography."

For example, by using steganography a digital device user

can conceal text in an image file that cannot be viewed

when the image file is opened.   Therefore, a substantial

amount of time is necessary to extract and sort through

data that is concealed or encrypted to determine whether

it is evidence, contraband or instrumentalities of a

crime.


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VIII.       PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING POTENTIALLY PRIVILEGED

            ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS

      20.   The procedures set forth in Attachment C will be

followed at the time of the search in order to avoid

unnecessary disclosures of any potentially privileged

attorney-client communications which may be found at the

premises to be searched.    PANG is currently represented by

legal counsel in connection with investigations by the FBI and

SEC that PANG conducted a Ponzi scheme at PEMGroup.

IX.     CONCLUSION

      21.   Based upon the above-stated facts, there is probable

Based on the foregoing there is probable cause to believe that

PANG violated Title 31, United States Code, Section 5324, and

that evidence relating to those violations may be found at the

SUBJECT PREMISES.




                                 Thomas J. Reitz
                                 Special Agent
                                 Federal Bureau of Investigation
                                 Los Angeles Field Office

Subscribed and sworn to
before me this      day
of April 2009.



HON. ROBERT N. BLOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE



                                 15
                        ATTACHMENT A

                   PREMISES TO BE SEARCHED


     The Subject Premises located at 2681 Crestview Drive,
Newport Beach, California, is a two-story, gray stucco home
with a covered balcony above the front door. There is a glass
front door that faces South and has brown trim around it.
There are white curtains on the balcony. The number 2681 is
painted on the curb in front of the home. There is a small
black iron gate in front of the home.
                         ATTACHMENT B
                      ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
     The following evidence of violations of Title 31, United
States Code, Section 5324 for the period of August 22, 2006,
to the present:

     A. All checks or copies of checks in the range of $9,000
to $9,900 that were negotiated during relevant time period
from any account at a bank or other financial institution in
the name of Danny Pang, also known as Zuchen Pang, and any
account which Danny Pang holds jointly with Ming Hsiang Lee
Pang, also known as Sheanna Pang.

     B. All bank statements reflecting the deposit or
withdrawal of sums of money in the range of $9,000 to $9,900
from any account in the name of Danny Pang aka Zuchen Pang,
and any account which Danny Pang holds jointly with Ming
Hsiang Lee Pang aka Sheanna Pang.

     C. All deposit slips and withdrawal slips for
transactions in the range of $9,000 to $9,900 from any account
in the name of Danny Pang aka Zuchen Pang, and any account
which Danny Pang holds jointly with Ming Hsiang Lee Pang aka
Sheanna Pang.

     D. All notes, e-mails, or other documents that contain
instructions regarding the negotiation of checks in amounts in
the range of $9,000 to $9,900 from any account in the name of
Danny Pang aka Zuchen Pang, and any account which Danny Pang
holds jointly with Ming Hsiang Lee Pang aka Sheanna Pang.

     E. Any ledger, list or other record showing a list of
checks in the range of $9,000 to $9,900 which have been
negotiated.

     F. Any correspondence from a bank, any banking
regulatory authority, or any law enforcement agency concerning
suspicious activity in any account in the name of Danny Pang
aka Zuchen Pang, and any account which Danny Pang holds
jointly with Ming Hsiang Lee Pang aka Sheanna Pang.

     G.   Gold bullion.

     H. As used above, the terms records, documents,
programs, applications or materials include records,
documents, programs, applications or materials created,
modified or stored in any form, including in digital form on
any digital device. The term "digital device" includes any
electronic device capable of storing and/or processing data in
digital form, including: central processing units; laptop or
notebook computers; personal digital assistants; wireless
communication devices such as telephone paging devices,
beepers, and mobile telephones; peripheral input/output
devices such as keyboards, printers, scanners, plotters,
monitors, and drives intended for removable media; related
communications devices such as modems, cables, and
connections; storage media; and security devices.

     I. In searching for data capable of being read, stored
or interpreted by a digital device, law enforcement personnel
executing this search warrant will employ the following
procedure:

          1. Upon securing the premises, the law enforcement
personnel executing the search warrant will, to the extent
possible without requiring the use of special training in
searching and seizing digital data, seek to determine if any
digital device contains data falling within the scope of the
items to be seized in the warrant. If they can make this
determination without jeopardizing the integrity of the
digital data and a digital device contains data falling within
the scope of the items to be seized in the warrant, that
digital device will be seized. If they cannot make this
determination, or they believe they cannot make this
determination, without jeopardizing the integrity of the
digital data, law enforcement personnel trained in searching
and seizing digital data (the "computer personnel") will be
consulted (either on-site or off-site) to determine whether
the digital device can be searched on-site in a reasonable
amount of time and without jeopardizing the ability to
preserve data contained on the digital device.

          2. If the digital device can be searched on-site in
a reasonable amount of time and without jeopardizing the
ability to preserve data, it will be searched on-site and
seized only if the search reveals it to contain any data that
falls within the list of items to be seized set forth herein.

          3. If the digital device cannot be searched on-site
in a reasonable amount of time and without jeopardizing the
ability to preserve data, then the computer personnel will
determine whether it is practical to create a forensically
sound image of the data contained on the digital device during
the execution of the search in a reasonable amount of time
without jeopardizing the ability to preserve that data. If it
is practical, and the digital device cannot be searched on
site in a reasonable amount of time and without jeopardizing
the ability to preserve data, the computer personnel will make
a forensically sound image of the data contained on the
digital device (a "data image") during the execution of this
search and shall seize the data image rather than the digital
device itself.

          4. If the computer personnel determine it is not
practical to perform an on-site search of the digital device
or make an on-site data image within a reasonable period of
time and without jeopardizing the ability to preserve data,
then the digital device will be seized and transported to an
appropriate law enforcement laboratory for review. The
digital devices will be reviewed by appropriately trained
personnel in order to extract and seize any data that falls
within the list of items to be seized set forth herein.

          5. In searching the digital device or data image,
the computer personnel may examine all of the data contained
in the digital device or data image to view their precise
contents and determine whether the data falls within the items
to be seized as set forth herein. In addition, the computer
personnel may search for and attempt to recover "deleted,"
"hidden" or encrypted data to determine whether the data falls
within the list of items to be seized as set forth herein.

          6. If the computer personnel seize the digital
device pursuant to subparagraph iv above or make a data image
pursuant to subparagraph iii above, the computer personnel
will initially search the digital device or data image within
a reasonable amount of time not to exceed 60 days from the
date of execution of the warrant. If, after conducting such
an initial search, the case agents determine that the digital
device or data image contains any data falling within the list
of items to be seized pursuant to this warrant, the government
will either (1) return the digital device, keeping a data
image for further analysis, provided that, prior to such
return, the owner and user(s) of the digital device stipulate
individually and in writing to the authenticity and accuracy
of the data image or (2) seek an order of the Court allowing
the government to retain the original digital device for
further analysis. If the digital device or data image does
not contain any data falling within the list of the items to
be seized pursuant to this warrant, the government will return
the digital device or delete the data image. If the
government needs additional time to determine whether the
digital device or data image contains any data falling within
the list of items to be seized pursuant to this warrant, it
may seek an extension of the time period from the Court within
the original sixty day period from the date of execution of
the warrant.

     J. In order to search for data that is capable of being
read or interpreted by a digital device, law enforcement
personnel will need to seize and search the following items,
subject to the procedures set forth above:

          1. Any digital device capable of being used to
commit, further or store evidence of the offense listed above;

          2. Any equipment used to facilitate the
transmission, creation, display, encoding or storage of
digital data, including word processing equipment, modems,
docking stations, monitors, printers, plotters, encryption
devices and optical scanners;

          3. Any magnetic, electronic or optical storage
device capable of storing data, such as floppy disks, hard
disks, tapes, CD-ROMs, CD-R, CD-RWs, DVDs, optical disks,
printer or memory buffers, smart cards, PC cards, memory
calculators, electronic dialers, electronic notebooks,
cellular telephones and personal digital assistants;

          4. Any documentation, operating logs and reference
manuals regarding the operation of the digital device or
software used in the digital device;

          5. Any applications, utility programs, compilers,
interpreters and other software used to facilitate direct or
indirect communication with the digital device;

          6. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles
and similar physical items that are necessary to gain access
to the digital device or data stored on the digital device;
and

          7. Any passwords, password files, test keys,
encryption codes or other information necessary to access the
digital device or data stored on the digital device.

     K. In searching for the items to be seized, agents may
search any safe or other sealed container that might contain
such items. If such a safe or sealed container cannot be
opened on sight, the agents may seize the safe or sealed
container but must return the safe or container no later than
14 days after such seizure, absent further order from the
Court.
                         ATTACHMENT C

       PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING ATTORNEY-CLIENT MATERIAL

     The following procedures will be followed in order to
avoid unwarranted disclosures of privileged attorney-client
communication:

     1.   Prior to the search: (i) one or more law enforcement
agents will be designated as a “taint” agent; (ii) one or more
law enforcement personnel who are familiar with the procedures
set forth above for searching and seizing computer equipment
and peripherals will be assigned responsibility for searching
computer equipment and peripherals (the “computer
specialist”); and (iii) an Assistant United States Attorney
will be designated as the “taint” Assistant United States
Attorney. All members of the search team will be apprized of
the identities of the taint agent, the computer specialist,
and the taint Assistant United States Attorney prior to the
commencement of the search.

     2.   During the search, prior to reading any document in
its entirety, the searching agent will conduct a limited
review of the document in order to determine whether the
document appears to contain or refer to communications between
Danny Pang and an attorney (“potentially privileged
communications”). If the searching agent determines that a
document appears to contain potentially privileged
communications, the agent will not review the document further
and will immediately notify the taint agent to review the
document to determine if it appears to contain potentially
privileged communications.

     3.   If the taint agent determines that a document
appears to contain potentially privileged communications, the
member will then review only as much of the document as is
necessary to determine whether or not the document is within
the scope of the warrant. If the document contains
potentially privileged communications, but is not within the
scope of the warrant, the document will be set aside and will
not be subject to further review (by anyone). If the document
contains potentially privileged communications and is within
the scope of the warrant, the taint agent will seize the
document, seal it in an envelope, and mark the envelope as
potentially attorney-client privileged. The document will
then be delivered to the United States Attorney’s Office
without any further review. No agents involved in the
investigation will open or examine the contents of any such
envelopes unless and until directed to do so by the United
States Attorney’s Office or the Court.
     4.   The taint agent and the taint Assistant United
States Attorney will be instructed that they may not discuss
the contents of any privileged communications with any agents
or Assistant United States Attorneys who are involved in the
investigation, absent a Court order.

     5.   Computer equipment will be searched only by computer
specialists. The computer specialists will be instructed that
they (i) may not disclose any information that is stored in or
derived from computer equipment (“computer information”) that
is outside the scope of the warrant, to anyone; and (ii) may
not disclose any computer information that appears to contain
potentially privileged communications that is within the scope
of the warrant, unless and until ordered by the Court or
authorized by the United States Attorney’s Office.

     6.   The taint Assistant United States Attorney will be
available for telephonic consultation with the taint agent
during the search.

								
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