AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS J. REITZ I. INTRODUCTION I, Thomas J. Reitz, being duly sworn, hereby depose and say: 1. I am a Special Agent (“SA”) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). I have been so employed for the last 13 years. During these 13 years I have investigated numerous white collar crime cases and received extensive additional training in investigative techniques and in identifying fraudulent schemes. Prior to becoming an FBI Special Agent, I was a certified public accountant with KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, where I worked for eight years in Los Angeles, California, Munich, Germany, and KPMG’s executive office in New York City. I am currently assigned to the Los Angeles Field Office, Santa Ana Resident Agency, white collar crime squad. II. THE PURPOSE OF THE AFFIDAVIT 2. This affidavit is made in support of a complaint and arrest warrant charging Danny Pang, also known as Zuchen Pang (“PANG”), with violations of Title 31, United States Code, Section 5324 (Structuring Transactions to Evade Reporting Requirements). This affidavit is also made in support of a search warrant for PANG’s home, located at 2681 Crestview Drive, Newport Beach, California, for evidence of violations of Title 31, United States Code, Section 5324. 3. This affidavit is not intended to, and does not, set forth all the evidence gathered in this matter. Rather, it is intended only to provide sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause that PANG violated the above- referenced statute. I make this affidavit based on personal knowledge and information that I have received from my participation in this investigation. 4. As will be described herein, PANG was the Chairman and CEO of PEMGroup. Beginning at least as early as June 2007, PANG used PEMGroup employees, among others, to cash checks in amounts less than $10,000 to avoid currency reporting requirements. III. PREMISES TO BE SEARCHED 5. The premises to be searched are located at 2681 Crestview Drive, Newport Beach, California ("SUBJECT PREMISES"). The SUBJECT PREMISES are further described in Attachment A, which is incorporated by reference herein. IV. SCHEDULE OF EVIDENCE TO BE SEIZED 6. A list of the specific items to be seized from the SUBJECT PREMISES is attached hereto as Attachment B, which is incorporated by reference. Based on my training and experience, as detailed above, there is probable cause to believe that the items listed in Attachment B will be found at the SUBJECT PREMISES. V. STRUCTURING FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 7. Title 31, United States Code, Section 5313 requires 2 financial institutions to issue a currency transaction report (“CTR”) for all customer currency transactions in excess of $10,000. Title 31, United States Code, Section 5324 makes it a federal crime for persons to structure or assist in structuring transactions in ways to cause a financial institution to not file a CTR. For example, a person who intentionally causes a financial institution to fail to file a CTR by engaging in several transactions on the same day or over a period of days, where each currency transaction does not exceed $10,000, but the total amount of the transactions exceeds $10,000, is structuring in violation of Federal law. VI. PROBABLE CAUSE A. The Structured Transactions 8. On April 27, 2009, I reviewed records maintained by East West Bank (“East West”), 1881 West Main Street, Alhambra, California. On April 28, 2009, I spoke with Krishan Sirimane, Vice President, East West, and Maria Madden, Vice President, East West. I learned the following: a. PANG has been known to East West to be the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of PEMGroup, a global private equity investment firm. Ming Hsiang Lee Pang, also known as (“A.K.A.”) Sheanna Pang (“Mrs. PANG”) is PANG’s wife and has been a restaurant manager and a housewife; b. Ricky Yeh (“Yeh”) is also known to East West as Hsiu 3 Feng Yeh, or H. F. Yeh. Yeh was born in 1976; c. C. H. Peng is also known to East West as Cheng-Hao Peng and was born in 1978; d. East West checking account 81312266 is a now-closed demand deposit account for Life Settlement Partners, Inc. PANG was an authorized signatory on the account; e. East West account 21311535 is a demand deposit account of PANG. Correspondence regarding this account, including bank statements, are sent to the SUBJECT PREMISES. PANG is an authorized signatory on the account; f. East West accounts 91914267 and 91907055 are demand deposit accounts PANG. Correspondence regarding this account, including bank statements, are sent to the SUBJECT PREMISES. PANG is an authorized signatory on the accounts. Sabrina Fan has power-of attorney over account 91914267; 9. On April 21, 2009, I reviewed an organizational chart of PEMGroup, prepared by PEMGroup. I noted the following: a. Yeh is listed as “Executive Assistant, Chairman’s Office”; b. PANG is listed as “Chairman, Chief Executive Officer”; 4 c. Sabrina Fan is listed as "Vice President, Chairman's Office and Client Relations"; d. Aprilianna Lim is listed as "Executive Assistant, Chairman's Office." 10. Based on my training and experience investigating white collar crime for thirteen years, I know that individuals that structure transactions with the intent to evade reporting requirements commonly: (1) engage in transactions between $9,000 and $9,900, (2) engage in multiple transactions between $9,000 and $9,900 in a single day or over a period of several days, and (3) use “runners” to engage in currency transactions on their behalf. The following spreadsheet is a summary of certain checks that I reviewed and believe indicate a pattern of structuring: Date Account Nr. Check # Cash Payee M aker W ithdraw al 6/11/2007 81312266 1469 $ 9,500 Danny Pang Danny Pang 6/11/2007 81312266 1472 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 6/14/2007 81312266 1473 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 6/18/2007 81312266 1499 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 6/20/2007 81312266 1498 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 6/22/2007 81312266 1500 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 7/3/2007 81312266 1303 $ 9,500 Danny Pang Danny Pang 7/5/2007 81312266 1311 $ 9,500 Danny Pang Danny Pang 7/9/2007 81312266 1313 $ 9,500 Danny Pang Danny Pang 7/11/2007 81312266 1315 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 5 7/16/2007 81312266 1327 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 7/17/2007 81312266 1328 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 7/20/2007 81312266 1329 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 7/23/2007 81312266 1396 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 7/25/2007 81312266 1398 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 7/27/2007 81312266 1397 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 7/31/2007 81312266 1405 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 11/8/2007 81312266 1346 $ 9,500 C.H. Peng Danny Pang 11/8/2007 81312266 1345 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 12/12/2007 81312266 1515 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 12/13/2007 81312266 1516 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 12/14/2007 81312266 1353 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 8/29/2008 91914267 1522 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 8/29/2008 91914267 1523 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 10/1/2008 21311535 1299 $ 9,600 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 10/1/2008 91907055 1172 $ 9,700 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 10/2/2008 21311535 1298 $ 9,800 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 11/6/2008 21311535 1458 $ 9,800 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 11/7/2008 21311535 1459 $ 9,900 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 11/7/2008 91907055 1176 $ 9,900 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 11/25/2008 21311535 1505 $ 9,700 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 11/25/2008 21311535 1504 $ 9,800 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 12/29/2008 21311535 1492 $ 9,800 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 12/30/2008 91907055 1003 $ 9,500 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 1/22/2009 91907055 1005 $ 9,800 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 1/22/2009 91907055 1006 $ 9,800 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 6 1/26/2009 21311535 1300 $ 9,800 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 1/26/2009 21311535 1508 $ 9,800 H.F. Yeh Danny Pang 11. With regard to the thirty-eight transactions indicated on the above spreadsheet of East West checks made by PANG, the following can be determined: a. Though PANG is the maker of all the checks, PANG only cashed four of them. The remaining checks were cashed primarily by Yeh, PANG's assistant. b. The average value of the checks cashed is $9,597. c. The median value of the checks cashed is $9,500. d. On eight occasions, two checks were cashed on the same day. The average, one-day cash withdrawal for those eight occasions was $19,350. B. Attempted Interviews with Executive Assistants to PANG 12. On April 26, 2009, I attempted to interview Sabrina Fan, one of PANG's executive assistants. Fan advised that she was laid-off from PEMGroup on April 24, 2009 and declined to be interviewed. 13. On April 26, 2009, I attempted to interview Aprilianna Lim, one of PANG's executive assistants. Lim declined to be interviewed. 14. On April 26, 2009, I attempted to interview Ricky Yeh, one of PANG's executive assistants, at Yeh's last known 7 residence. The occupant, Tomas Estolonio, told me that Ricky Yeh was PANG's cousin, that he had not seen Yeh in a long time, and that if any one person knew where to locate Yeh, it would be PANG. C. Interview with the Former President of PEMGroup 15. On April 27, 2009, I interviewed Nassar Aboubakare, the former president of PEMGroup, who told me the following: a. Aboubakare said that when he worked with PANG at PEMGroup, PANG routinely engaged in structuring transactions in order to avoid currency reporting requirements. PANG had Yeh, among others, cash checks on his behalf and give the money to PANG. Aboubakare recalled PANG once advising Aboubakare to do the same in order to avoid reporting by the bank of large cash transactions. b. Aboubakare said that his wife once saw PANG's father at a bank cashing a check. PANG's father told Aboubakare's wife that he was getting cash for PANG. c. Aboubakare said that PANG used the cash from the structuring to buy gold bullion that he stores in a safe in his bedroom at his home, behind a closet. PANG had the safe installed when he remodeled his home - 2681 Crestview, Newport Beach, California (the SUBJECT PREMISES). PANG told Aboubakare that the gold bullion 8 was there in the event something bad happened to PANG, he would have something to live off of. d. Aboubakare said that he and PANG created Life Settlement Partners' East West account 81312266 in order to receive "finder's fees" and commissions from investors successfully solicited by PEMGroup. These monies were paid by PEMGroup's controlled, investment entities that received the investor's funds to account 81312266. The fact that Aboubakare and PANG were the ones receiving these payments was not originally disclosed to anyone at PEMGroup nor to clients. e. Aboubakare never received any of the East West account statements for Life Settlement Partners, Inc. 16. I know from reading media reports and arbitration filings of PEMGroup and Aboubakare that Aboubakare engaged in a kickback scheme while at PEMGroup in which he and a third party purportedly inflated the purchase price of certain investments and split approximately $3 million in excess fees. Aboubakare admitted the scheme and claims he paid back the $3 million to PEMGroup. Aboubakare was also accused of having an affair with a PEMGroup employee, conduct which he admitted. Given this background and the fact that Aboubakare and PEMGroup are fighting each other in arbitration, I have tried to corroborate the statements of Aboubakare relied on in this 9 affidavit. D. Interview of Securitas employee 17. On April 26, 2009, at approximately 2:00 p.m., I spoke with Nikki Phillips, an employee of the private security firm Securitas. I learned the following: a. The PANG's residence, 2681 Crestview Drive, Newport Beach, California (the SUBJECT PREMISES), lies within the guard-gated community known as Dover Shores. b. PANG was in his residence at the moment of the interview. c. Phillips recognized a California Department of Motor Vehicles (“CA-DMV”) photo of Yeh as a frequent visitor to PANG's residence. d. Phillips recognized a CA-DMV photo of Cheng-Hao Peng as a frequent visitor to PANG's residence. e. Phillips recognized a CA-DMV photo of PANG as being the occupant of 2681 Crestview, Newport Beach, California (the SUBJECT PREMISES). f. PANG utilizes extensive security cameras around his residence. PANG is never alone in the residence and is often accompanied by persons of large physical bearing. g. PANG's brother, Alex Pang, owns 2671 Crestview Drive, Newport Beach, California which is the house adjacent to PANG's residence, to the West. 10 E. Probable Cause to Search SUBJECT PREMISES 18. I believe there is probable cause to believe that evidence relating to structuring will be found in PANG’s home, based on the following facts related to me: (1) On or about April 17, 2009, PANG stepped down as the CEO of PEMGroup, following reports that PEMGroup and PANG engaged in a Ponzi scheme; (2) on or about April 27, 2009, U.S. District Court Judge Philip Gutierrez granted a motion filed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to freeze the accounts of PEMGroup and to appoint a Receiver to oversee the company; (3) the accounts used to negotiate the checks described above were personally controlled accounts held by PANG, among others, and were not business accounts of PEMGroup; (4) the address of the SUBJECT PREMISES is listed on the face of certain checks negotiated in the transactions set forth in paragraph 10 of the Affidavit; (5) East West sends correspondence regarding three of the four accounts set forth in Paragraph 10 of the Affidavit to the SUBJECT PREMISES (6) both Yeh and Peng, noted in the chart above, are frequent visitors to the SUBJECT PREMISES; (7) PANG had a safe built in the SUBJECT PREMISES where he stored gold bullion purchased with money from the structuring scheme; and (8) PANG appears to take extensive physical security precautions at the SUBJECT PREMISES which are located in an exclusive and safe, guard-gated community. 11 In addition, it has been my experience investigating white collar crime for thirteen years that criminals frequently keep evidence of crimes in their homes, believing them to be safe from seizure by law enforcement. VII. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING COMPUTERS 19. Based upon my training and experience and information related to me by agents and others involved in the forensic examination of digital devices, I know that data in digital form can be stored on a variety of systems and storage devices including hard disk drives, floppy disks, compact disks, magnetic tapes and memory chips. I also know that during the search of the premises it is not always possible to search digital devices for data for a number of reasons, including the following: a. Searching digital devices can be a highly technical process that requires specific expertise and specialized equipment. There are so many types of digital devices and software in use today that it is impossible to bring to the search site all of the necessary technical manuals and specialized equipment necessary to conduct a thorough search. In addition, it may also be necessary to consult with specially trained personnel who have specific expertise in the type of digital device, software application or operating system that is being searched. 12 b. Searching digital devices can require the use of precise, scientific procedures that are designed to maintain the integrity of the evidence and to recover "hidden," erased, compressed, encrypted or password- protected data. Digital devices may contain "booby traps" that destroy or alter data if certain procedures are not scrupulously followed. Since digital data is particularly vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction, a controlled environment, such as a law enforcement laboratory, is essential to conducting a complete and accurate analysis of the digital devices from which the data will be extracted. c. The volume of data stored on many digital devices will typically be so large that it will be highly impractical to search for data during the execution of the physical search of the premises. A single megabyte of storage space is the equivalent of 500 double-spaced pages of text. A single gigabyte of storage space, or 1,000 megabytes, is the equivalent of 500,000 double- spaced pages of text. Storage devices capable of storing 500 gigabytes (GB) of data are now commonplace in desktop computers. Consequently, each non-networked, desktop computer found during a search can easily contain the equivalent of 240 million pages of data, that, if printed 13 out, would completely fill three 35' x 35' x 10' rooms to the ceiling. Further, a 500 GB drive could contain as many as approximately 450 full run movies or 450,000 songs. d. Digital device users can attempt to conceal data within digital devices through a number of methods, including the use of innocuous or misleading filenames and extensions. For example, files with the extension ".jpg" often are image files; however, a user can easily change the extension to ".txt" to conceal the image and make it appear that the file contains text. Digital device users can also attempt to conceal data by using encryption, which means that a password or device, such as a "dongle" or "keycard," is necessary to decrypt the data into readable form. In addition, digital device users can conceal data within another seemingly unrelated and innocuous file in a process called "steganography." For example, by using steganography a digital device user can conceal text in an image file that cannot be viewed when the image file is opened. Therefore, a substantial amount of time is necessary to extract and sort through data that is concealed or encrypted to determine whether it is evidence, contraband or instrumentalities of a crime. 14 VIII. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING POTENTIALLY PRIVILEGED ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS 20. The procedures set forth in Attachment C will be followed at the time of the search in order to avoid unnecessary disclosures of any potentially privileged attorney-client communications which may be found at the premises to be searched. PANG is currently represented by legal counsel in connection with investigations by the FBI and SEC that PANG conducted a Ponzi scheme at PEMGroup. IX. CONCLUSION 21. Based upon the above-stated facts, there is probable Based on the foregoing there is probable cause to believe that PANG violated Title 31, United States Code, Section 5324, and that evidence relating to those violations may be found at the SUBJECT PREMISES. Thomas J. Reitz Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation Los Angeles Field Office Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of April 2009. HON. ROBERT N. BLOCK UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 ATTACHMENT A PREMISES TO BE SEARCHED The Subject Premises located at 2681 Crestview Drive, Newport Beach, California, is a two-story, gray stucco home with a covered balcony above the front door. There is a glass front door that faces South and has brown trim around it. There are white curtains on the balcony. The number 2681 is painted on the curb in front of the home. There is a small black iron gate in front of the home. ATTACHMENT B ITEMS TO BE SEIZED The following evidence of violations of Title 31, United States Code, Section 5324 for the period of August 22, 2006, to the present: A. All checks or copies of checks in the range of $9,000 to $9,900 that were negotiated during relevant time period from any account at a bank or other financial institution in the name of Danny Pang, also known as Zuchen Pang, and any account which Danny Pang holds jointly with Ming Hsiang Lee Pang, also known as Sheanna Pang. B. All bank statements reflecting the deposit or withdrawal of sums of money in the range of $9,000 to $9,900 from any account in the name of Danny Pang aka Zuchen Pang, and any account which Danny Pang holds jointly with Ming Hsiang Lee Pang aka Sheanna Pang. C. All deposit slips and withdrawal slips for transactions in the range of $9,000 to $9,900 from any account in the name of Danny Pang aka Zuchen Pang, and any account which Danny Pang holds jointly with Ming Hsiang Lee Pang aka Sheanna Pang. D. All notes, e-mails, or other documents that contain instructions regarding the negotiation of checks in amounts in the range of $9,000 to $9,900 from any account in the name of Danny Pang aka Zuchen Pang, and any account which Danny Pang holds jointly with Ming Hsiang Lee Pang aka Sheanna Pang. E. Any ledger, list or other record showing a list of checks in the range of $9,000 to $9,900 which have been negotiated. F. Any correspondence from a bank, any banking regulatory authority, or any law enforcement agency concerning suspicious activity in any account in the name of Danny Pang aka Zuchen Pang, and any account which Danny Pang holds jointly with Ming Hsiang Lee Pang aka Sheanna Pang. G. Gold bullion. H. As used above, the terms records, documents, programs, applications or materials include records, documents, programs, applications or materials created, modified or stored in any form, including in digital form on any digital device. The term "digital device" includes any electronic device capable of storing and/or processing data in digital form, including: central processing units; laptop or notebook computers; personal digital assistants; wireless communication devices such as telephone paging devices, beepers, and mobile telephones; peripheral input/output devices such as keyboards, printers, scanners, plotters, monitors, and drives intended for removable media; related communications devices such as modems, cables, and connections; storage media; and security devices. I. In searching for data capable of being read, stored or interpreted by a digital device, law enforcement personnel executing this search warrant will employ the following procedure: 1. Upon securing the premises, the law enforcement personnel executing the search warrant will, to the extent possible without requiring the use of special training in searching and seizing digital data, seek to determine if any digital device contains data falling within the scope of the items to be seized in the warrant. If they can make this determination without jeopardizing the integrity of the digital data and a digital device contains data falling within the scope of the items to be seized in the warrant, that digital device will be seized. If they cannot make this determination, or they believe they cannot make this determination, without jeopardizing the integrity of the digital data, law enforcement personnel trained in searching and seizing digital data (the "computer personnel") will be consulted (either on-site or off-site) to determine whether the digital device can be searched on-site in a reasonable amount of time and without jeopardizing the ability to preserve data contained on the digital device. 2. If the digital device can be searched on-site in a reasonable amount of time and without jeopardizing the ability to preserve data, it will be searched on-site and seized only if the search reveals it to contain any data that falls within the list of items to be seized set forth herein. 3. If the digital device cannot be searched on-site in a reasonable amount of time and without jeopardizing the ability to preserve data, then the computer personnel will determine whether it is practical to create a forensically sound image of the data contained on the digital device during the execution of the search in a reasonable amount of time without jeopardizing the ability to preserve that data. If it is practical, and the digital device cannot be searched on site in a reasonable amount of time and without jeopardizing the ability to preserve data, the computer personnel will make a forensically sound image of the data contained on the digital device (a "data image") during the execution of this search and shall seize the data image rather than the digital device itself. 4. If the computer personnel determine it is not practical to perform an on-site search of the digital device or make an on-site data image within a reasonable period of time and without jeopardizing the ability to preserve data, then the digital device will be seized and transported to an appropriate law enforcement laboratory for review. The digital devices will be reviewed by appropriately trained personnel in order to extract and seize any data that falls within the list of items to be seized set forth herein. 5. In searching the digital device or data image, the computer personnel may examine all of the data contained in the digital device or data image to view their precise contents and determine whether the data falls within the items to be seized as set forth herein. In addition, the computer personnel may search for and attempt to recover "deleted," "hidden" or encrypted data to determine whether the data falls within the list of items to be seized as set forth herein. 6. If the computer personnel seize the digital device pursuant to subparagraph iv above or make a data image pursuant to subparagraph iii above, the computer personnel will initially search the digital device or data image within a reasonable amount of time not to exceed 60 days from the date of execution of the warrant. If, after conducting such an initial search, the case agents determine that the digital device or data image contains any data falling within the list of items to be seized pursuant to this warrant, the government will either (1) return the digital device, keeping a data image for further analysis, provided that, prior to such return, the owner and user(s) of the digital device stipulate individually and in writing to the authenticity and accuracy of the data image or (2) seek an order of the Court allowing the government to retain the original digital device for further analysis. If the digital device or data image does not contain any data falling within the list of the items to be seized pursuant to this warrant, the government will return the digital device or delete the data image. If the government needs additional time to determine whether the digital device or data image contains any data falling within the list of items to be seized pursuant to this warrant, it may seek an extension of the time period from the Court within the original sixty day period from the date of execution of the warrant. J. In order to search for data that is capable of being read or interpreted by a digital device, law enforcement personnel will need to seize and search the following items, subject to the procedures set forth above: 1. Any digital device capable of being used to commit, further or store evidence of the offense listed above; 2. Any equipment used to facilitate the transmission, creation, display, encoding or storage of digital data, including word processing equipment, modems, docking stations, monitors, printers, plotters, encryption devices and optical scanners; 3. Any magnetic, electronic or optical storage device capable of storing data, such as floppy disks, hard disks, tapes, CD-ROMs, CD-R, CD-RWs, DVDs, optical disks, printer or memory buffers, smart cards, PC cards, memory calculators, electronic dialers, electronic notebooks, cellular telephones and personal digital assistants; 4. Any documentation, operating logs and reference manuals regarding the operation of the digital device or software used in the digital device; 5. Any applications, utility programs, compilers, interpreters and other software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the digital device; 6. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles and similar physical items that are necessary to gain access to the digital device or data stored on the digital device; and 7. Any passwords, password files, test keys, encryption codes or other information necessary to access the digital device or data stored on the digital device. K. In searching for the items to be seized, agents may search any safe or other sealed container that might contain such items. If such a safe or sealed container cannot be opened on sight, the agents may seize the safe or sealed container but must return the safe or container no later than 14 days after such seizure, absent further order from the Court. ATTACHMENT C PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING ATTORNEY-CLIENT MATERIAL The following procedures will be followed in order to avoid unwarranted disclosures of privileged attorney-client communication: 1. Prior to the search: (i) one or more law enforcement agents will be designated as a “taint” agent; (ii) one or more law enforcement personnel who are familiar with the procedures set forth above for searching and seizing computer equipment and peripherals will be assigned responsibility for searching computer equipment and peripherals (the “computer specialist”); and (iii) an Assistant United States Attorney will be designated as the “taint” Assistant United States Attorney. All members of the search team will be apprized of the identities of the taint agent, the computer specialist, and the taint Assistant United States Attorney prior to the commencement of the search. 2. During the search, prior to reading any document in its entirety, the searching agent will conduct a limited review of the document in order to determine whether the document appears to contain or refer to communications between Danny Pang and an attorney (“potentially privileged communications”). If the searching agent determines that a document appears to contain potentially privileged communications, the agent will not review the document further and will immediately notify the taint agent to review the document to determine if it appears to contain potentially privileged communications. 3. If the taint agent determines that a document appears to contain potentially privileged communications, the member will then review only as much of the document as is necessary to determine whether or not the document is within the scope of the warrant. If the document contains potentially privileged communications, but is not within the scope of the warrant, the document will be set aside and will not be subject to further review (by anyone). If the document contains potentially privileged communications and is within the scope of the warrant, the taint agent will seize the document, seal it in an envelope, and mark the envelope as potentially attorney-client privileged. The document will then be delivered to the United States Attorney’s Office without any further review. No agents involved in the investigation will open or examine the contents of any such envelopes unless and until directed to do so by the United States Attorney’s Office or the Court. 4. The taint agent and the taint Assistant United States Attorney will be instructed that they may not discuss the contents of any privileged communications with any agents or Assistant United States Attorneys who are involved in the investigation, absent a Court order. 5. Computer equipment will be searched only by computer specialists. The computer specialists will be instructed that they (i) may not disclose any information that is stored in or derived from computer equipment (“computer information”) that is outside the scope of the warrant, to anyone; and (ii) may not disclose any computer information that appears to contain potentially privileged communications that is within the scope of the warrant, unless and until ordered by the Court or authorized by the United States Attorney’s Office. 6. The taint Assistant United States Attorney will be available for telephonic consultation with the taint agent during the search.
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