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Socio-Economic Impact Study
of Danchurchaid Mine Action in Kosovo,
July 1999-December 2001
Christopher HORWOOD
Danchurchaid Research Team, led by Pamela Zintatu Ntshanga
December 2001
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 2
Contents
Page 1 Contents/Acknowledgements
Page 2 Executive Summary
Section 1:
Page 4 1.1 Introduction
Page 5 1.2 Methodology
Page 7 1.4 The Special Characteristics of Kosovo
Page 9 1.5 Operational Overview
Page 9 1.6 Range of tasks executed
Page 10 1.7 Task Allocation & Prioritisation
Section2;
Socio-Economic Impact
Page 11 2.1 Minefield Clearance
Page 20 2.2 Spot Tasks / EOD
Page 22 2.3 School Clearance
Page 23 2.4 House Clearance
Page 25 2.5 Well Clearance
Page 26 2.6 Power-line Clearance
Page 28 2.7 Mine Awareness Education
Page 30 2.8 Socio-economic benefits to DCA / Kosovo .
Section 3:
Page 33 Identifying Conclusions & Recommendations
Tables:
Table No:1 Methodology : Proportions of activities selected for sample analysis.
Table No: 2 Functions performed but not subject to socio-economic analysis.
Table No: 3 Functions performed and subject to socio-economic analysis.
Table No;4 An evaluation of current annual economic benefits relating to direct beneficiaries.
Table No:5 Social impact recorded from communities following DCA minefield clearance.
Table No:6 Land values for land directly cleared and opened by DCA through mine clearance.
Table No 7. Summary table of social and economic impact values identified from clearance
and verification tasks (recorded or imputed as indicated)
Annexes:
Annex A: 20 Case studies
Annex B: 19 Semi-Structured Interview Data Notes.(As compiled by the research team)
Annex C: Examples of questionnaires.(A/B/C)
Acknowledgements.
This report was compiled by Chris Horwood as a consultant for Channel Research Ltd, on behalf of DCA-ACT in
December 2001, following 3 visits to Kosovo between June-November 2001. The design of the analysis, the
conclusions and recommendations are the responsibility of the consultant. The field research, data collection, and
questionnaire surveys were conducted by a team of DCA staff supervised by Pamela Zintatu Ntshanga and including
Valentina Bejtullahu, Ikram Shehu, Uliks Hasanaj and Rudina Qaushi.The consultant would like to thank Pamela and
the team for the dedicated and quality research that was collected for this report. Pamela Zintatu Ntshanga personally
researched and compiled the Case Studies in Annex A.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 3
Executive Summary
The presence of mines and UXO created, in Kosovo, an environment of fear causing economic and social
dislocation and paralysis. In a post conflict environment where people have returned to find homes, factories
and commercial centres destroyed; where agricultural machinery, draught animals and possessions have
been looted or damaged; to high unemployment and a massive dependency on outside assistance, mines
represent one problem among many. However, the clearance of mines /UXO (and the reduction of
psychological fear of their presence) was a vital and non-negotiable precursor to economic and social
recovery in Kosovo. This work needs to be understood as returningthe rural areas to a neutral, non-
threatening state (status quo ante bellum) and does not, in itself, cause economic recovery, but greatly
facilitates it. In December 2001 virtually all international mine action NGOs are leaving Kosovo with the UN
declaring that the mines problem is contained and there is minimal danger to social and economic activities.
This report seeks to assess, measure and visualise the socio-economic impact of DCA mine action in
Kosovo 1999-2001. For DCA Kosovo represents the first experience of direct implementation of mine action
intervention and it did so within the unique context that mine action agencies found themselves in Kosovo.
This study documents the wide range of mine action activities that have successfully taken place in the last
30 months. It identifies the probable, and in some cases definite social and economic impact but is very
aware of the limitations in accuracy that a study of this kind can attain. It is both early to assess post-
clearance land use and difficult to quantify both the social implications of clearance and the secondary,
‘knock-on’ benefits that will accrue. The social and economic findings are therefore conservative and
represent what can be substantiated by research and available data.
• This study shows a varied and complex range of social and economic benefits resulting from a
relatively short intervention by a small team. These illustrate the considerable potential benefits of
targeted mine action programmes.
• It is instructive that despite the relatively high costs of the Kosovo operations and the prescribed
clearance tasks (allocation), the study was able to identify higher economic and social values
accruing from the specific work undertaken.
• Although it is too early to develop a full assessment, the findings indicate that over the years the
land cleared will yield measurable economic benefit to local communities and can be shown to
already provide important economic relief to families.
• In the absence of sufficient data and tools required to conduct a benefit-cost analysis in respect to
clearance tasks, the conservative values established through the research here show a healthy
‘return’ on investment made by DANIDA and DCA. These benefits will extend and multiply into the
future. Both in terms of economic value and social impact the DCA programme has achieved clear
and positive results.
• The study was also able to show beyond doubt that the mine awareness and spot tasks played a
unique psychosocial role in reducing fear and stress significantly among communities while also
assisting in the reduction of threat and actual accident.
While the amount of actual area cleared in minefield clearance tasks by DCA is not large, the areas they
have opened are impressive in size and value. Adapting to the defined nature of minefields (‘known threat’)
in Kosovo, DCA developed a ‘threat removal’ approach which accounts for the smaller quantities of land
cleared in contrast to the high number of mines located and destroyed1.Section 1 of the report explains the
methodology used and explains the operational context and capacity of DCA. Section 2 catalogues the
social and economic findings. Section 3 offers observations and recommendations to DCA concerning
1DCA found 77% of all mines removed by the 11 agencies working under MACC in 2001 while directly clearing 2% of
mined land.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 4
impact assessment issues and how to maximise social and economic understanding in future mine action
initiatives.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 5
Section 1.
1.1 Introduction
This study should not be confused with a program evaluation or operations evaluation report. It is
an impact assessment study of the social and economic impact and benefits of the Dan Church
Aid (DCA) mine action programme in Kosovo between July 1999 and November 2001 inclusive.
DCA is a Danish agency and a member of the ACT-Action for Churches Together- network. The
intervention examined in this study was part of the UN-coordinated mine action response involving
various independent commercial and NGO humanitarian mine action agencies in Kosovo. It was
DCA’s first direct implementation of a mine action program. This study was requested and
implemented to enable DCA to understand the impact of their program in Kosovo, while providing
lessons learnt to inform existing DCA mine action programs, and future initiatives in the sector.
The long term implications of clearance in forests, agricultural land, schools, household, power-lines
conducted by DCA will clearly be greater than those identified in this report. The figures of beneficiaries that
have directly profited in social and economic respects appear to be high, as do the number of activities that
DCA have engaged in. As there are no comparative analyses of other agencies’ work it is impossible for this
study to conclude whether DCA is exceptional or particularly cost-efficient in their work and does not seek to
do so. The economic findings are in themselves self-explanatory. In all communities where DCA worked
people expressed an explicit reduction in stress and physical insecurity. The social benefit contributed by
clearance in this regard cannot be underestimated.
Study’s central objectives:
⇒ Identify all areas of social and economic benefit as a result of the DCA mine action intervention
in Kosovo. Dis-aggregate all measurable impact into quantifiable and non-quantifiable benefits.
⇒ Assess, where possible given limited data, cost-benefit implications (resources/ time/ cost)2 of
specific activities performed to make recommendations for future DCA interventions in terms of
optimising socio-economic impact.
⇒ Identify mechanisms for DCA to prioritise activities and develop indicators for measuring socio-
economic benefits in future interventions. Through this, identify any missed opportunities in
Kosovo.
It must be said that socio-economic evaluation is an imprecise science . This study includes
observations and recommendations on some issues normally examined in a program evaluation,
such as efficiency, effectiveness and relevance; these are included to increase the constructive
use of the report to operator, planners and donors of mine action interventions. However, as an
impact assessment it mainly seeks to go beyond operational issues and specifically investigate the
direct impact on individuals and communities in Kosovo. Different groups benefited in different
ways .Most of the impact can be measured using indicators or proxy values but few areas of direct
2 A Benefit-Cost Ratio calculated using economic analysis conventions or Present Net Values and Internal Rates of
Return was impossible due to the absence of critical data and the relative uncertainty of land use in many areas. (this
is discussed in section 3
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 6
benefit can be quantified in financial values. The range of categories of benefits can be expressed
in the following table:
Groupings Beneficiaries Valuation potential
• Societal benefits (individual/community) measurable / non-quantifiable
• Economic benefits (individual/community) measurable/ quantifiable
• Psychological benefits (individual/community) measurable/ non-quantifiable
• Organisational Benefits (DCA) measurable / non-quantifiable
• Multiplier Benefits /Synergy (MACC / ACT / NGOs 3etc) measurable / non-quantifiable
1.2 Methodology
This study used three different instruments to collect information that informed the analysis.
2) Questionnaires were used to target sample selections of communities and individuals in
the areas of psychosocial benefit measurement (from clearance and mine awareness
locations) as well as capacity building measurement (among DCA staff). Examples of the
questionnaire used are in the Annex C.
3) Semi-structured interviews (SSIs) were used to collect information from all locations where
demining tasks were performed and a sample selection of other clearance activities
including spot tasks, well clearance, house/school clearance and power-line clearance.
Examples of the SSI information with economic data collected can be found in the
annexes. The SSIs were the central tool for identifying measurable economic indicators. In
tasks where the benefits were deemed not to be measurable a low number of SSIs were
conducted.
4) 20 brief case studies of specific clearance tasks are used in this report (annex A) to
visualise and contextualise, with real examples, some of the statistical information
collected. These are deliberately presented in a readable, journalistic style to convey
individual stories of the war experience of families, the intervention of DCA and other
NGOs and the somewhat desperate economic situation in which most of these
beneficiaries remain.
Simple Random Sampling.
Due to the high number of different tasks conducted (over 778),a simple random sampling method
was used to select locations for information-collection through the instruments listed above. The
number of locations for each activity was decided by the consultant and chosen in such a way to
be representative with high levels of confidence. The numbers/proportions are illustrated below.
Simple random sampling is a method that ensures that every member of the statistical population
(in this case clearance and awareness activities/tasks) has an equal chance of being included in
the sample. Once the locations had been selected in this way the specific interviewees or groups
present at SSIs were identified in a non-purposeful random manner.
3 DCA’s intervention, while primarily benefiting communities, also assist other humanitarian agencies to get on with
their work. In this way some of DCA’s work could be said to be a multiplier. This is discussed in the report.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 7
TableNo:1 Methodology : Proportions of activities selected for sample analysis.
Tool for information Beneficiaries from Number of locations Percentage
collection tasks to be identified for info- of total
analysed: collection (number of statistical
questionnaires to be population
filled in brackets) per activity
Psychosocial Questionnaire for Well clearance 22 (2 each) 10%
clearance tasks House clearance 5 (one each) 21%
School clearance 6 (3 children/2 teachers) 21%
Spot tasks 15 (2 each) 9%
Demining tasks 17 (70 total) 100%
Psychosocial Questionnaire for Mine awareness 30 (x 6 each)
mine awareness supporting clearance 42%
Mine awareness alone 10 (x6 each)
Capacity Building. Staff Selection of DCA staff 37 * 19%
Questionnaire
SSIs of demining tasks All demining tasks 17 100%
undertaken
SSIs of different tasks Well clearance 10 N/a
House clearance 6
School clearance 6
Power-line clearance 3
Spot tasks 15
Survey tasks 3
Case study approach Well clearance 2 N/a
House Clearance 2
School clearance 2
Power-line clearance 1
Spot tasks 5
Demining task 8
Totals 20 x case studies
456 x questionnaires
61 x SSIs
* Staff from different positions in DCA.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 8
1.4 The special context of Kosovo
Mine action in Kosovo began mid-1999. Only 2.5 years later, by the end of December 2001,
international agencies, including DCA, and the UN-MACC (Mine Action Co-ordination Centre)
curtailed operations. By Dec 2001 the population of the Province was considered to face only
minimal threat, no worse than other European states that continue to deal with residual risk from
the presence of mines and UXO from WW2. The identified minefields had been cleared, all
affected communities had received mine awareness education and the number of monthly
casualties from mines or UXO had fallen to between only 1 or 2 people from a population of over 2
million. In the last decade of humanitarian mine action intervention the successful experience of
Kosovo is exceptional and its context very particular.
Why Kosovo was exceptional needs to be highlighted to set this report in perspective as it has an
impact on the socio-economic outcomes of the programme. Also as a measure of how comparable
the Kosovo experience is with other countries the following points should be understood.
• The UN had almost complete authority in the Province and required no negotiations or
clearance from local authorities to conduct mine clearance. In many countries institutional and
bureaucratic barriers associated with national governments severely delay programmes. DCA
,working under the auspices of the UN-MACC therefore also enjoyed freedom of movement
and operational deployment in the West of Kosovo.
• The landmine and UXO problem in Kosovo was the result of a short ground-war and brief and
defined bombing campaign. Kosovo did not have the entrenched problem of mines and UXO
resulting from years or decades of civil (and/or international) conflict so widely seen in other
mine-affected countries .
• The predominant areas of risk from mines where widely known due to the proximity of civilian
population during the civil conflict and the provision of reliable minefield maps recorded by and
handed over from the Yugoslavian (VJ) army as part of the peace agreements4. Those mines
placed by the opposing army, the KLA, were reported as mainly having been cleared by the
KLA in mid-1999 as part of their side of the agreements with KFOR. The NATO UXO (CBUs)
were visible in certain cases but locating ‘footprints’ of CBUs was assisted by released flight
mission records. In comparison with other mine affected countries this was a unique level of
reliable intelligence to facilitate and guide the clearance programme.
• The political interest and visibility of Kosovo after the NATO interventions, the withdrawal of the
Serbian army and the subsequent UN Security Council Resolution (1244), resulted in a
massive and immediate release of donor funding for reconstruction and rehabilitation, including
humanitarian mine action. This was exceptional for such a small territory, with a relatively small
population (2 mil) without high accident and death rates from mine and UXO. Kosovo probably
had the highest concentration of mine action agencies (Commercial and NGOs) in the world
during 2000-2001.
4 640 VJ recorded minefield maps were used by UNMACC as the basis for their clearance operations.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 9
• From the outset the UNMACC developed a tight control of mine action activities and adhered
to a systematic clearance plan with a defined time-frame and objectives. This too was
exceptional in comparison with other countries who may operate with weaker leadership and
certainly in more problematic institutional and geo-political contexts.
Although DCA had supported and funded other mine action initiatives (with other NGO) in other
countries, Kosovo was it’s first attempt at direct implementation of humanitarian mine action.
1.5 Operational Overview
DCA operated in Kosovo with teams of manual deminers, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
team, a survey and mapping team, teams of medics and a mine awareness team. These
operational elements were supported by a structure that included communications, administration,
finances, logistics, medical co-ordination, quality assurance (QA) functions as well as
management. The country office, based out of Gjakova in the west of Kosovo, was in turn
supported by the DCA HQ in Copenhagen. Staffing levels changed little during the 2 years but the
approximate number of local staff was 190 (130 EOD/Demining staff) and 7 international staff (4 for
EOD/Demining supervision) .
1.6 Range of tasks executed
DCA performed a wide range of clearance and mine action tasks during the period. Other
important activities relate to management, training and information-gathering functions and are not
relevant to the socio-economic study. These are briefly listed below as an illustration of activities
that were funded from the same overall budget and which were essential functions supporting and
facilitating those tasks that will be subject to socio-economic analysis.
Table No: 2 Functions performed but not subject to socio-economic analysis.
Activity/Function Duration
Staff training: mine clearance, Initially July 1999 and on-going.
survey, EOD
Medical training for medical team, Initial training July-Dec 99 and on-going
Emergency evacuation systems, Throughout program
mine-victim support
Survey and Info-collection Throughout program
Communications network Throughout program
Liaison with Throughout program
UNMACC/KFOR/ACT/NGOs
Project management, Throughout program
administration, HR, finance,
Logistics and re-supply etc
Donor and HQ monitoring and Throughout program
reporting
This report seeks to assess, measure and visualise the socio-economic impact of the DCA’s
intervention in Kosovo in the numerous activities represented in the following table. (For clarity and
identification of benefits, the study has chosen to dis-aggregate activities into the selected
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 10
categories below, which do not necessarily conform to categories used by DCA or MACC. They do
however include all activities recorded by DCA during the period.)
Table No: 3 Functions performed and subject to socio-economic analysis.
Activities Number of tasks Sector benefit
Well clearance 248 Water and sanitation / health / psychological
House clearance 24 Settlement / refugee return / psychological
Power-line clearance 15 Electricity supply
School clearance 29 Educational / psychological
Designated minefields 48 Agriculture / livestock / fuel
Area access / touristic / border crossing / hunting
Spot tasks / EOD 1725 Residential / agricultural / water /
livestock/business
Mine Awareness 242 tasks in 95 Individual/community/psychological
villages
Capacity building All staff (190) Human capital (indiv / comm / institutional)
Total tasks: 778 Based on above information from DCA internal records
Due to the high number of activities performed by DCA a sample selection (randomly identified)
from each category was used for the study. Only in the case of demining were all tasks (48 tasks)
examined .The proportions that these samples represent are illustrated in Table No:1.
1.7 Task allocation and prioritisation.
Allocation:
Unlike many UN mine action co-ordinating authorities, the Kosovo MACC, had the authority, will
and capacity to act as the focal point for task allocation. Being in possession of the minefields
reports from the Yugoslavian army, the NATO bombing records and the results of Halo Trust’s
rapid province-wide survey, the MACC considered itself to have a firm grasp of the entire mines
and UXO situation in Kosovo6. This was a unique situation for any MACC and allowed them to
divide the tasks and allocate them to NGOs and commercial agencies according to location and
technologies or demining systems available (different mechanical devices, dogs and manual
teams). In addition to this the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) was
deployed at the start of the program and a standardised system of data management was used by
all NGOs and commercial agencies working under the UNMACC’s co-ordination.
DCA fully participated in the co-ordinated allocation of tasks and the standardised reporting
structure. Most of the 48 minefields cleared by DCA were initially generated from intelligence
5 According to the EOD staff this total is lower than actual work completed. The study could only find records of this
total and will therefore use this figure throughout the report, although the implications are that many of the benefits can
not be reflected in the extrapolated results
6 This may be shown to be over-optimistic; some critics of the MACCs reliance on VJ maps suggest there are more
mines and many more UXO that have not been documented or cleared before the UN/mine action agency departure of
December 2001. Certainly, this study found many villagers who believe the problem was not completely addressed.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 11
provided by MACC and their tasking of DCA to take responsibility for the clearance. DCA also used
survey teams and designated information officers to listen to locals and reconnaissance
‘dangerous areas’ and find out if there were additional unrecorded areas of threat . The result was
therefore a negotiated agreement between DCA and MACC concerning the final location and size
of the clearance tasks.7 MACC only exerted tight control of mine action from the start of 2000. For
the previous 6 months various agencies were arriving, setting up, training their staff and competing
with each other to find demining projects.
In the case of school clearance, house clearance, well clearance, and the many spot tasks DCA
operated in support of NGOs such as members of the ACT network (Norwegian Church Aid) and
Save The Children, as well as directly responding to emergency requests by individuals, school
directors, village leaders and KFOR. Although MACC received reports from DCA concerning the
above tasks (when items were found) they did not assign or allocate these tasks to DCA. MACC
did, however, broker the arrangement between DCA and the Danish power company, to check the
15 power stations prior to their repair and rehabilitation.
DCA Mine awareness tasking was co-ordinated by MACC after the start of 2000. Different
agencies were responsible for particular areas to avoid competition and duplication. Regular (two-
weekly) meetings ensured that agencies were targeting high and medium risk villages with mine
awareness and that they followed the MACC-developed policy called MAST (Mine Awareness
Support Teams). Specific task allocation and activities were therefore organised by DCA staff
internally and not subject to MACC direction.
Prioritisation:
The issues of prioritisation is of great significance to socio-economic and cost-benefit analysis. This
will be discussed in section 3 . Concerning mine clearance tasks, for DCA in Kosovo, it appears
that there was little sense of prioritisation based on socio-economic assessment by MACC or DCA.
For MACC the special conditions of Kosovo meant that they could, by 2000 set a 2 year time
period to clear all known minefields and so the issue of prioritisation was somewhat academic as
all areas would be cleared in 24 months anyway8. MACC claim to have used IMSMA to prioritise
tasking and to have paid special attention to areas where accidents were occurring, however what
prioritisation that did exist appears to have been done in broad stocks and not based on more
detailed socio-economic criteria. In terms of lessons learnt, DCA will probably not be able to
operate in the same manner in other affected-countries, and neither would it be desirable. This is
mentioned in the recommendations in section 3..
Section 2 Socio-economic impact.
As the highest investment in time and resources, minefield clearance will be examined initially
followed by the other activities as divided by category.
7 The issue of task allocation, prioritisation and local information have important implications for DCA programmes in
other countries. See section 3 for further discussion and recommendations.
8 It was thought that the work would take 5 years initially. Only in 2000 did MACC revise its schedule to complete
clearance by the end of 2001.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 12
2.1 Mine Clearance tasks:
As indicated in the methodology all demining tasks were examined for this study.DCA demining
teams completed 48 demining tasks between mid-1999 and September 2001. Some of these
minefields were close together or adjacent and the area cleared benefited the same local
population, therefore for the socio-economical analysis the 48 sites have been condensed into 17
separate areas. In every area investigations were conducted through questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews(in Annex B) and in almost half of the areas individual case studies were
developed.(see annex A)
DCA predominantly worked on allocated minefields in the western section of Kosovo in 2
municipalities (Gjakova and Decani). They also worked in 2 areas of the northern section of
Kosovo (Vushtri).The western area of Kosovo is characterised by a rural population dependent on
dairy farming, limited agriculture and forest products. The minefields were on fields on the flat-land
and slopes rising into the mountain range that form the border between Kosovo and Albania. The
forest areas where mines were cleared were in the mountains that included woodland, with grazing
areas between the trees, and dense forest areas.
Typical profile of rural families in western Kosovo.
In the villages of western Kosovo families arein communities that depend essentially on
subsistence farming and forest foraging. Families frequently have gardens for vegetables and
limited quantities of cash crops, and they normally own one or two cows for milk, cheese and
yoghurt production. If they own agricultural land they may cultivate corn, beans and wheat and
possibly potatoes, all primarily for their family consumption and limited amounts for sale at the town
markets. A family size is, on average, 10 people.
Most of the population in these areas have access to the forests (legally or illegally) from where
they collect firewood for use and sale. They also forage mushrooms, chestnuts and berries for
consumption and sale. Hunting in the forests is more of a tradition and pass-time than a significant
source of sustenance or economic value. Communities at the foot of the mountains normally have
more cattle and sheep due to plentiful grazing pastures in spring and summer. Those closer to
forests may gain the bulk of their income from fire-wood collection and not from farming. Collection
of hay is vital to these dairy farmers to maintain their livestock during the winter, as well as for sale
in the low-lands. An important addition to most household economies is income from at least one
member of the family who may be working, typically, in France, Germany, Switzerland or Belgium.
Some families also receive cash income from a family member working for wages in the nearby
town or in construction.
From an analytical perspective the household economies are relatively complex with food
production and income generation deriving from multiple sources which were impacted by mines
and UXO to varying degrees. Seasonal changes in food production and emphasis on particular
activities at different times also complicated a full grasp of the impact of mines on communities and
their dependency on alternative options for survival. Finally, in addition to the above, throughout
the last 2 years many communities and families have been directly supported by the international
community with food, fuel, construction and therefore current and recent food production activities
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 13
are not entirely representative of ‘normal’ conditions. It should be noted that despite successful
clearance of mines in some areas, the population has not returned to ‘normal’ life in terms of
livelihoods or communal life.
Returning mine-free land / Creating access:
A total of 32 hectares (320,915 m2) were directly cleared by DCA using manual clearance teams,
sometimes supported by dog search teams and occasionally a flail team. The clearance of these
32 hectares facilitated the opening up of a further 842 – 892 hectares that were previously
inaccessible due to the mined areas. This represents approximately 8.5 Km2 land opened by
clearance. While recognising the importance of the large areas opened up by the clearance
operations it was beyond the scope and resources of this study to evaluate the social and
economic benefits of these larger areas.
Approximately 12.8% of all clearance took place on purely agricultural land, 54.4% in forest and
32.8% on forested areas that also had grazing and agricultural land.
Beneficiaries: Direct & Indirect
For this study direct beneficiaries are those who directly own and use the land cleared by DCA
teams and accurately represent a small number of families/people.
Indirect beneficiaries are those who do not own the land cleared but may use it or have in some
way directly benefited from the clearance. The study has tried to be conservative rather than
exaggerate or stretch the notion of indirect benefits, but definitely has to include these as the
clearance has yielded social and economic benefits to a wider group of people. In some cases
people have benefited from two different clearance tasks and therefore have been included twice
in the calculations. These figures can only be used as a guide as precision is impossible.
The total number of direct beneficiaries from mine clearance tasks alone were found to be 13,109
people in 17 geographical areas. The total number of indirect beneficiaries are between 35,000-
40,000 people. Using the municipality’s population figures for the specific villages where DCA
worked, the statistics suggest that the direct beneficiaries represent over 42% of the respective
village populations. Concerning indirect beneficiaries the statistics are less accurate due to certain
imputed values used in the absence of hard data. Nevertheless it appears that in the specific areas
worked DCA’s interventions has indirectly benefited over 75% of the village population on
average. These are very high proportions that should be understood in the light of the fact that
many of the villages are small and the minefields affected most of the families. In terms of the
social and economic impact, DCA’s intervention was very high in such cases.9 In situations where
the area cleared was close to larger settlements the percentage/proportion of the population that
benefited either directly or indirectly would be far lower.10
9 For example Clearance at Koshares; Case study 12, or Zhub SSI number 14 in the annexes
10 For example Irzniq clearance , SSI number 5 in annexes.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 14
Economic values / Economic Impact of mine clearance tasks:
The presentation of economic values in this study is attempted for direct beneficiaries only. It has
been calculated through direct interviews with beneficiary families who specifically identify the
economic benefits they gain from using the land cleared. This section seeks to isolate the
economic benefits only. The social benefits are addressed in another section.
Clearly the indirect beneficiaries who are considerable in number also have economic benefits from
the cleared land but there has been no attempt to calculate or impute these values. If attempted it
would involve exhaustive research and would result in highly speculative data of dubious reliability.
The actual economic benefit to the larger group of indirect beneficiaries, since clearance, should be
assumed to be far higher than those for the direct beneficiaries but for the above reasons cannot
be quantified. In the case of direct and indirect beneficiaries the economic benefits that
derive from clearance are currently being realised and, of course, will be repeated in
successive years. The long term economic value of the cleared areas can therefore be
multiplied by whatever factor of years and expected increase in use or productivity that the
reader chooses as a reasonable.11
The total value of economic /food production activities identified in favour of direct beneficiaries in
the 17 areas of clearance is 2,045,986 DM ($ 929,993 USD at exchange rate of 2.2 DM=$1.00).
This finding, illustrated in the table (4) and substantiated in the SSI data sheets in annex B, should
be read with the accompanying explanation points below.
Table No;4 An evaluation of current annual economic benefits relating to direct beneficiaries.
No Cleared areas (grouped Direct Food production / economic activities resumed value in DM
by area from 48 Beneficiaries in areas cleared by DCA teams (annual)
minefields cleared))
1 Pepsh 30 Hay, meat, dairy products 86523
2 Batusha 20 Hay, dairy products, corn, bean 16491
3 Pozhare 52 Hay, corn, wheat, dairy products, meat 40237
4 Pobergje 80 Forest products, dairy products 34899
5 Koshare 880 Chestnuts and wood production 52000
6 Irzniq 77 Dairy products 15860
7 Qafa e Prushit 80 Dairy products, meat 29670
8 Zhub 180 Forestry products, dairy products, meat 31711
9 Gergoc 30 Dairy products, meat 61092
10 Donja Dubnica 57 Corn, dairy production, meat 26832
11 Dubovc 186 Forest products, hay, bean, onion, dairy 7566
12 Rrasa e Koshares 82 Forest products, dairy products, meat 304786
13 Lloqan 9 Hay, dairy products 5634
14 Lupq 16 Forest products 3600
15 Rakoc 30 Dairy products 19775
16 Zhare 11000 Forestry products, dairy products 1204310
17 Jasiq 300 Wood collection 105000
Total 13109 2,045,986
11Conventional economic analysis normally chose the horizon of 10 years (with discounted values)to calculate the net
present value of future benefits.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 15
Explanation points:
Dairy products: Includes milk, yoghurt, cheese valued at market prices.
Forest Products: Include chestnuts, blueberries, wood collection
Prices: Prices were obtained from villagers themselves, cross checked across all
villages and with market values in urban centres. Seasonal adjustments have been accounted for.
Delayed use of land: For various reasons in a number of areas the villagers do not yet use the
land cleared. This is mainly for seasonal, rehabilitation and economic reasons. In such cases (such
as Rrasa e Koshare12, Pepsh and Irzniq) the economic value of recent clearance will be far greater
in future years. This cannot be evaluated at this stage but will represent a larger amount in
comparison to current valuations.
Partial Information: In some cases there was partial information and the evaluators had to
make conservative estimates. On the few occasions this occurred it is justified in the SSI
documentation.
Hidden economic benefits: There are secondary economic benefits that the study was not able to
calculate that directly relate to clearance. For example, where clearance allowed power lines to
reach communities, or water pipes or access to roads to other villages and markets. For details of
these, which clearly have social as well as economic implications, the reader is directed to the SSIs
in Annex B.
Informal economy: In cases where the population live close to government forestry land an active
‘black market’ of illegal logging and wood collecting was evident. In such cases (e.g. Jasiq)
villagers were reluctant to admit to full earnings from these activities and the study assumes the
figure used is conservative.
The limitations of obtaining full and accurate valuations are obvious from the reading of the
above caveats / explanation points. The above calculations are identified economic values
but are the minimal quantified in a complex scenario of shifting variables. The total benefits
over time are considerably higher but currently non-measurable.
Costs associated with alternative strategies of survival:
During the social and economic displacement caused by the war and minefields, families had to
develop coping strategies and alternative approaches for survival. Many of these activities had a
cost. Whether it was the purchase of firewood (previously collected themselves), or purchase of
hay for fodder (previously cut and stored themselves) they have been spending cash in the last 2.5
years. The SSIs document some of the costs associated with alternative activities and they can be
seen to be significant. It should be noted that for the direct beneficiaries concerned, the return to
their land not only means a resumption of productive economic activity, but also that these
associated costs are saved.
12 For example in Rrasa e Koshares the study identified a further 12 people who intend to buy 70 sheep and 10 cattle
for the area in 2002. Meanwhile a saw mill factory in Decani town intends to use wood from the opened are (through
DCA mine clearance) in 2002 employing a further 100 people and realising a value of approximately 1 million DM.
This amount alone, if included, would increase the current evaluation by 50%.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 16
Future increased economic benefits:
For many communities the presence of mines and the fear of abandoned weapons in and around
their homes and land was vividly reinforced by accidents sustained in the initial weeks following the
end of the war by those returning to their villages. The impact of this can be seen in various case
studies in Annex A. With the presence of the international aid community assisting many families to
survive, and the deep suspicion of the presence of mines, many communities have been very slow
to resume economic activities. The case of the Gerovija saw mill company in Rrasha e Koshares in
the previous footnote also illustrates the significant potential of future economic earnings facilitated
by mine clearance. (see SSI number 18 )
The local authorities13 indicate that in 2001 there has been a 15% increase in food production as
people return to cultivate their fields. This is an indication of things returning to normal as well as
necessity caused by the departure of international aid. The authorities fully expect the 2002
production levels to be higher. The economic benefit of land cleared by clearance will therefore
increase proportionally to the resumption of farming and food production activities. DCA should
assume that the final value of their clearance in these 17 areas will be significantly higher than
current evaluations suggest. In many cases this study has been conducted too early to yield most
accurate economic values.
Putting the mines problem in context:
‘The presence of mines and UXO create an environment of fear: economic and social dislocation
and paralysis. In a post conflict environment where people have returned to find homes, factories
and commercial centres destroyed; where agricultural machinery, draught animals and
possessions have been looted or damaged; to high unemployment and a massive dependency on
outside assistance, mines represent one problem among many. The clearance of mines /UXO and
the reduction of psychological fear of their presence was a vital and non-negotiable precursor to
economic and social recovery in Kosovo. This work needs to be understood in the context of a
return, inrural areas, to a neutral, non-threatening state (status quo ante bellum). It does not, in itself,
cause economic recovery. 14’
Considering the density of mines/UXO in populated rural areas, the fact that rural Kosova
populations have had alternative means of survival has resulted in far fewer accidents and deaths
than seen in similar mine-infested countries, where people are forced to live and work in mined
areas, due to lack of options.
Social Impact of minefield clearance.
The most important indicators of the social impact of minefield clearance are the statements of
villagers themselves concerning change in social activity and levels of stress since clearance has
occurred. In addition to the various social and cultural benefits that can be recorded factually in the
13Municipality of Gjakova.
14It may be noted that despite the optimistic claims of UNMACC many rural communities still feel the clearance work is
incomplete and do not live with the confidence that there is no threat.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 17
Semi-Structured Interviews (Annex B) and through the Case Studies (Annex A), this study used
psychosocial questionnaires to record people's personal perceptions of their level of stress/fear in
relation to mine and UXO in their environment.15
The following table (No: 5) indicates the main recorded social benefit indicators relating to the
various clearance tasks in the 17 areas of mine clearance operation. All communities express an
explicit reduction in stress and physical insecurity. The social benefit contributed by clearance in
this regard cannot be underestimated. The reduction of stress is the major non-economic benefit to
these communities and a direct result of the clearance tasks. The case studies of these demining
tasks illustrate vividly the proximity of mines and the fear they caused communities.
Table No:5 Social impact recorded from communities following DCA minefield clearance.
No Cleared areas Direct and approx (non-economic) Social benefit indicated by communities16
(grouped by area indirect
from 48 minefields beneficiaries
cleared)) combined
1 Pepsh 120 Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement
2 Batusha 26 • Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement
• Clearance facilitated the laying of water pipeline into the village
3 Pozhare 62 • Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement
• (esp. recreation for children)
4 Pobergje 120 • Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement
• (esp. recreation for children)
5 Koshare 1680 • Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement.
• Access to graveyard and forest recreational areas
• Access to Albania through road clearance included in task
6 Irzniq 77 • Express reduction of stress, physical stress / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement
• (esp. transit for livestock and access for children to school)
7 Qafa e Prushit 21980 • Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement.
• Access into Kosovo (hospitals) for Albanians and commerce from
Kosovo to Albania (hence high indirect beneficiaries)
8 Zhub 530 • Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement
• Access to most important border crossing between Kosovo and
Albania.
• Clearance facilitated establishment of power-line for electricity to 4
villages
9 Gergoc 30 Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement
10 Donja Dubnica 102 Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement
11 Dubovc 206 • Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement
• Use of central well situated in the minefield
12 Rrasa 132 • Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
Koshares improvement, increased freedom of movement
• (esp.use of mountain summer-season living / grazing areas)
13 Lloqan 795 Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
15Examples of the Psychosocial questionnaires used can be seen in Annex C(1) and C(2).
16The SSI data notes in Annex B contain more detail of these indicators for each location. The results here also
capture the findings from the questionnaire survey conducted in each site, but not included in the annexes.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 18
improvement, increased freedom of movement
14 Lupq 43 Express some reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement but still express
doubts and fear of mines
15 Rakoc 1630 • Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement
• (esp as area is used extensively as a recreational area on weekends
and summer : hence the high number of indirect beneficiaries)
16 Zhare 11000 • Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement
• (extensively used for recreation/picnics)
17 Jasiq 5300 • Express reduction of stress, physical safety / psychological
improvement, increased freedom of movement
• (especially into forest areas attracting many outsiders)
Total 43,833
Questionnaire findings in demined areas:
Of the 386 questionnaires completed, 70 of the interviews took place in the 17 demined areas.17
Those interviewed were selected randomly and included men, women and children. The results of
selected questions below can only be presented as percentages and are responses to statements
or multiple option answers.
⇒ 97% of those interviewed said that mines were a main fear after the war.
⇒ 74% expressed fear that mines were in their own property (home/garden/land).
⇒ 91% expressed fear of physical injury to themselves and their immediate family.
⇒ 78% no longer have these fears following clearance in their areas.
⇒ 10% said they felt that the clearance was incomplete and still had residual fears.
⇒ 29% of those interviewed claimed to have seen evidence of mines and UXO in their areas
following clearance.(but not in the cleared areas).
⇒ 54% felt that they did not have complete confidence that there is now no danger (in Kosovo
generally)
⇒ 93% said they have less stress related to mines following clearance
⇒ 81% said their quality of life was improved following clearance.
⇒ 81% identify economic, social and access/movement benefits (all three) due to clearance.
These results reveal a certain contradiction between a sense of greatly increased personal security
in their immediate environment and a more generalised suspicion and doubt that the problem has
been entirely dealt with. Some of these doubts are based on direct sighting of mine/UXO after
clearance. MACC has been trying to address the widespread residual fear of mines that persists in
Kosovo at the end of their clearance operations in the Province: this issue and its relevance to
DCA is discussed in section 3 but the same results were found from all questionnaires conducted.
The social, and psychosocial benefits of clearance are clearly felt by those interviewed for this
study. These indicators illustrate, and to some degree measure, the benefits but it is impossible to
quantify or give value to these.
17Due to the limitation of the research team and the additional research burdens of the SSIs and case studies this
sample of the total beneficiary population is recognised to be low.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 19
Land Values
A final indicator of value and potential value is included here as an additional illustration of
economic benefit. The following table of land values of land cleared and opened by DCA clearance
work is presented as additional information but has not been included in any total summary
valuation of the benefits of the clearance work. It may be assumed that if clearance did not take
place the loss to society is not only the economic/food production activities that are performed on
the land but the actual value of the land itself in any commercial sense (rent / sale/ inheritance).
The Director of Agriculture in Gjakove municipality provided the study with land values in the
western section of Kosovo:
5 DM per m2 for poorer quality agricultural land without irrigation.
7.5 DM per m2 for young forest land, with grazing pastures but limited agricultural land
without irrigation.
10 DM per m2 for good forest land, with large grazing areas, good soil for cultivation
with/without irrigation
15 DM per m2 for good, flat quality agricultural land with irrigation.
Based of these estimations the research teams calculate the following values for the relevant land
cleared.18
Table No:6 Land values for land directly cleared and opened by DCA through mine clearance.
Location Sq metres Value of cleared area Type of cleared Sq metre Value of
cleared land opened opened area
Pepsh 8,568m2 128,520DM Agricultural 75,000m2 1,125,000DM
Batusha 5,780m2 86,700DM Agricultural 15,400m2 23,100DM
Pozhare 11,441m2 171,615DM Agricultural 630,250m2 9,453,750DM
Pobergje 961m2 9,610DM Forest 40,500m2 405,000DM
Koshare 13,553m2 135,530DM Forest 800,000m2 8,000,000DM
Irzniq 15,000m2 225,000DM Agricultural 213,000m2 3,195,000DM
Qafa e Prushit 70,375m2 492,625DM Forest 110,375m2 772,625DM
Zhub 20,698m2 206,980DM Forest 2,000,000m2 20,000,000DM
Gergoc 4,180m2 41,800DM Forest 1-2,000,000m2 10-
20,000,000DM
Donja Dubnica 37,862m2 28,396DM Agricultural and 20,000m2 150,000DM
forest
Dubovc 129,492m2 1,294,920DM Agricultural and 2,000,000m2 15,000,000DM
forest
Rrasa Koshare, 56,486m2 395,402DM Forest unspecfd-huge N/a
Merqaj, Guri i Gate area
Lloqan 227m2 3,405DM Agricultural 10,000m2 150,000DM
Lupq 455m2 4,550DM Forest 10,000m2 100,000DM
Rakoc 1,209m2 18,135DM Forest 0 0
Zhare 4,861m2 7,2915DM Forest 1,000,000m2 1,500,00,00DM
Jasiq 1,933m2 13,531DM Forest 0 0
Total 383,081 m2 3,329,634 DM c.8,924,525 c.93,374,475
m2 DM
18These calculations are presented only for minefield clearance tasks and have not been made for other clearances
activities that opened or cleared land.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 20
2.2 Spot tasks/ EOD
For this report the term ‘spot tasks’ relates to small tasks concerning individual mines, UXO,
emergency call out work and search activities to verify suspicious areas whether they be houses or
areas of land. According to records 172 tasks were completed by the EOD (Explosive Ordnance
Disposal) team during the period under study. For the sake of this socio-economic analysis those
tasks that specifically cleared schools, wells, houses and wells have been categorised separately
but in many cases were conducted by the EOD /Spot task team
The EOD/Spot Task team essentially consisted of 4 trained technicians and one EOD
international. They were accompanied by a medic from the demining structure of DCA and
sometimes assisted by demining staff on certain tasks. Therefore the core team was 5 with
variable numbers of additional staff (average 8 members).
The study visited 15 (9%) randomly selected spot task areas to interview people through the SSIs
as well as the questionnaire process (35 interviewed). Additionally, 5 case studies were developed
from different spot task areas.
The finding from these investigations illustrate that for a relatively low level of input in terms of
hours worked and numbers of staff the EOD team were able to address high numbers of problems
and benefit a large number of people. The nature of the tasks they addressed, their mobility and
size obviously contributed to this.
Findings from the SSI Data notes:
From the 15 randomly selected spot tasks investigated the following finding can be quantified:
!" average tasks took the EOD team 4.8 hours to complete.
On
!" average they located and removed/destroyed 1.8 explosive items per task.
On
!" average the removal of these items opened up an area of 2466m2 (0.25 hectares)
On
!"There were on average 169.4 direct beneficiaries from each task performed.(this high figure
results from 2 schools and one graveyard access being included, by random chance, in the sample. Without these
tasks included the average direct beneficiaries per task were 8 people)
!"There were on average 672 indirect beneficiaries from each task performed.(the same applies
for the indirect beneficiaries; with out the 3 high beneficiaries tasks the average indirect beneficiary number is
7.However, the rules of random sampling demand that the higher figures be used)
!"Only 2 (13.3%) of the SSI samples reveal that a direct economic benefit resulted from the spot
task. Normally the benefits are overwhelmingly social and benefit one or two families.
Extrapolations from sample SSI data notes:19
The records for spot task clearance maintained by DCA are poor 20and the only mechanism
available to capture the overall potential gain of spot task/EOD as part of DCA’s mine action
19 When statistics are quoted from extrapolations caution is required in addition to qualification.
20 The issue of poor records or partial information and its relevance to future DCA programmes is discussed in section
3
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 21
intervention is extrapolation. If the above finding are extrapolated to cover the 172 tasks recorded it
may be said that through the spot task/EOD activities between July 1999-December 2001:
• Approximately 826 hours were directly spent locating, disarming or destroying items
found on spot tasks(not including transport time and other organisational activities)
• Approximately 424,152m2 (42 hectares) were opened up for access as a direct result of
spot tasks.
• Approximately 29,000 people directly benefited in some way from the spot task while a
further 115,500 people indirectly benefited from spot tasks.
• Approximately 302 items were located, removed/destroyed during these tasks.
The above statistics suggest that spot task/EOD teams can be extremely time and impact-efficient.
The social impact of spot tasks is high and very positive. It should be noted that many of those who
benefit socially (and especially psychosocially) from spot tasks may also have been assisted by
minefield clearance tasks by DCA (or other agencies). Also it is significant that the majority of
beneficiaries did not express economic benefit from spot task clearance but instead expressed
high levels of social / psychosocial benefits only. The economic benefits are more clearly identified
in mine clearance tasks.
Clearly the actual removal of these items have reduced the threat for many communities and has
to be seen as part of the contribution of reduced accident and death rates in Kosovo during the
period.
The case studies relating to spot task/EOD clearance illustrate the importance to individuals and
families of these activities. The impact of having individual unexploded items laying in communal
areas cannot be underestimated in terms of their ability to terrorise and severely limit normal social
and economic activities.
Questionnaire results for Spot tasks:
Of the 456 questionnaires completed, 35 of the interviews took place in the spot task areas.21
Those interviewed were selected randomly and included men, women and children. There was
almost no variation in the results of the questionnaires between the different categories of tasks.
The results of selected questions below can only be presented as percentages and are responses
to statements or multiple option answers.
⇒ 100% of those interviewed said that mines were a main fear after the war.
⇒ 46% expressed fear that mines were in their own property (home/garden/land).
⇒ 83% expressed fear of physical injury to themselves and their immediate family.
⇒ 74% no longer have these fears following clearance in their areas.
⇒ 2.8% said they felt that the clearance was incomplete and still had residual fears.
⇒ 14% of those interviewed claimed to have seen evidence of mines and UXO in their areas
following clearance.(but not in the cleared areas)
21This sample is recognised to be low and is due to the limitation of the research team and the additional research
burdens of the SSIs and case studies.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 22
⇒ 91% felt that they did not have complete confidence that there is now no danger (in Kosovo
generally)
⇒ 97% said they have less stress related to mines following clearance
⇒ 100% said their quality of life was improved following clearance.
⇒ 32% identify economic, social and access/movement benefits (all three) due to clearance.
⇒ 63% identify social benefits following clearance.
The social, and psychosocial benefits of clearance are clearly felt by those interviewed for this
study. Clearly these indicator illustrate and to some degree measure the benefits but it is
impossible to quantify or give value to these.
2.3 School Clearance
One of the initial priorities for MACC and the international aid agencies in Kosovo in 1999 was the
rehabilitation of education facilities. Because schools were frequently used by the Serbian forces
during the war they needed verification and clearance by mine clearance/EOD teams prior to
rehabilitation and/or use. DCA contributed to this work in collaboration with Save The Children
(NGO) and the municipality education authorities using demining teams and smaller survey and
search (EOD) teams. In most cases mines or UXO were not found but verification was essential for
teachers, directors, pupil and parents to feel safe before normal school activities resumed. In most
cases schools are also used for community meetings and adult training and therefore serve an
important function within communities. The social importance of school clearance was considered
vital in the initial months of international humanitarian intervention. Clearly education is a key social
provision and service with direct economic implications for any society.
From a humanitarian mine action perspective, schools benefit a large number of children and
adults and offer a high level of social impact as the following findings illustrate. When set against
numbers of potential beneficiaries assisted, the clearance of schools is a very effective and
efficient use of resources. DCA have recorded 29 tasks that were directly aimed at verification and
clearance of school buildings and grounds. From these 6 schools were randomly selected for SSI
investigation representing 21% of those covered.22 A further 2 schools have been subject to Case
studies (Case Studies 11 &16) and a limited number of questionnaire interviews took place in
cleared schools.
Findings from the School SSI Data notes:
!"On average teams spent 213 hours to check and clear school buildings and grounds.(the normal
length of time was far smaller (5 hours), but the sample included one task that took 600 hours and therefore raise
all the averages)
!" average 10,700 m2 (1.7 hectare)of land, per school, was opened and rendered safe by
On
school clearance.
!"Direct beneficiaries from school clearance were on average 530 people (children, teachers
etc)
22Not including other rural schools address as spot tasks. For reasons of DCA’s internal reporting categorisation and
the design of this study some of the schools checked and cleared by Spot tasks are not included in this total of 29
schools.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 23
!"Indirect beneficiaries (other adults, community) were on average 2673 people per task.
17
!" explosive items were located, per school, on average.23
Extrapolating SSI findings:
In so far that extrapolations from the random sampling help visualise the overall scenario, the
following totals can be developed using the averages developed from the samples above. Due to
the reason indicated in the footnote these totals are probably high in relation to the number of
hours worked and number of items located, but not in relation to land opened and beneficiaries.
In respect to the 29 schools:
• Approximately 6177 hours were used to perform school clearance and verification (see
caveat concerning this).
• Approximately 310,300m2 (31 hectares) of land opened up for access and use as well as
the buildings.
• Approximately 15,300 direct beneficiaries and 77,500 indirect beneficiaries are calculated
for these tasks.
• 493 explosive items located (and destroyed) in the 29 tasks. (see caveat and footnote)
Questionnaire results for School clearance:
Of the 456 questionnaires completed, 30 of the interviews took place in the school clearance
areas.24 Those interviewed were selected randomly and included men, women and children. The
results of selected questions below can only be presented as percentages and are responses to
statements or multiple option answers.
⇒ 100% of those interviewed said that mines were a main fear after the war.
⇒ 80% expressed fear that mines were in their own property (home/garden/land).
⇒ 63% expressed fear of physical injury to themselves and their immediate family.
⇒ 100% no longer have these fears following clearance in their areas.
⇒ 3.3% of those interviewed claimed to have seen evidence of mines and UXO in their areas
following clearance.(but not in the cleared areas).
⇒ 73% felt that they did not have complete confidence that there is now no danger (in Kosovo
generally)
⇒ 100% said they have less stress related to mines following clearance
⇒ 100% said their quality of life was improved following clearance.
⇒ 33.3% identify economic, social and access/movement benefits (all three) due to clearance.
⇒ 83% identify social benefits following clearance.
The social, and psychosocial benefits of clearance are clearly felt by those interviewed for this
study. These indicators illustrate, and to some degree measure the benefits but it is impossible to
quantify or give value to these measurements.
23 It was rare to find items and in many cases none were found. Using averages can give distort impressions as they
do here in respect to hours worked and items found.
24 This sample is recognised to be low and is due to the limitation of the research team and the additional research
burdens of the SSIs and case studies.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 24
2.4 House Clearance Tasks.
In the first year of DCAs mine action operations they were closely involved in verification tasks of
wells, schools and homes. The refugees were returning in the summer of 1999 and the
international community sought to rehabilitate as many home as possible before the winter. Apart
from returning to homes that were destroyed, burnt and looted many families had the additional
fear (real or suspected) of mines, UXO or booby traps in, or around, their home. Construction
companies and international NGOs also required verification and clearance before they were
prepared to build in suspect areas. Many accidents occurred in and around homes and the
demoralising and psychological impact, for many communities, severely affected their social and
economic activities.
DCA worked with agencies, local communities and individual home-owners to check and clear 24
houses that were suspected to have mines or improvised explosive devises (IEDs)/ booby traps.
This study investigated 6 sites, chosen by random, in the form of SSI Data Notes and developed 2
case studies ( Case Study No 3, for example, describes a situation in Decani municipality where
DCA cleared 22 mines from one house benefiting the family and all their neighbours. The
ramifications and human dimension of these situations is well illustrated in this case study as well
as the social benefit DCA clearance causes.)
As only 5 questionnaire interviews were conducted in areas where house clearance took place no
analysis of the result will be made. The number is not considered significant to be representative.
The scope of the social and psychological benefit that resulted from these tasks can be illustrated
and measured, to some degree, by the following statistics. House clearance was conducted by
small teams of DCA staff and therefore, in respect of the number of beneficiaries immediately
assisted at a crucial stage in their resettlement and reconstruction process, is judged to have been
an efficient and effect use of resources.
From the 6 SSI Data Note concerning house clearance tasks:
!" average house clearance took 12.4 hours.
On
!" average house clearance cleared the equivalent of 275m2.
On
!" average number of direct beneficiaries per task was found to be 9 people, while the
The
indirect beneficiary was found to be approximately 8 people.
!" average 3.6 explosive items were found per house.
On
Extrapolation of the SSI data Notes for house clearance tasks:
In so far that extrapolations from the random sampling help visualise the overall scenario, the
following totals can be developed using the averages developed from the samples above.
Therefore, for the 24 house cleared the following approximate findings could have been expected,
had the records from these tasks been maintained and available to the study team.
• Approximate total of 298 hours used to complete the 24 houses.
• Approximate total of 7220m2 of cleared land.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 25
• A total of 216 people could have been directly assisted while a further 192 people could have
been indirectly assisted by the clearance.
A total of 86 explosive items could have been located and removed/destroyed from these homes.
The context: Houses, wells and schools:
In 1999, the returning Kosova Albanians had only the international aid agencies and the UN to
support them in initial reconstruction and security. In so far that reconstruction and rehabilitation
could not have begun before clearance and verification, the work of DCA in this regard should be
seen as a multiplier, facilitating a range of other humanitarian agencies to perform their tasks. This
contextual observation applies to most mine action operations but particularly the clearance of
homes, schools and wells.
School, well and house clearance is a specialised form of EOD and normally regular deminers,
local or UN police/military were unwilling or unable to do the work. Hundreds of homes needed
verification and clearance in 1999 and many mine action agencies assisted the local populations.
Most families would have refused to return to homes or communities that they suspected to be
mined or booby-trapped: Particularly as stories of the accidents and deaths (by mines and IEDs),
from those who were the first to return, quickly spread among the refugees and IDP creating
widespread fear and suspicion.
2.5 Well clearance
Most rural family homes use wells for their main potable water needs a well as for washing,
irrigating gardens, orchards and for providing water to livestock. As part of the essential
reconstruction and rehabilitation plans certain international NGOs were responsible for the cleaning
and rehabilitation of household wells. When it was found that weapons, corpses, carcasses as well
as rubbish and debris were left in some wells, DCA and other mine action NGOs assisted with
clearance. Not only was there a need to clear the wells of explosive items but the question of
contaminated water supplies had to be address by specialised agencies.
DCA worked closely with the Norwegian Church Aid agency, within the ACT partnership, to check
and clear some of the many hundreds of wells that they rehabilitated during 1999 and 2000. After
certain wells were found to contain mines and UXO as well as rotting bodies a general suspicion
and fear of wells developed among rural populations in DCA’s project areas. Many homes in
different communities requested DCA and other agencies to check their wells, although many did
not actually require clearance. As with suspected minefields, the social impact of fear is the same
with wells, resulting in people not using their facilities until checked by professionals. Conversely
the social importance and practical benefit of well clearance to households and communities
should be self-apparent.
DCA used the EOD team to conduct the well clearance tasks. This was the same team that
conducted most of the school clearance, house clearance and spot tasks. Clearly the expertise
differs from that required in mine clearance and is a specialised (and unusual) function within
humanitarian mine clearance operations.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 26
DCA assisted NCA with the verification of 248 wells. 10 wells in different villages were chosen
randomly as a representative sample to be investigated by SSIs . Two case studies (Case Studies
5&7) were developed from additional village visits as well as 44 questionnaire interviews conducted
at different well sites.
Well clearance findings from SSI Data Notes:
!" average the wells each took 9.9 hours to clear.
On
!" suspected wells had been out of use on average for 6.9 months before
The
clearance/checking.
!" direct beneficiaries of each well were 11 people and the indirect beneficiaries were 2-3
The
people and 2 cows, on average.
!" average items found in the wells were 1 mine and 0.5 of a sheep’s carcass .
The
Extrapolation of the SSI Data Notes for well clearance.
As with other work performed by the EOD teams in 1999-2000 the records are poor or unavailable
and the study is forced to extrapolate the sample findings in order to understand the scope of the
achievements in relation to well clearance. When the averages are extrapolated to cover the full
number of tasks (248 wells) the following totals are found:
• Approximately 2,356 hours were spent clearing the wells.
• Approximately 2730 direct and 620 indirect beneficiaries gained from the clearance (along
with 470 cows that were watered from domestic wells)
• Approximately 248 explosive items and about 124 carcasses were cleared from these wells.
The case study number 7, included in Annex A, offers a dramatic description of the context in
which people suspected their wells and the potential dangers they faced.
Questionnaire results from well clearance sites.
Of the 386 questionnaires completed, 44 of the interviews took place in the well clearance areas.
Those interviewed were selected randomly and included men, women and children. The results of
selected questions below can only be presented as percentages and are responses to statements
or multiple option answers.
⇒ 93% of those interviewed said that mines were a main fear after the war.
⇒ 57% expressed fear that mines were in their own property (home/garden/land).
⇒ 86% expressed fear of physical injury to themselves and their immediate family.
⇒ 86% no longer have these fears following clearance in their areas.
⇒ 9% of those interviewed claimed to have seen evidence of mines and UXO in their areas
following clearance.(but not in the cleared areas: in other areas around the village)
⇒ 64% felt that they did not have complete confidence that there is now no danger (in Kosovo
generally)
⇒ 95% said they have less stress related to mines following clearance
⇒ 90% said their quality of life was improved following clearance.
⇒ 55% identify social and psychosocial benefits following clearance.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 27
As previously mentioned, the social, and psychosocial benefits of clearance are clearly felt by the
majority of those interviewed for this study. These indicators illustrate, and to some degree
measure the benefits but it is impossible to quantify or give value to these measurements.
2.6 Power line clearance (Supporting electrical rehabilitation)
DCA assisted two Scandinavian electrical rehabilitation companies25 by checking relevant
buildings, transformers and power stations in 15 different locations. Electrical rehabilitation was an
important pre-condition for the towns and many villages to resume normal activities following the
war. As strategically important facilities, there was fear that the retreating Serbians had booby
trapped and mined these power-line operational centres. DCA was requested to check and verify
various identified sites prior to the companies beginning their repairs . Without verification and/or
clearance the rehabilitation would not occur.
Of the 15 verified 3 were randomly selected for SSI investigation and one for Case Study (number
20). The results indicate that on average;
DCA teams spent 40 hours per power-line site.
They cleared 230m2 in each site and assisted directly 430 people per location. There were no
clear indirect beneficiaries26 and in none of the 3 cases selected were items found. (In the case
study a single UXO was located.).
When the averages are extrapolated to cover all 15 work locations the approximate totals indicate
that with a total of 600 hours of verification and clearance work the DCA teams gave access to
3450m2 (0.35 hectares) of land and facilitated power-line rehabilitation that directly benefit
approximately 6500 people today. According to the rules of extrapolation the number of
explosives items located and destroyed would be zero, although in some of the 15 cases
certain (few) items were found and destroyed.
This study does not seek to exaggerate or ‘squeeze out’ numbers of beneficiaries from the
findings. At the same time it does seek to capture and describe all the immediate and secondary
benefits that have resulted from DCA’s mine action operations in Kosovo. In this regard the above,
speculative, figures have been included.
In terms of social and economic importance to rural and urban communities, the work of DCA’s
teams to facilitate resumption of electricity should be self-apparent. The role of agencies such as
DCA to perform these specialised functions in post-conflict contexts, to facilitate reconstruction and
social normality should be recognised as important and have important humanitarian outcomes
despite the fact that NGOs normally leave these tasks to commercial mine action agencies.
Before briefly assessing the impact of mine awareness, table number 7 expresses the totals of
social and economic impact values derived from the different clearance-related tasks during the
period.
25Scandinavian Power Group and Danish Power Line.
26In one of the SSI samples, Gjakova, DCA checked a back-up power-line which will, if and when used, benefit over
32000 people. This figure has not been included in the statistics.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 28
Table No 7. Summary table of social and economic impact values identified from
clearance and verification tasks (recorded or imputed as indicated)
Activity Area cleared Area Direct Indirect Economic values
(m2) opened 27beneficiaries beneficiaries identified (DM)
(m2)
Minefield 320,915 842,000- 13,102 35,000- 2,045,986
clearance 892,000 40,000
Spot tasks* N/a 424,152 29,000 115,500 N/a
School N/a 310,300 15,300 77,500 N/a
clearance*
House 7,220 N/a 216 192 N/a
clearance*
Well N/a N/a 2,730 620 N/a
Clearance*
Power-line 3,450 N/a 6,500 N/a N/a
clearance*
Totals 331,585 1,576,452- 66,855 228,812- 2,045,986
1,626,452 233,81228
(* Extrapolations use from randomly selected representative samples)
2.7 Mine Awareness.
Mine awareness activities were conducted by DCA throughout the period. A small number of staff
(2-3) targeted specific villages with particular messages relevant to whether they were in high,
medium or low risk zones. The MA team worked in co-ordination with other MA teams in the region
(with regular 2-weekly co-ordination meetings) and came under the overall direction of the MACC
mine awareness department in Pristina.
The strategy of MACC was to promote an integrated approach to mine action where mine
awareness worked in close support to mine clearance in as defined in an approach called MAST
(Mine Awareness Support Teams). The key objective of mine awareness in DCA was risk
reduction and accident reduction through education in order to promote great caution concerning
contact of mines and UXO, promote reporting to authorities of sighting of mine/UXO and prevent
local interference with minefield marking equipment.
It is beyond the scope of this study to evaluate the relevance or effectiveness of the MAST
approach or mine awareness in DCA . As a matter of record this report notes that the mine
awareness team worked in 95 villages in 7 different municipalities of Kosovo. It records
attendance of 7766 adults and 5817 children (total 13,583) at its meetings. In addition it gave
27 To avoid exaggeration or mis-quotation it must be recognised that as DCA have mainly performed their multiple
tasks in the west of Kosovo and therefore some of the direct, and more of the indirect beneficiaries have been double
counted in the final total due to that fact that similar communities have benefited from different DCA interventions.
28 This total is almost the estimated total population in the municipalities where DCA worked, there it must be
understood in light of the previous footnote.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 29
mine awareness education to 16 NGOs that requested it for their staff. (an additional 328 people
attended these presentations). A broadcast on Gjakova radio was made with a potential listening
audience of 80,000 people.
In respect to mine awareness this study investigated the social benefits to the targeted
communities. Questionnaire interviews (174 interviews) were held in villages that had received
mine awareness as well as mine clearance, and others villages that had received mine awareness
but had not had any mine cleared conducted (60 interviews). Questionnaire B (see Annex C) was
used for these interviews. The objective was to measure the level of social, and in particular
psychosocial benefit, that mine awareness offered. Clearly the only direct method of measuring this
was through contact with the beneficiary communities and the findings from these interviews are
below.
The reduction in accident and injury rates also provides a measure of the success of mine
action (including mine awareness) in Kosovo. According to MACC statistics, there were 437 (86
killed)mine/UXO accidents in Kosovo between June’99 and Dec 2000, with an average monthly
rate of 23 accidents. . No records were kept of the high number of livestock lost to mines. The
reality is that since the end of 1999 the accident/death rates have been falling. However in 2001
the accident rate has fallen to an average of 1.5 victims per month with over half the accidents
involving UXO and not mines29. Considering the relatively small size of Kosovo, the defined nature
of the threat and the fact that the international mine action response to Kosovo was the most
concentrated and well-funded, well-coordinated intervention ever seen, it is not surprising that the
number of victims have fallen. How much the accident reduction rate can be accredited to mine
awareness or even mine action itself will never been known30.
Dis-aggregating mine awareness from the rest of mine action intervention and giving accurate
attribution to the impact of mine awareness has proved impossible in other analyses attempted in
other country programmes. Clearly in so far that DCA mine awareness contributed to the mine
action response in an area of Kosovo that was densely mined, and considered high risk, it should
take some credit for the social benefit of reduced accidents and other psychosocial benefits
express by those interviewed and listed below.
Questionnaire results:
From the interviews held in communities where mine clearance had taken place
(174 interviews) and in communities were mine clearance had not taken place (60 interviews), the
following responses were collected ( interviewees were randomly selected in villages visited).
29Not including accidents by operational deminers.
30There are numerous reasons for mine accident reduction, not least the fact that local people learn very fast where
the mines / UXO are in their areas and avoid them, and that they activate the most dangerous items, through accidents
earlier rather than later. This is the trend seen in other countries.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 30
Villages Villages
with mine with mine
Statement or question summarised from the questionnaire. awareness awareness
& clearance alone.
Agreed that mine awareness (MA) was necessary for them 97% 98%
Consider that MA has been of help to them personally 99% 100%
That MA contributed to their changing of behaviour in different everyday activities 95% 98%
Identified MA as changing their behaviour to self demining/tampering etc 58% 48%
Reported that they continued activities without change as they had no option 3% 0%
Feel at less risk because of MA 99% 100%
Previously felt afraid having been informed by MA that they lived near mines 86% 98%
Prior to MA and /or mine clearance their level of stress was ‘high stress’ 74% 87%
Feel more secure due to the clearance work completed 82% N/a
Trust that the land (in general) is totally clear of danger from mines/UXO 66% 57%
Felt ‘less stressed’ knowing there was an agency that helped with information about mines 94% 100%
The indications from these result suggests that mine awareness does have a social benefit to
people who receive it. Particularly in the area of individual sense of security and stress for
themselves and their immediate family it appears that mine awareness alone has important
psychosocial value to communities. Clearly an economic value cannot be attached to these
benefits, but as a humanitarian consideration in a mine affected area, these finding suggest the
necessity of having mine awareness. Not only for strategic reasons (assisting mine clearance with
information exchange, reducing accidents by influencing behavioural change) but for the social
value of increasing a sense of security and confidence in post-conflict reconstruction.
2.8 Socio-economic benefits to DCA / Kosovo .
In addition to the social and economic benefits accruing to the communities through mine action,
DCA as an agency, DCA staff and Kosovo have benefited through the mine action intervention
between 1999-2001. These will be highlighted briefly in the sections below.
Kosovo and DCA local staff:
Post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation is divided into different sectors and activities, but for
most bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors their contribution is clearly meant as financial injection, and
economic boost channelled through the work of international agencies. Kosovo has benefited from
the economic implications of a massive and multi-faceted rehabilitation response that followed the
end of the war. Less through goods purchased in Kosovo (few available) but through the salaries to
local staff .
DCA’s program had various social and economic implications for those working for them as well as
the local businesses that provided goods and services during the intervention.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 31
!"DCA employed approximately 190 local staff during the period in different positions. The
salaries paid to the local staff over the whole period was approximately $2 million USD (4.2
mil DM) 31
!"Vehicles were purchased outside Kosovo but all fuel purchase and maintenance was local.
DCA disbursed $499,500 USD on fuel, maintenance and vehicle related costs.
!"Products that were used for DCA’s work that were purchased locally32 amounted to over
$233,000 USD
!"International housing and office rental costs amounted to approximately $20,000 USD
These totals amount to approximately $2,876,000 USD (representing 44% of the total DCA
Kosovo budget for the period)that was disbursed in Kosovo.
In terms of assisting local businesses (mechanics/spare parts, office suppliers, fuel stations, and
clothing manufacturers etc) this economic stimulus was clearly important although limited.
The experience was significant for most of DCA’s employees in economic as well as social terms.
A short questionnaire was designed for DCA employees in different positions and 19% were
randomly selected for interviews (37 interviews). From these interviews the following findings can
be expressed:
• 70% of DCA staff had work in Kosovo or abroad before the war.
• 43% had no work in mid-1999 due to impact of the war.
• 76% were working for DCA because of no better alternative and the good (relative) salary
offered.
• Of the 37 interviewed they claimed their salaries directly supported a total of 266 people. This
is an average of 7 direct dependants on each salary. For all the staff this could mean that DCA
salaries supported approximately 1,330 people.
• 99% of the respondents claimed they had learnt new skills while working with DCA. 86% felt
that these new skills would be useful to their community/Kosovo in the future.
• However 78% of DCA staff interviewed felt their jobs were dangerous and 49% said would
change their work if the equivalent salary could be found in less dangerous work.
• 38% were registered to attend the vocational training courses organised by DCA at the end of
the program33. 78% felt that these courses would increase their job opportunities.
In terms of the total budget designated by DANIDA for the DCA program in Kosovo it may be noted
that approximately $830,000 USD worth of equipment will be used by DCA in other countries and
have been ‘salvaged’ from the programme.
DCA organisation
Although DCA has been active for years in humanitarian interventions as well as funding mine
action operations with other agencies, this was the first programme of direct implementation of
mine action. The Kosovo programme has given DCA the chance to establish a viable presence in
31 All figures in this section provided to the study by the DCA finance officer in Kosovo.
32 Including clothing, office equipment, clearance tools and medical supplies etc
33 Staff training cost DCA approximately 60,000 USD and was part of the exit strategy of DCA whereby they offered
various vocational training course to staff to assist reintegration in the ‘normalised’ local economy.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 32
the relatively limited community of mine action NGOs. Following an inevitably difficult start-up
period in 1999, DCA appears to have established a high reputation with the MACC and other
agencies. Efficiency analysis and comparative investigations with other agencies is beyond the
scope of this study.
Internally the period has clearly afforded DCA the chance to develop appropriate fund-raising and
organisational (including technical, logistics, recruitment, administration) capabilities in the sector of
mine action which have enabled them to extend their work to Eritrea, and now Albania. From an
organisational perspective the Kosovo programme has therefore had considerable internal benefit,
though a steep learning curve, that will benefit (is benefiting) DCA as an agency and the mine
action community as a whole.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 33
Section 3: Identifying conclusions and recommendations.
Section 2 has identified social and economic benefits of DCA’s mine action programme in Kosovo.
Section 3 will draw conclusions from the findings and offer comments and recommendation
concerning lessons that should be learnt from Kosovo and additional observations on reporting /
information documentation and issues relating to impact assessment.
Core Conclusions.
To avoid repetition the final concluding comment will be brief.
• This study has shown how varied and complex the social and economic implications and
benefits are, even from a relatively short intervention by a relatively small group of
operators.
• It is instructive that despite the relatively high costs of the Kosovo operations and the
prescribed clearance tasks (allocation), the study was able to identify significant economic
and social values accruing from the work undertaken.
• Although it is early to develop a full assessment the findings indicate that over the years
the land cleared will yield significant economic benefit to local communities and can be
shown to already provide important economic relief to families.
• There was an absence of data and tools required to conduct a benefit-cost analysis in
respect to clearance tasks: however, the conservative values established through the
research here show that a healthy ‘return’ on investment made by DANIDA and DCA both
now and into the future is apparent. Both in terms of economic value and social impact the
DCA programme appears to have achieve positive results.
• The study was also able to show beyond doubt that the mine awareness and spot tasks
played an important role in reducing fear and stress among communities while also
assisting in the reduction of threat and actual accident.
Recommendations:
The following recommendations should not be read in isolation as they arise from the context of the
findings in this report. They are presented as positive encouragement to DCA as a new agency in
mine action, having made an impressive debut in Kosovo, but striving to increase their
effectiveness in future programmes.
Prioritisation, task selection and the mine threat.
Certain aspects of the Kosovo programme are very a-typical of mine clearance operations in most
countries. The special case of Kosovo is argued at the start of this study: Particularly in the case of
prioritisation and task allocation. Outside of Kosovo DCA should not expect to be allocated defined
tasks( with numbers of expected mines to be cleared!) by a central, near, and organised central UN
mine action authority. In terms of lessons learnt concerning task allocation and definition of the
mine threat Kosovo will probably remain an exception.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 34
Recommendation:
DCA should consider carefully how it intends to operate in areas were the threat is ill-defined, and
where it must chose between competing needs for mine clearance. DCA should develop a
prioritisation strategy based on its humanitarian objectives and be clear of the mechanisms it will
use to establish its own priorities for clearance. If it chooses to maximise it’s socio-economic
impact DCA must establish what the indicators will be prior to commencing operations and conduct
community-based rapid rural assessments or deeper analysis.
Time-frames and exit strategies
Kosovo is the first major mine affected country to be considered mine-free and not needing
international mine clearance after only 2.5 years of intervention. No other mine affected country is
considering exit strategies yet34. For many reasons outlined in this report Kosovo is exceptional.
International agencies, humanitarian and independent, are all leaving Kosovo at the end of
December 2001 because MACC has concluded they are no longer needed. The accident rates are
now minimal (they were never’ high’, comparatively, even in mid-99) and the 640 minefields are
cleared. But many of the suspected cluster bombs remain un-located and the people throughout
this study indicated they were not confident that Kosovo is mine / UXO free. It appears that
agencies are hearing the same in other regions. Some suggest that the exit strategy for leaving
Kosovo for MACC may be partly driven by political reasons and in the absence of surveys by
MACC or NGOs to establish if there are significant previously unidentified minefields the exodus
may not be based on humanitarian analysis. MACC have made clear their reasons for leaving but
how have the NGOs decided?
Recommendation:
Linked to the recommendation on ‘prioritisation’, DCA needs to be sure of it’s own criteria for
working in mine affected countries and its own criteria for leaving, unless it sees itself as a partner /
service providers for UN-coordinated programmes.
Cost-benefit analysis / Efficiency analysis
The development of a cost-benefit analysis for specific activities using conventional statistical
procedures to establish internal rates of return, net present values against investment (if
humanitarian mine action is to analysed as an investment) cannot be achieved if basic data is not
recorded. In Kosovo the absence of certain programme data prevented the calculation benefit-cost
analysis. (It was also not requested as part of the Terms of Reference for the socio-economic
assessment.)
Recommendation:
DCA programmes are interested to track their internal efficiency and basic cost-benefit ratio over
time, but to realise this they will need to maintain certain information and documentation. All mine
action activities need to be recorded with information that includes the teams’ size involved and the
34 This is different from consolidation of programmes and creating indigenous capacities/authorities which is underway
in most affected countries where the UN and international mine agencies operate.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 35
time expended . Whether it is decided to use man-hours or team-hours or days is not important as
long as the units are standardised and can be used across all activities being measured.
Additional Observations:
For minefield clearance the methodology used (manual / dogs / machines / detectors etc) must be
specified or efficiency calculations will be meaningless. It must not be forgotten that just as the
admin, medical and office staff are part of the mine action workforce, so too the time required to get
to work locations and cannot be taken out of the calculations unless this is a standardised
approach and deliberate. This also applies to rest-time during clearance; it must be part of the
calculations. Finance officers also need to be aware and prepared to separate costs out to enable
cost-benefit analysis to be made. If those responsible are warned at the start of programmes they
may be able to set up their spreadsheets to accommodate this analysis later in the programmes’
life cycle.
Socio-economic information:
Beyond the emergency needs of communities to be safe from injury and death from mines, the
overwhelming need for clearance is the socio-economic needs of affected communities. This study
has shown that the use of rural land for economic and social use is often complex and varied and
difficult and resource-expensive to research long after clearance has occurred.
Recommendation:
As DCA expressly wishes to monitor its impact, through mine action, on rural society, it needs to
track these issues more closely. Its value would be to give DCA as well as its donors an on-going
wider appreciation of the multiple benefits of every clearance task undertaken.
Additional comments:
At present in most agencies clearance records and survey forms make only basic reference to the
land use of the land they clear or survey. ‘Agricultural land’, ‘Grazing’, ‘Forest’ are typical catch-all
categories. (The IMSMA form for Kosovo is a typical example not even including grazing or forest
as categories). Frequently cleared land has multiple benefits to the community reflecting the
multiple land use of the area. It would take very little extra effort for supervisors/liaison officers to
collect this information during the tasks and for it to appear on task clearance reports.
Secondary benefits of land clearance
Recommendation:
DCA should collect information concerning the secondary impacts / hidden benefits of their mine
action intervention in terms of land area opened through clearance, to capture the true benefit to
communities
Area cleared by direct clearance operations or BAC will be calculated and recorded in square
meters. However, because humanitarian mine action is directly concerned with social and
economic benefit to communities it could be very useful if surveyors and operators indicate not only
the land cleared by demining teams/dogs and or machines but also the additional/secondary
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 36
quantity of land that the area cleared opens up for community use. Approximations are better than
nothing. It would be very little extra work for surveyors and operators to include this in their
documentation. Some explanation of what the ‘freed’ land will be used for is also necessary in
addition to an expressed quantity. It is too narrow to see the impact of clearance as the sum total of
the specific areas cleared although this is the normal approach. This should also apply to UXO
clearance.
Beneficiaries:
Recommendation:
As with information concerning clearance of land, the direct and indirect beneficiaries need to
consistently gathered during the operations of a project for DCA to understand the scope of the
impact of their work.
Both at the survey stage and the clearance/removal stage some reference to beneficiaries needs
to be recorded. In the Kosovo programme this was only partially recorded if at all. Beneficiaries
should be divided between direct and indirect beneficiaries as they have been in this study. They
should not be exaggerated and if the numbers are not clear an approximate range is acceptable.
Direct beneficiaries are normally obvious but there are almost always indirect benefits to other
families or communities from any mine action. Try to capture this.
Underestimating impact of Spot task / UXO removal.
‘Spot tasks’ and emergency call out work for UXO destruction/removal is normally under-reported
in mine action programmes in absolute terms and in terms of socio-economic importance. This
study shows clearly that the contribution of the EOD team to the overall socio-economic impact
was far greater than expected. The estimated beneficiaries for school clearance, spot tasks, well
and house clearance and power-lines identified in this study and in table 7, are higher than those
of minefield clearance. This study struggled to find data relating to this work and subsequently
depended on sample surveys and extrapolations. Statistics also show that UXO are relatively far
more lethal to communities (esp children) than mines, in terms of injury and death. But more than
this, their importance as ‘blockages’ to normal community life (social & economic and not least
psychological) can also be considerable.
Recommendation:
The impact of small EOD teams dealing with specific community problems should continued to be
recognised by DCA, and incorporated in their programme planning and as an important and
indispensable part of mine action operations. There contribution can be considerable. Reporting for
these kind of operations activities should be fuller in terms of identifying direct and indirect
beneficiaries as well as land ‘freed’ by the removal/destruction of UXO.
Under-estimating the cost-benefit of Spot task / UXO teams.
Resources required to deal with UXO are normally far less than mine clearance and yet their
community impact very high. Their cost-benefit is therefore very positive. In Kosovo the summary
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 37
table (7) illustrates this clearly as the majority of the tasks and highest number of beneficiaries can
be attributed to work conducted by small EOD teams. The actual cost of running the EOD team in
Kosovo was relatively low35 in comparison to mine clearance and the resulting social benefits.
These comments in no way seek to minimise the importance of mine clearance, but seek to
redress the imbalance of emphasis on classic larger scale responses to community needs.
Recommendation:
Managers and operators need to establish a ways of reflecting the potential effectiveness of EOD
teams in their reporting, in their planning of operational profiles of future DCA mine action
programmes. Also managers should develop the concept (already being considered) and strategy
of using smaller demining teams to strategically address specific village problems.36
Against the marginalization of mine awareness
In Kosovo the majority of all mine awareness work was conducted by 2 or 3 staff at a cost of less
than 1.5% of the total budget. In terms of the number of villages visited and social impact indicated
by the beneficiaries in this study it may be considered cost effective and providing important social
benefit. If the operational teams of mine clearance consider that mine awareness did not support
their work in an integrated way or have much relevance in the programme, the suggestion of this
study is that the concept of mine awareness is not well-developed in DCA. It appeared to be
marginalized and non-integrated from the mine clearance and EOD taskings.
Recommendation:
This study recommends that DCA takes care in it’s use of mine awareness to ensure that MA is not
marginalized or seen as an less-relevant addition, but instead understand the effective strength of
MA when in support of mine clearance. Important lessons learnt can be gained from other
agencies’ experiences with mine awareness integration with mine clearance and the use of mulyi-
disciplinary teams. If not, DCA will miss a valuable tool that can enhance their impact and
efficiency.
Operational Profile: Different technologies
Mechanised devises and search dogs were used in the Kosovo programme. Documentation of
where they were used, and to what degree and to what effect do not exist, or only partially. This
study noted from the limited data available that the use of dog teams in support of manual teams in
DCA had been extremely effective. Dogs, when used correctly, can enormously enhance the
speed of clearance and have been highly cost-efficient in comparison to manual or mechanised
demining. However it was also noted that for climatic, geographical and planning reasons the dogs
available spent a large amount of time un-used.
35 In DCA Kosovo the EOD team, not including running costs of vehicles and fuel and the loan of medics and extra staff
from the demining teams, cost approximately 322,000 USD. This represents less than 5% of the overall budget.
36 The DCA Kosovo Operations Manager is aware of this and is designing the potential clearance response to Lebanon
in such a manner.
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 38
Recommendations:
Concerning dogs, machines, manual clearance and detectors, DCA should try to increase their
understanding of the comparative advantages of different technologies, the optimal combinations
of the technologies and their cost-efficiencies. Efficiency studies could be conducted in Albania and
Eritrea, perhaps, as part of the operations. This would give DCA a strong understanding of options
and increase their productivity through effective use of the ‘tool box’ approach.
Documentation:
Based on the experience with DCA in Kosovo, a concluding recommendation deals
with reporting within the project. The spirit of these comments are mentioned in part
in previous recommendations.
Recommendation:
That DCA projects seek to adopt a more systematic, thorough and standardised reporting
procedures that are designed for their own needs and not limited to the needs of others or central
co-ordination authorities. This reporting should be on-going and not add noticeably to the
operators’ work load, but cover all areas where information is required for on-going and future
use(see comments below).
Supporting comments:
All activities should be documented in some way. Do not fall into the trap of only documenting what
the UN Mine Action Centre (or donor, or other centralised authority) requires. Their requirements
are different from those of a humanitarian NGO like DCA that presumably have a wider interest in
the community than only removing landmines/UXO. Also, for purposes of internal monitoring and
evaluation (as well as cost-benefit analysis) maximum information is required. Simple, but
systematic.
Therefore, ensure that right from the start all activities are documented, including: Survey work,
Spot task, emergency call-out for demolition and even clearance in areas where no mines or UXO
are found. Battle Area Clearance (BAC) and survey leading to area reduction and negative
verification are all resource-using activities that benefit affected communities and should be
documented and be used in analysis towards efficiency and socio-economic assessment etc.
Programme archives:
Clearly all documentation should be retained at least for the full duration of the programme. Paper
and electronic. If a Socio-economic study or other evaluation process cannot gain access to all
documentation it will, obviously, only have partial understanding of the range of activities
conducted and partial appreciation of the benefits achieved for the affected population. This study
suffered from lack of documentation in many activities associated with the EOD teams which is
partly due to the MACC having little interest in reports from non-minefield tasks37.
37 Except in terms of explosive items destroyed .
Socio-Economic Impact Study. DanChurchAid Kosovo November 2001 39
GPS references insufficient.
GPS references on their own are insufficient to give precise locations of certain tasks. They may
serve to locate villages or a wider mined area but are not accurate enough for smaller locations
such as wells or households. If GPS references are the main source of information, those visiting
the sites for verification, SEIS studies or other work will not only need GPS equipment but also
skills to use them. Even then it would not be guaranteed that they would locate the correct site.
More information is required such as contact names of local relevant people or supplementary
geographical references given on the reporting forms.
Standardising units in reporting:
In many rural areas of mine-affected countries weights and measures are not metric. Managers
and operators need to agree what terminology (local or international) they will use throughout their
reporting. Using local terminology and units is OK if it is standardised and operator and evaluators
understand what they mean in metric terms. Clearly all external reporting and documentation
should have the metric values expressed.
