Congress engages in preemption pursuant to the Constitution's Supremacy Clause when it enacts federal legislation that supersedes existing state and local laws in a particular field and proscribes any future state and local regulation of that field. Conversely, when Congress, pursuant to its Article III powers, includes a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement in a statute, it merely defers rather than supersedes federal court jurisdiction. Courts have created the doctrine of prudential or administrative exhaustion, which is the requirement that potential litigants exhaust available administrative remedies before they can bring suit in federal court. This Article addresses recent decisions which hold that exhaustion requirements are jurisdictional only when Congress includes "sweeping and direct" language in statutory enactments. Preemption and jurisdictional exhaustion are two of the more interesting doctrines that relate to the power of Congress, because they respectively allow Congress to supersede state and local laws and delay federal court jurisdiction.