Open Source Intelligence, Science and Technology - A Natural Nexus for Academia and the Intelligence Community R.A. Norton and G.S. Weaver Auburn University Auburn, AL 36849 INTRODUCTION There is general agreement that most of the information that ultimately becomes intelligence can be obtained via public or open sources. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is both a product and a process culminating from the transformation of open source information into an organized and useful form. As will be discussed in the sections that follow, the internet has become an increasingly important and valuable source of information. This essay discusses the utility of science and technology intelligence (S&TI) as a example of OSINT, and in doing so, illustrates how the mutually-beneficial relationship between the intelligence community and academia already exists and how expansion of that relationship benefits both parties. More specifically, the use of scientific citation indices as a means to identify the most relevant (and important) research is discussed as an example of how the IC can utilize information quality matrices readily available in academia. OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) defines Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) as “publicly available information appearing in print or electronic form including radio, television, newspapers, journals, the Internet, commercial databases, and videos, graphics, and drawings”1. Lieutenant General Sam Wilson (USA Ret.) the former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (1976-1977) estimated the level of contribution of OSINT to the overall Intelligence Community (IC) mission stating;
“Ninety percent of intelligence comes from open sources. The other ten percent, the clandestine work, is just the more dramatic. The real intelligence hero is Sherlock Holmes, not James Bond”2. Though the actual figure is arguable, the general principle of OSINT being valuable to the overall intelligence process is widely recognized. Percentages aside, the fact is that the majority of the information needed for providing insight into virtually any issue is readily accessible and found on the internet. Megill, in his essay entitled The Dark Fruit of Globalization: Hostile Use of the Internet, states that the “Technological advances in telecommunications and computerization leading to the creation of the internet are the leading characteristics of the process involved in globalization. Today’s era of globalization is built around falling telecommunication costs- thanks to microchips, satellites, fiber optics and the internet. If the global movement of goods and services are the lifeblood of the world economy, then the internet is the nervous system…The movement of information and data across the internet is so vast and pervasive in the United States, and the industrialized world in particular, that it has become a feature of modern life”3. The concept of exploiting publicly available information (PAI) is really nothing new and there are numerous historical examples of what would now be called OSINT. In the past, the terms describing the general process have varied, although “open media” was frequently used by several agencies in earlier decades4. The Army’s Open Source Intelligence Manual (FMI 2-22.9) states that “American military professionals have collected, translated, and studied articles, books, and periodicals to gain knowledge and understanding of foreign lands and armies for over 200 years5. Stafford Thomas, in his classical review of the Intelligence Community, chronicled the breadth of agencies
conducting OSINT collection and analysis during the Cold War, which were then primarily concentrating on the Soviet Union and its satellite nations6. Richelson7 further expanded the list of past OSINT usage following World War II and through the Cold War. John Keegan in his book Intelligence at War, began his description of the acquisition process by quoting a former CIA director who always cautioned his analysts “against what he called the Encyclopaedia Britanninca factor: do not waste effort in seeking information which may freely be found in newspapers, scholarly journals or academic monographs”8. He also pointed out the inherent value of OSINT by providing the example that at least in totalitarian states like Stalinist Russia, the importance of what some might consider mundane information was recognized to the extent that restrictions were placed on the “distribution of such everyday material as telephone directories and street maps”8. Recently the Chinese government has moved to block geographical information sites on the web, claiming “they threaten state security”. Min Yiren, the Deputy Director of the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping is also quoted: “Some websites publish sensitive or confidential geographical information, which might leak state secrets and threaten national security”9. OSINT usage began significant expansion following the fall of the Soviet Union and was further expanded after the 9-11 attacks on the United States in 200110. Robert Steele, a long standing, strong proponent of OSINT surveyed the military applications and noted numerous case examples where was being used at the strategic, operational, tactical and technical levels11. He also noted that increasing amounts of information were being compiled and often sold by non-government agencies and private information
brokers, like Jane’s Information Group, The Economist and Oxford Analytica11. The number of private organizations and contractors continues to grow as government struggles to handle the volume of expanding information, often described as akin to “drinking from a fire hose”. Business intelligence, another form of OSINT, often called “Competitive Intelligence” (CI) has expanded in the last decade to the point that the IC now finds itself openly competing for analysts who frequently are trained by the IC and then quickly leave government for more lucrative positions in industry. Shelves can be lined with books describing CI methodology (e.g. 12,13,14,15). Also included in the variety of books are those actually profiling the successful practitioners of the discipline16, an unheard of practice in the cloaked environment of the IC. The discipline has actually grown so large that the international Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP; http://www.scip.org/) was established to “enhance the success of our members through leadership, education, advocacy and networks” as well as promoting “the legal and ethical collection and analysis of information regarding the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of business competitors”17. As has been stated, PAI volume is increasing daily at staggering rates, largely facilitated by improved accessibility and the expansion of the rapidly maturing worldwide-web, as well as freely distributed search engines such as Google® and Yahoo®. PAI differs from OSINT in a number of ways, in that the former is widely dispersed and dilute, having not been collated into a manageable form or its meaning determined through the process of analysis. Simply put, PAI is noise, while OSINT is music.
The advantages and disadvantages of OSINT are currently being discussed (some would say argued) throughout the entire IC. Considering the fact that OSINT has clearly been used in the past and leadership has acknowledged its contribution to the overall dataset, why is there still any controversy surrounding OSINT? Part of the answer involves the nation’s political climate. Huge sums of money have been spent on procurement systems and large numbers of people (representing political power) are employed maintaining and exploiting the capabilities of those systems. To some members of the OSINT is in effect a competing procurement system. Since OSINT is also closely tied with the internet, some of the concern also appears to be the result of unfamiliarity by some analysts with the primary medium in which OSINT must be practiced. The second cause of controversy is the ingrained caution built into the IC. Agencies by and large recognize that OSINT has value, but its expanded utilization is innovative and by design. Bureaucracies tend to move very slowly when adopting new things considered even remotely controversial, particularly when there is valid concern that new and unproven technologies and techniques could somehow create false pictures and thereby compromise national security. The Army, driven largely by the requirements of two wars, has taken a relatively progressive view of OSINT. Interestingly, the very characteristics of OSINT and its application to tactical or mission-related intelligence requirements are the same features which make it equally valuable for other applications like strategic intelligence and S&TI. The many advantages of OSINT include, but are not limited to:
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OSINT provides the foundation for intelligence and non-intelligence operations including shaping our “…world view, awareness of international events and perceptions of non-US societies.”
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OSINT answers requirements “without the use of specialized human or technical means of collection”.
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OSINT enhances collection by “providing foundational information (biographies, cultural information, geospatial information, technical data) that optimizes the employment and performance of sensitive human and technical means of collection.”
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OSINT enhances production when integrated into single discipline and multidiscipline intelligence approaches, ensuring “decisionmakers have the benefit of all-sources of available information.” 5
A Congressional Research Service report10notes that three prevailing but contrasting opinions currently span the IC: 1) OSINT has less value than that derived from clandestinely collected secrets. 2) OSINT is an important contextual supplement to classified data and has potential for serving in and of itself as a source of intelligence. 3) OSINT’s value lies somewhere in the middle, meaning it should be used as the analysts “source of first resort” in driving requirements for clandestine collection activities. In truth, it is highly probable that all three opinions are correct in specific circumstances. Like all of other “INTS” (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, etc.), OSINT can never be thought of as a panacea for solving all problems in all circumstances. As is the
case with other “INTS”, the OSINT product is supplementary material and only as good as the tools and the talent of the analysts that are used to create it. Serious deficiencies currently exist in both the number and quality of tools and analysts available for the OSINT mission, which also undoubtedly affects the perceived value and the ultimate reception of the finished products. With time the sometimes negative OSINT reception problem is likely to subside naturally as a result of the changing demographics in the analytical workforce and potential future budgetary constraints that will drive innovation and efficiencies. OSINT is very economical compared to other “INTS”, particularly when used to drive the “80% solution”. OSINT expansion will continue in the coming decades, perhaps even becoming the “INT” of first choice, rather than last resort. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTELLIGENCE Science and Technology Intelligence (S&TI) is that portion of intelligence focused on determining capabilities and development potential. As prescribed in the USSID 40, ELINT Operating Policy (U), National Security Agency (NSA), the official IC definition is that it is that “Intelligence concerning foreign developments in basic and applied scientific and technical research and development including engineering and production techniques, new technology, and weapon systems and their capabilities and characteristics; it also includes intelligence which requires scientific or technical expertise on the part of the analyst…”18 From a military perspective, “S&TI looks at foreign scientific and technical developments that have or indicate a warfare capabilities and potential. This includes medical capabilities; weapon system characteristics, capabilities, vulnerabilities,
limitations and effectiveness; research and development activities related to those systems; and related manufacturing information”5. “In a world profoundly changed by globalization, the United States and its allies may no longer lead scientific discovery or control sensitive technological applications. At the same time, the advent of nearly universal access to the digital infrastructure, design tools, and scientific knowledge has created an integrated global research, development and production environment with significantly shorter deployment time. These realities present significant challenges to understanding the S&T capabilities of potential adversaries and warning decision makers of developments that could impact U.S. operations, forces, and capabilities”19 Part of the value from S&TI is derived from the very nature of the subject matter; science. “It is the distinctive ability of scientific inquiry to produce sound understanding and reliable knowledge. As a way of knowing, it combines the best attributes of rationalism and empiricism and adds an array of internal procedures that enable to check itself. Compared to other “ways of knowing, its capacity for error identification and correction greatly improves it reliability”20 The Scientific Method is based on several principles: 1) The method utilizes hypotheses, whose validity must be tested in an ordered and rational manner, so as to produce data which is used to eliminate the possibility of chance or random occurrence. 2) Objective methods are utilized in testing, eliminating or at least lessening the possibility of distorting or influencing the results.
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Science is a very public activity, scrutinized by both peers and the public alike thereby better ensuring the integrity of the study.
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Replicability of the results is considered the hallmark of good science. Failure to reproduce the data results in rejection of the test.
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Peer review is particularly important because “results do not attain the status of knowledge until others knowledgeable either agree or at least concur that the results are consistent with the methods and that the methods were empirically sound.”
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Science is self correcting with results always considered provisional and subject to review, as new methods and technologies are continually developed. (Adapted from 20).
Scientific data can be considered pre-vetted data to some extent, making it distinctly different from all other categories of OSINT. Good science correctly procured and interpreted makes a better OSINT product. That being said, it must also be considered that science is not infallible. It too is subject to error and misrepresentation. Scientific bias and intentional fraud are ongoing problems and must always be considered during the analytical process. The federal government recognizes the potential problem to the extent that the Office of Research Integrity (ori.dhhs.gov) was established in the US Department of Health and Human Services and charged with promoting integrity in biomedical and behavioral research and investigating research misconduct. OSINT BRIDGES S&TI Other sources of information, including additional science will always be required to further verify any data before it can be accurately interpreted by the analyst. Science
again offers advantages as an OSINT target in that scientific organizations that monitor and maintain standards for published science exist in multiple disciplines. One such organization for microbiological research is the American Society of Microbiologists (www.asm.org ), which is actually an international organization that publishes twelve different journals. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (www.ieee.org) is another example of very large international engineering organization, which maintains high standards in electrical engineering related publishing. Since much of science is preliminary, the scientific community will be in a constant state of revision, therefore necessitating continual reexamination of the evidence by the analytical community. Reaction to a given study or line of scientific inquiry is a prominent feature in the scientific community and can assist the analyst by providing an independent measure of data validity. Perhaps the most useful indices for assessing science and technology publishing impact are produced by Thompson Scientific (formerly the Institute for Scientific Information), (www.scientific.thompson.com), including the measures of impact21,22,23,24 and obsolescence25. Impact is a measure of how often a given article is cited by scientists in other publications. Science which is cited by other scientists is considered more intrinsically valuable than that which is published and never cited again. Also related to issue of impact is the fact that a very high percentage of the “quality” scientific data is published by a small number of journals. High quality scientists tend to gravitate toward having their work published in the journals of highest prestige and readership. Combined, these two factors mean that if properly understood, a smaller and more manageable number of quality journals and high-impact articles can be monitored by the
analyst first in order to efficiently glean the most relevant science currently available. The technique of utilizing the impact index can also be used to identify top-tier scientific and engineering working groups, always a high priority for the IC. In essence the low hanging fruits of science and technology are self-labeled by the scientists and engineers themselves, while the obsolescence index (again determined by the scientists and engineers) tells the analyst when a given article is no longer considered as valuable by the scientific community25. Specific S&TI requirements differ by agency, but all remain primarily focused on threat nations and adversarial non-state groups, like al-Qaeda. In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) listed the current and projected national security threats to the United States, which included chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear related procurement attempts by non-state groups, including al-Qaeda26. Although, procurement efforts by state and non-state groups are technically not S&TI, but instead more appropriately considered “GMI” or General Military Intelligence, the two are closely related and in this specific line of enquiry could benefit significantly from the insert of more technically oriented analysts or Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Although, it may be a given that al-Qaeda is trying to procure biological, chemical or radiological weapons, it is all together something different to definitively state whether their methods of development and delivery systems are 1) scientifically valid – i.e. “yes this can be made into a viable weapon…” and 2) feasible – i.e. “yes this thing could actually be successfully delivered…”.
Other areas of concern noted in the testimony of Lieutenant General Michael Maples are more clearly S&TI-related including: state based Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities; weapons delivery platform development (Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, etc.); and nuclear technology proliferation, by countries including, Iran, China, Russia, North Korea, Pakistan and India26. IC AND ACADEMIC COLLABORATION The nexus between OSINT and S&TI provides significant opportunities for collaboration between the IC and academia. Clearly, the IC is not the source of all expertise, nor should it be. Expertise, for it to be most relevant to national security, must be current. This is in many ways a more readily achievable goal in academia than in the IC. Who better to provide insight into science and technology development than the very people who are actively doing it? This is particularly important when considering there can be a significant lag period from when the science is being performed and when it is actually published. Published articles always describe what has been done in the past. Active scientists and engineers, since they are often participants can better describe what is current from other information exchanges, such as meeting proceedings, the web and scientific presentations. IC based scientists and engineers may not have the luxury of actual participating in these forums, since many take place internationally. Academia and business are often the “drivers” of science and technology. The IC interacts with business, often successfully. Academia also interacts freely with the business community, but does so in more participatory manner, rather than solely as a customer. Academia is often the originators of ideas which are then translated into new
business enterprises. The IC on the other hand is more often a source of needs or a definer of requirements, rather than developers of the ideas which can solve the problems. That is again how it should be, as scarce resources are best spent with those entities that can deliver results most efficiently. The IC must concentrate on Intelligence, not developing the latest and greatest widgets that can be used in its collection or analysis. Academia also has another advantage in that unlike the IC it is by design open and transparent. Academics readily communicate with colleagues around the world. This is a highly desirable feature that can be utilized by the IC to great advantage. This is not saying that America needs its academics to become spies; far from it. That would be a disaster for all involved and would destroy all of the inherent advantages that academia currently offers. It also does not mean that academia should assume the responsibilities of the IC. Academia cannot and should not become another IC member agency. It should also not be considered just another contractor or purveyor of information. Instead, academia should be considered unique and remain independent; used to its best advantage when acting as a source of carefully developed alternative views and insight. Academia should be used primarily for the “long view”, because only it can operate with the luxury of extended term investigation and reflection, whereas the IC is always plagued by the push for immediacy and industry by the requirements of profit. Academia should not be used to produce “actionable intelligence”. It can however be used to great effect by providing inserts (context and meaning) into the early phases of Course of Action (COA) development. The 80% solution should always remain the goal of academia when working all OSINT and S&TI issues. The 100% solution should never
be sought, but instead left to the IC, where OSINT and S&TI can be used as additional bricks in the firm foundation which support all source intelligence requirements. Final validation must always be left to “the high side.” Academia must evolve and in doing so, serve more efficiently in producing an educated individual better prepared to become the “new analyst”. Critical thinking skills and problem solving abilities are best developed when practiced. Since practice requires time, the least desirable option is to attempt to teach these skills in the midst of other learning requirements when first entering employment with the IC. Basic and even some level of advanced OSINT and S&TI “tradecraft” are approachable skill sets, attainable in the academic setting. In an ideal system, academia is where the skill sets should be first taught, so that upon entrance into the IC the knowledge base can be further reinforced and more specifically. If maximizing efficiencies and reduction in the learning curve are desirable goals, the IC might be best served in focused collaborations where real problem sets are investigated by students working in educational partnerships with the IC. Once fully developed, the partnerships can serve as both the source of future IC employees, and a source of supplementary OSINT and S&TI information. Such a partnership ha the potential of producing highly educated, pre-vetted individuals capable of more rapidly assuming a position and role in efforts to protect national security. Considering the developing threats the U.S. will likely face in the future, efficiencies of many origins will have to be found. Academia appears to be one such option possessing great potential on many levels.
References 1. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2008. Web statement. http://www.dni.gov/who_what/what_collection.htm (Accessed 25 May 2008). 2. Reed, David 1997. "Aspiring to Spying," The Washington Times, 14 November, Regional News, p. 1. 3. Megill, Todd A. 2006. “The Dark Fruit of Globalization: Hostile Use of the Internet”. In: Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism, ed. W. Murray, 215-230. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. 4. Friedman, Richard S. 1998. Open Source Intelligence. Parameters, Summer: 129-65 (Review Essay). 5. Department of the Army 2006. Open Source Intelligence- FMI 2-22.9. 6. Thomas, Stafford T. 1983. The Central Intelligence Agency. In: The U.S. Intelligence Community, 45-63. Lanham: University Press of America, Inc. 7. Richelson, Jeffrey T. 2008. “Open Sources, Technical Surveillance and Emplaced Sensor, and Document and Materiel Exploitation”. In The US Intelligence Community, 317-340. Boulder: Westview Press. 8. Keegan, John 2003. Intelligence in War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 9. Anonymous, “China Cracks Down on Illegal Online Map Services to Protect State Security”, Peoples Daily Online, Xinhua News Agency, 26 March, 2008, (http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90782/6380703.html). (Accessed 28 May 2008).
10. Best, Richard A. and Alfred Cumming, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress – Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress. Order Code: RL34270, December 5, 2007. 11. Steele, Robert D. 2004. The Importance of Open Source Intelligence to the Military. In: Strategic Intelligence – Windows into a Secret World, eds L.K. Johnson and J.J. Wirtz, 112-119 . Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company. 12. Fleisher, Craig S. and Babette Bensoussan 2002. Strategic and Competitive Analysis: Methods and Techniques for Analyzing Business Competition. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 13. Fleisher, Craig S. and Babette E. Bensoussan 2007. Business and Competitive Analysis: Effective Application of New and Classic Methods. Upper Saddle River: FT Press. 14. Porter, Michael E. 1998. Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. New York: The Free Press. 15. Gilad, Benjamin 2003. Early Warning: Using Competitive Intelligence to Anticipate market Shifts, Control Risk and Create Powerful Strategies. New York: AMACOM. 16. Carr, Margaret M. 2003. Super Searchers of Competitive Intelligence. Medford: CyberAge Books. 17. Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals 2008. Web statement: http://www.scip.org/. (Accessed 25 May 2008). 18. Carl, Leo D. 1996. The CIA Insider’s Dictionary of US and Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Tradecraft. Washington: NIBC Press, 300.
19. Defense Intelligence Agency, Center for Science and Technology Intelligence. Web posting: http://www.dia.mil/college/csti.htm. Accessed 25 May, 2008. 20. Bruce, James B. 2008. “Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to Intelligence”. In: Analyzing Intelligence, eds R.Z. Bruce and J.B. Bruce. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 171-190. 21. Garfield, Eugene 1994. The Impact Factor. Current Contents (25):3-7, 20 June. 22. Garfield, Eugene 1994. Using the Impact Factor. Current Contents (29):3-5, 18 July. 23. Plomp, Reinier. 1994. The Highly Cited Papers of Professors as an Indicator of a Research Group's Scientific Performance. Scientometrics (29):377-93. 24. Price, Derek J.D.S. 1986. Citation Measures of Hard Science, Soft Science, Technology, and Nonscience. In Communication Among Scientists and Engineer, eds C.E. Nelson, and D.K. Pollack, 155-79. New York: Columbia University Press. 25. Deurenberg, Rikie 1993. Journal Deselection in a Medical University Library by Ranking Periodicals Based on Multiple Factor. Bull. Med. Libr. Assoc. 81(3): 316-319. 26. Maples, Michael D. 2007. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States. Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee. _________________________ Dr. Robert A. Norton received his BS and MS from Southern Illinois University and a Ph.D. from the University of Arkansas. His specialty is the analysis of weapons of mass destruction and weapon systems development. Dr. Gregory S. Weaver received his BS from Auburn University, his MA from University of Central Florida and Ph.D. from University of Nebraska. His primary specialty area is study of violence at the aggregate level.