EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - DOC by benbenzhou

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									         Future of the
Single Manager for Conventional
     Ammunition (SMCA)
            Study



                   By

     Office of the Executive Director
                    For
       Conventional Ammunition

              1 August 2006
Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study




                                  ii
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


                             Executive Summary
The Office of the Executive Director for Conventional Ammunition (O/EDCA) conducted a
study on the viability of the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) concept
during the period of September 2004 through June 2006. The study assessed whether the SMCA
concept is still viable for the future based on the plans for Military Services weapon systems and
associated munitions given the vision for future warfare. Included in this study was a review of
how SMCA will change in terms of definitions and scope and recommendations for changes in
the mission, roles, and responsibilities associated with the extant SMCA.

In the course of the study, the O/EDCA researched documentation and historical records,
conducted written and oral interviews with over 70 subject matter experts from all the Military
Services. Since the interview results are non-attribution, specific names and organizations are
not provided in the body of the study. A comprehensive analysis of the interview results and
information gathered was conducted by the O/EDCA.

As a result, the conclusion was reached that SMCA should continue in the 2010 and beyond
time period with suggested improvements.

The O/EDCA used a four-phased approach to assess the current performance of the SMCA,
determine the shortfalls and develop the recommendations. The four phases are as follows:

      Phase One – Planning Phase – Study Development Plan: Sep 04 – Jan 05.
      Phase Two – Data Collection Phase – Define Baseline and Current Vision: Jan – Aug 05.
      Phase Three – Analysis & Recommendation Phase – Comparison of Transformation
       Visions/Gap Analysis: Sep 05 – Feb 06.
      Phase Four – Report Preparation – Final Report: Mar – May 06.

The study provides an assessment of SMCA ―as designed‖: its formation in the late 1970’s; ―as is‖:
how it currently operates; and ―could be‖: where it needs to go in the future. Enhancements to
SMCA performance and changes in future Roles and Responsibilities are also provided to assure
SMCA is in a position to support the future needs.

This study identified eight focus areas or gaps that exist between the current and future capability
requirements of the SMCA mission for 2010 and beyond. The study analyzed these focus areas and
made recommendations to be reviewed by the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group (JOCG). The
methodology for the recommendations is based on a combination of several criteria: review of
future transformation initiatives and documentation, results of interviews with subject matter
experts; and analysis by the O/EDCA.




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

Executive Summary (Continued)

Recommendations include changes in the following focus areas. The primary recommendations
have been summarized below and, unless otherwise specified, are recommendations for Joint process
improvements:

   Focus Area                                       Recommendations

   Roles and Responsibilities                       - Expand SMCA role in RDT&E
                                                    - Document transition decision process
                                                    - Expand SMCA industrial base
                                                        management role
                                                    - Amend EDCA and O/EDCA designations
                                                        as required

   Management Process                               - Publish clearer written policy
                                                    - Develop SMCA training program
                                                    - Track SMCA Integrated Product Teams

   Procurement Financial Management                 - Put all Military Service requirements in
                                                        ICAPP (interim step)
                                                    - Link databases
                                                    - Reestablish Quad Service Review
                                                    - Synchronize PPBES

   Information Technology Management                - Leverage existing and build future
                                                        capability to support Transformation
                                                    - Improve connectivity and
                                                        information quality

   Engineering Support Items Production (ESIP)      - Execute Lean Six Sigma improvements
                                                    - Develop training programs

   Production Prioritization                        - Develop prioritization guidance

   Supply Management                                - Improve inventory management visibility
                                                    - Evaluate process Non-SMCA storage
                                                    - Identify support requirement changes for
                                                        seabasing and modularization

   Material Release and Safety Certification        - Surface consensus to DoD Safety Board

The O/EDCA would like to thank all the people who contributed to this study by granting
interviews and assisting in research. Additionally, we would like to thank Mr. George Eaton for
researching and preparing the SMCA history report, Matching Organization to Expectation: The
Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition, 1950 to 2004.



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Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study




     Future of the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition
                           (SMCA) Study
                                  Table of Contents

Topic                                                                        Page
Executive Summary                                                              iii
1. Introduction                                                                 1
2. Roles and Responsibilities                                                   8
3. Management Process                                                         14
4. Procurement Financial Management                                           18
5. Information Technology Management                                          24
6. Engineering Support of Items in Production (ESIP)                          29
7. Joint Adjudication for Production Line Prioritization                      32
8. SMCA Supply Management                                                     34
9. Single DoD-wide Standard for Material Release and Safety Certifications    39
10. Documentation Review – Joint Publications                                 41
11. Documentation Review – Air Force                                          47
12. Documentation Review – Army                                               53
13. Documentation Review – Marine Corps                                       60
14. Documentation Review – Navy                                               71
15. Summary of Recommendations                                                76
16. Conclusion                                                                78


Appendices
        Appendix A – Acronyms
        Appendix B – SMCA-Related Definitions and Terms
        Appendix C – Study Plan
        Appendix D – Interview Results
        Appendix E – SMCA History
        Appendix F – Expiring Year Funds Example
        Appendix G – Profile of Ammunition Procurement
        Appendix H – Profile of SMCA Operations Funding
        Appendix I – Supply Posture Analysis
        Appendix J – List of Personnel Interviewed
        Appendix K – References




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study




                                        Chapter 1
                                    Introduction
1.1. Introduction. This report contains the findings, analyses and recommendations resulting
from the study conducted at the request of the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group Executive
Committee (JOCG EXCOM). In a memorandum dated 22 September 2004 (see Appendix C),
the JOCG EXCOM requested the Office of the Executive Director for Conventional Ammunition
(O/EDCA) undertake a study to review the current SMCA concept to determine its applicability
in 2010 and beyond. As the Military Services transform to become more responsive to today’s
world, so must the processes that provide conventional ammunition to the Joint warfighter.

1.2. Objective. The objective was to review the current SMCA concept and provide
recommendations to improve the management of conventional ammunition to ensure it is
effective, relevant and responsive to the Joint warfighter of the future. In response to this
request, the O/EDCA developed a study plan. The study plan was approved 13 January 2005
and focused on the following questions (see Appendix C):

   1.2.1. Is the SMCA concept still viable for future based on the vision of the Military
Services weapon systems and associated munitions?

  1.2.2. Given the vision for future warfare, what are the Military Services’ expectations for
SMCA?

   1.2.3. If the SMCA concept is still viable, how will it change in terms of definitions and
scope?

   1.2.4. Based on the answers to the first three questions, what are the recommendations for
changes in the mission, roles, and responsibilities associated with the extant SMCA?

1.3. Scope. Subjects and areas reviewed and analyzed included, but were not limited to: the
missions, roles and responsibilities of the current SMCA and the Military Services; Joint Vision
2010; Joint logistics interdependencies; future munitions development programs; force
structures; infrastructure; transformational initiatives and automated information technology
programs; and SMCA versus Service-Retained items. Note: SMCA-related terms, as used in
this report are defined in Appendix B.

1.4. Purpose. The purpose of this study was to review the SMCA concept for future
applicability in supporting ammunition management in the Department of Defense (DoD). This
study of ammunition management was not limited to management of those items currently
identified as SMCA-Assigned in DoD Directive 5160.65 but also included management aspects
that could potentially be transitioned to SMCA in the future for all conventional ammunition.




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

1.5. Background. Knowing the history of SMCA is essential to understand the manner in which
SMCA supports the warfighters.

   1.5.1. Past.

       1.5.1.1. Planning the formation of the SMCA dates back to the mid-1970s. The
Department of Defense (DoD) assigned the single manager duties to the Department of the Army
(DA) to eliminate duplication and redundancy. While the SMCA mission was implemented in
October 1977, the single manager concept for materiel management dates back to the 1950s.
During the 1950s and into the late 1980s, conventional ammunition items designated SMCA-
Assigned comprised almost the entire Class V ammunition inventory.

        1.5.1.2. In the late 1970s, when SMCA was first designed and established, ammunition
management changed from decentralized, Military Service management to centralized
management of designated responsibilities. Communications were made by landline phone and
mailing was done by hard copy through the postal service. At that time, large, prepositioned
land forces with high munitions requirements was the strategy for warfighting against
conventional military foes. The establishment of centralized management included Procurement,
Production, Storage and Distribution. Production facilities transferred from the Navy to the
Army included what are now called Crane Army Ammunition Activity, McAlester Army
Ammunition Plant and Hawthorne Army Depot. The Conventional Ammunition Working
Capital Fund (CAWCF) was created as a Joint Service revolving fund. The SMCA was
designated to manage and operate the Wholesale Inventory control Point (ICP) for SMCA-
Assigned conventional ammunition although the Services retained ownership of their
ammunition.

       1.5.1.3. Until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the biggest threat to US sovereignty
was the Communist Block countries. This type of war was forecasted to be long duration in a
target rich environment and would require large amounts of ammunition delivered primarily by
commercial ship over the years of war. While no Military Service could fully fund their
requirement, the quantities being procured were significantly greater than the quantities being
procured today. At that time, communications were conducted primarily by landline telephones
and mailing hard copies of correspondence.

        1.5.1.4. In the early 1990s, after Desert Storm, the US DoD struggled with defining the
changing threat and determining how to meet it. The threat was now identified as Joint
operation, short duration contingencies against a reduced target threat in locations where US
Forces were not necessarily already located. Also, during the 1990s, the Military Services drew
down their war reserve inventories to support training. This draw down period had a significant
effect on the munitions industrial base as procurements did not occur for items being drawn
down. When the draw downs came to an end, new sources of supply had to be found to
manufacture the new smaller requirement quantities of conventional ammunition items.
Simultaneous to the draw downs, communication methodologies advanced to include email, fax,
batch files and some use of cellular telephones and Internet. The smaller quantities and
improved communications contributed to the need for improvements in asset visibility during
and following Desert Storm.



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    Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

       1.5.1.5. Another significant part of SMCA history is the establishment of Program
Executive Office Ammunition (PEO Ammunition) in 2001. The Army stood up this
organization based on a 1997 study conducted by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(PNNL).1 The study examined the ammunition management process and also looked at the
ammunition infrastructure. The PNNL study recommended the creation of PEO Ammunition to
manage ammunition program managers as well as execute the responsibilities of the SMCA.

     1.5.2. Present.

       1.5.2.1. Over the years, functions have changed, centralized management and Joint
consideration became the norm but management is still not fully centralized. Wide broadband
communications have improved by email, phone, fax, and internet but batch files still exist for
supporting of many functions. We now have tailored expeditionary forces with smaller
requirements against a long term asymmetric threat. Procurement is not fully centralized. The
CAWCF (Conventional Ammunition Working Capital Fund) is now being closed. The SMCA
manages and operates the wholesale ICP as originally designed.

        1.5.2.2. The perceived threat continued to evolve and had a significant change in
direction in 2001. Per the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report:

            The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war. Since the
            attacks of September 11, 2001, our Nation has fought a global war against violent
            extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice, and who seek to destroy
            our free way of life. Our enemies seek weapons of mass destruction and, if they
            are successful, will likely attempt to use them in their conflict with free people
            everywhere. Currently, the struggle is centered in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we
            will need to be prepared and arranged to successfully defend our Nation and its
            interests around the globe for years to come. This 2006 Quadrennial Defense
            Review is submitted in the fifth year of this long war.2

        1.5.2.3. Within DoD, considering Joint requirements is the normal procedure today.
Rapid data exchange through the Internet or other electronic means for data exchange is a
necessity but is frequently supported through manual work arounds when systems do not have
the required connectivity or capability.




1
  Recommended Strategy for Configuring and Managing the U.S. Munitions Industrial Base, T. J. Doherty and R.
E. Rhoads, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, June 1997, page 1.
2
  Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, Department of Defense (DoD), 6 February 2006, Pg v.


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


        1.5.2.4. To support the requirements, the SMCA structure has evolved to the
relationships depicted in Figure 1.




                                            SMCA Team
                                          SMCA Management Team
                                                  Secretary of the Army
                                                    SMCA Responsibility

                                          DA G4                            ASA (ALT)
                                SMCA Sustainment                          SMCA Authority

                   CG, AMC                               EDCA


                        CG, JMC                      Office of the EDCA
                   SMCA Field Operating
                                                                               PEO AMMO
                        Activity                                               SMCA Executor




                                                     Force
                                                   Projection

                                 War-fighter Support to
                                      all Services
                                                                                               1



                                                      FIGURE 1




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    Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

        1.5.2.4. Figure 2 graphically depicts a conceptual view of the SMCA scope of influence
across the life cycle of a typical SMCA-Assigned conventional ammunition item.



                                                                   SMCA SCOPE
                                                   WHOLESALE CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT

                             RESEARCH
                                                                                                               LOGISTICS/                  STOCKPILE
                               AND                         ACQUISITION              PRODUCTION
                                                                                                              SUSTAINMENT                   DISPOSAL
                           DEVELOPMENT

                                              Service Retained Scope

                                                                                                  SMCA SCOPE
                                             Service Retained Scope

                          SMCA                        SMCA                         SMCA                   SMCA                           SMCA
                          •Test support              •Acquisition strategy     • Production/Systems       • Program Mgmt/                • Demilitarization
                          • Reliability Data           Support Planning          Engineering if appl         Planning/Control               Program Mgmt/
                          • Test stock               •Contracting              •Design/process            •Surveillance Program/               Planning/Control
                          • 806 Decisions            •Program Mgmt/               improvement                QDR Suspensions/ASRP           Commercial Sale
                          • Efficiency Decisions       Planning/Control        •Production Testing        •Inventory Control/               Develop Demil
                          • Design Input             •Review/Certification     •Production Monitoring        Accountability                    Technologies and
      Responsibilities




                             Power Supplies            of TDP if applicable    •Configuration Mgmt        •Receipt and Issue                    Procedures
                             Common Fuzes            •Pre-production           •Acceptance                •Distribution/Requisitioning      RRR
                             Modular components       Engineering              •Program Mgmt/             •Out loading                      Contracting
                          • Interoperability         •PPBES                       Planning/Control        •Transportation                   Disposal
                          • Safety                   •Price and Availability   •Manufacturing             •Maintenance                      Recode to Stock
                                                     •IM Strategy              •Quality Assurance         •Maintenance of Storage        •Sales
                                                                               •First Destination             Facilities                    FMS
                                                                                   Shipping               •Safety/Security                  Presidential
                          Military Services          Military Services         •Contract Modification     •Pre-positioning                   Drawdown
                          • RDT&E                    • Program Mgmt            •Safety and Environment    •Malfunction Investigation        Direct Sales
                          • Short/Long Range         • Support SMCA Plan                                  •PPBES                            GFM
                          Planning                   • Execute Service FYDP     Military Services
                          •Consider commonality      • Service NICP/NMP        • Program Mgmt             Military Services              Military Services
                          •Transition assigned       • Configuration Owner     • Determine FYDP           • Program Mgmt                 • Forecast/ Plan
                          items                      • IM Decisions/Strategy   • Indus Base Planning      • Tech – Config Mgmt           • Tech Data Transfer
                                                                               • Use IB/ Strategic Plan   • MIPR Cross Service           • Transfer to Army PM    1

                                                                                FIGURE 2
      1.5.3. Future.

        1.5.3.1. In the future, Jointness will be the rule rather than the norm. Communications
will include direct connectivity down to the warfighter in the field. A faster, leaner, modularized
force with scalable requirements will be the strategy for warfight against a long term asymmetric
threat. Capabilities such as Sea Basing, rapid deployment and an agile industrial base are part of
the long-term defense strategy. DoD is working on establishing a centralized data base to
support procurement planning, and inventory management is moving from IT systems with no
connectivity toward a seamless warfighter.

       1.5.3.2. The 2006 QDR Report identified several shifts in emphasis that could be
considered to directly affect the SMCA concept and expectations from that concept: 3

                        From 20th century processes – to 21st century integrated approaches.
3
    Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, Department of Defense (DoD), 6 February 2006, page vi-vii.


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    Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


         From static defense, garrison forces – to mobile, expeditionary operations.

         From single Service acquisition systems – to joint portfolio management.

         From vertical structures and processes (stovepipes) – to more transparent, horizontal
          integration (matrix).

         From moving the user to the data – to moving data to the user.4

        1.5.3.3. Small mobile expeditionary operations imply smaller incremental shipments that
are closely coordinated with the operating forces. Joint portfolio management as part of a 21st
century integrated approach to supporting these expeditionary forces is endorsed from the
highest DoD levels to support this near term requirement. Seamlessly moving data to the user is
essential to all of this.

        1.5.3.4. Several changes will affect the SMCA level of support to the Warfighter needed in
the future. These include: more precision/guided weapons, more non-lethal weapons and less
money for SMCA-Assigned ammunition in the procurement budgets. In most cases, the new
technologies are not replacing the existing SMCA-Assigned items but are supplementing their
capabilities. Increased Force Protection ammunition usage and training will also continue on items
like small arms.

       1.5.3.5. Modularized units and larger numbers of expeditionary forces could change the
ways in which follow-on ammunition sustainment is provided to all Military Services.

         1.5.3.6. The seabasing concept, when implemented, could store more ammunition at sea and
less at land-based activities. This concept is under development and a number of decisions relevant
to ammunition support have not yet been made. Whether the ammunition loaded on seabasing ships
will come from SMCA storage facilities or the current retail facilities’ allocations has not yet been
decided. Regardless, follow-on sustainment methodologies and packaging requirements for the
seabasing ships have not yet been identified; this decision could affect what functions SMCA is
expected to execute as part of its logistics support role.

        1.5.3.7. Changes to the logistics support requirements related to modularization and
seabasing were still being analyzed as part of the transformation process at the publication time for
this report. Changes to ammunition support requirements are anticipated but were not fully defined.

       1.5.3.7. The preceding view of the strategic level requirements for ammunition support
should be considered with a brief portrayal of some of the tactical changes that have affected and
may affect SMCA’s mission execution. The following table lists some of the major functional
changes over the years.




4
    Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, Department of Defense (DoD), 6 February 2006, page vi-vii.


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


            SMCA                               SMCA                              SMCA
      Past ―As Designed‖                   Present ―As Is‖                  Future ―Could Be‖
 • Transfer Installations.           • BRAC.                              • BRAC?
 • Establish Centralized Mgt of      • Procurement not fully              • Agile Industrial Base.
   Procurement & Production,            centralized.
                                                                          • Centralized Procurement
    Storage & Distribution.          • CAWCF closing.                        Database.
 • Creation of CAWCF.                • SMCA manage & operate              • Seamless Support
 • SMCA manage & operate                Wholesale ICP.                            DPO
    Wholesale ICP.                   • PEO Ammunition Chartered as                CAM
 • Sec Army issue charter.              SMCA Executor.
 • Creation of joint staff NCR.      • Staff in NCR reduced by half.


1.6. Issues and recommendations.

     1.6.1. While the SMCA concept remains viable, the changes recommended in this study are
necessary to help make SMCA remain responsive to customer needs and to enable it to attain the
highest level of effectiveness and efficiency. Over time, the expectations of all Military Services
as well as SMCA have changed; but the idea of providing one source for management of
common ammunition items and functions at the wholesale level has not. The SMCA concept is
still valid, but just as all elements within DoD are evolving to meet the changing defense
planning guidance requirements, the execution of the SMCA mission also will have to continue
to evolve and improve. This study identified focus areas or gaps that exist between the current
and future capability requirements of the SMCA mission for 2010 and beyond. The objective of
the focus area analyses was to determine the current effectiveness and efficiency of the SMCA
concept and causes for shortfalls. The study compared the current operational environment to
the Military Services’ transformation initiatives to identify any disconnects with the SMCA
concept.

    1.6.2. The eight analyses in Chapters 2 through 9 identify roles and responsibility changes,
shortfalls and areas for improvement based on the research conducted for this study. These
analyses were made using information in the documentation review, personal interviews
(Appendix D), and other appendices of this report. Information in the analyses was cross-
referenced against existing policy guidance and evidentiary data to verify accuracy.

    1.6.3. The documentation reviews in Chapters 10 through 14 summarize strategic guidance
for current and future operational and logistics support based on published material. The Joint
Application chapter (Chapter 10) draws from Joint Staff publications and DoD publications.
Chapters 11 through 14 draw information from Military Service publications. The materiel in
these chapters was selected for the potential impact the documentation might have on
ammunition management and logistical support requirements. The impact of the concepts in
these chapters is not limited to SMCA, but concentrates on the Military Services’ strategic plans
and provides a holistic view of their munitions management from the wholesale to the
operational level.



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    Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


                                         Chapter 2
                        Roles and Responsibilities
2.1. Roles and Responsibilities Issue One. The SMCA needs to have greater involvement
during the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) phase.

    2.1.1. Background. During the interview phase of the study, numerous individuals
expressed the concern that the SMCA and the Military Services needed to work in a more
collaborative method during the RDT&E phase. While paragraph E2.1 of DoDI 5160.68 states
the SMCA and Military Services responsibilities during RDT&E, no disciplined approach has
been established to ensure proper coordination occurs.

     2.1.2. Analysis.

        2.1.2.1. Greater involvement in the RDT&E phase should provide earlier identification
of logistics capabilities and requirements and would capitalize on synergy in RDT&E activities.

        2.1.2.2. In a 14 October 2003 memo to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Logistics and Materiel Readiness, the Chairman of the JOCG, stated that the JOCG EXCOM
concurred with the Army’s offer to be the lead agent to ―…coordinate and leverage the various
Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) efforts underway within the Department that affect the AA&E logistics chain.‖5 One
of the agent’s roles is to ―…facilitate discussion/foster collaborative efforts to jointly leverage
solutions, technologies and designs and better use limited RDT&E funds.‖6

        2.1.2.3. In July 2005 the Army’s Program Executive Officer for Ammunition (PEO
Ammunition) formed an Ammunition Logistics Research and Development Strategic Plan
Integrated Product Team (IPT) ―…to synchronize and prioritize current and future Army
ammunition logistics R&D efforts.‖7 The memo further states, ―Additionally, I would like to
better leverage efforts with the other Services and Department of Defense agencies, and
potentially develop Joint, collaborative programs.‖

    2.1.3. Recommendations. The following two recommendations will assist in developing a
more disciplined method of coordination, which will lead to reduced costs as items are
transitioned for procurement and sustainment.

       2.1.3.1. Establish and implement a process whereby AA&E RDT&E efforts are reviewed
or coordinated by Armaments, Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) and
the SMCA Executor organization to identify impacts on the logistics chain. Included in this
coordination should be a feedback loop to the Military Services to share information and
recommendations.
5
  Memorandum, JOCG Chairman, SUBJECT: DoD Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E) Distribution
Strategic Plan, 14 October 2003.
6
  Ibid.
7
  Memorandum, PEO Ammunition (SFAE-AMO), SUBJECT: Ammo Log R&D Strategic Plan IPT, undated.


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    Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


        2.1.3.2. Use the PEO Ammunition's Ammunition Logistics Research and Development
Strategic Plan as the basis for a SMCA Plan.

     2.1.4. Key organizations impacted. All Military Services, SMCA.

2.2. Roles and Responsibilities Issue Two. The DoD needs to have a documented, disciplined,
defendable decision process for transitioning items to SMCA for procurement.

    2.2.1. Background. Transitioning is the process of transferring responsibility from the
developing Military Service to the SMCA. It begins early in the life of an ammunition item and
continues until the SMCA assumes management responsibility. Some responsibilities and
authorities are retained by the developing Military Service even after the item has been
transitioned to the SMCA. Paragraph E2.1.2.2.7 of DoDI 5160.68 states that the Military
Services will ―Transition SMCA items to the SMCA at Milestone C to accommodate the SMCA
logistics support function…‖ and that ―As an exception, the Military Services may retain
procurement responsibility when SMCA procurement offers no efficiencies (e.g., small buys,
Service-Unique items).‖8 Many of the SMCA Executor representatives expressed a concern that
items were not being transitioned for procurement and that there is no way to determine if a
Military Service transitions, or decides not to transition, an item.

     2.2.2. Analysis.

        2.2.2.1. Non-transitioning of newly developed items impacts SMCA mission execution.
The SMCA Executor representatives expressed a strong desire to require the Military Services to
transition items to SMCA for procurement and post-procurement wholesale life cycle support.
The SMCA Executor representatives indicated that opting out of transitioning items for
procurement is too easy and there is little or no consequence to opting out. SMCA Executor
representatives suggested that a more disciplined or structured process should be developed to
require Military Services to justify their decisions to not transition items to SMCA. The SMCA
Executor representatives view was that the portion of DoDI 5160.68 that allows Military
Services to procure and manage their own ammunition procurements for SMCA-Assigned
ammunition goes against DoD goals. The SMCA Executor representatives also felt that
transitioning would occur more often if efficiencies were demonstrated to DoD and the Military
Services, e.g., adding value by consolidating management of smart and precision guided
munitions sustainment would offer incentives for Military Services to move sustainment to the
SMCA.

        2.2.2.2. Some of the Military Service interviewees stated they were concerned about
losing control of the management functions if they transitioned items to the SMCA. Another
concern was that the transitioning issue will get worse as DoD moves towards smarter munitions.
Smart and precision guided munitions are not SMCA-Assigned but they have many of the same
logistics sustainment requirements. A Military Service that transitions an item theoretically loses
part of their structure to support that item. However, the SMCA Executor organization thought

8
  DoD Instruction 5160.68, Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA): Responsibilities of the SMCA
and the Military Services, 22 December 2003.


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    Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

that significant management redundancies exist between SMCA and the Military Services partly
due to lack of confidence and that the Military Services retain large ammunition management
staffs even with the use of SMCA for support.

      2.2.2.3. Some SMCA Executor organization representatives suggested improvements in
SMCA’s efficiency and effectiveness by redefining SMCA-Assigned and Service Retained
ammunition items. Whether ammunition is guided or non-guided is irrelevant to certain parts of
the ammunition industrial and sustainment base.

        2.2.2.4. A disciplined method needs to be developed to ensure that the Military Services
notify the SMCA Executor organization of all SMCA-Assigned ammunition items that are at
Milestone C and potentially ready for transition. Such notification would allow the SMCA
Executor organization to show the benefits of transitioning the item and ensure all required
administrative steps have been taken by the Military Service and the SMCA. The process will
allow the SMCA Executor organization to determine if there are areas requiring improvement in
order to better meet the needs of the Military Services. The process also can provide the
documentation to prove the decision was based on disciplined procedures rather than
organizational preferences. If the business case decision is made to not transition the item, the
reasons for not doing so should be documented.

     2.2.3. Recommendations.

       2.2.3.1. The SMCA Executor organization, in coordination with the Military Services,
should establish a process that documents and tracks the decisions for transitioning ammunition
to SMCA for procurement. As a minimum, the detailed tracking documentation should indicate,
by item: the procurement decision, the logistics decision and the reason for each decision.

        2.2.3.2. The SMCA Executor organization should establish and maintain a detailed
transition tracking report that documents decisions made each fiscal year.

          2.2.3.3. A summary of transitioning decisions should be included in the SMCA Annual
Report.

     2.2.4. Key organizations impacted. All Military Services, SMCA, O/EDCA.

2.3. Roles and Responsibilities Issue Three. The SMCA needs to have greater oversight of
industrial capabilities for all ammunition and missile items.

    2.3.1. Background. The DoDI 5160.68 states that the SMCA will ―Lead in the
development and publication of an overarching conventional ammunition industrial base
strategic plan that supports the Military Services’ conventional ammunition requirements.‖9 and




9
  DoD Instruction 5160.68, Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA): Responsibilities of the SMCA
and the Military Services, 22 December 2003, paragraph E2.2.1.1.


                                                    10
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

that the Military Services will ―Provide support in development of the overarching conventional
ammunition industrial base strategic plan.‖10

     2.3.2. Analysis.

       2.3.2.1. In theory, strict adherence to Section 80611 would assist the SMCA in
developing a realistic conventional ammunition industrial base strategic plan. In practice, such
adherence is not occurring, though moves to increase compliance with Section 806 requirements
are underway.

        2.3.2.2. Currently, the Military Services are required to provide industrial base
information to the SMCA for the SMCA-Assigned ammunition but not for items that are retained
for management by the Military Services. SMCA Executor representatives felt that DoD needs
to have visibility of industrial base requirements for all ammunition procured within the DoD.
Some Army interviewees suggested improvements in SMCA’s efficiency and effectiveness by
redefining or expanding SMCA responsibilities for ammunition industrial base management
purposes. Whether ammunition is guided or non-guided is irrelevant to certain parts of the
ammunition industrial and sustainment base. Military Service retained items often compete for
the same industrial base assets used to support conventional ammunition requirements; this could
cause readiness issues. A single clearing house for all ammunition industrial base issues would
provide an awareness of possible industrial base issues to the DoD.

       2.3.2.3. The SMCA has a tool, the Industrial Base Assessment Tool (IBAT), which
provides detailed information on industrial base requirements for a large percentage of
ammunition items. Inclusion of all ammunition items would provide critical industrial base
information to the DoD.

     2.3.3. Recommendations.

        2.3.3.1. Recommend DoDD 5160.65 and DoDI 5160.68 be changed to expand SMCA’s
industrial base management mission to include all conventional ammunition: SMCA-Assigned
and Service Retained.

       2.3.3.2. Recommend IBAT’s database be populated and maintained to include Service
Retained ammunition item information.

     2.3.4. Key organizations impacted. All Military Services, SMCA.

2.4. Roles and Responsibilities Issue Four. During the December 2005 JOCG Executive
session, MG Johnson requested that this study take a look at the O/EDCA and PM JS
organizations, roles, missions and alignments.



10
   DoD Instruction 5160.68, Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA): Responsibilities of the SMCA
and the Military Services, 22 December 2003, paragraph E2.2.2.4.
11
   Section 806 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (PL105-261).


                                                    11
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

    2.4.1. Background. The Base Realignment and Closure 2005 (BRAC) decision required the
Headquarters Army Materiel Command (HQ AMC) to move to Huntsville, AL. The move is
expected to occur in the FY09 to FY11 time period. The Deputy Commanding General AMC
(DCG AMC) is currently designated as the EDCA with his supporting staff (O/EDCA)
co-located as a separate reporting agency under AMC. Historical guidance required the
O/EDCA to be in the National Capitol Region (NCR), but this requirement has been questioned
due to the advancements in electronic communication and due to changes in the SMCA
organization.

The O/EDCA has the mission to assist the EDCA in the execution of the assigned mission to
include: reviewing and assessing SMCA mission execution and related Service responsibilities,
as well as participating in the Joint Service management of conventional ammunition under the
Single Manager concept.

Stand up of the PEO Ammunition as the SMCA Executor included establishing a Project
Manager for Joint Services (PM JS). The PM JS office integrates the SMCA and provides the
other Military Services with an entry point for issues. PM-JS is directly responsible for non-
Army issues within SMCA.

At the time this study was prepared, organizations under AMC and Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)) were being realigned into Life
Cycle Management Commands (LCMCs). The PEO Ammunition organization at Picatinny
Arsenal, ARDEC and Joint Munitions Command (JMC) were being realigned to form the Joint
Munitions and Lethality Life Cycle Management Command (JM&L LCMC).

   2.4.2. Analysis.

       2.4.2.1. During close coordination with PM JS, three potential EDCA and O/EDCA
alignments were developed. These were:

             2.4.2.1.1. Option 1. Status Quo. DCG AMC remains designated as the EDCA with
his staff located in the NCR.

           2.4.2.1.2. Option 2. Co-Location in Picatinny with PEO-AMMO. DCG AMC
remains designated as the EDCA with his staff co-located with the SMCA Executor staff at
Picatinny Arsenal. One of the O/EDCA O-6 officers would be dual-hatted as the PM JS. In this
structure PM JS and O/EDCA will remain separate organizations. This option preserves
organizational autonomy, but improves access and interface with the SMCA Executor and
Leadership.

           2.4.2.1.3. Option 3. Aligning the O/EDCA into the JM&L LCMC Structure.
This integrates the O/EDCA into the JM&L LCMC Structure at Picatinny Arsenal. This option
enhances the O/EDCA ability to perform analytical and assessment functions by positioning
O/EDCA inside the process and integrates O/EDCA into the PM-JS structure.




                                               12
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

       2.4.2.2. These options were briefed to the current EDCA, LTG Mortensen during July
2006 and he endorsed Option 3. At the time this study was published, these options were
scheduled for a separate briefing to the JOCG for review and decision.

    2.4.3. Recommendations. The EDCA and O/EDCA designations be amended as required
based on the decisions made during ongoing meetings and briefings. As needed, realignment
documentation and function and personnel movement planning should be initiated to support the
final alignment decision.

   2.4.4. Key organizations impacted. O/EDCA, SMCA.




                                             13
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


                                            Chapter 3
                               Management Process
3.1. Management Process Issue One. Improvements in the flow of information between
SMCA and the Military Services as well as additional knowledge of the management processes
are necessary to position SMCA’s support of the warfighter of the future.

     3.1.1. Background.

       3.1.1.1. The key management finding in the PNNL study was that the management
organization was fragmented with responsibilities divided among several major organizations.
PNNL recommended that in order to eliminate fragmented management, the Army should
manage ammunition like a major acquisition program.12 They recommended creation of the
Program Executive Office Ammunition (PEO Ammunition) to manage ammunition program
managers. The PNNL study did not address the role of the other Military Services in the
ammunition system.13 However, PNNL recommended that PEO Ammunition execute the
responsibilities of the SMCA.

        3.1.1.2. In 2001, the PEO Ammunition was formed and SMCA Executor duties
transferred from the Commanding General, Army Materiel Command (CG AMC) to the PEO
Ammunition in 2003. The AMC subordinate command located at Rock Island Arsenal, IL,
currently called Joint Munitions Command (JMC), was and remained the SMCA Field Operating
Activity (SMCA FOA). The SMCA structure was set up with the Army’s ammunition Program
Managers (PMs) reporting directly to the PEO Ammunition and with the JMC as the SMCA
FOA.14

        3.1.1.3. Per DoDD 5160.65, the SMCA Executor is responsible for the overall execution
of the SMCA’s mission as outlined in DoDI 5160.68. Per the SMCA Charter, the SMCA
Executor is responsible to ensure integration and execution of the SMCA functions. Per the
SMCA Charter, the SMCA FOA is responsible to accomplish the duties and responsibilities
prescribed in DoDD 5160.65 and DoDI 5160.68’s SMCA mission by providing logistics and
sustainment support to the SMCA Executor and the Military Services.

      3.1.1.4. Since the creation of the PEO Ammunition, integration and communication has
improved, however some shortfalls still exist. The SMCA roles and responsibilities identified in
DoDD 5160.65 and DoDI 5160.68, have been successfully executed for the most part but
communication problems must be addressed to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness.


12
   Recommended Strategy for Configuring and Managing the U.S. Munitions Industrial Base, Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, June 1997, page 15-20.
13
   Matching Organization to Expectation: The Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition, 1950 to 2004, George
Eaton, Army Field Support Command (AFSC)/Joint Munitions Command Historian AFSC/JMC History Office,
Rock Island, IL 61299, 28 January 2006, page 47 (Appendix E).
14
   Recommended Strategy for Configuring and Managing the U.S. Munitions Industrial Base, Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, June 1997, page 15-20.


                                                     14
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

        3.1.1.5. Finding the correct responsible party to answer a day-to-day question or resolve
issues was surfaced several times by the Military Services and SMCA Executor representatives.
Much time is wasted by not knowing who to call and where to go within the organizational
structure. Although relationships are getting better, there are still many disconnects on who does
what. The PM Joint Services organization has been beneficial in providing a single point of
entry for many areas; however, the Military Services continue to work some of the day-to-day
operational issues at the action officer level within the SMCA FOA. Clarification and possible
realignment of missions and roles would be beneficial in addressing this problem.

        3.1.1.6. Along the same lines, some procedures within the SMCA FOA require
standardization and/or strengthening. For the most part, policies exist that cover every aspect of
SMCA management; however, they do not always provide step-by-step procedures causing users
to rely on verbal guidance. An example of this is the current writing of the Section 806
procedures. Although the policy was in place to provide instruction on how to use the 806
process, the policy was unclear and confusing to the Military Services.

   3.1.2. Analysis

                3.1.2.1. Since communication surfaced as one of the most important issues for
many of the interviewees, analysis and validation was performed. We agree that the lack of
knowledge and procedures for both the SMCA and the Military Services is evident at the team
level. A clear understanding of the total mission areas and processes is essential for
improvements to occur. During the validation process, we found that often the process existed
but was not being followed correctly by all. For example, when the Military Services asked for
guidance on an issue, they sometimes received two different answers from the action officers at
SMCA Executor organization and the FOA causing even greater confusion. As another
example, the timing of the requests for Technical Data Package (TDP) updates in support of
procurements actions vary, sometimes based on the specific solicitation but other times based on
the habits of the procuring PM or Commodity Team. No standardization of practices has been
implemented. The conjecture made is that this may be the result of a lack of policy. We also
discovered that sometimes what the customers were requesting was already implemented, just
not being followed correctly.

        3.1.2.2. The Single Manager concept is not just one entity managing ammunition, it is a
team concept. SMCA is challenged to be efficient and effective without coordination with the
entire team. For example, in some areas, the SMCA FOA processes for Supply and Distribution
are proactive and well-established to meet user needs in supporting the war-fighter; however, in
other areas, some process confusion exists over who has functional responsibility, SMCA
Executor organization or the SMCA FOA action officer. The latter may be a residual effect of
standing up the PEO Ammunition as the SMCA Executor. This often results in delays in
program execution while the Military Services or SMCA research the correct answer.

         3.1.2.3. This is not just a SMCA communication issue but also a lack of understanding
among some of the Military Services as well. For example, Military Services identified as a
problem return of funds too late in the year to obligate them. Research of this problem identified
that in some cases the SMCA FOA notified the Military Services early in the year but the



                                               15
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

Military Services did not respond until late in the year. In other cases, SMCA FOA did not
provide the Military Services adequate time to obligate funds that were returned late in the year
(see example on expiring year funds in Appendix F). Neither side was fully aware of the
problems associated with this issue. Improved communication and knowledge of the procedures
along with development of quarterly metrics would greatly increase the effectiveness of this
function.

        3.1.2.4. Education programs are lacking to support SMCA requirements and processes.
The SMCA Executor organization’s PMs and the SMCA FOA commodity teams each conduct
business differently; there should be more standardization, integration and information flow.
Many of the SMCA processes and procedures are improving through use of Lean Six Sigma
(LSS) efforts; however more can be done. For example, with the creation of the ESIP and
Section 806 LSS initiatives, the Military Services are more familiar with the processes and their
functions. More areas require further clarification and step-by-step procedures providing
detailed process flows.

   3.1.3. Recommendations.

       3.1.3.1. Ensure policy is written clearly so the number of differing interpretations is
reduced and standardization of processes are outlined. Continue to determine differences in
previously written SMCA manuals and Joint Conventional Ammunition Policies and Procedures
(JCAPPs) to further clarify processes. Add process descriptions or appendices to JCAPPs where
appropriate or prepare written desk-procedures to assure nothing slips through the cracks. This
should include information flow diagrams outlining organizations along with establishing an
associated database with POCs and phone numbers.

        3.1.3.2. Develop a training program using the Defense Ammunition Center (DAC) to
ensure personnel are familiar with all responsibilities under SMCA and with the potential impact
of decisions. This is different than the CP-33 career program development. Create SMCA 101
tutorials with associated mission areas similar to the JOCG subgroups. Provide to all as a DVD
set with easy reference. Training program should become part of employee and supervisor
performance standards.

       3.1.3.3. Continue to utilize the Lean Six Sigma process to further improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of SMCA procedures.

   3.1.4. Key organizations impacted. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), all Military
Services, SMCA.

3.2. Management Process Issue Two. No system to coordinate or prevent unplanned overlap
of Integrated Process Teams (IPT) responsibilities within SMCA currently exists.

   3.2.1. Background.




                                                16
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

        3.2.1.1. IPTs are an integral part of the Defense acquisition oversight and review
process.15 Within SMCA, each PM and each SMCA FOA Commodity has at least one IPT.
When special projects arise, IPTs or Lean Six Sigma (LSS) Teams are formed to address the new
subject.

       3.2.1.2. One Military Service indicated they had counted 120 SMCA IPTs (including the
12 JOCG subgroups) and similar teams in which their personnel were asked to participate. Other
Military Services confirmed that while they never made an actual count that seemed about right.

        3.2.1.3. Discussions with key SMCA Executor representatives indicated no knowledge
of any system to track or identify existing IPTs. LSS teams are managed through the LSS
Champion.

     3.2.2. Analysis.

        3.2.2.1. Follow-up discussions on the SMCA IPTs and similar teams indicated that some
Military Service organizations were unable to fully participate on all the teams because of time
constraints for their personnel. While IPTs are not a full time activity, SMCA has significantly
more IPTs than some of the Military Services have for staffing in their ammunition management
offices. Additionally, IPTs occasionally are formed to work a project that is already being
worked by another IPT or LSS team; this leads to inefficiencies. At the time this report was
being prepared, an LSS team was working a project on the Production Status Report
(PRODSTAT) that significantly overlapped efforts underway by the Pricing IPT. During the
Pricing IPT, the pre-existing overlap was identified.

       3.2.2.2. The DoD 5000.1 says: ―The DoD acquisition, capability needs, financial
communities and operational users shall maintain continuous and effective communications with
each other by using IPTs. Teaming among warfighters, users, developers, acquirers,
technologists, testers, budgeters, and sustainers shall begin during capability needs definition.
Milestone Decision Authorities (MDAs) and PMs are responsible for making decisions and
leading execution of their programs, and are accountable for results.‖16

        3.2.2.3. While this guidance clearly indicates the IPTs are a necessity, the current
situation seems to be an efficiency matter of having a means by which to identify when an IPT is
already addressing an issue prior to forming a new IPT.

   3.2.3. Recommendation. Recommend a database or similar Information Technology (IT)
method be established and maintained within the SMCA organization to track existing IPTs and
LSS teams and their projects to prevent overlap and to aid in finding the correct POC for the
subject area. If this database were maintained on the Ammunition Enterprise Webpage, any
group thinking about forming an IPT could quickly check if the subject is already being worked.

     3.2.4. Key organizations impacted. All Military Services, SMCA.

15
   Defense Acquisition Guidebook, paragraph 10.3, http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&doc=1
16 The Defense Acquisition System, 12 May 2003, USD(AT&L), DoD 5000.1, paragraph E.2,
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&doc=1


                                                    17
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


                                               Chapter 4
                Procurement Financial Management
4.1. Procurement Financial Management Issue One. The SMCA procurement financial
management responsibilities are not fully accomplished as specified in DoDI 5160.68. Mission
accomplishment is hindered by not having a unified, automated database and system.

      4.1.1. Background.

        4.1.1.1. SMCA Charter states that the SMCA Executor is responsible for the overall
execution of the Army’s SMCA mission which includes providing required support to the
Military Services in planning, programming and budgeting for resources necessary to accomplish
their responsibilities as specified in DoDI 5160.68.17

         4.1.1.2. Currently, the SMCA procurement support financial management process is
focused mainly on providing pricing and execution information to the Military Services on those
items the Military Services have already transitioned for procurement to the SMCA rather than
the full range of financial management impact areas identified in DoDI 5160.68. Specific areas
in which the SMCA Executor does not fully execute its financial management responsibilities
are discussed in the Analysis section of this focus area.

        4.1.1.3. As described by the SMCA FOA, the SMCA Procurement Planning Process is
as follows: Each Military Service is responsible for providing Conventional Ammunition Plan
(CAP) submissions to the SMCA three times annually. SMCA publishes a call letter providing
cycle requirements and due dates prior to each budget cycle. The Navy, Air Force and Marine
Corps submit their SMCA procured conventional ammunition requirements electronically
(manual entry from the Military Service to the SMCA database). SMCA develops P-Forms
based on the CAPs and returns them to the customer for review. The data from the P-Forms are
consolidated within the Integrated Conventional Ammunition Procurement Plan (ICAPP).

         4.1.1.4. During the interview portion of this study, both SMCA and Military Service
representatives acknowledged that SMCA lacks a clear integrated planning process with
visibility of all DoD munitions.

            4.1.1.4.1. SMCA representatives would like to see improvements in preliminary
planning for conventional ammunition acquisition since the SMCA Executor only sees definite
planning when the Military Services have funds in hand. SMCA representatives stated that
better visibility of Military Service preliminary planning would improve the SMCA’s mission
execution and avoid higher costs and reduced quantities from not consolidating buys.

           4.1.1.4.2. Several Military Services thought that earlier coordination of Joint
requirements and an early invitation to industry to provide input, where possible, so that
coordination process might improve the planning process and allow for the most cost effective and

17
     SMCA Charter, 15 May 06, paragraph V.d.


                                                  18
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

efficient manner to meet requirements. Additionally, fluctuations in pricing from programming to
execution and during execution cause a ripple effect in financial management for the Military
Services; earlier coordination might smooth this impact.

        4.1.1.5. Until 2000, a Quad-Service Review (QSR) was conducted annually prior to
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Lock to afford Military Services the opportunity to
review each other’s planned FYDP requirements. POM Lock is when each Military Service’s
financial management office closes the POM database for changes by other elements of the
Service. This review helped assess economies and helped determine the producibility of these
requirements for the SMCA production base. Prior to POM lock, Military Services can, in
theory, make changes to facilitate economies of scale. The QSR was based on the ICAPP and
evolved into a line by line program review. With the webification of the ICAPP and the ability
to see the Military Services’ transitioned ammunition SMCA procurement requirements on-line,
the Military Services agreed in May 2000 not to continue with the QSR. A QSR-comeback was
being considered by the SMCA Procurement Steering Council at the time of this report’s
publication.

   4.1.2. Analysis.

         4.1.2.1. Although all Military Services have indicated an improvement in support
provided by the SMCA, the Military Services identified issues with the SMCA financial
processes, accountability, and management that affect Military Service input to Planning,
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) for procurement. Examples of issues
are increasing production support costs, lack of visibility on how Service funds are used and the
need for more timely information on cost-to-complete status. As a result, Military Services limit
their transitions for procurement of ammunition to SMCA. Information on procurement
transition status based on procurement funding profiles is included in Appendix G.

        4.1.2.2. Although the DoDI 5160.68 specifies that the SMCA Executor has certain
financial responsibilities to manage the program and that the Military Services are to participate
in defined ways, analysis found indications that guidance in DoDI 5160.68 is not fully observed
or executed in the following areas:

   DoDI 5160.68 Responsibility                 Study Review Results
   In RDT&E, ―SMCA is to identify the          Review found no SMCA records of
   benefits of delegating the procurement      cost comparisons for procurement
   function to the SMCA‖ (paragraph            through SMCA vs. procurement
   E2.1.1.2).                                  through Military Service (outside of
                                               SMCA) to identify benefits of SMCA
                                               procurement. However, at least one
                                               Service retained information on
                                               procurement cost comparisons related
                                               to transition decisions.




                                                19
Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


 DoDI 5160.68 Responsibility                 Study Review Results
 In RDT&E, ―Services are to prepare          No standardized process captures
 transition plans in coordination with the   decisions on whether a Military
 SMCA and to retain procurement              Service chooses to transition
 responsibilities when SMCA                  procurements to SMCA.
 procurement offers no efficiencies (e.g.,
 small buys, Service-Unique items)‖
 (paragraph E2.1.2.2.6 & E2.1.2.2.7).
 In Production Base, ―SMCA is to             While the Industrial Base Strategic
 manage and invest in a production base      Plan does address GOCO adequacy, it
 that supports SMCA-Assigned                 does not plan for GOGO or COCO
 conventional ammunition and                 adequacies nor production technology
 components to ensure an adequate            improvements across the industrial
 production base to meet conventional        base facilities.
 ammunition requirements and identify
 and incorporate new and more efficient
 production technologies‖ (paragraph
 E2.2.1.2).
 In Production Base, ―Military Services      Military Services do not convey all
 are to ensure conventional ammunition       SMCA-Assigned ammunition
 requirements are conveyed to the            requirements to the SMCA Executor.
 SMCA and provide planning                   Additionally, the SMCA Industrial
 information to the SMCA relative to         Base Strategic Plan does not address
 facilities retained by the Military         facilities retained by the Military
 Services for ensuring that the SMCA         Services.
 has adequate data upon seeking the best
 balance in an overarching industrial
 base strategic plan‖ (paragraph E2.2.2).
 In Acquisition, ―SMCA is to comment         As identified earlier, SMCA does
 on the Military Services’ conventional      prepare an ICAPP but it includes only
 ammunition procurement plans and            conventional ammunition procured by
 prepare, with the assistance of the         the SMCA FOA; it does not include
 Military Services, an Integrated            SMCA-Assigned conventional
 Conventional Ammunition Procurement         ammunition procured by the Services.
 Plan (ICAPP) for use by the Military        Documented SMCA comments or
 Services and the Office of the Secretary    analysis on the overall Military
 of Defense staff. The ICAPP should be       Services’ conventional ammunition
 published to coincide with the budget       procurement plans could not be found.
 submission requirements of the DoD          When the SMCA FOA was asked
 Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and       about an overall analysis of the ICAPP
 Execution (PPB&E) process‖                  or Services’ plans as previously
 (paragraph E2.3.1.8).                       occurred when Quad-Service Reviews
                                             were conducted, reply was that an
                                             overall analysis is not conducted at
                                             this time.



                                              20
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

  DoDI 5160.68 Responsibility                Study Review Results
  In Financial Management & Planning,         Real-time access to view order
  Programming, Budgeting, and                   status is not possible without
  Execution:                                    unified, automated database and
   Provide Military Services real time         system.
      access to view order status             Provision of timely info on cost to
      (paragraph E2.12.1.4) and                 complete is under review.
   Provide the Military Services timely
      information of expected costs to         The planning process described earlier
      complete orders (paragraph               in Background appears to be more of a
      E2.12.1.5).                              programming / budgeting activity and
                                               does not address all DOD SMCA-
                                               assigned conventional ammunition
                                               requirements.
NOTE: Impact of the SMCA operations funding detailed in Appendix H may be relevant to the
completion functions listed in the preceding table.

        4.1.2.3. The logic behind the May 2000 decision to end Quad-Service Reviews was
―Services have visibility of procurements via the ICAPP.‖ The thought at the time was that each
Military Service would conduct analyses on other Services’ procurements in the ICAPP and
therefore determine ―best buy‖ scenarios to propose to the SMCA. This has not occurred.
Additionally, the ICAPP does not contain all SMCA-Assigned ammunition procurements; items
contracted through Military Service channels are not included in the ICAPP. As a result, the
Military Services do not have visibility of each others total conventional ammunition
procurements in order to conduct this self-analysis in all areas.

   4.1.3. Recommendations.

       4.1.3.1. Examine why full spectrum Joint financial management processes are not being
accomplished by SMCA Executor and the Military Services and correct the situation. In the
absence of a unified, automated database and system for all DoD financial management, improve
communication of Joint financial data supporting SMCA-Assigned ammunition procurement
planning and execution.

       4.1.3.2. Reinstate Quad-Service Reviews to improve the planning process. Also, these
reviews should address all Military Services’ SMCA-Assigned ammunition procurements
whether transitioned to SMCA for procurement or not. By doing a Quad-Service Review,
SMCA could generate the data needed to advise the Military Services as required by DoDI
5160.68.

   4.1.4. Key organizations impacted. All Military Services, SMCA.

4.2. Procurement Financial Management Issue Two. The SMCA Procurement Financial
Management process lacks a unified, automated database and system. This hinders
accomplishment of SMCA procurement financial management responsibilities.



                                              21
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

   4.2.1. Background.

        4.2.1.1. SMCA Charter states that the SMCA Executor is responsible for the overall
execution of the Army’s SMCA mission which includes providing required support to the
Military Services in planning, programming and budgeting for resources necessary to accomplish
their responsibilities as specified in DoDI 5160.68. Lack of a unified, automated database and
system hinder SMCA accomplishment of its mission.

        4.2.1.2. The Army’s IT systems supporting procurement through SMCA do not interface
with each other or the Military Services. Data must be manually entered into multiple systems
and this manual entry results in errors. Many manhours, within Army and in the other Military
Services, are expended in researching data errors rather than analyzing the data and managing
the procurement process.

        4.2.1.3. All Military Services’ funding management is impacted by these data errors.
For example, the absence of a Joint integrated planning system or connectivity between existing
systems reduces the ability for long-term planning by SMCA. This impacts funding for
acquisition, industrial base modernization, and sustainment.

        4.2.1.4. Currently, each Military Service builds its input to the PPBES separately from
the SMCA process and separately from each other. The SMCA and PPBES Process are not
interlinked. While SMCA Executor attempts to work the SMCA process within the deadlines of
the OSD PPBES process so that Military Services can use SMCA pricing information in the
Military Service PPBES build, disconnects exist. This results in different funding-based
requirements shown in the Service-level budget documentation and the SMCA-level
documentation which may not then be reflected in the DoD-level documentation. By this point,
three possible sets of requirements for PPBES are maintained: Military Service, SMCA and
OSD.

       4.2.1.5. All Military Services commented that lack of timely, accurate financial
information impacts the accuracy and timeliness of funding planning and execution. Cost-to-
complete (CTC) reporting is not timely. Although Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
provided a cost-to-complete model for the SMCA to populate and use with its customers several
years ago, the model still does not provide accurate, timely information. Better communication
is needed as the CTC report system requires manual data update rather than drawing information
from other systems. Additionally, the Military Services would like to have real time status of
procurement actions as required by DoDI 5160.68, paragraph E2.12.1.4.

   4.2.2. Analysis.

      4.2.2.1. The lack of a unified, automated database and system hinders the SMCA in
accomplishment of its financial management responsibilities.

        4.2.2.2. Without visibility into a unified, automated database, SMCA does not have a
holistic picture of all munitions life-cycle requirements from which to facilitate a Jointly




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

developed clearer picture of overall requirements, e.g., operations, procurement, and logistic
requirements.

        4.2.2.3. Additionally, Force structure changes not visible to SMCA could affect long-
term requirements associated with types and quantities of ammunition SMCA will need to
support. While stable requirements on the types and quantities of munitions required are desired
for efficient management, fluctuations in requirements are a fact-of-life and complicate
requirement determinations and stability for the POM.

       4.2.2.4. Changed strategies of one Military Service may impact another Service’s POM.
Without a unified, automated database and system, SMCA cannot facilitate impact analysis of
changes to PPBES requirements across the Services’ and life-cycle management of SMCA
items.

       4.2.2.5. Another impact of the unconnected databases is that changes based on
management decisions at one level do not necessarily show up the same way in the other
databases. For example, a cut at one level may not be reflected at another level.

   4.2.3. Recommendations.

        4.2.3.1. Link existing databases into one virtual financial database for all conventional
ammunition procurements. This will improve the ability to manage procurement of conventional
ammunition throughout the DoD. The ultimate goal might lie in the direction of developing an
interactive, near real-time capability.

       4.2.3.2. As an interim step to establishment of a virtual financial database, input all
Military Services’ SMCA-assigned ammunition requirements (whether transitioned or not) into
the ICAPP so that total procurement requirements are visible to all regardless of who procures
the ammunition. Additionally, this would provide each Military Service visibility of other
Services’ procurements to facilitate Joint requirements procurement planning via a Quad-Service
Review (as was conducted in the past).

       4.2.3.3. Ensure the requirements reflected in planning, programming, and budgeting
process information used by SMCA are synchronized with the DoD PPBES. Better visibility of
all ammunition acquisition programs improves the ability to analyze across the life-cycle and
allows Military Services to ensure cuts in one area do not impact another area.

   4.2.4. Key organizations impacted. All Military Services, SMCA.




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


                                           Chapter 5
       Information Technology (IT) Management
5.1. Information Technology Management Issue. Deficiencies in the Army’s SMCA
information process and information systems that support the SMCA mission must be addressed
to support DoD customer expectations in 2010 and beyond. For the purposes of this study, the
term IT includes quality of the generated data and information, ways and means of
dissemination, and how soon such information or knowledge is being made accessible to the
authorized users worldwide.

5.2. Background.

    5.2.1. The SMCA mission was assigned to the Department of the Army with the intention to
minimize overlap and duplication of effort among the Services while increasing efficiency and
effectiveness.18

   5.2.2. The SMCA history report at Appendix E offered the opinion that SMCA has had
qualified success and that the task now is for the current SMCA organization and the Military
Services to make the system work.

    5.2.3. Modernization of the IT used by SMCA is essential to meet current and projected
requirements. Numerous systems are used by SMCA to perform its mission. Commodity
Command Standard System (CCSS), Workload Performance Forecasting System, Production
Status System (PRODSTAT), Integrated Conventional Ammunition Procurement Plan (ICAPP)
are a few of the key systems and these do not communicate well with each other. This causes
problems such as: multiple data entries, errors in data exhibits/reports, minimal system
flexibility, and frustration for the internal SMCA personnel as well as the Military Services.
This problem was recognized by the OSD-led Ammo Procurement Improvement Team (APIT)
in the late 1990s.19 An attempt was made internally by the SMCA FOA to partially fix the
problem for procurement by using Commercial Software but the effort was not successful. The
Manufacturing Resource Planning II (MRPII) program development was initiated but stopped as
the Army’s Logistics Modernization program (LMP) and the Ammunition Enterprise Portal were
developed. The MRPII effort became Pricing, Budget and Execution Web Portal (PBE) which is
part of the Ammunition Enterprise Portal. Examples of tools, programs or systems in PBE are:
e-Mipr, 710, CAP, ICAPP, PRODSTAT, PRODREP, CTC and Ad-Hoc reports. PBE provides
an easy, single-screen access to the included programs but does not provide for a common
database and single data entry for the included systems.

   5.2.4. The SMCA-generated management information is not always accurate and SMCA
FOA personnel often need to reenter Service-provided information. An example, outlined in the
Procurement Financial Management analysis section of this study, is the ICAPP and systems
18
   Matching Organization to Expectation: The Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition, 1950 to 2004,
George Eaton, Army Field Support Command/Joint Munitions Command Historian AFSC/JMC History Office,
Rock Island, IL 61299, 28 January 2006, page 56 (Appendix E).
19
   Summary Ammunition Procurement Improvement Team (APIT) Meeting Minutes, 3 November 1997.


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

used to communicate information in Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPRs), P-
Forms, production deliveries. These systems are especially important to execution of the SMCA
mission. Data errors accounted for 6-19% of all delivery delinquencies.20

    5.2.5. Another problematic procurement support IT product is the Quarterly Cost-to-
Complete (CTC) Report. Through the Procurement Steering Counsel (PSC) and other forums,
the Military Services have been asking the SMCA to provide the customers a routine quarterly
CTC report that shows the current and projected status of all open ammunition MIPRs at the
program and component level. This report would quickly enable identification of funding
excesses/shortfalls, compare projected costs to actual costs, provide rationale for cost variances,
and identify any options to buy more ammunition. The current CTC Report, developed from a
NAVSEA product, does not fully meet this need.

    5.2.6. Because of the multiple data entry requirements and poor connectivity, many man-
hours (within the Army and in the other Military Services) are expended in researching or
obtaining data rather than analyzing that data. The Army is developing the Logistics
Modernization Program that may resolve some of the issues, but, to date, fielding of the LMP
system has been problematic. Early fielding tests resulted in failure and further fielding of LMP
has been delayed by funding and technical challenges.

    5.2.7. Lack of information sharing and inadequate connectivity between SMCA and Navy
automated systems are a major concern for the Navy, but none of the Military Services have
perfect IT systems for management of ammunition processes. Accurate inventory management
system connectivity is essential to interoperability. The Marine Corps observed that the Military
Services currently must use a cumbersome IT path to requisition SMCA-Assigned ammunition
stored at SMCA installations; they must pass requests through the SMCA FOA Inventory
Control Point where a new document is prepared for forwarding to the storage installation.
Different procedures are used for non-SMCA Assigned ammunition stored at the same facilities.

      5.2.8. The following summarizes the Military Services’ inventory management systems:

       5.2.8.1.The Marine Corps inventory management system is an older batch file system
whose software is no longer supported by the developer. The Navy’s Ordnance Information
System (OIS) is currently behind schedule with respect to incorporating Marine Corps
requirements in its development. In the interim, the Marine Corps is considering various options
from commercial products to inclusion in the Navy’s OIS system.

       5.2.8.2. The Air Force is in the early development stages of replacing their Combat
Ammunition System (CAS) with new Enterprise Resource Planning software, Expeditionary
Combat Support System (ECSS). The ECSS will allow better interface with other Military
Services.

        5.2.8.3. The Navy’s OIS system has the capability to connect to other systems via Secure
Internet, but the other Military Services’ systems do not have that capability yet and other
Military Services’ inventory management systems are not classified.
20
     SMCA Procurement Steering Council Meeting Minutes, 8 June 2005 and 29 November 2005


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        5.2.8.4. Army uses CCSS at the SMCA FOA for inventory management. CCSS contains
records for Army ammunition and for other Military Services’ SMCA-Assigned ammunition
stored at SMCA installations. The Army depots use Standard Depot System (SDS) for all
ammunition; the other Military Services can not access SDS. These two systems are not well
connected. SDS and CCSS need to be linked or replaced to provide full, seamless visibility to
customers. The Army is working on a Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) which is
expected to link various Army IT systems and provide some inventory visibility improvements
for all Army classes of supply. LMP development has encountered some problems and
implementation has been delayed.

        5.2.8.5. All Military Services can access National Level Ammunition Capability
(NLAC), but NLAC is not truly an inventory management system. NLAC pulls and displays
asset/location detailed information from the preceding inventory management systems; it does
not support requisitions, transportation, positioning requirement determinations or similar
inventory management functions.

   5.2.9. Other SMCA functional support areas beyond procurement support and inventory
management use IT systems that do not fully support anticipated requirements.

        5.2.9.1. The TDP management system is not a centralized system that allows users to
fully gage the potential impact of TDP changes. One component on one end item might be
modified or replaced based on the decision of a single manager, engineer or procurement action
but the use of that component on other items and the impact of the decision on other items are
not visible or assessed. SMCA and ARDEC are working to develop a more systemic approach
to TDP management.

       5.2.9.2. Industrial Base Assessment Tool (IBAT) was developed from the USAF Warrior
program and the Cost-to-Complete (CTC) report was adapted from a NAVSEA product. The
IBAT works well but does not include non-Army, non-SMCA Assigned ammunition items in the
IB planning mix. The Air Force would like to see a database for industrial base producers and
capabilities that can be queried by the Military Services.

    5.2.10. In the near future, Military Services expect to need information systems that can
handle the flow of data in a real time or near real time fashion. Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea
Basing will be enabled by FORCEnet, an overarching IT effort to integrate warriors, sensors,
networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a fully netted combat force.
FORCEnet will be the Navy's plan to make this an operational reality.21 The current SMCA IT
capabilities are insufficient to support this requirement. Based on the input received during the
study, the SMCA needs to bring its future IT capabilities up to the level required by the future
interoperable IT capabilities such as FORCEnet in order to be a part of the future Joint Force.




21
     Sea Power 21, October 2002.


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

5.3. Analysis.

    5.3.1. The intention of single managing hundreds of selected DoD conventional ammunition
items was to achieve the highest possible degree of efficiency and effectiveness in acquiring
ammunition and providing logistical support. Lack of accurate data impedes and degrades
SMCA’s ability to manage, perform and support this mission.

    5.3.2. The SMCA currently uses numerous Army-centric IT systems that the Military
Services consider inadequate to serve their current needs. While there is insufficient
connectivity between the Military Services’ and SMCA’s IT systems, quality of the SMCA and
Service-generated information is also a concern. The quality issues concern non-connectivity
that requires manual input of the same information in multiple systems; this can and has lead to
mismatches of information between different systems. The current IT systems in use by the
SMCA and its customers appear to barely meet the minimum demand from the current Joint
Force. Additionally, many manhours are spent inputting or verifying information among the
various systems; that time might be better used in analyzing the information.

    5.3.3. Development of a single IT system, Joint Ammunition Management Standard System
(JAMSS) was attempted in the late 1990s and was ended without success in 2001. Future
systems need to provide good interfaces. IT connectivity is critical to the success of munitions
management and logistics support.

    5.3.4. The Joint warfighting environment has changed over time and will continue to
transform. Information sharing, information access, and speed of information reach are a
military force multiplier. As a part of military transformation, the Military Services are looking
to accelerate implementation of their IT concepts in support of future Network-Centric warfare.

    5.3.5. Information gathered during this study indicates that the most pressing capability gap
is SMCA’s ability to provide good quality information that is accurate, relevant, and timely; and
the means to disseminate such information to the users at the correct level, location, and time.
Current and future ammunition IT capabilities must include timely mutual access and feedback
of quality information.

    5.3.6. IT capability gaps exist in areas such as connectivity and accessibility among current
and legacy SMCA and Military Service systems. Gaps also exist between current and projected
demands for interoperability and information exchange such as what the Navy is projecting is
needed to support FORCEnet. The SMCA currently uses systems that do not interface well or
that do not interface at all with the Military Services’ IT systems. If the SMCA is to support
future concepts such as seabasing and FORCEnet, connectivity is critical for the Joint
warfighters. The SMCA and its customers lack a viable interactive IT capability that allows
authorized user access to near real-time ammunition information any time, anywhere worldwide
to support concepts of future warfights.

    5.3.7. As the Military Services continue on their logistics modernization efforts, the current
and ―to be‖ business rules need to be reviewed with a focus on incorporating the power of
current and future information technologies. The SMCA should map out a correction course to
modernize the SMCA IT systems and coordinate requirements with the other Military Services


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

to ensure adequate support of their needs. Although costly, a SMCA IT modernization effort has
the potential to have a large positive impact on ammunition readiness and support throughout
DoD.

5.4. Recommendations.

    5.4.1. Leverage existing and build future ammunition IT capability for SMCA that supports
the requirements of the transforming Joint force tactics, techniques, and technologies. Analyze
the lessons learned from JAMSS, as well as current and planned ammunition IT related efforts
such as OIS, FORCEnet, ECSS to frame a unified Joint strategy for IT infrastructure and
conceptual framework aimed to securely support future military missions, operations, and
organizations. This effort needs to be worked, as a minimum, through the Army’s Program
Executive Office Enterprise Information Systems (PEO EIS). Since the system would support or
interconnect with other Military Services’ IT systems, further coordination with EIS offices from
other Military Services would probably be needed.

   5.4.2. Identify and eliminate the gaps in information reach such as connectivity,
accessibility, interoperability, interactivity, security, continuity and protection at all military
operational and tactical levels as well as authorized segments in the industry.

    5.4.3. Improve the quality of ammunition information by using enhanced information reach
capabilities, better trained and knowledgeable personnel, and a data management process aimed
to better synchronize the PPBES information entry. Implement this enhanced capability at a
measured pace acceptable to all SMCA customers to avoid disruptions to SMCA operations.

5.5. Key organizations impacted. All Military Services, SMCA.




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                                        Chapter 6
     Engineering Support of Items in Production
6.1. Engineering Support of Items in Production (ESIP) Issue. Throughout the interview
process for this study, Military Service SMCA customers expressed concern about the ESIP
program. Although there are IPTs that are currently addressing many of these issues, some
dissatisfaction with the cost and effectiveness of the program is still apparent.

6.2. Background.

    6.2.1. ESIP encompasses pre- and post-contract award engineering efforts to conduct any
investigation, inspection, analysis, evaluation or test which will impact on the software,
hardware, producibility, reliability, maintainability or logistic support of the item being
produced.

   6.2.2. The Army representatives interviewed for this study indicated a gap exists in what
SMCA doctrine identifies to be done using ESIP and what customers would like to have done
under ESIP. The original concept was to provide engineering support to production, not to invite
Military Services to approve the SMCA procurement strategy. The Services have concerns
about justification of funding and costs associated with ESIP.

    6.2.3. Some Military Service customers have expressed concern over a lack of feedback and
substantive justifications of ESIP funding costs. Opinions are that once the budget and SOW are
agreed upon, there is little follow up from the ARDEC or PEO Ammunition detailing how the
money was spent and what benefits are being gained.

     6.2.4. The ESIP process has been reasonably well defined by a Joint ESIP IPT but
improvement and clarification of the process is still needed to establish a valid ESIP baseline
cost per item or category of items. The functions defined by ESIP are reasonable, but the cost to
do these functions still needs to be validated by the IPT at the functional/manhour level.

    6.2.5. Concerns the Military Services have about ESIP support for SMCA procurements are
gaps between the concept and actual practice and lack of proven performance compared to the
costs and benefits. The SMCA Executor representatives do not provide adequate justification of
ESIP baseline costs and expenditures, especially at the functional breakout or man-hour level.
The primary issue is not the value of the function; the issue is the benefit and reasonableness of
the costs.

    6.2.6. The Air Force wants to have an accounting of how the funds are used. For example,
on the M55 20mm TP round, the TDP update required four years of ESIP money and was
nothing but a list of exceptions. The AF does not mind paying ESIP if the product is good and
the Military Service can task them to do specific efforts. There appears to be no mechanism
established to challenge prices. In some cases, the Air Force was asked to pay $150,000 for
items that are standard yearly buys only to find out the package hadn’t been updated.



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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

6.3. Analysis.

    6.3.1. Review of several SMCA-related historical documents showed that the ESIP issues
stated in this study are not new, but the same concerns keep resurfacing. We believe this process
requires a clearer definition of the functions and responsibilities to help resolve some of the
disagreements.

    6.3.2. Although much work is currently being done to improve the ESIP process through
Lean Six Sigma efforts, we’ve found that focus in specific areas such as man-hour levels would
be beneficial. The Military Services need a more detailed justification and explanation of costs
along with performance consistency to alleviate their concerns. While higher costs for ESIP
could possibly be a misperception, cost remains one of the primary concerns of all the Military
Services. For this reason, ESIP maintains high visibility and generates frequent dialogues.

    6.3.3. An example of a Military Service concern is the near-term potential Marine Corps
procurement transition of the Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breeching System (APOBS). This was a
Marine Corps developed item which is also being procured by the Army. Reasons for non-
transition are primarily cost driven. The Military Services lose control, not of the TDP/
Specifications/Configuration Management; rather, they lose control of the costs. The Marine
Corps' ammunition managers believe that, if transitioned, SMCA would require a significant
amount of additional ESIP once the item comes under SMCA management. The Marine Corps
would be willing to offer this up as a test case to either refute or confirm this premise.

     6.3.4. The work breakdown structure requires further explanation and clarification from start
to finish. Explanations received thus far during the ESIP IPT meetings are too subjective and are
not totally verifiable. Perhaps a walk-through of ESIP costs from start to finish, similar to an
actual desk audit, would be beneficial.

6.4. Recommendations.

   6.4.1. Execute process improvements currently identified through SMCA-led Lean Six
Sigma efforts:

          Cost Validation Process at the function/man-hour level
          Establishment of a mechanism for challenging costs
          Technical Data Package management

    6.4.2. Include the ESIP process in the SMCA training developed per the Management
Process recommendation in this study (paragraph 3.1.3.2). This would be accomplished through
web-based training or tutorial CDs and would provide a good understanding of ESIP principles,
practices and procedures.

   6.4.3. Establish a metric to track ESIP cost variances and man-hour performance measures.




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

    6.4.4. Support the intent of the DoD 5000 Series to integrate Joint requirement determination
in planning and execution related to ESIP. Collectively develop an innovative capability
consistent with military transformation.

   6.4.5. Marine Corps have already recommended a change within the JCAPP to specify that
Military Services should only pay for what they put in the ESIP Scope of Work.

   6.4.6. Track the transitioning of the Marine Corps APOBS as a test case to determine
whether this item would require a significant amount of additional ESIP once the item comes
under SMCA management.

6.5. Key organizations impacted. Military Services, SMCA, ARDEC




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


                                        Chapter 7
                      Joint Adjudication for
                   Production Line Prioritization
7.1. Issue. When a single facility produces several products and there are competing delivery
requirements, a prioritization for the order in which the items are produced must be developed.
No standardized process exists to verify whether operating force requirements or readiness issues
might be impacted by the decision.

7.2. Background.

    7.2.1. In some cases a portion of the products produced in a manufacturer’s facility are
Service Retained or Service Unique items; these items may or may not be procured by SMCA.
Through the contracting officer, the PM may provide guidance to the manufacturer on the
production sequence for items contracted through him. This is of particular concern to
management when the facility is working at maximum capacity and is the sole provider of a
particular item or component of the item.

    7.2.2. Several SMCA PMs expressed the belief that the Military Services need to let the
SMCA PMs prioritize production sequences for synergies. This would allow PMs to prioritize
across commodities managed by SMCA. One PM felt that he had had to work as a referee
between a Military Service and the manufacturer when the Military Service did not agree with
the manufacturer’s production sequence prioritization during execution of a SMCA contract and
that the SMCA Executor organization needs a lot more authority to break the paradigm on
production prioritization issues.

    7.2.3. Several Military Service representatives said there seems to be no policy or process
for prioritizing which items or which Military Services get supported when the industrial base is
overtaxed and that there is an appearance of preferential treatment of the Army’s requirements.
Further, this should be an overarching Joint process, not a PM decision when competing
requirements occur that need prioritization of production execution.

    7.2.4. Within the past 3 years, the Air Force 30mm production is an example of this
challenging production prioritization situation. The example illustrates a process that may
necessitate adjustment in the future. In this example, AMRON is the only manufacturer for
cartridge cases for the 40mm and the 30mm rounds. Increased requirements for use of this
production line overloaded the capacity causing a disruption to the 30mm production.

    7.2.5. In this example, the producer could manufacture 30mm or 40mm but not both items at
the same time. The SMCA contracts procured 40mm items for the Army and 30mm items for
the Air Force. The PM made the decision as to which item would be produced first. Effectively,
Army items were produced first and then Air Force items; giving the appearance of preferential
treatment of Army. This was done without any Joint forum to prioritize the decision; the Air
Force representatives felt they had no place to go to challenge the decision. The Air Force also


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

felt this decision should be an overarching process, not a PM decision for competing Military
Service requirements. There appeared to be no standard policy or process for prioritizing which
items or which Military Services would get supported when the industrial base is overtaxed.

    7.2.6. The Bomb Acquisition IPT, with full Military Service participation, routinely works
this type of prioritization issue for the bomb production line. Navy and Air Force representatives
work with SMCA FOA representatives to determine the production sequence for the bomb
assembly line at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant.

7.3. Analysis.

    7.3.1. The 30mm/40mm example given above was, in fact, the same incident for which the
PM felt he had to work as a referee. In other words, it was the same incident from two points of
view. The Air Force representatives did not feel that they had a forum through which to make a
timely challenge to the PM’s decision. The PM acted in good faith to produce items based on his
perception of priorities; the PM created his own method to resolve this issue. Combatant or
operating force requirements or readiness issues could, on occasion, take priority over production
line efficiency. This type of situation does not occur often, but no guidance was available to
require the SMCA PM to use specific procedures. Neither organization chose to formally raise
the issue to the Program Manager Joint Services (PM JS), O/EDCA or SMCA Executor.

   7.3.2. The only standard, documented process for Military Services to challenge the chosen
sequence in which items are produced under SMCA contracts would be to go to the PM JS,
O/EDCA or SMCA Executor. The SMCA charter and DoDD 5160.65 address this as a way to
achieve resolution of contentious SMCA issues. However, the PM JS, O/EDCA or SMCA
Executor are not privy to all Military Services’ operational ammunition requirement priorities.
Operational force requirements and readiness issues could influence decisions of this type.

    7.3.3. Any process developed to resolve production line prioritization needs to be rapid and
responsive to needs in order to avoid delaying production further. The Joint Material Priorities
and Allocation Board (JMPAB) led by the Joint Staff would be one forum for this but is a high
level board that resolves issues when agreement between Military Service Chiefs of Staff can not
be reached. JMPAB has 24 hours to render decisions. Raising most SMCA production
prioritization issues to the Service Chief or JMPAB level would not be desirable. A lower level,
perhaps a Joint Flag-level panel, with decision authority, would be more appropriate for SMCA
procurement actions with JMPAB reserved for extremely complex prioritization decisions.

7.4. Recommendation. Develop guidance for prioritization of use of multi-product production
lines. When Service-to-Service conflicts occur on production line prioritization, a rapid response
adjudication process should be available. This guidance could be included in the next update to
DoDD 5160.65 and DoDI 5160.68. The JOCG members would be an appropriate group for
making these Joint decisions but would not be responsive enough if these decisions were set
aside until the next formal JOCG meeting. A rapid review process would have to be developed
to support this type of JOCG decision.

7.5. Key organizations impacted. All Military Services, SMCA, JOCG.



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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


                                        Chapter 8
                     SMCA Supply Management
8.1. SMCA Supply Management Issue One. The SMCA and its customers differ on whether
SMCA or the owning Military Service should select SMCA storage facilities for storage of their
conventional ammunition.

   8.1.1. Background.

        8.1.1.1. SMCA storage facilities are defined as the Army ammunition depots, plants and
ammunition activities currently under the AMC management hierarchy. Military Services
frequently select which SMCA storage facilities to use for the wholesale level storage and
maintenance of their conventional ammunition. This selection process makes SMCA’s
management of their facilities challenging, particularly when storage facilities are at or near
maximum capacity. The differing Military Service positions on storage location selection were
as follow:

            8.1.1.1.1. Transportation and supply management personnel at the SMCA FOA
expressed the opinion that the SMCA should be the organization that determines which storage
location within its own organization/installations should be used. They want to make the case to
the Military Services: the SMCA needs to store at certain depots in order to increase
efficiencies, SMCA should determine the best place to store ammunition, and the Military
Services should not be able to dictate location.

             8.1.1.1.2. Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps inventory management representatives
all stated that the Military Services own their assets and prefer to choose where those assets, both
SMCA-Assigned and Service Retained, will be stored. SMCA does not manage the Military
Services' inventories, the Services do; SMCA supports the Military Services.

        8.1.1.2. The first step in identifying storage locations is forecasting the workload. Per
the DoD 5160.65-M and its replacement JCAPPs, the Army relies on other Military Services to
accurately plan or forecast Military Service workloads, storage, shipping and demilitarization
requirements. When dealing with forecasts and funding, storage costs are reviewed for Services’
long term storage.

        8.1.1.3. The Military Services currently forecast their workload to the SMCA, but this is
not a fully automated process. Metrics on workloading and an IT system to improve support for
workload forecasting and distribution are needed to make this process more efficient. Using this
system, the SMCA could ensure resources are properly available to support customer
requirements without having SMCA inventory managers working as a pass-through or clearing
house for requisitions from the Services.

       8.1.1.4. The Military Services are interdependent for inventory management accuracy.
Based on short tons:



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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

              8.1.1.4.1. The Marine Corps store approximately 68% of their conventional
ammunition stockpile at SMCA activities. The Marine Corps store their Non-SMCA Assigned
ammunition at Navy facilities.

              8.1.1.4.2. The Navy stores approximately 37% of their conventional ammunition
inventory at SMCA storage facilities. For Navy Service Retained (non-SMCA Assigned)
ammunition items, Navy uses SMCA for storage over and above operational fleet requirements.

              8.1.1.4.3. Air Force stores approximately 58% of its conventional ammunition in
SMCA facilities.

        8.1.1.5. One of the inventory management accounts used by the SMCA is the Resource,
Recovery, and Disposition Account (RRDA). While the RRDA account contains only about
15% of the total ammunition tonnage in the SMCA depots, it represents a growing portion of the
inventory. The RRDA is one of the inventory management accounts used by the Army in
executing the SMCA sustainment mission. The RRDA is commonly called the B5A or "Demil"
account and contains excess or obsolete items no longer desired by the original owning Military
Service. Material in this account may be in any condition code. Before being considered for the
B5A account, these items are offered to other users, recycled, reclaimed, recovered, or
transferred via Foreign Military Sales. Ammunition in the RRDA account may or may not be
SMCA-Assigned ammunition, but all ammunition in this account is managed by SMCA. Note:
See Appendix I for more detail on the supply posture at the SMCA storage facilities.

        8.1.1.6. The Military Services have support agreements with some of the installations.
Through these agreements, the Services have established maintenance and quality support
agreements to fund these operations directly. The Marine Corps has worked with Red River
Army Depot to establish a maintenance quality process to meet Marine Corps’ requirements.
The Air Force has support agreements with several depots at which the Air Force Reserve
Ammunition Teams (AFRATs) train. The Military Services prefer to locate their assets where
these agreements exist and where they know the support, outload capacity and responsiveness
have been proven capable of supporting their requirements.

        8.1.1.7. Beyond the maintenance and support issues for the Military Services, the lack of
systems connectivity for the Army’s SDS systems has been a long standing problem for supply
management. The CCSS system does not contain records for non-Army owned, Service
Retained items. The SDS system used by the depots contains the information for non-Army
owned, Service Retained items, but outside users cannot access those records. Most
SMCA/Army automated systems were designed for internal Army use or Army access only and
are not linked to other Military Services’ systems.

       8.1.1.8. The general Navy opinion is: The SDS at the Army storage activities doesn’t
always track Navy assets and can’t give Navy all necessary data. The SMCA FOA item
managers work primarily with CCSS; the SDS and CCSS systems need to be linked or replaced
to provide full, seamless visibility to customers.




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

        8.1.1.9. The Navy Inventory Control Point (ICP) representatives indicated that they have
no automated means to check the depot records for all Navy assets held at the Army/SMCA
depots. The Navy’s OIS system is capable of being linked, but the Army’s outdated systems are
not. For SMCA-Assigned items, the Navy can check the CCSS records at JMC. Item managers
at Navy Operational Logistics Center (NOLSC) have to call or email the depots and get faxed or
emailed information on their assets stored at the Army depots even though those assets may be
stored side-by-side with SMCA-Assigned items. This is cumbersome and causes work for both
Army and Navy personnel. The bigger issue is that Navy needs better visibility of Navy SMCA
and non-SMCA assets stored at SMCA storage facilities. Accurate real-time serial number
tracking capability linked to the Navy’s OIS is needed to match asset movement.

         8.1.1.10. From the Marine Corps point of view, the SMCA FOA Item Managers add no
value for the Marine Corps. Per JCAPP 5, and Chapter 7, DoD 5160.65-M that predated the
JCAPP, the SMCA FOA item managers pass Military Service requisitions through to the storage
activities and source the material for the owning Service unless the owning Service provides a
specific source requirement. The Marine Corps representatives felt the whole inventory control
function within SMCA needs to be looked at as it is cumbersome and, perhaps, was structured
when the IT systems were incapable of supporting the level of communication needed for
requisition processing and workload management. The Army’s ammunition management IT
systems in use today are the same ones that were in use when the SMCA procedures were
developed.

         8.1.1.11. The Army is upgrading its IT systems through the Logistics Modernization
Program (LMP), but LMP is funding constrained, significantly behind schedule and failed some
of its early fielding tests.

   8.1.2. Analysis.

         8.1.2.1. SMCA inventory managers do not currently have ready access to information for
non-SMCA Assigned items. The other Military Services do not have a thorough understanding
of the Army’s nor the SMCA’s asset management plan for depot distribution. In order to
achieve a fully cohesive storage management plan for installations, the organization executing
that management decision would have to have full visibility of the resources and knowledge of
all related requirements. SMCA management does not always have technical expertise on the
support requirements for non-SMCA Assigned, Service Retained ammunition stored at SMCA
installations. Some Military Services have agreements with Army/SMCA installations for direct
funding of work in support of ammunition and other Service functions. An example of this is the
AFRATs that train by performing inspections and maintenance on Air Force ammunition stored
at certain SMCA installations. Consequently, any SMCA decision affecting positioning of non-
Army, SMCA-Assigned ammunition could disrupt the owning Military Service’s overall
ammunition support, training and budget plans.

        8.1.2.2. A storage posture analysis was performed for this study to understand the order
of magnitude of the storage utilization decisions. This posture analysis (Appendix I) depicts the
current DoD Class V asset posture in terms of SMCA-Assigned and non-SMCA Assigned
Military Service ownership based on short tons of ammunition. Square footage numbers would



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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

probably be more accurate for determining space utilization, but only short tons information
could be obtained for this study. The numbers in the posture analysis were accurate at the time
they were drawn but inventories are dynamic when material is received, issued and consumed.
The numbers do provide a rough estimate of the impact of storage decisions for SMCA facilities.
Slightly less than 50 percent of the conventional ammunition in the DoD inventory is stored in
the Army’s SMCA facilities. The SMCA-Assigned plus RRDA (B5A/Demil) account portion is
65% of the total amount of ammunition stored at SMCA facilities. Obtaining the numbers for
this analysis was difficult as the Army’s current information management systems do not
compile this data in a readily accessible manner. Information from the other Military Services
was readily available.

        8.1.2.3. Due to chronic underfunding of the SMCA’s demilitarization requirement, a
growing portion of the inventory at the SMCA facilities will be in the RRDA account. This
could become problematic from a space utilization point of view. SMCA needs to plan for this
aspect of storage facility use.

       8.1.2.4. No single entity has all the data necessary to make a unilateral, well-informed
space utilization decision for SMCA usage of SMCA storage facilities. SMCA does not have
management control, sufficient technical knowledge or real time visibility of non-SMCA
Assigned ammunition stored at SMCA facilities; the Military Services are not familiar with
SMCA’s facility-use plans; neither the Military Services nor SMCA are in a position to make
sound unilateral decisions on storage locations. Furthermore, without accurate asset visibility,
the Army is not in a position to determine whether they are using SMCA funds to support non-
SMCA-Assigned ammunition support requirements. The current process is fractured with each
Military Service and SMCA managing only that portion for which they have visibility.

    8.1.3. Recommendations. Achievement of a more holistic view of storage location choice
at SMCA installations is the goal. Improved information exchange and visibility of assets is
essential. To achieve this goal, several incremental steps should be taken:

        8.1.3.1. Continue to store SMCA-Assigned non-SMCA Assigned ammunition at SMCA
storage installations but a Joint financial management team should be formed to determine
whether the non-SMCA Assigned ammunition items stored at SMCA facilities should be stored
on a reimbursable basis. If reimbursement is required, accurate inventory information will be
necessary for billing purposes; improvement of the inventory management systems will be
required. Recommend further evaluations to validate units of measure for appropriate resourcing
determinations.

        8.1.3.2. Continue, as an interim measure, to have Military Service ICPs choose where to
store their munitions, but these decisions should be coordinated in advance with the SMCA FOA
for storage at SMCA facilities. An objective Joint process should be developed for this purpose.
As IT is modernized, SMCA should ensure that visibility of all assets and storage utilization
factors is readily available to all customers.

       8.1.3.3. Institute a Joint process to adjudicate differences when the owning Military
Service and SMCA do not agree on where ammunition items should be stored.



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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


   8.1.4. Key organizations impacted. All Military Services, SMCA.

8.2. SMCA Supply Management Issue Two. Seabasing and other distribution process changes
that support ongoing transformation efforts may modify logistics support expectations for SMCA
storage facilities.

   8.2.1. Background.

       8.2.1.1. The impact of seabasing on quantities stored at SMCA is still unclear; however,
seabasing is expected to affect how items are managed. Some Naval representatives working on
seabasing thought the amount of ammunition stored at SMCA would increase, while others
thought the amount would decrease. More seamless inventory management information between
Military Services will be needed to support seabasing.

     8.2.1.2. Army plans for modularization may change the methods for shipping
ammunition sustainment.

    8.2.2. Analysis. Seabasing, modularization and the Distribution Process Owner’s (DPO)
process could impact future decisions in regard to storage and support requirements. The
seabasing concept being developed by the Department of the Navy (DoN) is in early
development. A similar statement applies to support for deployment of modularized units. The
impact on ammunition storage and outloading processes is not known at this time. Modular
packaging and containerization systems such as Joint Modular Intermodal Container (JMIC) and
Joint Modular Intermodal Distribution System (JMIDS) are being explored under Joint
Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD) programs to see if these systems are feasible for
support of seabasing and modularization. If the technical aspects are proven feasible, the
determination of how existing ammunition would be placed into these containers would have to
be made; this decision could affect funding, supply management, maintenance and transportation
planning for SMCA.

   8.2.3. Recommendations. Determine, as early as possible, whether changes are needed to
support seabasing and modularization. The SMCA needs to work closely with the Army
operating forces and other Military Services while these concepts are developed and
implemented. Funding sources for needed changes must be clearly identified.

   8.2.4. Key organizations impacted. All Military Services, SMCA.




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


                                         Chapter 9
            Single DoD-wide Standard for
       Material Release and Safety Certifications
9.1. Single DoD-wide Standard for Material Release and Safety Certifications Issue. All
Military Services expressed the desire for single DoD-wide Material Release (MR) and Safety
Certification (SC) test standard for ammunition. Jointness would be enhanced and overall costs
to DoD would be reduced by having a single standard. The standard would apply regardless of
which Military Service develops or uses the item. Currently, each Military Service has its own
standard.

9.2. Background.

    9.2.1. While each Military Service has standard material release and safety criteria test
requirements, the requirements are not consistent across all Services. Consequently, an
ammunition item developed by one Military Service must be retested prior to use by another
Service. Sometimes the differences are as simple as measuring a different characteristic during
the same test. Other times an additional test is required.

    9.2.2. Consistent material release and safety certification standards across all Military
Services would improve interoperability. Neither the SMCA nor the Military Services want to
default to the most stringent criteria. Even at the TDP level the engineers can’t get answers as to
why criteria were set as they were.

    9.2.3. All Military Services expressed a desire to have one set of testing criteria for safety
and release certification within the DoD. Multiple sets of criteria result in test repetition to
satisfy a slight variance in requirements or to satisfy a separate requirement. Conducting a new
set of tests is more costly. If one set of criteria covered all Military Services, when any Service
certifies an ammunition item for use, the item could be used DoD wide, without further safety or
IM testing, by any Service.

9.3. Analysis.

    9.3.1. Repeating a test to make minor changes is much more expensive than performing
multiple processes or measurements during one test session. Also, wait time for getting
scheduled for a test range time can delay the ability of a Military Service to start using a new
item.

    9.3.2. None of the Military Services want to default to the most stringent requirements for
each element of these tests. As a bottom line, the Military Services concur in principle but need
to resolve the details.

   9.3.3. While MR and SC are a Service responsibility, having consistency in the criteria could
simplify SMCA’s mission and improve efficiency within the DoD.


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


   9.3.4. None of the Military Services specifically addressed insensitive munitions neither
(IM) nor Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) testing criteria, but similar
considerations and concerns are appropriate for ammunition in a Joint operating environment.

9.4. Recommendations.

    9.4.1. Apprise the DoD Safety Board and similar forums of the SMCA-related concerns on
this subject.

   9.4.2. While working with ARDEC on the coordination of RDT&E for logistics impact,
SMCA could also assess any potential savings or efficiencies to be gained by combining MR,
SC and HERO tests.

9.5. Key organizations impacted. All Military Services, SMCA, ARDEC.




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


                                              Chapter 10
         Documentation Review – Joint Publications
10.1. Existing Documented Mission, Roles, Responsibilities

      10.1.1. National Strategic Guidance

        10.1.1.1. The National Security Strategy (NSS)22 articulates eight methods the U.S. will
pursue to achieve its goals. These goals and methods (Figure 3) provide the foundation for the
objectives developed in subordinate supporting strategies such as the Defense Strategy and the
National Military Strategy (NMS). These goals and methods outline what the Department of
Defense must accomplish to protect national interests and achieve U.S. objectives.

                         National Security Strategy 2002 Goals and Methods




                                                   FIGURE 3

       10.1.1.2. While the U.S. has always retained the right under international law to strike
preemptively to protect itself from imminent threats, the NSS adapts the concept to account for
the capabilities and objectives of rogue states and terrorists willing to use weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). To support preemptive options to counter the WMD threat the U.S. will

22
     National Security Strategy, The White House, 17 September 2002.


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities; coordinate closely with allies to form a
common assessment of the most dangerous threats; and continue to transform our military forces
to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.

        10.1.1.3. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the NMS further refine national
level guidance by focusing the goals and methods outlined in the NSS in terms of military
instrument of power. A thorough analysis of these three documents, the NSS, the NDS, and the
NMS informed by the lessons learned in the War on Terrorism, including Operation Enduring
Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom- allows the DoD to prepare its forces and capabilities to
support and defend America’s interests in conjunction with other government agencies, allies
and friends.

      10.1.2. Strategic Objectives: National Ends

        10.1.2.1. The NDS seeks to extend America’s influence and prosperity and improve
America’s security by building a durable framework in which the U.S. and its allies and friends
can prosper freely. The strategic framework to defend the Nation and secure a viable peace,
articulated in the NDS and Chapter 1 of the Strategic Planning Guidance 06-11, is built around
four strategic objectives (See Figure 4). These objectives will guide DoD security activities.

                                                                              The 2004 Defense Strategy*
  Ways Ends




                                                                  Strategic Objectives                                    What must
                                                                                                                           DoD do to
                                   •   Secure the US from direct attack                                                   execute the
                                   •   Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action                           NSS?
                                   •   Strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges
                                   •   Establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order


                                                              How will we                                                        How will we
                                                             structure our                                                     accomplish the
                                Guidelines                   planning and                         Key Activities                 objectives?
                 •   Active, forward defense-in-depth      decision making?      •   Assure allies and friends
                 •   Continuous Transformation                                   •   Dissuade potential adversaries
                 •   Capabilities-based approach                                 •   Deter aggression and counter coercion
                 •   Managing Risk                                               •   Defeat adversaries


                                                                     How much                                                          What
                                                                     do we need                                                     capabilities
                                                                    and where do                                                   do we need?
                          Force Planning Construct                   we need it?
              • “1” - Defend the US homeland;                                             Key Capabilities & Attributes
  Means




              • “4” - Operate in and from four forward                        • Strengthening Intelligence
              regions to assure allies and friends, dissuade                  • Protecting critical bases of operation
              competitors, and deter and counter aggression                   • Operating from the commons – space, international
              and coercion;                                                   waters and airspace, cyberspace
              • “2” - Swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping               • Projecting and sustaining forces in distant anti-
              military campaigns while preserving for the                     access environments
              President the option to call for                                • Denying enemies sanctuary
              • “1” - a more decisive and enduring result in                  • Conducting network-centric operations
              one of the two;                                                 • Improving proficiencies against irregular challenges
              • Conduct a limited number of lesser                            • Increasing capabilities of partners – international
              contingencies                                                   and domestic

  2                                                                                             * As published in the 2004 Strategic Planning Guidance

                                                                  FIGURE 4

        10.1.2.2. The NMS takes the NSS goals and extrapolates three supporting military
objectives: to protect the United States against external attacks and aggression, prevent conflict
and surprise attacks; and prevail against adversaries. These military objectives help to define the
types and amounts of military capabilities required.



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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

   10.1.3. National Ways

        10.1.3.1. The NDS, the NMS and the Joint Operations Concept (JOpsC) all contribute to
the national plans for implementing the NSS. The National Defense Strategy and Chapter 1 of
the Strategic Planning Guidance describe four key activities or methods for ensuring national
security and promotion of national goals. They are:

           10.1.3.1.1. Assuring allies and friends by demonstrating U.S. steadfastness of
purpose, national resolve and military capability to defend and advance common interests, and
by strengthening and expanding alliances and security relationships.

           10.1.3.1.2. Dissuading adversaries from developing threatening forces or ambitions,
shaping the future military competition in ways advantageous to the U.S. and complicating the
planning and operations of adversaries;

            10.1.3.1.3. Deterring aggression and countering coercion against the U.S., its forces
and, allies and friends in critical areas of the world by developing and maintaining the capability
to swiftly defeat attacks with only modest reinforcements; and at the discretion of the President,

           10.1.3.1.4. Decisively defeating any adversary at the time, place and in the manner
of our choosing.

       10.1.3.2. In addition to these four methods, the NDS outlines four-implementation
guidelines that steer strategic planning and decision-making.

            10.1.3.2.1. Active Defense-in-Depth. The first priority is the defeat of direct threats
to the United States – whenever possible, before they become manifest. Therefore, the U.S. must
defeat the most dangerous challenges at a distance, before the challenges are allowed to fully
mature. Military planning must focus on the active, forward and layered defense of the U.S. and
its partners – with varied and flexible capabilities.

            10.1.3.2.2. Continuous Transformation. The purpose of transformation is to
extend key advantages and reduce vulnerabilities in the face of an ever-changing strategic
environment. Continual adaptation for how the DoD approaches and confronts challenges, and
for how it conducts business and work with others must occur.

           10.1.3.2.3. Capabilities Based Approach. Capabilities based planning and
operations focus more on how adversaries challenge the U.S. than on whom those particular
adversaries might be or where exactly the DoD may have to contend with them.

            10.1.3.2.4. Managing Risks. Effective management of a variety of complex defense
risks is central to operating under the guidance of the NDS. The full range of risks associated
with resources and operations to manage explicit tradeoffs across the department must be
considered.




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

        10.1.3.3. In addition to these tenets summarized above, the JOpsC describes how the
transformed Joint Force will operate in 10-20 years. Taken together these four key activities,
implementation guidelines, and the JOpsC are the ways we achieve the Defense Strategies’ goals
of Secure, Ensure, Establish and Strengthen.

      10.1.4. Joint Forces and the Force Sizing Construct (1-4-2-1) –National Means

        10.1.4.1. A truly Joint Force is the instrument of means used to execute the Defense
Strategy and achieve its goals. The Joint Force must be interdependent, fully integrated with
other instruments of national power, and flexible enough to rapidly respond to a variety of
challenges and achieve a variety of decisive outcomes. The Joint Force must possess an
appropriate mix of critical capabilities and employ quality people to provide the President and
Secretary of Defense with a wide variety of options to take decisive action as required.

        10.1.4.2. The U.S. Defense Strategy implements a ―capabilities-based‖ approach to
defense planning to provide, over time, a richer set of military options across the full range of
military operations, offering U.S. forces the means to adapt to any potential surprise and deny
asymmetric advantages to the enemy. The force-sizing construct (also referred to as the 1-4-2-1
construct) specifically shapes forces to accomplish the following four missions:

          10.1.4.3. Defend the U.S. homeland;

           10.1.4.3.1. Operate in and from four forward regions to assure allies and friends,
dissuade competitors, and deter and counter aggression and coercion;

           10.1.4.3.2. Swiftly Defeat adversaries in overlapping military campaigns while
preserving for the President the option to call for a more decisive and enduring result in one of
the two; and

              10.1.4.3.3. Conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies;

            10.1.4.3.4. The shape, size and force structure of this construct provide the
capabilities needed to conduct the global war on terrorism. In the end, all U.S. military
operations in the war on terrorism help assure allies, dissuade competition in key areas and
defeat both state and non-state opponents.

10.2. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report
   10.2.1. The foundation of the 2006 QDR is the National Defense Strategy, published in
March 2005. This strategy calls for continuing to reorient the Department’s capabilities to
address a wider range of challenges. Guidance must account for distributed, long-duration
operations, including unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction operations.23



23
     Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, Department of Defense (DoD), 6 February 2006, pages 3 and 36.


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

    10.2.2. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) family of ships will advance the
capability of seabasing to support a wide spectrum of Joint Force operations. Special Operations
Forces will exploit Afloat Forward Staging Bases to provide more flexible and sustainable
locations from which to operate globally. Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) changes will
promote Joint and multi-Service basing in order to achieve economies of scale.24

    10.2.3. The U.S. forces must be made more agile and more expeditionary with more combat
capability with the same or, in some cases, fewer numbers of weapons platforms and with lower
levels of manning, placing emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots across the
globe.25

   10.2.4. Today, the armed forces are hampered by inefficient business practices. The
Department has made substantial strides in fostering Joint solutions, including the creation of
new organizations and processes that cut across traditional stovepipes.26

    10.2.5. Most of the Department’s resources are provided through the Military Services. This
arrangement can lead both to gaps or redundancies within capability areas as each Military
Service attempts to supply a complete warfighting package rather than organize to depend on
capabilities provided by other Military Departments. To optimize the provision of capabilities
for the Joint warfighter, the Department will work to re-orient its processes around Joint
capability portfolios. The Department will build on initial efforts to integrate tasks, people,
relationships, technologies and associated resources more effectively across the Department’s
many activities. By shifting the focus from Service-specific programs to Joint capabilities, the
Department should be better positioned to understand the implications of investment and
resource trade-off s among competing priorities.27

    10.2.6. This QDR underscores the need for a better way to organize and manage Joint
activities to ensure that mission assignment is accompanied by the authorities, resources and
clear performance expectations necessary for mission success. The Defense Business
Transformation Agency (BTA) was created to integrate and oversee corporate-level business
systems and initiatives. The BTA is the management link responsible for integrating work
across the Department in areas such as human resources, financial management, acquisition, and
logistics. It is accountable to the Defense Business Systems Management Committee (DBSMC)
governing body for results.28

   10.2.7 The SMCA must be responsive within the framework of the QDR projected
operational requirements. The greater demand for distribution to support long-duration

24
   Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, Department of Defense (DoD), 6 February 2006, pages 3 and 36,
pages 47 and 53
25
   Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, Department of Defense (DoD), 6 February 2006, pages 3 and 36,
page v.
26
   Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, Department of Defense (DoD), 6 February 2006, pages 3 and 36,
page 63
27
   Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, Department of Defense (DoD), 6 February 2006, pages 3 and 36,
page 68
28
   Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, Department of Defense (DoD), 6 February 2006, pages 3 and 36,
page 69


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

operations must be satisfied to support the Joint Forces. Through use of seamless logistics
initiatives such as centralized ammunition management to support seabasing and modularization,
the SMCA must improve its resource management and business practices. A shift in focus from
Service-specific programs is required to support competing priorities.




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


                                     Chapter 11
             Documentation Review – Air Force
11.1. Existing Documented Mission, Roles, Responsibilities – Munitions Management

    11.1.1. Munitions organizations are aligned in accordance with Air Force Instructions: AFI
38-101, Air Force Organization and AFI 21-201, Management and Maintenance of Nonnuclear
Munitions. Munitions units are responsible for the command and control (C2); administration
and management of training, resources, and programs; and the control, accountability, storage,
receipt, shipment, inspection, maintenance, assembly, flightline delivery, and limited local
disposition of conventional, precision guided, nuclear munitions and associated components.
Munitions personnel utilize the Combat Ammunition System to manage munitions assets.
Squadron and flight personnel manage and maintain all assigned tools, test, and munitions
handling equipment. Munitions personnel perform operator level maintenance on powered and
non-powered Aerospace Ground Equipment.

    11.1.2. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics (HQ USAF/IL) establishes
policy and management concepts regarding Air Force participation in the Department of Defense
(DoD) Program for SMCA (DoD 5160.65-M, Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition
(Implementing Joint conventional Ammunition Policies and Procedures, April 1989). HQ
USAF/ILMW develops policy and procedures for conventional ammunition management. Major
Commands (MAJCOMs) or equivalent, in conjunction with the United States Air Force
Ammunition Control Point (USAF ACP) and the Tactical Missile Control Point (TMCP)
implement these policies. The USAF ACP and the TMCP maintain worldwide asset postures by
components and complete rounds of all Air Force-owned nonnuclear munitions and missiles.

    11.1.3. MAJCOM or equivalent and installation commanders are responsible for ensuring
programs for the inspection, maintenance, storage, and accounting of nonnuclear munitions,
missiles, and munitions materiel handling equipment comply with these policies and current
technical data.

   11.1.4. Air Education and Training Command (AETC) is responsible for providing the high-
quality training individual technicians required to accomplish inspections, maintenance,
handling, storage, and accountability actions on munitions.

    11.1.5. The Air Force Materiel Command’s Air Armament Center (AAC) establishes and
maintains coordination with the SMCA on those ammunition items in research, development,
test, and evaluation that will transition to SMCA.

11.2. Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

    11.2.1. The Air Force CONOPS are a major innovation for the United States Air Force. By
clearly defining how the Service intends to fight, the Air Force can then focus its planning,
programming, requirements and acquisition processes on a capabilities-based framework.
Through the CONOPS, the Air Force is transforming its planning process to make effects, and


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

the capabilities needed to achieve them, the driving force for all Air Force operational,
programming, and budget decisions. The objective is to improve the Air Force ability to get the
right balance of high-quality capabilities into the hands of the warfighters.

    11.2.2. There are seven Air Force CONOPS: Global Mobility, Global Persistent Attack,
Global Strike, Homeland Security, Nuclear Response, Space & C4ISR, and Agile Combat
Support (ACS). Each Air Force CONOPS starts with a problem definition. These problems are
missions the Air Force must accomplish in the 21st century. Each CONOPS describes how the
Air Force solves problems within the context of Joint operations. Then, these CONOPS outline
the specific effects-based capabilities needed to solve those problems. This effort integrates the
warfighter’s responsibility to define requirements at the start of the process. The requirements
focus on capabilities instead of particular programs or weapon systems. Other benefits include
improved communication between the research, development, acquisition, and warfighting
communities. The CONOPS capabilities will bridge the gap between the effects the Air Force
will create in the battlespace of the future and the systems needed to generate those effects.

    11.2.3. The term Air Force CONOPS has a very specific purpose: clearly convey how air
and space power capabilities should be used as instruments of national military power. They tie
the enduring and evolving principles of air and space power employment directly to the
requirements definition and capabilities development processes. The Air Force CONOPS are not
independent forces in and of themselves, i.e., there will not be physical entities dedicated to a
particular CONOPS. Rather, the necessary capabilities and assets for any given CONOPS are
imbedded within the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct. When these
capabilities are required, in part or in whole, to meet Joint Force Commanders’ requirements,
they are presented in accordance with Air Force Doctrine as Air and Space Expeditionary Task
Forces (AETF). As missions change in these theaters, the composition of the AEFs and the
capabilities within them will evolve to best meet the needs of the Combatant Commanders. In
doing so, they will serve as vehicles to increase understanding of these principles within Joint,
sister Service, government, and civilian audiences.

    11.2.4. The mission of ACS is to create, sustain, and protect all Air and Space Forces across
the full spectrum of military operations. ACS ensures that responsive expeditionary support for
right-sized forces used in Joint operations is achievable within resource constraints. Thus, ACS
provides the foundation supporting Air Force Operational Concepts enabling the capabilities that
distinguish air and space power—speed, flexibility, and global perspective.

     11.2.5. There are 24 functional areas embedded in ACS, of which munitions is one. All of
the functional areas work in concert supporting national objectives, Joint Vision 2020 and the
overarching air and space capabilities of Global Vigilance, Reach and Power. A functional area
is a broad scope of related warfighting and support skills and attributes that may span the range
of many operations.

11.3. Munitions Functional Area Description

   11.3.1. As part of ACS, maintenance repairs weapon systems and weapon system
components. This work is performed at the flightline, intermediate and depot levels, depending



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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

on the specific weapon system/subsystem and the maintenance CONOPS. The munitions
responsibility for the management, production, and maintenance of munitions is a key
component of Air and Space Power, and is absolutely necessary for the successful performance
of most combat air operations. Munitions are most critical in deployed situations where
transport and build-up times can become significant constraints in combat capabilities. The
ability to deliver the right munitions, on the right target, at the planned time, is critical to
supporting the warfighter.

    11.3.2. Munitions leaders envision a world-class integrated Air Force munitions community
that is agile, interoperable, and accountable. It seamlessly provides accurate information,
reliable products, and superior services through optimal infrastructure and highly trained
technicians. The Air Force munitions community channels the vitality and innovation of its
people to exploit technology and streamline processes to provide safe, combat-ready munitions
and weapon systems. The organization plans and implements improvements in munitions,
weapons systems, equipment, infrastructure and procedures to support global, Joint,
expeditionary operations.

     11.3.3. Munitions support encompasses more than expeditionary combat support. It includes
all the processes that ready and prepare munitions stockpiles and personnel for quick and flexible
response, and that sustain operational activity efficiently at home and abroad.

   11.3.4 The Air Force currently does not plan to transition any new development items to
SMCA. Most Air Force items being developed in the near term are non-SMCA Assigned guided
munitions or more complex, non-SMCA Assigned munitions that are not subject to being
considered for transition to SMCA.

11.4. Air Force Vision

    11.4.1. The Air Force vision is to defend the United States and protect its interests through
aerospace power. As Joint Vision 2020 suggests, the nation will face a wide range of challenges
and opportunities. With Global Vigilance, Reach and Power, the Air Force will provide
balanced aerospace capabilities key to meeting national security objectives and realizing the full
spectrum dominance envisioned by Joint Vision 2020.

    11.4.2. The Air Force is an expeditionary Air and Space Force configured for the full
spectrum of operations. They have constituted ten deployable AEFs. Two AEFs, trained to task,
are always deployed or on call to meet current national requirements while the remaining force
trains, exercises and prepares for the full spectrum of operations.

   11.4.3. In a smaller-scale contingency, one AEF, task force-organized into an AETF, can
provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and command and control of aerospace forces,
over an area roughly half the size of Texas. The AEF can provide air superiority while striking
some 200 targets per day. One AEF can surge to provide these capabilities 24 hours a day.

   11.4.4. As the Air Force becomes lighter and leaner, they will continue to improve their
expeditionary capabilities – at the same time becoming more lethal. They will be able to deploy



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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

an AEF in 48 hours and rapidly deploy additional AEFs – up to 5 in 15 days – providing Joint
Force commanders’ options to begin offensive operations.

    11.4.5. Effective, efficient logistics will be key to sustaining expeditionary forces.
Information technology, rapid transportation and the strengths of both the organic and industrial
logistics base will be harnessed to ensure responsive, dependable, precise support.

    11.4.6. The Air Force plans to capitalize more fully on revolutionary technologies like
stealth, advanced airborne and spaceborne sensors and highly precise all-weather munitions.

    11.4.7. Air Armament Vision – The current weapons development cycle has not produced
weapons that are optimal for our future aircraft requirements. This is due to the revolution in
stealth and supercruise aircraft, which drives internal carriage, and the need for a reduced
logistics footprint driven by the Expeditionary Air Force. Both of these needs are driving a
requirement for smaller weapons. Due to maturing technology and advanced management
information systems, there is an opportunity to develop the weapon and aircraft at the same time,
which should result in weapons optimized for the platforms. Although technology is ready, the
current Air Force budget has not projected any funds for future weapons investment. They are
lead-time away to start development efforts for weapons for the 2008-2025 timeframe.

11.5. Life Cycle Management – As part of the strategic plan, the Air Force will implement
agile acquisition procedures and sustain a munitions industrial base capable of meeting Air Force
operational demands and will develop operationally effective and efficient procedures to care for
munitions across the entire life cycle. Although the majority of Air Force munitions items
depend on contractor repair, or support from government-owned/contractor-operated facilities,
life cycle management for AFMC-managed items must address retention of some organic
capability through the source of repair process. This has major implications concerning
legislation directing retention of government repair and a 50/50 objective. Air force Life cycle
management objectives are:

   11.5.1. Industrial Base Management. In cooperation with Army JMC Industrial Base
analysts, plan and manage industrial (government and contractor owned/operated) capabilities to
meet planned surge requirements.

   11.5.2. Release and launch systems. Improve commonality (across airframes), reliability
and maintainability of release and launch systems.

    11.5.3. Insensitive munitions. Develop a compliant insensitive munitions stockpile for the
Air Force.

    11.5.4. Cradle-to-Grave stockpile planning and involvement. Develop plans to effectively
care for and manage every munitions asset from the time it enters the operational requirements
process to disposal through active involvement of the munitions community in all aspects of
system maturation.




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

   11.5.5. Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition. Continually assess ability of the
Army’s SMCA capability to support transition of technologies and components into the
production base.

11.6. Actual Air Force Acquisition and Management Practice

   11.6.1. Acquisition. A characterization of Ammunition Procurement for the Air Force is
shown in Appendix G.

    11.6.2. Lead Time for Delivery of Munitions. New or increased munitions requirements can
take two or more years after forecast before items are available. Programming, approval,
funding and procurement actions make up this lead-time. The Air Force’s ability to support
operational and training requirements is directly dependent upon the timeliness and accuracy of
forecasts. Munitions users should order only what they can use and use what they order. By
following this simple methodology, end-of-year munitions excess will be minimal.

    11.6.3. Munitions Accountability. A Munitions Accountable Systems Officer (MASO) is
assigned to account for DoD stocklisted munitions including only those Commercial off The
Shelf (COTS) munitions approved and managed by OO-ALC/WM. MASOs manage
conventional ammunition as defined by DoDD 5160.65 Single Manager for Conventional
Ammunition.

    11.6.4. Requisitioning. Units submit requisitions in accordance with command guidance.
Munitions Accountability Elements work in conjunction with the Inspection and Storage
Elements to ensure sufficient storage space exists. Requests for expedited support or deviations
from the existing requisitioning priorities based on operational need must be coordinated with
the MAJCOM prior to processing.

   11.6.5. Inventory.

        11.6.5.1. Air Force managed inventories are required to validate accuracy of accountable
records by reconciling National Stock Number (NSN), quantity, lot number, condition code, and
location.

       11.6.5.2. Stock discrepancies between accountable records and on-hand balances must
be thoroughly investigated to determine the cost and appropriate reporting procedures should be
followed.

   11.6.6. Disposition. All organizations must comply with the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA).

   11.6.7. Transportation.

        11.6.7.1. Shipments – General Guidance. The transportation office provides the MASO
with a list of individuals authorized to receipt for munitions and explosive items, including
classified items to be released to the transportation movement officer for shipment.



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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


       11.6.7.2. The Global Transportation Network (GTN) provides in-transit visibility of
munitions movements through the Cargo Movement Operation System (CMOS).

    11.6.8. The SMCA’s continued provision of effective, efficient logistics support will be key
to sustaining expeditionary Air Force units. Improvements in the storage inspection and
condition code process will be beneficial in supporting the future warfighter.

    11.6.9. The Air Force would like to see a database for industrial base producers and
capabilities that can be queried by all the Military Services. The Air Force’s ECSS will allow
better interface with other Military Services; however, use of Common Data Dictionaries are
needed to support ECSS’s connectivity to the IT systems of other Military Services and SMCA.




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


                                                                                  Chapter 12
                                        Documentation Review – Army
12.1. Existing Documented Mission, Roles, Responsibilities29

           12.1.1. The Army’s Purpose and Role in National Security:

        12.1.1.1. The Army’s purpose is to serve the American people, protect enduring national
interests and fulfill national military responsibilities.30 While the Army has performed diverse
tasks since its establishment in 1775, the non-negotiable contract with the American people has
remained constant: As part of the Joint Force, the Army is tasked to provide relevant and ready
forces to the Combatant Commanders and the Joint Team. To achieve the objectives of the
Defense Strategy and the supporting objectives of the Military Strategy, the Joint Force
synergistically applies its capabilities to decisively defeat any adversary across the full range of
military operations. In support of the Joint Force, the Army provides versatile, relevant and ready
land combat forces, capable of operating alone or in combination with multinational and
interagency partners.

       12.1.1.2. The following chart provides a graphic depiction of how the Army fits into the
broader contexts of the NDS and the NMS.


                                       Nesting Army Strategy
                   Defense Strategy*                                       National Military Strategy**                        Army Strategy
     Ways Ends




                                  Strategic Objective                                                                                     Strategic Objectives
                                                                                        Military Objectives                            Trained and Equipped Soldiers
                               Secure the United States
                                                                                                 Protect                                        and Leaders
                               Ensure Strategic Access
                                                                                                 Prevent                               Relevant and Ready Land Power
                            Establish Favorable Conditions                                                                           Capability Provided to the Combatant
                                                                                                 Prevail
                            Strengthen Allies and Partners                                                                            Commanders and the Joint Team
                           Key Activities      Guidelines
                                                                                     Joint Operations Concepts                             Title 10 Functions (constant)
                              “AD3”      Active Defense-In-Depth
                                                                                         Joint Operating Concepts                        Recruit, Organize, Supply, Equip, Train,
                                Assure                 Continuous                                                                            Service, Mobilize, Demobilize,
                                                     Transformation                      Joint Functional Concepts                       Administer, Maintain; Construct, Outfit &
                               Dissuade
                                                    Capabilities Based                   Joint Integrating Concepts                       Repair Equipment; Construct, Maintain
                                 Deter                  Approach                                                                                & Repair Infrastructure***
                                Defeat               Managing Risk
                                                                                                                                                      Strategic Imperatives
                                       8 Key Operational Capabilities                         Joint Force Attributes                               Implement transformation Initiatives,
                                                                                                    Fully Integrated                                Improve Capabilities for Homeland
                                             Strengthening Intelligence                                                                          Defense, Improve Proficiencies Against
                                                                                                     Expeditionary
                                      Protecting Critical Bases of Operation                                                                   Irregular Challenges, Improve Capabilities
                                                                                                      Networked
                                                                                                                                                  for Stability Operations, Achieve Army
                                      Operating from the Commons: Space,                             Decentralized                                   Force Capabilities to dominate in
                                                Water, Air, Cyber                                      Adaptable                                      Complex Terrain, Improve Army
                                       Projecting and Sustaining forces in                        Decision Superiority                                   Capabilities for Strategic
                                                                                                        Lethality
     Means




                                        distant anti-access environments                                                                         Responsiveness, Improve Global Force
                                                                                                                                                 Posture, Improve Capabilities for Battle
                                     Denying enemies sanctuary
                                                                                    Joint Functions & Capabilities                                    Command, Improve Joint Fires
                                    Conducting network-centric                                   Apply Force                                   Capabilities, Improve Capabilities for Joint
                                           operations                                                                                                             Logistics
                                                                                         Sustain Military Capabilities
                                Improving proficiency for Irregular                         Securing Battlespace                           People & Organizations
                                            Warfare                                     Achieving Decision Superiority
                                                                                                                                                            HQDA
                               Increasing capabilities of partners –
                                                                                                                                                         MACOMs
                                    international & domestic
                                                                                                                                                          Soldiers
                             Global Defense Posture                              Joint Force Size & Design                                                Leaders
                                                                                                                                                  Resources
                             Force Planning Construct                                                                                                  Budget
                                                                                                                                                 Infrastructure***
                                   “1-4-2-1-C”
                                                                                                                                 *** infrastructure includes: buildings, structures,
                 * As published in the 2004 Strategic Planning Guidance   ** Signed by CJCS, but unpublished as of 7 Oct 04.
                                                                                                                               utilities, real property and interests in real property.


                                                                                           FIGURE 5


29
       National Strategic Guidance (From Army Strategic Planning Guidance - Annex A), undated.
30
       The Army, Field Manual No.1, 14 June 2001, page 21.


                                                                                                    53
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

        12.1.1.3. As the source of ―trained and ready land forces capable of decisive action
across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict,‖31 the Army must keep these
goals and its war fighting focus constantly in mind as it performs its Title 10 functions to
organize, train and equip forces for Joint Force Commanders (JFCs).32 The combined forces
provide the Combatant Commander critical capabilities to set the conditions for strategic success
by ensuring the broadest range of military options in a crisis and by providing the ability to
decisively conclude operations. Army combat forces provide the means to decisively defeat
adversaries.

      12.1.2. The Strategic Readiness System

        12.1.2.1. The Army has developed the Strategic Readiness System (SRS) as the
framework to transform into a strategy-focused organization. SRS is based on the Balanced
Scorecard Methodology and will ensure establishment of a clear linkage between strategy and
actions. The SRS links core competencies (ends) with internal processes (ways) as well as
people and assets (means). SRS then measures the Army’s effectiveness in achieving those ends.
The SRS enables leaders to monitor and forecast strategic performance and evaluate how well
the Army makes use of its resources in implementing strategy. The Army Strategy Map is
aligned with the Army Strategic Goals listed in the main body of the Army Strategic Planning
Guidance (ASPG). The ASPG, Annex E provides objective descriptions, measures, and targets
for each of the objectives shown on the Army Strategy Map.

        12.1.2.2. The Army’s Ammunition Enterprise Executive Steering Committee has stated
that the vision of Battle space Dominance for the warfighter through Superior Munitions should
be executed by integrated life-cycle management through a team of dedicated professionals who
provide effective, available, and value-added munitions for Joint warfighters. In the journey
toward meeting a collective strategic plan for the Ammunition Enterprise, the following goals
were set:

                  Grow World-Class People, Teams and Partnerships
                  Leverage and integrate Joint Service activities
                  Improve Integrated Life-Cycle Management
                  Technology Development
                  Industrial Base (refer to IB Strategic Plan)
                  Logistics
                  Best Value Enterprise Acquisition
                  Communicate effectively with Stakeholders

   12.1.3. Documented Army Munitions Mission, Roles/Responsibilities. Current policy for
―conventional ammunition‖ (which excludes nuclear and biological munitions systems),
munitions management responsibilities have been delegated to a number of Army staff offices.
They are:


31
     The Army, Field Manual No.1, 14 June 2001, page IV.
32
     Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components, DoDD 5100.1, 25 September, 1987, page 16.


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

        12.1.3.1. DA G3. The DA G3 consolidates requirements, establishes priorities, and
policies for operations, to include EOD and environmental compliance of training ranges.

       12.1.3.2. DA G4. The DA G4 provides budget and policy for the management of the
munitions stockpile, the industrial base, readiness assessment, environmental compliance,
transportation, demilitarization, OPLAN Support and support of Toxic Chemical stockpile
storage.

      12.1.3.3. DA G8. The DA G8 programs funds for: Research, Development, acquisition
and POM missiles.

       12.1.3.4. ASA (ALT)/ PEO. The ASA (ALT)/ PEO provides management and policy
oversight for: Research and development, acquisition, ammunition and missile policy and life
cycle oversight.

       12.1.3.5. ASA (Financial Management). The ASA (FM) administers the Army
munitions budget.

       12.1.3.6. ASA (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology). The ASA (ALT) is responsible
for execution of R/D, acquisition and Integrated Lifecycle Support.

        12.1.3.7. PM Chemical Demilitarization: Demilitarization of toxic chemical stockpiles

     12.1.3.8. PEO Ammunition and Joint Munitions Command. Execution of the
ammunition enterprise operations and execution of the Single Manager for Conventional
Ammunition (SMCA) mission.

        12.1.3.9. SMCA. The Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) was
formed in 1977. The Department of Defense assigned the single manager duties to the
Department of the Army, who delegated the mission to the AMC. AMC further delegated the
mission to the Army Armament Command (ARMCOM). ARMCOM completed implementation
plans, but the SMCA mission actually went to Army Armament Materiel Readiness Command
(ARRCOM), Rock Island, IL when that command was activated in FY77. The SMCA mission
has remained at Rock Island as an element of the ammunition management mission of the
successor commands to ARRCOM, (Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command
(AMCCOM, FY 83-94); Army Industrial Operations Command (IOC, FY 95-99); Army
Operations Support Command (OSC, FY00 to present)).33

            12.1.3.9.1. PEO Ammunition and JMC execute the principle sustainment missions
for the Army. They accomplish this as the principal agent for acquisition and sustainment of
munitions systems, munitions and equipment used by the DoD’s Operating Forces to accomplish
their war fighting mission. In addition to Army research and development The PEO
Ammunition fills the Joint DoD Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition Executive Agent
role for DoD. This support role is limited to assigned ammunition types and logistically to the

33
  Matching Organization to Expectation: The Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition, 1950 to 2004,
George Eaton, AFSC/JMC History Office, 28 January 06.


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

continental United States wholesale operations base. Army performs Joint support role beyond
just SMCA. That extended role extends to munitions logistic support through the Joint
Munitions Transportation Control Activity that coordinates delivery of ammunition both in
Continental United States (CONUS) and to OCONUS theater commanders; munitions readiness
assessment; and sustainment of CONUS Joint training missions.

           12.1.3.9.2. Current executive agent authority for the Army to execute the SMCA
mission is given by the Secretary of the Army by the Under Secretary of Defense. The Secretary
of the Army has subsequently delegated the executive agent responsibilities for the SMCA to
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA (ALT)). The
ASA(ALT) has delegated SMCA Executor responsibilities to the PEO Ammunition and the
SMCA Field Operating Activity (FOA) to the Joint Munitions Command through establishment
of the Army SMCA Charter. The Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition Charter – dated
16 August 2004 provides the following guidance for supporting the Army’s conventional
ammunition mission:

               12.1.3.9.2.1. Execution of the SMCA responsibilities is delegated to PEO
Ammunition as the SMCA Executor. The ASA(ALT) retains responsibility for policy and
oversight of the SMCA and Section 806 functions. The SMCA Executor integrates and executes
the SMCA functions outlined in DoDI 5160.68.

                12.1.3.9.2.2. The EDCA is responsible for oversight and assessment of the
SMCA Executor in the execution of the mission responsibilities. The EDCA shall be supported
by a Jointly-staffed office of senior Service military and civilian ammunition management
specialists located in the National Capital Region. This supporting office shall report directly to
the EDCA. The O/EDCA assists the EDCA in the execution of the assigned mission.

               12.1.3.9.2.3. The Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) Deputy Chief
of Staff (DCS) G-4 is designated as the principal Army staff ammunition proponent responsible
for programming, budgeting for OMA and for Procurement of Ammunition, Army (PAA)
Demilitarization resources necessary to accomplish the SMCA mission.

               12.1.3.9.2.4. The AMC has responsibility to provide logistics and sustainment
support for the SMCA mission. This responsibility includes establishing and operating a SMCA
organization, processes, and structure to support peacetime and wartime conditions. The U.S.
Army Joint Munitions Command (JMC), subordinate to AMC, is the principal SMCA Field
Operating Activity (FOA) for supporting the SMCA Executor and the Military Services in
accomplishing the duties and responsibilities prescribed in DoDD 5160.65 and DoDI 5160.68.

12.2. Ammunition Enterprise (AE) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

    12.2.1. This AE Memorandum of Understanding captures the overarching ammunition
enterprise operational principles and agreements between the JMC, ARDEC and PEO
Ammunition. The MOU establishes the business climate of cooperation for the path forward.
These enterprise operational principles and agreements will be further delineated for
implementation by each PM as an annex to this MOU. The goal of the Ammunition Enterprise is



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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

to integrate the people, organizations, infrastructure and processes for effective life-cycle
management of conventional ammunition for the warfighter and other customers e.g. Foreign
Military Sales. Accomplishment of this goal requires the near seamless integration of PEO
Ammunition and JMC with life cycle engineering support and services from the ARDEC. The
AE management strategic concept is a bottom-up approach that establishes IPTs as the
organizational structure for execution of ammunition life cycle management functions.

    12.2.2. Additionally, the PEO Ammunition, ARDEC and the JMC plans to work in
partnership with the Acquisition Logistics Technology Enterprise Systems and Services
(ALTESS) to establish an Ammunition Enterprise IT infrastructure that will enable full
interoperability and integration across the ammunition community and is consistent with DoD
operational, architecture and security requirements. The Ammunition Enterprise will enable data
access through a single sign-on, web based portal linked to the Army Knowledge Online (AKO)
for Army personnel and to other Military Services by direct "purple" portal access. The PEO
Ammunition, ARDEC and JMC will establish a direct relationship with ALTESS to develop an
AE solution that will help us reduce and consolidate the number of stovepipe applications/
systems, by using data-centric methodologies and standard applications/systems development
involving COTS tools. The PEO Ammunition, ARDEC and JMC will ensure all
applications/systems are linked, integrated, or interfaced into the AE Portal. No PM, ARDEC or
JMC element shall develop any new IT applications/systems without coordination with the IPT
and approval by the PEO Ammunition and ARDEC Chief Information Officers (CIOs) and the
JMC Systems Officer. The PEO Ammunition and JMC corporate goal is to have all new
systems/applications developed in the Ammunition Enterprise portal and also ensure that legacy
systems have a specific plan to migrate into the enterprise environment.

12.3. Joint Munitions and Lethality Life Cycle Management Command (JM&L LCMC)
Ammunition Enterprise (AE) Strategic Plan. This Army document is a drill down of strategic
planning derived from the National Military Strategy, Defense Planning Guidance and the Army
Champaign Plan and formulated by the process owners (PEO Ammunition, Joint Munitions
Command and ARDEC) as it relates to assigned munitions missions. This Army AE document
articulates the Commands' visions, missions, goals and objectives as well as strategies to achieve
them. The existing mission for the Army AE community is to execute integrated life cycle
management for the Joint Warfighters. The existing JM&L LCMC organization was directed as
a result of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) (2 August 2004) between the AMC and
ASA(ALT) in support of the Army's Life Cycle Initiative. Strategic planning activities were
initiated in the Spring of 2004 and are now culminating in 4th quarter 2006 with plans to
establish a JM&L LCMC that will stand up 1 October 2006.

12.4. Ammunition Enterprise Strategic Planning Process. Four goals were developed as a
result of identifying key programmatic impediments. The goals were further decomposed into a
number of executable operating objectives for the enterprise. These objectives enable
performance measurement and develop accountability:
     Grow world-class people, teams and partnerships
     Leverage and integrate Joint Services activities
     Improve integrated life-cycle management
            o Technology Development


                                               57
 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

          o Industrial base
          o Logistics
          o Best value enterprise acquisition
       Communicate effectively with stakeholders




                             Develop
        Conduct             Ammunition             Conduct               Develop                Execute &
                                                                                                                 Closed
        Strategic           Enterprise’s           Strategic            Management               Review           Loop
       Assessment            Planning              Planning                Plans               Performance
                             Guidance

   Environmental         Resource          Offsite framework       Management             Management
    factors and            Outlook            and structure            Planning                Plan
    supporting data       Strategic         Ammunition               Guidance and            Implementation
    list                   priorities and     Enterprise-wide          Template                Approach
   Ammunition             planning           strategic priorities    Resource               Organization
    Enterprise             constraints       Offsite Results          Guidance                Performance
    specific TIPs List    Draft Guidance     Report                  Draft organization-     Review (OPR)
   Prioritized TIPs       Memo                                        specific                approach,
                                             Draft Ammunition                                 schedule, and
    List                  Ammunition         Enterprise               Management
                                                                       Plans                   report template
   Working                Enterprise         Strategic Plan
    Strategic              Planning                                   Draft consolidated     OPR Guidelines
                                             Ammunition
    Assessment             Guidance Memo      Enterprise               Ammunition             OPR Report
    Report                                    Strategic Plan           Enterprise             Performance
   Draft Strategic                                                    Management Plan         Action Plan
    Assessment                                                        Performance            Revised
    Report                                                             measures                Management
   Strategic                                                          guidance and            Plan, as
    Assessment                                                         performance data        appropriate
    Report                                                            Organization-          Revised budget
                                                                       specific                allocations, as
                                                                       performance             needed
                                                                       measures,
                                                                       Measures               Strategic
                                                                       Dictionary, targets     assessment
                                                                                               input summary
                                                                      Ammunition
                                                                       Enterprise
               Dependent
               Dependent                                               Consolidated
               Upon ESC                                                Mgmt. Plan
               Upon ESC
                Decision
                Decision

                                                        FIGURE 6

12.5. Comparison of Munitions Mission Roles and Responsibilities

    12.5.1. Conceptual vs. Documented Roles/Responsibilities – A comparison was made of
documented missions and conceptual guidance addressing evolving needs. Since ammunition is
the core mission being considered, feedback from DA and JMC indicates that both the
Ammunition Enterprise and development of the LCMC is considering ―Future SMCA‖. The
following concepts are under review and differ from current document Army, SMCA doctrine
and policy and may require change:

        12.5.1.1. Effects of Service Modularity. Will sustainment of conventional ammunition
to the war fight be affected? Will SMCA need to address increasing procurement, supply,


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

inspection, transportation and accountability issues to satisfy rapid deployment and unit specific
load requirements? How will modularity affect SMCA? What needs to be changed?

        12.5.1.2. Scope of field support. How far should the Army’s SMCA Executive Agent
(EA) support extend to support the sustainment of Joint warfighter conventional ammunition?
Should SMCA scope extend to Theater supply, re-supply, inspection, maintenance and
retrograde?

        12.5.1.3. Reset. Is Army’s role as SMCA EA meeting DoD’s goals to fight multiple
conflicts and replenish conventional ammunition? (Note: Conventional ammunition includes
missile requirements). What refinements should be made to keep pace with change?

      12.5.1.4. Training. Is Army’s SMCA test mission with Centralized Ammunition
Management (CAM) adaptable to sustain Military Services’ CONUS training requirements?
What changes are needed in SMCA to allow CAM or some similar process to be used to meet
SMCA customer needs?

   12.5.2. Future Transformational Objectives.

        12.5.2.1. Leadership efforts in the first three quarters of FY2006 have resulted in
Development of a Joint Munitions and Lethality Life Cycle Management Command (JM&L
LCMC). This effort is a big step in integrating Tank-automotive and Armaments Command
(TACOM); Joint Munitions Command and Research, Development and Engineering Command
(RDECOM) under HQ AMC and the Army Acquisition Executive. The newly
conceived "confederation" will replace the existing Army AE and will enable organizational
efficiencies and allow focus of resources to achieve near term goals and long term visions
associated with Battle-Space Dominance for the warfighter through superior munitions. The
details supporting the new confederation in place of the current JM LCMC Ammunition
Enterprise MOA, how to execute all munitions missions (Army and SMCA) and
roles/responsibilities will be crafted by a special AE transition team in the 4th quarter 2006.

        12.5.2.2. Review of DoD Directive 5160.65 and DoD Instruction 5160.68, which serve
as a doctrinal base for SMCA, began in June 2006. This update will serve as a basis for SMCA
in 2010 and beyond. The new "Confederation" MOA (in lieu of the AE MOU) will reflect the
addition of "lethality" to the Joint Munitions concept and define its expanded concept of
operations. Standup of the JM&L LCMC is expected to occur in the 22 September - 1 October
2006 timeframe. The proposed organizational structure was being staffed for approval at the
time this study was published.




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                                            Chapter 13
             Documentation Review – Marine Corps
13.1. Existing Documented Mission, Roles, Responsibilities

    13.1.1. The United States Marine Corps is organized as a ―force-in-readiness,‖ one that is
able to support a wide range of national military requirements. The Service is divided into four
broad categories:
         Headquarters Marine Corps;
         Operating forces;
         Supporting establishment; and,
         Reserves.

      13.1.2. The Headquarters Marine Corps is structured as follows:34




                                                FIGURE 7



34
     http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/hqmcmain.nsf/frontpage


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

    13.1.3. Within the Marine Corps structure, the Marine Corps Systems Command serves as
the Commandant's principal agent for acquisition and sustainment of systems and equipment
used by the Operating Forces to accomplish their warfighting mission.

  13.1.4. As part of the Marine Corps Systems Command, the Program Manager for
Ammunition (PM Ammo) has the following mission and structure:35

    13.1.5. The PM Ammo Office represents the singular entry point for customers and
stakeholders in the Life Cycle Management (LCM) of ammunition and explosives for the Marine
Corps. The span of responsibility, from budget formulation and acquisition strategy
development, to ultimate use/disposal, requires a clear, methodical path within the myriad
Ammunition Logistics elements. Although PM Ammo provides diverse and critical support in
the area of Ground Munitions to the Marine Corps, the mission in Total Life Cycle Support for
this commodity remains distinct within the Command. The introduction of ammunition and
explosives into the Marine Corps stockpile, and management of all facets thereafter, compel this
office to partner across numerous DoD organizations. Designated the Marine Corps Class V(W)
Inventory Control Point (ICP) per MCO P4400.151B, PM Ammo executes global positioning of
Class V(W) assets and addresses Operational Planning Support for the Marine Forces. The
entire LCM effort draws the PM Ammo staff into perpetual Integrated Product Teaming within
the Marine Corps Systems Command, Higher Headquarters and, due to increasing jointness,
across the Department of Defense. The responsibility for executing the Marine Corps explosives
safety program, tasked by MCO 5100.29A, has migrated into both explosives and environmental
concerns as environmental issues continue to impact munitions management.




                                                FIGURE 8

35
     http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/syscomorg/ammo.asp


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


13.2. CONOPS - Conceptual

   13.2.1. Fusing the concepts, capabilities, and core competencies expressed in the Navy's
Service vision Sea Power 21 and the Marine Corps' capstone concept Expeditionary Maneuver
Warfare, the Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOC) provides overarching
guidance for the development of future naval forces and the basis for incorporating new naval
concepts within a broader joint context.36

    13.2.2. In their role within the Department of Navy, the Marine Corps operates in forward
areas at the end of long supply lines without a significant land-based supply structure and needs
to resupply at sea. Consequently, Naval forces carry their own ammunition, spares, and
consumables - as well as support and repair facilities for use early in a crisis or throughout a
protracted conflict. This self-sustainability provides the National Command Authorities critical
time to create an environment that will bring success. Naval ships are designed to travel
significant distances without replenishment. They carry the striking power of aircraft, guns,
missiles, and Marine forces that can execute operations ashore immediately, without an assembly
period or a lengthy logistics buildup. If conflict should continue over an extended period, Naval
forces can remain on station through augmentation and resupply by combat logistics ships.37

    13.2.3. While the Navy – Marine Corps Team is expanding the entire array of naval
capabilities provided to the Nation, Naval transformation is centered upon the development of
Seabasing: the concepts and capabilities that exploit command of the sea to project, protect, and
sustain integrated warfighting capabilities from the maritime domain. Seabasing and the
supporting tools being developed will usher in dramatic new ways of employing naval forces to
deter conflict and, when required, to wage war. Throughout, every aspect of naval
transformation will be, first and foremost, committed to and built upon the principles of
jointness.38

    13.2.4. Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) is directed towards operational
objectives in support of the strategic aim. Instead of focusing on the seizure of terrain, OMFTS
applies combat power directly to critical vulnerabilities. OMFTS does not envision the
methodical buildup of combat power ashore. Naval Expeditionary Force power projection
options range from the use of precision guided munitions, aviation, special operations forces, and
Command and Control Warfare (C2W) to the employment of ground forces. Amphibious
operations are part of OMFTS and integral to naval power projection. Amphibious operations
are conducted within OMFTS to enable the introduction of larger forces and to support a main
effort elsewhere or as the main effort in a campaign.39

   13.2.5. The Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), the most capable of their kind in the
world, are task-organized, self-sustaining, rapidly deployable air, ground, and logistic units.
They provide a wide range of power projection options from short-duration raids to large scale

36
     Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003, undated.
37
     Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Pub 1, 28 March 1994, page 12.
38
     Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003, undated.
39
     Ground Combat Operations, MCWP 3-1, 27 November 2002, pages 57 and 59.


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forcible-entry operations. Amphibious forces provide the ultimate conventional demonstration
of power by landing on an adversary’s sovereign territory.40

    13.2.6. While often thought of as force sustainment, the Maritime Prepositioning Forces
(MPF), are integral to operational power projection and provide the United States with a rapid,
sustainable, global-response capability. By employing maritime prepositioning ships that are
maintained in-theater, naval expeditionary forces can travel directly to conflict areas, joining
with these ships to build a potent fighting force.41

    13.2.7. To support Marine Corps ammunition requirements, the Marine Corps Systems
Command, PM Ammo office will remain the Marine Corps’ central repository for ammunition
data and will act as the single point of contact for Marine Corps Ground Ammunition.42

    13.2.8. Over the years, management of Marine Corps ground ammunition has become
complex. Jointness is not a luxury, rather, it has become critical to leverage resources and
achieve economies of scale in the $2 billion annual DoD conventional munitions procurements.
Jointness comes with unique challenges. Per the PM Ammo’s Strategic Plan, reliance on the
SMCA’s primary FOA, Joint Munitions Command, for both procurement and wholesale ―Care
of Stocks In Stores (COSIS)‖ of the bulk of the Marine Corps stockpile will most certainly
remain pivotal to logistics support to the Marine Corps. Establishment of the PEO Ammunition
as SMCA Executor brought the formerly disparate Army Program Managers under one
organization to gain efficiencies in the research, development, and acquisition domains. This
structure offered a new set of challenges and complexities within the joint ammunition business
domain. Additionally, reliance on the Navy tidewaters for both storage and load out of Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) basic force-held stocks is key in support of Marine Forces’
ammunition requirements. External influence on Marine Corps ground ammunition polices and
procedures continue to play a significant role in fashioning the future management of this
commodity.43

   13.2.9. The Marine Corps benefits from the commonality of product lines with the U.S.
Army in many ways, specifically: Research and Development (R&D) leveraging, cross-leveling,
and efficiencies of buys. However, the Marine Corps, as a Military Service within the
Department of the Navy, must also include the DoN unique safety aspects of munitions within its
programs.

    13.2.10. The Marine Corps' link and dependency is significant. Many of their products are
shipboard loaded in support of deployed Marine Expeditionary Units. A significant portion of
Marine Corps' assets reside at SMCA wholesale storage activities. The Marine Corps is neither
structured nor facilitized to manage/store its own stockpile. Today, of the $4B stockpile,
approximately 4-5% is held at Marine Corps ground-based retail activities.



40
     Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, 28 March 1994, pages 65-67.
41
     Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, 28 March 1994, pages 65-67.
42
     PM Ammo FY05 Strategic Plan, 1 October 2004.
43
     PM Ammo FY05 Strategic Plan, 1 October 2004.


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    13.2.11. An important take-away is this understanding: The Marine Corps, more so than any
other Military Service, is representative of the most complex logistic chain. For example, Air
Force generally relies on the SMCA for Wholesale to Air Force Retail activities where planes are
loaded, i.e., end of the train from the SMCA perspective. Navy is similar as the Naval Weapons
Station is the end state for grey bottom shipboard loading. The Marine Corps is dependent on
wholesale to retail, wholesale to outload, all shipment there after, regardless of movement mode
(vessel, air mobility), to final destination.

    13.2.12. The Marine Corps has always taken a position of support to, and for, the SMCA
concept. For the most part, operational concepts laid out through the various forums of the
SMCA, generally materialize and work. At times if there was turbulence or ―hiccup‖, the
Marine Corps has expressed a belief that the execution of the concept not the concept, was at
fault. As an example, at times middle or lower levels of the Enterprise are not aware of Senior
Management decisions and tend to interpret policy, guidance, and processes individually.

     13.2.13. For the Marine Corps, the most important concerns are the beginning, and the end
of life cycle management. In other words, the most important operations are: Efficient
acquisition/ procurement of quality munitions items, and, the efficient outload/distribution of
those items. Conceptually, at the highest level, Military Services procure ammunition for use by
their respective warfighting elements. ALL intermediary actions and functions only serve to
accomplish this mission. This should not be construed that functions such as COSIS, Quality
Assurance (QA), surveillance, fiscal management, etc. are not important, rather they are
functions of the end game.

    13.2.14. The Marine Corps has participated in the U.S. Transportation Command
(TRANSCOM) DPO End-to-End (E2E) effort since inception. Currently, the Marine Corps is
executing a pilot project, via signed agreement with the TRANSCOM. This will be a
TRANSCOM sponsored demonstration of a Common Operating Picture (COP) for Class V End
to End Material Management and Visibility. The premise behind this pilot:

    13.2.15. DoD does not currently possess a single common tool or application that will
provide end-to-end (E2E) visibility of class V materiel in inventory, in-transit, or in hands of
supported units. The TRANSCOM, as the designated DPO, has conducted a Capabilities-Based
Assessment Team (CBAT) study that conceptualized development of a tool as ―proof-of-
concept‖ that could provide that visibility. The demonstration of a COP tool for class V end-to-
end materiel management and visibility is a short-term exploratory venture that is medium-risk,
and relatively low-cost. PM Ammo, Marine Corps Systems Command, in coordination with
selected industry partners, has agreed to facilitate and support a demonstration of this prototype
COP Tool to quickly validate the conceptual basis, or to identify shortcomings in its design,
performance, or capability.

    13.2.16..If this pilot program is successful, having a single COP tool may become a goal for
all Military Services to use under the single DPO, TRANSCOM, supported moves. The tool
would have to interact with the Military Services’ inventory and transportation management
systems.




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13.3. Actual Marine Corps Munitions Acquisition and Management Practice

   13.3.1. Transitioned ammunition

         13.3.1.1. Within the DoN, the Marine Corps is responsible for acquisition and inventory
management for all ground ammunition for support of Marine Forces. Aviation Ordnance that
supports Marine Forces is acquired and managed by the Navy. Within the DoN, ground
ammunition is defined as anything fired from the ground and the Marine Corps ground
ammunition inventory currently consists of more than 300 individual ammunition and explosives
items. These items support all major weapons systems employed by the Marine Corps to include
artillery, tank, small arms (such as 9mm, 5.56mm, 7.62mm, and .50-caliber), non-lethal, rockets,
missiles, medium caliber (25mm and 40mm), mine clearance systems, and the family of mortar
ammunition. Conventional ground ammunition also includes individually employed and hand
emplaced material, such as grenades, demolition equipment, pyrotechnics, and signaling devices.
Also included are training- and mission-unique items, such as non-lethal, Special Effects
Ammunition Markings System (SESAMS), and Military Working Dog Scent Kits.

       13.3.1.2. While 60 percent of the ammunition the Marine Corps buys are procured
through the SMCA, additional missile munitions are procured through the Army’s Aviation and
Missile Command and other items are procured through NAVSEA, PM-4.

         13.3.1.3. The PM Ammunition has a limited research and development mission in that
most, but not all, of the ground munitions items used by the Marine Corps are common to the
Army. The Marine Corps has always been able to explore material solutions that address littoral
warfare, amphibious warfare and other specific operator needs that are unique to the Marine
Corps. This is normally performed by Navy offices that are sponsored by the PM Ammunition.
Depending on the outcome of the required realignment under Base Closure and Realignment
Report, May 2005, this functional area may change in the future but that determination has yet to
be finalized. Per the BRAC 05 report, the Navy offices that work some of the gun ammunition
research and development may be relocated to Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. This realignment would
result in a more robust joint center for gun and ammunition Research, Development &
Acquisition at Picatinny Arsenal. How this joint center would be structured has not yet been
defined in detail.

        13.3.1.4. The only potential Marine Corps near term procurement transition is the
APOBS. This was a Marine Corps developed item which is also being procured by the U.S.
Army. Reasons for non-transition are primarily cost driven. The Military Services lose control
(not of the TDP/Specifications/ CM) rather, cost. The Marine Corps' ammunition managers
believe that if transitioned, a significant amount of additional ESIP would be required once the
item is managed by SMCA. The Marine Corps would be willing to offer this up as a test case to
either refute or confirm this premise. While this could possibly be a misperception, higher
management costs for ESIP is one of the primary concerns of all the Military Services. This is
why ESIP maintains such high visibility and ongoing dialogue.

       13.3.1.5. The remainder of SMCA-Assigned items that currently are not planned for
procurement through SMCA are not being transitioned due to efficiencies. Most are small,



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Indefinite Type, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) type buys for non-lethal ammunition, SESAMS,
unique small arms procurements.

       13.3.1.6. In broad terms, the Marine Corps will be continually modernizing their
munitions products over the POM. While many of these efforts may be transparent due to
commonality or development by U.S. Army, it will add to the list of Marine Corps Class V(W)
ground ammunition products. Within the next 3 years for example, the Marine Corps will have:

          High Mobility Artillery Rocket System HIMARS – Multiple Launch Rocket System
           MLRS Rocket based
          120mm Expeditionary Force Support System (will fire both rifled and smoothbore
           120mm more ctgs.) with an initial operational capability November 2006
          Excalibur
          New family of 155mm (working with PEO Ammunition); the South African DENAL
           family
          A family of 30mm ammunition in support of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle
          Air to Air Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) in support of
           the Marine Corps Complementary Low Altitude Weapons System (CLAWS).
          Possibly Polymer Cased Small Arms Ammunition (internal USMC/ONR effort)
          Currently fielding M72A7 Light Anti-Armor Weapon (LAAW)
          Currently fielding the 120mm Anti-Personnel (APERS) Canister Cartridge

        13.3.1.7. The Marine Corps has always required non-waivered compliance with all
quality acceptance criteria on their munitions. To ensure this, the PM Ammo office sponsors an
oversight function to be performed by technically proficient personnel at a Navy installation.
This office reviews all contracts covering procurement to support Marine Corps procurements of
Class V(W) ammunition. The office advises the PM Ammo regarding contract completeness and
contract compliance. The office also works cooperatively effort with the SMCA procuring
offices and SMCA QA representatives.

   13.3.2. Non-transitioned ammunition

        13.3.2.1. Beyond the ammunition the Marine Corps buys through the SMCA, additional
missile munitions are procured through the Army’s Aviation and Missile Command and other
items are procured through other procuring agencies such as NAVSEA, PM-4, Naval Weapons
Support Centers (NWSCs) Crane, Indian Head, Dahlgren, and via direct contract with industry.
This will change over the next several years with most of the non-transitioned procurement
executed by PM Ammo in-house. Oversight and support arrangements for procurements through
the Navy are worked similarly to those procedures used for items procured through SMCA
although funding streams may vary slightly.

        13.3.2.2. Non-transitioned Marine Corps owned munitions are normally stored at NWSC
Crane as opposed to storage at SMCA installations. Navy Receipt, Stowage, Segregation and
Issue (RSSI) money funds any required support incidental to storage of these munitions while
stored at NWSC Crane. This is predominately serialized missile and DU capabilities. NWSC
Crane performs Receipt, Storage Segregation and Issue (RSS&I) on the Crane Division Marine


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

Corps inventory of Missiles and other Marine Corps peculiar ammunition and components as
required.

       13.3.2.3. A characterization of Ammunition Procurement for the Marine Corps is shown
in Appendix G.

13.4. Future Transformational Initiatives

    13.4.1. The Marine Corps has executed a Force Structure Review Group to address Marine
Corps Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) based tempo. As such, there is a likelihood of a
structure increase (two additional operating infantry battalions and some miscellaneous
occupational field enhancements) of between 3,000-10,000 Marines. This would increase
ammunition requirements between $16M and $55M annually.

   13.4.2. The Marine Corps recently stood up a Marine Corps Special Operations Command
(MARSOC). MARSOC ammunition, for the most part, will be integrated like any other Marine
Corps unit/Command. There will be some nonstandard needs or requirements that will be
addressed via USSOCCOM however, the preponderance of training and war reserve will use the
same process as a normal requirements.

    13.4.3. The PM Ammo works with Headquarters Marine Corps on strategic Global
Prepositioning initiatives and future ship designs that will allow U.S. Naval expeditionary forces
to conduct logistic re-supply operations with the lift capacity, flexibility, and responsiveness of
surface ships with the deployment speed conferred by strategic airlift in a seabase environment. 44

    13.4.4. To realize the full potential of seabasing, technologically based advancements in
areas such as selective offload, joint command and control, integration of naval logistics and
joint in-transit visibility, at-sea transfer of personnel, intermodal containers, and at-sea reload of
munitions are required. These new capabilities will enhance the Department of Navy’s ability to
close the force, conduct at-sea arrival and assembly, employ the force, sustain the force, and
reconstitute and redeploy the force.45

    13.4.5. In a 21 Mar 05 Memorandum for the Office of Secretary of Defense, Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Services, Combatant Commands (CoComs), Acquisition Commands, and
Agencies, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chiefs of Staff of the other Military
Services all agreed a common approach and set of standards for Joint Common Packaging /
Containerization must be adopted as quickly as possible. Common containers reduce cargo
handling which results in faster distribution with fewer in-transit losses. The memorandum
recommended Commander, United States Transportation Command, as the Distribution Process
Owner, coordinate and develop common joint packaging and containerization standards and that
the already functioning Joint Intermodal Working Group serve as the action agency for this
effort. The JMIC concept, initially developed for ammunition but now broadened to include all
classes of supply, is an example of a common modular package that can move throughout the
Defense Transportation System (DTS). As a potential end-to-end packaging solution the JMIC

44
     PM Ammo FY05 Strategic Plan, 1 October 2004.
45
     Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003, undated.


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

meets all DTS constraints and Joint distribution requirements. It can be loaded at a depot, move
globally via any means throughout DTS without the need for repackaging, and arrive unchanged
at the using unit. A common packaging and containerization capability such as the JMIC
supports emerging operational concepts and architectures.

    13.4.6. Support from other Military Services and Agencies will be required to realize the
transformational potential of naval integrated force protection efforts. One munitions example is
leveraging the efforts of the U.S. Army in development of new types of lethal and non-lethal
ammunition.46

    13.4.7. As 60 percent of the ammunition the Marine Corps buys are procured through the
SMCA, establishment of a solid foundation is critical to minimize the waste of time and
resources, and to maintain the high quality standard for ammunition the Marine Corps requires.47

     13.4.8. The Marine Corps has developed and is continuing to refine a robust Quality
Assurance Master Plan for the procurement and maintenance of Marine Corps Ammunition. The
PM Ammo Strategic Plan serves as the overarching guidance to all Navy activities, Army
activities and contractors that support the Marine Corps in the acquisition, surveillance, and
maintenance of ammunition and explosives. Over the past six years, the Marine Corps has
experienced the cost and time delays associated with poorly manufactured ammunition, which
can be directly linked to quality. As the quantity of ammunition in the inventory is depleted and
Marine Corps Forces are called upon to do more, the quality of ammunition becomes a very
critical element in PM Ammo’s ability to provide reliable, timely support to Marine Forces.48

     13.4.9. The changing logistics distribution requirements necessary to support seabasing may
lead to a change in packaging or containerization requirements either during procurement or at
SMCA storage installations. Exactly how this support requirement will be implemented will
become evident over the course of the next few years. At this time, use of the Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) JMIC or the ACTD Joint Modular Intermodal
Distribution System (JMIDS) appears to be the most likely candidate for supporting sustainment
shipping in support of seabasing. Whether the JMIC and JMIDS will be used only for initial
support or for all operational sustainment has yet to be identified. Over the course of the last ten
to fifteen years, the SMCA installations equipped themselves to handle the demand for
operational sustainment shipping via International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
containers aboard commercial ships. The JMIDS and JMIPPS will require this same equipment
but also might impose an outloading burden on the wholesale supply system as pallets may need
to be broken down and material crated within the JMIC or JMIDS containers. These containers
will then need to be unitized into ISO Twenty foot equivalent units for shipping.

   13.4.10. Since the early 1990s, several mobility requirements studies have been conducted
within DoD. These studies assumed that sustainment shipping would require ever increasing
dependence on containerized shipping. Improvements have been made at SMCA facilities to
meet these demands. If JMIC or JMIDS are used for a significant portion of munitions

46
     Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003, undated.
47
     PM Ammo FY05 Strategic Plan, 1 October 04.
48
     PM Ammo FY05 Strategic Plan, 1 October 04.


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sustainment shipping, a capability to support blend of containerized shipping equipment use and
JMIC or JMIDS stuffing procedures will have to be developed and implemented.

    13.4.11. While use of JMIC and JMIDS is expected to streamline support on receiving end,
this effort could increase manpower and equipment requirements at the originating source.
Prepackaging in JMIC or JMIDS could alleviate the burden during the high demand operational
outload time. The bulk of the Marine Corps Class V(W) ground ammunition operational
sustainment is stored and shipped from SMCA installations. This operational requirement could
increase the logistics support requirement from SMCA installations. To avoid surprises, this
logistics support requirement must be worked closely with SMCA representatives as the
requirements and processes are developed and refined.

    13.4.12. One area of concern for transformational initiatives involves improvements in
information technology and data management (IT) systems.

        13.4.12.1. The Marine Corps is adopting the Program Manager Combat Ammunition
Systems (PM CAS) developed Rapid Ammunition Planning Tool and Optimization Routine
(RAPTOR). The purpose of this project is to enhance the utility and capability of the delivered
RAPTOR and extend the optimization capability of RAPTOR to cover the full domain of Marine
Corps munitions decision-making responsibility, including all ammunition product lines and all
associated activities such as R&D, demilitarization, industrial base support, and all cross-caliber
projects and funding opportunities for which PM is responsible. Because current and projected
funding is inadequate to procure all required munitions, PM must allocate shortages to the best of
their ability. This requires a significant amount of manpower with many of the decisions based
upon expert opinions. These decisions are repeatedly revisited during budget deliberations and
during budget drills throughout the year. As a result, many of the decisions are suboptimal.
Additionally, because of the complexity of the allocation process there is the potential for errors.
PM Ammo needs this methodology (and link to their Ammunition Budget Management System)
to link existing contracts to requirements and procurement plans.

        13.4.12.2. The Marine Corps has funded a ―replication‖ task to provide a Marine Corps
Munitions Readiness Reporting (MRR) systems function. Specifically, this effort calls for the
duplication of the existing Army MRR algorithms, screens and functions (the development of a
mirror configuration) dedicated to Marine Corps munitions. Data feed, update, and reporting
functions are also required to result in a monthly Marine Corps munitions readiness report. The
task includes both system development, and system operations and maintenance.

        13.4.12.3. What’s Required of the SMCA. SMCA IT Management Systems - The
current SMCA IT systems are in need of modernization. There are numerous systems, e.g.,
CCSS, Pricing/Budget, Production Status, etc, that do not communicate well with each other.
This causes problems such as: multiple data entries, errors in data exhibits/reports, minimal
system flexibility, and frustration for the internal SMCA personnel as well as the Military
Services. This problem was recognized by the OSD-led Ammunition Procurement Integrated
Team in the late 90s. An attempt was made internally by the SMCA FOA to partially fix the
problem for procurement using Commercial Software but the effort was not successful. Suggest




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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

the SMCA Community, with funding and priority IT support from ASA, map out a correction
course to modernize the SMCA IT systems.

        13.4.12.4. As the Military Services continue on their Logistics modernization efforts, it
is imperative that the current and "to be" business rules be reviewed with a focus harnessing the
power of current information technologies. Currently, the Marine Corps must utilize an IT path
to request order fulfillment that is extremely cumbersome by passing requests through the
JMC/SMCA FOA Inventory Control Point (designated National Inventory Control Point (NICP))
to an accountable record holder. This process should reengineered to maximize web enabled
technology. Additionally, accountable record holders should be able to pass transactional data
directly to the Marine Corps Inventory Control Point (MCICP) to enable updating the Marine
Corps Class V(W) Ammunition Total Item Property record. Simultaneously, the transaction
should be passed to the Army's ICP to facilitate their business processes. Bottom line, the NICP
concept should be reviewed for efficiency improvements. At times, this can be viewed as a
―layer‖ of oversight.




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                                          Chapter 14
                    Documentation Review – Navy
14.1. Existing Documented Mission, Roles, Responsibilities.49 Navy strategic and ordnance
life cycle management related documents were reviewed for this study. Secretary of the Navy
Instruction, SECNAVINST 5000.2C, provides mandatory procedures for the implementation of
DoD 5000 series and CJCSI 3170 series publications for major and non-major acquisition
programs, and Marine Corps Order 3900.15A provides the same for Marine Corps Expeditionary
Force Development System. These documents take precedence over any issuances conflicting
with them except for policy, direction, or guidance embodied in current statute, regulation, the
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and the Navy-Marine Corps
Acquisition Regulation Supplement. The roles are assigned as follow:

   14.1.1. ASN (RD&A). The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition) (ASN(RD&A)) is the Department of Navy (DoN) Component Acquisition
Executive responsible for DoN acquisition per SECNAVINST 5400.15A (DoN RD&A, and
Associated Life Cycle Management Responsibilities.)

    14.1.2. CNO/CMC. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)/Commandant of the Marine Corps
(CMC) are responsible for the DoN’s joint capabilities integration and development process,
mission and business area architecture developments, operational test and evaluation, readiness,
planning and programming for operational capability needs, and providing acquisition logistics
assistance to ASN(RD&A) Deputy for Logistics, as well as other specific responsibilities listed
in SECNAVINST 5400.15A.

    14.1.3. PEOs, SYSCOMs and PMs. PEOs, Systems Command (SYSCOM) Commanders
have the responsibilities of administration of assigned acquisition programs. PEOs, SYSCOM
Commanders, and Program Managers (PMs) have authority, responsibility, and accountability
for life-cycle management of all acquisition programs within their cognizance. They implement
appropriate management controls as required to ensure the policies in this instruction are
implemented to the maximum extent practical.

   14.1.4. NCAD. The Naval Cost Analysis Division (NCAD) in the Office of Budget,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller is responsible for
preparing life-cycle, independent cost estimates for major defense acquisition programs to
support milestones B and C decisions.

    14.1.5. DoN Activities. The Naval Surface and Air Warfare Centers and other field
activities and labs are responsible for following the policies and procedures in this instruction
and its enclosures.

14.2. Concept of Operations

49
  SECNAVINST 5000.2C, Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System, 19 November 2004.


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    14.2.1. CNO Guidance for 2006.50 In support of the National Security Strategy, National
Military Strategy, National Strategy for Maritime Security, Naval Power 21 and the Naval
Operating Concept for Joint Operations, and the National Fleet policy, the CNO is committed to
these three priorities:

      1. Sustain combat readiness.
      2. Build a Fleet for the future.
      3. Develop 21st Century leaders.

    14.2.2. The aim is to realize Navy’s vision of global security for Americans, enduring naval
relationships, open and free sea and air lanes, cooperation among the maritime forces, and a
combat-ready Navy.

    14.2.3. Sea Power 21 will enable the Navy to fulfill its roles in joint battles over blue and
brown waters, as well as those over land, global war on terror, and homeland emergency
response. The concept calls for the Navy to organize its ships into a collection of ―sea bases‖
that will shield or support troops who could be hundreds of miles inland, and supply them with
equipment, food and firepower. To ensure continual supply of munitions for the naval
firepower, the following summarizes typical Navy munitions acquisition and management
practice.

14.3. Navy Munitions Acquisition and Management Practice

    14.3.1. Capabilities Development. Navy acquisition programs use a capability-based
approach to define, develop, and deliver technologically sound, sustainable, and affordable
military capability. This approach as guided by the Naval Capability Development Process,
Expeditionary Force Development System, and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) is aimed to improve existing warfighting capabilities and develops new
capabilities that are highly relevant and resource leveraged. Coordination among Department of
Defense (DoD) Components is an essential element of these processes.

    14.3.2. Acquisition Management. For the purpose of SECNAVINST 5000.2C, a weapon
system is a host platform (e.g., ship or aircraft), missile, munitions, subsystems, components, and
equipments that may be acquired collectively or individually. The management model
acknowledges that every acquisition program is different and the PM shall structure the program
to ensure a logical progression through acquisition phases. IPTs are used as an integral part of
the defense acquisition process to maintain continuous and effective communications and to
execute programs. IPTs may address issues regarding requirements or capability needs,
acquisition strategy or execution, or financial management. The PMs structure, tailor, and lead
IPTs to resolve issues, provide assessments and execute programs at the lowest level.

   14.3.3. Test and Evaluation. T&E is conducted continuously throughout the acquisition life
cycle for statutory and regulatory reasons, and to gain knowledge that can be used to make
acquisition decision.
50
     Chief of Naval Operations Guidance 2006 - Meeting the Challenge of a New Era.


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   14.3.4. Resource Estimation. SECNAVINST 5000.2C summarizes DoN policy for
conducting independent cost estimates (ICEs) of the life-cycle cost of major defense acquisition
programs. SYSCOM’s cost estimating organizations may conduct ICEs when required.

    14.3.5. Systems Engineering. The PM is accountable for employing systems engineering as
a mechanism to achieve the program objectives of optimal total system performance and
minimal total ownership cost. Systems engineering focuses on defining user needs and required
functionality early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, then proceeding with
design analysis and system validation to achieve the total capability.

14.4. Naval Doctrine. In achieving the Navy strategic vision, the Navy continues to reshape
and restructure its force for current and future roles, missions, and tasks. The Navy doctrine
contains fundamental principals that guide the actions of its forces, while the supplemental
publications increase fleet awareness and understanding, and standardize the Services’ naval
operations thinking. These doctrinal publications are: Pub 151 – Naval Warfare; Pub 452 – Naval
Logistics; Pub 553 – Naval Planning.

    14.4.1. Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA). The naval surface ammunition lifecycle
management policies and procedures are governed by the Surface Ammunition Management
Technical Manual.54 Designed to support CNO readiness objectives, this manual describes the
policies and procedures for program, acquisition, in-service, maintenance, inventory, and
demilitarization (demil) management; logistics management support; security assistance
program; and training functions for Naval surface activities. The types of ammunition covered
are 2T Cog (cognizance) ammunition and the associated logistics support equipment subject to
the program management of NAVSEA conventional ammunition program office and the
inventory management of the NOLSC. CNO sets policy for management responsibilities to all
naval activities associated with naval surface ammunition. NAVSEASYSCOM, PEOs, PMs, or
Naval Surface Warfare Centers have the management responsibilities for the NAVSEA Service-
assigned ammunition. Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division, PM-4 executes the
NAVSEA SMCA-Assigned ammunition programs under PEO-IWS (integrated warfare
systems), IWS3 Surface Ship Weapons, IWS3C Naval Surface Fire Support.

    14.4.2. Naval Air Systems (NAVAIR). The naval air ammunition lifecycle management
policies and procedures are governed by the NAVAIR Acquisition Guide55. It supports CNO
readiness objectives, and describes the policies and procedures for program, acquisition, in-
service, maintenance, inventory, and demilitarization management; logistics management
support; security assistance program; and training functions for Naval and Marine Corps air
activities. The types of ammunition covered are 2E Cog ammunition and the associated logistics
support equipment subject to the program management of NAVAIR conventional ammunition
program office and the inventory management of the NOLSC. CNO sets policy for management

51
     Naval Warfare, Naval Doctrine Pub 1, 28 March 1994.
52
     Naval Logistics, Naval Doctrine Pub 4, 20 February 2001.
53
     Naval Planning, Naval Doctrine Pub 5, (date).
54
     NAVSEA SW010-AE-GYD-010, 30 October 2002.
55
     NAVAIR Acquisition Guide, January 2001.


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responsibilities to all naval activities associated with naval air ammunition. PMs execute the
NAVAIR-assigned ammunition programs under PEOs, NAVAIR Systems Command
(NAVAIRSYSCOM), Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division or other DoD field
activities. NAVAIR PMs execute the SMCA-Assigned ammunition programs under PEOs,
NAVAIRSYSCOM, Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division or other DoD field activities.

14.5. SMCA Doctrine. DoDD 5160.65 identifies the SMCA-Assigned items, assigns the
functions, responsibilities, authorities, and relationships of the SMCA. DoDI 5160.68 prescribes
the SMCA mission, as well as the duties and responsibilities of the SMCA and the Military
Services including the Navy, making the SMCA an integral part of the Naval ammunition life
cycle management and support process. DoDD 5160.65 assigns the SMCA Executor the
responsibilities of the overall execution of the SMCA’s mission and functions as outlined in
DoDI 5160.68. Per the SMCA Charter, the SMCA FOA is responsible to accomplish the duties
and responsibilities imposed in DoDD 5160.65 and DoDI 5160.68 by providing logistics and
sustainment support to the SMCA Executor and the Military Services, including the Navy.

14.6. Characterization of Munitions Procurement for the Navy. A characterization of
Ammunition Procurement for the Navy is shown in Appendix G.

14.7. Future Transformational Initiatives

    14.7.1. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were the most joint operations in
history and demonstrated the enhanced power, protection and freedom afforded by the Navy’s
Sea Power 2156 vision. To align the Navy’s efforts, accelerate progress, and realize the potential
human resources, future naval operations will use revolutionary information superiority and
dispersed, networked force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive power, defensive
assurance, and operational independence to Joint Force Commanders. The Navy and its
partners’ aim will continue to be dominating the continuum of warfare from the maritime
domain—deterring forward in peacetime, responding to crises, and fighting and winning wars.

   14.7.2. Sea Power 21 identifies Sea Strike, Sea Shielding, and Sea Basing as the three core
concepts for the Navy to provide continued operational effectiveness.

             Sea Strike will provide the abilities to project precise and persistent offensive power
              from the sea. The capabilities will provide Joint Force Commanders with a potent
              mix of weapons, ranging from conventional strike, to covert land-attack in anti-access
              environments, to the swift insertion of ground forces.

             Sea Shield will extend defensive assurance throughout the world, including the joint
              Sea Base and the US homeland. Its missile defense operations will provide the
              capability to support and defend forward operating base infrastructure, regional
              defense of allies and joint forces ashore.

             Sea Basing will serve as the foundation from which joint forces are projected to
              enhance operational independence and support. Ships will be organized into a
56
     Sea Power 21, October 2002.


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study

           collection of ―sea bases‖ to supply joint forces with weapons, munitions and other
           supplies and capabilities hundreds of miles away including inland. The extended
           reach of networked weapons and capabilities will tremendously increase the impact
           of naval forces in unified actions.

    14.7.3. FORCEnet. Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing will be enabled by FORCEnet,
an overarching effort to integrate warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms,
and weapons into a fully netted combat force. FORCEnet will be the Navy's plan to make this an
operational reality.

    14.7.4. Global Concept of Operations. Supported by FORCEnet, Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and
Sea Basing capabilities will be deployed by way of a Global Concept of Operations. It widely
distributes the firepower by creating independent operational groups capable of simultaneously
responding around the world to deter, improve crisis response, and position us to win decisively
in war.

    14.7.5. Sea Enterprise. Resource reallocation is a big challenge for the Navy to recapitalize
and resource tomorrow’s Fleet. Increased inter-Service integration holds great promise for
achieving efficiencies. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation integration
plan will save billions of dollars for both Services while enhancing interoperability, and better
integrate human resources, while JMIC or JMIDS (Joint Modular Intermodal Container or
Distribution System) described in the Marine Corps section will improve joint logistics practice
and enhance Sea Power 21 efficiency. In addition, the Navy is expected to continue to pursue
the DoD Business Enterprise Architecture to further effective and efficient modernization of its
business operations and systems in an increasingly joint environment.

    14.7.6. As depicted in the CNO Guidance and resulting guidelines, whether it is the U.S.
Coast Guard's Deepwater Integrated Systems Program, new munitions being developed with the
U.S. Air Force, joint experiments with the U.S. Army on high-speed vessels, or a new combined
intelligence structure with the U.S. Marine Corps, the Navy plans to share technologies and
systems whenever possible. These and other initiatives will continue and expand. A partial
intent of this SMCA study is to identify and recommend efforts that could potentially enhance
Navy munitions management as a part of the Navy’s future transformational initiatives to help
deliver what truly matters to the Navy: increased combat capability.




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                                     Chapter 15
                 Summary of Recommendations
15.1. The preceding analyses and documentation reviews in combination with the interview
results at Appendix D and the research performed as part of this study led to a number of
recommendations. Those recommendations were detailed in the analyses contained in Chapters
2 through 9. For convenience, the primary recommendations have been summarized below and,
unless otherwise specified, are recommendations for Joint process improvements:

   Focus Area                                       Recommendations

   Roles and Responsibilities                       - Expand SMCA role in RDT&E
                                                    - Document transition decision process
                                                    - Expand SMCA industrial base
                                                        management role
                                                    - Amend EDCA and O/EDCA designations
                                                        as required

   Management Process                               - Publish clearer written policy
                                                    - Develop SMCA training program
                                                    - Track SMCA Integrated Product Teams

   Procurement Financial Management                 - Put all Military Service requirements in
                                                        ICAPP (interim step)
                                                    - Link databases
                                                    - Reestablish Quad Service Review
                                                    - Synchronize PPBES

   Information Technology Management                - Leverage existing and build future
                                                        capability to support Transformation
                                                    - Improve connectivity and
                                                        information quality

   Engineering Support Items Production (ESIP)      - Execute Lean Six Sigma improvements
                                                    - Develop training programs

   Production Prioritization                        - Develop prioritization guidance

   Supply Management                                - Improve inventory management visibility
                                                    - Evaluate process Non-SMCA storage
                                                    - Identify support requirement changes for
                                                        seabasing and modularization

   Material Release and Safety Certification        - Surface consensus to DoD Safety Board



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15.2. For full understanding, the preceding recommendations should be read in the context of
the analyses contained in this report.




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                                        Chapter 16
                                       Conclusion
16.1. While the SMCA concept remains viable, the changes recommended in this study are
necessary for SMCA to remain responsive to customer needs and to enable it to attain the highest
level of effectiveness and efficiency. We’ve restated the four study questions below along with a
synopsis of the supporting rationale to back up our claim.

   16.1.1. Is the SMCA concept still viable for the future based on the vision of the
Military Services weapon systems and associated munitions?

Yes, based on feedback from our interviews, extensive research and analysis, the SMCA concept
is still viable for the future. All evidence, both written and verbal, substantiates the need for one
single entity to manage conventional ammunition. Regardless of whether they are SMCA-
Assigned, most Class V ammunition items use the same facilities for at least a portion of their
manufacturing and logistics support. In most cases, the technologically new ammunition items
are not replacing the existing SMCA-Assigned items but are supplementing existing capabilities.
Having a single DoD entity looking at all sectors of the industrial base to identify the impact of
acquisition decisions makes good business sense. Oversight of industrial base capabilities for all
munitions and missiles would be an expansion of SMCA’s current mission. Analysis has shown
that with some recommendations and improvements, the SMCA concept can position itself to
support some of the future weapon systems and associated munitions. This support would
provide a consistency to the support process across DoD; thus ensuring efficiency.

    16.1.2. Given the vision for future warfare, what are the Military Services’ expectations
for SMCA?

The Military Services expectations, based on their long-term defense strategies and QDR
guidance are for improved information technology, seamless logistics support, seabasing, rapid
deployment, an agile affordable industrial base and the ability to defeat any threat to national
security. With enhancements, the SMCA is in the best position to support the future needs,
conceptually and tactically. The main reasons are: SMCA already owns and/or manages the
core capability required for the future in production and logistics. The SMCA Field Operating
Activity is already partnering with the DPO to improve or streamline strategic support for all
Class V ammunition distribution processes. Only evolutionary changes to the SMCA’s roles and
responsibilities are necessary.

   16.1.3. If the SMCA concept is still viable, how will it change in terms of definitions and
scope?

An expanded scope in RDT&E coordination and oversight of industrial base capabilities for all
conventional ammunition items could improve SMCA’s position to support future warfighter
needs. The changes recommended in this study are necessary to help make SMCA remain
responsive to customer needs and to enable it to attain the highest level of effectiveness and
efficiency for DoD.


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 Future of the Single Manager For Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Study


    16.1.4. Based on the answers to the first three questions, what are the recommendations
for changes in the mission, roles and responsibilities associated with the extant SMCA?

Recommendations for improvement include changes as summarized in Chapter 15.
Significant areas of possible change in SMCA Roles and Responsibilities are:
    Greater involvement in the RDT&E phase.
           Provides earlier identification of logistics capabilities and requirements.
           Capitalizes on synergy in RDT&E activities.
    Ability to assure compliance of the transition process.
           Bring discipline to the transition process.
           Ability for Military Service to retain if deemed in best interest of DoD.
    Oversight of industrial base capabilities for munitions and missiles.
           Concern that Military Services compete for same limited industrial base capabilities
           with no knowledge of the impact they have on the whole.
           Provides a ―central clearing house‖ for industrial base capabilities.

16.2. Over time, the expectations of all Military Services as well as SMCA have changed; but
the idea of providing one source for management of common ammunition items and functions at
the wholesale level has not. The SMCA concept is still valid, but just as all elements within
DoD are evolving to meet the changing defense planning guidance requirements, the execution
of the SMCA mission also will have to continue to evolve and improve.

16.3. The Office of the Executive Director for Conventional Ammunition would like to thank all
the people who contributed to this study by granting interviews and assisting in research; most of
the interviewees are listed in Appendix J. Additionally, we would like to thank Mr. George
Eaton for researching and preparing the SMCA history report, Matching Organization to
Expectation: The Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition, 1950 to 2004, contained in
Appendix E.


Appendices:




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