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					CNDI 2009                                                                                                                                                   Federalism DA
Regents
                                      Federalism DA
Federalism DA ....................................................................... 1
1NC Shell ½........................................................................... 2    Federalism good- state power. ............................................. 55
1NC Shell 2/2 ........................................................................ 3    Federalism good- competition ............................................. 56
Uniqueness- Generic- fism high ............................................ 4               Cooperative Federalism Good- funding ............................... 57
Uniqueness- Generic- fism high ............................................ 5               Federal gov bad- senators .................................................... 58
Uniqueness- Generic- fism high ............................................ 6               Plan won‘t pass- politics link ............................................... 59
Uniqueness- Immigration fism .............................................. 7               ___________________________________ ........................ 60
Uniqueness- State check federal gov ..................................... 8                 ***AFF*** .......................................................................... 60
Uniqueness- State control ...................................................... 9          Non- Unique- Fed low now ................................................. 61
Uniqueness- States ............................................................... 10       Non-Unique- Fed low Now.................................................. 62
Link- Immigration................................................................ 11        Non- Unique- Dormant Commerce Clause proves .............. 63
Link- Immigration................................................................ 12        Non-Unique- Loss of fed now ............................................. 64
Link: Immigration ................................................................ 13       Non-unique- USFG control .................................................. 65
Link- Social Welfare ............................................................ 14        AT: Link- plan popular ........................................................ 66
Link- Welfare....................................................................... 15     States can‘t solve- social services ........................................ 67
Link: Welfare ....................................................................... 16    State‘s can‘t solve- budget ................................................... 68
Link- Mental Health............................................................. 17         AT: now key ........................................................................ 69
Link- Health care & Welfare ............................................... 18              No Impact- federalism is cyclical ........................................ 70
Link- Health Care ................................................................ 19
Link: Health Care ................................................................ 20
Link- Homelessness ............................................................. 21
Link- Generic ....................................................................... 22
Link: Medicaid..................................................................... 23
Link- Natives ....................................................................... 24
Link- Auto ........................................................................... 25
Link- Fed grants Good ......................................................... 26
Link- Fed grants Bad ........................................................... 27
Link- Fed grants bad ............................................................ 28
Impact- war .......................................................................... 29
Impact- Demo ½ .................................................................. 30
Impact- Demo 2/2 ................................................................ 31
Impacts- Minority peace ...................................................... 32
Impact- Tyranny ½ .............................................................. 33
Impact- Tyranny 2/2 ............................................................ 34
Impact- Flexibility ............................................................... 35
Impact- Competition/ better govs ........................................ 36
Impact- Iraq ½ ..................................................................... 37
Impact- Iraq 2/2 ................................................................... 38
Impact- India modeling ........................................................ 39
Impact- Modeling Indonesia/ Pakistan ................................ 40
Impact- Modeling China and Tibet ...................................... 41
Impact- Modeling Asia ........................................................ 42
Federalism Good- Econ ....................................................... 43
Federalism Popular- Economic crises .................................. 44
Decentralized welfare popular ............................................. 45
States Solve- local needs...................................................... 46
State Solve- best laws .......................................................... 47
Federal models after state gov ............................................. 48
State solve- Welfare ............................................................. 49
State solve- Medicaid........................................................... 50
State solve race to the bottom- Immigration ........................ 51
States want federalism- control ............................................ 52
Federalism works- Clinton proves ....................................... 53
Federalism Good- history proves ......................................... 54

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CNDI 2009                                                                                                                                                                              Federalism DA
Regents


                                                                                         1NC Shell ½
A.     Major Turning Point in Federalism Now – States are becoming laboratories for social
service programs –federal government action on social services will crush deccentralized authority

Sheppach 2k8
(Raymond C. Scheppach, Ph.D., is the executive director of the National Governors Association, ―Will the 2008
election improve state-federal relations?,‖ pg online @ http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=323921
//ef)
While it is always risky to look into the crystal ball, I sense that we are at a major turning point in the role of the
states in our intergovernmental system. Essentially, the long-term trend of increased centralization of
authority in Washington, D.C., may slow dramatically or even be reversed. Two reasons will drive this
change. First, the next administration and Congress will have to focus more on international issues ,
ranging from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to terrorism, to Iran and North Korea and to global economic issues
such as the price of oil and other commodities and the value of the dollar? all in an increasingly fragile
international financial system. In short, the next administration and Congress will face huge international challenges that
could dominate the agenda . Second, on many of the domestic issues such as health care, energy and climate
change, states and governors have been providing national leadership over the last decade. Health Care
Reform – During the last several years, Vermont and Maine have enacted universal access while
Massachusetts has enacted universal coverage. Overall, about 35 states have enacted major reforms,
including coverage expansions, insurance market reforms, small business pools, and disease
management. They also are focusing on quality improvement and the development of electronic data exchange to improve the efficiency and quality of patient care. Energy – Governors are
leading efforts to conserve energy resources while also seeking to diversify supplies by expanding renewable resources, including biomass, geothermal, hydropower, solar and wind. Many of these efforts also
would reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, states are setting renewable portfolio standards for public utilities and are establishing renewable fuel standards for transportation and heating fuels. Other
states are upgrading new building standards and setting standards for state automobile fleets and state government buildings. Climate Change – There are now three major regional climate change initiatives,
which when fully implemented would cover about one-half the population of the United States. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) will reduce carbon-dioxide emissions for power plants in 10
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states through a regional, mandatory market-based cap-and-trade program. Meanwhile, Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon and Washington have formed the Western Climate
Initiative (WCI). Since WCI‘s founding, the governors of Utah and Montana, and the premiers of British Columbia and Manitoba and Quebec, Canada, have joined. The third agreement – the Midwestern
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord – was signed in November 2007 by the governors of nine Midwestern states and the premier of Manitoba, Canada. A New Partnership As the next president and

                                                    both the shift in responsibilities that has taken place
Congress begin to set an agenda for 2009, it is critical that they understand
over the last decade on domestic issues, as well as the role states can play in helping move the country
forward. They should build on states‘ leadership and expertise on the major domestic issues. The good
news is that states have shown a real policy path on these domestic issues; the bad news is that states
could become an obstacle if the federal government continues a coercive approach to federalism.

B.             US federalism is modeled worldwide
Steven Calabresi, Associate Professor at the Northwestern School of Law, Michigan Law Review, December 1995,
94 Mich. L. Rev. 752

We have seen that a desire for both international and devolutionary federalism has swept across the world in recent
years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and emulation of our own American
federalism success story. The global trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development that
greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic growth, respect for social and
cultural diversity, and protection of individual human rights. It depends for its success on the willingness
of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept. n233 The U.S.
Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing vigorously our
own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that process, if only the Justices and the legal academy
would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                                                     Federalism DA
Regents
                                                                    1NC Shell 2/2
C.      Centralization is wrecking Russia‘s stability/economy – federalism key to solve
TPMCafe, 7-8-2006
And, as the mainstream press sheds more light on the corruption of Russian and American business life, the
continuing centralization of Russian power and unfair taxation goes unabated, it seems. I am told by friends
that Moscow is a shining, advanced, tax-dollar flush city, but that the rest of the country lacks significant
infrastructure spending.
Unless federalism gets traction in Russia, it's "oblasts" or regions will remain too weak to develop. If that
happens while Moscow sucks up all of the wealth, aren't we seeing the seeds of another revolution?
There are many democracies, however, few seriously carry the name without a healthy federalism not
only in the air, but on the ground.

D.     That causes nuclear war
David, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins, 99 (Steven, ―Saving America From the Coming Civil Wars,‖
Foreign Affairs, January / February, Volume 78, Number 1)

If internal war does strike Russia, economic deterioration will be a prime cause. From 1989 to the present, the GDP
has fallen by 50 percent. In a society where, ten years ago, unemployment scarcely existed, it reached 9.5 percent in 1997 with many economists declaring
the true figure to be much higher. Twenty-two percent of Russians live below the official poverty line (earning less than $70 a month). Modern Russia can
neither collect taxes (it gathers only half the revenue it is due) nor significantly cut spending. Reformers tout privatization as the country's cure-all, but in a
land without well-defined property rights or contract law and where subsidies remain a way of life, the prospects for transition to an American-style
capitalist economy look remote at best. As the massive devaluation of the ruble and the current political crisis show, Russia's condition is even worse tha n
most analysts feared. If conditions get worse, even the stoic Russian people will soon run out of patience.      A future conflict would quickly
draw in Russia's military. In the Soviet days civilian rule kept the powerful armed forces in check. But with the Communist Party out of office,
what little civilian control remains relies on an exceedingly fragile foundation -- personal friendships between government leaders and military commanders.
Meanwhile, the morale of Russian soldiers has fallen to a dangerous low. Drastic cuts in spending mean inadequate pay, housing, and medical care. A new
emphasis on domestic missions has created an ideological split between the old and new guard in the military leadership, increasing the risk that disgruntled
generals may enter the political fray and feeding the resentment of soldiers who dislike being used as a national police force. Newly enhanced ties between
military units and local authorities pose another danger. Soldiers grow ever more dependent on local governments for housing, food, and wages. Draftees
serve closer to home, and new laws have increased local control over the armed forces. Were a conflict to emerge between a re gional power and Moscow, it
is not at all clear which side the military would support. Divining the military's allegiance is crucial, however, since the structure of the Russian Federation
makes it virtually certain that regional conflicts will continue to erupt. Russia's 89 republics, krais, and oblasts grow ever more independent in a system that
does little to keep them together. As the central government finds itself unable to force its will beyond Moscow (if even that far), power devolves to the
periphery. With the economy collapsing, republics feel less and less incentive to pay taxes to Moscow when they receive so little in return. Three-quarters of
them already have their own constitutions, nearly all of which make some claim to sovereignty. Strong ethnic bonds promoted by shortsighted Soviet
policies may motivate non-Russians to secede from the Federation. Chechnya's successful revolt against Russian control inspired similar movements for
                                                                                                        Should Russia
autonomy and independence throughout the country. If these rebellions spread and Moscow responds with force, civil war is likely.
succumb to internal war, the consequences for the United States and Europe will be severe . A major power
like Russia -- even though in decline -- does not suffer civil war quietly or alone. An embattled Russian Federation
might provoke opportunistic attacks from enemies such as China. Massive flows of refugees would pour into central and western
Europe. Armed struggles in Russia could easily spill into its neighbors. Damage from the fighting, particularly attacks on nuclear plants, would poison the
environment of much of Europe and Asia. Within Russia, the consequences would be even worse. Just as the sheer brutality of t he last Russian civil war laid
                                                                                 Most alarming is the real
the basis for the privations of Soviet communism, a second civil war might produce another horrific regime .
possibility that the violent disintegration of Russia could lead to loss of control over its nuclear arsenal .
No nuclear state has ever fallen victim to civil war, but even without a clear precedent the grim consequences can be foreseen. Russia retains some 20,000
nuclear weapons and the raw material for tens of thousands more, in scores of sites scattered throughout the country. So far, the government has managed to
prevent the loss of any weapons or much materiel. If war erupts, however, Moscow's already weak grip on nuclear sites will slacken, making weapons and
supplies available to a wide range of anti-American groups and states.   Such dispersal of nuclear weapons represents the greatest
physical threat America now faces. And it is hard to think of anything that would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow
a Russian civil war would increase this threat more than the chaos that would follow a Russian civil war.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                  Federalism DA
Regents
                                      Uniqueness- Generic- fism high
Federalism is high now.
The Examiner. 6/26/09. ―Examiner Editorial: Time for Conservatives to discover Federalism‖
http://www.sfexaminer.com/opinion/Examiner-Editorial-Time-for-conservatives-to-discover-federalism-
49156217.html
Many in the media suggest that the Republican Party, and thus traditional American conservatism, has suffered a major
setback from the personal indiscretions of Sen. John Ensign, R-Nev., and presidential aspirant-no-more Gov. Mark Sanford,
R-S.C.
Such scandals encourage an unhealthy preoccupation with national politics at a time when Republicans and conservatives
must remember that there are many winnable fights closer to home. It‘s time for a reminder that one of the enduring
strengths of the American political system is its federalism — keeping accountability and power as close
to the people as possible whenever possible.
Indiana Gov. Mitch Daniels, for example, entered office in 2005 facing an $800 million state budget
deficit. He trimmed it by $250 million, then saved even more by renegotiating state contracts. The state
now has a surplus of $1.3 billion — a good place to be during an economic downturn. And by taking a
risk and selling a 75-year lease to a European transportation company eager to operate the state‘s costly
toll road, Daniels pulled $3.85 billion into an overwhelmed transportation budget. Though initially
criticized as too risky, this move has since proven to be a boon for Indiana.
Therein lies the promise of federalism. Fighting Big Government is not done only in Washington, D.C.;
focusing on a state-by-state basis allows conservatives a greater opportunity to present solutions that
solve problems closest to the people experiencing them. When a solution works, it can be replicated
elsewhere.
When it doesn‘t, other states can learn from the failure.
And it‘s also philosophically consistent: As a problem-solver, Big Government forces square pegs into round holes.
Federalism encourages as many pegs in as many shapes as there are states.
Conservatives should not focus their expectations exclusively on leaders in Washington, D.C. The Tea Party movement
should keep this fact in mind, too. States solving their own problems make it doubly difficult for Washington, D.C.,
politicians to pose as if they alone can save the day while running up multitrillion-dollar deficits.
There was a time when states were routinely viewed as ―laboratories of democracy.‖ Conservatives in
Wisconsin demonstrated that welfare reform could benefit taxpayers and those in need of assistance, and in the process
provided the template for what later became the Welfare Reform Act of 1996. Similarly, Florida conservatives, led by former
Gov. Jeb Bush, implemented school reform that emphasized parental choice and student responsibility. Florida students have
shown marked academic progress in the years since.
The genius of America is the creativity and energy of a free people, and it‘s federalism that most
effectively encourages that genius to flower across the country.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                        Federalism DA
Regents
                                        Uniqueness- Generic- fism high
Federalism is high now.
New York Times. 1/30/09. ―From new Administration, Signals of Broader Role for States‖ ACCESSED BY
LEXIS-NEXIS
The Obama administration seems to be open to a movement known as ''progressive federalism,'' in
which governors and activist state attorneys general have been trying to lead the way on environmental
initiatives, consumer protection and other issues, several constitutional experts say.
A recent decision by President Obama that could open the way for California and other states to set their
own limits on greenhouse gases from cars and trucks represents a shift in the delicate and often
acrimonious relationship between the federal government and the states, legal experts say, possibly
signaling a new view of federalism.
''I think it's quite significant,'' said Samuel Issacharoff, a professor of constitutional law at New York University law school.
''It shows the Obama administration's more benign view of government intervention,'' Professor
Issacharoff said, and ''may indicate a spirit of cooperative federalism'' in which Washington will look to
the states for new ideas and even a measure of guidance.
Tom Miller, the attorney general of Iowa, who met with the transition team in December to discuss federalism and other
issues, said he believed the Obama administration would ''usher in a new era in federal-state relations.''
Members of the new administration, Mr. Miller said, ''are open to what we're talking about, what we're thinking.'' They also
appreciate, he said, the fact that state attorneys general often achieve a level of bipartisan cooperation when they ba nd
together to pursue lawsuits.
The general trend under previous administrations had favored federal pre-emption, the belief that the best law comes from
Washington, a concept still favored by business leaders.
William L. Kovacs, a vice president for environmental and regulatory issues at the United States Chamber of Commerce, said
free-for-all federalism was bad for business and would lead to a ''patchwork of laws impacting a troubled industry.'' Detroit,
Mr. Kovacs said, would have to produce different cars for different parts of the country, and the environmental protection
agency would grow tremendously to meet the new regulatory burden.
Many liberal thinkers skeptical of states' rights and state actions since the days of segregation have
begun to see that the states, to use Justice Louis Brandeis's words from the 1930s, can ''serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.''
Professor Issacharoff said states were often quicker than Washington to spot a problem when it emerged, and so ''it may be
the states that have the best initial take on it, and try different regulatory methods until we fasten on a single national
solution.''
States have taken up the challenge of consumer protection, addressing issues like predatory lending well before the federal
government took action, and often achieving reforms by suing the federal government to force it to enforce its laws and
through legal settlements with industry. In October, 11 states reached an $8.4 billion settlement with Countrywide Financial
in which it agreed to modify home loans to help people at risk of foreclosure. And in 2006, 49 states and the District of
Columbia reached a $325 million settlement with the Ameriquest Mortgage company to change its policies.
Attorneys general also pressured major universities to adopt a code of conduct regarding their relationships with student
lending companies. Eliot Spitzer, the former New York attorney general, achieved a settlement with the pharmaceutical
company GlaxoSmithKline in 2004 in which it agreed to release more information about the risks to patients that had come
out in clinical trials.
The Obama administration, then, is embracing a states' rights movement that a liberal could love. ''The pro-
regulatory folks realized in the last eight years that the old line on federal power being the only good power wasn't correct,''
said William Marshall, a law professor at the University of North Carolina who was deputy White House counsel in the
Clinton administration and a former solicitor general of Ohio.
''It doesn't mean you abandon the federal regulatory process -- you don't, of course,'' Mr. Marshall said. ''But you treat it as a
floor and not a ceiling.''
He added, ''The Obama administration is signaling that state regulations may very well complement
federal regulations, and they can both work together to achieve important goals.''




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                       Federalism DA
Regents
                                        Uniqueness- Generic- fism high
Federalism is high.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,            and        Social          Policy         Reform           in         the      United          States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
In fact, the Reaganite regulatory review process was designed mostly to protect the interests of the private sector. Not very
helpful for state and local government, this effort became less and less significant after 1982. The most significant piece
of legislation dealing directly with federalism and social policy enacted under Reagan's Presidency is the
1988 Family Support Act (PL 100-485). In many aspects, it may be regarded as a precursor to the much
bolder welfare reform enacted in 1996. Indeed, it puts the emphasis on workfare programmes aimed at
forcing welfare recipients to find a job in order to keep their benefits. Title II of this law mandated states
to operate a welfare-to-work training and employment programme (JOBS), but granted considerable
discretion to states in the composition of activities from which local JOBS programmes are constructed.
Subject to a number of exceptions, all adult recipients of AFDC were required to participate. Starting in 1990, JOBS was
initially designed to shift AFDC from its entitlement status to a true workfare program. States are required to have at least 7%
of people enrolled in AFDC to participate in some kind of an educational program. Individuals who refused to participate in
such activities would receive lower benefits.

New federalism now.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,        and         Social      Policy        Reform         in      the                    United          States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
Recent events aided the emergence of New Federalism under the Nixon presidency. During the 1960s,
the number of federal programmes and regulations had increased dramatically, and many voices at both
the state and the federal level called for a rationalisation of the US welfare state; this call for
rationalisation became the motto of Nixon's New Federalism. The presidential team believed that the
federal government, instead of directly providing the services, should mostly fund programmes
administrated at the state and the local levels. But the actual implementation of New Federalism fell short of the
initial goals. Under the advice of Moynihan himself, the Republican President unsuccessfully supported the replacement of
the Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) by a centralized, entirely federal, measure. And measures favouring the
decentralization of federal public policy were relatively modest (Conlan, 1998).




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                       Federalism DA
Regents
                                         Uniqueness- Immigration fism
Immigrant federalism is high now.
Harvard Law Review. 5/05. ―Developments in the law – jobs and borders: V. The Constitutionality of Immigrant
Federalism‖ ACCESSED BY LEXIS-NEXIS.
In 1996, seventy-two percent of Americans favored a significant reduction in the number of immigrants allowed into the
United States each year. n1 In particular, Americans objected to aliens' use of public benefits: fifty-eight percent thought that
immigrants took "more from the U.S. economy through social services and unemployment than they contributed through
taxes and productivity." n2 Congress addressed voter outrage when, as part of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 19 n3 (PRWORA or the Act), it made sweeping changes to
alien eligibility for public benefits. Among the most important was the introduction of what one
observer has called "immigration federalism" n4 - the devolution of authority to determine alien
eligibility for welfare from the federal government to the states. PRWORA thus raised an important
constitutional question: can the federal government, pursuant to its plenary immigration power, authorize the
states to undertake action that would otherwise be plainly unconstitutional? n5




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                   Federalism DA
Regents
                                   Uniqueness- State check federal gov
There is high federalism now – state governments check the federal government.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,        and         Social      Policy        Reform         in      the                United         States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
 In the context of US federalism, states acted like mere interest groups. (16) Instead of formally
bargaining with the federal government, as they would do in the context of inter-state federalism, they
only lobbied to convince federal policy-makers to enact a law that would protect the states against their
unilateral decision. As a response to state and local concerns, the 104th Congress enacted the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act in Match 1995 (PL 104-4). Far from being a radical shift in intergovernmental relations, this
law created new federal rules that have made it harder to enact most direct mandates. In fact, the legislation's
complex procedures allow any congressman to stop the enactment of an "unfunded mandate" with an uncompensated cost
greater than 50 million dollars per year. A majority of the membership can override this point, but at least "the provision
ensures the potential for a debate about the issue of mandating itself." (Posner 1998:174) The legislation has also
forced Congress to estimate the costs of all the proposed mandates and to report the direct effects of
those generating costs of more than 50 million dollars. Also, federal agencies must consult with state
and local governments before imposing new mandates (Conlan, Riggle and Schwartz, 1995). In a way, the law
makes the federal system more transparent by favouring communication and the production of
information within the federal system.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                   Federalism DA
Regents
                                           Uniqueness- State control
State governments have direct control over welfare programs – federalism high.
The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government . 2002. ―Case Studies in Medicaid Managed-Care: State
Medicaid Agencies as Key Actors in Medicaid Manged-Care‖ http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/federalism/2002-
state_medicaid_agencies_as_key_actors_in_medicaid_managed-care.pdf
The legislature also controls the state spending — a role extremely important to lobbyists. ―We must
establish (desired) funding levels (in the legislature),‖ said one lobbyist. ― The legislature controls the purse strings.
They determine how much money Medicaid will get,‖ said another. In some states interest groups worked closely
with the Medicaid agency to lobby the legislature on these issues; in most states they did not—often ―going around‖ the state
agencies to seek more funding than that supported by the agency and the governor. In sum, legislators‘ relationships to
Medicaid agencies were often defined by rising (often called ―skyrocketing‖) Medicaid costs . Few
legislators understand Medicaid but this does not keep them from setting up commissions and task forces and holding
hearings — particularly in response to rising Medicaid costs and complaints from health care providers.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                     Federalism DA
Regents
                                                 Uniqueness- States
States are taking steps towards federalism, and away from uniformed governmental action.
Stephen Gardbaum,; Michigan Law Review December 1, 2008 The myth and the reality of American
constitutional exceptionalism; Pg. 391(76) Vol. 107 No. 3 ISSN: 0026-2234; Lexis.

 Mention of state law leads me to a brief final point. Although, asis well known, there is currently only one textual exception
to the general principle of a state action requirement under the U.S. Constitution--the Thirteenth Amendment ban of slavery
"anywhere in the United States" (252)--there are several exceptions under state constitutional law. This fact is
partly explained by the obvious irrelevance of the standard federalism rationale for the principle, and it
cautions against an overly uniform, federally biased conception of constitutional rights and their scope
in the United States. Thus, at least seven state constitutions contain express rights against private, as wellas public, race
and sex discrimination or rights to join labor unions that apply to private employers. (253) In addition, even absent such
express application to private actors, several state supreme courtshave interpreted their free speech, due
process, and equality provisions not to have a state action requirement.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                      Federalism DA
Regents
                                                 Link- Immigration
Federalism is needed in social services and immigration.
Harvard Law Review. 5/05. ―Developments in the law – jobs and borders: V. The Constitutionality of Immigrant
Federalism‖ ACCESSED BY LEXIS-NEXIS.
[*2249] The Act bars qualified aliens from receiving any federal means-tested public benefit n11 for the
first five years after entry into the United States. n12 After five years, their eligibility for federal
programs varies depending on the program and on the state in which the alien resides. For example,
qualified aliens remain ineligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). n13 However, section 402(b) of the Act,
codified at 8 U.S.C. 1612(b), authorizes states to determine aliens' eligibility for Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF), Social Services Block Grants (SSBGs), and Medicaid. n14 Section 412 of
the Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. 1622, further authorizes states to determine the eligibility of qualified
aliens, nonimmigrants, and parolees for state public benefits. n15
The Act bars unqualified aliens from eligibility for any federal public benefit, regardless of their length of residence. n16 It
also makes illegal aliens ineligible for state and local public benefits, n17 but provides that states can, by affirmative
legislation passed subsequent to PRWORA, extend eligibility to such aliens. n18
2. State Responses to PRWORA. - States have responded to PRWORA in a variety of ways. Although most
states provided qualified aliens already in the United States as of PRWORA's enactment with state-
funded substitute programs to replace TANF and Medicaid, n19 more than half of these states declined
to make such substitute [*2250] programs available for qualified aliens who arrived after the Act took
effect. n20




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CNDI 2009                                                                                      Federalism DA
Regents
                                          Link- Immigration
Link - States should be given the power to deal with immigration and social welfare.
Harvard Law Review. 5/05. ―Developments in the law – jobs and borders: V. The Constitutionality of Immigrant
Federalism‖ ACCESSED BY LEXIS-NEXIS.
In a footnote, the Court reserved the question whether the federal government itself could impose on aliens
a "uniform nationwide residency requirement as a condition of federally funded welfare benefits." n41
Since the statutes limiting alien eligibility enacted subsequent to PRWORA were passed by state
legislatures, and many involve exclusively state-funded programs, it may appear that they fall within Graham's
ambit and should be subject to strict scrutiny. The claim that these statutes pass muster because they are
federally authorized would seem to be blunted by the Court's twin constitutional concerns: first,
Congress cannot authorize states to violate the Equal Protection Clause, and second, the federal
government has no power to authorize states to adopt divergent policies with respect to aliens.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                       Federalism DA
Regents
                                                  Link: Immigration
Link: Immigration is a state concern.
Peter H. Schuck; 2007 University of Chicago; The University of Chicago Legal Forum; 2007; U C7 U Chi Legal F
57; IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY: ARTICLE: Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously

To my knowledge, only one scholar, Peter Spiro, has advanced an extended defense of a larger role for the states in the
immigration context. 26 In an intriguing 1994 article, Spiro noted that immigration had become a prominent
political issue in some high-impact states, and that "as a practical matter, immigration is now largely a
state-level concern." 27 Audaciously, Spiro argued that "existing constraints on state measures relating to
undocumented aliens can be justified only by way of foreign affairs preemption," and that this
preemption should be abandoned in light of the growing and often independent role of the states ("demi-
sovereigns," in Spiro's terminology) in "a post-national world order." 28 If Congress wishes to preempt or constrain state
measures, he maintained, it should do so expressly; absent that, the courts should not do it for them.
Before proceeding, I briefly defend my use of the term "immigration federalism." Some federalist arrangements are based on
the sovereignty of the states. That is, state authority inheres in the constitutional settlement among the states and the people,
whereby only limited powers (later vastly expanded) were delegated to the national government while all other powers were
reserved to the states and the people. This is not the species of federalism that I have in mind here. Although
contemporary federalism and the jurisprudence that surrounds it are certainly influenced by such notions
of constitutional state sovereignty, many if not most of the powers exercised by the states today are
undertaken pursuant to a bewilderingly complex system of federal-state relationships in which the states
participate in programs enacted and largely funded by Washington. 30 This state participation can take
many different forms: administration and/or enforcement of federally-established rules and policies;
policy development and implementation within parameters (more or less constraining) set by federal
policymakers; federal funding of states to develop their own policies; and many other collaborative
(though inevitably conflicting) arrangements. What I refer to as immigration federalism, then, consists of arrangements,
[*67] such as these, in which the states operate under, and are obliged to respect, federal immigration policies and
supervision. 31




                                                                                                                             13
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                                          Federalism DA
Regents
                                                 Link- Social Welfare
Federalism is key in social welfare.
Harvard Law Review. 5/05. ―Developments in the law – jobs and borders: V. The Constitutionality of Immigrant
Federalism‖ ACCESSED BY LEXIS-NEXIS.
a) Concurrent State Power To Regulate Alien Welfare Eligibility. - The Supreme Court has long held that the immigration
power is exclusively federal. n126 However, as De Canas v. Bica n127 made clear, "[not] every state enactment
which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration . . . . The fact that aliens are the
subject of [*2264] a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration . . . ." n128 In Bica, the
Supreme Court upheld a California statute that criminalized the employment of illegal aliens. n129
States were free to regulate aliens under their traditional police powers, the Court held, as long as their
regulations furthered legitimate state interests and were "consistent with pertinent federal laws." n130
Clearly, determining eligibility for state public benefits programs falls within a state's police powers over
health, safety, and welfare. The remaining question is whether the states are precluded from doing so on grounds of
preemption.
Although the Court has previously employed the logic of preemption to limit rather than enable state
regulation of aliens, it has done so under the strong presumption that state regulation of aliens would
interfere with the federal government's foreign policy by preventing the nation from speaking with one
voice. n131 This concern is inapplicable to state statutes enacted with clear congressional authorization. As in the dormant
commerce clause context, specific congressional authorization can modify the constitutional default rule that disables the
states from acting. n132 In passing PRWORA, Congress determined that a uniform federal law was not
essential in the area of welfare eligibility, and that divergent state welfare policies did not compromise
the federal government's ability to conduct foreign affairs with one voice.
Thus, under PRWORA's explicit authorization, states are free to regulate alien welfare eligibility pursuant to
their police powers; no delegation of federal power is needed. The question remains, however, to what degree of
scrutiny such state legislation should be subjected. Ordinarily, of course, state regulation of aliens is subject to strict scrutiny
under Graham. However, when state regulation is expressly authorized by a federal statute enacted in the exercise of the
immigration power, courts should apply a less searching standard for two reasons.




                                                                                                                               14
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                      Federalism DA
Regents
                                              Link- Welfare
Federal intervention in welfare causes federalism imbalance.
Butler 1991 (Stuart M., Ph.D., Guidelines for State Welfare Reform, Heritage Lecture #346,
http://www.heritage.org/research/welfare/HL346.cfm)
Ever since the 1980s, it has been the states that have set the pace in welfare reform, and indeed almost all
areas of domestic policy. That surge in state experimentation, made possible in part by greater flexibility
to states afforded by the Reagan Administration, has left the federal government vying to play catch-up.
It has also meant that federal action and federal laws often simply reinforce and extend the experiments that
have taken place earlier at the state level.




                                                                                                         15
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                                   Federalism DA
Regents
                                                   Link: Welfare
Federal restriction on welfare cause decrease in federalism.
Grant Reeher; associate professor of political science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs. Syracuse University Will States Get Help From Feds This Time? The Post-Standard (Syracuse, New
York) August 24, 2008 Sunday Earlier this month, Govs. David Paterson, D-N.Y., and Martin O'Malley, D-Md.,
wrote in this space about the hard economic times currently facing state governments ("Feds must help states through
tough time," Aug. 3).

In welfare policy, and in Medicaid and the State Child Health Insurance Programs, the administration
has tightened the federal requirements for compliance and funding . Medicare Part D, which covers prescription
drugs and is the biggest change in Medicare since its inception in 1965, constitutes a huge expansion of a national program.
Big government has returned.
In other areas where the states have been out in front of the federal government, such as air pollution,
spam-blocking and prescription drug purchasing, the administration has used national authority to stop
or pre-empt the efforts. State-level innovation nonetheless continues on issues like health insurance
coverage, identity theft, privacy invasion and immigration.
Regarding the overall flow of money to the states under Bush, the picture looks somewhat different, and better than what
Paterson and O'Malley suggest. During Bush's first term, for example, federal aid rose to levels not seen since the 1970s.




                                                                                                                        16
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                               Federalism DA
Regents
                                                 Link- Mental Health
Federal intervention in mental health care causes a decrease in federalism.
Bazelon Center, ‘00 , (―A Factual and Statistical Review of Mental Health Policy and a Questionnaire for
Candidates for Public Office in 2000,‖ Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, www.bazelon.org)

State mental health authorities have the responsibility to serve individuals who are unable to access care
through other means. However, states have found it hard to provide newer and more effective treatments and services as
these become available. u States, the primary level of government responsible for public-sector mental health
services, have reduced their spending (when adjusted for inflation and growth in population) on public mental health
systems over the past decade and continue to do so.10 u State appropriations are now significantly lower (when
adjusted for inflation and growth in population) than at the height of institutionalization (1955).11




                                                                                                                  17
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                                      Federalism DA
Regents
                                         Link- Health care & Welfare
Federalism develops the best policy option in health and welfare.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,        and         Social       Policy       Reform          in          the        United       States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
In the field of health policy, for example, Ellen Immergut has shown that the structure of the Swiss federal system
allows Swiss physicians to have more political influence than their French and Swedish colleagues
(Immergut 1992). Authors comparing welfare state development in Canada and the US have also
demonstrated how different forms of regionalism and federalism--as related to other political institutions--favour
contrasting policy outcomes (Banting, 1997; Maioni, 1998; Theret, 1999). Although their work is stimulating and
insightful, institutionalist students of welfare state politics seldom put forward a systematic analysis aimed
at understanding how specific ideas affect policy outcomes. (2) This does not mean that these scholars never deal
explicitly with ideational processes but that their framework does not allow them to grasp the complex role of ideas in policy-
making. This is especially problematic because recent scholarship has demonstrated that both ideas and institutions
shape policy change and, for that matter, the relationship between federalism reform and welfare state
development (Beland and Hacker, 2004; Lieberman, 2002). While the institutionalist concept of social learning (Heclo,
1974) illustrates the constant interaction between ideas and institutions in policy-making, institutionalist scholars would gain
from a careful analysis of ideational processes and, more precisely, the way in which political actors mobilize discourses and
"ideological frames" to justify the policy alternatives they support. During legislative debates, as well as after the enactment
of specific measures, policy makers indeed justify their political and technical choices through frames that legitimize the
"need to reform" (Cox, 2001).




                                                                                                                           18
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                                   Federalism DA
Regents
                                                Link- Health Care
Federal interference in health care causes imbalance of federalism.
Nathan, Richard P., 12/05 (codirector of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government) ―Federalism and
Health Policy‖ http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/24/6/1458.pdf
Although it is complex territory,we need to try to unpack thewhys and hows of the state-push factor for Medicaid in U.S.
federalism. Intrinsic characteristics of federalism have put liberal/innovative states in a position to lead in
conservative periods. Changes that states make in these periods, because they are easier to develop and
test in relatively small places (as opposed to having to be adopted nationally), have a demonstration/replication
effect on other states. Such changes would not be as likely to occur and be diffused in a unitary political
system. When a particular state policy innovation is shown to be substantively and managerially feasible, this gives activist
leaders in other states confidence that they can do similar things, providing them with a knowledge base for adopting new or
changed policies and reducing apprehensions about doing so. This state-push factor in the case ofMedicaid in
recent years has had a notable protective and expansionist influence, despite the U.S. political culture in which
individualism and general skepticism about government‘s role in social policy is strongly manifest. An underlying reason
why this occurs is that many federal grant-in-aid programs, including Medicaid, are structured to give
states flexibil- ity in setting benefit levels and determining how benefits are defined. If there had to be
one nationwide standard (―one size fits all‖) for the benefits and services provided under social
programs such as Medicaid, the ultimate effect would be less expansive. This floor-setting accommodation to
diversity in social policy (sometimes aided by federal waivers for human services for ―demonstration-type‖ initiatives)
permits establishing higher standards and benefits in some states. It has also been an instrument for providing
federal matching funds for existing health programs (such as mental health and retardation, drug and alcohol
treatment, and school health programs), such that in New York, as the saying goes, ―Medicaid is a verb,‖ by enabling the
state to useMedicaid funds for programs that are already part of a strong base of publicly supported
health care services.




                                                                                                                         19
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CNDI 2009                                                                                     Federalism DA
Regents
                                          Link: Health Care

Health care systems are switching to a total electronic record system, this indicates the push for
increasing federalism.
Benjamin J. Beaton; 2008 Directors of The Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.; Columbia Law Review
November, 2008; 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1670 Walking; The Federalist Tightrope:A National Policy Of State
Experimentation For Health Information Technology. Lexis

In fits and starts, the American healthcare system is transitioning from paper charts to electronic records.
The ultimate goal is a nationwide health information network through which clinicians can access
comprehensive electronic health records for each of their patients. Despite wide-ranging political
                                                                         1


support for health information technology (HIT) and the health and cost benefits it promises, no           2


overarching national [*1671] strategy has emerged for designing and implementing such a system.
What progress has been made is due in large part to state leadership, underscoring Justice Brandeis's
                                                                         3


famous observation that "one of the happy incidents of the federal system" is the ability of "a single
courageous State ... [to] serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country." By his account, a diversity of state policies is a means to optimize
                                  4


public policy nationwide: If a state initiative proves successful, its approach can be replicated nationally
or by other states. Though almost certainly not a conscious goal of the Framers, this ancillary benefit
                   5                                                                 6


of our constitutional order is frequently cited as a justification for the continuing relevance of
federalism. 7




Ideal healthcare policy would embrace federalism.
Benjamin J. Beaton; 2008 Directors of The Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.; Columbia Law Review
November, 2008; 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1670 Walking; The Federalist Tightrope:A National Policy Of State
Experimentation For Health Information Technology. Lexis

An ideal national HIT policy should embrace federalism and state experimentation to the extent they
further the goal of a nationwide health network, following the Brandeisian view of instrumental
regulatory diversity. The small-scale efforts that accompany widespread state experimentation will allow
the transition's inevitable stumbles to occur "without [*1672] risk to the rest of the country." And the
                                                                                                  8


unique incentives and tools possessed by states will lead to solutions a national policy would not
otherwise                                                                                    contemplate.
The looming risk of this approach is that nascent HIT projects might prove incompatible. The costs of
reconciling divergent systems could be overwhelming, and states will be loath to sacrifice their
                                                            9


investments simply because the federal government ultimately chose a different model.                The
                                                                                                      10


development of a national network, therefore, is at once dependent upon and susceptible to state
regulatory diversity. To take advantage of lessons learned while avoiding a patchwork of standalone
systems, federal and state leaders must achieve a baseline of uniformity without destroying the
flexibility and diversity required for meaningful state experimentation. This poses a significant
challenge          for         American          policymakers       and          federalist       theory.




                                                                                                               20
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                        Federalism DA
Regents
                                             Link- Homelessness
Federal intervention in homelessness creates the loss of federalism.
Martha R. Burt and Barbara E. Cohen (The Urban Institute). ‘89. ―Who is helping the homeless? Local, State,
and Federal Responses. http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/19/3/111
Based on interviews with state and local officials, providers in states with more state resources devoted to
homeless programs were better able to acquire McKinney Act funds for programs that required
matching funds than states that dedicated fewer resources. Because state resources were available,
applicants used them to match federal funds; applicants from states without extensive state programs and funding
sources had difficulty meeting the match requirements.
Five of the six states visited (excluding New Mexico) have established emergency shelter grants with state
funds. Two (California and Ohio) have major state programs for the severely mentally ill homeless. Most
have substantial funding for domestic violence shelters, and California supports several other family
violence and runaway/homeless youth programs. Connecticut has an extensive array of housing support
programs, including security deposit, rent subsidy, homefinders, case management, emergency
assistance, and other programs. Both California and Connecticut have made serious commitments to
increase the stock of low-income housing through sizable bonding authority ($120 million in Connecticut, and
$600 million through two ballot propositions—77 and 84—in California).




                                                                                                            21
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                                Federalism DA
Regents
                                                  Link- Generic
Federal intervention in mental health, homelessness, nursing, and marriage causes a loss of
federalism.
Nathan, Richard P. (codirector of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government) 12/ 05. ―There will always be a
new federalism‖ http://federalismproject.org/depository/NathanRoundtablePaper.pdf
Because the states remain the dominant government in providing fundamental domestic services such as
education, public health, property law and family law, they are almost always the first governments to
act on new and different policy issues.
By contrast, Congress is rarely an innovator. When a new social issue appears — what to do about
acquired immune deficiency syndrome, the homeless, nursing homes, or how to regulate new
reproductive practices or whether to ban smoking on commercial airline flights — states are likely to be
pace setters.
No matter how big the Federal Government gets, the states retain their historic role as laboratories for
experimentation in public policy.
Moreover, when all or part of the national Government is controlled by conservatives, as it has been recently, people who
seek to experiment in social policy are inclined to concentrate on the state level.27




                                                                                                                     22
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                                    Federalism DA
Regents
                                                   Link: Medicaid
Federalism must be increased to encourage state experimenting on Medicaid.
Richard P. Nathan; December 2005; co-director of the NelsonA. Rockefeller Institute of Government Federalism
And Health Policy Medicaid is an appropriate and feasible base on which to build basic health care coverage.
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/24/6/1458.pdf

Although it is complex territory, we need to try to unpack thewhys and hows of the state-push factor for Medicaid in U.S.
federalism. Intrinsic characteristics of federalism have put liberal/innovative states in a position to lead in
conservative periods. Changes that states make in these periods, because they are easier to develop and test in
relatively small places (as opposed to having to be adopted nationally), have a demonstration/replication effect
on other states. Such changes would not be as likely to occur and be diffused in a unitary political
system. When a particular state policy innovation is shown to be substantively and managerially
feasible, this gives activist leaders in other states confidence that they can do similar things, providing
them with a knowledge base for adopting new or changed policies and reducing apprehensions about
doing so. This state-push factor in the case of Medicaid in recent years has had a notable protective and
expansionist influence, despite the U.S. political culture in which individualism and general skepticism
about government‘s role in social policy is strongly manifest. An underlying reason why this occurs is
that many federal grant-in-aid programs, including Medicaid, are structured to give states flexibility in
setting benefit levels and determining how benefits are defined. If there had to be one nationwide
standard (―one size fits all‖) for the benefits and services provided under social programs such as
Medicaid, the ultimate effect would be less expansive. This floor-setting accommodation to diversity in social
policy (sometimes aided by federal waivers for human services for ―demonstration-type‖ initiatives) permits establishing
higher standards and benefits in some states. It has also been an instrument for providing federal matching funds for existing
health programs (such as mental health and retardation, drug and alcohol treatment, and school health programs), such that in
New York, as the saying goes, ―Medicaid is a verb,‖ by enabling the state to useMedicaid funds for programs that are already
part of a strong base of publicly supported health care services.




                                                                                                                          23
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                              Federalism DA
Regents
                                                 Link- Natives
States control most of Native Policy.
Robert B. Porter Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Tribal Law and Government Center, University of
Kansas; 1998; Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Sac & Fox Nation of Kansas and Missouri; University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform, 31 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 899, ―A Proposal To The Hanodaganyas To Decolonize Federal
Indian Control Law‖ Lexis [ev]

In addition to the challenges associated with the separation of powers, federalism has also affected
management of Indian affairs. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states claimed [*944] that their
authority to manage Indian affairs co-existed with that of the federal government. 278 While the
replacement of the Articles by the Constitution clarified that the federal government would have primary
authority over managing Indian affairs, 279 the states continued to challenge this federal constitutional
authority for years thereafter. 280 Despite the clarity of pronouncements such as those in Worcester v. Georgia 281 and
Williams v. Lee, 282 the states have continued to press for control over the Indian territory within their
borders. 283 The recent trend, in fact, has been for the Supreme Court to grant the states an even greater role in the
administration of Indian affairs. 284




                                                                                                                   24
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                                   Federalism DA
Regents
                                                      Link- Auto
Regulation over auto industry should be given back to the states.
Matthew T. Lee Business And Economic History, Volume Twenty-sevneon.2, Winter 1998; The Ford Pinto Case and
the Development of Auto Safety Regulations, 1893-1978 * Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice. University
of Delaware
Federalism, and the larger legal culture of which it is a part, also played a key role in the evolution of
auto safety regulations. This role was mostly one of maintaining the status quo. The law (civil and criminal) traditionally
refused to recognize car manufacturers' responsibility for crashworthy designs [Nader, 1972]. Federalism also inhibited
auto safety regulations. Partly because the traffic safety establishment equated traffic fatalities with
driver behavior, the federal government viewed auto safety as a problem for the states to resolve, except
in the area of safer road construction. After all, if the driver was the problem, federal involvement meant an
increased federal presence (probably coercive) in the lives of individuals . Few were willing to advocate that.
The decentralized nature of traffic accidents also prevented most people from considering auto safety as
a national crisis, even as fifty-thousand people died annually in car accidents [Gusfield, 1981]. Only
local traffic deaths made the news reports and this framed the issue as a local problem. Thus, the
federal government did not regulate the auto industry until 1966 because the "common-sense"
view suggested that auto safety was not within the scope of federal authority, despite the fact that all other transportation
systems had been subject to federal regulation decades earlier [U.S. DOT, 1985, p. 270; Eastman, 1984].T he boilers on
steamboats for example had been subject to federal safety regulations early s1 838[ Rabin1, 986,p . 1212].




                                                                                                                         25
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                      Federalism DA
Regents
                                        Link- Fed grants Good
Block grants control spending and fight welfare dependency.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,        and         Social      Policy        Reform         in      the   United         States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
By replacing the AFDC with the Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF), the law created a new
block grant that gives the states more autonomy in the distribution and management of welfare benefits.
Instead of the AFDC's open-ended federal aid, state governments have, from then on, access to block
grant funding that had been fixed over a six-year period (1997-2002). For federal policymakers seeking
a "balanced budget," this block grant was a great opportunity to control welfare spending. The
availability of such a fixed amount of federal dollars also provided states with an economic incentive to
help US families leave welfare, since a decline in welfare rolls would not affect the amount of money
available to the states. Overall, the shift to block financing has apparently increased the autonomy of the
states in the management of social welfare measures. The 1996 law was based on the conservative model of
"decentralisation for retrenchment." Beyond these elements of decentralisation, the welfare reform law has
also implemented conservative mandates that force the states to adopt strict eligibility criteria aimed at
actively fighting "welfare dependency."




                                                                                                         26
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                                        Federalism DA
Regents
                                                Link- Fed grants Bad
Federal grants to states are only limiting competition.
John O. McGinnis* and Ilya Somin; Northwestern University Law Review Fall, 2004 99 Nw. U.L. Rev. 89;
Symposium: The Rehnquist Court: Federalism Vs. States' Rights: A Defense Of Judicial Review In A
Federal System; BIO: * Class of 1940 Research Professor, Northwestern Law School; B.A., Harvard, 1979;
M.A., Oxford, 1980; J.D., Harvard, 1983. ** Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School
of Law; B.A., Amherst College,

The federal government can often crush vertical competition simply by paying the states not to compete
with it. n124 Federal grants to states are a particularly effective tool for restricting competition because,
unlike in the case of preemptive mandates, state governments are actually likely to support them due to
their desire to acquire additional federal funds. Finally, federal grants to state governments can undermine diversity
by attaching conditions that force dissenting states to conform to the preferences of the majority. n125 Both liberal and
conservative interest groups can use such conditions to impose their preferences on recalcitrant minority states. n126
Why might state governments be motivated to accept federal grants that undermine the key advantages of federalism as a
system? The crude but accurate answer is that they want the money. The opportunity to acquire funds that are
mostly paid for by taxpayers in other states is an offer that state governments cannot easily refuse. n127
States are constantly in search of additional federal funds that enable politicians to increase expenditures
without simultaneously raising taxes for their constituents. Even state officials that are perfect agents of
their voters might accept grants that undermine federalism as a system. First, the states face to some extent a
tragedy of the commons problem: If they pass up this money, their citizens will still pay in federal taxes for benefits for states
that do accept it. Second, the voters might sometimes prefer additional funds to being allowed to pursue their most preferred
policy without restriction by the federal government. However, the problem certainly becomes more severe as a result of
serious principal-agent problems arising from most citizens' near-total ignorance of both the theory of federalism and the
details of intergovernmental financial relations.




                                                                                                                              27
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                                      Federalism DA
Regents
                                               Link- Fed grants bad
Only giving federal grants while still attaching strings to the money is the worst kind of
federalism.
John O. McGinnis* and Ilya Somin; Northwestern University Law Review Fall, 2004 99 Nw. U.L. Rev. 89;
Symposium: The Rehnquist Court: Federalism Vs. States' Rights: A Defense Of Judicial Review In A
Federal System; BIO: * Class of 1940 Research Professor, Northwestern Law School; B.A., Harvard, 1979;
M.A., Oxford, 1980; J.D., Harvard, 1983. ** Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School
of Law; B.A., Amherst College,

The Court has at least begun to revive judicial review of the Commerce Clause and Section 5. In contrast, the Supreme Court
continues to construe the Spending Clause n111 to provide nearly a blank check for any spending that Congress chooses to
undertake and to permit Congress to impose regulatory conditions that may parallel those barred by its Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. In the leading case of South Dakota v. Dole, n112 written by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist himself, the
Court summarized its Spending Clause jurisprudence and concluded that federal grants to state governments
- the form of spending that arguably poses the greatest threat to federalism values - are constitutional so
long as these grants (1) serve the "general welfare" under a standard that "defers substantially to the
judgment of Congress," (2) state any conditions that the states must meet in order [*116] to acquire the
funds "unambiguously," (3) ensure that conditions are not "unrelated to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs" for which the funds were provided to the state, and (4) do not violate
"other constitutional provisions." n113 Furthermore, the Court noted the possibility that federal grants might be
invalidated if "the financial inducement offered by Congress [is] so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into
compulsion." n114
Conditions one and four do not impose any real limits on the spending power not already imposed by
"other constitutional provisions." n115 Condition two likewise does not limit the substantive scope of
federal grants to state governments, but merely ensures that state governments are informed of the terms
under which federal funds are given to them. n116 Condition three and the additional ban on federal "coercion"
could potentially serve as significant restrictions on federal power, but have not been so interpreted in practice by the courts
so far. n117 In a recent decision, the Supreme Court has loosened the restraints on the Spending Power still further by
holding that federal grants to state governments that have conditions only very loosely related to any federal purpose may be
upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause. n118
 [*117] As one of us has argued in greater detail elsewhere, n119 the common weakness of Dole and its precursors is the
excessive focus on the interests of state governments and the failure to consider the possibility that even those "noncoercive"
grants actually desired by state governments might nonetheless undermine constitutional federalism. n120 It is often not
recognized that federal grants with few or no attached conditions may be just as pernicious in these respects as those that
impose rigorous requirements. Federal grants to state governments in fact tend to undermine all three of the
major advantages of a federal system: horizontal competition, vertical competition between states and
the federal government, and diversity. n121
Federal subsidies to the states undermine interstate competition in two major ways. First, to the extent that horizontal
competition is motivated by a desire to increase state tax revenue by attracting migrants or preventing
emigration, the existence of an alternative source of revenue necessarily diminishes state incentives to
compete. n122 In addition to serving as a substitute source of state revenue, federal grants can sometimes undermine
interstate competition more directly by enabling the states to establish a cartel by acceding to a common federal grant
condition. n123 The federal government in this scenario acts as the cartel manager, punishing defecting
states by withdrawing their funding. For example, states seeking to avoid tax [*118] competition can create a cartel
by the adoption of a federal policy that denies grants to states with tax rates below a certain level.




                                                                                                                           28
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                                 Federalism DA
Regents
                                                    Impact- war
Collapse in federalism leads to nationalism, which leads to war.
Calabresi, Steven (Associate Professor at Northwestern University) ‘95 ―A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States vs. Lopez, Michigan Law Review; ACCESSED FROM LEXIS-
NEXIS
The bitter harvest of the nationalist revolution was gathered in this century with the slaughter of the First
and Second World Wars and with the fifty-year Cold War that then followed. These events finally made clear
to the great-great-grandchildren of the Enlightenment that celebration of the nation state could lead to Nazism and
Stalinism, to war and genocide, and to totalitarianism and the most complete loss of freedom humankind
ever experienced. By 1945, the democratic revolution was still in full flow, but the nationalist revolution was not. World
leaders scrambled to replace the still collapsing colonial, imperial transnational structures with new
federal and confederal transnational structures.




                                                                                                                      29
Being sick sucks…
CNDI 2009                                                                                                    Federalism DA
Regents
                                                  Impact- Demo ½
Federalism is key to democracy.
Lane, Jan-erik and Ersson, Svante (2005)' Department of Political Science, University of Geneva, Switzerland b
Department of Political Science, Umeå University, Sweden; The riddle of federalism: does federalism impact on
democracy?',Democratization,12:2,163 — 182; http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340500069220

The favourable argument about a generally close relation between federalism and democracy has been
well stated by Elazar: Conceived in the broadest sense, federalism looks to the linkage of people and
politics in lasting yet limited union by mutual consent, without the sacrifice of their respective
integrities. Federalism must be considered a ‗mother‘ form of democracy like parliamentary democracy
or direct democracy.12


Federalism is key to democracy.
Lane, Jan-erik and Ersson, Svante (2005)' Department of Political Science, University of Geneva, Switzerland b
Department of Political Science, Umeå University, Sweden; The riddle of federalism: does federalism impact on
democracy?',Democratization,12:2,163 — 182; http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340500069220

There are also other scholars who argue that federalism is analytically a part of democracy: It is thus
possible to consider federalism as a particular type of democracy: a pluralist democracy based on a
constitutional system of delegated, reserved and/or shared powers between relatively autonomous, yet
interrelated, structures of government, whose multiple interactions aim to serve the sovereign will of the
federal demos.13 Pluralism and decentralization feature as the mechanisms linking federalism and democracy.
Federalism, when it works properly, would promote values like freedom and pluralism and these values
would then be conducive for democracy, general links already suggested by Alexis de Tocqueville in the nineteenth
century. This idea is now expressed in many versions, for example: ‗The basic aspect of federalism is pluralistic, its
fundamental tendency is harmonization and its regulative principle is solidarity‘.14 Elazar too subscribes to this argument
about federalism and pluralism: ‗Federalism, whether by name or in reality, is an extraordinarily
important element for the maintenance and the containment of pluralism‘ .15 He goes on to say: Not only do all
modern federal systems claim to be democratic and seek democratic legitimacy, but there is likely to be
general agreement among true democrats that the great majority of those polities held up as models of
democracy (France is the great and important exception) are either federal in form or extensively use federal
principles.16 Similarly, Vincent Ostrom states that ‗the thrust of the argument in this volume pertains to the conceptions
and structural characteristics of a federal system of governance as a particular regime-type that is highly pluralistic in its
structure‘.17 And he links federalism with democracy through pluralism and decentralization specifically: ‗Democracy
depends upon multitudinous communities operating as self-governing collectivities having recourse to
overlapping and concurrent instrumentalities of government‘ .18 In his later writings Riker also endorsed the
connection between federalism and democracy. Riker‘s position was more refined than the others, allowing for a positive
association between federalism and democracy when there was ‗true federalism ‘: A dictatorship really cannot
be a federation. When the central government denies omnipotence and guarantees constituent governments unique functions,
then groups that lose nationally have a chance to win locally. With such compensation for national losers, the
society as a whole is not zero-sum. In that sense, federalism does promote individual freedom.19 Riker at
the end of his life reached the following cautious conclusion: ‗Taking together all federations in the world at all times, I
believe that federalism has been a significant force for limited government and hence for personal
freedom‘.20 In sum, the thesis proposing that federalism positively impacts on democracy suggests that (a) federalism is
analytically a part of democracy and (b) that there are links like pluralism and decentralization that connect federalism and
democracy.




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                                                 Impact- Demo 2/2
Democracy is key to prevent multiple scenarios for extinction
Larry Diamond December 1995 (A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict Carnegie
Corporation of New York)

5 OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and
decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of
illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with
authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem,
appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are
associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy , with its provisions for legality,
accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this
century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to
war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify
their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are
much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another.
They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable,
open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are
more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to
protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value
legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because,
within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law.




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                                                Impacts- Minority peace
Federalism maintains peace by letting minorities participate in the government at lower levels.
Calabresi, Steven (Associate Professor at Northwestern University) ‘95 ―A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States vs. Lopez, Michigan Law Review; ACCESSED FROM LEXIS-
NEXIS
These nationwide crosscutting cleavages make American federalism stable because they give it a Madisonian plurality of
interest groups, no one of which is likely to terrorize the others on a permanent basis . American federal politics
involves the assembling and maintaining of shifting and unstable coalitions of numerous groups with
wildly different goals. The very instability of these continental, federal coalitions is what makes the whole thing work.
No one feels permanently threatened because the combination of federalism, a separately elected Congress and
President, and a very high degree of instability in political coalitions guarantees almost every faction a
piece of the pie. All of this is facilitated greatly by our highly fortuitous division into fifty states, which
masks over the underlying regional fault lines.
The United States, then, like Switzerland, provides a textbook example of how federalism under some circumstances can help
alleviate the problem of majority tyranny - the key problem that is raised by the democratic revolution of the past 200 years.
What then of separation of powers or cabinet power sharing or proportional representation? Are not these constitutional
mechanisms for dealing with social and political heterogeneity just as good at alleviating the problem of majority tyranny?
The answer to this question, I think, is no. All three mechanisms work by exposing and making visible the most dangerous
social fault lines and then giving each social group something close to a veto over governmental decisionmaking. This tends
to produce weak, if not paralyzed, coalition governments and societies that are acutely, if not bitterly, aware of their social
divisions. [*770]
Frankly, people are happier, in my view, when their governmental structure provides some outlets for
their minority viewpoints but does so in a way that blurs over and deemphasizes the fault lines as much
as possible. Sometimes that blurring over is best accomplished by governmental structures and policies that accentuate
crosscutting fault lines over the ones that are more socially dangerous. American federalism blurs over regional fault
lines, racial fault lines, and religious and cultural fault lines, just as Swiss federalism blurs over linguistic fault
lines, ethnic fault lines, and religious fault lines. n50
Small state federalism is a big part of what keeps the peace in countries like the United States and
Switzerland. It is a big part of the reason why we do not have a Bosnia or a Northern Ireland or a Basque country or a
Chechnya or a Corsica or a Quebec problem. n51 American federalism in the end is not a trivial matter or a quaint historical
anachronism. American-style federalism is a thriving and vital institutional arrangement - partly planned by
the Framers, partly the accident of history - and it prevents violence and war. It prevents religious warfare, it
prevents secessionist warfare, and it prevents racial warfare. It is part of the reason why democratic
majoritarianism in the United States has not produced violence or secession for 130 years, unlike the
situation for example, in England, France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, or Spain. There is
nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace,
prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document. There is nothing in the U.S.
Constitution that shouldabsorb more completely the attention of the U.S. Supreme Court.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                         Federalism DA
Regents
                                                  Impact- Tyranny ½
Federalism solves for tyranny and violence.
Calabresi, Steven (Associate Professor at Northwestern University) ‘95 ―A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States vs. Lopez, Michigan Law Review; ACCESSED FROM LEXIS-
NEXIS
Some of the best arguments for centripetal international federalism, then, resemble some of the best arguments for centrifugal
devolutionary federalism: in both cases - and for differing reasons - federalism helps prevent bloodshed and war . It
is no wonder, then, that we live in an age of federalism at both the international and subnational level. Under the right
circumstances, federalism can help to promote peace, prosperity, and happiness. It can alleviate the threat
of majority tyranny - which is the central flaw of democracy. In some situations, it can reduce the
visibility of dangerous social fault lines, thereby preventing bloodshed and violence. This necessarily brief
comparative, historical, and empirical survey of the world's experience with federalism amply demonstrates the benefits at
least of American-style small-state federalism. n61 In light of this evidence, the United States would be foolish indeed to
abandon its federal system. [*774]

Federalism solves majority tyranny by providing levels of government that minorities can express
their views.
Calabresi, Steven (Associate Professor at Northwestern University) ‘95 ―A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States vs. Lopez, Michigan Law Review; ACCESSED FROM LEXIS-
NEXIS
Federalism as a Response to the Problem of Majority Tyranny. First, federalism is popular today because in a
surprisingly large number of circumstances it has the potential to offer a direct cure to a central and age-
old failing of democracy: the tendency of certain kinds of political majorities to tyrannize and abuse
certain kinds of political minorities. n30 This problem - majority tyranny - is a problem in all
democracies, but it is most acute in democracies that are very heterogeneous as a matter of their racial,
ethnic, religious, linguistic, or social class background. It is the problem that concerned James Madison in the
Federalist Ten, n31 and it is the problem that has generated support in this country and around the world for judicial review.
Arend Lijphart, a distinguished and leading political scientist, puts the matter as follows:
That it is difficult to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a plural society is a well-established proposition
in political science - with a history reaching back to Aristotle's adage that "a state aims at being, as far as it can be, a society
composed of equals and peers." Social homogeneity and political consensus are regarded as prerequisites for, or factors
strongly conducive to, stable democracy. Conversely, the deep social divisions and political differences within plural
societies are held responsible for instability and breakdown in democracies. n32
 [*762] As Lijphart emphasizes, social heterogeneity can pose a big threat to stable democratic government.
Federalism sometimes can reduce this threat by giving minorities a level of government within which
they are the geographical majority. If minorities are concentrated geographically to some degree and if
the nation is willing to cede control over key issues to constitutionally established subunits of the nation,
then federalism can help maintain social peace.




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                                                                                 Impact- Tyranny 2/2
Totalitarian tyranny renders individuals into docile subjects at the disposal of the government.
This concentrates power in the hands of a few and makes nuclear use inevitable. Upholding
individual liberty in the face of state power is the vital check on extinction.
George Kateb, Director of the Program in Political Philosophy at Princeton, 1992; (The Inner Ocean, p.121-122)

I have said that statism is one of the main ideas that are implied in official (and lay) rhetoric rationalizing the use of nuclear weapons. But the role of statism
in the nuclear situation is not confined to this function. In another form it makes another contribution. The form is best called-once again a French name is
most apt-dirigisme, the unremitting direction by the state of all facets of life. Let us translate the word as                                         "state        activism." The contribution is
indirect but insidious and pervasive, and  consists of the general tendency to leave citizens in a condition of
dependence which borders on helplessness. The virulent practitioners of state activism are, of course, the
police state, tyranny, despotism, and totalist rule in all their varieties. Whenever a nuclear power is also
one of the latter regimes, then the disposition among a compliant population is to get used to the idea
that the state, as the source of practically all benefits and penalties-all those outside the intimate sphere and many inside it-has the right to
dispose of the fate of the people in any way it sees fit. The way it sees fit seems the unavoidable way. Such
compliance strengthens the readiness of officials to think seriously about using nuclear weapons. Just as
the people are used to the idea that the state has the right to dispose of their fate, so the state gets used to
the idea that it may even use nuclear weapons in disposing of its people's fate.
My concern here, however, is not with the mentality of unfree societies but rather with that of democratic societies. I propose the idea-it is no more than a
hypothesis-that the growth of state activism in a democracy is the growth, as well, of that compliance creating and resting on dependence which makes it
easier for the government to think of itself as a state-not only in our earlier sense of an entity whose survival is held to be equivalent to the survival of society
itself, but in the related but separate sense of an entity that is indispensable to all relations and transactions in society. The state, in this conceptualization, is
the very life of society in its normal workings, the main source of initiative, response, repair, and redress. Society lives by its discipline, which is felt mostly
                                                            The government becomes all-observant, all-competent; it
as benign and which is often not felt as discipline or felt at all.
intervenes everywhere; and as new predicaments arise in society, it moves first to define and attempt a
resolution of them. My proposed idea is that as this tendency grows-and it is already quite far advanced-people will, to an increasing degree, come
to accept the government as a state. The tendency of executive officials (and some in the legislative and judicial branches) to conceive of government as a
state will thus be met by the tendency of people to accept that conception. People's dependence on it will gradually condition their attitudes a nd their
sentiments. Looking to it, they must end by looking up to it. I believe the "logic" of this tendency, as we say, is that officials become confirmed in their sense
                                                                Entrusted with so much everyday power,
that they, too (like their counterparts in unfree societies), may dispose of the fate of the people.
the entire corps of officials must easily find confirmation for the rationalization of the use of nuclear
weapons proposed by the foreign-policy sector of officialdom. There may be a strong, if subterranean, bond between the state as indispensable to
all relations and transactions in everyday society and the state as entitled to dispose of the fate of society in nuclear war, even though officials receive no explicit confirmation of this bond by the peo ple. Under
pressure, however, a people that habitually relies on the state may turn into a too easily mobilizable population: mobi lizable but otherwise immobile. My further sense is that a renewed understanding of the
moral ideas of individualism is vital to the effort to challenge state activism. Continues (p. 122-124)I say this, knowing that some aspects of individualism do help to push democratic government in the
direction of becoming a state, and to push the state into state activism. Tocqueville's prescient analysis of democratic despotism must never be forgotten. Even more important, we must not forget that he
thought that democratic despotism was much more likely in those democracies in which individualism was narrowly or weakly developed and in which, therefore, the power of a full moral individualism had
never corroded the statist pretensions of political authority. His main anxiety was for France and the Continent, not for America. Thus, following Tocqueville, we may say that anti-individualism provides no
remedy for the deficiencies: the remedy is to be sought from individualism itself. One task of a renewed and revised individualism is to challenge every-day state activism. Remote as the connection may seem,
the encouragement of state activism, or the failure to resist it, contributes to nuclear statism and thus to the disposition to accept and inflict massive ruin and, with that, the unwanted and denied possibility of
extinction. In the nuclear situation, one must be attentive to even remote connections that may exist between human activity and human extinction. There are no certainties of analysis on these possible
connections. And so far the worst speculative connection is not exemplified in American society. I only mean to refer to the hypothesis offered independently first by Hannah Arendt and then by Michel

              where the state is regarded both by itself and by the population not as a mere protector of life
Foucault; namely, that

against domestic or foreign violence but as the source of contented and adjusted and regularized life
(through its welfarist policies and other interventions), it is subtly empowered to take the next step and become
the source of mass death. What it gives it can take away, like God. But though still short of this extreme, American society is full of serious
tendencies of state activism which indirectly cooperate with the possibility of extinction. By continuously expanding the scope of governmental activity,
these tendencies work against one of the principal constituent elements of individualism, the idea that each person should be subject to the smallest possible
amount of government regulation. The protection of rights and the restriction of governmental activity are jointly at the service of an individual's free life.
One's life is not supposed to be arranged or designed by government or have meaning or coherence given to it by government; nor is one supposed to be
helped too much, or saved from oneself, or looked at closely or continuously. One is supposed to be free, autonomous, self -reliant. Individual rights are not
always abridged when government acts to substitute itself for the individual and tries to lead our lives for us. Government may abide by the constitutional
limitations on itself and nevertheless fill up too many vacant places in a person's life, thus leaving too little raw material out of which a person develops on
his or her own. This ideal of free being is under relentless attack, but the attack could not score its successes unless we cooperated. In cooperating we forget
the ideal, or let preliminary aspects of it, like the pursuit of interests, exhaustively define the whole ideal. The very notion of rights becomes bloated because
of obsession with interests and turns false to itself. Resistance must be offered from within the ideal, not from collectivis m or communitarianism, which are
both on the side of making a people systematically docile and ready for mobilization. Even if nuclear weapons did not exist and there were no possibility of
extinction, the fight against state activism would have to be carried on. But the link between state activism and extinction suggests itself, and a cultivated
individualism must be enlisted against such activism and in behalf of avoiding massive ruin and the possibility of extinction.


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                                                 Impact- Flexibility
Impact - Federalism allows flexibility and participation.
McClatchy-Tribune Business News. 7/24/08. ―Rockefeller expert lauds federalism in America‖ ACCESSED
BY LEXIS-NEXIS
Sep. 24--Richard Nathan, co-director of the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute in Albany, N.Y., lauded
American federalism, which he credits with facilitating important policies, innovating government and
allowing beneficial shared responsibilities between the states and the national government. Nathan spoke at
the Rockefeller Center on Tuesday to commemorate the center's 25th anniversary and its ongoing centennial celebration of
Nelson Rockefeller's birth.
In his speech, Nathan revisited Rockefeller's "Future of Federalism" lectures that Rockefeller delivered as part of Harvard
University's annual Godkin lecture series in 1962.
"Federalism is described most commonly as a mechanism for reconciling unity and diversity." Nathan
said.
According to Nathan, the founding fathers of the United States accepted the idea of federalism to allow the 13 states, which
were varied in culture and size, to form a nation. Since then, history has shown that the principle of federalism has given
energy to the country, Nathan said.
"States test ideas to confront problems," Nathan said. "These ideas then diffuse or morph into national
policies."
Nathan cited specific issues confronted by federalism, including healthcare and education, which states
as well as the national government attempt to address. Furthermore, federalism allows the American
government to be flexible, he said. Nathan described how the Reagan administration cut back many
social programs that the states in turn provided.
"Strong central policies must still rely on school districts and local institutions to enact them," Nathan said. "Our government
cannot operate with implementing policies as the short suit. Federalism allows for extravagant promises to be
changed into realistic public policies."
Nathan also spoke about the 87,578 state and local governments in the United States that provide services ranging from
infrastructure to public safety. This structure allows for greater transparency of government and more
opportunities for Americans to become involved in government, he said. One-sixth of the entire American
workforce serves in state and local governments or nonprofit organizations, making public service a key component of the
nation's economy, Nathan added.
Another benefit of federalism, according to Nathan, is that regional governments allow the federal government to
better focus on issues of foreign policy and defense in an increasingly changing world. He explained that
American federalism allows the U.S. to be more balanced in dealing with both domestic and
international issues than other countries.
Andrew Samwick, director of the Rockefeller Center, said Rockefeller was a scholar and practitioner of federalism, and that
Rockefeller's enthusiasm for the subject reflects the center's goals.
Nathan, who worked for Rockefeller during his presidential campaigns as the coordinator of domestic issues, agreed with
Samwick.
"The hardest part of working for [Rockefeller] was because he cared so much and knew so much, it was hard to tell him
anything," Nathan said.
The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute is a public research division of the State University of New York.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                 Federalism DA
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                                    Impact- Competition/ better govs
Federalism ensures competition and better governments.
Steven Calabresi (Associate Professor at Northwestern University) 2001. ―Federalism and the Rehnquist Defense: A
Normative Defense‖ http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/574/1/24
1. The decentralization of decision making allows for decision makers to be responsive to local tastes and
conditions. If one area of a country is filled with smokers, for example, and another area has few smokers, then statewide
laws discouraging smoking may make more sense than one national law (McConnell 1987 ). State laws can be designed
to vary with local tastes and conditions, while national laws must be uniform nationwide. The more
heterogeneous a nation is, the more desirable decentralization will be. Since the United States is a large,
continental-sized nation with a population of 284 million people, some degree of constitutionally
mandated decentralization is likely to be even more important for us than for less populous nations like
Spain and Great Britain.
2. Constitutionally mandated decentralization encourages competition between jurisdictions (Tiebout
1956). If local tastes and conditions vary between jurisdictions, and if some degree of decentralization of decision
making is required, then jurisdictions will compete with each other to offer optimal laws so that they can
attract taxpaying citizens and industries.
3. Constitutionally mandated decentralization encourages experimentation. In a competitive situation,
the states must constantly improve the quality of their laws and government programs so that they attract
new taxpayers and businesses or they will lose out to their neighbors (Shapiro 1995; LeBoeuf 1994; Epstein
1992). The end result is a race to the top between jurisdictions, with market forces encouraging a constant improvement in
the quality of state governmental programs.
4. Constitutionally mandated decentralization keeps government nearer the people, where it can be
watched more closely and where it is more likely to have good information about popular preferences as
to good policy (LeBoeuf 1994; McConnell 1987). In economic terms, monitoring, agency, and information costs
all should be lower at the state level because there is a closer identity of interests between state
governments and the governed than is possible at the national level, where government is inevitably
more remote from the citizenry.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                    Federalism DA
Regents
                                                   Impact- Iraq ½
Federalism key to maintain peace in Iraq
 Sol Sanders; March 9, 2007; Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former
correspondent for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International.;
Federalism to the rescue: Here, there and Iraq? special to world tribune.com;
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2007/s3_09.html
Barreling down a Florida interstate listening to pomp and ceremony [and occasional ―cracker calls‖] opening the new
legislative session in Tallahassee, the genius of the U.S.‘ federal system becomes apparent. The Founding Fathers‘
political acumen, serendipitously monolingual, America‘s highly geographic and social mobility — and
not least, enormous blood and suffering of The War Between the States — have made America‘s
federalist formula a jewel. It permits grass roots government, regional differences toleration, and local
experimentation. It acts as a check on the centripetal force of an enormously powerful national
bureaucracy.
There might be an argument for repealing the 17th Constitutional amendment, restoring election of federal senators by state
legislatures as The Founders envisaged, strengthening federalism The principle argument for popular election was, after all,
charges the Senate had become a millionaires‘ club. Today? Perhaps the current spectacle of a dubious ―debate‖ over ―Iraq‖
might have been improved were the states‘ weight strengthened as intended against runaway populism.
From Istanbul to Beijing, federalism gets a hearing from time to time, a piece of governance for compromise
needed for stability and modernization. That‘s what is being worked out, hopefully, in Iraq, at the
moment. [Forbid that anyone should take seriously Sen. Joseph R. Biden‘s proposal setting up what inevitably would be
three warring states along ethnic lines.] The first building bloc seems going into place with agreement to divide
oil revenues, allotting some to Sunni areas which are bereft compared, at least as far as anyone knows
now, to current production in the north and south. Divvying up the enormous potential of fossil fuel —
U.S. farm lobby and worldwide enviromentalistas‘ love affair with ethanol notwithstanding — would
obviously be essential for any kind of viable future regime speeding American withdrawal.

Civil War in Iraq Snowballs to Middle East War
The Australian, May 28, 2005 (―Brink of civil war‖ p. Lexis-Nexis)
United Arab Emirates' daily Al Bayan feared Iraq was slipping into "the abyss of sectarianism", warning that if civil war
erupted, it could spread to neighboring countries "prone to being quickly infected". In the London-based
Azzaman, Fatih Abdul Salam argued the current wave of assassinations indicated "the weakness of the
political process". But the Los Angeles Times saw promising signs in a weekend announcement by Sunni leaders that they
would seek a unified plan to re-enter politics and negotiate with Shia and Kurds. "Guerrillas are unlikely to cease fire soon,
but greater Sunni Arab involvement in politics could make them feel less marginalised, thus depriving
insurgents of some support," it editorialised.
The UAE's Gulf News had a gloomier assessment, carrying an exclusive interview with a powerful Sunni tribal chief who
threatened open warfare with the Iraqi government if it sent Shia security forces north to battle insurgents. " Although
officials dismiss suggestions the country could descend into open civil war, elements of the communities
are already fighting one another, " it said.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                                                       Federalism DA
Regents
                                                                 Impact- Iraq 2/2
Middle East conflict triggers global nuclear war.
Steinbach, Professor at the Center for Research on Globalization working with Iraq Coalition, March 2002
http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.03/0331steinbachisraeli.htm (PDOCSS1047)
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for
future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war
break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a
nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability ." and Ezar
Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not
be conventional." Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the
principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S.
nuclear targeting strategy. (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland
seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously
                                                                                           if the familar
destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "...
pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for
whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."




                                                                                                                                                         38
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CNDI 2009                                                                                                   Federalism DA
Regents
                                            Impact- India modeling
Federalism key, India will model after US federalism.
Sol Sanders; March 9, 2007; Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former
correspondent for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International.;
Federalism to the rescue: Here, there and Iraq? special to world tribune.com;
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2007/s3_09.html
Barreling down a Florida interstate listening to pomp and ceremony [and occasional ―cracker calls‖] opening the new
legislative session in Tallahassee, the genius of the U.S.‘ federal system becomes apparent . The Founding
Fathers‘ political acumen, serendipitously monolingual, America‘s highly geographic and social mobility — and not least,
enormous blood and suffering of The War Between the States — have made America‘s federalist formula a jewel.
It permits grass roots government, regional differences toleration, and local experimentation . It acts as a
check on the centripetal force of an enormously powerful national bureaucracy.
There might be an argument for repealing the 17th Constitutional amendment, restoring election of federal senators by state
legislatures as The Founders envisaged, strengthening federalism The principle argument for popular election was, after all,
charges the Senate had become a millionaires‘ club. Today? Perhaps the current spectacle of a dubious ―debate‖ over ―Iraq‖
might have been improved were the states‘ weight strengthened as intended against runaway populism.
From Istanbul to Beijing, federalism gets a hearing from time to time, a piece of governance for compromise needed for
stability and modernization. That‘s what is being worked out, hopefully, in Iraq, at the moment. [Forbid that anyone should
take seriously Sen. Joseph R. Biden‘s proposal setting up what inevitably would be three warring states along ethnic lines.]
The first building bloc seems going into place with agreement to divide oil revenues, allotting some to Sunni areas which are
bereft compared, at least as far as anyone knows now, to current production in the north and south. Divvying up the
enormous potential of fossil fuel — U.S. farm lobby and worldwide enviromentalistas‘ love affair with ethanol
notwithstanding — would obviously be essential for any kind of viable future regime speeding American withdrawal.
But federalism is not easy. Malaysia, with its potpourri of British, Hindu, Moslem, and Chinese Confucian
protocols, has made it work [even when several decades of cronyism by former Prime Minister Mohammad Mahathir
almost subverted it].
The most ambitious effort, of course, is India. There Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru‘s 1956 surrender
to populism, redrawing British Indian maps to create states based on the subcontinent‘s dozens of
languages is still being played out. For example, a bloody, reigniting 25-year-old insurgency seeking to
create an independent greater Tamil state in both Sri Lanka and India is only one example of New
Delhi‘s vulnerability. India resists solution of the Kashmir issue, principal bone of contention with
Pakistan, in part, for fear of establishing precedent for secession.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                               Federalism DA
Regents
                                Impact- Modeling Indonesia/ Pakistan
US federalism key to Indonesia and Pakistan, risk of escalation of war if federalism is not
maintained.
Sol Sanders; March 9, 2007; Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former
correspondent for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International.;
Federalism to the rescue: Here, there and Iraq? special to world tribune.com;
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2007/s3_09.html
Barreling down a Florida interstate listening to pomp and ceremony [and occasional ―cracker calls‖] opening the new
legislative session in Tallahassee, the genius of the U.S.‘ federal system becomes apparent . The Founding
Fathers‘ political acumen, serendipitously monolingual, America‘s highly geographic and social mobility — and not least,
enormous blood and suffering of The War Between the States — have made America‘s federalist formula a jewel.
It permits grass roots government, regional differences toleration, and local experimentation . It acts as a
check on the centripetal force of an enormously powerful national bureaucracy.
Indonesia, struggling out of a 50-year history of war with Atjeh, minerals rich tip of northern Sumatra,
had a federal state thrust on its revolutionary leadership by U.S ., British, Dutch and Australian conciliators in
1949. But Soekarno, longtime dictator and demagogue, used nationalist sentiment to quickly disassemble
it, leading to continuing strife among its myriad ethnic and racial constituents — their one commonality
having been colonials under the Dutch for 350 years . Recent efforts to decentralize — and a tenuous peace in
Atjeh — could do the work long overdue.
But Indonesia, like Pakistan, has one ethnic group, the Javanese, or the Punjabis, dominating the political landscape.
Pakistan, carved out of British India, struggles with insurgencies now — some built on old ethnic roots, some
led by Islamofascists — the battlecry of which is against Punjabi-raj. Ironically, Pakistan‘s rulers — as with President
Gen. Perve Musharraf [a scion of immigrants from what is now India] have not been Punjabi but its landlords and
businessmen run the show.




                                                                                                                    40
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CNDI 2009                                                                                           Federalism DA
Regents
                                     Impact- Modeling China and Tibet
US federalism is key to peace between China and Tibet.
Sol Sanders; March 9, 2007; Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former
correspondent for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International.;
Federalism to the rescue: Here, there and Iraq? special to world tribune.com;
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2007/s3_09.html

The Dalai Lama, now 72, facing mushrooming Chinese military as well as ethnic immigrants in Tibet, is
ready to accept ―autonomy‖ rather than independence. Beijing gossip holds a struggle has ensued within
Communist leadership by those who would accept his return — worried his death may bring on new
guerrilla activity — and hardliners [presumably including President Hu Jintao who as Beijing‘s Tibetan gauleiter in
the late 80s brutally put down dissidence]. Yet decentralization may have to be formalized in China with
increasing loss of control by Beijing over local Party cadre, especially those wallowing in corruption and falling
living standards in rural areas where most Chinese live.




                                                                                                               41
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CNDI 2009                                                                                      Federalism DA
Regents
                                       Impact- Modeling Asia
Countries model US federalism, this is key to Turkey and the rest of Asia.
Sol Sanders; March 9, 2007; Asian specialist with more than 25 years in the region, and a former
correspondent for Business Week, U.S. News & World Report and United Press International.;
Federalism to the rescue: Here, there and Iraq? special to world tribune.com;
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2007/s3_09.html

The latest convert to federalism is a most unlikely candidate: former Turkish President Kenan Evren, who
headed the 1980 coup which overthrew an elected government accused of flirting with Islamicist
revival. The 90-year old Evren, once representing the quintessence of ―Kemalism‖ — modernization of a Turkish
state through a highly centralized, regime borrowed from France and Prussia — now says dividing the
country into states is the only way to solve its problems. Most of all, he sees it solving the problem of
the Kurds, the huge Turkish minority — an ethnic group it shares with Iraq and Iran — who have waged
an off and on revolt taxing Ankara‘s military and financial resources since the 1960s. The problem
becomes all the more critical for Ankara with Kurdish autonomy [and relative stability] across the
border in Iraqi Kurdistan. Evren‘s statements have unleashed a torrent of discussion — and abuse. But should
Turkey move toward federalism, it would be monumentally significant for the rest of Asia which long
hoped the formula of contemporary Turkey‘s founder, Ataturk, was the correct one for their own nascent
nationalism.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                    Federalism DA
Regents
                                             Federalism Good- Econ
Federalism is popular when tied to economic issues – Reagan proves.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,          and         Social          Policy      Reform           in        the          United          States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
With Reagan, decentralization (that is, federal government downsizing) definitely took on a grass foot and populist turn that
is still present in today's conservative discourse. The second characteristic of Reagan's anti-governmental
campaign is that he succeeded in making decentralization a key political issue by linking it to budgetary
issues. In other words, Reagan implemented a policy of tax reduction that was largely legitimized by
underlining its "positive" effects on the federal government, i.e. the reduction of its size. This certainly
accounts for the permanency of anti-federalist criticisms within the Republican Party even after Reagan left office. In the
constraining environment of "checks and balances" between Congress and the Presidency, however, the "conservative
revolution" aimed at reducing the size of the federal government indeed failed to transform significantly the balance of power
between Washington and the states. Facing strong opposition from Democrats in Congress as well as
constituencies attached to existing social programmes, such as the American Association for Retired
Persons (AARP), the Reagan administration rapidly embraced a more moderate approach concerning
public policy and intergovernmental relations.




                                                                                                                          43
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CNDI 2009                                                                                                Federalism DA
Regents
                                 Federalism Popular- Economic crises
During economic crises, federalism is popular.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,        and         Social        Policy          Reform         in          the        United        States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
The advent of mammoth federal deficits also contributed to the push for decentralisation and devolution. In a context of
high financial constraint, the transfer of social and economic responsibility from federal to state and
local governments appeared as a logical solution (Lowi 1990). From then on, far from being obsessed
with federalism per se, US conservatives pushed for decentralisation in order to crush "big government"
and the federal deficit.




                                                                                                                     44
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CNDI 2009                                                                                               Federalism DA
Regents

                                     Decentralized welfare popular
Decentralized welfare is popular among conservatives.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,        and         Social      Policy        Reform         in      the            United         States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
During the 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton mobilized the rhetoric of welfare reform to shield himself
against traditional conservative attacks directed at "liberals." Since the late 1960s, conservative
intellectuals had described AFDC as a threat to "family values" and "work ethics." Furthermore, books such
as Charles Murray's Losing Ground (1984) depicted federal welfare policy as a cause of the country' s worsening social
problems. Framing welfare as a source of dramatic unintended consequences, Murray and other
conservative intellectuals seriously undermined the legitimacy of federal social assistance programs
(Somers and Block, 2003). They described Democrats who opposed the shift from welfare to workfare
(work-for-welfare) as blind ideologues unable to realise how dangerous and perverse federal social
assistance programs were. For Clinton, embracing the idea of workfare appeared as an attempt to shield
himself against these traditional conservative attacks (Beland et al., 2002).




                                                                                                                  45
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CNDI 2009                                                                                                    Federalism DA
Regents
                                            States Solve- local needs
State governments suit local laws to local needs.
Calabresi, Steven (Associate Professor at Northwestern University) ‘95 ―A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States vs. Lopez, Michigan Law Review; ACCESSED FROM LEXIS-
NEXIS
a. Responsiveness to Local Tastes and Conditions. The opening argument for state power is that social tastes and
preferences differ, that those differences correlate significantly with geography, and that social utility
can be maximized if governmental units are small enough and powerful enough so that local laws can be
adapted to local conditions, something the national government, with its uniform lawmaking power, is
largely unable to do. n66 Consider here the following example offered by Professor McConnell:
Assume that there are only two states, with equal populations of 100 each. Assume further that 70 percent of State A, and
only 40 percent of State B, wish to outlaw smoking in public buildings. The others are opposed. If the decision is made on a
national basis by a majority rule, 110 people will be pleased, and 90 displeased. If a separate decision is made by majorities
in each state, 130 will be pleased, and only 70 displeased. The level of satisfaction will be still greater if some smokers in
State A decide to move to State B, and some anti-smokers in State B decide to move to State A. n67
As McConnell's example shows, federalism can produce, at least in some admittedly abstract situations, a net gain in social
utility. This lends credence to the argument made above that federalism sometimes can alleviate the problem of raw majority
rule, the key problem generated by democratic government.




                                                                                                                          46
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CNDI 2009                                                                                                      Federalism DA
Regents
                                               State Solve- best laws
Through competitive jurisdiction, states decide the best laws to enact.
Calabresi, Steven (Associate Professor at Northwestern University) ‘95 ―A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States vs. Lopez, Michigan Law Review; ACCESSED FROM LEXIS-
NEXIS
b. The Tiebout Model and Competition Among Jurisdictions. The second argument for state power follows ineluctably from
the first. If social tastes and preferences differ and if states are allowed to exist and take those differences
into account in passing laws, then the states will compete with one another to satisfy their citizens'
preferences for public goods. An advantage to federalism then is that
while unitary governments may have no means of determining their citizens' preferences for public
goods, decentralized systems [do]. The necessary "market type' preference-revelation mechanism was the citizens'
ability to move freely among local jurisdictions... Social welfare can be maximized by allowing citizens to
choose from among a number of jurisdictions, each of which provides a different bundle of public
goods. n68
 [*776] Because it often may be unclear what bundles of public goods are desirable at what cost , competition among
jurisdictions holds out the potential for a market mechanism that can provide an empirical answer to the
most important questions of governance. n69 This argument has built into it two crucial assumptions: first, that the
policies adopted by the states do not generate significant externalities, a point I come back to; and second, that there be free
movement of capital and labor across state borders with no important residency requirements of any kind. Obviously, a right
of exit is crucial to any competition among jurisdictions because it is that right that allows market discipline of those
jurisdictions that provide less desirable bundles of public goods. n70 Without a right of exit, a situation of jurisdictional
monopoly prevails like that which exists under all unitary national governments.
Jurisdictional monopoly is conducive not only to a low-quality bundle of public goods; at the extreme, it could be said also to
lead to the denial of fundamental individual liberties. Jurisdictional competition, then, is also beneficial because it
leads to the protection of liberty. If I dislike the laws of my home state enough and feel tyrannized by
them enough, I always can preserve my freedom by moving to a different state with less tyrannous laws.
Some may think this liberty argument for federalism is just another form of the argument already made that federalism leads
to competition in the provision of public goods. And, of course, if one wrongly believes that fundamental private liberties are
"provided" by government as a public good, then these two points indeed do collapse into each other. In fact, however, it
turns out that fundamental private liberties are actually antecedent to government, n71 and, therefore, the
protection of those liberties through jurisdictional competition is a great and additional benefit of
federalism. [*777




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                     Federalism DA
Regents
                                        Federal models after state gov
National programs are shaped after state programs.
Richard P. Nathan; December 2005; co-director of the NelsonA. Rockefeller Institute of Government Federalism
And Health Policy Medicaid is an appropriate and feasible base on which to build basic health care coverage.
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/24/6/1458.pdf

In the 1980s,when the pendulum of social policy nationally swung toward conservatism, there was a similar spurt in state
activism in response to President Ronald Reagan‘s policies to cut domestic spending. States reshaped programs to
reflect state priorities, increased their funding of programs in areas in which the federal government had
become less active, and assumedmore control over the activities of local governments and nonprofits.8
In these and other ways, states increased their influence vis-à-vis the federal government and their
relationships with local governments and nonprofits. More recently, Randy Bovbjerg and other Urban Institute
scholars pointed to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 as an example of a state
initiative that stimulated national policy activism: ―HIPAA adapted some state and small group insurance market
reforms and applied them nationally.‖9
The key to the argument about the essentially pro-governmental activist influence of federalism cycles over time is to
convince the reader that in liberal times nationally, recalcitrance and opposition to change by some states have not been
as important for social policy as the state-push factor in conservative periods. The historical record and the
Medicaid experience support this position, but I grant that definitive proof is a hard standard to satisfy for theories of this
kind.




                                                                                                                          48
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CNDI 2009                                                                                                   Federalism DA
Regents
                                              State solve- Welfare
States are innovative and responsible – can solve welfare problems the federal government can‘t
or don‘t want to.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,        and         Social      Policy        Reform         in      the                United         States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
A Representative from California summarized this trend during the debates leading up to the welfare
law: "The Republican bill simply passes the buck to the states. We should call this legislation the
Government Responsibility Abdication Act, because all this bill does is to drop the responsibilities of
the Federal Government." Similarly, the Democratic Senator from Illinois, Carol Mosley-Brown, stressed that "this bill
takes a Pontius Pilate approach to Federal responsibility. (...) [The] bill sends the problem to the States with a high-
flown rhetoric about State responsibility and innovation." (22) The welfare law debate confirms one
definitive orientation: the reference to decentralization and federalism is instrumental as an ideological
frame aimed at justifying retrenchment while diminishing the potential electoral costs of harsh social
policy reforms. Frames related to a relatively stable ideological repertoire form essential "weapons of mass persuasion" in
the bands of conservative policy-makers. Institutional logics and historically rooted ideas and representations about
government have shaped the strategies of these political actors.




                                                                                                                       49
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CNDI 2009                                                                                                     Federalism DA
Regents
                                               State solve- Medicaid
State Medicaid agencies influence policy formation. <retag>
The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government . 2002. ―Case Studies in Medicaid Managed-Care: State
Medicaid Agencies as Key Actors in Medicaid Manged-Care‖ http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/federalism/2002-
state_medicaid_agencies_as_key_actors_in_medicaid_managed-care.pdf
There is some published research documenting the key role Medicaid agency staff play in shaping public policy.4 Sparer
highlighted the importance of discretion given to Medicaid agencies. Schneider concluded that Medicaid staff are
especially influential when issues and choices are highly technical and complicated such as those
eligibility guidelines, service decisions, and financing and reimbursement issues that make up the day-
to-day activities of Medicaid policy formulation and implementation. In the ten states studied here, the
Medicaid agencies were key players — but not always valued players. In one state (West Virginia), the Medicaid
agency had recently been ―downsized‖ and its functions privatized to the point that the researcher characterized it as a hollow
agency. In this state, many of the planning functions were carried out by consulting firms. At the other extreme was a larger
state (Ohio) whose Medicaid agency appeared to be somewhat arrogant and where legislators complained that they were
―talked down to.‖ In interviews conducted for this research, health lobbyists recognized the power and importance
of the bureaucracy. ―They are the ones most involved in the details of implementation,‖ said 4 one
lobbyist. ― They make things happen.‖ Another noted the role the bureaucracy plays in initiating policy. ―That
is where recommendations or changes are instigated. They go through the governor and on to the
legislature.‖ Another said, ―Bureaucracy is the day-to-day regular entity. Without their understanding and their ear, very
few objectives would be accomplished.‖ Still another lobbyist put it more bluntly, ―You‘ve got to ultimately go through them
[bureaucrats] to get changes.‖ ―The bureaucracy doesn‘t do anything they don‘t want to,‖ said a lobbyist. In sum, state
Medicaid agencies are major players in both policy formulation and implementation. They know the rules
and the sometimes Byzantine demands from Washington and agency attorneys. But they do not necessarily lead. In only two
of the states (Georgia and New Jersey) were agency leaders credited with proposing managed-care. In one state, the change
was due to demands for substantial cuts in the program; in the other, it was part of an 1115 waiver proposal to the Health
Care Financing Agency that was not submitted.




                                                                                                                           50
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CNDI 2009                                                                                                                                     Federalism DA
Regents
                                       State solve race to the bottom- Immigration
States solve best. Desire for uniformity only leads to race to the bottom.
Peter H. Schuck; 2007 University of Chicago; The University of Chicago Legal Forum; 2007; U C7 U Chi Legal F
57; IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY: ARTICLE: Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously

A federal system allocates public authority between the national government and sub-national entities, but this allocation differs according
to the nature of the allocation and the specific policy domain. In the U.S., as noted earlier, the plenary power doctrine
and its dormant power corollary leave immigration policy as the sole responsibility of the federal
government, subject only to such delegations of immigration authority to the states as Congress may
choose to make. Spiro insists that this federal monopoly over immigration is rooted entirely in the exclusive
federal authority over foreign relations, captured in the (anachronistic, in Spiro's view) "one voice" metaphor.
32 Surely that is the chief rationale for the doctrine, but it is not the only one. For example, appeals to tradition and the sunk costs of the status quo may also
militate in favor of federal authority over immigration. But advocates of exclusive federal power almost always have other, more functional arguments to
                     a desire for uniformity, increasing returns to regulatory scale, administrative
make against decentralization:
expertise and competence, fear of "races to the bottom," and others. (There are, of course, important, often
decisive, political arguments for decentralization.)
It is all the more striking, then, that some major immigrant-receiving nations delegate (or reserve) substantial authority over
certain significant aspects of immigration policy to their states (Germany (Lander) and Australia), provinces (Canada), and
cantons (Switzerland). 33 In contrast, the U.S. remains a firm centralizer in immigration policy despite its
robust tradition and structure -- the federalist default -- of state authority and administration in health
care, education, national elections, taxation, and many other policy areas that in other countries are
almost entirely [*68] the responsibility of national governments. Why, other than by virtue of immigration's relation to
foreign affairs, should this exception to the federalist default exist and, more to the point, why should it be maintained? I
explore this question by focusing on three distinct immigration policy problems where the states might play an effective role
in better achieving national goals.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                       Federalism DA
Regents
                                        States want federalism- control
States want to take control.
Grant Reeher; associate professor of political science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs. Syracuse University Will States Get Help From Feds This Time? The Post-Standard (Syracuse, New
York) August 24, 2008 Sunday Earlier this month, Govs. David Paterson, D-N.Y., and Martin O'Malley, D-Md.,
wrote in this space about the hard economic times currently facing state governments ("Feds must help states through
tough time," Aug. 3).

They noted that unlike the national government, states can't run budget deficits and must therefore make
difficult choices when needs for spending exceed revenue. They claimed that their states had been
compelled to go beyond the federal government in critical areas where effective national response was
lacking, such as infrastructure investment, housing and education, and called for more financial
assistance from Washington. And they rejected the federal government's failure to act in partnership with
the states in addressing our most pressing domestic problems.
All plausible claims. But we've been here before. In the economic downturn earlier in this decade, states reeled under budget
crises that were arguably the worst since World War II. With a few notable exceptions, like then-Gov. Mark Warner's
Virginia, most shied away from instituting significant tax increases to make up for the shortfalls, and opted instead for cuts in
education, social services and other areas. That approach was largely informed by the political memory from the previous
time such state-level financial problems had struck, in the early 1980s. Back then many states instituted tax increases, and the
governors and majority parties in those legislatures subsequently paid the price in the elections that followed.
Indeed, Paterson and O'Malley's jeremiad evokes a distinguishing feature of the American political landscape ,
one that complicates a governor's job -- the tangled and often tense relationship between states and the federal
government.




                                                                                                                            52
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CNDI 2009                                                                                            Federalism DA
Regents
                                  Federalism works- Clinton proves
Clinton administration proves federalism works.
Grant Reeher; associate professor of political science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs. Syracuse University Will States Get Help From Feds This Time? The Post-Standard (Syracuse, New
York) August 24, 2008 Sunday Earlier this month, Govs. David Paterson, D-N.Y., and Martin O'Malley, D-Md.,
wrote in this space about the hard economic times currently facing state governments ("Feds must help states through
tough time," Aug. 3).

Under Clinton, more money flowed to the states, and although state-federal relations were often rocky,
the devolutionary trend continued. At the end of his first term, Clinton signed into law the welfare
reform act, ending a federal entitlement and turning over a sizeable chunk of authority to the states. He
talked of creative state-federal partnerships, and told us that the era of big government was over .
When George W. Bush was elected president, advocates of further devolution had reasons to celebrate. Here was a
self-styled compassionate conservative, a former governor, who had also spoken favorably about state authority and
innovation.
But that hope was not realized. Although there is some disagreement at the margins, the majority opinion
among experts on federalism is that the Bush administration has advanced a relationship based on
greater national authority. Phrases like "coercive federalism" have reappeared.




                                                                                                                53
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CNDI 2009                                                                                                   Federalism DA
Regents
                                      Federalism Good- history proves
Federalism is in the history of US. US federalism also helps international issues.
Fan Zhang, September 24, 2008; State and regional News; Rockefeller expert lauds federalism in America. Lexis.

According to Nathan, the founding fathers of the United States accepted the idea of federalism to allow the
13 states, which were varied in culture and size, to form a nation. Since then, history has shown that the
principle of federalism has given energy to the country, Nathan said. "States test ideas to confront
problems," Nathan said. "These ideas then diffuse or morph into national policie s." Nathan cited specific
issues confronted by federalism, including healthcare and education, which states as well as the national
government attempt to address. Furthermore, federalism allows the American government to be flexible ,
he said. Nathan described how the Reagan administration cut back many social programs that the states in turn provided.
"Strong central policies must still rely on school districts and local institutions to enact them," Nathan
said. "Our government cannot operate with implementing policies as the short suit. Federalism allows
for extravagant promises to be changed into realistic public policies." Nathan also spoke about the 87,578 state
and local governments in the United States that provide services ranging from infrastructure to public safety. This structure
allows for greater transparency of government and more opportunities for Americans to become involved in government, he
said. One-sixth of the entire American workforce serves in state and local governments or nonprofit organizations, making
public service a key component of the nation's economy, Nathan added. Another benefit of federalism, according to Nathan,
is that regional governments allow the federal government to better focus on issues of foreign policy and defense in an
increasingly changing world. He explained that American federalism allows the U.S. to be more balanced in
dealing with both domestic and international issues than other countries. Andrew Samwick, director of the
Rockefeller Center, said Rockefeller was a scholar and practitioner of federalism, and that Rockefeller's enthusiasm for the
subject reflects the center's goals. Nathan, who worked for Rockefeller during his presidential campaigns as the coordinator
of domestic issues, agreed with Samwick. "The hardest part of working for [Rockefeller] was because he cared so much and
knew so much, it was hard to tell him anything," Nathan said.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                Federalism DA
Regents
                                        Federalism good- state power.
State governments can compete with federal governments for social service programs.
John O. McGinnis* and Ilya Somin; Northwestern University Law Review Fall, 2004 99 Nw. U.L. Rev. 89;
Symposium: The Rehnquist Court: Federalism Vs. States' Rights: A Defense Of Judicial Review In A
Federal System; BIO: * Class of 1940 Research Professor, Northwestern Law School; B.A., Harvard, 1979;
M.A., Oxford, 1980; J.D., Harvard, 1983. ** Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School
of Law; B.A., Amherst College, 1995

For the Founding Fathers and their generation, the main rationale for federalism was not diversity or
competition (the most familiar modern arguments), but the role of the states as a bulwark against possible
federal tyranny. n87 As the case of state efforts to forestall enforcement of the federal Fugitive Slave Act
dramatically illustrates, n88 state governments can sometimes use their powers to block or mitigate
federal violations of fundamental [*111] individual rights. n89 On a more prosaic level, state governments
can compete with the federal government in providing public goods and social services . n90 For
example, both state and federal governments engage in environmental and social regulation, both try to foster a favorable
"business climate" for industry, and both seek to win the support of a variety of interest group constituencies. Vertical
competition, like horizontal, is not an unalloyed good. In some cases, states may use their competitive leverage to
stymie federal efforts to eliminate highly oppressive state policies, such as the southern states' ultimately
successful resistance to Reconstruction-era efforts to protect the rights of African-Americans. n91
Nonetheless, some substantial capacity for competition is a major advantage of a federal system.




                                                                                                                     55
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CNDI 2009                                                                                                    Federalism DA
Regents
                                        Federalism good- competition
Federalism competition good. Federal gov shouldn‘t over power states.
John O. McGinnis* and Ilya Somin; Northwestern University Law Review Fall, 2004 99 Nw. U.L. Rev. 89;
Symposium: The Rehnquist Court: Federalism Vs. States' Rights: A Defense Of Judicial Review In A Federal System;
BIO: * Class of 1940 Research Professor, Northwestern Law School; B.A., Harvard, 1979; M.A., Oxford, 1980; J.D.,
Harvard, 1983. ** Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; B.A., Amherst College,

An argument can be made that judicially enforced federalism might actually undermine vertical competition, insofar as states
may have little incentive to compete with the federal government if they have a guaranteed sphere of authority which is
completely separate from that of the federal government. This point is not wholly lacking in validity, but it ignores two
important considerations that outweigh it.
First, if state governments do not have a substantial sphere of authority that Congress cannot override,
their attempts to engage in vertical competition are likely to be futile because the federal government
could easily suppress them simply by passing legislation to that effect. Second, the objection ignores the
fact that separate spheres of power can have overlapping effects. For example, even if the federal
government's power to regulate "interstate commerce" is narrowly defined, its regulations in this area
will still have substantial effects on economic activity that doesn't cross state lines. Conversely, the tax
and regulatory policies of state governments will have a substantial impact on interstate trade even if -
under the Dormant Commerce Clause - states are denied the power to regulate interstate trade directly. Thus,
state and federal officials can often compete over the same policy area even if they each have different
types of powers.
Diversity, vertical competition, and horizontal competition may all be undermined by various principal-
agent problems in federalism's political process. Both state and federal elected officials may be tempted to
undermine them in order to advance their electoral and other interests. Thus, judicial restraint of federal government
power will sometimes be necessary in order to ensure that the benefits of federalism are not lost .
Importantly, however, judicial action is also needed to ensure that state governments do not undermine federalism. One of the
important advantages of viewing [*112] federalism from a principal-agent perspective is that it allows us to
create a unified theory that incorporates judicial limits on both state and federal authority .




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                              Cooperative Federalism Good- funding
Federal gov. should offer funding through cooperative federalism
Grant Reeher; associate professor of political science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs. Syracuse University Will States Get Help From Feds This Time? The Post-Standard (Syracuse, New
York) August 24, 2008 Sunday Earlier this month, Govs. David Paterson, D-N.Y., and Martin O'Malley, D-Md.,
wrote in this space about the hard economic times currently facing state governments ("Feds must help states through
tough time," Aug. 3).


In 1980, Ronald Reagan made increasing the authority of state governments a theme of his presidential
campaign, and in his first inaugural address, reminded us that the federal government was created by the
states, not the other way around. But under Reagan, federal aid to states declined.
For the states, the effects of this decrease in federal support were compounded by the increased demand
on social services during the same period -- hence the complaints from states, and the political repercussions
mentioned above.
Nonetheless, in many policy areas state governments also began to enjoy more independent policy authority and more
flexibility in federal grant-spending. Some also went beyond the federal government's efforts on issues like
environmental protection and welfare and health care reform. Their innovations began to trickle up and
inform the national agenda . This phenomenon led to discussions of a new "devolution" of power from
Washington to the states.




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                                            Federal gov bad- senators
Senators do not act in the interest of the people.
Steven Calabresi (Associate Professor at Northwestern University) 2001. ―Federalism and the Rehnquist Defense: A
Normative Defense‖ http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/574/1/24
There are, in addition, three fundamental realities of the modern political process that the Wechsler- Choper thesis overlooks.
First, it ignores the influence our campaign finance system has on the political process. The Wechsler-Choper thesis assumes
that members of Congress are primarily representatives of particular states or congressional districts. They thus assume
that senators and congresspersons will be attuned to federalism problems in pending legislation. In fact,
however, senators and congresspersons are heavily focused on the preferences of national political
action committees (PACs) because modern media campaigns are very expensive to run (Calabresi 1995).
These national PACs are either indifferent to federalism or are opposed to it to the extent that it
interferes with their narrowly conceived special interest projects.
A second difficulty with the Wechsler-Choper thesis is that it overlooks the incentive structure that national politicians face.
The Wechsler-Choper thesis rightly assumes that members of Congress are interested in promoting the likelihood of their
reelection. It errs, however, in assuming that this result is promoted by defending state power. Members of
Congress can do more to promote their reelection by expanding national programs and advocating the
creation of new national programs than they can accomplish by defending federalism (Calabresi 1995).
There are very few votes to be had by defending the proper meaning of the commerce power. In
contrast, new national health insurance or education programs can look like surefire winners.




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                                         Plan won‘t pass- politics link
Even small opposition to a policy makes it harder to pass.
The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government . 2002. ―Case Studies in Medicaid Managed-Care: State
Medicaid Agencies as Key Actors in Medicaid Manged-Care‖ http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/federalism/2002-
state_medicaid_agencies_as_key_actors_in_medicaid_managed-care.pdf
Political science research tells us that even when only one person or group opposes a policy or bill, the odds of
passage drop substantially. Legislators (like most people) don‘t like controversy. Arizona uses this notion
effectively in presenting a united front to the legislature. Michigan provides the opposite case: controversy was everywhere,
and the legislature ended up making no one perfectly happy while creating ill will in the process.




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                    ___________________________________
                                 ***AFF***




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                                          Non- Unique- Fed low now
Non-UQ – Federalism is low now.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,          and          Social        Policy         Reform         in       the         United         States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
By far the most enduring social legislation voted during the New Deal was the omnibus Social Security Act of 1935. Despite
interference from the emerging Conservative Coalition in Congress--which regrouped Republicans and Southern Democrats--
that reduced the level of protection (Quadagno 1988), the Social Security Act made provisions for a federal old-
age insurance program, a decentralized unemployment insurance system, and social assistance grants-in-
aid to the states (Old Age Assistance, Aid to Dependant Children). With the exception of old-age insurance, the
US welfare state thus remained relatively decentralised and modest in scope. (10) This being said,
reforms enacted during the New Deal dramatically increased the involvement of the federal government
in economic and social affairs (Amenta 1998). Between the enactment of fairly minor amendments to the Social
Security Act in 1939 and the beginning of the 1950s, Congress did not significantly alter federal programmes enacted in 1935
(Derthick 1979). In the 1960s, massive social programmes were enacted in the context of the War against Poverty, like the
ambitious reform campaign launched by President Lyndon Johnson in the aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement
(Sundquist 1968). Among these programmes, Medicare has been by far the most substantial one. Aimed at protecting social
groups that were not well covered by private insurance (the elderly, the disabled), Medicare has favoured a further
centralization of the US welfare state without endangering the vested interests of the private medical sector (Hacker 1998).
(11) Despite some concessions to "state autonomy," the measures enacted during the 1960s increased the
involvement of the federal government in US social policy (Derthick, 1996). In the name of the War on
Poverty and the protection of Civil Rights, Washington played an unprecedented regulatory role in the
US economy and society. Paradoxically, the centralization of the US welfare state was confirmed and radicalized under
the presidency of Richard Nixon (1969-1974), who was elected on a conservative platform centred on the critique of "big
[federal] government." Between 1969 and 1972, old-age insurance benefits (often referred to as "Social Security") were
increased by more than 50%, just before the enactment of an indexation scheme (Weaver 1988). In 1972, a federal
Supplemental Security Income also replaced the state old-age assistance and disability programmes
altogether. All these measures have significantly increased the involvement of the federal government in
the field of social policy. Despite the preservation of state-run assistance and unemployment insurance
programmes, these measures have favoured a gradual centralization of the US welfare state. Considering
the broad constituencies that tend to emerge as feedback effects of existing social programmes, politicians who attempt to
reduce their scope or even dismantle them face huge political risks (Pierson, 1994; Pierson, 2000). For that reason, welfare
state centralization largely appears as a path dependent process that is difficult to reverse.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                  Federalism DA
Regents
                                         Non-Unique- Fed low Now
Federalism low – federal government is the dominant actor.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,        and         Social      Policy        Reform         in      the               United         States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
Conclusion After thirty years of somewhat modest reform, the federal government is still the dominant
actor in the US welfare state, which largely confirms the institutionalist thesis about the enduring weight
of previously enacted policies. Medicare and old-age insurance (Social Security) are still the core of US
social policy, and decentralised measures such as unemployment insurance and social assistance appear
as limited, residual measures. What is fascinating about US reforms of federalism and social policy is not their
(predictable) failure to halt centralization in the context of intra-state federalism but the consistency of the rhetoric
surrounding them. In their crusade, conservatives have systematically mobilized frames exploiting
traditional fears towards political power and the federal government to legitimize retrenchment. At the
theoretical level, this article thus underlines the prominent role of ideas and, more specifically,
ideological frames in policy-making. Additional theoretical discussion should improve our
understanding of the complex interaction between ideas, institutions, and political strategies at all stages
of the policy-making process. Such a discussion could further enrich historical institutionalism, which
still appears as a most useful conceptual framework for the analysis of social policy reform.




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                          Non- Unique- Dormant Commerce Clause proves
Dormant Commerce Clause proves federal power.
John O. McGinnis* and Ilya Somin; Northwestern University Law Review Fall, 2004 99 Nw. U.L. Rev. 89;
Symposium: The Rehnquist Court: Federalism Vs. States' Rights: A Defense Of Judicial Review In A Federal System;
BIO: * Class of 1940 Research Professor, Northwestern Law School; B.A., Harvard, 1979; M.A., Oxford, 1980; J.D.,
Harvard, 1983. ** Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; B.A., Amherst College,

Parochial and protectionist legislation interferes with beneficial horizontal competition because it permits one state to
interfere with the commerce of its competitors. Accordingly, under the Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
Congress is given the exclusive power to regulate commerce, displacing state power in this area. Yet,
because of capture by parochial interests described above, members of Congress may not take the initiative of passing
legislation to get rid of protectionist legislation. Accordingly, the Court enforces the Dormant Commerce Clause
against the states even in the absence of congressional legislation. n139
Under a thoroughgoing application of political process theory, it would be unclear why the Court would maintain a Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. If the political process is up to the task of appropriately limiting
Congressional power, why should it not also be trusted to police state obstruction of the free flow of
goods and services? The same refusal to enforce the Dormant Commerce Clause is also implicit in any
theory of federalism that focuses exclusively on "states' rights." After all, enforcement of the Clause
necessarily limits the power of state governments. But invalidating protectionist state legislation rather
than waiting for Congress to do the job represents a judicial recognition that federalism exists for the
benefit of individual citizens, rather than state governments. It also addresses the reality that the distribution of
powers between the states and the federal government [*123] is not a smoothly self-enforcing mechanism. The interests of
political actors, state and federal, are often sand in the gears of political enforcement.
Despite its reputation as a pro-states' rights court, the Rehnquist Court has actually expanded the scope of the Dormant
Commerce Clause in some respects, providing some evidence that it is pursuing a structural federalism jurisprudence rather
than merely a states' rights jurisprudence. For example, it has extended the Clause to protect non-profit institutions that serve
out-of-state customers against state discrimination. n140
Given our structural analysis, the Supreme Court has probably been wrong to allow Congress to return
to the states legislative authority within the domain of its exclusive interstate commerce power . n143 That
long standing doctrine allows the protectionist tendencies implicit in the representational system to frustrate the free trade
zone established in the Constitution, while permitting Congress and the states to blur accountability for which government is
responsible. n144 It is in a sense the converse of commandeering, [*124] because it permits the states to exercise authority
provided to the federal government in a manner that blurs lines of accountability. The Court would be better advised to return
to the Taney Court rule that barred Congress from delegating this authority. n145




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                                        Non-Unique- Loss of fed now

Federal laws restrain states‘ social services.
The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government . 2002. ―Case Studies in Medicaid Managed-Care: State
Medicaid Agencies as Key Actors in Medicaid Manged-Care‖ http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/federalism/2002-
state_medicaid_agencies_as_key_actors_in_medicaid_managed-care.pdf
It [Medicaid] requires a substantial commitment to invest the time to really understand the program in
detail. The legislature has been frustrated on many occasions because they want to move ahead with
some sort of simple fix, only to be told that the federal law or rules prohibit the proposed change or
make it unattractive. Not only do the legislators not like or understand the program, they resent being lectured to by the
Medicaid staff on all the details they don‘t understand.… In effect, the legislators interpret the message to be that
the huge fiscal commitment (between $6 billion and $7 billion per year at present) is a no-choice
situation because of federal constraints, which is bound to make the message unpopular.
Despite this complexity, however, in some states, legislatures provide a great deal of oversight to the program and want to
school themselves on the details:




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                                       Non-unique- USFG control
USFG has been taking power away from states.
Grant Reeher; associate professor of political science at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs. Syracuse University Will States Get Help From Feds This Time? The Post-Standard (Syracuse, New
York) August 24, 2008 Sunday Earlier this month, Govs. David Paterson, D-N.Y., and Martin O'Malley, D-Md.,
wrote in this space about the hard economic times currently facing state governments ("Feds must help states through
tough time," Aug. 3).

Wars always increase the power of the national government, and the effects often extend to the domestic
sphere. This war has been no different.
But war isn't the whole story. No Child Left Behind, the president's signature domestic policy initiative,
represents a striking shift toward greater national control over an arena that had been left mostly to the
states. The law included funding to support its implementation, but state administrators assert that full
compliance requires them to tap their own scarce resources. Across party lines, many state legislatures
and governors have bitterly resisted the law's testing-based accountability requirements, limited funding,
and what they claim are its harmful effects on actual learning.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                               Federalism DA
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                                             AT: Link- plan popular
Link - Poverty is unpopular during an economic crisis.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,         and          Social         Policy        Reform          in      the        United         States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
This was especially true in the field of social policy, where most federal programmes were protected against widespread
cutbacks (Pierson 1994; Schwab 1991; Stockman 1986). (14) That is why, at an early time in the Reagan administration,
there was a switch from an ideological commitment to decentralization to a logic of retrenchment.
Indeed, according to Kevin Phillips, the Economic Recovery Act and the Tax Reform Act directly
contributed to the widespread increase in economic inequality that characterized the 1980s (Phillips
1990). These reforms (coupled with the negative effects of the 1982 economic recession and the sudden
rise in military spending) also favoured an increase in the federal deficit, which exacerbated the logic of
retrenchment during the second half of the 1980s. Facing skyrocketing federal deficits related to
Reagan's 1981 tax cut (Economic Recovery Act), Congress could not even consider the enactment of
new (significant) federal measures aimed at fighting poverty and social inequality. In a new context of
financial austerity, retrenchment became a real obsession for federal policymakers.




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                                 States can‘t solve- social services
States don‘t know anything about their social service programs.
The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government . 2002. ―Case Studies in Medicaid Managed-Care: State
Medicaid Agencies as Key Actors in Medicaid Manged-Care‖ http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/federalism/2002-
state_medicaid_agencies_as_key_actors_in_medicaid_managed-care.pdf
It is important to note that state legislators generally are not well-informed on the workings of the Medicaid
program. In New Jersey, for example, legislators aren‘t really ―tuned in‖ to the program and thus provide
little oversight or scrutiny. A health committee chair in Arizona confessed that most of her elected
colleagues don‘t know much and care less about the Medicaid managed-care program, and that most, in
fact, believe that Arizona does not have a Medicaid program.




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                                            State‘s can‘t solve- budget
States can‘t solve for health care because of budget problems.
New      York       Times.     ―In    a     Crisis,   Rethinking                Fiscal              Federalism‖         6/29/09.
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/in-a-crisis-rethinking-fiscal-federalism/
States and localities are intimately involved in delivering, financing, administering and monitoring
health services, and are responsible for wide national variations in access and quality. Serious health care
reform at the federal level must address two intertwined realities: First, Medicaid is killing state and local budgets.
Second, legally and fiscally constrained states lack the capacity and administrative tools to spend health
care monies well.
Adjusted for inflation, state and local health expenditures have more than tripled since 1980 and continue to grow. The ranks
of the uninsured have swelled, and include increasing numbers of immigrants and Americans with costly needs.
Local safety-net providers traditionally bear much of the resulting burden. It is not surprising, then, that states and localities
are groaning under the load, or that they are cutting services at precisely the moment of greatest need, when elementary
macroeconomics suggests that service cutbacks most harm the overall economy.




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                                                    AT: now key
Federalism is cyclical, states will gain power again even if the plan passes.
Richard P. Nathan; December 2005; co-director of the NelsonA. Rockefeller Institute of Government Federalism
And Health Policy Medicaid is an appropriate and feasible base on which to build basic health care coverage.
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/24/6/1458.pdf

Medicaid‘s experience demonstrates an important, related characteristic of U.S. federalism: its
cyclicality. Generally, over time, the national government has been the source of social policy initiatives
in liberal periods in our history. In conservative periods, on the other hand, some states have been
sources of innovation and expansion in the social sector . In the 1920s, for example, when the country was
―Keeping Cool with Coolidge,‖ states were the source of progressive initiatives such as unemployment insurance, public
assistance, and workers‘ compensation. James T. Patterson noted that the states ―preceded the federal government in
regulating large corporations, establishing minimum labor standards, and stimulating economic development.‖3 He added
that ―the most remarkable development in state government in the 1920s was the increase in spending.‖4 State initiatives
planted the seeds of Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s New Deal.
The key to the argument about the essentially pro-governmental activist influence of federalism cycles over time is to
convince the reader that in liberal times nationally, recalcitrance and opposition to change by some states
have not been as important for social policy as the state-push factor in conservative periods. The historical
record and the Medicaid experience support this position, but I grant that definitive proof is a hard standard to satisfy for
theories of this kind.




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CNDI 2009                                                                                                     Federalism DA
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                                      No Impact- federalism is cyclical
Federal interventions occur because of the loss of federalism – it‘s a cycle.
Daniel Beland and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal Abstract. 2004. ―Fighting ‗Big Government‘: Frames,
Federalism,        and         Social      Policy        Reform         in      the United      States.‖
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/canadian_journal_of_sociology/v029/29.2beland.html
Yet when it comes to conservative social issues like "family values" and "personal responsibility," the
critique of federal "big government" loses much of its political appeal and "moral centralization"
prevails. Out analysis of the 1996 welfare reform provides ground to this claim. The US Ideological Repertoire and Social
Policy Centralization While the logic of "competitive state-building" usually characterizes the institutional logic of Canada's
inter-state federalism, US intra-state federalism has transformed regional entities (states) into
institutionalized interest groups represented directly in the federal legislative body (Senate). In intra-
state federalism, regional discontents--for example the US southern states' opposition to generous
welfare benefits during the New Deal and the post-war era--are generally expressed through the federal
legislative process, never through formal bargaining between the states and the federal government (as it
is the case in inter-state federalism). In a way, this logic of intra-state federalism has contributed to a more
radical, path-dependent centralization of the US welfare state partly because the states have no formal
institutional means (for example, the equivalent of federal-provincial conferences) to fight against the
gradual increase in federal government's social and economic interventions




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