Deal evaluation 10 failure modes
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FINANCIER
WORLDWIDE corporatefinanceintelligence
North American Middle-Market Review 2005
PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL
Deal evaluation:
10 failure modes
Financier Worldwide Magazine
Reprints & Syndications Department
R E P R I N T
The Exchange, 19 Newhall Street,
Birmingham, B3 3PJ
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www.financierworldwide.com
PROFESSIONALopinions
Deal evaluation: 10 failure modes
BY TODD ANDERSON AND DAVID FISHMAN
T his year marks the fifth anniversary of
the NASDAQ bubble bursting, mak-
ing it an appropriate time to review com-
nies began offering online services, and it
became nearly impossible for an internet
only company to compete. The traditional
5. Failure to understand key uncertainties
Investors often donʼt include a full set of
variables that could impact financial results.
mon deal failure modes. What follows are grocer already had a distribution system in Even in cases where a relatively complete
10 common evaluation mistakes observed place which could be leveraged with little set of factors is modeled, analysts rarely
during the run up of the NASDAQ. These incremental costs and could buy the technol- handle risk and uncertainty well. Generally,
errors fall into three groups: failure to an- ogy cheaply from failed internet grocers. inputs are tested using sensitivity. Typically,
ticipate market changes; financial evalu- analysts examine a +/-10 percent change in
ation failures; and failure to execute after 3. Assuming market valuation remains each input to evaluate how it impacts the
the investment is made. These mistakes are constant bottom line. However, this method fails to
no less common today than they were five The safest assumption is that market valu- take into account the variation unique to
years ago. ation will not be constant over three to five each uncertainty. For example, an analyst
years, a typical length of time to hold an as- may know a fixed cost for a critical com-
Failure to anticipate market changes set before exit. For example, the valuation ponent, but overall revenue will have wider
multiples assigned to internet companies variation. For this reason, we recommend
1. Failure to anticipate technological are vastly different today than they were assessing each variable as a range with the
change five years ago. The same conclusion holds low case being a tenth percentile, the high
Frequently, investors put money in tech- true in a different industry, the utility sec- case being a ninetieth percentile, and the
nologies that represent a paradigm change. tor. In the late 90s, utilities were looking base case being a fiftieth percentile. By us-
There is often a failure to ask when newer for non-regulated, growth businesses as the ing common definitions, it then becomes
and better solutions will eclipse this tech- market assigned a higher multiple to these possible to rank each variableʼs impact on
nology. The length of time that a solution earnings. In the last 12 months, many utili- key metrics with their intrinsic uncertainty
dominates the market should be a key as- ties have taken huge write-offs in nontra- taken into account. The next analytic step
sessment, and a wide range of potential sce- ditional areas. Today, the market does not is defining how these variables interact
narios should be tested. Also, as technolo- differentiate, and earnings are earnings to a and determine the range of results given
gies evolve and mature, margins are likely utility investor regardless of their source. all of the uncertainties. A Monte Carlo or
to be challenged, but projections often fail some other probabilistic analysis is recom-
to reflect this reality. Investors assume ei- Financial evaluation failures mended. Failure to capture uncertainty and
ther constant or slowly decreasing margins, their correlations generally results in sig-
whereas a competing solution would likely 4. Applying a uniform discount to financial nificant underestimating the overall risk for
have a more deleterious impact. projections an investment and is a cause of many deal
Deal makers focus on projections provided failures.
2. Failure to account for competitive by management. While they know that the
response by incumbents projections are only estimates and inher- 6. Income statement focus
A company entering the marketplace with ently optimistic, many investors deal with Examining only the income statement fails
a new solution must anticipate its competi- this bias by discounting earnings. In real- to focus on the intrinsic value that is being
torsʼ responses. A common mistake is to not ity, earnings will not simply scale upwards created. In the late 90s, most clients focused
define broadly enough who the competitors and downwards. Changing just one or two on some multiple of the income statement.
will be. Online grocers in the late 1990s felt critical inputs can entirely eliminate or com- The most common metric used was some
their primary competitors were going to pound future earnings. Thus, it is important multiple of EPS or EBITDA. However, in
be other internet grocery delivery services. to change the underlying inputs to deter- the most extreme cases, valuation by multi-
However, it turned out that the greatest com- mine the overall variability in earnings and ples of revenue was conducted without any
petitive threat was from preexisting bricks cash flow and not just apply a bottom line regard to cash flows, the balance sheet, or
and mortar grocers. Large grocery compa- “haircut”. even earnings. Any of these methodologies 8
FW North American Middle Market Review 2005 | www.financierworldwide.com
PROFESSIONALopinions
yse a “home run” deal can cause this home
run to be only a “single” either by overpay-
ing or suboptimal management.
Failure to execute after an investment is
made
9. Disconnect between the deal and
management teams
Deal and management teams are generally
incented very differently, which creates in-
“These mistakes are no less common today herent tension between the two. Deal teams
want to complete deals, whereas manage-
ment teams want, understandably, some-
than they were five years ago.” thing that can be managed. Also, the deal
team will, at least, initially know far more
about an investment than the management
team. The earlier the management team is
involved, the smoother the hand-off once
the investment occurs.
10. Failure to have a clear exit plan
Sometimes, investors begin with clear exit
goals and fail to manage to that goal. How-
ever, more often, deals are exited early to
failed to take into account the cash crunches unusual to track 20 or more metrics and not ensure a steady stream of earnings and cash
that even a successful investment would just EPS in the exit year. In addition, hav- flow. Frequently, the deals exited are the
have. These companies had to actively ing a quality valuation discussion upfront, relatively successful deals with little or no
choose between growth and cash burn, and, reveals what the investor will have to pay thought devoted to the long-term value be-
by the late 90s, with the cash running out, particular attention to as the deal matures. ing sacrificed or the optimal exit timing. As
growth slowed and income statement mul- a result, investing companies can quickly
tiples declined. 8. “Home Run” deals donʼt need to be create a portfolio of very lackluster invest-
analysed ments with very little potential upside.
7. Over-reliance on just one valuation The best deals require analysis. In fact, they
approach require more analysis because it is highly In the late 90s, many investors become
Triangulation provides a much better es- likely that they are actually going to get caught up in the excitement of the NASDAQ
timate of overall value, at investment and done. A careful analysis upfront will sug- bubble. While some of the most egregious
exit, than any one valuation approach. In gest how these deals can be most effectively errors have been corrected, more work is
addition, cash and debt levels must be an- managed. Also, very attractive deals may required to ensure success or avoid invest-
nually tracked in any model to ensure that come via a competitive bidding process. It ments that are unlikely to be successful.
a company is meeting their financial cov- is critical to careful analyse how much a
enants in all the years and not just in the percentage of equity is worth to your com-
Todd Anderson is a Senior Engagement Manager and can be contacted on +1
exit year. It is relatively easy to automate pany rather than getting caught up in the (617) 478 7621 or tanderson@sdg.com. David Fishman is a Managing Director of
tracking these critical variables, and it is not competition. Thus, failure to properly anal- Strategic Decisions Group and can be contacted by email: dfishman@sdg.com
www.financierworldwide.com | North American Middle Market Review 2005 FW
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