Convergence or Coexistence
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Journal of Information, Law and Technology
Convergence or Coexistence?
Television and Telecommunications
Policies Diverge in the Convergence Debate
Chris Marsden
School of Law,
University of Warwick
C.T.Marsden@warwick.ac.uk
This is a Work In Progress article published on 31 October 1997.
Citation: Marsden C, 'Convergence or Coexistence’, Work In Progress, 1997 (3) The
Journal of Information, Law and Technology JILT).
<http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/wip/97_3mars/>
Marsden C Convergence or Coexistence
Abstract
Television, or audio-visual, and telecommunications policy in the European Union are
discrete regulatory systems. This paper illustrates some of the theoretical difficulties
of the attempt to marry the two policy fields, and the practical effect of the changes
thus far implemented. It continues by examining policy initiatives which are currently
under internal governmental scrutiny, and those already in the public sphere. It
concludes by mapping the anticipated course of the policy debate in the next six
months.
1. Introduction
‘The Impact of Convergence on Broadcasting Regulation’ is the subject of the
Working Group on Audio-visual Policy and Regulation at the European Institute for
the Media Forum on 7 November 1997. Mention is not intended as free advertising,
but to illustrate three issues.
[i] The impact of convergence is on broadcasting regulation. It is the encroachment of
telecommunications regulation, or capture of a cultural activity by an economic
analysis of the distribution of that activity, which is the real issue.
[ii] This debate is clearly European in scope, allowing for national debates within this
wider forum largely to illustrate the futility of divergent national approaches.
[iii] This futility is indicated by the asymmetrical regulation of terrestrial cultural
broadcasters in comparison with satellite economic broadcasters, as we may term
them. The former will be represented at the EIM by Werner Rumphorst of the
European Broadcasting Union; the latter by Ray Gallagher of BSkyB. The question
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they will be asked to analyse: Will broadcasting continue as a regulated activity
dependent on state allocation of scarce spectrum, or become fragmentary lowest-
common-denominator channels amongst thousands on the Internet?
The Bangemann Report (Bangemann 1994) presented to the Council of Ministers at
the Corfu Summit in June 1994 contained an uncompromising deregulatory message.
It Europeanised the Gore/Clinton ‘Information Superhighway’ of early 1993 cliché to
the ‘Information Society’ cliché which now dominates in Brussels. Its conclusions
were that European answers to the American challenge, which since Jean Servan-
Schreiber first wrote (Servan-Schreiber 1967) has transmutated from industrial to
information, were to be found by Anglo-Saxon means.
2. From the Sublime to the Ridiculous
The Internet, for all its power to raise moral panics in pornography and privacy
amongst commentators and legislators, and its contrasting inability to approach video
transmission standard prior to the introduction of digital modems, can be seen as an
aid to the argument for continued regulation. Between approximately late 1992 and
early 1995, the assumption was that multichannel growth would be concentrated in
broadband switched systems of interactive video (Oftel 1995), rather than the
narrower-bandwidth of the Internet. Though this assumption still holds, it is clearly a
longer-term prospect than its prophets predicted at that time. The Internet is
uncontrolled and seemingly uncontrollable: in itself, a challenge to any regulator. As a
version of narrowcasting, it is not dominated by multinationals, but by amateurs. Its
exponential month-on-month growth has continued in the period since early 1995,
when it reached critical mass and changed the strategy of even Microsoft (Gates
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1996). Consequently, the product is prone to content both illegal and incompetent,
though paradigmatically contemporary.
The very profusion and omnipotence of Internet lends itself to an extenuated
regulatory tendency. Its distortion of the multichannel debate has enabled public
service broadcasters and their supporters in national and European legislative debate
to secure breathing space against their formerly dominant multinational opponents and
state sponsors in the convergence debate. It is far less certain in October 1997 than it
was in June 1994 whether convergence of communications will mean the
subservience of television to telecoms.
This article argues that these policy manoeuvres may have been historically
predictable, but that the modest nature of legislative change is a result of the largely
unpredicted rise of the Internet in 1994 to date. Had the far more expensive and
complete solution of broadband cable supplemented by satellite distribution proved as
dynamic in its growth as Internet, there would have been far less regulatory lag than
has been seen. The barriers to entry and control through self-regulation ultimately
offered through cable would have proved a convergent technology far harder to
demonise. It may still prove to be the case that cable and satellite, in their domination
by the multinational and their content conformity and conservatism, will overcome the
demonisation portrayed by policy makers particularly in the Francophone community.
It is now far less certain than in 1994.
3. From Paradigm to Pragmatism
This policy change reflects a wider political reality, expressed in five factors. The
legislators in national Parliaments of the larger Member States are now dominated by
Socialists or reconstructed Socialists in France, Britain and Italy, in contrast to the
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situation in 1993-5. The European economy is recovering from its recession of 1992-
4. The 1994 European Elections were massively distorted by the UK’s first-past-the-
post voting system, under which Labour secured a disproportionate increase in MEPs
(30 more than under proportionality). The Treaty of European Union allowed for co-
decision under Article 189b of the Treaty of Rome, giving Parliament power to play a
more active role in the legislative process. The accession of Sweden, Finland and
Austria has added to the number of member states which view broadcasting as a
national and culturally specific activity. The combination of these factors has given
cultural advocates in Brussels a more favourable set of circumstances than existed in
the recent past.
4. Horizontal From Vertical
The DG XIII Green Paper on Regulation of Communications Convergence, long-
awaited, was completed in mid-September 1997. It is circulating within the
Commission, prior to adoption and publication in November/December. While its
contents are obviously confidential, it can broadly be assumed that it will suggest
horizontal regulation, rather than vertical. There will therefore no longer be a market
for television or telecoms, but rather a market for distribution of electronic
communications in various forms. As Commissioner Bangemann stated in Geneva on
8 September 1997
We may need to simplify the current framework and to perhaps bring together
legislation on the provision of infrastructure, services, content and on conditions for
access to that content (via TV, computer, or telephone networks)...10 years after the
1987 Green Paper [which lead to telecoms liberalisation], we intend the Convergence
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Green Paper of 1997 to be a platform for defining the policy response to this
evolving communications and media environment over the next 5 years.
This removal of ‘pigeonholing’, as Richard Hooper has termed it (Hooper 1996 at
230), will allow synergistic monomedia and multimedia operators to merge with
telecoms operators. Radio and TV companies will be allowed to merge with cable
companies, subject to general competition law. British Telecom in Britain will be
allowed to enter the television market, should it wish. (As its merger with MCI was
abortive, it may find the capital to do so.) The removal of ‘Chinese walls’ between
rival distribution platforms - cable, satellite, terrestrial - will require firmer regulation
of vertical value chains, to prevent the re-emergence of oligopolies at any one stage.
Bangemann in Venice on 18 September 1997 acknowledged the need for continued
economic regulation: ‘a single European regulatory authority for communications may
one day prove necessary’. He appeared less convinced of the need for content
regulation:
a new approach is required as content becomes network-independent and as control
of content (and responsibility for its use) shifts from government to the individual.
Regulators will seek to avoid replacing a state-sponsored monopoly in telecoms or
television with a state-coerced monopoly in premium sports rights, for example.
Separation of transmission from distribution, channel packaging, subscription,
conditional access, programme navigation, and decoder software, is already
recognised in pay-television competition analysis (Cowie and Williams 1997). The
‘content distribution industry’ is, however, prone to market failure, as gatekeepers
emerge in various links in the value chain: this is common to emerging high-
technology industries (Marsden 1997). The early signs are that competition regulation
has proved insufficiently co-ordinated between national agencies, as well as EU
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institutions. The results are unfortunate: either ‘target’ companies perceive
persecution by regulators ignorant of their industry, or those same companies employ
regulatory arbitrage to secure minimal regulation in jurisdictions competing for their
expertise. Bangemann’s espousal of a telecoms competition regulator modelled on the
UK telecom regulator Oftel is therefore attractive.
5. Licensing: The Insuperable Barrier
In moving from vertical segmentation of communications to this horizontal
convergent model, states will also reform their regulatory agencies. The justification
for separate telecoms and television licensing authorities may then appear
undermined. The difficulty is in the licensing structure for terrestrial television. In
telecoms, cable and satellite television, the use of ‘class licences’ is common: similar
obligations are placed on similar sized and resourced rivals. In television, the
parcelling of various economic and cultural rights and duties is sufficiently complex
to present serious difficulty in unbundling these rights. While the separation of
distribution from programming is theoretically attractive, in practice the federal or
cross-subsidised systems which represent the government-licensed status quo in most
European countries are reliant on the existing vertical regulator. The value links may
prove indissoluble, in practical and political terms. Reconstructed social democrats
claim that the division between culture and economic goals of regulation is mythical
(Smith 1997): it may rather be that any proposed division is idealistic.
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6. Public Service: Ghettoised?
A solution which is promulgated politically is that public service broadcasting be
‘ringfenced’ from competition concerns in deregulated markets, thus reaffirming the
pathology which currently pervades free-to-air television. This is crudely that public
service broadcasters are given the resources to finance high-quality programming, in
exchange for a stakeholding agreement of varying degrees of formality. Resources
may include viewer taxes, free or subsidised use of airwaves, limiting of competition
to produce an advertising oligopoly, or licensing of additional services. Stakeholder
obligations may include training and minority group employment, independent and
original production quotas, European programming quotas, Universal Service
Provision. The complexity of such arrangements mitigates against wholesale reform.
In protecting these stakeholder/public service arrangements, governments
avoid a radical solution such as licensing or auctioning public service components.
This prevarication enables competitors to erode their market share, reducing resources
and legitimacy. The longer term prospect under this scenario is ‘ghettoisation’. The
Member States have agreed a Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam which protects
public service broadcasters from the full effect of competition laws. This may prevent
the immediate dissolution of the European Broadcasting Union but it will not secure
the long-term future of these channels.
7. Institutional Turf War - Europe
Following the Bangemann Report, Bangemann’s own think-tank and cheerleader for
the Information Society, the Information Society Project Office , was established to
co-ordinate DG III (industry) with DG XIII (telecoms and research) into a sort of
super-ministry for the Information Society.
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DG X (education, culture, audio-visual) initially seemed powerless in the face
of this Bangemann challenge. In early 1995, rumours were rife in Brussels (as ever)
that DG X would be dismembered and the audio-visual transferred to DG XIII. With
new Commissioner Oreja and Director-General Papas, DG X is now asserting an
independent future for public service broadcasting ringfenced from the deregulatory
environment of telecoms. This sea-change was reflected in the distinctly frosty
reception accorded to the ‘Anglo-Saxon consultancy’ report (KPMG 1996)
commissioned by DG XIII, published in September 1996. The dispersal since 1994 of
the initial euphoria surrounding the new technological paradigm is typical of the
reaction to new technology, and was repeated elsewhere in Europe, notably in the UK
government’s pragmatic Broadcasting Act 1996 following the more radical goals of
the May 1995 Green Paper (DNH 1995).
The European Parliament’s support for cultural goals in information policy
have been vouched in terms which portray deregulation as quite literally a moral
hazard. The Protection of Minors and Human Dignity (Whitehead 1997) are the
rhetorical goals to which the liberalisers have apparently found themselves opposed.
Point 9 of the Whitehead Report is quoted in full:
[The European Parliament] insists that any future work on both regulation and
self-regulation of converging communications shall cover all of them, so that
harmful content on the Internet is dealt with in the broad spectrum of point-to-
point and multipoint electronic communication.
The Parliament, having in a bitter battle lost in its attempt to exert televisual
regulation over Internet and video-on-demand services (in the revised Article 1 of the
‘Television Without Frontiers’ directive, EP 1997 , has clearly retained its opposition
to deregulation. Whitehead recognises ‘the general instinct for deregulation’, and self-
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regulation as a subset thereof, though acknowledging that broadcasters and telecoms
experts will lean in different directions. The Economic and Monetary Committee of
the Parliament , as will be seen in section 10 below, adopts a different perspective.
Critically, the most active members of the EMC are alternates on the Media and
Culture Committee, as co-ordinators for Christian Democrat (Hoppenstedt) and
Liberal (Larive) groups. There is therefore active involvement and indeed direction by
EMC members in Media and Culture Committee business.
8. Institutional Turf War - UK
UK communications policy was driven in 1993-6 by the economic Department of
Trade and Industry, especially in the period 1993-5 under the formidable President of
the Board of Trade Michael Heseltine. The role of the Department of National
Heritage (now renamed Culture, Media and Sport) was reduced to little more than
platitude until the Conservative defeat in May 1997.
At the Brighton European culture ministers’ meeting on September 29, 1997,
Jack Lang characterised UK policy under Conservative ministers as ‘the victory of
ignorance over extravagance’. Though recognising the priority of cultural goals, the
present Secretary of State Chris Smith has been careful to avoid an ‘extravagant’
appearance (Smith 1997). His view is of a more or less harmonious coexistence of
culture and economics, a view apparently shared by his Italian counterpart and Deputy
Prime Minister Veltroni. Since May, Smith has repeatedly indicated that his
department is responsible for a greater share of GDP than manufacturing industry. The
result of this coexistence is that Smith and President of the Board of Trade Margaret
Beckett have co-authored a letter to the Prime Minister, indicating the pressing need
for a Communications Act in 1999-2000, replacing existing vertical regulatory
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structures with horizontal. There will therefore be a debate in 1998 within the UK, as
in Brussels, regarding convergence.
Labour policy radically liberalised under the stewardship of Broadcasting
Spokesman Lewis Moonie in 1995-7. Policy in this period ostensibly sought to merge
‘Ofcom’ from ITC and Oftel before the end of the century, in a model derived from
the US FCC. This found support amongst influential academic and policy analysts
(Collins and Murroni 1996). The sobriety which European Commission and UK
government policy reattained in 1995-6 as Internet grew, only reached Labour policy
in May 1997, with the appointment of Smith as Secretary of State. An independent
future for the Radio Authority, Independent Television Commission (ITC) and Oftel is
the medium term policy.
9. Regulatory Body Turf War - UK
The politicians may have become reconciled to a ‘new style of politics’ (the mantra of
the leaders of Labour and Liberal Democrat parties) within Whitehall communications
governance, but the regulators’ relationship remains strained. The abrasive and
effective regulation of Oftel under its dynamic Director, Don Cruikshank, has
succeeded in impressing the European Commission with its effectiveness, but
offending the television regulator ITC with its tactlessness, notably in Oftel advice to
ITC regarding the BDB digital multiplex licence award in June 1997. (The UK
competition office, the Office of Fair Trading, was similarly affected in the Oftel
summission to the pay-TV enquiry published in February 1996). Criukshank’s
resignation with effect from March 1998 may succeed in removing the personality
issue from the dispute.
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10. Ofcom - The Bonfire of the Regulators?
In policy terms, detente between Oftel and ITC views of regulation has been rapid
since their initial skirmishes in 1995. The publication of Beyond the Telephone...
(Oftel 1995) was interpreted as a take-over attempt by Oftel. In 1995, momentum was
developed to transform communications regulation by merging all content regulators
into an ‘Ofcom’, a policy espoused by Labour’s superhighway policy review under
Smith’s chairmanship. Though Oftel views broadband as the digital broadcasting
future, a view shaken but firm despite the explosive growth of Internet, ITC continues
to believe in the dominance of terrestrial free-to-air TV. In the USA, the major
networks account for over 60% of all TV viewing, though in continuing decline. ITC
has expressed its belief in a prolonged period of ‘coexistence’ between on-demand
interactive services and traditional TV (ITC 1995).
Both regulators have recently submitted evidence to their respective Commons
Select Committees. ITC saw the value in merging all content regulation within its
aegis, including the presently self-governed BBC. The National Heritage Select
Committee was ‘not persuaded that now is the time to change to a single regulator’ for
communications (National Heritage, 4th Report, 1996-7 at xviii, para 74). The Trade
and Industry Select Committee believed that ‘an earlier rather than later review would
be appropriate’ (Trade & Industry, 3rd Report, 1996-7 at xix, para 44,). The evidence
presented to both bodies was similar: their difference of view is as to the timing of
convergence rather than the necessity to amend current regulation. The crux, as earlier
discussed, will be the licensing of dominant television broadcasters.
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11. Some Preliminary Observations
The OECD, G7, and ITU have exerted liberalising influences on the convergence
debate, as evidenced in Bangemann’s international communications Charter Initiative
in Geneva this September. The casual observer should not be misled into the
impression that convergence in favour of the telecoms model is inevitable, nor that the
policy option is unanimous even inside DG XIII, the home of the Green Paper.
Garnham’s report to the Steering Committee of Legal Advisors was couched in very
cautious terms, in keeping with his lengthy experience in communications policy
formation and analysis.
Though functions are leaching from television to telecoms regulators, for
instance the transmission and distribution of digital pay-TV from ITC to Oftel in the
UK, consolidation of the existing content regulators provides greater scope for
legislators to simplify structures. Thus in the UK, ITC has suggested that it regulate in
place of the Broadcasting Complaints Commission and BBC self-governance. The
independent future of a Radio Authority separated from ITC in the 1990 Broadcasting
Act is vociferously argued by its Chief Executive Tony Stoller. Collins for the
Institute of Public Policy Research identified ten separate regulators, which could be
reduced to three (Radio Authority, ITC, Oftel) without perverse results for industry
structures.
12. Democracy and Convergence - The Autumn Timetable
The European Parliament and Commission are the venues for convergence debate this
winter. The European Parliament will debate the Hoppenstedt Satellite Action Plan
on 20 October, which follows his work on Trans-European Telematics Networks and
Television Without Frontiers. The Whitehead Report was adopted by the Culture
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Committee on 2 October. In the following months Parliament will return to the issue
of convergence, especially in regard to commercial communications (note Larive’s
Report to Parliament and media pluralism (Hitchens 1994, Beltrame 1996), on which
the Internal Market Directorate, DG XV, is expected to issue proposals in the final
quarter. The Convergence Green Paper’s release to Parliament should also lead to
lively debate. It may be, however, that any new policy direction will await the
quintennial ‘Audiovisual Assizes’ in Birmingham on 6-8 April 1998, hosted by the
then-President of the Culture Council, Chris Smith. The expectations of a grand, if
pragmatic, social democratic alliance (Britain, Italy, France), to attempt reconciliation
of the vertical and horizontal regulators, will rest on the UK government’s actions
during the next six months. The political settlement of the culture/economics debate is
likely to be decided in this period. The outcome will decide the future development of
the television industry, the wider communications industry, and European consumers’
future direction into the Information Age. At a policy level, it will also reveal a great
deal of the institutional and constitutional future of the European Union in the decade
to come.
References
Bangemann, Martin, et al (1994) Europe and the Global Information Society, The
Report of the High Level Group.
Beltrame, Francesca (1996) 7 Util.LR Harmonising Media Ownership Rules: Problems
and Prospects at p172
Collins, Richard and Murroni, Christina (1996) New Media, New Policies
Department of National Heritage (1995) Media Ownership: The Government’s
Proposals
Cowie, Campbell and Williams, Mark (1997) Telecommunications Policy
JILT Issue 1997 (3) http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/wip/97_3mars/ Work In Progress
Marsden C Convergence or Coexistence
European Parliament (1997) European Parliament and Council Directive amending
Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the co-ordination of certain provisions laid down
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit
of television broadcasting activities
Gates, Bill (1996) The Road Ahead
Hitchens, L.P. (1994) 57 MLR 4 Media Ownership and Control: A European Approach
at pp585-601.
Hooper, Richard (1996) Chapter 16 in Media Ownership and Control in the Age of
Convergence
KPMG (1996) Public Policy Issues Arising From Telecommunications and Audio-
visual Convergence, A Report for the European Commission
ITC (1995) ITC Response to the Oftel Consultative Document at paragraph 58, p15
Marsden, Chris (1997) 8 Util.LR 4 ‘Structural and Behavioural Regulation in UK,
European and US Digital Pay-TV’ at pp114-119
Oftel (1995) Beyond the Telephone, the Television and the PC
Servan-Schreiber, Jean (1967) Le Defi American (The American Challenge)
Smith, Chris (1997) Speech to European Culture Ministers Channel 4/Arte Fringe
Meeting, Brighton Labour Party Conference, 29 September 1997
Whitehead, Phillip (1997) Draft Report on the Commission Green Paper on The
Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audio-visual and Information Services
(COM[96]0483 - C4-0621/96) PE 221.804 of 24 April 1997.
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