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Security Issues and Challenges i by pengxuebo


									Security Issues and Challenges in
        Wireless Networks

                Kishore Kothapalli
             Bruhadeshwar Bezawada

Center for Security, Theory, and Algorithmic Research
  International Institute of Information Technology
                  Hyderabad, INDIA
   Wireless stations, or nodes, communicate over a wireless medium
        Networks operating under infrastructure mode e.g., 802.11, 802.16,
         Cellular networks
        Networks operating with limited or no infrastructural support e.g., ad
         hoc networks in AODV mode

   Security threats are imminent due to the open nature of
        Two main issues: authentication and privacy
        Other serious issues: denial-of-service

   A categorization is required to understand the issues in each
Introduction – Wireless Technologies
 Different technologies have been developed for
  different scenarios and requirements
 WiFi is technology for Wireless LANs and short range
  mobile access networks
 WiMAX is technology for last mile broadband
 Wireless USB is technology for Internet connectivity
  on the go
 Other technologies like Infrared (TV remotes etc),
  Bluetooth (soon to be obsolete) etc are short range
 Extreme bandwidth but short range technologies are
  Gigabit wireless etc

 Fixed   Infrastructure
     Base stations that are typically not resource constrained.
     Examples: sensor networks, and cellular networks.
     Mobility of nodes but not of base stations.

 Ad   hoc wireless networks                    Image from
     No infrastructural support.
     Nodes also double up as routers.
     Mobility of nodes.
     Examples laptops/cellphones operating in ad hoc mode.

 Mixed   mode
     In between the two modes.
     Some nodes exhibit ad hoc capability.
 To formalize study and solutions, need good models
 for these networks.
      Formal model to characterize the properties and
      Models that are close to reality
      Still allow for solution design and analysis.

 Solution    properties
     Light-weight
          Have to use battery power wisely.
          Other resources, such as storage, are also limited.
     Local control
          Many cases, only neighbours are known.
          Any additional information gathering is expensive.

           of modeling wireless networks as opposed to
 Difficulty
  wired networks:
      Transmission
      Interference
      Resource constraints
      Mobility
      Physical carrier sensing

 Introduction

 Models    of Wireless Networks
 Various    Layers and Current Solutions for each Layer
 Security   Issues and Threats at each Layer
 Security   Solutions
 Open   Problems
Models of Wireless Networks


          u'           R

 Unit   disk graph model

     Given a transmission radius R, nodes u,v are connected
      if d(u,v) ≤ R
Models of W ireless Networks

                   u                           R

                       R                 R         u

 Unit   disk graph model

     Given a transmission radius R, nodes u,v are connected
      if d(u,v) ≤ R.
     Too simple model – transmission range could be of
      arbitrary shape.
Models of Wireless Networks




 PacketRadio Network (PRN)
 Can handle arbitrary shapes
   Widely used
   Nodes u, v can communicate directly if they are
    within each other's transmission range, rt.
What is the problem?




     Model for interference too simplistic
What is the problem?

                                                ≥ rt
                 u           s            v
        v'                       ≤ rt           ≤ rt    t
                                              ≥ ri


     w can still interfere at u
     PRN model fails to address certain interference
      problems in practice
Models of Wireless Networks

   Transmission Range, Interference
       Separate values for transmission
        range, interference range.
       Interference range constant times
        bigger than transmission range.        ri        u
       Used in e.g., [Adler and                    u'
        Scheideler '98], [Kuhn et. al., '04]
Models of Wireless Networks
   Transmission Range, Interference
        Separate values for transmission
         range, interference range.
        Interference range constant times
         bigger than transmission range.        ri        u
        Used in e.g., [Adler and                    u'
         Scheideler '98], [Kuhn et. al., '04]

   What is the problem?
        Extension of unit disk model to
         handle interference
Model Based on Cost Function

  Edge (u,v)  Er
   if and only if              u        b
   c(u,v) ≤ r
                           v           w

  Gr  = (V, Er), set of nodes V, Euclidean distance d(u, v)
  c is a cost function on nodes
     symmetric: c(u,v) = c(v,u)
     [0,1), depends on the environment
     c(u,v)  [(1 –  )•d(u, v), (1 + ) •d(u, v)]
 Transmission and Interference Range

                            ri(P)‫‏‬        v                 c(v,w) rt(P)
                                     rt(P)‫‏‬                 c(v, v') ri(P)

 Transmission      range rt(P), Interference range, ri(P)
     If c(v,w)  ri(P), node v can cause interference at node w.
     If c(v,w)  rt(P) then v is guaranteed to receive the message from w
      provided no other node v' with c(v, v') ≤ ri(P) also transmits at the
      same time.
Carrier Sensing
        carrier sensing using RTS/CTS.
 Virtual
 Physical Carrier Sensing
      Provided by Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) circuit.
      Monitor the medium as a function of Received Signal
       Strength Indicator (RSSI)
      Energy Detection (ED) bit set to 1 if RSSI exceeds a
       certain threshold
      Has a register to set the threshold in dB
 Physical Carrier Sensing

                         rsi(T,P)       w         c(w,v) rst(T, P)
                           v'       rst(T,P)      c(w, v') rsi(T, P)
                                                  c(w, v'') rsi(T, P)

 Carrier sense transmission (CST) range, rst(T, P)
 Carrier sense interference (CSI) range, rsi(T, P)
     Beyond the CSI range, sensing is not possible.
 Both   the ranges grow monotonically in T and P.

 Introduction

 Models    of Wireless Networks
 Various    Layers and Current Solutions at each layer
 Security   Issues and Threats at each Layer
 Security   Solutions
 Open   Problems
Various Layers of Interest – Physical Layer

 Physical    Layer
     802.11 standard supports several data rates between
      11 Mbps and 54 Mbps
     802.16 support multiple data rates from 2Mbps to 300
     Several modulation schemes in use and support
      different conditions and data rates
          AM, FM, PSK, BPSK, QPSK, FDM, OFDM, OFDMA, ...
Physical Layer – WiFi

 Stands     for Wireless Fidelity Range of Technologies
     Technology that uses IEEE 802.11 protocol standards
     802.11b operates at 2.4 Ghz using DSSS
          Has three non-overlapping channels with 11mbps max
     802.11g operates at 2.4 Ghz resp, with 20 Mhz, OFDM
          Achieves 54 Mbps and inter-operable to 802.11b
     802.11a operates at 5GHz using OFDM
          About 4-8 (depending on country) non-overlapping
          Bandwidth achieved is 54 Mbps
Various Layers of Interest – MAC Layer

 MAC      Layer
     Medium access control is an important requirement.
     Collision detection (CSMA/CD) not possible unlike wired
          Hence using Collision avoidance (CSMA/CA)
     Functions of MAC
          Scanning, Authentication, Association, WEP, RTS/CTS,
           Power Save options, Fragmentation
Various Layers of Interest – MAC Layer

                         DATA     DATA

 802.11   MAC
     Use Physical Carrier Sensing to sense for a free
     Explicit ACKs to indicate reception of packet.
     Results in the problem of hidden node.
     Use Virtual Carrier Sensing using RTS/CTS.
Various Layers of Interest – MAC Layer

                     A          C
                            B           D

        Carrier Sensing cannot solve the exposed node
 Virtual
      A and D cannot succeed simultaneously.
Other MAC Techniques
 Cell   phone networks
      Node to base station and vice-versa.
      Fixed frequency for communication pair (FDD).
      Separate frequencies for each pair.
      Different technologies Analog/CDMA/GSM support
       different number of simultaneous communications per
 802.16has a Receive/Grant model which is basically
  TDD (Time-Division Duplexing)
    More    efficient than FDD.
MAC Layer

 Morerecent solutions address issues such as,
 especially with respect to ad hoc networks
     self-stabilization
     Dynamism
     Efficiency
     Fairness
Various Layers – Network Layer
 Route    packets in the network.
 Routing  in infrastructure based networks is similar to
  IP routing
 Allthe base stations have a wired IP interface which is
  used by the routers/switches to forward data
 Issues like handoffs are handled through techniques
  like Mobile IP or Cellular Handoffs or Soft-handoffs as
  done in Mobile WiMAX
 Now,   for network without infrastructure the problem is
  difficult as the routes are transient
Various Layers – Network Layer

 Ad   hoc networks
     No easy solutions but different proposals exist.
     Two kinds: proactive and reactive
     Proactive: Maintain lot of state, proactive updates.
          Example: DSDV, DSR
     Reactive: Minimal state, react to changes.
          Example: AODV
Other Important Layers
 Transport   layer
     This is important layer especially since the wireless
      medium suffers from high bit-error rate and collisions.
     To‫‏‬offset‫‏‬this‫‏‬wireless‫‏‬technologies‫‏‬rely‫‏‬less‫‏‬on‫‏‬TCP’s‫‏‬
      reliability mechanism
     This is mostly handled at physical layer through
      techniques like FEC and other error correcting codes
 Application   Layer
     Notion of an application layer protocol
     Email/Web/Games/SMS/MMS

 Introduction

 Models    of Wireless Networks
 Various    Layers and Current Solutions for each Layer
 Security   Issues and Threats at each Layer
 Security   Solutions
 Open   Problems
Threats in Present Solutions – MAC Layer


  Denial   of Service
      Can hog the medium by sending noise continuously.
      Can be done without draining the power of the
      Depends on physical carrier sensing threshold.
Threats in Present Solutions – MAC Layer


  802.11 standard uses Access Control Lists for
   admission control.
  IfMAC address not in the list, then the node is denied
       But easy to spoof MAC addresses.
Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer

  Ad   hoc networks
      Network layer
           Denial-of-service attacks
           Broadcast nature of communication
           Packet dropping
           Route discovery failure in ad hoc network
           Packet rerouting
Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer

  Source                       A


                                   Nodes Disrupting Routes
 Denial-of-service

      Easy to mount in wireless network protocols.
      One strategically adversary can generally disable a
       dense part of the network.
Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer
                       RREQ(c)   A
                       ….        z

 Can simply engage in conversation and drain battery
  power of other nodes – power exhaustion attack
     Send lot of RREQ messages but never use the routes.
Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer


 Broadcast    nature of communication
     Each message can be received by all nodes in the
      transmission range
     Packet sniffing is a lot easier than in wired networks.
     Poses a data privacy issue
Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer



  Route   discovery in ad hoc networks
      AODV discovers route by RREQ/RREP.
      Few adversarial nodes can fail route discovery.
    Difficult to detect route discovery failures.
    Also vulnerable to RREP replays.
Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer

 Packet     dropping
     Wired networks can monitor packet drops reasonably
     Such mechanisms are resource intensive for wireless
     AODV has timeouts but no theoretical solutions
          Difficult to distinguish packet drops, say RREQs, from
           non-existence of route itself
     Nodes some times behave selfishly to preserve
Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer



  Packet      rerouting – also known as data plane attacks.
  Attackerreveals paths but does not forward data along
   these paths.
  Control     plane measures do not suffice.
  Difficult   to trace in wired networks also [Gouda, 2007].
Threats in Present Solutions – Network Layer

  Application    Layer
      Easy to infect mobile devices.
      Rerouting content through the base station poses
       privacy issues.
           Bluetooth networks and ad hoc networks do not have a
            base station facility.
      Contrast with wired networks with firewalls, filters,

 Introduction

 Models    of Wireless Networks
 Various    Layers and Current Solutions for each Layer
 Security   Issues and Threats at each Layer
 Security   Solutions
 Open   Problems
Security Solutions
   Requirements

        Need solutions that do not add any perceivable burden

        Cryptography can help

        Public key solutions
             Public key operations about 1000 times slow compared to symmetric key
             Cost of SHA-1 = 2 microseconds
             Cost of RSA signature verification = order of millisec

        Symmetric key solutions for privacy and authentication
             Issue: How to distribute and manage keys?
Security Solutions for 802.11 Networks

 PreviousWEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) based on
 RC4 is prone to attacks
     Privacy is not guaranteed as the key streams could be
      easily recovered
          Weaknesses in RC4 are well documented
     Authentication is weak as well due to weak encryption
          Challenge-response using pre-shared keys is prone to
           attacks if encryption is weak
Previous WEP Solution using RC4

                           802.11 Hdr                      Data

                           Encapsulate                 Decapsulate

              802.11 Hdr         IV                        Data                        ICV

   RC4 is a Vernam Cipher meaning primary operations are XOR with pseudo-random bytes
   Per-packet encryption key is 24-bit IV concatenated to a pre-shared key
   Integrity Check Vector (ICV) is CRC-32 over plain-text (used as Message Authentication Code)
   Data and ICV are encrypted using per-packet encryption key
   Problem
        RC4 is weak (as the IV is reused) and can allow an attacker to get the key stream used
        The ICV can enable one to check the validity of the key stream recovered
WEP Authentication Model

Wireless                                                                             AP
                                 Shared secret distributed out of band

                                                       Challenge (Nonce)

             Response (Nonce RC4 encrypted under shared key)

                                                               Decrypted nonce OK?

 WEP Authentication Based on RC4
         Authentication key is distributed out-of-band
         Access Point generates a randomly generated challenge
         Station encrypts challenge using pre-shared secret
    Problem: Challenge-responses of valid users can be recorded and key stream can
     be recovered due to RC4 working
         Attacker can use the keys to encrypt any future challenges
Security Solution for 802.11 Networks:
802.11i Model
 Solution     Requirements
     Mutual authentication
     Scalable key management for large networks
   Central authorization and accounting
   Support for extended authentication like smart cards

     Key Management Issues
          Need to dynamically manage keys to avoid manual
           reconfiguration difficulties especially for large networks
Current Standard: 802.11i or WPA2

 802.1Xfor Authentication Based on EAP (Extensible
 Authentication Protocol)
     Port based authentication
     Access denied if port authentication fails
     CCMP (Counter Mode CBC-MAC Protocol) using AES
      for confidentiality, integrity and origin authentication
 Dynamic    Key Management
802.1X Authentication
802.1X Authentication
802.1X Key Management
   LEAP use dynamically generated WEP keys to secure authentication data
   EAP-TLS –Station and Access Point use public-key certificates through a
    TLS tunnel
        Session key can be exchanged
        Mutual-authentication as both parties have digital certificates
   EAP-TTLS and PEAP –Only server-side certificate is needed
        Simplifies implementation where certificate management is difficult
   EAP-GSS where the authenticator is required to be in contact with a KDC
Key Derivation in 802.11i
Key Derivation in 802.11i
   At the end of EAPOL: Station and Server share a Master Key: MK (E.g., Using
        Both the Station and the AP derive a new key, called the Pairwise Master Key (PMK),
         from the Master Key.
   Radius Server moves PMK to AP
   A‫−4‏‬way‫‏‬handshake‫‏‬between‫‏‬the‫‏‬station‫‏‬and‫‏‬the‫‏‬AP‫‏‬to‫‏‬derive,‫‏‬bind,‫‏‬and‫‏‬verify‫‏‬a‫‏‬
    Pairwise Transient Key (PTK).
        Key Confirmation Key (KCK), as the name implies, is used to prove the posession of
         the PMK
        Key Encryption Key (KEK) is used to distributed the Group Transient Key (GTK)
        Temporal Key 1 & 2 (TK1/TK2) are used for encryption.
   The KEK is used to send the Group Transient Key (GTK) from AP to the station
        The GTK is a shared key among all stations connected to the same authenticator
         (AP), to secure multicast/broadcast traffic
802.16 Authentication
Security Solutions for 802.16 Networks

   802.16 or popularly WiMAX use X.509 certificates for authentication
        Subscriber Station authentication using X.509 certificate
        Establish security association (SAID)
        Authentication Key (AK) exchange
        AK is encrypted using public key of SS
        Authentication is completed when both SS and BS verify possession AK
   AK is used to exchange the TEK (Traffic encryption key)
        Base station generates TEK randomly and encrypts using KEK
         generated from AK
   802.16 uses AES in CCM mode for privacy
   Mutual authentication is possible through EAP-TLS etc (802.16e)
Security in Ad Hoc Mode
   Ad hoc networks cannot use RADIUS type authentication
   Problem: if RADIUS type authentication is used, every station will need to
        Moreover, authentication will have to be using EAP-TLS which is
         computationally intensive
   Problem: mutual authentication is trouble some

   Other Security Requirements
        Cryptographic mechanisms for confidentiality
             Key establishment for confidentiality
             Public-key management to prevent replacement of keys
             Symmetric key management to protect from compromise
        Denial-of-service resistance in contention mechanisms at MAC layer
Security in Ad Hoc Networks

   Security Mechanisms
       Pro-active : Prevents an attacker from launching an attack say by
        using cryptographic mechanisms
            Requirement is establishment of necessary cryptographic material
            E.g., Routing Attacks

       Reactive : Relies on detection and mitigation of attacks
            Benign behaviour is defined and behaviour analysis is done to detect
             malicious behaviour
            E.g., Packet Forwarding attacks
Key Management in Ad Hoc Networks- An
   Key management – Manage a set of secure communication
    channels so that
       Use as few keys as possible
       Avoid centralized infrastructure during sessions
       Minimal cryptographic/message overhead
       Ensure‫“‏‬reasonable”‫‏‬security
   Two scenarios
       Broadcast security
       Peer-to-peer security
Security Solutions – Broadcast Security

   Base station and a set of nodes.

   Base station sends updates to all the nodes using broadcast.

   N = number of satellite nodes

   Authentication and privacy is required
Trivial Solution
    K1, K2, K3, K4,
    K5, K6, K7, K8


   Each node shares a key with the base station.
   Storage is O(N) for sender and does not scale well
   Authentication is expensive especially if messages need to be
Broadcast Security
    K1, K2, K3,                                     K1, K2, K4
    K4, K5                K1, K3, K4
                                       K2, K5, K3
                                                            K1, K5, K4

                             K1, K2, K3
                                                K2, K5, K4         K1, K3, K5
                                               K1, K2, K5

          Message MACK1(M)‫ ‏‬MACK2(M)‫ ‏‬MACK3(M)‫ ‏‬MACK4(M)‫‏‬MACK5(M)‫‏‬

   Maintain a set O(log N)
         Each satellite node gets a subset of log n keys of S.
   Privacy: use XOR of keys to communicate with the user
   Authentication: sender adds MAC using all its keys
         Each node verifies signatures that can be generated using its subset of
Broadcast Security
                                                                                      K1, K2, K3
                                                                                      K4, K5, K6,

                                         K1, K2, K4                                   K7, K8

                    K1, K3, K4
                                     K2, K5, K3
                                                         K1, K5, K4

                            K1, K2, K3
                                               K2, K5, K4
                                                               K1, K3, K5
                                      K1, K2, K5

   Collusion is an issue
   A larger pool of keys can be selected
   For N users O(log N) keys can give good results
   Scales well as the sender only needs to give a new subset of keys to a new user
Security Solutions

   Privacy in a Peer-to-peer situation

        Public-key cryptography can be of use but expensive

        Key distribution is a major hurdle given that communicating parties are
         not known in advance
             Anyone can communicate with any one

        Trivial Solution: one unique key per pair of users work
             Expensive
             Not scalable if new user gets added
             Revocation is little more tricky

        Scalable approach : key pre-distribution
Point-to-Point Security
                                                        KAB              B
    A-B          KAB
    A-C          KAC
                                                  KAC         KBD
    A-D          KAD                       KAD
    B-C          KBC
    B-D          KBD
    C-D          KCD                                                      C
                                       D             KCD

    Point-to-Point security

         Need a key for every pair of nodes in an n node network.

         Trivial solution requires storing n – 1 keys at every node.

               Not scalable on the space usage.
Point-to-Point Security

   Random Key Pre-distribution

                               K1, K2, K5, K6                K3, K9, K5, K11
         Pool of Keys
    K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6,        A                              B
     K7, K8, K9, K10, K11,                                                     E
      K12, K13, K14, K15
                                       K1                        K11           F
A        K1, K2, K5, K6
B        K3, K9, K5, K11
C        K12, K11, K13, K15
D        K1, K15, K9, K13                                          C
E        K10, K4, K5, K8, K7      D
                                 K1, K15, K9, K13        K12, K11, K13, K15
F        K3, K5, K7, K9, K15
G        K1, K5, K9, K13
Point-to-Point Security

   Issues in Random Key Pre-Distribution
        May need Intermediaries for key establishment
        Storage is High
             Experimental: 250 keys out of 10,000 keys may be necessary
        An active adversary is dangerous
        Collusion effect is unknown due to the randomness of key
        Might require privacy mechanisms to hide key sharing patterns
        Revocation issues exist
        Probabilistic arguments for size of key storage and connectivity
             Practice proves otherwise, especially for sparse graphs
Some Solutions –Key Establishment

   Multi-path    Key Establishment
                              K1, K2, K5, K6                 K3, K9, K5, K11
        Pool of Keys
   K1, K2, K3, K4, K5, K6,        A                               B
    K7, K8, K9, K10, K11,                                                      E
     K12, K13, K14, K15
                                         K1                      K11           F
   A    K1, K2, K5, K6
   B    K3, K9, K5, K11
   C    K12, K11, K13, K15
   D    K1, K15, K9, K13                                           C
   E    K10, K4, K5, K8, K7      D
                                K1, K15, K9, K13            K12, K11, K13, K15
   F    K3, K5, K7, K9, K15
   G    K1, K5, K9, K13
 Some Solutions –Key Establishment
Some Solutions –Key Establishment

  Deterministic    Solution –Square Grid [Ref. 4]
            [0,0]       [0,1]   [0,2]   [0,3]

           [1,0]        [1,1]   [1,2]     [1,3]

                                                  User Placement
           [2,0]        [2,1]   [2,2]     [2,3]

           [3,0]       [3,1]    [3,2]    [3,3]
 Some Solutions –Key Establishment
Some Solutions –Key Establishment

  Deterministic   Solution –Square Grid

               [0,0]    [0,1]    [0,2]    [0,3]

             [1,0]               [1,2]
                                                    Grid Secrets

             [2,0]      [2,1]    [2,2]      [2,3]

             [3,0]               [3,2]
 Some Solutions –Key Establishment
Some Solutions –Key Establishment

  Deterministic    Solution –Square Grid

             [0,0         [0,1]   [0,2]   [0,3]

                                                  Direct Secrets


 Some Solutions –Key Establishment
Some Solutions –Key Establishment

  Deterministic   Solution –Square Grid

              [0,0]     [0,1]   [0,2]   [0,3]

             [1,0]              [1,2]              Along Same

             [2,0]      [2,1]   [2,2]      [2,3]

             [3,0]              [3,2]
 Some Solutions –Key Establishment
Some Solutions –Key Establishment

  Deterministic   Solution –Square Grid

              [0,0]     [0,1]     [0,2]   [0,3]
             [1,0]                [1,2]             Among Users of
             Kg(2,0)                                Rows/Columns
             [2,0]      [2,1]     [2,2]     [2,3]

             [3,0]                [3,2]
 Some Solutions –Key Establishment
Some Solutions –Key Establishment

    Square Grid Features and Issues
         Mobility has no effect on key establishment –always guaranteed by
              Failure tolerant –failure of links hardly matters
         Storage is high, but comparable to random KPS
         Collusion resistance is slightly weak
              Two users are sufficient to compromise session key
         Scalability is weak as the grid size is fixed before hand
              Optimizations possible, by choosing higher grid size and allowing for
               some additional users
Security Solutions

   Can reduce storage further by considering a k – dimensional grid

        User belongs to multiple grids with lower dimension: n1/k

        number of keys stored per node decreases to kn1/k.

        At k = log n, this reduces to log n.

   But collusion resistance decreases with increasing k

   Best case storage is around: 12log2n

        Lower values are possible but multiplication constant is higher
Security Solutions-Hierarchical Solution

            A               C

                                 •Stands for any P2P key
                                 •E.g. (A,C) could be
                                 given a unique shared
            B               D    key
                                 •Better key distributions
                                 are possible
Security Solutions-Hierarchical Solution for
Reducing Storage
Nodes Treated
as Single Entity

                   A                   C            E         G
                   B                   D            F         H

•   E.g. (A,B) and (C,D) could share a common key
•   If B, needs to communicate with C, this key can be used
•   Collusion resistance is an issue

 Introduction

 Models    of Wireless Networks
 Various    Layers and Current Solutions for each Layer
 Security   Issues and Threats at each Layer
 Security   Solutions
 Open   Problems
Open Problems

   Problem 1: Secure Admission Control

        For fixed infrastructure networks, how to decide admitting a new node
         into the network?

        EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS are expensive in terms of computation and do not
         work well in ad hoc mode

        Access points should be able to handle more decisions to enable easy
             Need for a scalable but practical solution for admission control especially for
              roaming accessibility
             If key management is used dynamics and storage become issues
Open Problems

   Problem 2 : Application Layer Security for fixed infrastructure networks

        Equivalent notions of wired networks.
        Require Light-weight sand boxing mechanisms
        Privacy-preserving light-weight content filtering techniques
        Existing solutions: J2ME KVM, DownloadFun, QualComm
Open Problems

   Problem 3: Real-time Cell Communication Security

        Key management solutions may not work due to
         real-time voice data
        Hacking/tapping cell phones is possible depending on
         the encoding scheme used
    Open Problems 4
   Certificate mechanisms for nodes

        Certificates in wired networks are
         well understood.

        Users typically have better user
         interfaces e.g., PC Monitor, allowing
         them to examine things like

        Certificate verification/validation is
         tolerable on desktops and even
Open Problem 4
   Problem: Not the same for mobile users say, cell phones

        Integrating such features into a cell-phone is difficult

        Expensive to verify certificates due long certification path.

   Solution more difficult for devices with no display or limited display or
    regular monitoring of the device, such as sensors.

   Need a different way of handling certificates.

   Situations are more complex in wireless networks, even with
    infrastructural support.
   Threats exist at various layers of operation.
   Present solutions to address these threats are not scalable or
    not strong enough.
   Simple key management solutions can help.
        But not always.
   Still, lots of interesting and open issues to be solved.
Thank You!
   Jean-Pierre‫‏‬Hubaux,‫‏‬Levente,‫‏‬Buttyan‫‏‬and‫‏‬Srdan‫‏‬Capkun‫“‏‬The Quest for
    Security in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks”,‫‏‬ACM‫‏‬MobiHOC‫1002‏‬
   Laurent‫‏‬Eschenauer‫‏‬and‫‏‬Virgil‫‏‬D.‫‏‬Gligor‫“‏‬A Key Management Scheme for
    Distributed Sensor Networks”‫‏‏‬ACM‫‏‬CCS‫2002‏‬
   Haowen‫‏‬Chan,‫‏‬Adrian‫‏‬Perrig‫‏‬and‫‏‬Dawn‫‏‬Song‫“‏‬Random Key Predistribution
    Schemes for Sensor Networks”‫‏‬IEEE‫‏‬Symposium‫‏‬on‫‏‬Security‫‏‬and‫‏‬Privacy‫3002‏‬
   S.S.Kulkarni,‫‏‬M.G.Gouda‫‏‬and‫‏‬A.Arora‫“‏‬Secret Instantiation in Ad Hoc Networks”‫‏‬
    Special Issue of Elsevier Journal of Computer Communication on Dependable
    Wireless Sensor Networks, 2006
   Amitanand‫‏‬S.‫‏‬Aiyer,‫‏‬Lorenzo‫‏‬Alvisi,‫‏‬Mohamed‫‏‬G.‫‏‬Gouda‫“‏‬Key Grids: A Protocol
    Family for Assigning Symmetric Keys”‫‏‬IEEE‫‏‬International‫‏‬Conference‫‏‬on‫‏‬
    Network Protocols, 2006
   B.Bruhadeshwar‫‏‬and‫‏‬Sandeep‫‏‬Kulkarni‫“‏‬An‫‏‬Optimal‫‏‬Symmetric‫‏‬Secret‫‏‬Distribution‫‏‬
   Bezawada Bruhadeshwar, Kishore Kothapalli: A Family of Collusion Resistant Symmetric
    Key Protocols for Authentication. ICDCN 2008: 387-392
   Kishore Kothapalli, Christian Scheideler, Melih Onus, Andréa W. Richa: Constant density
    spanners for wireless ad-hoc networks. SPAA 2005: 116-125
   Edmund L. Wong, Praveen Balasubramanian, Lorenzo Alvisi, Mohamed G. Gouda, Vitaly
    Shmatikov: Truth in advertising: lightweight verification of route integrity. PODC 2007:
   Ran‫‏‬Canetti,‫‏‬Adrian‫‏‬Perrig,‫‏‬Dawn‫‏‬Song‫‏‬and‫‏‬Doug‫‏‬Tygar‫“‏‬The TESLA Broadcast
    Authenitcation Protocol”‫‏‬RSA‫‏‬Cryptobytes‫2002‏‬
   Chalermek Intanagonwiwat, Ramesh Govindan, Deborah Estrin, John S. Heidemann, Fabio
    Silva: Directed diffusion for wireless sensor networking. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 11(1): 2-
    16 (2003)
   Arshad Jhumka, Sandeep S. Kulkarni: On the Design of Mobility-Tolerant TDMA-Based
    Media Access Control (MAC) Protocol for Mobile Sensor Networks. ICDCIT 2007:
   General: Wikipedia, WiFi Forum, WiMAX Forum, IETF Website

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