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                              South Korea Primer




             Sources: Flag : http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/flags/ks-flag.html
            Map: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/korean_peninsula.gif
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         Prepared by: Virtual Information Center, (808) 477-3661 ext. 2500 on 18 October 2004
                                     Updated on: 02 April 2007
This is product of the Virtual Information Center (VIC). As such it represents the opinions of the various authors involved
           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


                                                South Korea Primer
                                                Executive Summary
  1. Assessment: Still officially at war as no peace treaty was signed at the end of the Korean War in 1953,
  South Korea‘s primary security issue is North Korea, which many believe now possesses between three and
  six nuclear weapons and which recently (October 2006) conducted a nuclear test (although some say it was
  a failure). Politically, Seoul is beginning to prepare for the December 2007 presidential election with
  political parties and potential individual candidates starting to jockey for position. Militarily, South Korea
  sees the next few years as a transition as the U.S. moves it forces farther south to Pyongtaek and the ROK
  military starts to prepare for the assumption of operational control of Korean forces from the U.S. in 2012.
  2. Background: The Korean War (1950-53) had U.S. and other UN forces intervene to defend South
  Korea from North Korean attacks (supported by China). An armistice was signed in 1953 splitting the
  peninsula along a demilitarized zone at about the 38th parallel. A republic was set up in the southern half of
  the Korean Peninsula (in August 15, 1945) while a communist-style government was installed in the north.
  Thereafter, South Korea achieved rapid economic growth, with per capita income rising to 13 times the
  level of North Korea. Following a severe financial crisis in 1997, South Korea currently has the tenth
  largest economy in the world, and the third largest in Asia behind Japan and China. South Korea has also
  maintained its commitment to democratize its political processes, and is now a fully democratic republic
  with powers shared between the president, legislature, and judiciary. Since 1948, the constitution has
  undergone five major revisions, each signifying a new republic. The current Sixth Republic began with the
  last major constitutional revision in 1988.
  3. Discussion: Despite political unrest and economic struggles, North Korea‘s nuclear ambitions remain
  South Korea‘s most pressing concern. Pyongyang‘s massive conventional forces and arsenal of weapons of
  mass destruction pose a significant threat to Seoul and the rest of the region. Although Pyongyang returned
  to the Six-Party Talks in March 2007, after the U.S. made promises about releasing North Korean funds that
  had been effectively frozen at Banco Delta Asia in Macau, the North abruptly left the talks.. The cause was
  the inability to find a bank that would accept the funds for fear of having its credit ratings drop. The recent
  appearance of U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes Daniel Glaser
  in Beijing to discuss this issue indicates the seriousness of the U.S. resolve to clear this matter and proceed
  with Pyongyang‘s denuclearization. Meanwhile, Seoul, which has taken a softer approach to the North, has
  resumed humanitarian aid shipments to Pyongyang that were suspended after the North's missile tests last
  July. Additionally, they opted for the first time in history to give cash to North Korea. Regarding the
  transformation of U.S. military forces on the peninsula, Washington and Seoul agreed to move the U.S.
  military units from Seoul and all points north, to a greatly expanded Camp Humphreys, south of the nation‘s
  capital. Each has reportedly agreed to pay roughly half of the nearly $12 billion bill. Washington and Seoul
  have also agreed to the transition full operational control of Korean forces from the U.S. to the ROK by 17
  April 2012. Domestically, Seoul is beginning to gear up for the December 2007 presidential elections. In
  February, President Roh left his Uri party to help settle conflicts within the party between pro-Roh and anti-
  Roh factions and to allow the party to get ready for the elections. Subsequently, Seoul‘s first woman prime
  minister, Han Myeong-Sook, formally resigned her position amid speculation that she may join the race for
  the presidential election. Contributing to these political ramblings, in January, President Roh proposed
  revising the current single five-year presidential term into a maximum of two four-year terms. The
  opposition Grand National Party (GNP) has refused to even discuss the matter, saying it believes the
  proposal is a political strategy to gain the upper hand in the upcoming presidential election.
  4. Prepared by: Virtual information Center; (808) 477-3661 ext. 2500 on 02 April 2007




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                                            South Korea Primer
                                                        Table of Contents
       Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 2
       1. Introduction................................................................................................................ 5
          A. Overview ................................................................................................................. 5
          B. History ..................................................................................................................... 8
       2. Travel Information .................................................................................................. 12
          A. Orientation ............................................................................................................ 12
           General....................................................................................................................... 12
           Travel Documents...................................................................................................... 14
           Holidays ..................................................................................................................... 18
          B. Crime .................................................................................................................... 19
          C. Transportation, Traffic Safety and Road Conditions ..................................... 21
          D. Health .................................................................................................................... 22
           Medical Care.............................................................................................................. 28
       3. At A Glance .............................................................................................................. 29
          A. Population ............................................................................................................. 29
          B. Ethnic Groups, Religions and Language ............................................................ 30
          D. Climate and Topography ................................................................................... 30
       4. Government .............................................................................................................. 33
          A. Executive Branch ................................................................................................. 34
           The Chief of State – President Roh Moo-hyun ......................................................... 35
           Prime Minister – Han Duck-soo (Designate) ............................................................ 37
           Cabinet ....................................................................................................................... 40
          B. Legislative Branch ................................................................................................ 41
          C. Judicial Branch..................................................................................................... 41
          D. Political Parties and Leaders ............................................................................... 42
          E. Political Pressure Groups .................................................................................... 42
          F. Foreign Affairs .................................................................................................... 43
       5. International Organization Participation.............................................................. 59
       6. Diplomatic Representation in the United States ................................................... 59
       7. U.S. Diplomatic Representation ............................................................................. 59
           Ambassador to South Korea – Alexander Vershbow ................................................ 60
       8. Economy ................................................................................................................... 61
       9. Infrastructure ........................................................................................................... 66
          A. Communication .................................................................................................... 66
          B. Transportation ...................................................................................................... 66
       10. Military ..................................................................................................................... 71
          A. Leadership ............................................................................................................ 71
           Minister of National Defense - Kim Jang Soo .......................................................... 71
           Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff - Kim Kwan-chin                                              ........................ 73
           Chief of Staff, ROK Army – Park Heung-ryul .......................................................... 73
           Chief of Staff, ROK Air Force - Kim Eun-ki ............................................................ 73
           Chief of Naval Operations - Admiral Song Young Moo.......................................... 74
          B. United Nations/U.S. Military Presence ............................................................... 76
          C. Armed Forces Summary ...................................................................................... 78
          D. Army ...................................................................................................................... 86


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


          E. Air Force ............................................................................................................ 103
          F. Navy ..................................................................................................................... 114
          G. Defense Spending ............................................................................................... 122
          H. Procurement ....................................................................................................... 125
       11. Security And Foreign Forces ................................................................................ 143




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                                       South Korea Primer
       1. Introduction
           A. Overview


                                                                  South Korea, officially Republic of
                                                                  Korea (2005 est. pop. 48,423,000),
                                                                  38,022 sq mi (98,477 sq km), formally
                                                                  proclaimed on Aug. 15, 1948, has its
                                                                  capital at Seoul, the largest city. Busan,
                                                                  the second largest city, is the country's
                                                                  chief port, with an excellent natural
                                                                  harbor near the delta of the Nakdong
                                                                  River. Other important cities are Daegu
                                                                  and Incheon. South Korea is divided
                                                                  into nine provinces and seven
                                                                  independent metropolitan cities.
                                                                  Syngman Rhee, who had established a
                                                                  provisional Korean government in exile
                                                                  in 1919, was elected South Korea's first
                                                                  president in 1948.

                                                        Traditionally the agricultural region of
                                                        the Korean peninsula, South Korea
       faced severe economic problems after partition. Attempts to establish an adequate
       industrial base were hampered by limited resources, particularly an acute lack of energy
       resources; most industry, prior to 1948, had been located in the North. War damage and
       the flood of refugees from North Korea further intensified the economic problem. The
       country depended upon foreign aid, chiefly from the United States, and the economy was
       characterized by runaway inflation, highly unfavorable trade balances, and mass
       unemployment.

       The increasingly authoritarian rule of President Syngman Rhee, along with government
       corruption and injustice, added to the discontent of the people. The elections of Mar.,
       1960, in which Rhee won a fourth term, were marked by widespread violence, police
       brutality, and accusations by Rhee's opponents of government fraud. A student protest
       march in Apr., 1960, in which 125 students were shot down by the police, triggered a
       wave of uprisings across the country. The government capitulated, and Rhee resigned and
       went into exile.

       Under the leadership of Dr. John M. Chang (Chang Myun), a new government was
       unable to correct the economic problems or maintain order, and in May, 1961, the South
       Korean armed forces seized power in a bloodless coup. A military junta under Gen. Park
       Chung Hee established tight control over civil freedoms, the press, and the economy,
       somewhat relaxing restrictions as its power solidified. Park was elected president in 1963,


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       reelected in 1967, and, following a constitutional amendment permitting a third term,
       again in 1971.

       Park's government was remarkably successful in fighting graft and corruption and in
       reviving the economy. Successive five-year economic development plans, first launched
       in 1962, brought dramatic changes. Between 1962 and 1972 manufacturing was
       established as a leading economic sector and exports increased dramatically. In Oct.,
       1972, President Park proclaimed martial law and dissolved the national assembly,
       asserting that such measures were necessary to improve South Korea's position in the
       reunification talks with North Korea. In Dec., 1972, President Park was elected to a new
       six-year term, under a revised constitution, by a national conference. In 1974, a Korean
       resident of Japan unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Park in Seoul, fatally wounding
       Park's wife.

       A second assassination attempt on Park, in 1979, was successful, and he was succeeded
       by Choi Kyu-hah, who instituted military rule. After a period of internal turmoil, Chun
       Doo Hwan was elected president (1980). Reforms were made to shift power to the
       national assembly, and the country's dynamic, export-oriented economy continued to
       grow. Labor unrest and general dissatisfaction with the government, however, led South
       Korean leaders to draw up a new constitution in 1987, which mandated popular election
       of the president and a reduction of the presidential term to five years.

       Roh Tae Woo, who was elected president and took office in 1988, fought rising inflation
       rates brought on by South Korea's growing economy. Roh attempted to improve relations
       with opposition politicians and with the North, also establishing diplomatic relations with
       the Soviet Union (1990) and China (1992). In 1992, Kim Young Sam, a former
       opposition leader who had merged his party with Roh's, was elected president, becoming
       the first civilian to hold the office since the Korean War. President Kim launched a
       campaign to eliminate corruption and administrative abuse and began to encourage
       economic cooperation with the North.

       In 1996 former presidents Chun and Roh were put on trial on corruption charges and also
       tried, with 14 former generals, on charges in connection with the 1979 coup following
       Park's death and the 1980 massacre of pro democracy demonstrators in Gwangju
       (Kwangju). Both received prison sentences. Along with other Asian countries, South
       Korea experienced a financial crisis in late 1997, forcing it to seek assistance from the
       International Monetary Fund.

       In December, voters elected Kim Dae Jung, who had been a pro democracy dissident
       during the country's period of military dictatorship, as South Korea's new president. The
       economy began to recover slowly from the effect of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis in
       1999, and economic reforms promoted sustained growth. Kim worked to open relations
       with the North, and in 2000 he traveled there for a historic meeting with Kim Jong Il.
       Subsequent progress in inter-Korean relations, however, was slow, leading many in the
       South to feel that too many concessions had been made.




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       Kim Dae Jung's government was hurt by a series of corruption scandals in 2001 and
       2002, some of which involved the president's family. The government suffered further
       embarrassment in 2002 when two nominees for prime minister were rejected by the
       national assembly. Despite these setbacks, the ruling party's candidate for president, Roh
       Moo Hyun, won the election in Dec., 2002. Following the election, when North Korea
       moved to resume its nuclear weapons program, the South pursued a more conciliatory
       course than that of the United States, and strongly opposed any military action against the
       North.

       A political party funding scandal in 2003 implicated the main South Korean parties and
       many businesses, but it was overshadowed in early 2004 by the impeachment of the
       president over a relatively minor election law violation, which involved his public
       support for the new Uri party (the president is required be politically neutral). The
       impeachment, which also accused Roh of incompetence, was reversed by the
       Constitutional Court, which restored him to office in May. In the meantime, Prime
       Minister Goh Kun was acting president, and the Uri party gained a majority of the
       National Assembly seats in an April election that amounted to a repudiation by the public
       of the impeachment. The election was the first in which a liberal party had won control of
       the South Korean legislature. Roh officially joined the party in May.

       In Aug., 2004, Roh announced that executive and administrative functions of the
       government would be moved to a new capital carved from portions of Yeongi co. and
       Gongju city in South Chungcheong prov., with construction to begin in 2007 and the
       relocation to be completed by 2030. Intended to reduce Seoul's economic dominance and
       overcrowding, the proposal provoked constitutional challenges from its opponents. In
       October the constitutional court ruled that a referendum or a constitutional amendment
       would be required before the move could be made.

        The South revealed in Aug. and Sept., 2004, that its scientists had twice conducted
        experiments to enrich nuclear materials. Although the amounts of enriched plutonium
        and uranium were small, the admissions were embarrassing internationally and did not
        help the campaign against the North's nuclear program. Relations with Japan were
        strained in early 2005 over the ownership of the Liancourt Rocks (a perennial source of
        friction) and over Japanese school history textbooks that downplayed Japan's actions
        during World War II. The Uri party, which had been hit by a number of scandals and
        ministerial resignations since winning control of parliament, lost its narrow majority in
        that body in Mar., 2005. In Apr., 2006, Han Myung-Sook, a member of the Uri party,
        became the first woman to be elected prime minister of South Korea; real power in the
        South Korean government, however, resides with the president. Local elections in May,
        2006, resulted in significant losses for the Uri party. After the North's nuclear test in
        Oct., 2006, South Korea imposed some sanctions and supported the UN-adopted military
        sanctions, but remained committed to its policy of engagement with the North and the
        significant economic trade involved.

       Source: Infoplease
       http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0859142.html
       http://www.state.gov/p/eap/ci/ks/


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           B. History

       Early History to Japanese Rule
       The Koreans, descended from Tungusic tribal peoples, are a distinct racial and cultural
       group. According to Korean legend, Tangun established Old Choson in NW Korea in
       2333 B.C., and the Korean calendar enumerates the years from this date. Chinese sources
       assert that Ki-tze (Kija), a Shang dynasty refugee, founded a colony at Pyongyang in
       1122 B.C., but the first Korean ruler recorded in contemporaneous records is Wiman,
       possibly a Chinese invader who overthrew Old Choson and established his rule in N
       Korea in 194 B.C. Chinese forces subsequently conquered (c.100 B.C.) the eastern half of
       the peninsula. Lolang, near modern Pyongyang, was the chief center of Chinese rule.

       Koguryo, a native Korean kingdom, arose in the north on both sides of the Yalu River by
       the 1st cent. A.D.; tradition says it was founded in 37 B.C. By the 4th cent. A.D. it had
       conquered Lolang, and at its height under King Kwanggaet'o (r.391–413) occupied much
       of what is now Korea and NE China. In the 6th and 7th cent. the kingdom resisted several
       Chinese invasions. Meanwhile in the south, two main kingdoms emerged, Paekche
       (traditionally founded 18 B.C., but significant beginning c.A.D. 250) in the west and Silla
       (traditionally founded 57 B.C., but significant beginning c.A.D. 350) in the east. After
       forming an alliance with T'ang China, Silla conquered Paekche and Koguryo by 668, and
       then expelled the Chinese and unified much of the peninsula. Remnants of Koguryo
       formed the kingdom of Parhae (north of the Taedong River and largely in E Manchuria),
       which lasted until 926.

       Under Silla's rule, Korea prospered and the arts flourished; Buddhism, which had entered
       Korea in the 4th cent., became dominant in this period. In 935 the Silla dynasty, which
       had been in decline for a century, was overthrown by Wang Kon, who had established
       (918) the Koryo dynasty (the name was selected as an abbreviated form of Koguryo and
       is the source of the name Korea). During the Koryo period, literature was cultivated, and
       although Buddhism remained the state religion, Confucianism—introduced from China
       during the Silla years and adapted to Korean customs—controlled the pattern of
       government. A coup in 1170 led to a period of military rule. In 1231, Mongol forces
       invaded from China, initiating a war that was waged intermittently for some 30 years.
       Peace came when Koryo accepted Mongol suzerainty, and a long period of Koryo-
       Mongol alliance followed. In 1392, Yi Songgye, a general who favored the Ming dynasty
       (which had replaced the Mongols in China), seized the throne and established the Choson
       dynasty.

       The Choson (or Yi) dynasty, which was to rule until 1910, built a new capital at
       Hanseong (Seoul) and established Confucianism as the official religion. Early in the
       dynasty (15th cent.) printing with movable metal type, which had been developed two
       centuries earlier, became widely used, and the Korean alphabet was developed. The 1592
       invasion by the Japanese shogun Hideyoshi was driven back by Choson and Ming forces,
       but only after six years of great devastation and suffering. Manchu invasions in the first
       half of the 17th cent. resulted in Korea being made (1637) a tributary state of the Manchu
       dynasty. Subsequent factional strife gave way, in the 18th cent., to economic prosperity


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       and a cultural and intellectual renaissance. Korea limited its foreign contacts during this
       period and later resisted, longer than China or Japan, trade with the West, which led to its
       being called the Hermit Kingdom.

       In 1876, Japan forced a commercial treaty with Korea, and to offset the Japanese
       influence, trade agreements were also concluded (1880s) with the United States and
       European nations. Japan's control was tightened after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–
       95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), when Japanese troops moved through Korea
       to attack Manchuria. These troops were never withdrawn, and in 1905 Japan declared a
       virtual protectorate over Korea and in 1910 formally annexed the country. The Japanese
       instituted vast social and economic changes, building modern industries and railroads, but
       their rule (1910–45) was harsh and exploitative. Sporadic Korean attempts to overthrow
       the Japanese were unsuccessful, and after 1919 a provisional Korean government, under
       Syngman Rhee, was established at Shanghai, China.

       A Country Divided
       In World War II, at the Cairo Conference (1943), the United States, Great Britain, and
       China promised Korea independence. At the end of the war Korea was arbitrarily divided
       into two zones as a temporary expedient; Soviet troops were north and Americans south
       of the line of lat. 38°N. The Soviet Union thwarted UN efforts to hold elections and
       reunite the country under one government. When relations between the Soviet Union and
       the United States worsened, trade between the two zones ceased; great economic
       hardship resulted, since the regions were economically interdependent, industry and trade
       being concentrated in the North and agriculture in the South.

       In 1948 two separate regimes were formally established—the Republic of Korea in the
       South, and the Democratic People's Republic under Communist rule in the North. By
       mid-1949 all Soviet and American troops were withdrawn, and two rival Korean
       governments were in operation, each eager to unify the country under its own rule. In
       June, 1950, the North Korean army launched a surprise attack against South Korea,
       initiating the Korean War, and with it, severe hardship, loss of life, and enormous
       devastation.

       After the war the boundary was stabilized along a line running from the Han estuary
       generally northeast across the 38th parallel to a point south of Kosong (Kuum-ni), with a
       ―no-man's land‖ or demilitarized zone, 1.24 mi (2 km) wide and occupying a total of 487
       sq mi (1,261 sq km), on either side of the boundary. Throughout the 1950s and 60s an
       uneasy truce prevailed; thousands of soldiers were poised on each side of the
       demilitarized zone, and there were occasional shooting incidents. In 1971 negotiations
       between North and South Korea provided the first hope for peaceful reunification of the
       peninsula; in Nov., 1972, an agreement was reached for the establishment of joint
       machinery to work toward unification.

       The countries met several times during the 1980s to discuss reunification, and in 1990
       there were three meetings between the prime ministers of North and South Korea. These
       talks have yielded some results, such as the exchange of family visits organized in 1989.
       The problems blocking complete reunification, however, continue to be substantial. Two


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       incidents of terrorism against South Korea were widely attributed to North Korea: a 1983
       bombing that killed several members of the South Korean government, and the 1987
       destruction of a South Korean airliner over the Thailand-Myanmar border. In 1996, North
       Korea said it would cease to recognize the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas,
       and North Korean troops made incursions into the zone. In 1999 a North Korean torpedo
       boat was sunk by a South Korean vessel in South Korean waters following a gun battle,
       and another deadly naval confrontation following a North Korean incursion in 2002.

       In early 2000, however, the North engaged in talks with a number of Western nations,
       seeking diplomatic relations, and South and North agreed to a presidential summit in
       Pyongyang. The historic and cordial meeting produced an accord that called for working
       toward reunification (though without specifying how) and for permitting visits between
       families long divided as a result of the war. Given the emotional appeal of reunification,
       it is likely that the North-South dialogue will continue, despite the problems involved;
       however, the tensions that developed in late 2002 have, for the time being, derailed any
       significant further reunification talks. Economic contacts have continued to expand,
       however, and South Korea has become a significant trade partner for the North. The
       North also receives substantial aid from the South. Many U.S. troops still remain in the
       South, though their numbers have decreased since the 1960s.
       Source: Infoplease
       http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0859140.html

       Historical Background

       Date       Events
       1905-      Korea governed as a Japanese protectorate.
       1910
       1910       Japan formally annexed Korea (August).
       1945-48    Korea divided between US and Soviet zones of influence.
       1948       Republic of Korea set up under President Syngman Rhee.
       1950-53    Korean War.
       1953       Ceasefire agreement. Military Armistice Commission set up under UN command.
       1960       Rhee's fall from power as a result of the 'April 19 Revolution' led by South Korea's students.
                  Second Republic inaugurated.
       1961       Military coup led by Park Chung-hee and Kim Jong-pil in May led to the dissolution of the
                  National Assembly. Military rule introduced.
       1963       Presidential system re-established under Park Chung-hee. Inauguration of the Third Republic.
       1972       Institution of the Fourth Republic and the Yushin (`renovation') Constitution.
       1979       Murder of President Park (May). Civilian rule overthrown (12 December) by army officers
                  Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo and martial law implemented.
       1980       Kwangju uprising and killing of an estimated 500 people by South Korean paratroopers.
                  Following Choi Kyu-hah's interim presidency, General Chun Doo-hwan becomes president
                  (August).
                  New constitution promulgated guaranteeing a single, seven-year term presidency (October).
       1981       Fifth Republic began (March).
       1987       Student-led unrest removed President Chun from office.


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                  Declaration of political reforms made by Roh Tae-woo (June).
                  Roh Tae-woo elected president through the first direct elections in 16 years (December).
       1988       Constitution of the Sixth Republic adopted, guaranteeing a popularly elected president for a
                  single five-year term (February).
                  Seoul hosted Olympic Games (October).
       1992       Kim Young-sam became South Korea's first democratically elected civilian president
                  (December).
       1993       President Kim Young-sam inaugurated (February).
       1995       First local elections since 1950 (27 June). South Korean government announced it was to
                  prosecute former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo on charges of mutiny and
                  murder.
       1996       Former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo sentenced to death and to 22 years six
                  months in prison, respectively. These sentences were subsequently commuted to life and 17
                  years imprisonment in December.
       1996-97    Nationwide strikes and demonstrations against new government labor law and espionage law.
       1997       Hanbo construction and steel chaebol collapsed with huge debts. President Kim Young-sam's
                  son, Kim Hyun-chul, imprisoned for bribery and corruption in connection with the incident.
                  Kim Young-sam was linked by an alleged bribe to the Hanbo scandal. (January).
                  East Asian Financial Crisis (November) .
                  In response to South Korean requests for assistance, the IMF agreed on a financial rescue
                  package worth USD57 billion (December).
                  Kim Dae-jung, leader of the main opposition party, the National Congress for New Politics
                  (NCNP), was elected to the presidency (December).
                  Former presidents Chug Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo were released from prison, having been
                  granted an amnesty by President Kim Young-sam and the president-elect, Kim Dae-jung
                  (December).
       1998       Kim Dae-jung inaugurated as president -'sunshine' policy of engagement towards North Korea
                  announced (February).
                  Presidential amnesty for 2,000 prisoners (March).
                  Widespread flooding; Hyundai strike (July).
                  Presidential amnesty for 7,700 prisoners and the launch of the Second Nation Reform Drive, to
                  mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of South Korea (August).
       1999       Government amnesty for 8,000 people announced (February).
                  The collapse of Daewoo Auto, the country's third largest chaebol, with debts of approximately
                  USD50 billion, brought the economy into new crisis (August).
                  The progressive trade union, the KCTU, was awarded full legal status after five applications
                  over its 12-year existence (November).
       2000       The ruling NCNP party renamed the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP).
                  Trades union activists formed the Democratic Labor Party (January).
                  A law was passed to reduce the number of seats in the National Assembly from 299 to 273
                  (February).
                  Ruling coalition split as the ULD moved into opposition. Disaffected lawmakers from the
                  Kyongsang region established the Democratic People's Party (March).
                  National Assembly elections resulted in no overall majority. The Grand National Party became
                  the largest single group, gaining 133 seats to the MDP's 115 (April).
                  Prime Minister Park Tae-joon resigned following tax evasion charges (May).
                  Amnesty granted to 3,500 prisoners (August).
       2001       Union occupation of the Daewoo Motors Pupyong plant in Incheon brought to an end after
                  massive police intervention (February).
                  Strikes involving an estimated 55,000 workers further dented South Korea's prospects for a
                  complete recovery from the economic crisis of 1997.
                  Prime Minister Lee Han-dong and his cabinet offered their resignations after the ULD voted



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


                  with the opposition in a motion of no-confidence in Minister for Unification Lim Dong-won.
                  Lee Han-dong later resigned from the ULD to remain as prime minister (September).
       2002       Two of President Kim's sons charged with corruption and sentenced to jail.
                  Two of President Kim's nominees for the prime ministerial post rejected by the National
                  Assembly..
                  MDP candidate and former labor rights lawyer Roh Mu-hyun defeated conservative GNP
                  candidate Lee Hoi-chang by a 2 per cent margin in the presidential elections (December).
       2003       President Roh Moo-hyun assumed office (February).
                  Besieged by opposition in the National Assembly and falling popularity ratings, President Roh
                  announced plans for a referendum on his rule (September).
                  Attempts to dissolve and reform the MDP led to a split and the breakaway of 44 MDP members
                  to form the 'Uri' Party (October).
       2004       Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoon Young-kwan, National Security Advisor Ra Jong-yil and
                  advisor for national defense Kim Hee-sang sacked and replaced by Ban Ki-moon, Kwon Chin-
                  ho and Yoon Kwang-ung respectively (February).
                  President Roh Moo-hyun become first president to be impeached by National Assembly
                  (March).
                  'Uri' Party won a majority in elections to the National Assembly (April).
                  Roh Moo-hyun reinstated as president by the Constitutional Court (May).
                  Lee Hae-chan confirmed as prime minister by National Assembly (June).
                  Yeongi-Kongju area selected as site for new capital, to replace Seoul by 2030 (August).
                  South Korea admitted that it had enriched nuclear material in the course of atomic vapor laser
                  isotope separation (AVLIS) experiments that had not been declared in 2000 (August).
       2005       In an admission of failure to pass promised reforms, the entire leadership of the ruling Uri Party
                  resigned (January).
                  Kim Woo-choong, former chief executive of Daewoo, returned and was arrested for the
                  chaebol's collapse (June).
       2006       Han Myeong-sook, the country's first female prime minister, appointed after the resignation of
                  Lee Hae-chan (April)
                  Local elections ended in defeat for the Uri party, with the Grand National Party (GNP) being
                  the primary beneficiary (May).
                  Kim Woo-chong sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment for embezzlement (of up to USD100
                  million) and accounting fraud during the collapse of the Daewoo Group (May).
                  Park Geun-hye, daughter of former president General Park Chung-hee, announced her intention
                  to run for president in 2007 (October).
                  Director of National Intelligence Service Kim Syeung-gyu, Minister for Unification Lee Jeong-
                  seok and Minister of Defense Yoon Kwang-ung all tendered their resignations following a
                  nuclear test by North Korea (October).
       Source: Jane‘s Information Group

       2. Travel Information
           A. Orientation

       General
                  Location: Eastern Asia, southern half of the Korean Peninsula bordering the Sea of Japan and
                            the Yellow Sea
                Geographic 37 00 N, 127 30 E
               coordinates:
           Map references: Asia
                      Area: total: 98,480 sq km



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


                              land: 98,190 sq km
                              water: 290 sq km
                   Area - slightly larger than Indiana
              comparative:
         Land boundaries: total: 238 km
                          border countries: North Korea 238 km
                 Coastline: 2,413 km
          Maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm; between 3 nm and 12 nm in the Korea Strait
                           contiguous zone: 24 nm
                           exclusive economic zone: 200 nm
                           continental shelf: not specified
                   Climate: temperate, with rainfall heavier in summer than winter
                   Terrain: mostly hills and mountains; wide coastal plains in west and south
                  Elevation lowest point: Sea of Japan 0 m
                  extremes: highest point: Halla-san 1,950 m
        Natural resources: coal, tungsten, graphite, molybdenum, lead, hydropower potential
                 Land use: arable land: 16.58%
                           permanent crops: 2.01%
                           other: 81.41% (2005)
            Irrigated land: 8,780 sq km (2003)
          Natural hazards: occasional typhoons bring high winds and floods; low-level seismic activity common
                           in southwest
            Environment - air pollution in large cities; acid rain; water pollution from the discharge of sewage
            current issues: and industrial effluents; drift net fishing
            Environment - party to: Antarctic-Environmental Protocol, Antarctic-Marine Living Resources,
             international Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol,
              agreements: Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous
                           Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution,
                           Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands, Whaling
                           signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements
         Geography - note: strategic location on Korea Strait
       Source: CIA Fact Book
       http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

       Country Description
       The Republic of Korea (South Korea or ROK) is a highly developed, stable, democratic
       republic with powers shared between the president and the legislature. It has a modern
       economy, and tourist facilities are widely available. English is often not spoken outside
       the main tourist and business centers. The Korea National Tourism Organization
       (KNTO) can be reached in the United States by calling 1-800-868-7567, and has a useful
       web site in English at http://www.tour2korea.com. The KNTO also operates a telephone
       information service in the Republic of Korea, which can be reached by calling 1330 (02-
       1330 from mobile phones) anywhere in the country. The telephone service has English
       speakers and is available 24 hours every day throughout the year. The Seoul Help Center
       (SHC) assists foreigners with an English speaking help line (02) 731-6802. The SHC is



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       located in the Seoul City Hall and open from 9:30 – 12:30, 14:30 – 17:30. Read the
       Department of State Background Notes on South Korea for additional information.

       Travel Documents

       Entry/Exit Requirements: A passport is required. U.S. passport holders may enter the
       Republic of Korea without a visa for a stay up to 30 days for tourism or transit to another
       country. When staying for more than 30 days or for any purpose other than tourism or
       transit, a visa must be obtained prior to entering Korea. Generally, individuals staying in
       Korea for longer than 90 days must apply for an Alien Registration Card. Individuals
       who plan to stay longer than the period authorized must apply to Korean immigration for
       an extension in advance. Individuals who stay in Korea longer than the period authorized
       by Korean immigration are subject to fines and may be required to pay the fines before
       departing the country. Changes of status from one type of visa to another (from tourism
       to teaching, for example) are normally not granted in the Republic of Korea but may be
       obtained at a Korean Embassy or Consulate after departing Korea.

       Active-duty U.S. military personnel may enter the Republic of Korea under the Status of
       Forces Agreement (SOFA) with proper Department of Defense (DOD) identification and
       travel orders. Every civilian accompanying the force, including DoD civilian employees,
       invited contractors, and family members must have a valid passport to enter Korea and
       should obtain an A-3 SOFA visa prior to arrival in Korea. Active duty military
       personnel should obtain a tourist passport prior to leaving the U.S. to accommodate off-
       duty travel elsewhere in Asia. DOD travelers should consult the DOD Foreign Clearance
       Guide before leaving the U.S.

       Exit permits are not required to leave Korea. However, if a parent requests through the
       Korean Immigration Office that a travel restriction be placed on a child, the child is likely
       to be prevented from departing Korea.

       For information on entry requirements for the Republic of Korea and other countries, see
       our Foreign Entry Requirements brochure or contact the Consular Section of the Embassy
       of the Republic of Korea at 2320 Massachusetts Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008,
       telephone (202) 939-5660 or visit the Korean Embassy Internet home page at
       http://www.koreaembassyusa.org/. Republic of Korean Consulates are also located in
       Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Guam, Honolulu, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, San
       Francisco, and Seattle. The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has a web site
       with a directory of all Korean diplomatic missions worldwide at
       http://www.mofat.go.kr/mission/missions_map_en.mof. Read our information on dual
       nationality and the prevention of international child abduction. Link to Customs and
       ATA information. For additional information on customs and dual nationality and
       military service in Korea, see also Special Circumstances below.

       Registration / Embassy Location
       Americans living in or visiting the Republic of Korea are encouraged to register on the
       Internet through the State Department‘s travel registration website,
       https://travelregistration.state.gov, or http://www.asktheconsul.org/ and obtain updated


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       information on travel and security within the Republic of Korea. American citizens may
       also sign up for warden messages and monthly newsletters by providing their e-mail
       address at www.asktheconsul.org. The U.S. Embassy street address is 32 Sejong-no,
       Jongno-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 110-710. The APO address is Unit 15550, APO,
       AP 96205-5550. Telephone (82-2) 397-4114; fax (82-2) 397-4101. The web page for
       the U.S. Embassy in Seoul can be found at http://usembassy.state.gov/seoul.

       Customs Regulations
       Persons traveling to/from Korea or transiting Korea to/from other countries should be
       aware that the Republic of Korea‘s customs authorities may enforce strict regulations
       concerning temporary importation into or export from Korea of items such as firearms,
       ammunition, explosives, narcotics and prescription drugs, non-prescription health
       supplements, radio equipment, gold, as well as books, other printed material, videos or
       audio recordings that might be considered subversive to national security, obscene, or in
       any way harmful to the public interest and cultural property.

       Further, the Republic of Korea has customs laws and regulations to prevent the spread of
       livestock diseases, such as the foot-and-mouth disease, avian influenza, etc. The
       following products must be declared to Korean customs officials upon arrival: live
       animals, such as dog, cat, pet birds, etc.; animal products, such as antlers, bone, blood
       meal, etc.; beef, pork, mutton, chicken meat and processed meat products, such as
       sausages, ham, meat jerky, boiled meat, canned products, boiled eggs, etc.; processed
       dairy products, such as milk, cheese, butter, etc.; processed egg products, such as egg,
       egg white, egg powder, etc. For further inquires, please send an email to
       nvrqs@nvrqs.go.kr. Please see our information on customs regulations.

       Special Circumstances:

       Dual Nationality
       The Government of the Republic of Korea does not recognize dual citizenship. An
       individual is a citizen of the Republic of Korea if his or her name appears on the Korean
       Family Census Register. The Korean Government requires persons with a claim to dual
       citizenship to choose or reject Korean nationality by December 31 of the year the
       individual turns 21 years old.

       A person‘s name is not automatically removed from the Korean Family Census Register
       simply because he or she is an American citizen. It is the obligation of an American
       citizen to inform the Korean government of his or her American citizenship for the
       purposes of removing his or her name from the Korean Family Census Register.

       Any male whose name appears on the Korean Family Census Register must fulfill his
       two-year military obligation unless he has surrendered his Korean nationality before
       March 30 of the year he turns 18 years old. An American male in this situation must
       notify Korean authorities of his parents‘ immigration status, renounce his Korean
       citizenship, and remove his name from the Korean Family Census Register. If an
       American male fails to remove his name from the Korean Family Census Register,



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Korean authorities may require that he serve in the Korean military if he lives in Korea or
       visits Korea during conscription age (18 to 35 years of age).

       Under a new law that went into effect on May 26, 2005, men who have dual citizenship
       may be required to serve in the military before they can give up their Korean citizenship.
       Women are not required to serve in the military.
       The new law affects American men of Korean descent in different ways.

               A Korean male who was born in Korea, emigrates to the U.S., becomes a
                naturalized American citizen, loses his Korean citizenship and therefore has no
                military obligations in Korea.
               A male who was born in the U.S. whose Korean parents were U.S. citizens at the
                time of his birth, does not have Korean military obligations.
               A male who was born in the U.S., whose name is on the Korean Family Census
                Register, and whose parents were not American citizens at the time of his birth
                but immigrated to and live in the U.S., is not obligated to serve in the Korean
                military if he renounces his Korean citizenship prior to March 30 of the year he
                turns 18 years of age.
               A male who was born in the U.S. and is on the Korean Family Census Register,
                whose Korean citizen parents lived only temporarily outside Korea, may not
                renounce his Korean citizenship until he completes his service the Korean
                military.
               A U.S. citizen male who was born in and lives in Korea and is on the Korean
                Family Census Register may not renounce his Korean citizenship until he serves
                in the Korean military.
               After fulfilling his military service, a dual national has two years to choose his
                nationality before he loses his Korean citizenship.

       There have been several instances in which young American men of Korean descent --
       who were born and lived all of their lives in the United States -- arrived in the ROK as
       tourists only to be drafted into the Republic of Korea army. At least two of these cases
       involved individuals whose names had been recorded on the Korean Family Census
       Register, without their knowledge.

       For additional information, consult your nearest Republic of Korea consulate and review
       our Dual Nationality flyer on the Department of State‘s Consular Affairs' home page on
       the Internet at http://www.travel.state.gov/.

       Passport Seizures/Exit Bans And Commercial Disputes
       The Government of the Republic of Korea sometimes seizes the passports and blocks
       departure from Korea of foreigners involved in commercial disputes. In such
       circumstances, the U.S. Government reissues a passport to a U.S. citizen who applies for
       one. The ROK exit ban, however, remains in effect, thereby preventing departure.

       Working In The Republic Of Korea
       Americans going to the Republic of Korea to teach, model or work for a company (part-
       time or full-time, paid or unpaid) must enter the ROK using the appropriate work visa.


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Changes of status from any other visa status to a work visa are not granted within the
       country. Any foreigner who begins work without the appropriate visa is subject to arrest,
       costly fines, and deportation. Persons working without a valid work permit and who have
       a contractual dispute with their employers have little or no entitlement to legal recourse
       under Korean law.

       Teaching English
       The U.S. Embassy in Seoul receives many complaints from U.S. citizens who enter the
       Republic of Korea to teach English at private language schools ("hagwons"). The most
       frequent complaints are that the schools and/or employment agencies misrepresent
       salaries, working conditions, living arrangements and other benefits, including health
       insurance, even in the written contracts. There have also been some complaints of
       physical assault, threats of arrest/deportation, and sexual harassment. Some U.S.-based
       employment agencies have been known to misrepresent contract terms, employment
       conditions or the need for an appropriate work visa. Since Spring 2005, Korean police
       have investigated a number of foreign teachers for document fraud. Several Americans
       have been arrested and charged with possession of fraudulent university diplomas which
       were used to obtain employment in Korea. A comprehensive handout entitled "Teaching
       English in Korea: Opportunities and Pitfalls" may be obtained at the U.S. Embassy in
       Seoul or via the Bureau of Consular Affairs homepage at http://travel.state.gov/ under
       Travel Publications.

       Disaster Preparedness
       Legally, the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of
       Korea remain in a state of war. Peace has been maintained on the Korean peninsula
       under an Armistice for more than 50 years. Recently, political, economic, and social
       contacts between the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea
       have increased significantly. However, the possibility of military hostilities that could
       necessitate the evacuation of U.S. citizens from the Republic of Korea cannot be
       excluded. The U.S. Government has developed a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
       (NEO) plan for the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Korea in an emergency. A guide for
       U.S. citizens about the NEO plan is available on line at http://www.asktheconsul.org/, or
       at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul.

       To provide enhanced protection to the dependents of U.S. military service members and
       to civilian Department of Defense (DOD) employees and their families, DOD provides
       protective gas masks and hoods to its noncombatant community in the Republic of Korea.
       In addition, the U.S. Embassy provides the same level of protection to its U.S. citizen
       personnel and their dependents. The gas masks and hoods provide the most fundamental
       level of protection in an emergency in which chemical substances are present.

       These measures do not result from any recent incident. They are a prudent precaution to
       further enhance the safety of U.S. Government-affiliated personnel and their families, and
       are part of a continuing effort to improve the U.S. Government's overall safety and
       security posture. If the Department of State becomes aware of any specific and credible
       threat to the safety and security of U.S. citizens, that information will be provided to the
       American public at large.


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.



       The U.S. Government is not providing protective equipment to private American citizens
       in the Republic of Korea. As always, U.S. citizens should review their own personal
       security practices and must make their own decisions with regard to those precautions
       that they might take to avoid injury. Those who may wish to acquire protective
       equipment for personal use should contact commercial vendors who may be able to
       provide such equipment. For further information, please refer to the Department of State
       Fact Sheet entitled, Chemical/Biological Agent Release, available at Internet address
       http://travel.state.gov/, or via the autofax by dialing (202) 647-3000 from a fax machine.

       During the monsoon season (June-August), there may be typhoons in Korea. General
       information about natural disaster preparedness is available via the Internet from the U.S.
       Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) at http://www.fema.gov.

       Children's Issues
       For information on international adoption of children and international parental child
       abduction, see the Office of Children‘s Issues website at
       http://travel.state.gov/family/family_1732.html.

       Registration / Embassy Location
       Americans living in or visiting the Republic of Korea are encouraged to register on the
       Internet through the State Department‘s travel registration website,
       https://travelregistration.state.gov, or http://www.asktheconsul.org/ and obtain updated
       information on travel and security within the Republic of Korea. American citizens may
       also sign up for warden messages and monthly newsletters by providing their e-mail
       address at www.asktheconsul.org. The U.S. Embassy street address is 32 Sejong-no,
       Jongno-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 110-710. The APO address is Unit 15550, APO,
       AP 96205-5550. Telephone (82-2) 397-4114; fax (82-2) 397-4101. The web page for
       the U.S. Embassy in Seoul can be found at http://usembassy.state.gov/seoul.
       Source: U.S. Department of State
       http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1018.html

                Holidays

       Holiday Name                                                Date 2007
       New Year's Day                                              Monday, Jan 1,2007
       Sollal (Lunar New Year) (3 days)                            Sunday, Jan 28,2007
       Samil Day                                                   Thursday, Mar 1,2007
       Labor Day                                                   Tuesday, May 1,2007
       Children's Day                                              March, ,2007
       Buddha Day                                                  Saturday, May 5,2007
       Memorial Day                                                Wednesday, Jun 6,2007
       Constitution Day                                            Tuesday, Jul 17,2007




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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Independence Day                                            Wednesday, Aug 15,2007
       Foundation Day                                              Wednesday, Oct 3,2007
       Ch'usok (Harvest Moon Festival) (3 days)                    Friday, Oct 5,2007
       Christmas Day                                               Tuesday, Dec 25,2007
       Source: Southtravels.com
       http://www.southtravels.com/asia/southkorea/holidays.html


           B. Crime

       Safety And Security

       In recent years, the U.S. Embassy and U.S. military installations throughout the Republic
       of Korea have taken steps to increase security at all facilities. The participation of Korean
       troops as part of the coalition in Iraq raises the potential for violent actions against
       Korean and U.S. Government facilities and personnel in Korea. U.S. citizens in the
       Republic of Korea should review their own personal security practices, be alert to any
       unusual activity around their homes or businesses, and report any significant incidents to
       local police (tel: 112; from a cell phone: 02-112).

       Many demonstrations occurred in 2006, with participants protesting either for or against
       the presence of U.S. military forces in Korea, U.S. military base relocations in Korea,
       labor accords, discussions regarding the Free Trade Agreement between Korea and the
       United States, the war in Iraq, and the Republic of Korea‘s decision to maintain troops in
       Iraq. While political, labor, and student demonstrations and marches have on occasion
       become confrontational and/or violent; the majority of these demonstrations were not
       violent in nature. Nevertheless, American citizens in the Republic of Korea can minimize
       personal risks to themselves and their property by exercising caution and avoiding areas
       in which demonstrations are being held, as well as by avoiding confrontation with
       protestors.

       American citizens and their families, especially young adults, are advised to exercise
       prudence and caution when visiting the Hongdae and Sinchon areas of Seoul. These
       areas, where many night clubs are located, have occasionally been the sites of bar or
       street fights and harassment involving Westerners.

       For the latest security information, Americans traveling abroad should regularly monitor
       the Department‘s Internet web site, where the current Worldwide Caution Public
       Announcement, Travel Warnings, and Public Announcements can be found.

       Up-to-date information on safety and security can also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-
       4747 toll free in the U.S., or for callers outside the U.S. and Canada, a regular toll-line at
       202-501-4444. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time,
       Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).




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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       The Department of State urges American citizens to take responsibility for their own
       personal security while traveling overseas. For general information about appropriate
       measures travelers can take to protect themselves in an overseas environment, see the
       Department of State‘s pamphlet A Safe Trip Abroad .

       Crime

       Although the crime rate in the Republic of Korea is low, there is a higher incidence of
       pick-pocketing, purse snatching, assault, hotel room and residential burglary, and
       residential crime in major metropolitan areas, such as Seoul and Busan, than elsewhere in
       Korea. U.S. citizens are more likely to be targeted in known tourist areas, such as
       Itaewon (near the U.S. Army Garrison in the Yongsan area) and large market areas
       downtown. Incidents of rape have been reported in popular nightlife districts in Seoul, as
       well as in the victims‘ residences. Travelers should exercise caution when traveling alone
       at night and should use only legitimate taxis or public transportation. Travelers may
       reduce the likelihood of encountering incidents of crime by exercising the same type of
       security precautions they would take when visiting any large city in the United States.

       In many countries around the world, counterfeit and pirated goods are widely available.
       Transactions involving such products may be illegal under local law. In addition,
       bringing them back to the United States may result in forfeitures and/or fines. More
       information on this serious problem is available at
       http://www.cybercrime.gov/18usc2320.htm.

       Information For Victims Of Crime

       The emergency number to reach the police anywhere in the Republic of Korea is 112 (02-
       112 from a cell phone). Foreigners who do not speak Korean can be connected to an
       English-speaking interpreter on a 24-hour, seven-day-a-week basis.

       If you are the victim of a crime while overseas, in addition to reporting to local police,
       please contact the U.S. Embassy for assistance. The Embassy staff can assist you to find
       appropriate medical care, to contact family members or friends, and to get funds
       transferred. Although the investigation and prosecution of the crime is solely the
       responsibility of local authorities, consular officers can help you to understand the local
       criminal justice process and provide a list of attorneys, if needed.

       The loss or theft abroad of a U.S. passport should be reported immediately to the local
       police and the U.S. Embassy.

       See our information on Victims of Crime .




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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.




       Criminal Penalties

       While in a foreign country, a U.S. citizen is subject to that country's laws and regulations,
       which sometimes differ significantly from those in the United States and may not afford
       the protections available to the individual under U.S. law. Penalties for breaking the law
       can be more severe than in the United States for similar offences. Engaging in sexual
       conduct with children or using or disseminating child pornography in a foreign country is
       a crime, prosecutable in the United States. Please see our information on Criminal
       Penalties .

       Persons violating Korean laws, even unknowingly, may be expelled, arrested, or
       imprisoned. Penalties for possession, use, or trafficking in illegal drugs in the Republic of
       Korea are severe, and convicted offenders can expect long jail sentences and heavy
       fines. American citizens in Korea have been arrested for past use of illegal drugs based
       on urine tests, hair samples, or other tests. Korean authorities frequently arrest Americans
       on drug charges by scanning suspicious packages sent through the mail system and by
       using information provided by other persons charged with drug possession or use.

       http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1018.html

           C. Transportation, Traffic Safety and Road Conditions

       Traffic Safety And Road Conditions

       The Republic of Korea‘s roads are well paved, traffic lights are functional, and most
       drivers comply with basic traffic laws. However, the Republic of Korea has a
       significantly higher traffic fatality rate than does the United States. Causes of accidents
       include excessive speed, frequent lane changes, running of red lights, aggressive bus
       drivers, and weaving motorcyclists. Pedestrians should be aware that motorcycles are
       sometimes driven on the sidewalks and drivers of all types of vehicles do not always
       yield to pedestrians in marked crosswalks. It is safer to use pedestrian underpasses and
       overpasses, where available.

       Traffic laws in the Republic of Korea differ from traffic laws in the United States in some
       respects. Left-hand turns are generally prohibited except where a green arrow indicates
       otherwise. Drivers may turn right on a red light after coming to a complete stop. Seat
       belts are mandatory. Children riding in the front seat of vehicles must wear a seat belt or
       use an appropriate child car seat. Passengers on motorcycles must wear protective
       helmets. An international driving permit issued in the U.S. by the American Automobile
       Association (AAA) or the American Automobile Touring Alliance (AATA) is required of
       short-term visitors who drive in Korea. Otherwise, drivers must have a Korean driver's
       license.

       In all accidents involving an automobile and a pedestrian or motorcycle, the driver of the
       automobile, regardless of citizenship, is presumed to be at fault. Police investigations of

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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       traffic accidents usually involve long waits at police stations. Police may request to hold
       the passport of a foreigner involved in a traffic accident if there is any personal injury or
       a dispute about the cause of the accident. Criminal charges and heavy penalties are
       common in accidents involving injury, even if negligence is not proven. Persons arrested
       in accidents involving serious injury or death may be detained until the conclusion of the
       police investigation and legal process. Driving under the influence of alcohol is a serious
       offense. People driving in the Republic of Korea may wish to carry a disposable camera
       to document any traffic accidents, even minor ones.

       For specific information concerning Korean driver's permits, vehicle inspection, road tax,
       and mandatory insurance, please contact the Korea National Tourism Organization office
       in Fort Lee, N.J., (telephone 1-800-868-7567) or check
       http://www.tour2korea.com. Please refer to our Road Safety page for more information.

       Aviation Safety Oversight
       The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has assessed the Government of the
       Republic of Korea‘s Civil Aviation Authority as being in compliance with International
       Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) aviation safety standards for oversight of Korea‘s air
       carrier operations. For more information, travelers may visit the FAA‘s website at
       http://www.faa.gov/safety/programs_initiatives/oversight/iasa.

       http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1018.html

           D. Health

       Risks
       Health Information for Travelers to Countries in East Asia


       On This Page


              Vaccines for Your Protection
              Diseases Found in East Asia
              Other Health Risks
              What You Need To Bring With You
              Staying Healthy During Your Trip
              After You Return Home
              For More Information



       Travel Notices in Effect

              Avian Influenza: Current Situation
              Human Infection with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus
              Interim Guidance about Avian Influenza A (H5N1) for U.S. Citizens Living Abroad




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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


              U.S. Department of State
              See all Traveler's Health travel notices




       Vaccines for Your Protection: East Asia

        Routine Vaccinations

      Before travel, be sure you and your children are up to date on all
      routine immunizations according to schedules approved by the
      Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP). See the
      schedule for adults and the schedule for infants and children. Some
      schedules can be accelerated for travel.

      See your doctor at least 4–6 weeks before your trip to allow time
      for shots to take effect. If it is less than 4 weeks before you leave,
      you should still see your doctor. It might not be too late to get your
      shots or medications as well as other information about how to               Check with your healthcare
      protect yourself from illness and injury while traveling.                    provider: you and your family may
                                                                                   need routine as well as
        Recommended Vaccinations and Preventive Medications                        recommended vaccinations.

      The following vaccines may be recommended for your travel to East
      Asia. Discuss your travel plans and personal health with a health-care provider to determine which vaccines you
      will need.

              Hepatitis A or immune globulin (IG). Transmission of hepatitis A virus can occur through direct
               person-to-person contact; through exposure to contaminated water, ice, or shellfish harvested in
               contaminated water; or from fruits, vegetables, or other foods that are eaten uncooked and that were
               contaminated during harvesting or subsequent handling.
              Hepatitis B, especially if you might be exposed to blood or body fluids (for example, health-care
               workers), have sexual contact with the local population, or be exposed through medical treatment.
               Hepatitis B vaccine is now recommended for all infants and for children ages 11–12 years who did not
               receive the series as infants.
              Japanese encephalitis, if you plan to visit rural farming areas and under special circumstances, such as a
               known outbreak of Japanese encephalitis.
              Malaria: if you are traveling to a malaria-risk area in this region, see your health care provider for a
               prescription antimalarial drug. For details concerning risk and preventive medications, see Malaria
               Information for Travelers to East Asia.
              Rabies, if you might have extensive unprotected outdoor exposure in rural areas, such as might occur
               during camping, hiking, or bicycling, or engaging in certain occupational activities.
              Typhoid, particularly if you are visiting developing countries in this region. Typhoid fever can be
               contracted through contaminated drinking water or food, or by eating food or drinking beverages that
               have been handled by a person who is infected. Large outbreaks are most often related to fecal
               contamination of water supplies or foods sold by street vendors
              As needed, booster doses for tetanus-diphtheria and measles.



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        Required Vaccinations

              None.

       Diseases found in East Asia (risk can vary by country and region within a country; quality of in-country
       surveillance also varies)

      The preventive measures you need to take while traveling in East Asia depend on the areas you visit and the
      length of time you stay. You should observe the precautions listed in this document in most areas of this region.
      However, in highly developed areas of Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, you should observe
      health precautions similar to those that would apply while traveling in the United States.

        Malaria

      Malaria is always a serious disease and may be a deadly illness.

      Humans get malaria from the bite of a mosquito infected with the
      parasite. Prevent this serious disease by seeing your health care
      provider for a prescription antimalarial drug and by protecting
      yourself against mosquito bites. Travelers to some areas in China,
      North Korea, and South Korea may be at risk for malaria. Travelers
      to malaria-risk areas in China, North Korea, and South Korea should
      take an antimalarial drug.

      For additional information on malaria risk and prevention, see
      Malaria Information for Travelers to East Asia.                            An Anopheles freeborni mosquito
                                                                                 takes a blood meal.
      There is no risk of malaria in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong S.A.R.
      (China), Macau S.A.R. (China), and Mongolia.

        Yellow Fever

      There is no risk for yellow fever in East Asia. A certificate of yellow fever vaccination may be required for
      entry into certain of these countries if you are coming from countries in South America or sub-Saharan Africa.
      For detailed information, see Comprehensive Yellow Fever Vaccination Requirements. Also, find the nearest
      authorized U.S. yellow fever vaccine center.

        Food and Waterborne Diseases




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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


      Make sure your food and drinking water are safe. Food and
      waterborne diseases are the primary cause of illness in travelers.
      Travelers’ diarrhea can be caused by viruses, bacteria, or parasites,
      which are found throughout East Asia and can contaminate food or
      water. Infections may cause diarrhea and vomiting (E. coli,
      Salmonella, cholera, and parasites), fever (typhoid fever and
      toxoplasmosis), or liver damage ( hepatitis).

      Additional information: see the Safe Food and Water page for a list
      of links.
                                                                                   Avoid buying food or drink from
        Other Disease Risks                                                        street vendors, because it is
                                                                                   relatively easy for such food to
      Dengue, filariasis, Japanese encephalitis, leishmaniasis, and plague         become contaminated.
      are diseases carried by insects that also occur in this region.
      Protecting yourself against insect bites (see below) will help to
      prevent these diseases. Avian influenza is also present in China.

      Outbreaks of severe acute pulmonary syndrome (SARS) occurred in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan
      in 2003. Avian influenza is present in the region.

      If you visit the Himalayan Mountains, ascend gradually to allow time for your body to adjust to the high
      altitude, which can cause insomnia, headaches, nausea, and altitude sickness. In addition, use sunblock rated at
      least SPF 15, because the risk of sunburn is greater at high altitudes.

       Other Health Risks

        Injuries

      Motor vehicle crashes are a leading cause of injury among travelers. Protect yourself from motor vehicle
      injuries: avoid drinking and driving; wear your safety belt and place children in age-appropriate restraints in the
      back seat; follow the local customs and laws regarding pedestrian safety and vehicle speed; obey the rules of the
      road; and use helmets on bikes, motorcycles, and motor bikes. Avoid boarding an overloaded bus or mini-bus.
      Where possible, hire a local driver.

       What You Need To Bring With You


              Long-sleeved shirt, long pants, and a hat to wear whenever possible while outside, to prevent illnesses
               carried by insects (e.g., malaria, Dengue, filariasis, leishmaniasis, and onchocerciasis).
              Insect repellent containing DEET.
              Bed nets treated with permethrin. For use and purchasing information, see Insecticide Treated Bednets
               on the CDC malaria site. Overseas, permethrin or another insecticide, deltamethrin, may be purchased
               to treat bed nets and clothes.
              Flying-insect spray to help clear rooms of mosquitoes. The product should contain a pyrethroid
               insecticide; these insecticides quickly kill flying insects, including mosquitoes.
              Iodine tablets and portable water filters to purify water if bottled water is not available. See Preventing
               Cryptosporidiosis: A Guide to Water Filters and Bottled Water for more detailed information.
              Sunblock, sunglasses, and a hat for protection from harmful effects of UV sun rays. See Skin Cancer
               Questions and Answers for more information.



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


              Prescription medications: make sure you have enough to last during your trip, as well as a copy of the
               prescription(s) or letter from your health-care provider on office stationery explaining that the
               medication has been prescribed for you.
              Always carry medications in their original containers, in your carry-on luggage.
              Be sure to bring along over-the-counter antidiarrheal medication (e.g., bismuth subsalicylate,
               loperamide) and an antibiotic prescribed by your doctor to self-treat moderate to severe diarrhea. See
               suggested over-the-counter medications and first aid items for a travel kit.

       Staying Healthy During Your Trip

      Travelers should take the following precautions

        To stay healthy, do...

           
              Wash your hands often with soap and water or, if
               hands are not visibly soiled, use a waterless,
               alcohol-based hand rub to remove potentially
               infectious materials from your skin and help
               prevent disease transmission.
              In developing countries, drink only bottled or
               boiled water, or carbonated (bubbly) drinks in cans
               or bottles. Avoid tap water, fountain drinks, and ice
               cubes. If this is not possible, learn how to make
               water safer to drink.
                                                                                  When using repellent on a child,
              Take your malaria prevention medication before,                    apply it to your own hands and then
               during, and after travel, as directed. (See your                   rub them on your child. Avoid
               health care provider for a prescription.)                          children's eyes and mouth and use it
                                                                                  sparingly around their ears.
              To prevent fungal and parasitic infections, keep
               feet clean and dry, and do not go barefoot, even on
               beaches.
              Always use latex condoms to reduce the risk of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.
              Protect yourself from mosquito insect bites:
                    o   Wear long-sleeved shirts, long pants, and hats when outdoors.
                    o   Use insect repellents that contain DEET (N, N-diethylmethyltoluamide). For more information
                        about insect repellents and correct use, see What You Need to Know about Mosquito
                        Repellent on the CDC West Nile Virus site.
                    o   If no screening or air conditioning is available: use a pyrethroid-containing spray in living and
                        sleeping areas during evening and night-time hours; sleep under bed nets, preferably
                        insecticide-treated ones.
                    o   If you are visiting friends and relatives in your home country, see additional special
                        information about malaria prevention in Recent Immigrants to the U.S. from Malarious
                        Countries Returning 'Home' to Visit Friends and Relatives on the CDC Malaria site.



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.



          Do not

                 Do not eat food purchased from street vendors or food that is not well cooked to reduce risk of infection
                  (i.e., hepatitis A and typhoid fever).
                 Do not drink beverages with ice.
                 Avoid dairy products, unless you know they have been pasteurized.
                 Do not swim in fresh water to avoid exposure to certain water-borne diseases such as schistosomiasis.
                  (For more information, please see Swimming and Recreational Water Precautions.)
                 Do not handle animals, especially monkeys, dogs, and cats, to avoid bites and serious diseases
                  (including rabies and plague). Consider pre-exposure rabies vaccination if you might have extensive
                  unprotected outdoor exposure in rural areas. For more information, please see Animal-Associated
                  Hazards.
                 Do not share needles for tattoos, body piercing or injections to prevent infections such as HIV and
                  hepatitis B.
                 Avoid poultry farms, bird markets, and other places where live poultry is raised or kept.

         After You Return Home

         If you have visited a malaria-risk area, continue taking your antimalarial drug for 4 weeks (mefloquine or
         doxycycline) or seven days (atovaquone/proguanil) after leaving the risk area.

         Malaria is always a serious disease and may be a deadly illness. If you become ill with a fever or flu-like illness
         either while traveling in a malaria-risk area or after you return home (for up to1 year), you should seek
         immediate medical attention and should tell the physician your travel history.

         For More Information

         For more information about these and other diseases, please check the Diseases page and CDC Health Topics A-
         Z

                 Diseases carried by insects
                          Dengue: http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=dis&obj=dengue.htm
                        Japanese encephalitis:
            http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=dis&obj=jenceph.htm:
            http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=dis&obj=lyme.htm
                         Malaria information for Travelers to East Asia :
            http://www.cdc.gov/travel/regionalmalaria/eastasia.htm
                          Malaria Frequently asked questions: http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/faq.htm
                         Malaria Prescription Drugs: http://www.cdc.gov/travel/malariadrugs.htm:
            http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/arbor/index.htm
                        Plague: http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=dis&obj=plague.htm:
            http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=dis&obj=yellowfever.htm
                 Diseases carried in food or water:
         http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=dis&obj=madcow.htm


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


                       Cholera: http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=dis&obj=cholera.htm
                       Escherichia coli diarrhea:
          http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/escherichiacoli_g.htm
                       Hepatitis A: http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=dis&obj=hav.htm
                      Schistosomiasis:
          http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=dis&obj=schisto.htm
                      Typhoid fever:
          http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=dis&obj=typhoid.htm
              Diseases from person-to-person contact
                       Hepatitis B: http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=dis&obj=hbv.htm
                      HIV/AIDS prevention:
          http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=dis&obj=hivaids.htm
                      HIV-infected travelers (in The Immunocompromised Traveler):
          http://www2.ncid.cdc.gov/travel/yb/utils/ybGet.asp?section=special&obj=hivtrav.htm&cssNav=browseoyb



               Important: This document is not a complete medical guide for travelers to this region. Consult
               with your doctor for specific information related to your needs and your medical history;
               recommendations may differ for pregnant women, young children, and persons who have
               chronic medical conditions.


         Source: http://www.cdc.gov/travel/eastasia.htm

                Medical Care

         Hospitals in Korea are generally well-equipped with state-of-the-art diagnostic and
         therapeutic equipment. High quality general and specialty dental care is available in
         Seoul. Western-style medical facilities are available in major urban areas of Seoul,
         Busan, Daegu, and a few other large cities. However, not all doctors and staff in these
         major urban areas are proficient in English. Most clinics in rural areas do not have an
         English-speaking doctor. A list of hospitals and medical specialists who speak English is
         available at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, via the Internet on the Department's website, or at
         www.asktheconsul.org.

         Pharmacies are first-rate and most prescribed medications, except psychotropic
         medications, can be obtained with a prescription. Travelers taking any psychotropic or
         controlled medications should bring a sufficient supply as well as a copy of the
         prescription for Korean customs clearance at the airport.

         Korean ambulances do not carry sophisticated medical equipment and the ambulance
         personnel do not have the same level of emergency medical training as in the United
         States. However, ambulances operated by the fire department (dial 119) will respond very
         quickly and take patients to the nearest hospital. For medical evacuation to points outside




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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Korea, SOS International is located in Seoul (tel: 02- 3140-1902, website:
       www.internationalsos.com

       Information on vaccinations and other health precautions, such as safe food and water
       precautions and insect bite protection, may be obtained from the Centers for Disease
       Control and Prevention‘s hotline for international travelers at 1-877-FYI-TRIP (1-877-
       394-8747) or via the CDC‘s Internet site at http://www.cdc.gov/travel. For information
       about outbreaks of infectious diseases abroad, consult the World Health Organization‘s
       (WHO) website at http://www.who.int/en. Further health information for travelers is
       available at http://www.who.int/ith.

       Medical Insurance
       Korean hospitals generally do not accept foreign medical insurance and expect advance
       payment for services in the form of cash or credit cards from foreigners. The Department
       of State strongly urges Americans to consult with their medical insurance company prior
       to traveling abroad to confirm whether their policy applies overseas and if it will cover
       emergency expenses such as a medical evacuation. Please see our information on medical
       insurance overseas .

       Source: U.S. Department of State
       http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1018.html

       3. At A Glance


          Flag description: white with a red (top) and blue yin-yang symbol in the center; there is a different
                            black trigram from the ancient I Ching (Book of Changes) in each corner of the
                            white field




       Source: CIA Fact Book
       http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

           A. Population
                Population: 48,846,823 (July 2006 est.)
             Age structure: 0-14 years: 18.9% (male 4,844,083/female 4,368,139)
                            15-64 years: 71.9% (male 17,886,148/female 17,250,862)
                            65 years and over: 9.2% (male 1,818,677/female 2,678,914) (2006 est.)
               Median age: total: 35.2 years
                           male: 34.2 years
                           female: 36.3 years (2006 est.)
        Population growth 0.42% (2006 est.)
                     rate:
                 Birth rate: 10 births/1,000 population (2006 est.)
                Death rate: 5.85 deaths/1,000 population (2006 est.)



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Net migration rate: 0 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2006 est.)
                  Sex ratio: at birth: 1.08 male(s)/female
                             under 15 years: 1.11 male(s)/female
                             15-64 years: 1.04 male(s)/female
                             65 years and over: 0.68 male(s)/female
                             total population: 1.01 male(s)/female (2006 est.)
           Infant mortality total: 6.16 deaths/1,000 live births
                      rate: male: 6.54 deaths/1,000 live births
                            female: 5.75 deaths/1,000 live births (2006 est.)
         Life expectancy at total population: 77.04 years
                     birth: male: 73.61 years
                            female: 80.75 years (2006 est.)
        Total fertility rate: 1.27 children born/woman (2006 est.)
         HIV/AIDS - adult less than 0.1% (2003 est.)
          prevalence rate:
        HIV/AIDS - people 8,300 (2003 est.)
              living with
              HIV/AIDS:
               HIV/AIDS - less than 200 (2003 est.)
                   deaths:
       Source: CIA Fact Book
       http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

           B. Ethnic Groups, Religions and Language
            Ethnic groups: homogeneous (except for about 20,000 Chinese)
                 Religions: no affiliation 46%, Christian 26%, Buddhist 26%, Confucianism 1%, other 1%
                Languages: Korean, English widely taught in junior high and high school
                  Literacy: definition: age 15 and over can read and write
                            total population: 97.9%
                            male: 99.2%
                            female: 96.6% (2002)
            Ethnic groups: homogeneous (except for about 20,000 Chinese)
       Source: CIA Fact Book
       http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

           D. Climate and Topography

       Korea is mountainous, with small valleys and narrow coastal plains. The Taebaek-
       sanmaek (Taebaek Range), forms the backbone of the peninsula, extending in a north-
       south direction along the eastern coastline. From them extend several mountain ranges
       oriented in a north-east south-west direction. These mountains are not very high, none of
       the peaks exceeding 1,737 m above sea level. There are extensive lowlands along the
       lower parts of the rivers that flow down from the Taebaek mountains.




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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       The Korean peninsula consists in large part of Precambrian rocks such as granite and
       gneiss. There are two volcanic islands, Cheju and Ullung, and a small scale lava plateau
       in Kangwon province. Sandy- and brown-colored soils are common and they are
       generally well leached and have little humus content. Podzolic soils are found in the
       highlands, the result of the cold of the long winter season.

       Environmental Factors

       As a result of South Korea's post-1961 industrialization, and the explosion in the numbers
       of privately owned cars, air pollution has become a major problem in South Korea. Water
       pollution arising from the discharge of sewage and industrial effluent has also become an
       issue. In recent years, large dust storms from northern China, caused by the advance of
       the Gobi and Talimaklan deserts, have caused considerable disruption. The 'yellow sand'
       as it is called in Korean, brings with it pollutants such as lead and cadmium.

       Rivers

       South Korea's principal rivers are the Hangang, which runs through the capital, and the
       Nakdonggang (Nakdong river), which flows through the southeast of the country.

       Coastline

       South Korea has a 2,413 km coastline. The eastern coastline is relatively straight,
       whereas the west has an extremely complicated creek-indented coastline and many
       islands located just offshore. The Yellow Sea and the nature of the coastline cause one of
       the highest tidal ranges in the world: for example, about 9 m maximum at Inchon, the
       entry port for Seoul.

       Climatic Summary

       AVERAGE ANNUAL TEMPERATURE
       Low 6ºC
       High 16ºC
       AVERAGE ANNUAL RAINFALL
       1,250 mm
       AVERAGE RELATIVE HUMIDITY
       Low 52 per cent
       High 84 per cent
       Pusan (elevation 13 m)
                            Av Temperature (ºC)                      Av           Rainfall
                                                                     Humidity
                                                                     (%)
                            min            max                       0530 1330 (mm)
                                                                     h    h
       Jan-Mar              1              9                         61    45     140
       Apr-Jun              13             21                        76    64     470
       Jul-Sep              20             27                        85    70     600
       Oct-Dec              7              15                        69    51     150


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       Seoul (elevation 87 m)
                             Av Temperature (ºC)                     Av           Rainfall
                                                                     Humidity
                                                                     (%)
                             min           max                       0530 1330 (mm)
                                                                     h    h
       Jan-Mar               6             4                         77    48     100
       Apr-Jun               11            22                        86    50     290
       Jul-Sep               18            29                        90    61     750
       Oct-Dec               10            11                        83    51     110



       South Korea has an extreme continental climate. Winters are very cold and characterized
       by frequent frosts and snow. Summers are warm and humid, and occasionally hot.
       Temperatures are sufficiently high for a significant rice yield. Before Korea's division in
       1945, the southern part of the peninsula was the most agriculturally productive. Most
       rainfall occurs between June and September, while between November and April
       precipitation takes the form of snow.

       South Korea is affected by the Asiatic monsoon with a rainy season of one month,
       usually in July. In winter the wind is mainly from the west and north, bringing cold but
       dry air. In summer the wind is from the opposite direction, bringing warm and moist air
       in from the Pacific Ocean. Typhoons can also occasionally move in from the South China
       Sea.

       Temperatures fall toward the north of the country. The table for Pusan (in the south) vis-
       à-vis Seoul (in the north of the country) is illustrative of regional variations in climate.
       Source: Jane‘s Information Group

       General Overview

                   Location: Eastern Asia, southern half of the Korean Peninsula bordering the Sea of Japan and
                             the Yellow Sea
                  Geographic 37 00 N, 127 30 E
                 coordinates:
           Map references: Asia
                       Area: total: 98,480 sq km
                             land: 98,190 sq km
                             water: 290 sq km
                   Area - slightly larger than Indiana
              comparative:
         Land boundaries: total: 238 km
                          border countries: North Korea 238 km
                   Coastline: 2,413 km
          Maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm; between 3 nm and 12 nm in the Korea Strait
                           contiguous zone: 24 nm



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                              exclusive economic zone: 200 nm
                              continental shelf: not specified
                   Climate: temperate, with rainfall heavier in summer than winter
                   Terrain: mostly hills and mountains; wide coastal plains in west and south
                  Elevation lowest point: Sea of Japan 0 m
                  extremes: highest point: Halla-san 1,950 m
        Natural resources: coal, tungsten, graphite, molybdenum, lead, hydropower potential
                 Land use: arable land: 17.18%
                           permanent crops: 1.95%
                           other: 80.87% (2001)
            Irrigated land: 11,590 sq km (1998 est.)
          Natural hazards: occasional typhoons bring high winds and floods; low-level seismic activity common
                           in southwest
            Environment - air pollution in large cities; acid rain; water pollution from the discharge of sewage
            current issues: and industrial effluents; drift net fishing
            Environment - party to: Antarctic-Environmental Protocol, Antarctic-Marine Living Resources,
             international Antarctic Treaty, Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol,
              agreements: Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous
                           Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution,
                           Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands, Whaling
                           signed, but not ratified: none of the selected agreements
         Geography - note: strategic location on Korea Strait
       Source: CIA Fact Book
       http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

       4. Government
            Country name: conventional long form: Republic of Korea
                          conventional short form: South Korea
                          local long form: Taehan-min'guk
                          local short form: none
                          note: the South Koreans generally use the term "Han'guk" to refer to their country
                          abbreviation: ROK
         Government type: republic
                   Capital: Seoul
            Administrative 9 provinces (do, singular and plural) and 7 metropolitan cities (gwangyoksi, singular
                divisions: and plural)
                           : provinces: Cheju-do, Cholla-bukto (North Cholla), Cholla-namdo (South Cholla),
                           Ch'ungch'ong-bukto (North Ch'ungch'ong), Ch'ungch'ong-namdo (South
                           Ch'ungch'ong), Kangwon-do, Kyonggi-do, Kyongsang-bukto (North Kyongsang),
                           Kyongsang-namdo (South Kyongsang)
                           : metropolitan cities: Inch'on-gwangyoksi (Inch'on), Kwangju-gwangyoksi
                           (Kwangju), Pusan-gwangyoksi (Pusan), Soul-t'ukpyolsi (Seoul), Taegu-gwangyoksi
                           (Taegu), Taejon-gwangyoksi (Taejon), Ulsan-gwangyoksi (Ulsan)
            Independence: 15 August 1945 (from Japan)
         National holiday: Liberation Day, 15 August (1945)




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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


              Constitution: 17 July 1948
             Legal system: combines elements of continental European civil law systems, Anglo-American law,
                           and Chinese classical thought
                  Suffrage: 19 years of age; universal
       Source: CIA Fact Book
       http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

           A. Executive Branch
       The President is the head of state and represents the state in international affairs. The
       President is also the head of the executive branch, and the commander-in-chief of the
       armed forces. In case of the President's death or disability, the Prime Minister will
       temporarily act as the President according to an order of succession provided by law.

       The President is elected for a single five-year term by popular vote through universal,
       equal, direct, secret balloting.

       The power and duties of the President are defined in the following six areas. First, the
       President, as head of state, symbolizes and represents the whole nation in both the
       governmental system and foreign relations. He receives foreign diplomats, awards
       decorations and other honors, and performs pardoning functions. Upon inauguration, he
       is to take the oath of his duties to safeguard the independence, territorial integrity, and
       continuity of the state, as well as to protect the Constitution. In addition, he is entrusted
       with the unique duty to pursue the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.

       Second, the President, in his capacity as chief executive, enforces all laws passed by the
       legislature and issues orders and decrees for the enforcement of these laws. The President
       has the full power to direct the State Council and oversee a varying number of advisory
       organs and executive agencies. He is authorized to appoint public officials, including the
       Prime Minister and heads of executive agencies.

       Third, the President, in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, has
       extensive authority over military policy, including the power to declare war.

       Fourth, the President is chief policy maker and chief lawmaker. He may propose
       legislative bills to the National Assembly or express his views to the legislature in person
       or in writing. The President cannot dissolve the National Assembly; rather, it is the
       National Assembly that may hold the President accountable under the Constitution by
       means of the impeachment process.

       Fifth, the President is vested with extensive emergency powers. In case of internal
       turmoil, external menace, natural disaster or severe financial or economic crisis, the
       President can take emergency financial and economic actions or issue orders that have
       the effect of law. The President can exercise these powers only when there is insufficient
       time to convene the National Assembly, and the actions or orders are absolutely essential
       to maintaining national security or public order. The President must subsequently notify,


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       and obtain the concurrence of, the National Assembly. If he is unsuccessful in doing so,
       the measures will be nullified.

       Sixth, the President is also empowered to declare a state of martial law in accordance
       with the provisions of the law in time of war, armed rebellion, or similar national
       emergency. The exercise of such emergency power is, however, subject to subsequent
       approval of the National Assembly.

       Source: http://www.korea.net/korea/kor_loca.asp?code=B05

  Executive branch: chief of state: President ROH Moo-hyun (since 25 February 2003)
                    head of government: Prime Minister HAN Duck-soo (since March 2007); Deputy Prime
                    Ministers KIM Woo-sik (since 10 February 2006); KWON O-kyu (since 18 July 2006); KIM
                    Shin-il (since 20 September 2006)

                       cabinet: State Council appointed by the president on the prime minister's recommendation

                       elections: president elected by popular vote for a single five-year term; election last held 19
                       December 2002 (next to be held on 19 December 2007); prime minister appointed by president
                       with consent of National Assembly; deputy prime ministers appointed by president on prime
                       minister's recommendation

                       election results: ROH Moo-hyun elected president; percent of vote - ROH Moo-hyun (MDP)
                       48.9%; LEE Hoi-chang (GNP) 46.6%; other 4.5%
       Source: CIA Fact Book
       http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

                The Chief of State – President Roh Moo-hyun


       Date of Birth:        August 6, 1946

       Place of Birth:       Gimhae, byeongsang-namdo

       Family:               Wife: Kwan Yang-suk
                             Son: Geon-ho
                             Daughter: Jeong-yon

       Military:             Honorable Discharge from the Army

       Roh Moo-hyun was born in 1946 in a small farming village in Gimhae, Gyeongsang-
       namdo province. He graduated from Busan Commercial High School in 1966. Upon
       passing the national bar examination in 1975, he became a district court judge in the city
       of Daejeon in 1977. In 1978, he opened his own law office. In 1981 he defended a
       student who was arrested on trumped-up charges of anti-state activities. Since then, he
       became a human rights lawyer defending pro-democracy and labor rights activists. He
       was one of the leaders of the June (1987)Democratization Struggles. Roh entered into
       politics in 1988 and led the nation's political reforms with a strong commitment to
       principles and integrity. He was elected to the 13th and 15th National Assembly and


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       served as the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. He also served as vice president
       of the National Congress for New Politics and senior member of the Millennium
       Democratic Party. During his political career, he experienced a lot of challenges such as
       the four defeats in the general elections mainly due to divisive regionalism. However, he
       did not give in to repeated setbacks and struggled to bring about new politics. He was
       nominated as the presidential candidate of the Millennium Democratic Party in 2002
       through a national primary election system, which was adopted for the first time in
       Korea. On December 19, 2002, he was elected president in the 16th presidential election.
       His successful campaign owed much to the strength and support of the voluntary
       participation of the Korean people.
       Source: Office of the President
       http://english.president.go.kr/warp/en/president/story/basis/

       Personal History Of President, Roh Moo-Hyun

            1946 - Born in Gimhae, Gyeongsang-namdo
            1959 - Graduated from Daechang Primary School
            1963 - Graduated from Jinyoung Middle School
            1966 - Graduated from Busan Commercial High School
            1968 - Army draftee service
            1971 - Honorable discharge from military service
            1973 - Married to Kwon Yang-suk
            1975 - Passed the National Bar Examination
            1977 - Served as judge at the Daejeon District Court
            1978 - Practicing attorney
            1981 - Began career as a human rights lawyer after defending a student involved in
            the "Burim Incident" in Busan
            1984 - Served as director of the Research Center for Environmental Pollution
            1985 - Served as executive director of the Busan Citizens Committee for Democracy
            1987 - Served as chairman and director of the Busan Headquarters of Citizens'
            Movement for a Democratic Constitution (Also became one of the leaders of the
            1987 June Democratization Struggles); Arrested in connection with the illegal strikes
            of the Daewoo Shipping Workers Union and his attorney‘s license was suspended
            1988 - Elected to the 13th National Assembly from Busan's Eastern District
            1989 - Served as member of the "Special Committee Investigating Political
            Corruptions during the Fifth Republic". Served as member of the Labor Committee
            of the National Assembly
            1990 - Opposed the three-party merger between the ruling and two opposition
            parties; formed a splinter Democratic Party and served as director of planning and
            coordination of the newly-created party; Resigned National Assembly seat along with
            a group of sympathetic colleagues in protest against the ruling party's ramming of a
            broadcasting bill
            1991 - Led the campaign to unite the opposition forces (served as the leading
            negotiator of the talks to unite the opposition forces)
            1992 - Ran for the National Assembly seat in the Eastern District of Busan
            (unsuccessful). Led the election campaign for presidential candidate Kim Dae-jung


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


           1993 - Became the youngest member of the supreme council of the United
           Democratic Party
        1995 - Ran for mayor of Busan (unsuccessful)
        1996 - Ran for the National Assembly Seat in the Jongno District in Seoul
           (unsuccessful)
        1997 - Led the election campaign for Kim Dae-jung, presidential candidate of the
           National Congress for New Politics (NCNP); Served as an anchor of a SBS radio
           news program
        1998 - Elected to the 15th National Assembly in a by-election in Seoul's Jongno
           District (as an NCNP candidate); Served as an arbitrator in the labor- management
           dispute at the Hyundai Motor Company
        1999 - Gave up the chance to seek a National Assembly seat for a second term in the
           Jongno District in Seoul and chose to run for the National Assembly seat in Busan;
           Served as the head of the Committee for the Development of the Southeast Regions
           of the Millennium Democratic Party
        2000 - Ran for the National Assembly Seat in Busan (unsuccessful); Served as the
           minister of maritime affairs and fisheries (August 2000 - March 2001)
        2001 - Served as advisor and senior member of the Central Committee, the
           Millennium Democratic Party; Appeared in the commercial of the Daewoo Motors as
           the 154,451th supporter.
        2002 - Nominated as the presidential candidate of the Millennium Democratic Party
           in a national primary election system; Elected President of the Republic of Korea in
           the 16th Presidential election.
       Source: Cheong Wa Dai – Office of the President
       http://english.president.go.kr/warp/en/president/story/basis/

                Prime Minister – Han Duck-soo (Designate)

       President Roh on 9 March 2007 nominated former finance minister Han
       Duck-Soo as his new prime minister. Han, a 58-year-old career
       administrator, has been serving as Roh's adviser on the free trade
       negotiations with the United States.
       http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/262980/1
       /.html


       Mini-biography
       Mr. Duck-Soo Han was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and
       Economy of the Republic of Korea on 15 March 2005, after serving as Minister of the
       Office for Government Policy Coordination since February 2004.

       Since Mr. Han started his career as a government official in 1970, he has served for
       various posts and held significant positions.

       His distinguished ability and extensive experience led him to serve as the Minister in
       different ministries. Before assuming the position of Minister of the Office for



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Government Policy Coordination, he was Senior Secretary to President for Economic
       Affairs and also for Policy and Planning in 2002 and 2001, respectively. Prior to that, Mr.
       Han served as Ambassador to the OECD from February 2001 to November 2001, and
       from March 1998 to February 2001, he served as Minister for Trade of the Ministry of
       Foreign Affairs and Trade.

       Mr. Han holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University and a B.A. in Economics
       from Seoul National University.


       http://www.oecd.org/speaker/0,2865,en_21571361_35842076_36602025_1_1_1_1,00.ht
       ml




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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Government Structure of the Republic of Korea




       Source: Office of the Prime Minister
       http://www.opm.go.kr/warp/webapp/content/view?meta_id=english&id=5



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


                 Cabinet
                                              (Last Updated: 2/2/2007)

            The spellings of names of South Korean officials have been changed to reflect widely
                                           recognized spellings.

    Pres.                                                                               ROH Moo-hyun
    Prime Min.                                                                          Han Duck-soo (Designate)
    Dep. Prime Min.                                                                     KIM Shin-il
    Dep. Prime Min.                                                                     KIM Woo-sik
    Dep. Prime Min.                                                                     KWON O-kyu
    Min. of Agriculture & Forestry                                                      PARK Hong-soo
    Min. of Commerce, Industry, & Energy                                                KIM Young-ju
    Min. of Construction & Transportation
    Min. of Culture & Tourism                                                           KIM Myong-gon
    Min. of Education & Human Resources                                                 KIM Shin-il
    Min. of Environment                                                                 LEE Chi-beom
    Min. of Finance & Economy                                                           KWON O-kyu
    Min. of Foreign Affairs & Trade                                                     SONG Min-soon
    Min. of Gender Equality & Family                                                    JANG Ha-jin
    Min. of Govt. Admin. & Home Affairs                                                 LEE Yong-sup
    Min. of Govt. Legislation                                                           KIM Sun-wook
    Min. of Govt. Policy & Coordination                                                 CHO Young-taek
    Min. of Health & Welfare                                                            RHYU Si-min
    Min. of Information & Communication                                                 ROH Jun-hyong
    Min. of Justice                                                                     KIM Sung-ho
    Min. of Labor                                                                       LEE Sang-soo
    Min. of Maritime & Fisheries                                                        KIM Sung-jin
    Min. of National Defense                                                            KIM Jang-soo
    Min. of Planning & Budget                                                           CHANG Byoung-wan
    Min. of Science & Technology                                                        KIM Woo-sik
    Min. of Unification                                                                 LEE Jae-joung
    Chmn., Board of Audit & Inspection                                                  JEON Yun-churl
    Chmn., Civil Service Commission                                                     KWON Oh-ryong
    Chmn., Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption                              CHUNG Soung-jin
    Head Commissioner, Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths               HAN Sang-bum
    Chmn., Fair Trade Commission                                                        KANG Chul-kyu
    Chmn., Financial Supervisory Commission                                             YOON Jeung-hyun
    Chmn., Korean Broadcasting Commission                                               NOH Sung-dai
    Chmn., Presidential Committee on the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative         LEE Su-hoon
    Pres., National Human Rights Commission                                             KIM Chang-kuk



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


    Chief of Staff, Office of the Pres.                                                    Moon Jae-in
    Chief Sec. to the Pres. for National Policy, Office of the Pres.                       BYEON Yang-kyoon
    Chief Sec. to the Pres. for Unification, Foreign, & Security Policy, Office of the
                                                                                           BAEK Jong-chun
    Pres.
    Dir., National Intelligence Service                                                    KIM Man-bok
    Governor, Bank of Korea                                                                LEE Seong-tae
    Ambassador to the US                                                                   LEE Tae-sik
    Permanent Representative to the UN, New York                                           CHOI Young-jin
       Source: CIA Fact Book
       https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/chiefs/chiefs95.html

           B. Legislative Branch

       The National Assembly consists of 299 members. Two hundred and forty three of them
       are directly elected in their districts by popular vote and 56 on the basis of the number of
       total popular votes each party earned in the general elections.

       The Assembly maintains 17 standing committees with the following functional
       designations: House Steering; Legislation and Judiciary; National Policy; Finance and
       Economy; Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade; National Defense; Government
       Administration and Local Autonomy; Education; Science, Technology, Information and
       Telecommunication; Culture and Tourism; Agriculture; Forestry, Maritime Affairs and
       Fisheries; Commerce, Industry and Energy; Health and Welfare; Environment and Labor;
       Construction and Transportation; Intelligence; and Women.

       Legislative branch: unicameral National Assembly or Kukhoe (299 seats - members elected for four-year
                           terms; 243 in single-seat constituencies, 56 by proportional representation)

                              elections: last held 15 April 2004 (next to be held in April 2008; by-elections held to
                              fill vacant seats)

                              election results: percent of vote by party - Uri 51%, GNP 41%, DLP 3%, DP 3%,
                              others 2%; seats by party - Uri 141, GNP 127, DP 12, DLP 9, PFP 5, independents 5

                              note: percent of vote is for 2004 general election; seats by party reflect results of
                              2005 and 2006 by-elections; MDP became DP in May 2005; United Liberal
                              Democrats (ULD) merged with GNP in February 2006
       Source: http://www.korea.net/korea/kor_loca.asp?code=C0201
       http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

           C. Judicial Branch

       The Judiciary of Korea consists of three levels of courts: the Supreme Court, High
       Courts, and District Courts including the specialized Patent Court, Family Court and
       Administrative Court. The courts exercise jurisdiction over civil, criminal, administrative,
       electoral, and other judicial matters, while also overseeing affairs related to the



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       registration of real estate, census registers, deposits, and judicial clerks.

       The Supreme Court is the highest judicial tribunal. It hears appeals from the decisions
       rendered by lower courts and court-martial verdicts. The Chief Justice of the Supreme
       Court is appointed by the President with the consent of the National Assembly. Other
       justices are appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Chief Justice.
       The term of office for the Chief Justice after approval by the National Assembly is six
       years and a second term is not allowed. The Chief Justice must retire from office at the
       age of 70. The term for other justices is six years but they may be re-appointed in
       accordance with the provisions of law, although they must retire from office when they
       reach the age of 65.

          Judicial branch: Supreme Court (justices appointed by president with consent of National Assembly);
                           Constitutional Court (justices appointed by president based partly on nominations by
                           National Assembly and Chief Justice of the court)
       Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html




       Source: http://www.korea.net/korea/kor_loca.asp?code=C03
           D. Political Parties and Leaders

           Political parties Federation of Korean Industries; Federation of Korean Trade Unions; Korean
              and leaders: Confederation of Trade Unions; Korean National Council of Churches; Korean
                             Traders Association; Korean Veterans' Association; National Council of Labor
                             Unions; National Democratic Alliance of Korea; National Federation of Farmers'
                             Associations; National Federation of Student Associations
       Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

           E. Political Pressure Groups
         Political pressure Federation of Korean Industries; Federation of Korean Trade Unions; Korean
       groups and leaders: Confederation of Trade Unions; Korean National Council of Churches; Korean
                            Traders Association; Korean Veterans' Association; National Council of Labor
                            Unions; National Democratic Alliance of Korea; National Federation of Farmers'
                            Associations; National Federation of Student Associations
       Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


           F. Foreign Affairs

       Foreign Policy Overview

       South Korea built up an extensive network of international links in the 1990s, facilitated
       in the main by the normalization of links with China, Russia and other former communist
       states, and its 1991 entry into the United Nations. While its relations with North Korea
       constitute the centerpiece of the South's foreign policy, the forging of robust and close
       links with all four major powers in Northeast Asia is also a major priority.

       Kim Young-sam's globalization and liberalization program brought a substantial
       expansion in South Korea's trading and economic ties. The South now has membership of
       the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization of Economic Co-operation
       and Development (OECD). Its companies have set up businesses all over the world,
       particularly in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states, European
       Union (EU) countries, Eastern-Central Europe and the republics of the former USSR.
       Despite the 1997 Asian financial crisis, South Korea's international relations widened and
       deepened under Kim Dae-jung. This was partly the result of the radical reform measures
       taken to strengthen the market economy and to improve foreign investment and trading
       facilities.

       The improvement in South Korea's international position can be largely attributed to the
       efforts of successive presidents designed to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula and in
       the region by gradually drawing North Korea out of isolation and helping it to survive its
       chronic problems. These efforts coalesced in President Kim Dae-jung's 'sunshine' policy
       of engagement for which Kim was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 2000.

       A growing respect for South Korea's foreign policy has recently led to closer ties with
       Australia and New Zealand, both of which seek to strengthen bilateral co-operation with
       Seoul in the economic, defense and security spheres. Seoul is keen to enlist the help of
       these and other countries to facilitate North Korea's integration into the international
       community, although the October 2006 nuclear test could mitigate against such a trend in
       the short term.

       Multilateral Relations

       The eagerness with which Seoul grasped the opportunities presented by the ending of the
       superpower confrontation to expand its overseas political and economic links has brought
       it dividends. Aside from its considerable economic success, South Korea has become a
       highly respected member of the international community, actively involved in many
       international organizations, as demonstrated by the appointment of former foreign
       minister Ban Ki-moon as UN secretary general in January 2007.

       South Korea is largely aligned with the US and its allies. Its bilateral defense treaty with
       the US (the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953) is its only binding defense agreement
       although it does have another defense agreement with the 16 countries (including the US)
       which were involved in the Korean War under UN auspices. However, this agreement,


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       which declares that in the event of further conflict with North Korea, these states would
       aid South Korea, is thought to be moribund. South Korea also has military co-operation
       and exchange agreements with other states including, inter alia, Japan, the UK and
       Russia.

       South Korea is either a member of, or a participant in, several official ('track one')
       regional economic or security co-operation groups. These include the Asia-Pacific
       Economic Cooperation (APEC); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); the ASEAN Post
       Ministerial Conference; the Chiefs of Defense Conference (open to Asia-Pacific countries
       covered by the US Pacific Command); ASEAN+3 (the ASEAN member states plus
       Japan, China and South Korea) and the TCOG (Trilateral Co-ordination and Oversight
       Group), including Japan, the US and South Korea. Seoul is a founder member of the
       extra-regional group Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), established in 1996. It is also a
       dialogue partner in the South Pacific Forum which seeks to increase bilateral economic
       and political co-operation between member and affiliated countries.

       Of the unofficial ('track two') regional groups, South Korea is a member of the Northeast
       Asia Co-operation Dialogue (NEACD) set up in 1993 as a private-level security forum
       involving scholars with expertise in political and military affairs from China, Japan,
       Russia, North Korea, South Korea and the US. A further group is the Council for Security
       Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). Established in 1993, its membership is open
       to all Asia-Pacific countries and representation is through institutes handling matters
       dealing with international security.

       Relations with China

       Sino-South Korean relations are characterized by a complex fusion of historical mistrust,
       fears over current alignments, and similarities in current strategic goals and trade. The
       warming of bilateral political relations has been assisted by summit diplomacy, with
       regular contacts taking place between the two states at a variety of other levels. Seoul has
       offered its support for Beijing's 'one-China' policy and also backed China's membership
       of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

       Economic co-operation

       This dichotomy between the benefits of co-operation and the latent fear of Chinese
       dominance of the Korean peninsula is nowhere more evident that in trade ties between
       the two countries. Diplomatic relations between Seoul and Beijing were formally
       established only in 1992 and the expansion of trading links has accelerated rapidly since
       then. Bilateral trade more than tripled in value between 1992 and 1996 to USD20 billion;
       its value reached USD30 billion by 2000 and in 2002, China became South Korea's
       biggest export destination. In 2005, trade between China and South Korea totaled over
       USD100 billion.

       However, despite the clear economic benefits of such trade, with China now consistently
       South Korea's largest trade partner, there are also fears that Beijing is closing the
       technology gap between its industries and those of South Korea. In the short term,


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       therefore, South Korea will continue to benefit from trade, but in the long term, economic
       co-operation could become competition and China looks set to become South Korea's
       greatest regional economic rival.

       Shared security goals

       A similar bipolarity is evident in strategic concerns of the two countries. South Korea is
       one of the strongest US allies in East Asia, and over 30,000 US troops are still based on
       the Korean peninsula, a fact that ensures Beijing's wariness in dealings with Seoul.
       Similarly, South Korea retains mistrust of China's interest in the Korean peninsula given
       the historical dominance exerted by China, given that the Chinese script was used on the
       Korean peninsula as the primary written form between the 2nd century BCE and the 15th
       century and Korea was officially an independent tributary of Qing dynasty China
       between 1637 and 1895.

       However, the two countries share several strategic goals that currently override this
       mistrust and ensure that the difference in their global alliances are an irritation rather than
       a cause for conflict. In particular, both Beijing and Seoul are opposed to Japan's potential
       constitutional amendment and possible re-armament, fearing that this may be a
       destabilizing factor in the region. Historically, China has engaged in military endeavors
       on the Korean peninsula several times to prevent Japanese encroachment, including the
       1894-1895 First Sino-Japanese war and during the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592-
       1598). The modern history of the Imperial Japanese Army in both China (1931-1945) and
       South Korea (1905-1945), tainted by allegations of the use of 'comfort women' (sex
       slaves for the military) and labor conscription, still colors regional relations and any hint
       of Japanese historical revisionism, including visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese
       politicians and the publication of history textbooks, leads to immediate condemnation by
       both China and South Korea.

       Moreover, Beijing and Seoul currently hold very similar views on the issue of North
       Korea, despite China remaining North Korea's chief ally, and Sino-North Koreans
       relations remain relatively strong, despite periodic squabbles and Beijing's exasperation
       at Pyongyang's brinkmanship. The Sino-South Korean policy sits in stark contrast to the
       more confrontational policy pursued by the US and to a lesser extent Japan. China has
       shown its approval of South Korea's 'engagement' policy towards the North, and in
       putting forward its own 'five principles to reduce inter-Korean tension' in January 1999, it
       endorsed all aspects of Seoul's approach to Pyongyang.

       The reasons for this similarity lie in both the desire of Beijing and Seoul to avoid a war
       on the Korean peninsula, and Beijing's desire to play a positive and mediatory role in
       attempts to resolve the current nuclear impasse between Pyongyang and Washington in
       order to increase its own diplomatic influence. China's participation in the trilateral talks
       held in Beijing between 22-25 April 2003 was largely that of 'impartial arbiter', and was
       clearly a vital factor in allowing both of the primary parties to the dispute, North Korea
       and the US, to engage in six-party talks since then. After the failure of the trilateral
       Beijing talks, China's active diplomacy was largely credited with persuading North Korea
       to accept the US' preferred multilateral format of six-party talks, while following the 9


                                                            45
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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       October nuclear test on in North Korea, Beijing was vital in persuading Pyongyang to
       return to the six-party talks format.

       Fear of intervention

       Such similarity in strategic objectives means that South Korea and China often find
       themselves supporting each other's positions in regional affairs, occasionally both
       rejecting US policy. However, the foundation of Sino-South Korean relations remains
       unsettled by Seoul's fear of further Chinese intervention on the Korea peninsula. The
       worry remains that if the Pyongyang regime disintegrated and chaos on North Korea's
       borders with China prompted military intervention by Beijing, this intervention might
       become permanent. The willingness of China to militarily intervene was clearly
       demonstrated by the Korean War, when 270,000 Chinese troops crossed the Yalu river
       from 25 October 1950 and effectively halted and turned the United Nations advance.

       South Korea's sensitivity on this issue was exacerbated by Beijing's attempts to rewrite
       the history of the ancient Korean kingdom of Koguryo (27BC-668AD) on the website of
       a state-funded think tank, the Northeast Asia Project, created in 2002. The website
       described Koguryo as a 'regional government set up by an ethnic group'. The Chinese
       Ministry of Foreign Affairs also reportedly deleted reference to Koguryo as a 'Korean'
       kingdom from the Korean history section of its website. Seoul, fearing an inept attempt to
       provide an historical rationale for future intervention in the peninsula, reacted angrily.
       Such South Korean fears of Chinese intervention and dominance are only likely to grow
       as China's military modernization and economic expansion continues apace.

       Relations with Japan

       South Korea's mistrust of Japan is an enduring feature of their relationship, to a greater
       extent than that which characterizes Sino-South Korean relations. Such suspicions have
       their roots in Japan's previous military encroachments on the Korean peninsula, and
       particularly to the period of Japanese colonial rule between 1910 and 1945 (the country
       was officially annexed in 1910, but an unofficial protectorate existed from 1905), and is
       sustained by the perception of Japanese historical revisionism and growing nationalism.
       The restoration of diplomatic links in 1965, although vital to South Korea's efforts to
       develop its economy, was initially greeted with anger and dismay in South Korea.

       Seoul is concerned about alterations to Japan's defense posture, its arms race with China
       and recurrent signs of a fresh nationalist surge. Perennial South Korean suspicions
       deepened in 1996 with Tokyo's announcement that it intends to apply its 200 mile EEZ
       with vigor and 'restore' its sovereignty to Dokdo (Takeshima in Japanese).

       North Korea encourages rapprochement

       A combination of South Korean diplomacy under Kim Dae-jung and a series of crises,
       provoked by North Korea, contributed to some positive adjustments in South Korean-
       Japan relations in 1998. The first ever bilateral security dialogue took place between
       high-level Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in June, with the aim of achieving


                                                            46
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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       'transparency' in each other's defense policies and increasing co-operation for possible
       regional contingencies. Following the test firing of a North Korean ballistic missile over
       Japan in September 1998, Seoul and Tokyo agreed to consider staging joint military
       exercises to counter the North's "aggressive military actions".

       During his term in office (1998-2003) President Kim Dae-jung progressively seized the
       initiative in bilateral ties with Japan. South Korea has continuously offered support to
       Tokyo amid its difficult dealings with the DPRK and has urged Tokyo to normalize ties
       with Pyongyang. The need for enhanced security dialogue as a result of changes to the
       Japanese-US security alliance and amendments to the Japanese-US Defense Guidelines,
       as well as the North Korea threat, led Seoul to propose an East Asian Economic Co-
       operation System to include Japan, China and the ROK.

       Cordial relations, bolstered by the announcement that South Korea and Japan were to co-
       host the 2002 World Cup, were jeopardized in April 2001 when South Korea recalled its
       ambassador to Japan in protest at the release of a school textbook, which claimed that
       Japan liberated Asia from Western colonizers in the Second World War. However, the
       need to retain Japan as a counterpoint to China and North Korea ensured that the incident
       did not escalate. In an apparent attempt to smooth relations on the eve of the 2002 World
       Cup and eradicate some of the friction remaining after the textbook issue, Japanese
       Emperor Akihito surprised the world by announcing in a speech that some of his
       ancestors had been from the royal house of Paekche, an ancient Korean kingdom.
       Although archaeological evidence for this is well-documented, Akihito's speech runs
       contrary to traditional Japanese efforts to maintain a distance between Japan and its Asian
       neighbors, and claim that Japan's civilization pre-dates and is distinct from those of either
       China or Korea.

       Diverging policy and continued irritants

       While Tokyo and Seoul have made strenuous efforts to harmonize their approaches to the
       difficult security issues posed by North Korea through the Trilateral Co-ordination and
       Oversight Group (TCOG), the unresolved issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North
       Korean agents has sharply hardened public attitudes toward North Korea in Japan and has
       effectively ensured that Tokyo has aligned its policy closer to Washington's punitive
       measures than Seoul's engagement policy. Japanese public opinion was enraged by the
       return of human remains Pyongyang claimed were those of Megumi Yokota, abducted in
       1978 by North Korean agents when she was 13 years. The remains were proved not to
       belong to the kidnapped girl after DNA testing. In January 2003, the Japanese ruling
       party (Liberal Democratic Party) and main opposition party (Democratic Party of Japan)
       agreed on a bill allowing the Japanese government to unilaterally impose financial
       sanctions on North Korea. The first bilateral sanctions were imposed in September 2006,
       in response to the failed test of the North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile, the
       Taepo Dong-2, with further sanctions in October 2006 following Pyongyang's nuclear
       test.

       With the South Korean-Japanese policy towards North Korea widening, despite their
       shared security objective of a denuclearized Korean peninsula, relations further soured


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       over the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute in late 2005. With the issue complicated by the
       presence of possible oil and gas resources in the vicinity of the islets, the importance of
       the islets to either country has increased. Tokyo's claim to Dokdo is based on its 1910
       annexation of the Korean peninsula. This quite naturally angers Koreans north and south,
       and, coupled with repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo by leading Japanese
       politicians, where the remains of Japanese war criminals are interred with the remains of
       other Japanese war dead, continues to ensure Japan's strained relations with South Korea
       in particular, and regional powers in general.

       Relations with North Korea

       Two issues have dominated inter-Korean relations: the North's nuclear weapons program
       and Pyongyang's unilateral rejection of the 1953 armistice agreement. As such, the two
       countries remain in a state of de jure war, and despite a policy of engagement since 1998,
       relations remain tense with occasional border clashes and little contact between the
       ethnically, linguistically and culturally homogenous populations.

       Armistice agreement

       Despite its rejection by Pyongyang, the 1953 armistice agreement has nonetheless
       effectively maintained peace on the Korean peninsula since the end of the Korean War.
       North Korea withdrew from the Military Armistice Commission in 1994 and closed its
       side of the Neutral National Supervisory Commission in 1996. In April 1996, it declared
       that it would no longer abide by the terms of the agreement and thenceforth engaged in a
       series of military incursions across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and submarine
       infiltration into South Korean waters over the ensuing three years. These moves should
       be understood in light of North Korea's continuing efforts to undermine the armistice
       structure in order to conclude a peace treaty with the US and drive a wedge between the
       US and South Korea. This issue is further complicated by the fact that, in the negotiations
       which dragged on for the final two years of the Korean War, then-South Korean president
       Syngman Rhee refused to sign the 1953 armistice.

       In response to Washington's proposal for four-party peace talks (involving the two
       Koreas, the US and China) to agree a new peace treaty for the Korean peninsula,
       preliminary talks occurred first in August 1997. These came to nothing in view of North
       Korea's insistence both that US forces be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula, as a pre-
       condition, and that Washington sign a separate peace treaty with Pyongyang. The North
       Korean military is clearly anxious to not let 'peace break out' before a peace treaty is
       signed with the US to formally end the 1950-3 Korean War. To Seoul's continued
       chagrin, North Korea's confrontation with Seoul and the ongoing tensions along the DMZ
       are clearly still an important bargaining card for Pyongyang.

       Nonetheless, President Roh Moo-hyun has proposed negotiations to resolve the aftermath
       of the Korean War between Washington and Pyongyang and in November 2005,
       Presidents Roh and Bush issued a joint statement to this effect. No negotiations have
       taken place and given the October 2006 nuclear test, no progress should be expected in
       the near future.


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Nuclear program

       A further hurdle in inter-Korean relations is the North Korean nuclear program and the
       seeming duplicity pursued by Pyongyang. Between 1992 and 1994 international fears in
       respect of Pyongyang's nuclear intentions grew as it obstructed inspections by the
       International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Eventually, in October 1994, a bilateral
       nuclear accord (the 'Agreed Framework') was signed by the US and North Korea
       providing for the replacement of the North's graphite-moderated nuclear reactors with
       two light water nuclear reactors, the cost of which was to be largely provided by Seoul,
       with Tokyo also providing USD1 billion. The US also pledge to provide 500,000 tons of
       heavy fuel oil annually until the new light water reactors were provided. In return for this,
       Pyongyang pledged to freeze its nuclear program.

       However, as the date for completion of the reactor project slipped back to 2008, North
       Korean skepticism of Washington's intentions to honor the deal increased, the incoming
       Bush administration's suspicions were raised surrounding Pyongyang's development of
       nuclear weapons and reluctance to allow IAEA inspections, and its evident desire to
       either distance itself from the 1994 accord or slow its implementation, led to a collapse in
       Washington-Pyongyang relations in October 2002. After first denying its contravention
       of its international obligations, North Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju
       admitted to visiting US Undersecretary of State James Kelly in October 2002 that North
       Korea was engaged in a clandestine program to produce fissile material via a uranium
       enrichment program. In response, the US persuaded its allies in the Korean peninsula
       Energy Development Organization (KEDO) consortium to punish North Korea by
       suspension of the deliveries of heavy fuel oil under the Agreed Framework in December
       2002.

       Subsequent attempts to negotiate the freeze of North Korea's nuclear program, primarily
       through the multilateral six-party talks brokered by China from August 2003, have failed,
       and Pyongyang's slow but steady progress towards a nuclear device was finally rewarded
       on 9 October 2006, with a test of a small device measuring with a yield less than one
       kiloton.

       'Sunshine' policy

       The North's nuclear program has been the focus of relations with North Korea for
       regional states and the US, but policies have varied widely. While the US has preferred
       punitive sanctions, South Korea has opted for engagement. Indeed, despite the October
       2006 nuclear test, South Korea stated that it would not end the 'sunshine' policy, the
       stratagem of economic and political association launched in February 1998 that evolved
       into a policy of comprehensive engagement in the succeeding year.

       The 'sunshine' policy's provisions constitute a major break with pre-1998 South Korean
       theory. It aims to break North Korea's isolation and bring it into the international
       community by encouraging other states to establish relations with Pyongyang. The policy
       also significantly renounces past measures aimed at destabilizing North Korea and
       bringing about any form of re-unification by absorption.


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       The 'sunshine' policy has provided some success. In June 2000 the first ever meeting of
       the two states' leaders occurred in Pyongyang. Seoul's declared aims were economic co-
       operation, reunions of divided families and political reconciliation. Moreover, inter-
       Korean trade has grown exponentially since the June 2000 summit. Trade between the
       two states reached USD1.3 billion in 2005. Seoul's more ambitious economic aid
       packages in 2006 should ensure that South Korea will replace China as North Korea's
       most important trading partner. This quiet but rapid growth in inter-Korean trade and
       Pyongyang's consequently growing dependence on South Korean largesse has
       considerably increased Seoul's influence over the North.

       One of the key factors in the 'sunshine' policy has been the creation of special economic
       zones (SEZs). The new Kaesong SEZ, whose pilot stage was completed in June 2004, is
       significant both in that it heralds further growth in inter-Korean trade and in that it is a
       clear sign of a significant change of heart in Pyongyang. Previous SEZs, at Najin-
       Sonbong, and the proposed and now defunct Sinuiju Project, were intentionally sited as
       far away from South Korea as possible in the northeast and northwest of North Korea
       respectively. These earlier piecemeal efforts at economic reform were aimed at foreign
       (ie non-Korean) inward investment. However, Kaesong is in close proximity to the DMZ
       and signals Pyongyang's tacit acceptance of its future growing reliance on South Korean
       assistance to reform North Korea's moribund economy. In consequence, Seoul's influence
       over Pyongyang can be expected to increase.

       Nonetheless, despite this impressive rise in inter-Korean ties, Pyongyang has made it
       repeatedly clear through its actions that it is not prepared to allow a complete
       rapprochement with Seoul until North Korea's relations with the US are addressed. As a
       result of the June 2000 summit, work began on both sides of the DMZ to reconnect the
       rail lines that once linked the North and the South along the west and east coasts of the
       peninsula. However, in May 2006 Pyongyang unilaterally cancelled a test run along the
       main west coast line. In the light of a planned USD 2.6 billion aid package from South
       Korea in 2006, this provoked angry debate in South Korea over Pyongyang's goodwill
       towards its benefactor and the entire rationale behind Seoul's policy of open-handed
       engagement.

       Relations with the Russian Federation

       Russia and South Korea currently harbor an uneasy alliance, with Seoul historically wary
       of Moscow owing to its support of North Korea during and after the Korean War.
       However, the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and the Soviet Union
       in September 1990 brought a rapid broadening of economic, political and cultural links
       and military co-operation and exchanges. These later translated into ties with Russia and
       the Soviet successor states.




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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Wary friendship

       The gradual improvement in the Russian-South Korea bilateral relationship encouraged
       Moscow in September 1995 to announce that its 1961 friendship treaty with Pyongyang
       had been annulled. However, ambiguities in Russia's policy towards the Korean
       peninsula make Seoul's leaders wary. Russia was piqued at being excluded from the 1994
       nuclear agreement concerning North Korea and offered to supply Pyongyang with
       nuclear reactors of its own in 1995. Russian Navy reconnaissance aircraft continue to
       monitor South Korean air defenses. These ambiguities in Russia's Korea policy are
       partially the result of factional squabbles between opposing forces in the Kremlin.

       Nonetheless, South Korea has endeavored to befriend one of North Korea's neighbors.
       Russia's debt to South Korea was estimated at USD1.0 billion by 2000, but Moscow
       experienced problems in repaying the debt. In lieu of repayment, Seoul has accepted from
       Moscow a variety of defense equipment and supplies, including helicopters, armored
       vehicles, aluminum and enriched uranium for use as nuclear fuel. Other strategic
       partnerships have involved the Russian Aviation and Space Agency offering, in June
       1999, to launch satellites for South Korea and to develop jointly with Seoul
       telecommunications and earth-monitoring satellites. It also offered to make available to
       South Korea much of its space-related technology.

       Policy towards North Korea

       For Seoul, one of the most beneficial aspects of its relationship with Russia is the
       agreement over policy towards North Korea. Moscow praised Seoul's policy of
       engagement with North Korea and welcomed South Korea's proposal for a six-party
       forum to discuss issues of security and peace on the Korean peninsula.

       Planned future projects involving Russia, South Korea and North Korea (including
       interstate electric ties, the building of a pipeline to deliver gas from Kovytka field to
       South Korea through North Korea and the connection of the trans-Siberian railway with
       the trans-Korea railway) are all premised on an improvement in inter-Korean relations,
       which would allow such ambitious projects to be completed. As these projects will
       provide considerable economic benefits to Russia, both in the form of revenues and in
       stimulating development of the Russian Far East, it must be assumed that Moscow is now
       firmly in favor of seeing, if not a reunited Korea, then at least one in which inter-Korean
       relations are considerably improved. Moscow's renewed interest in South Korea has been
       reflected in its willingness to send high-level envoys to Pyongyang at moments of crisis.
       After the June 2002 naval battle in the West Sea had threatened to sink the already
       strained 'sunshine' policy, Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov was
       dispatched to Pyongyang to mediate. This has been repeated with Moscow's sending of a
       delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov in an attempt to
       work out a compromise deal to draw Pyongyang and Washington back to direct
       negotiations on the nuclear issue.

       As the competition for energy resources increases in East Asia, it is evidently in the
       interests of both Seoul and Moscow to co-operate closely in trying to resolve the North


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Korean nuclear standoff in a manner in which the 'obstacle' to future regional
       development represented by North Korea's geographic position and strained regional
       relations can be peacefully overcome.

       Relations with the US

       The US is South Korea's closest ally. It provided Seoul with military assistance
       throughout the Korean War, during which some 33,000 US military personnel were killed
       in combat. Since 1953 a formal military treaty has existed between the two states and the
       US has over 30,000 troops based in South Korea. The US has been the dominant partner
       in their bilateral relationship. South Korea's foreign policy, defense posture and military
       procurement have been shaped by the US within the context of their bilateral alliance
       since the end of the Korean war.

       South Korea's remarkable economic and political success has taken place in the security
       context guaranteed by Seoul's alliance with Washington. Alternatives are few and all
       have their problems. Greater independence and initiative in its relations with Pyongyang
       carry an inherent and serious risk. The US-South Korea alliance has deterred Pyongyang
       for half a century and it is still unclear as to whether the North Korean military are as
       intimidated by the prospect of facing a South Korean military shorn of its US support.
       Closer ties with another growing regional power (China would be the prime candidate)
       would essentially place Seoul in a similar situation to the one it faces with the US; being
       the junior partner in an unequal relationship of dependence. In the absence of a regional
       security infrastructure, Seoul's relationship with Washington remains the cornerstone of
       its foreign policy.

       However, the bilateral US-South Korean relationship has loosened during the course of
       the 1990s. It is entirely logical that the South's growing economic strength, military
       power and political success have all strengthened Seoul's hand in its dealings with North
       Korea. A mutually desired, negotiated and agreed re-ordering of the alliance will both
       strengthen South Korea's independence and undermine Pyongyang's long-held strategy of
       prioritizing relations with Washington, while trying at every opportunity to sap the South
       Korea-US alliance; a policy North Korea has pursued relentlessly since 1962.

       The differences between Washington and Seoul that became apparent in their respective
       attitudes to KEDO during the 1990s reflect opposing views of the future of the
       negotiations with Pyongyang, and Seoul's somewhat ambivalent attitude to North Korea
       and its nuclear ambitions. While Seoul and Washington agree on the need for a Korean
       peninsula free of nuclear weapons, nuclear power is another matter. Both Koreas are
       desperately short of energy resources in an increasingly energy-competitive region.
       Nuclear power in a North Korea, which has abundant supplies of uranium, would be a
       logical source of energy. However, Pyongyang's long-standing desire for nuclear
       weapons and its own autarkic juche philosophy that advocates national politico-economic
       independence, especially in key areas such as energy, complicate the picture, as does
       Pyongyang's long-standing efforts to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington.




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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       This leaves Seoul in a very difficult position in which it must attempt to placate its
       longstanding ally in Washington, drive forward plans for growing economic inter-Korean
       inter-dependence and political reconciliation while remaining aware of the continued
       inherent danger Pyongyang may still represent.

       Despite the oft-reported and real growing frictions on these important policy differences,
       however, it is worth remembering that public opinion polls in South Korea consistently
       show that the majority of the South Korean population remain grateful to the US for its
       long commitment to the country and wish for that relationship to continue. As such,
       although opinions might diverge over policy towards North Korea, and a partial US
       withdrawal planned by 2012 would appear to be an attempt to have South Korea assume
       greater responsibility for its own security, the US will remain Seoul's primary ally and
       guarantor for the foreseeable future.

       Trade and External Assistance

       Exports

       The US, Japan, Hong Kong and China take a large proportion of South Korea's exports.
       In recent years, particularly after the establishment of full diplomatic ties with China,
       South Korea has turned increasingly towards Asia in its efforts to expand its economy.

       Trade partner                    Exports, per cent of total
                                        (2005)
       China (excl Hong Kong and        22.6
       Macau)
       European Union                   16.0
       United States                    15.2
       Japan                            8.8
       Hong Kong                        5.7
       Singapore                        2.7
       Indonesia                        1.8
       Malaysia                         1.7
       India                            1.7
       Other                            18.5
       Source: European Union


       Imports

       Japan, the US, China and Germany are major exporters to South Korea.

       Trade partner                    Imports, per cent of total
                                        (2005)
       Japan                            19.1
       China (excl Hong Kong and        15.3



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Macau)
       United States                    12.2
       European Union                   10.8
       Saudi Arabia                     6.4
       United Arab Emirates             4.0
       Australia                        3.9
       Indonesia                        3.2
       Malaysia                         2.4
       Kuwait                           2.4
       Other                            16.4
       Source: European Union


       Historical Background

       Date        Events
       1905        Japanese protectorate established over Korea after Russia's defeat by Japan in the 1904-05
                   Russo-Japanese War.
       1910        Japan formally annexed Korea (August).
       1945        US occupation of southern Korea began. American Military Government set up (September).
                   Agreement on five-year trusteeship for Korea under US, USSR, UK and China (December).
       1947        UN became involved in peacekeeping in South Korea.
       1948        Republic of Korea founded.
       1950        North Korean troops invaded South Korea (June), initiating the Korean War. UN forces
                   intervened.
                   Chinese troops intervened in the Korean War fearing the proximity of UN troops to the
                   Chinese border (October).
       1953        Korean War ended. Armistice agreement signed by the UN Command and North Korea, but
                   not by South Korea (July).
       1965        South Korean-Japanese treaty on the restoration of diplomatic links ratified in the National
                   Assembly (August).
       1977        Carter administration in the US announced a phased withdrawal of US combat forces from
                   South Korea.
       1979        The US reversed its decision to withdraw forces from South Korea on the grounds that North
                   Korea's military superiority in men and tanks over South Korea was excessive.
       1988        President Roh Tae-woo adopted 'nordpolitik' to improve relations with communist states.
       1989        US began military personnel withdrawals from South Korea, with the intention of reducing
                   US troop strength there by half by 1997.
       1990        Diplomatic relations established with the Soviet Union (September).
       1991        South Korea and North Korea joined the UN (September).
                   The US postponed any further troop cuts from South Korea in view of North Korea's
                   suspected nuclear weapon construction (November).
                   President Roh Tae-woo announced that all nuclear weapons had been removed from South
                   Korea (December).
       1992        Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Co-operation, and
                   the Joint Declaration of the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed by both Koreas



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


                  (February).
                  Diplomatic relations established with China (August).
       1994       North Korea and US signed Geneva Accords - later known as the 'Agreed Framework'
                  (October).
       1995       Agreement signed between North Korea and KEDO, whose members include the two
                  Koreas, the US and Japan, to supply two light-water nuclear reactors to the North
                  (December).
       1996       Pyongyang declared that it would no longer observe the 1953 armistice treaty and sponsored
                  three armed incursions into South Korea. The US suggested four-power talks between the
                  two Koreas, the US and China to implement a new peace settlement on the Korean peninsula
                  (April).
                  North Korean submarine incursion on South Korea's east coast (September).
                  Suspected North Korean assassination of South Korean diplomat in Russia (October).
       1997       Hwang Jang-yop, North Korea's ideologue and highest-ranked defector since the Korean
                  War, arrived in South Korea (May).
                  Armed incursion into South Korean territory led to exchanges of artillery and rifle fire (July).
                  Full four-power talks failed in Geneva given Pyongyang's insistence that a peace agreement
                  be signed between Washington and Pyongyang alone, and that US troops must be removed
                  from South Korea (December).
       1998       The first bilateral high-level inter-Korean talks since 1994 took place (March).
                  The first ever high-level bilateral security dialogue took place between South Korea and
                  Japan to increase security co-operation (June).
                  Diplomatic row broke out between Seoul and Moscow following the deportation of a South
                  Korean diplomat for spying in Russia and the subsequent deportation of a Russian diplomat
                  from Seoul. The South Korean foreign and trade minister was forced to resign as a result
                  (July).
                  North Korean spy boat sunk in South Korean waters after gun battle with South Korean
                  Navy (December).
       1999       President Kim Dae-jung announced his 'package deal' towards North Korea, based on
                  encouraging the normalization of ties between the North and both the US and Japan
                  (February).
                  Two further rounds of four-party peace talks (January/February and April).
                  North Korean patrol boats intruded into South Korean territorial waters in the Yellow Sea
                  (June).
                  The first ever joint naval exercises between the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
                  (JMSDF) and the South Korean Navy took place (August).
                  North Korea unilaterally declared a new maritime boundary 70 km south of the Northern
                  Limit Line (NLL), which Seoul immediately rejected (August).
                  South Korean-US Criminal Extradition Treaty ratified by US Senate (November).
                  South Korean company KEPCO signed a USD4.6 billion contract with KEDO to begin the
                  construction of light-water reactors in North Korea (December).
       2000       The heads of state of the South and the North met in Pyongyang- the first meeting of its kind
                  since partition (June).
                  The first meetings for 15 years among divided family members occurred in Seoul and
                  Pyongyang (August).
                  The defense ministers of the two Koreas met for the first time. They agreed to allow mine-
                  clearing operations in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to facilitate the completion of the
                  project to restore the rail link between the two states. (September).
       2001       The militaries of the South and the North agreed on arrangements for reconnection of the
                  disused railway link between the two states. The 41-point agreement included the
                  establishment of a military hotline (February).
                  South Korea withdrew its ambassador from Japan following textbook controversy (April).
       2002       Japanese Emperor Akihito stated that some of his ancestors had hailed from the ancient


                                                            55
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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


                  Korean kingdom of Paekche. This was interpreted as an attempt to improve relations in the
                  run up to the 2002 World Cup to be jointly hosted by Japan and Korea (February).
                  The co-hosting of the World Cup in summer 2002 with Japan contributes greatly to the
                  improvement of bilateral relations.
                  Naval battle in the Yellow Sea (West Sea) between North and South Korean ships (June).
                  North Korea apparently admitted the existence of a program for the enrichment of uranium
                  leading to the suspension of deliveries of heavy fuel oil (HFO) by the US-led KEDO
                  consortium. (October)
       2003       Seoul announced it would donate 500,000 tons of surplus rice annually to North Korea
                  (March).
                  South Korea raised the issue of North Korea's nuclear program in the 10th round of bilateral
                  ministerial-level talks (April).
                  First round of six-party talks held in Beijing on North Korea's nuclear program. No
                  agreement was reached (August).
                  Executive Board of KEDO decided to 'suspend' the construction of two light water reactors
                  in North Korea (November).
       2004       South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoon Young-kwan resigned and was replaced by
                  Ban Ki-moon (January).
                  South Korea welcomed North Korea's offer to re-freeze its nuclear activities, but insisted the
                  North's suspected enriched uranium program be included in any future deal (February).
                  North Korea cancelled planned inter-ministerial talks with Seoul citing the impeachment of
                  President Roh as a 'coup' (March).
                  14th round of inter-Korean ministerial talks in Pyongyang (May).
                  General officer-level talks between the two Koreas' militaries decided on three tension-
                  reduction measures (June).
                  Completion of pilot industrial facility as part of planned SEZ in North Korean city of
                  Kaesong (June).
                  468 North Koreans arrived in South Korea via Vietnam, in the largest-ever mass defection
                  (July).
       2005       South Korean Minister for Unification Chung Dong-young announced that Seoul's policy of
                  economic co-operation and assistance to the North would be unchanged by North Korea's
                  formal 10 February declaration of nuclear status and indefinite suspension of participation in
                  the six-party talks (February).
                  16th inter-Korean cabinet-level talks held in Seoul. Agreements reached on the establishment
                  of a trade office in Kaesong and increased economic co-operation including South Korean
                  investment in the North's mining sector (June).
                  South Korean Minister for Unification Chung Dong-young met Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang
                  and offered to supply 20 per cent of the North's electricity needs if North Korea abandoned
                  its nuclear weapons (July).
                  Military hotline established between the North and South to prevent inadvertent clashes
                  (August).
                  Washington imposed sanctions on the Banco Delta Asia for alleged money laundering on
                  behalf of North Korea. Pyongyang refused to return to the six-party talks until the sanctions
                  were lifted (September).
                  In a joint statement, Presidents Roh and Bush stated talks should be held to draw up a peace
                  treaty to formally end the Korean War and 'improve confidence and reduce tension'
                  (November).
                  17th inter-Korean cabinet-level talks held at South Korean resort of Jeju Island. North Korea
                  refused to discuss the nuclear issue or its most recent dispute with Washington (December)
       2006       Seoul agreed in principle to 'strategic flexibility' for US forces based in Korea (January).
                  Washington and Seoul began negotiations towards a free trade agreement (February).
                  South-North Korean military talks held but failed to reach any agreement on the NLL
                  (March).
                  North Korea accepted former South Korean president Kim Dae-jung's plan to visit



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


                  Pyongyang in June (April).
                  US imposed further sanctions on North Korea by banning US citizens and companies from
                  using North Korean vessels (April).
                  18th round of inter-Korean ministerial-level talks held in Pyongyang after a one-month delay
                  caused by Pyongyang's protests over annual joint South Korean-US military exercises (April)
                  North and South Korea opened talks on increasing economic co-operation through the Inter-
                  Korean Economic Co-operation Promotion Committee (May).
                  North Korea tested seven ballistic missiles, including a (failed) test of its intercontinental
                  ballistic missile, the Taepo-dong 2 (July).
                  North Korea tested a small nuclear device (October).
                  South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Ban Ki-moon appointed UN secretary-general-
                  elect (October).


       War to war (1945-1953)

       The 1945 partitioning of the Korean peninsula resulting from the defeat of Japan and the
       beginning of the Cold War ideological confrontation, between the US and the USSR, was
       deeply unpopular in Korea and incomprehensible to the majority of Koreans. Widespread
       unrest resulted from the US military occupation government's decision to not recognize
       the people's committees which had sprung up after the Japanese surrender. This led to a
       long and bloody campaign of suppression on the part of the US occupation forces and
       their Korean allies of the popular ad hoc committees and their supporters between 1945-
       48

       Founded in August 1948, the Republic of Korea led by veteran nationalist Syngman Rhee
       reflected from the outset the extreme polarization of Korean politics as a result of both
       the divisions sown in Korean society by resistance and collaboration with the long and
       brutal Japanese occupation, and the then-embryonic Cold War struggle between Moscow
       and Washington. The foundation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the
       north of the peninsula the following month set the stage for a bitter ideological struggle
       which became increasingly violent and militarized and resulted in open conflict.

       The Korean War began in June 1950 when forces from the North invaded the South.
       However, border incursions of ever-growing ferocity had preceded this for two years
       after the withdrawal of US and Soviet troops and the establishment of the two rival
       Korean states in 1948. The UN (in the absence of the Soviet delegation) sanctioned
       international intervention on the side of South Korea and forces from 21 states
       participated in the US-led UN intervention. After the US-led forces had pushed the North
       Korean People's Army (KPA) north as far as the Yalu river border with China, forces
       from the newly founded China joined the conflict in support of North Korea in November
       1950. The internationalization of the conflict was extremely costly to the Korean people
       and it is estimated that approximately four million Koreans died in the Korean War.

       Post-war South Korea 1953-60

       The Korean War concluded with an armistice signed by the UN Command, North Korea
       and its Chinese allies. South Korean President Rhee, however, refused to sign,
       demanding instead that the war continue until the final defeat of Kim Il-sung and his
       Chinese supporters.

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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       South Korean foreign policy during the period of Rhee's dictatorial reign was
       characterized by absolute dependence on US force of arms and generous economic
       support, and intense opposition to North Korea. Rhee's unification policy was summed up
       in the slogan 'March north and unify!' (bukjin tongil).

       During this period Seoul made little if any attempt to develop relations with other states.

       Revolution, coup and democratization (1960-87)

       Rhee's rule was overturned after South Korea's students, always at the vanguard of
       change and opposition to dictatorship, led nationwide protests at Rhee's blatant vote-
       rigging and the police's torture and murder of a young student.

       Rhee was forced into exile in Hawaii and the opposition parties in the National
       Assembly, led by Chang Myon, began a brief period of democratic cabinet rule. As
       demonstrations demanding immediate re-unification with the North convulsed and
       paralyzed the country, however, a military coup led by army officers Park Chung-hee and
       his nephew by marriage Kim Jong-pil took power on May 16 1961.

       This ushered in South Korea's rapid and impressive economic growth and began to
       redress the economic balance with North Korea which had forged ahead of the South in
       terms of economic recovery after the disaster of the war.

       Unlike his predecessor, Park began to develop foreign relations and even to talk to North
       Korea; the first diplomatic agreement to be signed by the two rivals, the July 4 Joint
       Communiqué, was signed in 1972.

       In the same year, however, Park began to tighten his grip on power with the introduction
       of the Yushin (renewal) Constitution. This document gave Park absolute control over the
       country and led to growing protests, again spearheaded by the students.

       After Park's assassination by Kim Jae-kyu, the head of the Korean Central Intelligence
       Agency (KCIA), in still unexplained circumstances, a brief period of caretaker rule led to
       another coup led by army officers Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo on 12 December
       1979.

       Unpopular and marked by violence and repression from the start, Chun's rule met with
       growing protests which were eventually to usher in South Korea's democratization in
       1987. After a split between the two main opposition figures - Kim Young-sam and Kim
       Dae-jung - Chun's co-conspirator Roh Tae-woo was elected president.

       Roh quickly established the trend which still pertains in South Korean foreign policy of
       both developing Seoul's relations with other countries, and drawing North Korea into a
       dialogue and eventually into a co-operative relationship with the South.




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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       This has fitfully, as under the rule of Roh's successor Kim Young-sam, continued to
       establish South Korea as a responsible and influential actor on the international scene,
       and to slowly improve relations with the North.

       Engagement with the North 1998-

       Today's improved inter-Korean relations are based on the policy framework developed by
       Roh Tae-woo, which was to evolve into Kim Dae-jung's 'sunshine' policy of engagement
       launched in 1998. However, despite this improvement, outstanding issues of contention
       (North Korea's nuclear programs, the absence of a peace treaty or even diplomatic
       recognition between the two Koreas, Pyongyang's missile program and its refusal to
       recognize the Northern Limit Line unilaterally set by the UN command in the aftermath
       of the Korean War) remain unchanged.

       5. International Organization Participation
             International AfDB, APEC, APT, ARF, AsDB, ASEAN (dialogue partner), Australia Group, BIS,
              organization CP, EAS, EBRD, FAO, IADB, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICC, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IEA,
             participation: IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITU,
                            ITUC, LAIA, MIGA, NEA, NSG, OAS (observer), OECD, ONUB, OPCW, OSCE
                            (partner), PCA, PIF (partner), SAARC (observer), UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO,
                            UNHCR, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMOGIP, UNOMIG, UNWTO, UPU, WCL,
                            WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO, ZC
       Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

       6. Diplomatic Representation in the United States

                Diplomatic chief of mission: Ambassador LEE Tae-sik
          representation in chancery: 2450 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008
                   the US: telephone: [1] (202) 939-5600
                            FAX: [1] (202) 387-0205
                            consulate(s) general: Agana (Guam), Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Honolulu, Houston,
                            Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Seattle
       Source: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

       7. U.S. Diplomatic Representation
                Diplomatic chief of mission: Ambassador Alexander VERSHBOW
             representation embassy: 32 Sejong-no, Jongno-gu, Seoul 110-710
              from the US: mailing address: American Embassy Seoul, Unit 15550, APO AP 96205-5550
                            telephone: [82] (2) 397-4114
                            FAX: [82] (2) 738-8845
       http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

       REGISTRATION/EMBASSY LOCATION: Americans living in or visiting the Republic of
       Korea are encouraged to register on the Internet at http://www.usembassy.state.gov/seoul or
       http://www.asktheconsul.org/, by fax (011-82-02)-397-4101, or in person at the Consular Section
       of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and obtain updated information on travel and security within the
       Republic of Korea. American citizens may also sign up for warden messages and monthly



                                                            59
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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       newsletters by providing their e-mail address at http://www.asktheconsul.org or by sending an e-
       mail to join-seoulacs@mh.databack.com. The U.S. Embassy is located at 82 Sejong-Ro Chongro-
       Ku, Seoul, telephone (82-2) 397-4114 fax (82-2) 738-8845. The U.S. Embassy's web page can be
       found at http://usembassy.state.gov/seoul

       Ambassador to South Korea – Alexander Vershbow
       Alexander Vershbow was sworn in as Ambassador to the Republic
       of Korea on October 14, 2005 and took up his duties on October 17,
       2005. He is a career member of the Foreign Service, with rank of
       Career Minister, and has extensive experience in East-West
       relations, non-proliferation and European security affairs.

       From July 2001 to July 2005, Ambassador Vershbow served as U.S.
       Ambassador to the Russian Federation. During his tenure, the
       Ambassador worked to promote U.S.-Russian cooperation in the
       areas of counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, and to expand
       the agenda to encompass new challenges such as HIV/AIDS. He was
       a consistent advocate for the causes of democracy, human rights and rule of law in
       Russia, and received the American Bar Association‘s 2004 Ambassador‘s Award for
       these efforts. He also promoted U.S. business interests in Russia, advancing American
       trade, exports and investment during a period of unprecedented Russian economic
       growth, while campaigning for the protection of intellectual property rights.

       From January 1998 until July 2001, Alexander Vershbow served as the U.S. Ambassador
       to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As U.S. Permanent Representative on
       the North Atlantic Council, Ambassador Vershbow was centrally involved in
       transforming NATO to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era, including the
       admission of new members and the development of relations with Russia. In June 2001,
       Secretary of State Colin L. Powell awarded Ambassador Vershbow the State
       Department's Distinguished Service Award for his work at NATO.

       From 1994 to 1997, Alexander Vershbow served as Special Assistant to the President and
       Senior Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council. During this period,
       he helped shape U.S. policy toward NATO enlargement, the conflicts in the former
       Yugoslavia, and other U.S.-European issues. He was a principal member of the U.S. team
       that helped negotiate the Founding Act between NATO and the Russian Federation
       signed in 1997. In October 1997, former Secretary of Defense William Cohen presented
       Mr. Vershbow with the first annual Joseph J. Kruzel Award for his contributions to the
       cause of peace.

       Ambassador Vershbow is a long-time student of Russian Affairs and international
       relations. He received a B.A. in Russian and East European Studies from Yale College
       (1974) and a Master's Degree in International Relations and Certificate of the Russian
       Institute from Columbia University (1976). He has held a series of assignments since
       joining the Foreign Service in 1977, including postings to the U.S. Embassies in Moscow
       and London and Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
       in Geneva. Ambassador Vershbow was director of the State Department's Office of


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Soviet Union Affairs during the last years of the USSR and participated in numerous
       U.S.-Soviet summits and ministerial meetings. In 1990, he was awarded the Anatoly
       Sharansky Freedom Award by the Union of Councils of Soviet Jews for his work in
       advancing the cause of Jewish emigration from the USSR.

       In 1991, Ambassador Vershbow was posted to NATO as U.S. Deputy Permanent
       Representative and Charge d'affaires of the U.S. Mission, where he participated in
       NATO's earliest initiatives to forge cooperative relations with Russia and the other states
       of the former Warsaw Pact. He served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
       for European and Canadian Affairs from 1993-1994, before joining the National Security
       Council Staff in 1994.

       Ambassador Vershbow was born in Boston, Massachusetts. His wife, Lisa, is a prominent
       designer of contemporary jewelry.

        Source: Embassy of the U.S., Seoul, Korea
       http://seoul.usembassy.gov/ambassador_info.html

       8. Economy
       Overview

                 Economy - Since the 1960s, South Korea has achieved an incredible record of growth and
                  overview: integration into the high-tech modern world economy. Four decades ago, GDP per
                            capita was comparable with levels in the poorer countries of Africa and Asia. In
                            2004, South Korea joined the trillion dollar club of world economies. Today its GDP
                            per capita is equal to the lesser economies of the EU. This success was achieved by a
                            system of close government/business ties, including directed credit, import
                            restrictions, sponsorship of specific industries, and a strong labor effort. The
                            government promoted the import of raw materials and technology at the expense of
                            consumer goods and encouraged savings and investment over consumption. The
                            Asian financial crisis of 1997-99 exposed longstanding weaknesses in South Korea's
                            development model, including high debt/equity ratios, massive foreign borrowing,
                            and an undisciplined financial sector. GDP plunged by 6.9% in 1998, then recovered
                            by 9.5% in 1999 and 8.5% in 2000. Growth fell back to 3.3% in 2001 because of the
                            slowing global economy, falling exports, and the perception that much-needed
                            corporate and financial reforms had stalled. Led by consumer spending and exports,
                            growth in 2002 was an impressive 7%, despite anemic global growth. Between 2003
                            and 2006, growth moderated to about 4-5%. A downturn in consumer spending was
                            offset by rapid export growth. Moderate inflation, low unemployment, an export
                            surplus, and fairly equal distribution of income characterize this solid economy.
         GDP (purchasing $1.18 trillion (2006 est.)
           power parity):
              GDP (official $897.4 billion (2006 est.)
            exchange rate):
        GDP - real growth 4.8% (2006 est.)
                     rate:
          GDP - per capita $24,200 (2006 est.)
                   (PPP):
        GDP - composition agriculture: 3%



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


                  by sector: industry: 45%
                             services: 52% (2006 est.)
               Labor force: 23.77 million (31 December 2006 est.)
           Labor force - by agriculture: 6.4%
               occupation: industry: 26.4%
                            services: 67.2% (2006 est.)
            Unemployment 3.3% (December 2006 est.)
                    rate:
         Population below 15% (2003 est.)
             poverty line:
        Household income lowest 10%: 2.9%
        or consumption by highest 10%: 25% (2005 est.)
         percentage share:
             Distribution of 35.8 (2000)
            family income -
                Gini index:
             Inflation rate 2.2% (2006 est.)
        (consumer prices):
         Investment (gross 28.4% of GDP (2006 est.)
                   fixed):
                    Budget: revenues: $200 billion
                            expenditures: $201 billion; including capital expenditures of $NA (2006 est.)
               Public debt: 31.9% of GDP (2006 est.)
              Agriculture - rice, root crops, barley, vegetables, fruit; cattle, pigs, chickens, milk, eggs; fish
                 products:
                Industries: electronics, telecommunications, automobile production, chemicals, shipbuilding,
                            steel
                Industrial 8% (2006 est.)
        production growth
                     rate:
               Electricity - 345.2 billion kWh (2004)
               production:
               Electricity - 321 billion kWh (2004)
             consumption:
               Electricity - 0 kWh (2004)
                  exports:
               Electricity - 0 kWh (2004)
                  imports:
          Oil - production: 7,378 bbl/day (2004)
        Oil - consumption: 2.149 million bbl/day (2004)
              Oil - exports: 645,200 bbl/day (2004)
             Oil - imports: 2.263 million bbl/day (2004)
              Natural gas - 0 cu m (2004 est.)
               production:
              Natural gas - 27.84 billion cu m (2004 est.)
             consumption:



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


              Natural gas - 0 cu m (2004 est.)
                  exports:
              Natural gas - 28.93 billion cu m (2004 est.)
                  imports:
          Current account $2 billion (2006 est.)
                 balance:
                   Exports: $326 billion f.o.b. (2006 est.)
                 Exports - semiconductors, wireless telecommunications equipment, motor vehicles, computers,
              commodities: steel, ships, petrochemicals
        Exports - partners: China 21.8%, US 14.6%, Japan 8.5%, Hong Kong 5.5% (2005)
                   Imports: $309.3 billion f.o.b. (2006 est.)
                 Imports - machinery, electronics and electronic equipment, oil, steel, transport equipment,
              commodities: organic chemicals, plastics
       Imports - partners: Japan 18.5%, China 14.8%, US 11.8%, Saudi Arabia 6.2% (2005)
        Reserves of foreign $239 billion (2006 est.)
        exchange and gold:
           Debt - external: $249.4 billion (30 September 2006 est.)
            Economic aid - ODA, $744 million (2005)
                  donor:
       Source: CIA Factbook
       https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

       Main Economic Indicators

       Assessment

       The ROK's economy grew at an impressive rate for 30 years until 1996. At the average
       growth rate of 9 per cent per year, South Korea would be the seventh or eighth largest
       economy in the world by 2020.

       The economy's astonishing recovery after the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis was
       considerably assisted by effective measures taken by the Kim Dae-jung government to
       force through financial and corporate restructuring. This has helped enormously in
       eliminating the inefficiencies and insolvencies among Korean businesses. The
       development of the economy through the engine of the chaebol has meant, however, that
       SMEs in South Korea have long been starved of the necessary capital to improve their
       technology and hence to compete on the world market. This fundamental aspect of South
       Korea's modern economic development has yet to be effectively and comprehensively
       addressed, although low interest rates have significantly eased provision of capital for
       small and medium-sized enterprises.

       The economy has, however, become more externally-dependent in the process of
       recovery. Greater procurement of foreign capital and the market liberalization which
       followed the 1997-98 crisis both mean that the economy is more susceptible to outside
       shocks. However, as a country whose development has stemmed from a successful export
       driven policy, Korea is well-used to such shocks. One worry that has arisen over the past


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       couple of years has been the government's attempts to ensure GDP growth through
       domestic consumption-driven policies. This has resulted in rising levels of household
       debt; in 2002 this is thought to have risen to 75 per cent of GDP. This has also been
       accompanied by a concomitant fall in the savings rate. If this trend persists, the current
       account will fall into deficit. Despite generally effective steps to restructure the financial
       and corporate sectors, these sectors of the economy are still marred by lame duck
       institutions and the government has been loath to take the unpopular but necessary
       measures to either render them profitable or sell them.

       South Korea's trade has seen a clearly discernible shift from what was once over-
       dependence on the US towards diversification of trading partners, and, in particular, an
       exponential growth in trade with the PRC since the establishment of diplomatic relations
       in 1992. China, if the figures for Hong Kong are included in trade statistics, became the
       ROK's number one export destination in 2002. As with all predictions regarding Korea,
       however, forecasts of continued high rates of GDP growth and economic prosperity are
       all, of course, premised on a peaceful resolution to the problem of the DPRK's future, or
       at least a non-violent continuation of the status quo in Northeast Asia.

       The ROK's IMF debts were completely repaid in 2002 and most macroeconomic indices
       have seen a return to pre-crisis levels. Despite the slowdown in the world economy in the
       aftermath of 11 September 2001, South Korea posted GDP growth figures of 7 per cent in
       2002 and 3 per cent in 2003.

       Policy

       In the 40 years since the end of the Korean War, South Korea has undergone a series of
       changes. From a devastated economy with one of the world's lowest per capita incomes,
       the country has emerged as a major trading state. Politically it has developed from
       authoritarian and semi-military government into a working democracy.

       The country began to face the familiar problems of a relatively affluent economy - high
       labor costs, the need for technological improvements, competition from the next
       generation of Asian 'Tigers' (including China), the hunger of the public for more
       advanced consumer goods and increasing congestion and pollution in the country's cities.
       Further into the future is the prospect of unification with North Korea.

       The government realized in the mid-1990s that its economic regime was not appropriate
       to its political and economic status in the world. Thus a program of reforms was initiated
       to modernize the financial service sector, to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to
       imports and to ease the restrictions on foreign investment. The 1998 economic crisis
       inspired a more radical restructuring, however. The chaebol system of large corporations
       has been shaken, as has faith in the country's financial institutions and mechanisms.
       Faced with the disastrous effects of the 1997-98 financial crisis on taking power,
       President Kim Dae-jung diligently followed the stringent financial policies demanded by
       the IMF, despite the considerable social and political repercussions these were to have on
       his presidency. President Kim and his successor, President Roh Moo-hyun have had some
       success in reducing the country's heavy debt burden, however.


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       South Korea's long-term development strategy aims to build an advanced industrial
       economy, with the government playing a lesser but nevertheless important role in
       economic management. However, the restructuring of the chaebols is the most pressing
       concern for South Korea's government, and will be the key issue in the ROK's long term
       success or otherwise.


       Sector Analysis

       South Korea was not so long ago characterized by a heavy-handed statist approach to
       economics. However, its economy is now based on private ownership and the
       government only interferes indirectly through such measures as tax incentives. There are
       still some non-tariff import barriers, however.

       In 1990 South Korea became the world's sixth largest steel producer with the completion
       of the Kwang Yang blast furnace. A wide range of industrial machinery and equipment is
       produced and another major growth sector is the electronics industry. Ship building is
       now on the decline, but the car industry is expanding to meet the demands of both
       domestic and foreign markets. Two large petrochemical complexes, supported by several
       large refineries located along the three coasts of the country, have been developed to
       meet domestic demand.

       Other principal industrial products include cement, processed foods, plywood, chemical
       fertilizers, footwear, ceramics, glass, non-ferrous metals and farm implements. The
       Korean economy is notable for the concentration of capital in the ownership of large
       conglomerates known as chaebol. This structural characteristic was shaken by the 1997-
       98 economic crisis.

       Statistical Overview
                                     1999        2000        2001        2002        2003
       GDP (current US$ billion)     445.17      511.93      481.97      546.71      605.33
       GDP Growth (annual %)         9           8           4           7           3
       GDP per capita (constant      12,668      13,628      14,051      14,937      15,291
       1995 US$)
       FDI net inflows (BoP current 5,135        4,284       1,076       -702        n/a
       US$ million)
       Inflation, consumer prices    1           2           4           3           4
       (annual %)
       External debt, total (DoD     n/a         n/a         n/a         n/a         n/a
       current US$ billion)
       Exports of goods and          173.90      208.97      182.20      192.72      231.03
       services (current US$
       billion)
       Imports of goods and          144.10      192.84      171.15      185.17      215.77
       services (current US$
       billion)



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       Source
            World Development Indicators, World Bank
       Source: Jane‘s Information Group

       9. Infrastructure
           A. Communication

        Telephones - main 23.745 million (2005)
              lines in use:
             Telephones - 38.342 million (2005)
           mobile cellular:
        Telephone system: general assessment: excellent domestic and international services
                          domestic: NA
                          international: country code - 82; fiber-optic submarine cables - 1 Korea-Russia-
                          Japan, 1 Korea-Japan-Hong Kong, 3 Korea-Japan-China, 1 Korea-Japan-China-
                          Europe, 1 Korea-Japan-China-US-Taiwan, 1 Korea-Japan-China, 1 Korea-Japan-
                          Hong Kong-Taiwan, 1 Korea-Japan; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (1 Pacific
                          Ocean and 2 Indian Ocean) and 3 Inmarsat (1 Pacific Ocean and 2 Indian Ocean)
          Radio broadcast AM 61, FM 150, shortwave 2 (2005)
                 stations:
                Television 43 (plus 59 cable operators and 190 relay cable operators) (2005)
        broadcast stations:
          Internet country .kr
                     code:
            Internet hosts: 5.434 million (2005)
            Internet users: 33.9 million (2005)
       Sources: https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html
           B. Transportation

                  Airports: 107 (2006)
            Airports - with total: 69
           paved runways: over 3,047 m: 3
                            2,438 to 3,047 m: 21
                            1,524 to 2,437 m: 14
                            914 to 1,523 m: 11
                            under 914 m: 20 (2006)
           Airports - with total: 38
        unpaved runways: 914 to 1,523 m: 3
                           under 914 m: 35 (2006)
                 Heliports: 540 (2006)
                  Pipelines: gas 1,482 km; refined products 827 km (2006)
                  Railways: total: 3,472 km
                            standard gauge: 3,472 km 1.435-m gauge (1,361 km electrified) (2005)
                Roadways: total: 100,279 km
                          paved: 87,032 km (including 3,060 km of expressways)
                          unpaved: 13,247 km (2004)



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                Waterways: 1,608 km (most navigable only by small craft) (2006)
        Merchant marine: total: 669 ships (1000 GRT or over) 8,634,188 GRT/13,733,624 DWT
                         by type: bulk carrier 157, cargo 193, chemical tanker 98, container 81, liquefied gas
                         22, passenger 5, passenger/cargo 24, petroleum tanker 57, refrigerated cargo 17, roll
                         on/roll off 6, specialized tanker 3, vehicle carrier 6
                         foreign-owned: 22 (France 12, Japan 1, UK 2, US 7)
                         registered in other countries: 365 (Belize 4, Cambodia 23, China 2, Cyprus 1,
                         Georgia 1, Honduras 6, Hong Kong 6, Indonesia 1, Liberia 3, Malaysia 1, Malta 6,
                         Marshall Islands 1, Panama 291, Singapore 17, unknown 2) (2006)
                   Ports and Inch'on, Masan, P'ohang, Pusan, Ulsan
                  terminals:
       Source: CIA Fact Book
       https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html

       Infrastructure

       Country       Railways       Roads (km) Waterways Main                    Main Port
                     (km)                      (km)      Airport
       China         72,000         770,265       110,000        Beijing        Shanghai
                                                                 Capital
                                                                 International,
                                                                 Shanghai
                                                                 International
       Japan         25,526         859,000       1,770          Narita         Kobe
                                                                 International,
                                                                 Tokyo
       Mongolia      1,810          3,523         400            Buyant-Ude      None
                                                                 Ulaanbaatar
       North Korea 8,000            2,000         2,250          Pyongyang       Nampo
                                                                 Sunan
       South Korea 3,118            63,000        1,600          Incheon         Pusan
                                                                 International
       Taiwan        2,363          17,000        None           Chiang Kai- Kaohsiung
                                                                 shek (Taipei
                                                                 International);
                                                                 Kaohsiung


       Roads

       South Korea has 63,000 km of total road network. About 13,000 km of this is national
       highway, the remainder consisting of provincial and local roads.

       Railways

       Korean National Railroad (KNR) operates under the auspices of the Republic of Korea's
       Ministry of Transportation. The backbone of the railway system is the 444 km double-
       tracked Kyongbu line, running between the nation's two principal cities, Pusan on the
       southeast coast and Seoul in the northwest. Principal intermediate cities which may be



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       reached by this route include Taegu and Taejon. While it constitutes less than 15 per cent
       of total route-km, the line accounts for nearly half of the system's operating revenues.

       Diverging to the southwest from the Kyongbu line at Taejon, the Honam line reaches into
       the rich agricultural plain of North and South Cholla provinces and on to the important
       southwestern port of Mokpo. Branching from the Honam line at Iri is the Cholla line,
       which extends southward to Yosu, an important southern port and the site of a major oil
       refinery.

       Linking these two lines across the south coast with the Kyongbu line near Pusan is the
       Kyongchon line. The Yongdong line, which links the east coast with the Chungang line at
       Yongju, extends northward to the major east coast city of Kangnung. The KNR's second
       route to the east coast was completed through the heart of the Taebaek mountain range in
       1993.

       The only 762 mm branch, opened in 1937, running from Suweon to Songdo, was closed
       in 1995.

       Waterways

       South Korea has 1,600 km of inland waterway, most of which is navigable only by small
       craft.

       Airports

       There are 97 usable airports in South Korea, 60 of which have permanent-surface
       runways.

       A international airport for Seoul at Incheon, built offshore on reclaimed land 45 km west
       of Seoul, was opened in 2001, and the previous international airport at Kimpo was
       downgraded to domestic flights.

       Seoul-Kimpo International

       Reference point                  37º33.3'N 126º48.0'E
       Maximum runway length            3,600 m (11,811 ft)
       Runway surface                   Asphalt
       Elevation                        17.5 m
       Nearest town/city                Seoul 17 km


       Civil Airlines

       Asiana Airlines

       Asiana Airlines is an international and domestic scheduled passenger carrier.



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       A subsidiary of the Kumho Group, Asiana began operations in December 1988, initially
       serving only domestic routes. International services to Japan commenced in early 1990
       and further international services established when delivery of more wide-bodied aircraft
       had taken place.

       In 1997, Asiana and American Airlines agreed to join forces via a code-sharing and
       frequent flyer arrangement. On 1 March 2003, Asiana Airlines officially became the 13th
       member of Star Alliance.

       Fleet details
       A321-100                         × 5 (5 are leased in)
       A321-200                         × 5 (5 are leased in)
       A320-200                         ×5
       A330-300                         × 5 (5 are leaded in)
       B737-400                         ×7
       B737-500                         ×3
       B747-400                         ×2
       B747-400F                        ×5
       B747-400M                        ×6
       B767-300                         ×9
       B767-300ER                       ×2
       B767-300F                        ×1
       B777-200ER                       ×4


       Korean Air Co Ltd.

       The privately owned Korean Air Co Ltd., formed in 1948, was succeeded by the
       government-owned Korean Air Lines in 1962 and then sold to the Hanjin Group in 1969.
       In May 1997, the airline centralized the management in the new headquarters building.
       More recently, the airline has implemented a management restructure involving the
       creation of passenger, cargo and three further business units. Each unit is responsible for
       reaching target profit margins. The airline continues to streamline the number of fleet
       types currently operated.

       Fleet details
       A300-622R                        × 10
       A330-200                         ×3
       A330-300                         × 16
       A380-800                         × 5 (on order)
       B737-800                         × 14
       B737-900                         × 16 (6 are leased in)
       B747-200F                        ×1
       B747-400                         × 24



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       B747-400ERF                      ×8
       B747-400M/B747-400F              x 10 (6 are leased in)
       B777-200ER                       × 12 (5 are leased in)
       B777-300                         ×4
       B777-300ER                       × 10 (on order)
       B777-F                           x 5 (on order)
       B787-8                           x 10 (on order)


       Ports

       South Korea has 17 major ports.

       Inchon

       The port of Inchon is located at 37º 28' north, 126º 36' east.

       Inchon is situated on the mouth of the Han river. It is the port of access for the capital
       Seoul, to which Inchon is connected by both railway and expressway.

       The approach to Inchon is from the south. The harbor can accommodate vessels of up to
       302 m in length and 13 m draft. A peculiarity of Inchon harbor is the tide, which reaches
       approximately 9.14 m.

       Kunsan

       Kunsan port, situated south of the mouth of the Kum Kang river, is situated at 36º north,
       126º 43' east.

       Special regard for tide and wind set should be taken when approaching Kunsan, there
       being small islands, drying rocks, shoals and mud-flats near the fairway within the
       channel. The harbor can accommodate vessels of up to 225 m in length and 6.76 m draft.

       Pusan

       The port of Pusan is located at 35º 6' north, 129º 4' east. It is South Korea's most
       important port.

       Pusan harbor is approached from the Korea Strait, the wide passage between the Korean
       coast and the Japanese island of Tsushima. Within the harbor are 10 specified anchorages
       for ocean-going vessels, including three mooring berths, with an average depth of 12 m.
       The outer harbor has a total of 17 anchorages for deep draft vessels available.

       Pilotage is compulsory, and 20 pilots are available day and night. Pusan Radio, call sign
       'HLP', operates on 434, 500 and 512 kHz and VHF Channel 16, frequency 156.8.




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       Ulsan

       The port of Ulsan, situated in a natural bay on the Korean peninsula, is located at 35º 29'
       north, 129º 24' east.

       The entrance is 6.0 km long, 500 m wide and has a depth of 13 m. There are 29 specified
       anchorages in the inner and outer harbors, with depths ranging from 10.6 m to 78.0 m.
       Towage is recommended as the harbor entrance is often crowded with small ships.

       The principal product imported through Ulsan harbor is crude oil.

       Telecommunications

       South Korea has relatively advanced domestic and international telecommunication
       facilities. There are almost five million telephones in the country and South Korea has
       access to one Indian Ocean and two Pacific Ocean INTELSATs. The Korean
       Broadcasting System (KBS) broadcasts both radio and TV programs.

       Regional network operator Asia Global Crossing formed a joint venture with South
       Korea's Dacom Corporation in February 2001 which was eventually expected to increase
       Korea's overall international capacity by 25 tim

       10. Military
                A. Leadership


                Minister of National Defense - Kim Jang Soo




            1967          42nd class of Gwang Ju Jaeil High School,
                          Chunnam Provinceool
            1971          27th class of the Korea Military Academy
            1988          National Security Program, Korea National Defense University
            1989          MA, Graduate School of Public Administration, Yonsei University



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            1971                      Commissioned Second Lieutenant of the Infantry

            1989-1991                 Commander, 5th Regiment, 7th Infantry Division

            1994-1996                 Cadet Corps Commandant, Korea Military Academy

            1996-1997                 Chief, Operations Division,
                                      First Republic of Korea Army (FROKA)

            1997-1999                 Commanding General, 6th Infantry Division

            1999-2000                 Director, Operational Planning/J3, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

            2000-2001                 Director, Operations/J3, Joint Chiefs of Staff

            2001-2003                 Commander-in-Chief,
                                      ROKFLTCommanding General, 7th Corps

            2003-2004                 Chief Director, Operations/J3, Joint Chiefs of Staff

            2004-2005                 Deputy Commander,
                                      ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC)

            2005.4.7-2006.11.7 37th Chief of Staff, ROK Army

            2006.11.23-present 40th ROK Minister of National Defense




            1996      Order of National Security Merit Chonsu Medal

            2002      Order of National Security Merit Gukson Medal

            2000      United States Legion of Merit
       Source: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea
       http://www.mnd.go.kr/mndEng/AboutMND/profile/minister/index.jsp




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                Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff - Kim Kwan-chin




       Title       -Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
       Birth Date 08/27/1949 (lunar)
       Birth Place Cho'nju, N. Cho'lla Province
       Education Graduated from Seoul High School (20th class)
                   KMA's 28th class
       Career      Served as commander of the 35th Division
                   Staff officer in charge of planning and management of the Army
                   Headquarters
                   Commander of the 2nd Army Corps
                   Chief director of operation for the JCS (2004)
                   Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (2006)



                Chief of Staff, ROK Army – Park Heung-ryul




       Title       -Chief of Staff of Army
       Birth Date 03/18/1949
       Birth Place Pusan
       Education -- Pusan High School
                   -- Graduated 28th class of Korea Military Academy 1972
       Career


                Chief of Staff, ROK Air Force - Kim Eun-ki

       He is 55 years old.

       A graduate of the Air Force Academy in 1974, Kim has served in key
       posts regarding intelligence and policy planning.




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       Kim served as intelligence chief of staff of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command
       (CFC) from 2003 to 2005. He worked as vice chief of the Air Force from 2005 to 2006.

       Kim was decorated with several military decorations such as the Legion of Merit from
       the U.S. government in 2000, as well as the Security Merit Chonsu and Kukson medals in
       2001 and 2006, respectively, for his contributions to military development and
       outstanding performance.

       Source: http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200704/kt2007040600162811990.htm



                Chief of Naval Operations - Admiral Song Young Moo




                                             Song, Young Moo


                                             Admiral


                                             February 24, 1949


                                             1973 Naval Academy


                                             1984 Kyungnam University/Business School(MBA)


                                             1985 Naval War College


                                             1997 National Defense University(MA in National Security)


                                             2006 Korea University/Business School(Advanced Management
                                             Program)




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                                             1973 Ensign


                                             1997 Rear Admiral(Lower Half)


                                             2000 Rear Admiral(Upper Half)


                                             2005 Vice Admiral


                                             2006 Admiral


                                             1992 Commanding Officer, ROKS CHUNGJU(FF-961)


                                             1993 Chief of Naval Forces Branch, ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff


                                             1997 Director of Test and Evaluation, ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff


                                             1999 Commander, 2nd Combat Flotilla


                                             2000 Commander, 1st Fleet Command


                                             2002 Commander, Naval Sea System Command


                                             2003 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Policy, Plan &
                                             Comptroller,
                                                     ROK Navy HQs


                                             2005 Chief Director, Personnel & Logistics, ROK Joint Chiefs of
                                             Staff


                                             2005 Chief Director, Strategic Planning, ROK Joint Chiefs of
                                             Staff




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                                             2006 Chief of Naval Operations


                                             1980 President's Commendation


                                             1988 Prime Minister's Commendation


                                             1999 Order of Military Merit(Chungmu)


                                             2004 Order of National Security Merit(Chonsu)


                                             Golf, Reading


                                             Married to Miss Koo, Ja Jeong with a daughter




       http://www.navy.mil.kr/english/about/admiral.jsp

           B. United Nations/U.S. Military Presence

       United Nations Command: The UNC, established on 24 July 1950, marked the first
       time in history that nations of the world united under the UN flag to repel aggression. The
       mission of UNC is to maintain the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, which resulted
       in the cessation of hostilities. The Military Armistice Commission, which supervises
       implementation of the Armistice, is composed of officers from the UNC, north Korea and
       China.

       Combined Forces Command: CFC exercises operational control over Korean and
       American forces responsible for the defense of the Republic. Should our mutual policy of
       deterrence fail, Combined Forces Command would direct combat operations to defeat an
       enemy attack.


       U.S. Forces Korea: A U.S. Army four-star general serves as commander-in-chief of the
       United Nations Command, the ROK/US Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces
       Korea. USFK includes all U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Special Operations
       elements stationed in Korea. USFK headquarters is located on Yongsan Army Garrison,
       Seoul.


                                                     Commander,


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          United Nations Command / Combined Forces Command / United States Forces
                                         Korea

                     General Bell was born in Oak Ridge,
                     Tennessee on 9 April 1947 and was
                     commissioned as a Distinguished Military
                     Graduate in June 1969 upon graduation
                     from the University of Tennessee at
                     Chattanooga. His military education
       includes the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses,
       Command and General Staff College, and the National
       War College. He received a Master of Science in
       Systems Management from the University of Southern
       California.

       General Bell's command positions include the 2nd
       Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 24th Infantry Division (Mech) at Ft. Stewart, Georgia; and the
       24th ID‘s 2nd Vanguard Brigade, also at Ft. Stewart. He served as an Assistant Division
       Commander, 1st Infantry Division (Mech) Bamberg, Germany and commanded the
       Army's Armor Center and Ft. Knox, Ft. Knox, Kentucky. General Bell commanded the
       Army‘s III Corps, headquartered at Fort Hood, Texas; and most recently commanded the
       United States Army, Europe and 7th Army; and NATO's Allied Land Component
       Command, Heidelberg, Germany.

       General Bell's staff positions include service as an ROTC Instructor at Texas Tech
       University; Force Plans Analyst for the Army DCSOPS; and Joint Staff Officer
       responsible for the Unified Command Plan in the J5, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally,
       he was a tank battalion S3 in Korea and the Chief of Staff of 3rd Infantry Division in
       Würzburg, Germany. He also served as Chief of Staff of V Corps, and as DCSOPS and
       subsequently Chief of Staff, United States Army, Europe and 7th Army.

       In 1994 General Bell served as a Senior Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign
       Relations in New York City, and has since been selected as a serving member on the
       Council. General Bell deployed as USCINCCENT's Executive Officer in Desert Shield
       and Desert Storm; and later served as Chief of Staff, USAREUR Forward Headquarters,
       Taszar, Hungary during Operation Joint Endeavor in the Balkans.

       His awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished
       Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with 4 Oak Leaf
       Clusters, Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with 1 Oak Leaf Cluster, and
       the Army Commendation Medal with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters. General Bell has also been
       awarded the NATO Meritorious Service Medal and the Polish Army Medal (Gold
       Award).

       General Bell is married to the former Kathleen Fields of Chattanooga, Tennessee. The
       Bells have one son, Buck, who lives with his wife, Jennifer, in Florida.
       Source: http://www.korea.army.mil/org/Bell1.htm


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           C. Armed Forces Summary

       TOTAL STRENGTH
       672,000
       Reserves: 3,040,000


       Assessment

       The Republic of Korea (ROK) military is a modern force dedicated to defeating any
       threat directed against its territory or interests. Its primary challenge is to maintain forces
       needed to defend against 'low tech' ground war with the DPRK; at the same time build air
       and naval forces capable of matching the capabilities of its neighbors. The ROK
       recognizes the danger posed by asymmetric warfare and non-state actors as well as a need
       to participate in peacekeeping and shared regional defense activities.

       The main defense objective for South Korea has always been to develop a military
       capability to effectively prevent another North Korean offensive. While maintaining a
       strong alliance with the US, South Korea has continuously modernized its armed forces
       and actively developed the domestic defense industrial base to achieve its ultimate
       objective of 'self-reliant' defense.

       The 2004 Defense White Paper published by the ROK Ministry of National Defense
       defines the highest defense objective as follows: "To defend the nation against foreign
       military threat or invasion, support reunification and contribute to stability of the region
       and world peace." To accomplish these objectives, the MND has four focused defense
       management objectives:

       Establishing a firm defense posture: The most notable change in South Korea's military
       posture is that while it is placing continuous focus on establishing firm defense posture
       against a North Korean offensive, the military development today is more focused on
       building capabilities to effectively implement anti-terrorism and operations other than
       war (OOTW).

       Despite relocation and some reduction of the US forces stationed in South Korea, the
       RoK-US military alliance remains strong through the continuation of the joint ROK-US
       military surveillance, intelligence and early warning systems. Furthermore, to respond to
       the new kinds of threat such international terrorism, South Korea is actively developing
       rapid reaction capabilities as well as integrated inter-agency effort to minimize
       devastation to critical national infrastructures and the USFK military facilities. Lastly,
       much more effort is being invested in improving combat readiness through various
       personnel training and national security education programs.

       Implementing the strategy of 'cooperative self-reliant defense': One of the latest
       objectives of the South Korean military under the Roh Moo-Hyun administration is the
       establishment of 'cooperative self-reliant defense.' While enhancing indigenous defense
       capability is crucial to South Korea's survival, the government continues to believe that


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       the most effective way of defending the country's territorial integrity is through the
       continuation of the close cooperation with the US. Although there are some concerns in
       and outside South Korea that the RoK-US alliance has deteriorated since the inauguration
       of President Roh, Seoul continues to emphasize that despite occasional disagreements the
       US will in the immediate future play a critical part in safeguarding the security of South
       Korea.


       Implementing consistent defense reform: From the beginning of the Roh
       administration in 2003, the South Korean military has undergone a series of defense
       reform debates and programs. Officials maintain that systematic and consistent reform on
       various levels are needed to prepare the military for challenges in the future. In particular,
       civilianization of the Ministry of National Defense is viewed as one of the most critical
       objectives of the defense reform currently in progress. Through the civilianization
       program, a significant increase in efficiency and professionalism in the management of
       the defense sector is desired. Current reforms include establishing the Defense Program
       Agency (currently being considered) in charge of all military procurement programs;
       reforming the military personnel system; and improving the quality of military living
       environment and welfare system.



       Earning the trust of the people: The Roh administration's defense management is also
       heavily focused on fostering a military that is highly trusted by the people. The
       government strongly maintains that a military armed even with the most advanced
       weapon systems of the world cannot win a war without earning the trust of the people.
       The military is fully dedicated to accomplishing 'Open Defense Management' through
       increased transparency and fairness of military administration.




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       Chain of Command




       Source: Jane‘s Information Group

       Doctrine and Strategy

       The ROK is heavily influenced by US military doctrine and strategy as a result of over 50
       years of joint operations with the US and the large amount of US designed equipment
       fielded by ROK forces.

       ROK military doctrine and strategy is focused on plans to deal with the threat of North
       Korea's large conventional forces - based only 40 km away from the Seoul metropolitan
       area. OP Plan 5027 defines the actions of the combined ROK and US militaries in the
       event of an attack or provocation by North Korea. The Chungmu Plan outlines ROK
       defense and mobilization activities of reserve and non-military organizations in the event
       of an attack on the ROK.

       The OP Plan 5027 has not been publicly released, although the general concepts outlined
       in the plan have been openly discussed and the number of US troops required to execute
       this plan has been disclosed in several ROK Defense White Papers. It is believed that the


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       plan divides US-ROK actions into three phases. The first phase is for the ROK and USFK
       to contain any DPRK attack or provocation as far forward of Seoul as possible. Emphasis
       during this phase is to limit DPRK penetration, counter DPRK Special Forces, and
       eliminate DPRK missiles and artillery. The second phase calls for combined US-ROK
       defense as large numbers of US forces are mobilized and moved to South Korea. The
       third phase is a counter-attack against and occupation of the DPRK.

       OP Plan 5027 calls for a forward, active and mobile defense, and is heavily influenced by
       US operations doctrine, including the Air Land Battle doctrine adopted by the ROK in
       the early 1980s. Main focuses of this plan are quick suppression of DPRK artillery and
       missile forces, defending the ROK north of Seoul, and countering the DPRK's special
       forces in the rear areas. The most controversial portion of this plan is the final stage,
       which calls for counter-attack and invasion of the DPRK. Execution of this final phase
       depends on the mobilization and movement to South Korea of almost one half of US
       forces, the survival of significant numbers of ROK forces and their availability for a
       counter attack, and no opposition from Russia and China to the invasion and occupation
       of the DPRK by US and ROK forces.

       The Chungmu Plan specifies the actions of various non-military organizations and
       agencies during times of threat or beginning of hostilities. Actions are keyed to three
       threat levels. Chumgmu 3 goes into effect when there are indications of hostilities, and
       begins the process of preparation for higher readiness levels. Chungmu 2 goes into effect
       when a high level of threat short of war exists and specifies actions in specified
       geographical areas. Chungmu 1 goes into effect with hostilities or the highest possible
       level of threat and is a full mobilization of reserve and non-military forces.

       Due to the agreement between South Korea and the US to relocate US Forces in Korea to
       south of the Han River, the operation plan of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command
       (ROK-US CFC) is believed to be going through some modifications. According to South
       Korean press reports, the modified combined forces operation plan would seek to
       overwhelm the North Korean long-range artillery forces with South Korea's MLRS and
       155mm self-propelled artillery system when North Korea fires or the ROK-US CFC
       detects any a sign of an attack by the DPRK forces. The OP PLAN would also include
       launching precision strike against North Korea's WMD and military commanding
       facilities and destroying the North's ability to launch a counter attack.

       It is also believed that the concept of the "trip-wire" effect no longer is subscribed to by
       the US Forces Korea. The "trip-wire" effect meant that if North Korea attacked, US
       troops, because of their close proximity to the DMZ, would be immediately drawn into
       the conflict.

       Strategic Weapons

       The ROK has chosen not to field weapons of mass destruction or produce long-range
       delivery systems. However, there is a strong concern within the defense community that
       South Korea must have effective long-range strike capability to counter the growing
       ballistic missile threat of North Korea as well as the rapidly advancing military


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       capabilities of the surrounding states such as China and Japan. In 2001, the US agreed
       that South Korea could develop a surface-to-surface missile based on its own
       technologies and increase the missile range limit from 180 km to 300 km with up to 500
       kg warhead. It is believed that Washington has also agreed that South Korea could field a
       missile with a 500 km range if weight of the warhead is reduced to 300 kg.

       Considering the active development of space launch vehicles and the recent successful
       test of a secret surface-to-surface missile, South Korea, if it wishes, could soon have the
       capability to field advanced long-range strike capability using ballistic and cruise
       missiles. South Korea's choice on development of long-range missiles and other related
       systems will largely depend on the decisions of the surrounding states. According to the
       defense budget proposal submitted to the South Korean National Assembly, South
       Korea's Agency for Defense Development (ADD) is expected to start upgrading the
       existing surface-to-surface missile force in 2005.

       Declared Policy

       The ROK has the same capability as any advanced industrial country to independently
       pursue the production and fielding of weapons of mass destruction and long-range
       delivery systems. It could pursue these if it became a national imperative to do so.
       However, the ROK has chosen to participate in various regimes and agreements which
       prohibit the production of such weapons, a policy that has wide support among Koreans.
       These agreements include:

               Missile Technology Control Regime
               Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
               Chemical Weapons Convention
               Joint Agreement for the De-Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
               Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
               Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
               Australia Group

       Ballistic Missiles


       It is known that the ROK has 12 NKH-1/II surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, with a
       range of 180 km. South Korea is now a member of the Missile Technology Control
       Regime and allowed to produce a missile with a range of up to 300 km. In 1999,
       Washington and Seoul agreed that South Korea could make a missile with a range of 500
       km provided that it was confined to research and development purposes. Ministry of
       National Defense has approved KRW14.8 billion for range extension of the NHK-
       II(Hyonmu) missiles.

       Instead of developing military-purpose ballistic missiles, South Korea is investing
       actively in development of civilian space launch vehicles. So far, South Korea has test-
       launched one experimental rocket and two space launch vehicles, KSR-II and KSR-III.
       South Korea plans to launch the KSLV-1 with payload of 100kg by 2007. South Korea


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       also plans to develop the KSLV-II with 1,000 kg payload by 2010 and KSLV-III with
       1,500 kg payload by 2015. It is assumed that the vehicle will be launched and tested at
       the new Space Centre which is expected to be completed sometime in 2005. It is expected
       that South Korea will develop capability to launch a space rocket with payload of
       1,500kg by 2015. Japan has actively developed its civilian space industry which in turn
       have contributed significantly in securing required technologies for military use. South
       Korea seems to be following the act of its neighbor.

       Type             Name              Stage            Range (Km)        Payload
       SRBM             NHK-1/2           1                180 km            500 kg (NHK-
                                                                             2)
       SRBM             Upgraded          1                300 km+           500 kg
                        Hyonmu
       SLV              KSR-III (basic) 1                  50-70 km          150 kg
                                                           (altitude)
       SLV              KSR-III           3                700-900 km        100 kg
                        (Variant)                          (altitude)
       SLV              KSLV-1            1                700 km            100 kg
                        (Launch in                         (altitude)
                        2007)
       SLV              KSLV-II           n/a              n/a               1,000 kg
                        (Launch in
                        2010)
       SLV              KSLV-III          n/a              n/a               1,500 kg
                        (Launch in
                        2015)



       Nuclear Weapons

       The ROK made initial efforts to acquire nuclear weapons beginning in the early 1970s
       but discontinued these programs under US pressure. The ROK signed the Treaty on the
       Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in April 1975 and disbanded organizations
       working on this program.

       The ROK has nuclear power and research programs, all under IAEA monitoring and
       control. There are no known compliance issues or proliferation concerns. South Korea
       does not use plutonium in their power program and has limited ability to reprocess
       nuclear waste.

       The US removed all nuclear weapons from the ROK in the early 1990s at the request of
       the ROK government, in support of the Joint Agreement for the De-Nuclearization of the
       Korean Peninsula. In August 2004, during discussions about the initial declarations of
       ROK under the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, the ROK informed the
       IAEA that it had enriched nuclear material in the course of atomic vapor laser isotope
       separation (AVLIS) experiments that had not been declared to the IAEA. The ROK
       informed the IAEA that these experiments had been on a laboratory scale and involved


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       the production of only milligram quantities of enriched uranium. According to the ROK,
       these activities were carried out without the government‘s knowledge at a nuclear site in
       South Korea in 2000, and that the activities had been terminated.

       Despite some calls for the ROK to 'reclaim it's sovereignty' and pursue a nuclear weapons
       program in response to that of the DPRK, the ROK has continued commitment to a non-
       nuclear, no chemical-biological weapons policy outlined by former President Roh Tae
       Woo in 1991. This commitment is likely to continue even in light of the DPRK's
       February 2005 declaration that it possesses nuclear weapons.

       Biological Weapons

       The ROK has the technical and manufacturing capability to produce biological weapons,
       but there is no indication that they have pursued weapons of this type. In addition, the
       ROK ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Treaty in 1987 and joined the Australia
       Group in 1995.

       The ROK has a large and highly developed pharmaceutical industry and is making
       extensive investment and research efforts into becoming a world leader in biotechnology.
       South Korea established the first institution devoted to research and development of
       vaccines for developing countries, called the International Vaccine Institute, under the
       guidance of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

       Chemical Weapons

       The ROK has a large and advanced chemical industry. In 1997 in conjunction with
       ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the ROK declared that they were in
       possession of chemical weapons and a chemical weapons production facility. Efforts are
       underway to destroy all chemical weapons in their inventory by 2006. Based on the ROK
       declarations that the chemicals are being destroyed at their military waste treatment plant
       at Yong Dong, the ROK is believed to have produced Nerve Agent GB (Sarin).

       The ROK has prohibited by law the possession, development, production, transfer and so
       on, of chemical weapons. The import, export, or possession of precursors is tightly
       controlled. These laws and regulations are enforced by the ROK, and it actively
       participates in control regimes related to the prevention of the spread of chemical
       weapons.

       Information Warfare Capabilities

       The ROK MND has been criticized for not aggressively pursuing greater information
       warfare capabilities. Currently the development of information warfare capabilities is
       being addressed by ROK military planners, as a formal part of efforts to prepare for
       'Future War'.

       ROK information warfare capabilities have lower priority than conventional combat
       capabilities, as there are limited opportunities to use information warfare against the


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       DPRK. The ROK has also been able to rely on the more traditional advanced intelligence
       and electronic warfare capabilities of the US. However, as the ROK begins to focus on
       future threats and the form of this kind of warfare is further defined, the ROK will
       increase efforts to acquire independent offensive and defensive information warfare
       capabilities.

       The ROK has a large broadband infrastructure that has made it the second largest source
       of Internet based network attacks after the US. Per 10,000 Internet users, the ROK is the
       highest source nation of Internet attacks in the world. The rapid growth of broadband
       Internet in the ROK has resulted in a large number of unsecured machines attached
       continuously to the Internet. This, coupled with a large number of novice users and the
       chaotic nature of the ROK's national network infrastructure, makes the ROK an ideal
       location for launching Internet attacks. One study identified at least 80,000 zombie
       machines in the ROK, machines that could be used for attacks on Internet connected
       networks. The ROK also has a small population of hackers and cyber-activists that
       engage in attacks - primarily denial of service - on organizations, companies, and
       governments deemed anti-Korean.

       The ROK Defense Security Command (DSC) is responsible for detecting, countering and
       protecting the military network systems from all cyber-threats. DSC controls the Defense
       Information Warfare Response Centre which monitors the entire national defense
       network. The DSC continues to actively recruit encryption and computer programming
       experts.

       Last year, the Ministry of National Defense admitted that some of the computers
       connected to the non-military network were attacked by hackers, but the military network
       remained safe. MND spent KRW4.6 billion between 2001 and 2004 for military
       information protection programs and KRW800 million between 2003 to 2004 for
       computer virus protection system. MND also requires all army corps-level bases or
       equivalent level of bases in each service to operate their own Computer Emergency
       Response Team (CERT) to monitor the military network for 24 hours.

       Assessment of Covert Programs

       The chemical weapon program disclosed by the ROK government indicates that South
       Korea has the capability to engage in covert development activities. The ROK national
       security law gives the government great power in monitoring and controlling the actions
       of individuals engaged in classified activities, and preventing unauthorized disclosure of
       such activities. Given the nature of the South Korea's democracy and institutions
       however, it is unlikely that any significant covert program in violation of international
       treaties and agreements exists.
       Source: Jane‘s Information Group




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           D. Army

       Summary
       STRENGTH
       560,000
       (600,000 reserves)
       INFANTRY
       Division × 19
       Each division consists of:
       Regiment × 3
       Reconnaissance battalion × 1
       Tank battalion × 1
       Engineer battalion × 1
       Artillery regiment × 1 (battalion × 4)
       MECHANISED INFANTRY
       Division × 3
       Each division consists of:
       Mechanized infantry brigade × 2 (mech inf bn x 2, armd bn x 1)
       Armored Brigade × 3 (mech inf bn x 1, armd bn x 2)
       Reconnaissance battalion × 1
       Engineer battalion × 1
       Artillery regiment × 1 (battalion × 4)
       ARMOUR
       Brigades (9 battalions) in mechanized infantry divisions × 3
       Battalions in 19 infantry divisions × 19
       ARTILLERY
       Field artillery brigades in 3 mechanized infantry divisions × 3
       Regiments (76 battalions) in infantry divisions × 19
       SPECIAL FORCES
       counter-infiltration brigades × 3
       Special forces brigades × 7
       Army aviation command × 1
       COUNTER-INFILTRATION
       Brigade × 3
       SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
       Battalion × 3
       Batteries × 24
       AIR DEFENSE - ARTILLERY
       Brigade × 3
       SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE
       Battalion × 5


       Assessment

       The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) is the ROK's largest military service. It has the
       primary responsibility for defending the Republic of Korea (ROK) from an attack by the
       Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK).

       The ROKA uses organization, tactics, and equipment similar to those used by the US
       Army. ROKA and US Army forces train together on a regular basis. Many ROKA




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       officers and senior staff enlisted receive training at US Army schools and institutions and
       US officers teach at ROK military academies.

       Confucianism and Korean society heavily influence the command environment in ROKA
       units. Leaders often see themselves as fathers to their troops. In many cases, relationships
       and obligations are more important then regulations, multiplying the effect of both good
       and bad leaders on their units. Discipline in the ROKA is often personal and sometimes
       harsh. As the ROK has become more affluent, the society has less toleration for this type
       of discipline. While the most extreme cases of violence are related to discipline, there has
       been a parallel increase in insubordination and other problems.

       ROKA personnel conscripted up to the rank of Sergeant serve for 24 months. They are
       paid a little more than USD30 (based on the monthly payment for Sergeant) a month,
       have little time off and live in cramped quarters with little privacy. Most conscripted
       soldiers are required to attend a few weeks of training at specialized schools while some
       soldiers still depend on the training provided by their units. The living environment for
       the soldiers is also gradually changing as the MND plans to provide Western-style beds
       to 1,085 battalion-level bases and 1,245 GOP and coastal platoon-level barracks.

       The ROKA continues to field older weapon systems, including unguided rockets,
       recoilless rifles, and the Nike Hercules Surface-to-Air Missile. While the US Army
       considers these weapons obsolete, they are contemporary with most DPRK weapons and
       still have use on the battlefield. While ROKA is upgrading older systems as quickly as
       funding allows. A ROKA unit should not be considered to have the same combat power
       as a comparable US Army unit.

       The ROKA is concerned about both the rise in both anti-Americanism and the perception
       that the DPRK is not a threat among conscripts. They also continue to seek means to
       reduce the vulnerability of ROKA forces in fixed defenses and positions to massed
       DPRK artillery, prepare for and address the effects of the relocation of US forces, and
       manage increased tensions with the DPRK.

       The ROKA has not sought overwhelming combat capability or parity with DPRK forces.
       While the ROKA has qualitative superiority compared to DPRK forces, defense against
       DPRK forces is still dependent on co-operation with the US. While the ROKA is capable
       of defending the ROK against the DPRK without US assistance, its ability to deter a
       DPRK attack would be weakened. Without US air and naval assets, which South Korea
       lack, the ROKA would face important deficiencies, and these would not be easily
       addressed in the short term.

       The most recent development in the ROKA is the transformation of some of the infantry-
       focused forces into mechanized forces. The ROKA is in the process of establishing two
       new mechanized armor brigades.




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       Deployments, tasks and operations

       Role and Deployment

       The ROKA has responsibility for defending the territorial integrity of the ROK and its
       deployment is directed almost exclusively to deal with an invasion from the DPRK. The
       emphasis on combat readiness and the capability for rapid crisis-response is designed
       both as a deterrent to a full-scale North Korean attack and to deal with small-scale
       military incursions from the DPRK. If deterrence fails, the ROKA's primary role is to
       give priority to the defense of the Seoul metropolitan area and to destroy the attacker's
       main forces and weaken their will to continue combat.

       The bulk of the ROKA forces are deployed parallel to the demilitarized zone (DMZ),
       facing North Korea's divisions. The order of battle presently includes the First Field
       Army which defends territory adjacent to Kangwon province and the Third Field Army,
       which defends Seoul and the surrounding Kyonggi province. The Second Field Army
       operates across the rear areas. There are also three counter-infiltration brigades covering
       the ROK and seven special operations force brigades which undertake a similar role.

       Recent and Current Operations

       The ROKA provides combat and non-combat troops to assist UN Peace Keeping
       Operations.

       As of August 2005, the Republic of Korea was participating in the following UN
       missions:

               MINURSO (Western Sahara); 18 troops
               ONUB (Burundi); 2 military observers
               UNAMA (Afghanistan); 1 military observer
               UNMIL (Liberia); 1 troop and 1 military observer
               UNMOGIP (India and Pakistan); 9 military observers
               UNOMIG (Georgia); 7 military observers

       South Korea had deployed a total of 3,328 troops to the UN mission in East Timor from
       1999, a deployment that ended in 2003.

       Deployment to Iraq

       In support of the US and multinational forces operating in Iraq, South Korea deployed a
       total of 3,541 troops to Iraq, including medical officers, special operation forces, and
       army engineers for reconstruction and area security operations. The South Korean forces,
       called the Zaytun Division, are currently operating in Irbil, the region administered by the
       Kurds. South Korea maintains the third largest foreign force deployed in Iraq after the US
       and United Kingdom.




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       About 200 troops are also deployed to Afghanistan in support of the reconstruction and
       humanitarian effort.

       Command and control

       The President commands the armed forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK), advised by
       the National Security Council (NSC) and a Senior Adviser for National Security. The
       Minister of National Defense (who sits on the NSC) receives orders from the President
       via the Prime Minister and directs the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
       Chiefs of Staff of each service.

       In peacetime, Army headquarters controls the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Field Armies, the Capital
       Defense Command, the Special Warfare Command, the Aviation Command, the
       Logistics Support Command, the Training & Doctrine Command, the Army Military
       Academy, and various other units and activities. The Chemical, Biological and
       Radiological Defense Command is directly under the command of the Ministry of
       National Defense

       In war all forces in Korea are subordinate to the ROK-US Combined Forces Command.




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       Relationship with US forces

       The US continues to play a crucial role in the ROK's deterrence strategy and defense
       against a possible North Korean attack. In that capacity, South Korea's core military
       doctrine and strategy are in line with those of US forces on the peninsula. Operation Plan
       5027, updated annually, is the war plan used by the Combined Forces Command
       (including both US and ROK armed forces) which would be activated if North Korea
       invaded the South.

       US Army forces in South Korea are under command of Eighth US Army; the principal
       formation is 2nd Infantry Division. US troop levels in Korea are being reduced,
       eventually by about 12,500, as part of the US global force realignment.

       South Korea is to assume responsibility for several missions previously assigned to US
       forces. These include control of the Joint Security Area, maritime counter-infiltration
       operations, rapid mine-laying, search-and-rescue, front-line control, rear-area chemical
       and biological decontamination, military police operations and control of the air-to-
       ground firing range. A ninth mission, counter-battery artillery operations, should
       eventually be added. Most of these missions will have been handed over by 2006.

       Command appointments

       Minister of National        General Kim Jang-soo (appointed
       Defense:                    November 2006)
       Chairman of Joint           General Kim Kwan-chin
       Chiefs of Staff:
       Chief of Army Staff:        Park Heung-ryul


       Organization

       The military has traditionally maintained a defensive posture, guarding against the threat
       of an attack across the border from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
       The active army is 560,000 strong, including 140,000 conscripts serving for 26 months. It
       fields three armies, 10 corps, three mechanized infantry divisions, 19 infantry divisions,
       two independent infantry brigades, three counter-infiltration brigades and seven special




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       forces brigades. On mobilization, its multimillion-strong reserve component could field
       another army headquarters and 23 infantry divisions.

       ROKA is organized into 1st, 2nd, 3rd Field Army Command, Capital Defense Command
       (CDC), Special Warfare Command (SWC), Airborne Operation Command, Logistics
       Support Command, Training and Doctrine Command, Military Academy and other
       subordinate units. The 1st and 3rd Field Army commands respectively cover eastern and
       western forward areas along the border with North Korea, and the 2nd Field Army
       command is responsible for southern regions. CDC manages the Seoul area.




       The organization of the three Field Armies varies with their mission and deployment. The
       largest of the three armies is the 3rd Field Army, with five corps, mobilization forces and
       rear area reserves. The 2nd Field Army has two Corps. The 1st Field Army consists of
       three corps, mobilization forces, and rear area reserves.

       Reserves

       In 2003, the total Reserve Forces were 3.04 million strong, organized into regional and
       workplace units. The MND, through the Army and Navy Headquarters, commands the
       Reserve Forces, and the Military Manpower Agency is responsible for maintenance of
       their structure. During peacetime, reservists receive regular training. During wartime,
       reservists become supplementary manpower to create new units, reinforcing the existing
       units and serving as replacements for combat losses.




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       Order of Battle

       1st ROK Army (HQ Wonju)

       1st Army's task is to defend Kangwon Province.
       Formation/Unit                   Location
       Army Troops
       Aviation Bn x 2
       3 Armd Bde
       Security Regt
       Signal Bde
       Engineer Bde
       Logistic Gp
       Artillery Gp
       11 Inf Div                       Hongcheon
       II Corps                         Chunchon
       Corps Troops
       15 Inf Div                       DMZ
       27 Inf Divt                      DMZ
       7 Inf Div                        DMZ
       III Corps                        Hyonni
       Corps Troops



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       21 Inf Div                         DMZ
       2 Inf Div                          DMZ
       12 Inf Div                         DMZ
       VIII Corps                         Yangyang
       Corps Troops
       22 Inf Div                         Koseong
       23 Inf Div                         Samchok
       69 Mobilization Reserve Inf        Yangyang
       Div
       Plus 5 x Divisions of
       mobilization reserves


       3rd ROK Army (HQ Wonjin

       3rd Army's task is to defend Kyonggi Province.
       Formation/Unit                                           Location
       Army Troops
       Aviation Bn x 2
       AD Bde
       Civil Affairs Bde x 3
       Engr Bde x 2
       Arty Gp x 9
       Logistic Support Gp x 2
       Mde Bde
       Sig Bde
       Capital Corps                                            Anyang
       Corps Troops
       2 Marine Div                                             Kimpo
       17 Inf Div                                               Inchon
       I Corps                                                  Seoul
       Corps Troops (includes inf, arty and armd brigades)
       1 Inf Div                                                DMZ
       25 Inf Div                                               DMZ
       9 Inf Div
       30 Mech Inf Div                                          Munzan
       V Corps                                                  Ildong
       Corps troops (includes armd and aviation bdes, avn gp)
       6 Inf Div                                                DMZ
       3 Inf Div                                                Geumhwa
       Capitol Inf Div (mech)                                   Bulgeudegi
       VI Corps                                                 Pochon
       Corps Troops (includes armd, arty bdes, avn gp).
       28 Inf Div                                               DMZ




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       5 Inf Div                                                  DMZ
       26 Inf Div (mech)                                          Uijongbu
       VII Corps                                                  Changhowan
       Corps Troops (includes arty, engineer brigades, aviation
       group)
       Capital Inf Div (mech)
       20 Inf Div                                                 Seoul
       Plus eight reserve divisions.


       2nd ROK Army (HQ Taegu)

       2nd Army is responsible for Rear Area security.
       Formation/Unit                      Location
       Army Troops
       Special Asslt Bde
       Engr Bde x 2
       Avn Gp
       Security Regt
       MP Regt
       IX Corps                            Taejun
       Corps Troops (includes Special
       Asslt Bde, 2 x engr bdes, sig
       bde
       31 Homeland Defense Inf             Kwangju
       Division(HDD)
       32 HDD                              Taejon
       35 HDD                              Chonju
       37 HDD                              Chonju
       XI Corps                            Changnyong
       Corps Troops (includes Special
       Assault Bde, 2 x engr bde, sig
       bde)
       50 HDD                              Taegu
       39 HDD                              Changwon
       53 HDD                              Pusan


       Army Aviation Order of Battle

       Unit                   Base                  Type                     Role
       301 Aviation           n/k                   Chinook                  Transport
       Regiment


       504 Aviation           Chunchon              MD 500                   Observation
       Regiment



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       Special Warfare Command (HQ Songnam)

       Formation/Unit                     Location
       Under direct command
       Special Ops Trg Gp
       707 Special Missions Bn            Songnam
       708 Special Asslt Bn


       1 Special Forces Bde (AB)          Kimpo
       3 Special Forces Bde
       5 Special Forces Bde
       7 Special Forces Bde               Iksan
       9 Special Forces Bde
       11 Special Forces Bde              Damyong
       13 Special Forces Bde
       201 Special Assault Bde
       203 Special Assault Bde
       205 Special Assault Bde
       700 Special Assault Rgt
       701 Special Assault Rgt
       702 Special Assault Rgt
       703 Special Assault Rgt
       705 Special Assault Rgt
       706 Special Assault Rgt
       707 Special Assault Rgt


       Capital Defense Command (HQ Seoul)

       Capital Defense Command's task is to protect the Seoul area.
       60 Mob Res Infantry Division       Seoul
       (3 x inf regt, 1 x arty regt)
       71 Mob Res Infantry Division       Seoul
       (3 x inf regt, 1 x arty regt)
       52 Home Defense Infantry           Seoul
       Division (5 x inf regt, 1 x arty
       bn)
       56 Home Defense Infantry           Seoul
       Division (4 x inf regt, 1 x arty
       bn)
       57 Home Defense Infantry           Seoul
       Division (4 x inf regt, 1 x arty
       bn)




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         Formation Structures




                                           Mechanized Infantry Division




                                                   Infantry Division


       Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine

       The ROKA's operational performance and tactical doctrine are governed by much the
       same principles as are those of the US Army.

       Bases

       ROKA forces are generally deployed at small bases in their area of responsibility
       designated by numbers rather then formal names. The sites of major commands and
       headquarters units are all that can be established.

               Aviation Operations Command Yicheon, Kyonggi Province
               Special Forces Command Songnam, Kyonggi Province
               Capital Defense Corps Seoul Special City
               3rd ROK Army Wonjin, Kyonggi Province
               2nd ROK Army Taegu Special City
               1st ROK Army Wonju, Kangwon Province



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       South Korea keeps the locations of its defense bases secret but there are believed to be
       major ground force installations at the following locations:

       Base                             Location
       Andong                           36.37N 128.44E
       Cheju (Cheju do island)          33.31N 126.29E
       Chunchon                         37.56N 127.40E
       Inchon                           37.30N 126.38E
       Kunsan                           35.57N 126.42E
       Mokpo                            34.50N 126.25E
       Pusan                            35.05N 129.02E
       Seoul                            37.30N 127.00E
       Sokcho                           Unconfirmed
       Taegu                            35.52N 128.36E
       Yosu                             34.50N 127.30E




                      Map showing South Korean Army airfields south of 37th Parallel




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                       Map showing South Korean Army airfields north of 37th Parallel

       Training

       Individual Training

       The ROKA's training establishments are:

               Korea Military Academy (KMA), in Seoul, which takes recruits judged to be
                capable of attaining high officer rank and offers an education to graduate and
                postgraduate level over a period of four years;
               Korea Third Military Academy, in Yungchon, which takes entrants who are
                officer material and trains them to university degree standard for two years;
               The Army War and Staff College, in Daejeon, that provides for military training
                to the rank of major for six months and one year;
               Army Infantry School, at Jansaung, that is established specifically for infantry
                training for conscripts, non-commissioned officers, and officers;
               non-commissioned Officer Academy, at Yeosan, gives training for non-
                commissioned officers;
               Korea Army Training Centre, at Nonsan, that gives a military training to enlisted
                personnel;
               General Logistics Training School: established for logistics training;
               General Administration School: for military police, public relations and financial
                management training for officers, NCOs, and conscripts;
               Special Combat Training Centre: training centre for special purpose troops;



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               There are also eight other specialized schools which include Mechanized Infantry
                School, Artillery School, Engineering School, Chemical Defense Training School,
                air-defense School, Intelligence School, Signals School, and Aviation School.

       There is also the Korea National Defense University, Seoul, that provides for the military
       training of high-ranking officers in areas such as planning, decision-making, strategy and
       tactics, for a two-year period. KNDU also provides a master's degree program in the area
       of national security for both military officers and civilians.

       Collective Training

       Collective training at unit and formation level takes place on a regular basis,
       encompassing cold weather and all arms exercises. A significant amount is conducted
       with US forces.

       Major joint/combined training and exercises include:

               Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL): a Command Post Exercise (CPX) which has
                taken place annually since 1976. During the exercise the ROK government's crisis
                management and ROK-US combined crisis management processes during the
                early stages of war are depicted through various situations from each operational
                phase.
               Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) Exercise: a
                command post exercise conducted under the control of the ROK-US Combined
                Forces Command (CFC). This computer simulated exercise includes the processes
                of reception, staging, movement to the forward area, and integration of US
                augmentation forces that would be deployed to the peninsula during war. Also
                included in these exercises are wartime support, mutual logistics support,
                mobilization, combined rear area coordination (CRAC) tasks. The ROK MND,
                JCS, the HQ of each service, and operational commands participate.
               Exercise Foal Eagle (FE): an annual ROK-US combined field training exercise
                conducted since 1961. Its purposes are to demonstrate ROK-US military resolve
                to deter war on the Korean Peninsula and to improve the combined and joint
                operational posture. Since 2002, it has been conducted simultaneously with the
                RSOI Exercise in late March.
               Exercise Amnokgang: an ROK CPX under the command of the JCS conducted
                every May, with the JCS and the operational commands playing central roles. The
                JCS and operational commands participate as the supervisory body while other
                units and organizations are grouped into either a response team or an execution
                team
               Exercise Hoguk ("Guarding the Nation"): conducted under the command of the
                ROK JCS since 1996, a large-scale joint exercise to exercise operational plans
                along coastal and inland axes of movement. Since 2001, the Joint Battle
                Evaluation war game model produced in Korea has been adopted.




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       Training Areas

       Major training areas in South Korea include the Korean Training Centre and the Twin
       Bridge Training Area.

       Equipment in service

       Armor

       Type                          Role                              Quantity In
                                                                                Service
       T-80U                         Main Battle Tank                  80          80 (+10
                                                                                   by 2006)
       K1 1                          Main Battle Tank                  1,000+      1,000
       M47                           Main Battle Tank                  400         400
       M48A5                         Main Battle Tank                  4400        400
       M48A2                         Main Battle Tank                  420         420
       KIFV                          Infantry Fighting Vehicle         1,700       1,700
       BMP-3                         Infantry Fighting Vehicle         63          33 (+30
                                                                                   by 2006)
       M113                          Armored Personnel Carrier         400         400
       M577                          Armored Personnel Carrier         120         120
       Fiat 6614/KM-900              Armored Personnel Carrier         200         200
       Bv 206                        All Terrain                       300         300
            2
       K1                            Armored Reconnaissance            200         200
                                     Vehicle
                  Note:

             1.   The K1 MBTs are being upgraded to K1A1 standard.
             2.   A fourth batch of 20 x ARVs was delivered in 2005 bringing the total to 200
             3.   An XK-2 MBT is under development and is expected to be equipped with
                  upgraded armor.



       Artillery

       Type                           Role                             Quantity    In
                                                                                   Service
       203 mm M110                    Self-propelled Howitzer          20          20
       175 mm M107                    Self-propelled Howitzer          100         100
       155 mm M109A2                  Self-propelled Howitzer          1,040       1,040
       203 mm M115                    Howitzer                         48          48
       155 mm M53                     Howitzer                         1,800       1,800
       155 mm M114                    Howitzer                         n/a         n/a
       155 mm KH-179                  Howitzer                         n/a         n/a


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       105 mm M101                   Howitzer                            1,000       1,000
       105 m KH-178                  Howitzer                            1,700       1,700
       130 mm KM809A1                Multiple Rocket Launcher            150         150
       Kooryong
       227 mm                        Multiple Rocket Launcher            29          29
       81 mm KM-29                   Mortar                              4,000       4,000
       107 mm M30                    Mortar                              5,000       5,000
       NHK-I/II                      Battlefield Missile                 12          12
       Note:
                                                                 -propelled howitzers and 3,500
       towed howitzers.


       Anti-Tank Weapons

       Type                         Role                                 Quantity    In
                                                                                     Service
       TOW-2A                       Anti-tank Missile                    n/a         n/a
       57 mm M67                    Recoilless Rifle                     n/a         n/a
       75 mm M67                    Recoilless Rifle                     n/a         n/a
       90 mm M65                    Recoilless Rifle                     2,000       n/a
       106 mm RCL M40A2             Recoilless Rifle                     200         200
       90 mm M67                    Anti-tank Recoilless Rifle           n/a         n/a
       90 mm M36 SP                 Anti-tank Gun                        50          50
       76 mm M18                    Anti-tank Gun                        12          12


       Air Defense Weapons

       Type                         Role                                 Quantity    In
                                                                                     Service
       Javelin                      Manportable SAM                      350         350
       Redeye                       Manportable SAM                      50          60
       Stinger                      Manportable SAM                      150         130
       Mistral                      Manportable SAM                      1,000+      1,000+
                          1
       Chiron (Singung)             Manportable SAM                      n/a         n/a
                 2
       M-SAM                        Self-Propelled SAM                   n/a         n/a
       20 mm M167 Vulcan            Towed Anti-Aircraft Gun              60          60
       30 mm B1 HO                  self-propelled AAG                   20          20
       35 mm GDF-003                Anti-Aircraft Gun                    20          20
       40 mm M1                     Anti-Aircraft Gun                    80          80
       40 mm L/60/70                Anti-Aircraft Gun                    80          80
       12.7 mm M55                  Anti-Aircraft Gun                    n/a         n/a
                 Note:



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           1.   The Chiron (Singung) also known as KP-SAM went into series production
                and deployment on completion of development in September 2005.
           2.   The M-SAM programs is on schedule to enter service in 2010. The weapon
                is expected to be able to engage targets at ranges up to 100 km.



       Infantry Weapons

       Type                                  Role
       0.45 in M1911A1                       Pistol
       9 mm DP51                             Pistol
       Berreta 9 mm 92Fs                     Pistol
       0.30 in M1                            Carbine
       0.30 in Garand M1                     Carbine
       5.56 mm K2                            Rifle
       5.56 mm K1A                           Sub-Machine Gun
       5.56 mm M16A1                         Assault Rifle
       0.45 in M3A1                          Sub-Machine Gun
       7.56 mm K3                            Light Machine Gun
       7.62 mm M60                           General-Purpose Machine Gun
       7.62 mm FN MAG                        General-Purpose Machine Gun
       0.30 in Browning M1919A4              Heavy Machine Gun
       0.50 in Browning M2HB                 Heavy Machine Gun
       12.7mm K6                             Heavy Machine Gun
       40 mm M79                             Grenade Launcher
       40 mm M203                            Grenade Launcher
       107 mm M30                            Mortar
       81 mm KM-29                           Mortar
       60 mm M2/KM-19                        Mortar


       Army Aviation

       Type                 Manufacturer Role                      Original In      First
                                                                   Total    Service Delivery
       AH-1F HueyCobra Bell                 Combat Helicopter 62            54      1988
       AH-1J SeaCobra       Bell            Combat Helicopter 8             6       1978
       500MD/TOW            MD              Combat Helicopter 50            45      1976
       BO 105 CBS-5         Eurocopter      Combat Helicopter 2             2       2000
       BO 105 CBS-5         KAI             Combat Helicopter 10            10      2000
                            (Eurocopter)
       500MD                MD              Observation            144      130     1976
                                            Helicopter



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       CH-47D Chinook         Boeing         Transport            18        18      1988
       AS 332L Super          Eurocopter     Communications       3         3       1988
       Puma
       UH-1H Iroquois         Bell           Utility Helicopter   104       20      1985
                                                                        1
       UH-60P Black           Sikorsky       Utility Helicopter   140       130     1990
       Hawk
       Missiles
       BGM-71A TOW            Raytheon       Anti-Armor
       BGM-71E TOW-           Raytheon       Anti-Armor
       2A
       AGM-114 Hellfire Hellfire             Anti-Armor
                  Note:

           1.     Total includes small number of UH-60A/L supplied from US stocks; bulk of
                  Black Hawk fleet to comprise 138 UH-60P assembled locally by Korean
                  Air; further batch of 70 under consideration. Some transferred to Air Force


       Source: Jane‘s Information Group

           E. Air Force

       Summary

       STRENGTH
       52,000
       (55,000 reserves)
       FIGHTER
       F-4, F-5, F-15, F-16

       CLOSE SUPPORT
       A-37
       TRANSPORT
       C-130, CN-235
       RECONNAISSANCE/OBSERVATION
       RF-4, RF-5, Raytheon Hawker 800, KO-1
       UTILITY HELICOPTER
       HH-47, UH-60, Ka-32
       TRAINING
       Il-103, KT-1, Hawk, T-38, T-50


       Assessment

       The Republic of Korea Air Force (Han-Guk Kong Goon - ROKAF) is a well trained and
       powerful force that plays a significant role in the country's deterrent strategy against
       possible invasion by North Korea and other military contingencies that threaten South
       Korea's national interests and security. The ROKAF currently has a strength of about
       52,000 personnel and operates a total of 850 aircraft. The latter includes 560 combat



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       aircraft and it also has an extensive network of radar sites and air-defense bases
       throughout the country.

       Apart from approximately 160 F-16 fighters and an increasing number of F-15Ks, the
       ROKAF's resources mainly consist of F-4 and F-5 fighters that are now approaching their
       maximum service age. Although force quality is being improved, with fielding of the F-
       15K and the addition of indigenous T-50/A-50 Golden Eagle aircraft, at least 50 per cent
       of South Korea's airpower continues to rely on near- obsolete F-4 and F-5 fighters. Thus,
       it continues to press for further force improvement through the acquisition of more
       advanced aircraft, however the ROKAF is increasingly unlikely to be able to effectively
       respond effectively to future regional threats. Approximately 300 new combat aircraft
       must be fielded in the next 20 to 30 years for the ROKAF to have effective air capability
       against future threats.

       Currently, there are three major force improvement objectives for the ROKAF. First, and
       probably the most important, is the intent to field a quartet of airborne early warning and
       control aircraft by 2011 under the much delayed E-X program. The ROKAF currently
       depends on land-based radars and forward-positioned ground-based observation posts to
       fulfill early warning. However, about 75 per cent of the land is mountainous which
       creates many blind spots for the ground-based radar systems. Furthermore, the relatively
       low-quality of the existing radar systems makes it difficult for South Korea's military
       forces to be responsive to the North Korean air threat; particularly in countering low-
       altitude infiltration by air of highly trained and motivated North Korean special forces.

       Establishment of a 2nd Master Control & Reporting Centre at Daegu and a continuous
       process of upgrading the existing radar and early warning systems have brought some
       improvement, but an effective early warning capability is urgently required - and a
       decision on procurement is expected to be taken during the course of 2006.

       The second most important objective of ongoing force improvement initiatives concerns
       advancing intelligence gathering capability. It is no secret that South Korea depends
       heavily on the US air assets as a prime intelligence source. In particular, virtually all
       signals intelligence data originates from the US Forces in Korea, although the ROKAF is
       better able to satisfy its needs for imagery intelligence. Current imagery intelligence
       capabilities include the Hawker 800-and RF-4C as well as access to US assets such as the
       high-flying Lockheed U-2 aircraft and military imagery satellites.

       Many phased efforts are being made to secure self-reliant intelligence capability and
       support systems. The first phase involves creation of an effective tactical surveillance
       system, something the ROKAF believes has been partially fulfilled by acquisition of
       eight Hawker-800 aircraft for the duel tasks of signals and imagery intelligence
       gathering. The second phase of the effort will focus on securing strategic surveillance
       systems that will give the ROKAF strategic imagery and signals intelligence gathering
       capabilities. There are many strategic intelligence programs currently in planning, but it
       is not certain whether all of the programs will go ahead as scheduled due to continuing
       budget constraints.



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       Finally, much attention is being directed towards improving ROKAF's air-defense missile
       systems. South Korea continues to operate obsolete equipment such as Nike and
       Improved-HAWK surface-to-air missile systems. Currently, the ROKAF has three air-
       defense brigades composed of a total of 30 Nike and Improved-HAWK air-defense
       batteries. However, the Nike is no longer an effective air-defense system as it has already
       reached its maximum service age. The ROKAF has long sought to replace it with the far
       more modern and capable Patriot system but the Ministry of National Defense (MND)
       does not appear to place a high priority on this.

       The RoKAF currently has seven major objectives of modernization, specifically:

           1. Diversify the force to respond effectively and flexibly to multi-dimensional
              threats;
           2. Secure strategic and long-distance strike capabilities while maintaining effective
              counter methods to the threat posed by North Korea;
           3. Continuously improve early warning capability against low-altitude and surprise
              attacks;
           4. Develop real-time and wide-area air control capabilities;
           5. Modernize ground-based air defense systems;
           6. Increase survivability of existing radar and air defense sites by acquiring
              additional mobile systems; and
           7. Improve tactical airlift capability.

       Deployments, tasks and operations

       Role and Deployment

       The ROKAF has both ground support and air defense roles and units are deployed
       according to their mission.

       Ground-based air defense radars and control centers under Air Force control are
       principally concerned with, and assigned to, two threat axes: the northern border and the
       southwest approaches.

       The ROKAF's latest and most advanced air base is located at Seosan, South Chungchong
       province. It has two runways, advanced maintenance facilities and a fortified
       underground battle command centre. Fighter aircraft at Seosan air base and Suwon air
       base are tasked with defending the airspace over the capital and the six western islands.

       Recent and Current Operations

       ROKAF C-130 Hercules transport aircraft have been involved in supporting
       peacekeeping missions in Angola, Afghanistan and East Timor.

       In addition, the C-130 fleet also performed relief flights in the aftermath of the Asian
       tsunami in December 2004; landslides in the Philippines in February 2005; and the
       earthquake in Indonesia in June 2005.


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       Four ROKAF C-130s were deployed to Ali al Salem Air Base in Kuwait in October
       2004. Assigned to the 58th Airlift Wing, they continue to provide airlift support to the
       ROK's Zaytun Division, which is conducting peacekeeping and reconstruction operations
       in Irbil, Iraq.

       Command and control




       Organization

       ROKAF Headquarters exercises control of three subordinate major commands and a
       number of direct reporting units (DRUs). Major commands comprise the Air Force
       Operations Command, Air Force Logistics Command and Air Force Education and
       Training Command. Air Force Operations Command (AFOC) manages the majority of
       combat units, some of which report directly to AFOC headquarters, while others are
       subordinated to the recently established Air Force Southern Combat Command. AFOC
       also oversees Air Defense Artillery Command and the Air Defense and Control Wing.
       Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) is responsible for maintenance and supply depots.
       Air Force Education and Training Command (AFETC) echelons include the Air
       University, Basic Military Training Wing, Flying Training Wing and specialist technical
       schools. DRUs consist of the Air Force Academy, Aerospace Projects Group, Air


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       Combat Development Group and single examples of an Airlift Wing and Composite
       Wing. Aircraft-operating elements are organized into wings, with each wing typically
       controlling the activities of from two to five squadrons, which are usually resident at a
       single air base. In the case of combat units, individual squadrons within a wing generally
       operate the same type of aircraft, although there are some exceptions to this rule.

       Order of Battle

       Unit                Base                 Type                 Role
       1st FW              Gwangju AB
       102 FS              Gwangju AB           F-5A                 Operational Training
       102 FS              Gwangju AB           F-5B                 Operational Training
       122 FS              Gwangju AB           F-5A                 Operational Training
       122 FS              Gwangju AB           F-5B                 Operational Training
       206 FS              Gwangju AB           F-5E                 AD/Attack
       206 FS              Gwangju AB           F-5F                 Continuation Training


       3rd TW              Sacheon AB
       213 FTS             Sacheon AB           KT-1                 Training
       215 FTS             Sacheon AB           KT-1                 Training
       217 FTS             Sacheon AB           KT-1                 Training
       236 FTS             Sacheon AB           KT-1                 Training


       5th TATW            Gimhae AB
       251 TASS            Gimhae AB            C-130H               Transport
       251 TASS            Gimhae AB            C-130H-30            Transport
       256 TATS            Gimhae AB            CN-235M              Transport
       256 TATS            Gimhae AB            Citation             Calibration
       258 TATS            Gimhae AB            CN-235M              Transport
       259 TASS            Gimhae AB            UH-60P               Special Operations


       8th FW              Wonju AB
       103 FS              Wonju AB             F-5E                 AD/Attack
       103 FS              Wonju AB             F-5F                 Continuation Training
       203 FS              Wonju AB             F-5E                 AD/Attack
       203 FS              Wonju AB             F-5F                 Continuation Training
       207 FS              Wonju AB             F-5E                 AD/Attack
       207 FS              Wonju AB             F-5F                 Continuation Training
       238 FS              Wonju AB             A-37B                COIN
                 1
       239 SFS             Wonju AB             A-37B                Aerobatic Display




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       10th FW             Suwon AB
       101 FS              Suwon AB             F-5E                 AD/Attack
       101 FS              Suwon AB             F-5F                 Continuation Training
       201 FS              Suwon AB             F-5E                 AD/Attack
       201 FS              Suwon AB             F-5F                 Continuation Training
       38th FG             Gunsan AB
       111 FS              Gunsan AB            F-5E                 AD/Attack
       111 FS              Gunsan AB            F-5F                 Continuation Training


       11th FW             Daegu AB
       110 FS              Daegu AB             F-4D                 AD/Attack
       151 FS              Daegu AB             F-4D                 AD/Attack


       15th TATW           Seongnam AB
       237 TCS             Seongnam AB          O-2A                 Observation
       255 SOS             Seongnam AB          C-130H               Special Operations
       255 SOS             Seongnam AB          C-130H-30            Special Operations
       257 TASS            Seongnam AB          C-130H               Transport
       257 TASS            Seongnam AB          C-130H-30            Transport
       35th CG             Seongnam AB
       296 Squadron        Seongnam AB          Boeing 737           VIP Transport
       296 Squadron        Seongnam AB          BAe 748              VIP Transport
       296 Squadron        Seongnam AB          CN-235M              VIP Transport
       296 Squadron        Seongnam AB          UH-60P               VIP Transport
       39th TRG            Seongnam AB
       125 TRS?            Seongnam AB          Hawker 800           Elint/Reconnaissance
       131 TRS             Suwon AB             RF-4C                Reconnaissance
       132 TRS             Suwon AB             RF-5A                Reconnaissance
       132 TRS             Suwon AB             F-5B                 Continuation Training


       16th FW             Yecheon AB
       115 FTS             Yecheon AB           T-38A                Advanced Training
       189 FTS             Yecheon AB           T-38A                Advanced Training
       202 FS              Yecheon AB           F-5E                 Operational Training
       202 FS              Yecheon AB           F-5F                 Operational Training
       216 FTS             Yecheon AB           Hawk Mk 67           COIN/Training


       17th FW             Cheongju AB
       152 FS              Cheongju AB          F-4E                 AD/Attack
       153 FS              Cheongju AB          F-4E                 AD/Attack




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       156 FS              Cheongju AB          F-4E                 AD/Attack
       29th TD&TG          Cheongju AB
       191 TD&TS           Cheongju AB          F-16C                Tactics Training
       191 TD&TS           Cheongju AB          F-16D                Tactics Training
       192 TD&TS           Cheongju AB          F-5E                 Tactics Training
       192 TD&TS           Cheongju AB          F-5F                 Tactics Training
       6th S&RG
       233 CS&RS           Cheongju AB          UH-60P               Combat SAR
       233 CS&RS           Cheongju AB          AS332                Combat SAR
       233 CS&RS           Cheongju AB          Ka-32T               Combat SAR
       235 S&RS            Cheongju AB          CH-47D               SAR


       18th FW             Gangneung AB
       105 FS              Gangneung AB         F-5E                 AD/Attack
       105 FS              Gangneung AB         F-5F                 Continuation Training
       112 FS              Gangneung AB         F-5E                 AD/Attack
       112 FS              Gangneung AB         F-5F                 AD/Attack
       205 FTS             Gangneung AB         F-5E                 Operational Training
       205 FTS             Gangneung AB         F-5F                 Operational Training


       19th FW             Jungwon AB
       155 FS              Jungwon AB           F-16C                AD/Attack
       155 FS              Jungwon AB           F-16D                Continuation Training
       159 FS              Jungwon AB           F-16C                AD/Attack
       159 FS              Jungwon AB           F-16D                Continuation Training
       161 FS              Jungwon AB           F-16C                AD/Attack
       161 FS              Jungwon AB           F-16D                Continuation Training
       162 FS              Jungwon AB           F-16C                AD/Attack
       162 FS              Jungwon AB           F-16D                Continuation Training


       20th FW             Seosan/Haemi AB
       120 FS              Seosan/Haemi AB F-16C                     AD/Attack
       120 FS              Seosan/Haemi AB F-16D                     Continuation Training
       121 FS              Seosan/Haemi AB F-16C                     AD/Attack
       121 FS              Seosan/Haemi AB F-16D                     Continuation Training
       123 FS              Seosan/Haemi AB F-16C                     AD/Attack
       123 FS              Seosan/Haemi AB F-16D                     Continuation Training
       157 FS              Seosan/Haemi AB F-16C                     AD/Attack
       157 FS              Seosan/Haemi AB F-16D                     Continuation Training




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       52nd T&EG            Sacheon AB
       281 T&ES             Sacheon AB           XKT-1               Test Duties
       281 T&ES             Sacheon AB           T-50                Test Duties


       AFA                  Seongmu AB
       208 FTS              Seongmu AB           CAP 10              Aerobatic Training
       212 FTS              Seongmu AB           T-41B               Primary Training
       212 FTS              Seongmu AB           Il-103              Primary Training
                 Note:

           1.    'Black Eagles' aerial display team


                                                        Glossary:
       AFA                         Air Force Academy
       CG                          Combined Group
       CS&RS                       Combat Search and Rescue Squadron
       FG                          Fighter Group
       FS                          Fighter Squadron
       FTS                         Flight Training Squadron
       FW                          Fighter Wing
       S&RG                        Search and Rescue Group
       S&RS                        Search and Rescue Squadron
       SFS                         Special Flying Squadron
       SOS                         Special Operations Squadron
       T&EG                        Test and Evaluation Group
       T&ES                        Test and Evaluation Squadron
       TASS                        Tactical Air Support Squadron
       TATS                        Tactical Air Transport Squadron
       TATW                        Tactical Air Transport Wing
       TCS                         Tactical Control Squadron
       TD&TG                       Tactical Development and Training Group
       TD&TS                       Tactical Development and Training Squadron
       TRG                         Tactical Reconnaissance Group
       TRS                         Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
       TW                          Training Wing

       Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine

       ROKAF operational art and tactical doctrine is based largely on US Air Force doctrinal
       and operational procedures. This is reinforced by joint operations undertaken with the US
       Air Force and other elements of the US military.




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       Bases

       Chongju
       Daegu Gangneung
       Gimhae
       Gunsan
       Gwangju
       Jungwon
       Sacheon
       Seongmu
       Seongnam (Seoul)
       Seosan
       Suwon
       Wonju
       Yecheon

       There are also highway strips at the following locations:

       Chongup
       Chukpyon
       Daegu
       Kimchon
       Naegi
       Onyang
       Pyongtaek
       Suwon
       Tochon
       Yongju

       Training

       Officer training is carried out at the Air Force Academy at Chungju, with primary pilot
       training given on Il-103 and T-41 aircraft at Seongmu AB, followed by basic and
       advanced phases of instruction at Sacheon and Yecheon respectively. The Air Force War
       and Staff College, at Daejeon, is used for the military training of officers up to middle
       rank. Some training is also undertaken in the USA. Conscripts receive their basic military
       training at Daejeon.

       Training Areas

       The ROKAF has six training ranges, some of which are shared with other branches of the
       South Korean armed forces, as well as with US forces.




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       Equipment in service

       Fixed Wing

       Type                 Manufacturer Role                    Original In      First
                                                                 Total    Service Delivery
       F-15K Eagle          Boeing          Multirole Fighter    40        -           2005
       F-16C Fighting       Lockheed        Multirole Fighter    125       118         1986
       Falcon               Martin
       F-16D Fighting       Lockheed        Multirole Fighter    55        51          1986
       Falcon               Martin
       F-4D Phantom II      McDonnell       Air Defense/Attack 86          60          1969
                            Douglas
       F-4E Phantom II      McDonnell       Air Defense/Attack 95          70          1978
                            Douglas
       F-5E Tiger II        Northrop        Air Defense/Attack 174         150         1975
       F-5A                 Northrop        Air Defense/Attack 95          20          1964
       A-37B Dragonfly      Cessna          Counter              28        20          1976
                                            Insurgency
       RF-4C Phantom II McDonnell           Reconnaissance       18        16          1990
                        Douglas
       RF-5A                Northrop        Reconnaissance       9         6           1972
       Hawker 800RA         Raytheon        Reconnaissance       4         4           2000
       Hawker 800SIG        Raytheon        Elint/Sigint         4         4           2001
       O-2A Super           Cessna          Observation          14        10          1975
       Skymaster
       KO-1                 KAI             Observation          20 4      -           2005
       CN-235M-100          Airtech         Transport            12        12          1993
       CN-235M-220          Airtech         Transport            8         8           2001
       C-130H Hercules      Lockheed        Transport            8         8           1989
                            Martin
       C-130H-30            Lockheed        Transport            4         4           1987
       Hercules             Martin
       737-300              Boeing          Communications       1         1           1985
       748 Srs 280          BAe             Communications       2         2           1974
       500 Citation I       Cessna          Calibration          1         1           1998
                                                                      1
       A-50 Golden Eagle KAI                Lead-in Trainer      44        -           2005
                                                                               5
       CAP 10B              CAP Aviation Trainer                 2         2           1995
       P.1182 Hawk Mk       BAE Systems Trainer                  20        17          1992
       67
       T-41B Mescalero      Cessna          Trainer              24        20 6        1975
                                                                                   2
       Il-103               Ilyushin        Trainer              23        15          2004



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       KT-1 Woong-Bee         KAI              Trainer               85             83   2000
       T-50 Golden Eagle KAI                   Trainer               50 1           -    2005
       F-5F Tiger II          Northrop         Trainer               40             34   1976
       F-5B                   Northrop         Trainer               36             20   1964
       T-38A Talon            Northrop         Trainer               30 3           30   1997
                   Notes:

              1.   Initial planned procurement; additional purchases expected
              2.   Delivery in progress
              3.   Operated on lease until indigenous T-50 trainer enters service
              4.   On order
              5.   Civil-registry
              6.   To be retired following delivery of Il-103



       Rotary Wing

       Type                    Manufacturer Role                     Original In         First
                                                                     Total    Service    Delivery
       412                     Bell           Communications         3          3        1981
                                                                         1
       S-92                    Sikorsky       Communications         3          -        2006
       CH-47D (HH-47D)         Boeing         Utility                6          6        1991
       Chinook
       UH-60P Black Hawk Sikorsky             Utility                30?        28
       Ka-32T Helix-C (HH- Kamov              Utility                7          7        2004
       32)
                   Note:

              1.   On order




       Missiles

       Type                                 Manufacturer Role
       AIM-9M Sidewinder                    Raytheon           Air-to-Air
       AIM-9N Sidewinder                    Lockheed           Air-to-Air
                                            Martin
       AIM-9X Sidewinder 1                  Raytheon           Air-to-Air
       AIM-7E Sparrow                       Raytheon           Air-to-Air
       AIM-7F Sparrow                       Raytheon           Air-to-Air
       AIM-120A AMRAAM                      Raytheon           Air-to-Air
                                  1
       AIM-120C AMRAAM                      Raytheon           Air-to-Air
       AGM-65A Maverick                     Raytheon           Air-to-Surface
                                  1
       AGM-84H SLAM-ER                      Boeing             Air-to-Surface
                              1
       AGM-84L Harpoon                      Boeing             Air-to-Surface



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       AGM-130                            Boeing           Air-to-Surface
       AGM-142C Popeye                    Lockheed         Air-to-Surface
                                          Martin
       AGM-142D Popeye                    Lockheed         Air-to-Surface
                                          Martin
                Note:

           1.   On order


       Source: Jane‘s Information Group

           F. Navy

       Summary

       STRENGTH
       60,000 (including 19,000 conscripts)
       25,000 (Marine Corps)
       SUBMARINE
       20 (11 submarines + 2 midget sub)
       DESTROYER
       6
       FRIGATE
       9
       CORVETTE
       28
       FAST ATTACK CRAFT - MISSILE
       5


       Assessment

       The ROK Navy (ROKN) is a modern, well-equipped force that is gradually acquiring a
       bluewater capability, with the aim of safeguarding the ROK's maritime interests as far a
       field as the Indian Ocean. In pursuit of this power projection goal, the ROK is currently
       concentrating the bulk of its resources in advanced warship and submarine assets. In this
       capacity, its warship program is at the core of the ROKN's development of an
       increasingly sophisticated surface fleet.

       The principal frigate in service with the ROKN is the 2,180-tonne 'Ulsan' class small anti-
       submarine warfare frigate, of which nine have been procured. Three heavily armed
       3,900-tonne KDX-1 frigates, produced locally, are due to be commissioned into service
       shortly.

       There is also the 5,000-tonne KDX-2 class destroyer program, which involves the
       construction of six ships locally. The hull is ROK-built but the combat management
       system, fire control and radars, anti-submarine warfare systems and long-range anti-air
       capabilities are supplied by Western sources. The first unit of the KDX-2 is currently
       undergoing sea-trial and also participated in the 2004 RIMPAC training, during which it


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       successfully launched ROKN's latest air-defense missile, SM-2MR Block IIIA. The
       KDX-3 program was announced in the ROK's latest medium-term defense procurement
       plan (March 1999). This entails the ROKN operating three 7,000-tonne, 'Aegis' class
       destroyers by 2010-2015. These are state-of-the-art warships, equipped with advanced
       electronic equipment and weaponry, capable of attacking multiple targets. The US and
       Japan are the only two other countries whose navies have Aegis class destroyers.

       In addition to the planned purchase of the 'Aegis' class destroyers, the ROKN's force
       improvement is focused also on developing advanced underwater warfare capability and
       long-range power projection capabilities. There are nine 1,200-ton 209-class attack
       submarines currently in operation by the ROKN and this small but powerful underwater
       force will be further strengthened by acquisition of at least three 1,800-ton '214' class
       submarines which will be license manufactured in South Korea. Long-range power
       projection capability will be gradually supported first with the acquisition of the two
       13,000 ton amphibious ship capable of carrying 700 Marines, 10 helicopters, two high-
       speed air-cushioned landing craft, and 10 main battle tanks.

       Deployments, tasks and operations

       Role and Deployment

       The ROKN, which is gradually developing a power projection capability, is deployed
       mainly to protect the coastal approaches to the ROK and to support the land forces with
       amphibious troops and equipment. The Marine Corps constitutes a powerful strike force;
       it is tasked chiefly with the defense of the five islands off the west coast of the ROK and
       with defending Seoul. The Marine Corps is composed of two infantry divisions, one
       infantry brigade, and a number of support and specialized island units. Naval aviation
       forces are divided into two maritime patrol squadrons (equipped with the S-2E and MD
       500C) and two flights with shipborne helicopters.

       Recent and Current Operations

       It is understood that the ROKN has not been involved in major UN duties so far other
       than its support missions for the ROK UN Peacekeeping Forces in East Timor. South
       Korea declared in March 1995 of its willingness to become involved in the UN's stand-by
       arrangements made mention of the possible provision of a sea rescue service. This may
       include a naval input, although this is not specified.

       Command and control

       The chief of naval operations is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Beneath the chief
       of naval operations are the vice chief of naval operations and the commanders of the
       three fleet commands, each a rear admiral. The commandant of the Marine Corps also
       reports to the vice chief of operations.




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       Organization

       In 1996 the ROKN was reorganized into three fleets, each commanded by a rear admiral.
       Fleet Command is located at Chinhae and is headed by the commander of the Naval
       Operations Centre, who holds the rank of vice admiral. Each fleet contains one combat
       flotilla, 1 logistic support squadron, and 1 training unit. The Marine Corps was
       designated an independent service in November 1987. The ROKN's large force of 60,000
       (19,000 conscripts, both navy and Marines) is organized to supply personnel for the
       nation's warships, submarines, patrol and coastal craft, and base facilities. In addition to
       its main inventory of forces, the ROKN also possesses substantial auxiliary forces
       including four tankers, two large tugs, four survey ships and 35 service craft.

       1st Fleet

       No 11, 12 and 13 DD/FF Squadrons; No 101 and, 102 Coastal Defense Squadrons; 181,
       191, 111 and 121 Coastal Defense Units; 121st Minesweeper Squadron; and 1st Fleet
       Decontamination Unit. Responsible for defense of the east coast.

       2nd Fleet

       No 21, 22 and 23 DD/FF Squadrons; No 201 and 202 Coastal Defense Squadrons; 211
       and 212 Coastal Defense Units; and 522nd Minesweeper Squadron. Responsible for
       defense of the west coast.

       3rd Fleet

       No 301, 302 and 303 DD/FF Squadrons; and 304th and 406th Coastal Defense Units.
       Responsible for defense of the southern peninsula and Cheju Do island.

       There are 17,000 naval and Marine conscripts. Naval conscripts serve for 26 months and
       24 months for the Marine. Officers are usually graduates of the service academies and are
       required to serve for 10 years. The rank and grade structure of the ROKN largely
       corresponds with that of the US Navy, on which it is modeled.

       Coastal defense is largely the responsibility of three batteries of Marines equipped with
       truck-mounted quadruple Harpoon missile launchers.

       The US announced in February 1998 that it would be putting its Seventh Fleet under the
       operational control of the US-ROK Combined Forces Command in wartime.

       Naval Aviation Order of Battle

       Unit                Base                 Type                 Role
       6 Air Wing          Pohang
       61 Air Group        Pohang
       611 Squadron        Pohang               Caravan II           Target Towing



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       613 Squadron        Pohang               P-3C                 Maritime Patrol
       615 Squadron        Jeju                 P-3C                 Maritime Patrol
       62 Air Group
       621 Squadron        Mokpo                Alouette III         ASW/Communications
       623 Squadron        Pohang               UH-60P               Utility
       623 Squadron        Pohang               UH-1H                Utility
       627 Squadron        Jinhae               Lynx Mk 99           ASW
       629 Squadron        Jinhae               Lynx Mk 99A          ASW
       Training Unit       Pohang               JetRanger            Training
       Training Unit       Pohang               UH-1H                Training


       Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine

       Operational art and doctrine are based mainly upon US naval and Marine Corps doctrine
       but the ROKN is now believed to be developing its own distinctive art and doctrine to
       meet its future needs as an independent force with power projection capability.

       Bases

       Chinhae (Fleet Headquarters and maritime aviation)
       Donghae (1st Fleet Headquarters)
       Pyongtaek (2nd Fleet Headquarters)
       Pusan (3rd Fleet Headquarters)
       Cheju (maritime aviation)
       Inchon
       Kimpo (Marine Corps)
       Mokpo
       Mukho
       Pengyongdo (Marine Corps)
       Pohang (maritime aviation and Marine Corps)




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       Training

       Most naval training takes place in the ROK, although some officers attend US staff
       courses. The Naval Academy at Chinhae provides an officer education to graduate and
       postgraduate level. The Basic Training School, for conscripts, is also at Chinhae. The
       Naval War and Staff College is at Daejeon. ROKN forces participate in the US-led
       RIMPAC multinational exercise series, as well as in bilateral exercises such as 'Foal
       Eagle' with the US Navy.

       In 1997 the Defense Education and Training Regulations were revised. Considerable
       resources have been devoted to developing an efficient military education and training
       system. An early example of this was the consolidated training program created for
       personnel serving in the submarine arm. The first crews for the Chang Bogo boats were
       trained in Germany by the German Navy and the shipyard, HDW. They are now trained
       in South Korea by former US Navy instructors and by serving German Navy personnel.
       Deep-sea training is conducted off Hawaii under the terms of an agreement concluded
       recently with the US. The first submarine to conduct deep-sea training off Guam did so at
       the end of 1996.

       Training Areas

       The principal training areas are understood to be in Chinhae and Daejeon.



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       Equipment in service

       Surface Fleet

       Type                            Role                          Current       First
                                                                     Total         Delivery
       KDX-1                           Destroyer                     3             1998-2000
       KDX-2                           Destroyer                     3; 6 by 2008 2004-08 1
       KDX-3                           Destroyer                     n/a           2008-12
                                                                                   (projected)
       Ulsan                           Frigate                       9             1981-93
       FFX                             Frigate                       n/a           2012-15
                                                                                   (projected)
       Po Hang                         Corvette                      24            1984-93
       Dong Hae                        Corvette                      4             1982-3
       Pae Ku (PSMM 5)                 Fast Attack Craft - Missile   5             1976-8
       PKX                             Fast Attack Craft - Missile   n/a           2007
                                                                                   (projected)
       Sea Dolphin                     Fast Attack Craft - Patrol    85            1978-
       LPX                             Landing Platform Dock         n/a           2007
                                                                                   (projected)
       Alligator                       Landing Ship Tank             4             1993-9
       LST 1-510 and 511-1152          Landing Ship Tank             6             1944-5
       LSM 1                           Landing Ship Medium           3             1956
       Furseal                         Landing Craft Utility         7             1979-81
       Won San                         Minelayer                     1             1997
       Swallow                         Minehunter                    6             1986-94
       Yang Yang                       Minesweeper - Coastal         3             1999-2005
       Solgae                          Landing Craft Fast            1             1990
       LCM 8                           Landing Craft Mechanized      10            1978
       611                             Landing Craft Air Cushion     1             n/a
       Chun Jee                        Logistic Support Ship         3             1990-8
       Chung Hae Jin                   Salvage/Rescue Ship           1             1996
       Edenton                         Salvage Ship                  2             1996 2
       Sunjin                          Trials Support Ship           1             1993
       Various                         Survey Craft                  16            1980-7
                   Notes

             1.    Approval for the boats was given in late 1996, but the final decision was not
                   taken until 1998. Contract to design and build the first of class was won by
                   Daewoo in November 1999. First steel was cut in late 2000.
             2.    Commissioned in 1972 and delivered from the US in August 1996.




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       Submarines

       Type                            Role                           Quantity       Delivered
                                                                      3 building (6 2007-09
                                                                      more          (remainder
       KSS-2 (Type 214)                Attack Submarine               planned)      by 2020)
       Chang Bogo (Type 209)           Attack Submarine               9              1993-2000
       KSS-1 Tolgorae                  Midget Submarine               2              1983
       Dolphin (Cosmos)                Midget Submarine               9              n/a


       Naval Aviation

       Type                   Manufacturer Role                      Original In      First
                                                                     Total    Service Delivery
       SA 319B Alouette Aerospatiale          Anti-Submarine         10         5          1976
       III                                    Helicopter
       WG.13 Lynx Mk          Westland        Anti-Submarine         12         11         1990
       99                                     Helicopter
       WG.13 Lynx Mk          Westland        Anti-Submarine         13         13         1999
       99A                                    Helicopter
       P-3B Orion             Lockheed        Maritime Patrol        81         -
                              Martin
       P-3C Orion             Lockheed        Maritime Patrol        8          8          1994
                              Martin
       UH-1H Iroquois         Bell            Utility Helicopter                5
       UH-60P Black           Sikorsky        Utility Helicopter     11         9          1993
       Hawk
       F 406 Caravan II       Reims Cessna Combat Support            5          5          1998
       206B JetRanger         Bell            Training               2          2          1974
       Missiles
       Sea Skua               Matra BAe       Anti-Ship Attack
       AGM-84A                Boeing          Anti-Ship Attack
       Harpoon
                  Note:

           1.     Presently stored in USA; total of nine aircraft to be received, of which eight
                  will be refurbished with ninth to be used as spares source. Upgrade to be
                  undertaken by KAI in Korea, to where aircraft are expected to be ferried in
                  2005



       Marine Police (Coast Guard)

       Type                            Role                           Current        First
                                                                      Total          Delivery
       Mazinger                        Offshore Patrol Craft          3              1981


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       Daewoo                          Offshore Patrol Craft         1             1999
       Han Kang                        Offshore Patrol Craft         1             1985
       Sea Dragon/Whale                Offshore Patrol Craft         6             1978-82
       Hyundai                         Coastal Patrol Craft          3             1991-7
       Sea Wolf/Shark                  Coastal Patrol Craft          22            1979-88
       Bukhansan                       Coastal Patrol Craft          4             1987-90
                                   1                                      2
       Kilurki-11 (Sea Dolphin)        Inshore Fast Patrol Craft     80            n/a
       Chebi-51 (Sea Hawk)             Inshore Fast Patrol Craft     15            n/a
       Jaemin I                        Salvage Ship                  1             1992
       Jaemin II                       Salvage Ship                  1             1996
       Tae Pung Yang II                Salvage Ship                  1             1993
                  Note

           1.     Ordered in 1997 for delivery in 1999. Described as a multi-purpose patrol
                  vessel, this is the largest patrol vessel yet built for the Maritime Police.
           2.     Several deleted and in reserve, several transferred abroad, most recently
                  three patrol craft donated to Kazakhstan in May 2006.


       Source: Jane‘s Information Group

           G. Defense Spending

       Assessment

       Defense spending trends

       Defense spending in South Korea appears to be on a firmly upward trend after its
       previous fall from 6.0 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 2.40 per cent in 2004. The Ministry of
       National Defense budget increased by 11.1% in 2005 and 9.5% in 2006 to a level
       equivalent to 2.53 per cent of GDP and announced its intention to secure funding of
       2.90% of GDP by 2009.

       The increase in defense spending can be attributed to both the deteriorating security
       situation in the region and the withdrawal of US troops from the peninsula. As part of
       their force realignment, the US will withdraw 12,000 of their troops from South Korea
       and reposition the remaining 24,500 away from the frontline with North Korea. As a
       result of this policy, the US has been increasing pressure on South Korea to strengthen its
       own armed forces and begin to rely less on them for its own security. South Korea‘s
       President Roh Moo‐hyun has repeatedly endorsed this view, explaining that it is
       unacceptable for the worlds 12th largest economy not to be able to ‗assume the role of
       main actor‘ in its own defense matters. The MND has indicated that it would like to see
       defense spending rise to a level of 3.2 per cent of GDP in the long term ‐ the most
       obvious caveat to this scenario would be a breakthrough in political dialogue with North
       Korea, which would partly remove the immediate upward pressure on defense spending.


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       Following President Roh‘s comments regarding South Korea‘s need for greater defense
       self sufficiency, the government has launched a major overhaul of the entire defense
       acquisition process in an attempt to improve efficiency. The reforms will address the
       organizational structure and budgeting process of national military acquisitions and will
       be carried out by the Prime Ministers Office and the Commission against Corruption,
       rather than the MND, in an effort to gain the public‘s trust following recent arms scandals
       involving the powerful MND Acquisition Policy Bureau.

       The defense plan for the period 2004‐08 emphasized a switch in the allocation of funds
       within the defense budget between investment and operational expenditure. By 2008,
       operational spending which accounted for 67 per cent of the budget in 2004 will have
       fallen to just 60 per cent of the total whereas investment spending will increase from 33
       per cent to 40 per cent of total defense expenditure.

       The 2004‐08 defense plan was somewhat superseded in October 2005 with the release of
       plans to comprehensively restructure the country‘s military forces by the year 2020. The
       plan, which was originally devised in 1998 but never implemented, is now expected to
       receive parliamentary approval by 2006. This would include a 25% reduction in the
       regular forces and a 50% reduction in the number of reservists. The money saved by
       these measures would be used to improve the salaries and benefits for those remaining in
       service as well as help with the ambitious equipment modernization program.

       Total Defense Spending
                         2001         2002      2003      2004          2005       2006     2007     2008     2009

       KRW trillion      16.17        16.36     17.51     18.74         20.82      22.80    25.31    28.35    32.80

       USD (millions)    12,540       13,080    14,700    16,225        20,820     22,800   25,310   28,350   32,800


       Total Defense Spending (% of GDP)
       2001    2002   2003     2004      2005    2006     2007     2008     2009

       2.61    2.60   2.43     2.40      2.49    2.53     2.60     2.70     2.90


       Overall Defense Procurement
                         2001     2002        2003     2004      2005     2006      2007    2008     2009

       KRW trillion      n/a      4.90        5.15     5.64      6.20     6.90      8.60    9.92     11.47

       USD (millions)    n/a      3,940       4,330    4,890     6,200    6,900     8,610   9,920    11,480


       If implemented, the current defense plan for the period 2004‐08 proposes that investment
       spending (procurement plus R&D funds), will increase from 33 per cent to 40 per cent of
       the total defense budget.



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       Following several arms procurement scandals in recent years the MND is to reform its
       acquisitions procedures with the creation of a new Office of Defense Acquisition due to
       begin operations in early 2006. The new agency replace nine previous separate
       procurement organizations.

       Operational and Maintenance Expenditure
                         2001    2002    2003    2004     2005    2006    2007     2008      2009

       KRW trillion      n/a     3.88    4.19    4.66     4.95    5.01    5.31     5.67      6.56

       USD (millions)    n/a     3,100   3,520   4,040    4,950   5,010   5,310    5,670     6,560


       As the Participatory Government Defense Policy 2003 noted, the armed forces possess
       ―worn out equipment‖ and are having difficulty in ―securing spare parts and conducting
       maintenance and repair‖, indicating that the repair and maintenance budget has been
       seriously under funded. Furthermore, the policy document also indicated that future
       priorities include improving service members‘ morale, accommodation and service
       conditions, as well as securing extra funds for training, suggesting that competition for
       future operational resources will be fierce. Overall, operational expenditure is intended to
       fall as a proportion of the total defense budget as funds are switched into investment and
       R&D.

       Within the operational and maintenance sector, the repair and maintenance budget should
       benefit from both the increasing overall defense budget as well as the shift of funds into
       investment spending, of which repair and maintenance is considered a part. The navy and
       air force will benefit at the expense of the army whose equipment will be significantly
       reduced.

       Personnel Spending
                         2001    2002    2003    2004     2005    2006    2007      2008       2009

       KRW trillion      n/a     7.01    7.58    7.98     8.75    9.35    10.38     11.34      13.12

       USD (millions)    n/a     5,600   6,360   6,910    8,750   9,350   10,380    11,340     13,120


       With the budgetary emphasis on switching funds from operational expenditure to
       investment expenditure, the MND announced plans to reduce its force strength by around
       7 per cent by 2008 and by a total of around 25% by 2020. The cuts are expected to be
       achieved through restructuring, with no overall loss in combat strength. However, while
       reunification remains a distant prospect there are unlikely to be significant additional
       changes in force strength in the medium term.

       An MND document, the Participatory Government Defense Policy 2003 noted that the
       welfare and morale of service members needed to be considerably improved. As a result
       several new plans are under way to improve barrack facilities and living quarters for
       officers and NCO‘s, improve wages and health facilities. For example, the average



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       monthly salary of an enlisted soldier will increase from KRW24,000 to KRW80,000 by
       2006.

       R & D Spending
                         2001    2002   2003    2004    2005   2006     2007    2008    2009

       KRW billion       n/a     550    580     650     800    1,000    1,270   1,420   1,640

       USD (millions)    n/a     440    490     565     800    1,000    1,270   1,420   1,640


       In 2004, South Korea allocated KRW650 billion to military research and development,
       3.5 per cent of the total defense budget, but is aiming to more than double that amount to
       around 10 per cent of the budget by 2015. As such, annual research and development
       growth will be among the highest of defense‐budget line items. It is acknowledged by
       Ministry of Defense officials that even with such a level of investment they will be
       unable to undertake R&D activities in all the areas they would like and will therefore
       have to adopt a ‗selection and concentration‘ strategy. The areas of prime interest have
       been identified as precision guided munitions and C4ISR technologies. The long term
       intention is not to just develop a strong domestic defense industrial base but to develop
       products that will substantially increase South Korea‘s defense exports.

       One future project to be undertaken between Korea Aerospace Industries and the Agency
       for Defense Development is the 10 year development of an indigenous medium‐altitude
       lone‐endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle.

       Source: Jane‘s Information Group

           H. Procurement


       Assessment

       The five-year plan announced by the MND in March 1999 placed emphasis on providing
       the ROK military with independent surveillance, early warning and target strike
       capabilities. It called for a 4 per cent to 5 per cent annual increase in the defense budget
       between 2000 and 2004, amounting to a value of USD69.6 billion. The March 1999
       proposals, while focusing on major weapons systems that enhance power projection
       capabilities, also included major equipment assets deemed essential to combat the North
       Korean threat. This was in response to the increased vulnerability to the DPRK's security
       violations that the ROK experienced during its economic difficulties. Accordingly, it is
       estimated that, by 2010, South Korean military forces will have reached 88 per cent of
       North Korea's military capabilities, up from 79 per cent.

       Another consequence of the financial crisis could be a greater ROK reliance on the US
       for its overseas military equipment, despite MND wishes that it should, on the contrary,


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       be lessened. This is not only out of consideration for interoperability requirements but in
       recognition of the extent to which South Korea has been beholden to the US for its
       defense/security and economic needs since the end of 1997. In this respect, Seoul has
       recently appeared far less eager to obtain advanced Russian military systems towards
       payment of Moscow's remaining USD2.12 billion outstanding debt to the ROK,
       preferring instead to receive advanced military technology and mineral resources.

       Increased reliance on the US for defense procurement is likely to have problems,
       however. Past vexing issues for Seoul include the over-pricing of equipment and the
       failure to recompense the ROK for this. Examples of this include the overcharging,
       amounting to millions of dollars, on Sikorsky UH-60 helicopters and Lockheed Martin P-
       3C maritime patrol aircraft, both purchases made in 1990. In addition, as a result of a
       loophole in the agreement, Pratt and Whitney for a long time refused to compensate the
       ROK for the loss of two KF-15 fighter jets which crashed with defective engines. Seoul
       also regards Washington's aggressive sales pitch, its use of the interoperability factor as a
       thinly-veiled blackmailing tactic and its restriction on technology transfer, as arrogant
       and unwarranted. In 1998 Washington promised that it would look into lifting restrictions
       on the ROK's export of weapons made with US technology to third countries and also
       possibly re-opening its military credit line suspended in 1986. Such problems have been
       aggravated by the controversy surrounding the ROK government's alleged favoritism of
       Boeing in the battle for the lucrative FX fighter project contract. This has resurrected
       memories of the corruption scandal which followed the decision to award the 1990
       fighter contract to Lockheed-Martin's F-16, despite the fact that its rival - the F-18 -
       performed better in evaluation trials.

       South Korea's dependence on US weapon systems is seemingly under close critical
       scrutiny. First, Seoul's new defense policy specifically states that the country will greatly
       diversify the source of major weapons procurement and secure advanced defense
       technologies from other foreign states, mainly European states such as France, Germany,
       and the UK. Second, MND foresees the increased focus on domestic development of
       major weapon systems will eventually reduce its dependence on the US.

       The government's strong willingness to diversify the procurement source is likely to
       heavily affect the way procurement is administrated. It does not seem to be a coincidence
       that South Korea launched development of its own advanced air-defense missile system,
       KM-SAM, while continuously excluding the budget for SAM-X. Some local analysts
       believe the South Korean government could finally decide that developing KM-SAM and
       upgrading it for high-altitude air-defense and ballistic missile defense is far more cost
       effective than buying the expensive PAC-3 system from the US in the long-term. KM-
       SAM is believed to be designed based on the Russian Triumph M-SAM.

       Another trend in defense procurement is the government's will to have a balanced defense
       development. South Korea has focused on developing a defense force against the large
       North Korean conventional forces. As the military focused on land force development,
       the ROK Air Force and Navy had to suffer years of relative neglect in the allocation of
       funding. The heavy concentration of the nation's defense budget on the ROKA's
       expenditures takes up about 30 per cent of the total defense budget. The South Korean


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       government is making a tremendous effort to reduce the level of the army's expenditure
       through various budget-saving programs such as the troop reduction plan.

       DEFENCE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

       South Korea's current military procurement programs reflect its concern toward the
       growing military capabilities in neighboring countries such as China and Japan. To match
       the pace of military developments in the region, South Korea places a high priority on
       procuring advanced C4I systems, early warning, long-range air-to-ground/air-to-air strike
       capabilities, and 'blue water' navy and naval air-defense capabilities.

       In December 2004, South Korea's National Assembly approved the budget of KRW7.851
       trillion (approximately USD7.13 billion) for military force improvement. Continuing
       programs in FY2005 include 21 programs in C4I and electronic warfare, 14 in maneuver
       and strike force, 20 in naval and amphibious force, 15 in air and air-defense force, 36 in
       research and development, and 74 support programs. Contrary to the significant injection
       of additional funding toward exiting programs, only 16 new programs, which account for
       KRW33.2 billion (approximately USD30.1 million), were approved. The SAM-X
       program, an air force program to replace the current but obsolete Nike surface-to-air
       missile system, was excluded from the FY2005 FIP budget due to the lack of government
       funding.

       Although the government calls for facilitation of self-reliant defense capability, many of
       the major programs are actually being delayed largely due to the growing budget
       constraint and program mismanagement. The high-altitude air-defense system (SAM-X),
       airborne early warning and control system (E-X), and Korea Multi-role Helicopter
       (KMH) programs are all being delayed for at least one to two years.

       Army procurement

       The ROK's defense equipment requirements since 1995 have been in large part dictated
       by the needs of the force improvement program launched that year. That program was
       designed in the main to equip the ROK with a self-reliant defense capability for three-
       dimensional warfare, enabling it to deal with a range of post-reunification regional
       threats. The economic crisis of late 1997 halted this program. It led to an announcement
       that 47 defense procurements scheduled for 1998, worth KRW400 billion, would be
       cancelled, and some 200 projects delayed. The ROK government also stated its intention
       to cut back drastically on the estimated 20,000 weapon component parts and systems it
       purchased annually from abroad. The economic downturn also accentuated the ROK's
       perception of its vulnerability in respect to the North Korean threat, especially in view of
       the DPRK's proliferation of hostile and provocative acts. One of the effects of this was to
       persuade the ROK government to give more attention to the country's defense from that
       threat. This has been mirrored in some of the latest military equipment decisions,
       focusing on long-range counter-artillery capabilities and unmanned aerial vehicles.

       The current requirement for the ROKA includes the following major programs:



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               C4I: TICN system, ground tactical C4I system, MILSATCOM;digitization is an
                aspiration.
               Intelligence: electronic warfare equipment for western front, new ground
                surveillance radar;
               Maneuver: next generation tank development, next generation infantry fighting
                vehicle, Korea Helicopter Program (previously Korea Multi-role Helicopter
                Program), heavy attack helicopter program (AH-X);
               Fire Projection: 155mm K-9 self-propelled howitzer, counter-battery radar,
                MLRS;
               Defense: short-range surface-to-air missile Chunma, 30mm self-propelled air-
                defense gun Bi Ho (Flying Tiger), Shin-Gung MANPADS.

       The ROKA is in the midst of acquiring an array of new equipment to bolster its armored
       capability and its capacity to conduct successful mobile warfare operations. Emphasis is
       currently being placed on procuring tanks, Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) and
       Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) with improved firepower, defense and mobility
       characteristics.

       Armor

       The K1A1 MBT, the upgraded version of K-1 with 120 mm gun, has been developed and
       approximately 400 units are expected to be fielded by 2010 to replace M-class tanks.

       In April 2004 it was reported that an additional batch of 20 K1 armored recovery vehicles
       (ARVs) had been ordered on top of the three previous batches totaling 173, the third of
       which was being delivered. The fourth order is to be delivered from 2005.

       Artillery

       In June 1997 the ROK finalized an Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) deal with
       the US whereby it would receive 29 M270 self-propelled launchers and 111 ATACMS
       rockets and 708 training rockets. In June 2003, Hanwha obtained the license to locally
       produce the 227 mm MLRS as part of the second stage MLRS procurement program.
       Hanwha will produce and deliver MLRS rockets worth KRW600 billion each year to the
       ROK Army.

       Over 4,000 missiles have been ordered for the year 2005. The launchers were ready for
       the new 300 km-range ATACMS missile directly purchased from the US. The new
       extended-range MLRS systems have taken over the roles of USFK MLRS currently
       assigned for counter-battery missions. ATACMS will enable the ROK Army to strike
       most of the critical ground military targets in North Korea.

       Russian equipment

       The 'weapons for debt' agreement with Russia has led to a growing input of Russian-
       made equipment into the ROKA's inventory. In December 2002, the ROK Ministry of
       National Defense announced that it would bring more Russian weapons under the


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       agreement. As the second phase of the Bul-Gom Project, the ROKA will receive Metis
       anti-tank missiles, 10 more T-80U MBTs, and 30 more BMP-3s from Russia by 2006.

       Two Russian T-80U main battle tanks (MBTs) and 17 BMP-3 infantry combat vehicles
       were delivered to Seoul in March 2005 as part of this second tranche. These have been
       modified with RoK communication systems and a night-vision system. The RoK Army
       aims to retrofit these same systems on 33 T-80U MBTs and 30 BMP-3s obtained in
       1997-98 under the program's first phase.

       Air defense

       A decision was finally made in October 1997 to order an additional 1,294 Matra (now
       MBDA) Mistral MANPADS for the air defense wing of the ROKA. The Shingung, South
       Korea's new man-portable air-defense system, was developed in 2003 as part of the
       French Mistral offset programs. Shingung is expected to replace much of the older
       MANPADS used by the three services including the Mistral missiles. In 1997, South
       Korea succeeded in developing a short-range air-defense missile system, Pegasus
       (Chunma or K-SAM), and some of its Batch 1 package have been delivered to division-
       level air-defense units near the DMZ. A total of 48 Batch 1 systems were ordered and
       additional 66 systems were ordered in 2004 as part of the K-SAM Batch 2.

       Army Aviation

       In June 2006, the government approved the launch of the new Korean Helicopter
       Program (KHP). This development will produce 245 utility helicopters that are expected
       to replace the ageing fleet of 130 MD 500MD observation and UH-1H Iroquois
       helicopters. The new aircraft will enter service by 2012.

       Air Force Procurement

       ROKAF acquisition planning is focused predominately on strengthening the country's air
       combat capability. Since this is regarded as being at the core of modern warfare, and in
       order to engage in phased air operations based upon a proactive defense strategy, fighters,
       support aircraft and other operational systems are being continuously acquired and/or
       upgraded.

       Fighter Program

       South Korea locally assembled/produced and fielded 140 F-16C/D Block 52 fighters in
       addition to the 40 F-16C Fighting Falcons obtained directly from the US in the 1980s. F-
       16 weaponry includes the AIM-120 AMRAAM (Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
       Missile) capable of hitting targets at ranges in excess of 27 n miles (50km; 31 miles),
       AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship attack missile and the AGM-88 HARM (High-speed Anti-
       Radiation Missile) to disable enemy radar systems with surface to air missile sites.
       Sensors available to F-16 pilots are spearheaded by LANTIRN (Low-Altitude Navigation
       and Targeting Infra-Red system for Night) enabling them to fly at low altitude in
       darkness whilst evading enemy radar.


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       In 2002, the ROKAF selected the Boeing F-15K SLAM Eagle as its next generation
       fighter, in order to provide increased deep-strike capability against North Korea. The
       initial contract covered 40 aircraft which will be fielded by 2008. F-15K equipment
       includes AN/APG-63(v) radar, AN/ALR-56C (v) radar warning receiver, Link-16 data-
       link package, a third generation FLIR, Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System and other
       advanced electronic systems. Unless existing fighters such as the F-16 are upgraded with
       Link-16, the F-15K will be the only ROKAF aircraft capable of digitally linking with the
       four airborne early warning aircraft that are to be procured by 2011. The F-15K is able to
       carry a large array of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, with the latter including items
       suitable for all-weather, low-altitude, precision strike missions. The first F-15K was
       rolled out in March 2005 and deliveries to the ROKAF had begun by the end of the year.

       As originally structured, the F-X program envisaged the acquisition of 120 aircraft,
       although funding shortages resulted in the initial tranche being reduced to just 40, with
       the intent to place a follow-on contract for a second batch of 40 at a later date. In the
       event, a second batch of F-15Ks has been ordered, but this involves only 20 aircraft for
       delivery between 2009 and 2015. By early June 2006, the ROKAF had taken delivery of
       four F-15Ks and begun training at Daegu, which was chosen as the initial operating
       location. However, service introduction received a setback in that month, with the loss of
       one aircraft and its crew in as yet unexplained circumstances.

       The shortfall in F-X procurement could eventually be resolved through the acquisition of
       more examples of the F-15K, although it is conceivable that the ROKAF may elect to
       instead obtain a different type to update its combat-ready forces. With South Korea
       traditionally looking to the USA as a source of military hardware. Lockheed Martin's F-
       35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) would appear to be a hot favorite to satisfy this requirement,
       although one cannot rule out the possibility that Korea might instead opt for more F-16s
       to the latest configuration or even look to Europe by obtaining either the Eurofighter
       Typhoon or the Dassault Rafale.

       Trainers

       Self-sufficiency may not have been achieved with regard to combat aircraft, but a
       different picture prevails when it comes to trainers, with the Republic of Korea having
       successfully developed and deployed two indigenous designs to meet its need for basic
       and advanced training. First to enter service was the propeller-driven KT-1 Woong-Bee
       (Great Flight) basic trainer that was conceived to replace the US-built Cessna T-37.
       Deliveries of the KT-1 begun in April 2000 and a total of 85 was eventually acquired,
       with the last examples being handed over to the ROKAF in June 2004.

       Development of an even more ambitious project ran concurrently for much of the KT-1
       program, the RoK government having decided in July 1997 to proceed with acquisition of
       a jet-powered advanced trainer for the ROKAF. Initially this was referred to as the KTX-
       2, with preliminary design work predating contract award by some five years. Korea
       Aerospace Industry (KAI) teamed with Lockheed Martin on this prestigious project and
       begun full-scale development (FSD) in October 1997, with the prototype making its
       maiden flight in August 2002. By then, it had been redesignated as the T-50 Golden


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       Eagle and an order for an initial production batch of 25 aircraft was duly placed in
       December 2003. The current ROKAF requirement is for 94 aircraft, of which 50 will
       emerge as T-50 advanced trainers, with the remainder to be produced as A-50s (with
       radar and integral gun armament) for the lead-in fighter training role. The first production
       T-50 was formally rolled out on 30 August 2005 and deliveries to the ROKAF began
       shortly before the end of that year, allowing a start to be made on retirement of a number
       of T-38 Talon trainers operated under the terms of a loan arrangement with the USA.
       Further orders may well follow in due course, with additional A-50 and T-50 aircraft
       almost certain to be acquired. As well as providing design assistance, Lockheed Martin is
       supplying the AN/APG-67 (v) radar for the A-50 and weapons hardpoints for both
       variants, while the BAE Systems Head-Up Display (HUD) is also manufactured in the
       USA. Messier-Dowty International is responsible for landing gear. Seoul anticipates
       overseas orders from 600 to 800 aircraft, with the first export machines to be available
       from late 2006.

       Support Aircraft

       The ROKAF is looking to operate more advanced support aircraft with the acquisition of
       additional transports for enhanced all-weather tactical airlift operations and to allow
       better support for special operations forces. A requirement also exists for a tanker (four
       aircraft), although there has been no movement on this recently.

       The MND issued a request for Proposals (RfP) for the E-X airborne early warning and
       control aircraft program in March 2004. South Korea plans to purchase four platforms,
       with the first two originally expected to be delivered in 2009, followed by a second pair
       in 2011. These aircraft will allow the ROKAF to monitor and control airborne activities
       throughout the entire Korean peninsula, as well as some parts of China and Japan. The
       program has an overall value of up to USD2 billion and in 2003 KRW10 billion was
       allocated as the start up budget. However, the E-X program was temporarily suspended
       after the bidding system fell short of expectations.

       Originally, Israel's Elta proposed a system using the Gulfstream G550 as a platform, with
       Boeing offering one based on the Boeing 737. However, the G550 failed to meet the
       necessary performance requirements and Boeing's submission exceeded the planned
       budget, forcing a reappraisal and causing further delay. The MND still plans to purchase
       four early warning aircraft for the ROKAF but the procurement deadline was delayed,
       with the final decision due to be revealed in June 2006, although no such announcement
       was made that month. Under the changed timeline, the ROKAF now anticipates receiving
       two early warning aircraft by 2010 and two more in 2012.

       In July 1996, the MND ordered eight intelligence-gathering aircraft from the US, with the
       purpose of acquiring more information on North Korean military activity and thereby
       reducing reliance on the USA. The Hawker 800 aircraft was selected as a platform and is
       able to gather visual and audio information on the DRPK while remaining south of the
       demilitarized zone (DMZ). Following modification by Lockheed Martin, four Hawker
       800RA radar-surveillance aircraft were delivered in 2000 with four Hawker 800 SIG
       Paekdu (Peace Pioneer) signals intelligence aircraft following in 2001. These extensively


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       modified aircraft are able to eavesdrop on enemy communications, provide clear pictures
       of football-sized objects on the ground and detect moving targets by day or night.

       In the event and despite ROKAF calls for procurement of a new high-altitude air-defense
       system, the MND omitted the KRW34.8 billion requested by the Air Force from its
       FY2005 budget proposal. Instead, the MND has been negotiating to purchase second-
       hand Patriot systems from Germany.

       South Korea is also developing K-MSAM, a medium-range air-defense missile system, to
       replace the existing HAWK air-defense system. With an expected range of 24 n miles
       (44km; 27 miles), those responsible for missile development believe it will have the
       capability to shoot down North Korean ballistic missiles such as the Scud. Work on K-
       MSAM begun in 1998.

       Missiles

       The question of Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) was thrust firmly to the forefront of the
       defense agenda following the DPRK's test-firing of a Taepo Dong 1 missile in August
       1998 and, most recently, by the first launch attempt of the Taepo Dong 2 missile in July
       2006. Despite understandable concern over development in the northern neighbor, Seoul
       has made it clear that it will not join Japan and the US in constructing a TMD system on
       the grounds of cost and political considerations.

       Major upgrades are planned for the ROKAF missile defense capability. Under the SAM-
       X project - a program to replace the RoK's ageing Nike Hercules missiles with Patriot
       Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles - three air-defense brigades comprised of Nike
       Hercules and MIM-23 HAWK SAMs are to be upgraded. The Ministry of National
       Defense plans to spend USD1.6 billion on replacing its Nike missiles with the PAC-3s by
       2007.

       Modernization

       ROKAF modernization efforts are focused on developing an advanced 'air & space' force
       with independent operational capabilities that are able to rapidly respond to threats at
       greater distances from the Korean peninsula. The planned procurement of new systems
       such as airborne early warning aircraft, air refueling aircraft, military spy satellites, and a
       new integrated C4I system indicate South Korea's determination gradually to transform a
       predominantly tactical air force into one that possesses a strategic capability.

       According to the Air Force Vision 2025 document, there are five primary objectives for
       force development:

           1. Development of superior situational awareness capability.
           2. Development of real-time command and control facilities so as to increase
              strategic flexibility and rapid reaction capability.




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           3. Development of precision engagement capability to enhance ROKAF ability to
              acquire, evaluate, and engage critical enemy targets with greatly improved
              accuracy.
           4. Development of a rapid and wide-area logistics support capability.
           5. Improve mission performance of individual personnel through enhanced training
              programs.

       Currently, ROKAF modernization programs are underway in the areas of ISR
       (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), C4, and Precision Guided Munitions
       (PGM). South Korea plans to spend billions of dollars in the next few years to purchase
       advanced ISR systems. It has already purchased eight Hawker 800 signals and imagery
       intelligence aircraft and plans to buy four airborne early warning aircraft by the end of
       the decade. With the objective of enhancing command and control capability, ROKAF
       invested heavily in the development of a new air force C4I system by 2005. Furthermore,
       the Master Control & Reporting Centre (MCRC) in Osan has been replaced by new
       systems and software developed in 1997 to detect and track low-flying enemy planes
       such as North Korean Antonov An-2s. Another MCRC with indigenously developed
       systems is located at Daegu Air Base under the control of the Southern Air Operations
       Command. It is also reported that the ROKAF and Korea Aerospace Research Institute
       (KARI) are collaborating on development of an indigenous military satellite.

       As well as acquiring new combat aircraft like the F-15K, a number of modernization
       programs have provided existing warplanes with additional capabilities, one recent
       example being a project to upgrade 30 F-4Es and arm them with Lockheed Martin-
       produced AGM-142 versions of the Israeli Rafael Popeye stand-off weapon. The same
       weapon is also deployed on the F-16 Fighting Falcon. Other improvements to the F-16
       centre around self-protection systems and include acquisition of Raytheon's AN/ALE-50
       towed decoy, plus the Northrop Grumman/ITT AN/ALQ-165 Advanced self protection
       Jammer (ASPJ). Northrop Grumman is also supplying night vision kits to upgrade
       ROKAF F-16s, while attack capability will undoubtedly be enhanced through
       procurement of GPS-guided bombs, the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and the
       joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW). In addition, ROKAF short-range air-defense capability
       was greatly improved by the French Mistral manportable SAM system in 1997.

       Navy procurement

       Requirements

       The ROKN's requirements are formidable, both in terms of capability and cost. In the
       light of the 1997-1999 economic crisis it appeared that certain key elements of the
       ROKN's modernization program would be shelved indefinitely. However, by March
       1999, much of the original program appeared to have been reprieved, particularly in
       regard to warships and submarines. Submarine and patrol boat infiltrations by the DPRK
       have revealed a need for faster vessels and more advanced technology and equipment to
       deter the DPRK from future violations. Japan's purchase of the 'Aegis' class destroyers
       and continued development of its submarine force have also been a major factor for
       facilitation of the naval force improvement in South Korea.


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       The current ROKN FIP requirement includes 4,000-ton KDX-II destroyer, 7,000-ton
       'Aegis' class KDX-III destroyer, 2,300-ton FFX frigates, 1,800-ton '214' class submarine
       (KSS-II), 3,500-ton submarine (SSX), and new amphibious ship code-named LPX. The
       LPX will have the capability to transport 700 Marines, 10 helicopters, two high-speed
       air-cushioned landing craft, and 10 main battle tanks. It is also believed that LPX could
       also be used as a light aircraft carrier if ROKN purchases vertical-takeoff aircraft such as
       Harrier. The official long-term objective of the ROK Navy is to build a blue-water navy
       capable of responding to distant threats and crisis affecting national security of South
       Korea.

       Submarines

       The ROK has selected Hyundai Heavy Industries to produce the German HDW Type 214
       submarine which will strengthen the existing 'Chang Bogo'-class attack submarine force.
       Under the KSS-II program, the ROKN will receive three '214' class submarines by 2009.
       The Type 214 is a synthesis of the proven Type 209 design with Air Independent
       Propulsion (AIP) from the Type 212. The first Type 214 boat, named Sohn Won-il, was
       launched in June 2006 and is scheduled to enter service by November 2007. Two more
       will follow by 2009 and there are plans to build an additional six boats of this type by
       2020. South Korea seeks to learn accumulate advanced submarine development and
       manufacturing know-how through the KSS-II program.

       The know-how from the KSS-II program will likely be used extensively in developing
       the next generation 3,500-ton attack submarine. The 2004 ROK defense budget includes
       KRW1.7 billion for the two-year feasibility study of the advanced submarine. In 2006
       plans were revealed to build three of the advanced boats by 2022. It is believed that the
       recently developed indigenous anti-ship cruise missile could be selected as part of the
       submarine's main weapon system. Although the two recent (2003) cases of North Korean
       coastal infiltration has embarrassed the ROK Navy, the plan for advanced submarine
       development is mainly caused by the growth of the naval forces in the surrounding states
       such as China and Japan.

       Destroyers

       The ROKN has fielded two new classes of surface warship into its three commands. In
       2000, it completed the commissioning of the three 3,900-ton 'Kwanggaeto' class (KDX-1)
       destroyers with two launchers for RGM-84D Harpoon anti-ship missile and two vertical
       launchers for RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, two 30 mm Goalkeeper CIWS and two triple
       324 mm Mk32 torpedo tubes.

       The next destroyer program, KDX-2, sought to build a bigger warship with improved air-
       defense capability. The production of a first batch of three 4,500-ton KDX-2 destroyers
       has been completed and the last vessel was commissioned in June 2005. Construction of
       a second batch of destroyers is well under way with two of three vessels launched by
       March 2006 and all three expected in service by 2008. The KDX-2 destroyer weapon
       systems include the Standard SM-2MR Block III SAM with 32-cell VLS, RIM-116 RAM
       Block 1 short-range air-defense system, United defense Mk45 5 in gun, and 30 mm


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       Goalkeeper CIWS. It is believed that KDX-2 has a limited stealth capability. The first
       ship of the KDX-2 class, Yi Sun Shin (named after the victorious Korean admiral in the
       Chosun period who defeated the invading Japanese navy), successfully test-fired its
       Standard SM-2MR Block III surface-to-air missiles during the RIMPAC exercise in the
       summer 2004.

       In July 2002, the ROKN selected the US Aegis system as its next naval combat system
       which will be installed in the new 7,000-ton KDX-3 destroyers. A total of three 'Aegis'
       class destroyers are scheduled to be delivered by 2012, significantly improving ROKN's
       air and fleet defense capabilities. KDX-III will be equipped with the most advanced SPY-
       1D Aegis radar and the upgraded SM-II Block 4 which the US has promised to deliver in
       2005. In 2002, the US promised South Korea that it will deliver an upgraded version of
       the SM-II Block 4A which was recently cancelled due to the high development cost.
       South Korea will spend a total of KRW3.16 trillion for acquisition of the three destroyers.
       Construction of the first ship began in November 2004 at Hyundai Heavy Industries and
       the vessel is due to be delivered before the end of 2008.

       Frigates

       The ROKN is planning to procure six new FFX frigates by 2015 as a replacement for the
       Ulsan-class frigates. The FFX 2,300-ton surface combatants will have advanced stealth
       features and are due to make heavy use of indigenously developed and produced systems.
       They are also due to embark a maritime helicopter. Design work on the KRW1.7 trillion
       FFX project is continuing.

       Patrol Forces

       Up to 40 missile armed high-speed PKX patrol boats are planned to replace ageing
       existing patrol assets from 2007. The 56 meter long PKX craft will be powered by diesel
       engines and LM500 gas turbines. A locally produced multi-sensor fire control director
       system based on the SaabTech CEROS 200 is expected to be fitted. The armament fit is
       to include Korean-designed surface-to-surface missiles and a 76 mm gun. Hanjin Heavy
       Industries is the lead the construction yard.

       Mine Warfare Forces

       Mine warfare forces are also being expanded and modernized. South Korea currently
       operates six Swallow-class mine hunters (MHC) developed by Kangnam Industry. The
       vessels are equipped with GEC-Marconi 193M Mod 1 sonar, MAINS 500 combat data
       system, and a Raytheon navigation radar, and the Gaymarine Pluto ROV. The ROKN had
       also received three Yang Yang-class mine countermeasures vessels based on an enlarged
       Swalllow-class design from Kangnam by 2005 and is expected to issue further orders.

       In September 1997, the ROKN commissioned a 3,300-ton advanced minelayer named
       Wonsan. Only one Wonsan-class minelayer has been developed. The ship can deploy up
       to 300 mines from two stern launchers and is also equipped with 76mm and 40mm guns,



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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       324 mm torpedoes, bow-mounted active search and attack sonar, ESM/ECM, decoy/chaff
       dispenser, and Samsung ST1802 tracking radar.

       Amphibious Forces

       The Ministry of Defense announced in September 2002 that it will construct two 13,000-
       ton landing ships (LPXs) by 2010 to enhance the navy's war capabilities. In a report to
       the National Assembly for an annual audit, the ministry said it will inject KRW951.3
       billion (USD740.1 million) into the construction project commission won by Hanjin
       Heavy Industries. With a capacity to carry 700 marines, 10 helicopters, two high-speed
       air-floated boats and 10 armed vehicles, the LPX is expected to improve the marine
       corps' competence for landing operations, not to mention the significant increase in the
       ROKN's power projection capability. The ministry initially contemplated delaying the
       construction project due to budget shortages, but decided to push ahead with it
       considering its strategic importance, officials said. "The construction of a LPX has more
       symbolic meaning than establishing an Aegis system in terms of force improvement. The
       project appears to mark a crucial turning point for the navy to expand its span of
       operations in the oceans," a navy official said. An order for the first LPX was placed in
       October 2002 and the vessel, named Dokdo, was launched in July 2005. Dokdo is due to
       enter service in 2007 and will be followed by up to two additional units, the first of which
       is expected to be started in 2006.

       Naval Aviation

       The ROKN completed fielding the 13 Super Lynx ASW helicopters in 2000, adding more
       strength to the existing anti-submarine warfare capability supported by 11 Lynx.

       The ROKN now has several Ka-32 helicopters in its inventory, these having been
       transferred from Russia as part of its 'weapons for debt' deal. Designed for a variety of
       roles, the Ka-32 can be used for ASW, mine-sweeping, fire-fighting and search-and-
       rescue operations. Shore-based naval expansion was bolstered by the receipt of eight
       Lockheed P-3C long-range patrol aircraft by 1996. The ROKN will receive an additional
       8 P-3B aircraft from 2008 to equip a second squadron. These additional aircraft were
       acquired from surplus US Navy stocks in 2003 and are receiving life extensions and
       modernized mission systems from L-3 Communications Integrated Systems (L-3 IS) and
       Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI).

       Modernization

       In coming years the ROKN's defense capabilities are expected to be developed to meet
       the demands of three-dimensional warfare. The ROKN is aiming for blue water status
       through the balanced improvement of surface-underwater-air capabilities and the
       acquisition of a strike capability of increased range. In achieving this goal, the ROKN has
       a great deal of renovation still to undertake. All of the old destroyers, frigates, and escort
       vessels from the US have been retired from the ROKN and have been replaced with
       locally made frigates and 'KDX' class frigates and warships.



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       As with the other two services, the ROKN is being extensively restructured. Surface
       combat capability is being enhanced by the acquisition of new, powerful warships,
       improved surface reconnaissance and surveillance systems and through more advanced
       weaponry such as anti-air guided missiles and new light and heavy torpedoes.

       Underwater combat capabilities are progressing too, with the arrival of submarines in the
       1,200-ton class. The construction of diesel-powered submarines in the 1,500-2,300-ton
       range, which have extended underwater operations capabilities through the introduction
       of Air Independent Propulsion, is indicative of further advances. Since 2001 nine 'Chang
       Bogo' class (Type 209/1200) submarines have been in service with the ROKN. The
       UGM-84D Sub-Harpoon anti-ship missile will figure as part of the submarine's
       modernization program. Three of the nine have been modified to carry the missile. The
       'Chang Bogo' class submarines have been engaged in training at Pearl Harbor since 1997
       to improve their operating procedures.

       The ROKN is also aiming to update and expand its inventory of landing ships, most of
       which are 1940s and 1950s vintage. As one measure to improve the aging landing ship
       fleet, the ROKN commissioned four 4,200-ton 'Gojunbong' class LSTs between 1994 and
       1999. The MND, in 1997, announced its intention to procure a 24,000-ton landing ship
       capable of carrying a substantial number of personnel and assault tanks but financial
       considerations have led to this being postponed.

       In July 1998, the ROK Defense Ministry announced, as part of its second defense
       capability enhancement project for the ROKN, that KRW10 billion would be provided
       for the upgrading of amphibious assault landing companies to battalion-size units, and
       that another KRW4 billion would be used to construct an operations base in Asan Bay,
       South Chungchong province, for the 2nd Fleet Command.

       The 2nd Fleet moved to its new home port at Pyongtaek, some 60 km south of its former
       home port of Inchon, in November 1999. The construction of the Pyongtaek naval base,
       at a cost of around USD620 million, took 10 years. It is designed to cope with the
       increasing number of ships under the 2nd Fleet's command. Its advantages are that it is
       located further from the maritime border with the DPRK, it can offer one-stop service to
       naval ships and its ground operational camp, equipped with an advanced command
       control system, the Korean Naval Tactical Data System, can identify and monitor all
       shipping in the Yellow Sea.

       Procurement History

       Until the early 1970s the ROK's military procurements came almost exclusively from the
       US. From that time forth, however, the country began to develop an indigenous defense
       industry. The reasons behind this drive for local arms procurement were threefold:

           1. To achieve greater self-sufficiency in order to ensure a reliable source of supply
              and to provide an adequate defense capability.
           2. The ROK perceived that producing its own arms would improve the state's
              regional politico-military position.


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


           3. It was thought that internal weapons development would promote advanced-
              technological industrialization and perform an import-substitution function, thus
              giving an impetus to economic growth and prosperity.

       To begin with, domestic defense manufacture flourished and grew. It was strongly
       supported by the Park administration, to the extent that priority was placed on the
       development of the heavy machinery, shipbuilding, electronics, chemicals and metals
       sectors, and on the contribution that this group of industries could make to military goods
       manufacture. Those firms engaging in military production were given preferential
       treatment, being entitled to loans, low-interest capital, tax and tariff exemptions and a
       preferential contract system. Defense procurement and defense research and development
       (R&D) were highly prized and privileged at this time, and came under the direct
       supervision of the Presidential Secretariat.

       From 1979 until the end of the 1980s domestic military manufacture and procurement fell
       into the doldrums, as they lost favor with successive ROK administrations and the
       country procured mainly from the US once again. The ending of the Cold War provided
       the impetus for renewed efforts at indigenous development of arms systems, in view of
       the changing security environment and the perceived need for greater self-reliance.
       Currently, the ROK procures domestically a wide array of systems including armored
       vehicles, combat aircraft, training aircraft, helicopters, major surface ships, submarines,
       short-range surface-to-air guided missiles, C4I systems, electronic warfare equipment and
       also locally produces the US F-16 fighter aircraft. This is in addition to a variety of small
       arms such as the M1 rifle, the K1 sub-machine gun, the K2 rifle, artillery, multi-tube
       rocket launchers, recoilless rifles and mortars. By 1992 the ROK was officially producing
       63 per cent of its total defense procurement locally; by 1995, this figure had risen to 79
       per cent.

       Generous foreign technological assistance at relatively low cost has been largely
       responsible for the ROK's expansion in arms manufacture. The US has been at the
       forefront, since 1971, in supplying the ROK with advanced military technologies,
       designs, component parts and sophisticated weapons systems. During the 1990s the ROK
       has also looked to diversify its sources of supply of foreign technology, weapons systems
       and component parts. Italy, Germany, Russia, France, the UK, and Israel have become
       suppliers. Japan, although forbidden by its constitution to transfer military technology
       and products, has long been an important source of dual-use technological expertise to
       the ROK.

       However, bureaucratic, structural and organizational problems, together with a 13-year
       period of serious neglect of military R&D (1979-92) in the ROK, have created obstacles
       to increased domestic defense procurement which have yet to be overcome. This is
       illustrated by the fact that although 63 per cent of the defense procurement budget in the
       year 1992-93 was officially allocated to indigenous acquisitions, 45 per cent of this was
       spent on acquiring component parts and raw materials from abroad. Evidence from the
       ROK shows that the more advanced the weapon system, the higher is the input from
       abroad. Reliance on licensed-product systems, precision parts, designs and military
       technology, from overseas is high. According to one source, such is the degree of foreign


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           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       input into what is officially termed as ROK local defense procurement that only 20 per
       cent of it can accurately be described as indigenous.

       The financial upheaval that struck the ROK in late 1997 looked set to put an indefinite
       freeze on South Korea's ambitious program to transform its defense sector. At the outset
       of the crisis, the ROK MND announced the delay of around 200 military procurement
       projects already in the pipeline and the cancellation of 40 that were to have been given
       the go-ahead in 1998. By the end of 1998 more than USD14 billion worth of planned
       weapons purchases had been either cancelled or postponed indefinitely. The situation did
       not look good for the ROK military sector at the end of 1998 - calls were being made for
       even greater cuts in military spending, not only to release much-needed funds for the
       civilian economy but to try to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula.

       However, the publication of favorable economic statistics at the start of 1999 indicated
       that the ROK economy was on the road to recovery. This factor, coupled with growing
       concerns, especially articulated by the US that the fall in ROK military spending and
       procurement was having a negative effect on its national security, appeared to be the
       catalyst for the reinstatement of the defense modernization program.

       Major Conventional Military Procurement

       Designation     Equipment Type       Qty     Origin         Delivery   Manufacturer
       KDCOM 2         Combat               3       UK             n/a        BAe Defense
                       Management                                             Systems
                       System
       Hawker 800      Spy Aircraft         8       US             2000/01    Lockheed
                                                                              Martin
                                                                              Raytheon
       KAAV            Armored              n/a     US             2006       United
                       Amphibious                                             Defense
                       Vehicle
       T-38            Trainer              30      US             1997       Northrop
       9M117          Anti-Tank Missile 480         Russia         1996/97    Tula
       'Bastion' (AT-
       10)
       CN-235-220      Transport Aircraft 8         Indonesia      1997       CASA
       Stinger         Manportable SAM 200          US             ordered    Hughes
                                                                   1997       Missile
                                                                              Systems
       Super Lynx      Helicopter           13      UK             ordered    Westland
                                                                   1997
       E-767           AEW&C                4       US             4 (planned Boeing
                                                                   by 2011)
       Mistral         Manportable SAM Over         France         1991-2000 Matra BAe
                                       2,400                                 Dynamics
       AGM-142         Air-to-Ground        n/a     Israel         1998-2000 Rafael/
       Popeye          Missile                                               Lockheed



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                                                                              Martin
       UH-60P          Helicopter           57      US             1999        Sikorsky
                                                                   (postponed)
       HS-800          Reconnaissance       10      US             1999/2000 n/a
       Harpy           Anti-Radar Attack 100        Israel         1999/2000 IAI
                       UAV
       ATACMS          Missile              110     US             2000       Lockheed
       Block 1                                                                Martin
       M-290           MLRS                 29      US             2000       Lockheed
                                                                              Martin
       KTX-2           Trainer              94      US/ROK         2000-2005 Lockheed
                                                                             Martin/
                                                                             Samsung
       T-72            MBT                  n/a     Russia         1997/98    State Arsenals
       BTR-80          APC                  n/a     Russia         1997/98    State Arsenals
       T-80U           Main Battle Tank     26      Russia         1997       State Arsenals
       BGM-84          Missile              32      US             1996       McDonnell
       AIM-120         Missile              100     US             1996       US Air Force
       AGM-88B         Missile              136     US             1996       US Air Force
       CH-47           Helicopter           6       US             1996       Boeing
       9K115/9M115 ATGW                     40-50 Russia           1996       Tula
       Mi-17           Helicopter           20      Russia         1996       Ulan Ude
       BMP-3           IFV                  70      Russia         1997       State Arsenals
       Igla-1E         SAM System           n/a     Russia         1995       Tula
       P-3C            Maritime Patrol      8       US             1995-97    Lockheed
                                                                              Martin
       F-16C/D         Combat Aircraft      48      US             1994       Lockheed
                                                                              Martin
       MW-08           Surveillance Radar 1         Netherlands 1994          n/a
       127 mm/54       Naval Gun            3       Italy          1993       n/a
       CN-235M         Transport Aircraft 8         Spain          1993       CASA/IPTN
       Mistral         Manportable SAM 984          France         1992-96    Matra
       Type 209        Submarine            9       Germany        1989-2002 HDW
       Hawk Mk67       Training Aircraft    20      UK             1992       BAe
       227mm           Missile              4,000+ Production 2004-2005 Lockheed
       MLRS                                        under      (1st phase Martin
                                                   license    ends in
                                                              2013)




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       Main Foreign Suppliers

       US

       The US is by far the most important supplier of arms and equipment to the ROK. Among
       the most important recent defense procurement deals with the US have been the provision
       of F-16C/D fighter aircraft worth in total USD2.52 billion, 30 T-38 trainers delivered in
       1997, 200 Stinger manportable SAMs ordered in 1997, eight P-3C maritime patrol
       aircraft delivered between 1995 and 1997, 29 M-290 MLRS ordered in 1997 worth
       USD82 million, and 94 KTX trainer aircraft ordered in 1997 and to be built in
       conjunction with the ROK. In 2002, 40 F-15K worth over USD4 billion were ordered by
       the ROKAF.

       At the beginning of 2000, the ROK had USD8.2 billion worth of equipment on order
       from the US; almost 80 per cent of its foreign military purchases now come from the US.
       In the near future, the ROK and the US are to be involved in three co-operative research
       and development programs. They include one focusing on insensitive munitions to reduce
       the possibility of accidental explosions of deployed munitions; a second concerns data
       fusions to improve battlefield digitization; and the third involves a three-dimensional
       integrated circuit project to reduce the size and cost of circuitry used in antennae,
       wireless technologies and smart munitions. In addition, the reinstatement of the KTX-2
       trainer program and the decision to purchase the AWACs in 2004, among others items,
       means the potential for additional ROK-US defense contracts is still very large.

       France

       The second largest supplier to the ROK is France. Seoul is looking to Paris to help relieve
       some of its heavy dependence on the US for weapons. At the beginning of 1999 Seoul
       had USD870 million worth of equipment on order from France. At a meeting in January
       the ROK requested France transfer more defense industry technology to Seoul and for
       French firms to participate in joint production of defense items with South Korean firms.
       However, Dassault's failure to secure the contract for the FX fighter program has
       damaged relations between the French supplier and Seoul, and probably between Paris
       and the ROK. Dassault is attempting to sue the ROK government for what it has
       characterized as 'unfair favoritism' toward Boeing in the evaluation process for South
       Korea's next generation fighter. However, the level of defense co-operation between
       France and South Korea continues to increase as South Korea seeks to increase
       acquisition of advanced technologies beyond the US. It is believed that some French
       defense contractors will greatly benefit from the USD12 billion KMH program.
       Furthermore, Samsung-Thales, a joint venture between the South Korean conglomerate
       Samsung and French Thales, will enjoy continued technological investment as Thales has
       recently promised to increase financial and technological investment in the most
       successful joint venture defense contractor in South Korea.




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       Russia

       According to a 1995 agreement Russia was due to supply USD209 million of defense
       equipment as part of its 'weapons for debt' agreement with Seoul. Between 1996 and
       1999, this agreement was fulfilled and the ROK received various amounts of BMP-3
       APCs, T-80U tanks, Igla manportable anti-tank missiles, Ka-32 transport helicopters and
       quantities of ammunition and spare parts. Russia's worsening domestic economic crisis
       meant that interest on the debt it owed to the ROK grew and, by the end of 1998, the total
       amount was USD1.7 billion.

       Moscow has intensified its pressure on Seoul to take more advanced weapons systems in
       lieu of money, offering S-300 SAMs, Su-37 fighter aircraft and 'Amur' class submarines.
       While this offer appeared attractive to an ROK afflicted with its own financial problems,
       by 1999 more Russian weapon systems were being discounted by the ROK's MND. This
       was due to one reason in particular. ROK military figures showed increasing irritation at
       having Russian weapons foisted upon them, because of, inter alia, operational failings in
       the systems, difficulty in acquiring spare parts and potentially serious setbacks associated
       with non-interoperability with USFK. In spite of these problems, it was announced in
       February 2001 that the ROK would be purchasing USD500 million in Russian arms and
       equipment in the near future.

       In addition, the Agency for Defense Development is closely cooperating with Russia to
       develop Korea's indigenous medium-range air-defense missile system, KM-SAM. KM-
       SAM is believed to be under development based on the Russian Triumph M-SAM. The
       gradual breakaway from the US dependence is likely to increase the opportunity for the
       Russians in South Korea's military modernization effort.

       Others

       Israel, Germany and the UK are also likely to figure as significant suppliers of military
       goods to the ROK in the coming years.

       Country                          1998-2004 (USD million)
       US                               13,900
       France                           870
       Germany                          590
       Russia                           209
       Indonesia                        140
       Israel                           52
       UK                               n/a
       Source: Jane‘s Information Group




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       11. Security And Foreign Forces

       Police

       TOTAL STRENGTH
       38,000 (2006 estimate)


       Organization

       The Korean National Police Agency (NPA) system consists of, from the top: one
       National Police Headquarters located in Seoul; five special task police agencies,
       including Marine Police; 13 provincial police headquarters; 220 police stations; and
       3,389 police branch offices across the country. The Korean Police has its own chain of
       command independent of the Army. There are no local municipal police systems or state
       police departments like those in many Western states.

       The police box is a first-line organization of the police and served as a base for anti-crime
       activities for maintaining the security of an area in consideration of the population, area,
       administrative district, frequency of crime. The total number of nationwide police boxes
       is 3,422, manned by 38,000 policeman; some 43 per cent of the entire police force work
       day and night.

       The NPA performs various surveillance activities to guard against the appearance of
       anarchistic ideology struggle, the reappearance of anti-democratic and anti-government
       violence. It also monitors increased labor circle meetings and demonstrations due to the
       impact of the government's relations with the IMF. Activities include watching various
       events such as ceremonial meetings, athletic events, and guarding the people visiting
       hometowns or parent's graves. The NPA utilizes its own order keeping guardians as well
       as guardians from security guard service companies, allocating a minimum number of
       policemen when keeping order is required. It is also responsible for checking the
       protection status of important facilities and paying guidance visits to protect them from
       various dangerous activities. The chief of the facility takes primary responsibility for
       protection; the police takes responsibility for guidance and supervision. Protection of
       candidate activities include pre-investigate and present disrupting activities to the election
       speech sites, voting place and ballot counting locations.

       Customs

       TOTAL STRENGTH
       3,845 (2002)


       Organization

       The customs organization is civilian and operates under the authority of the Ministry of
       the Interior.


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       The Korea Customs Service (KCS) is headed by a Commissioner, under whose command
       are the deputy commissioner and 13 Director-Generals. Six Director-Generals are at the
       headquarters being in charge of different areas of customs administration - Planning &
       Management, Internal Audit & Inspection, Clearance Facilitation, Audit, Investigation &
       Surveillance, and Intelligence & International Affairs. The other six Director-Generals
       are in charge of field administration at main customs houses - Incheon Airport (formerly
       Kimpo), Seoul, Pusan, Incheon, Taegu and Kwangju. There also is a Director-General in
       charge of customs training at the National Tax Officials Training Institute. In 2002, there
       were 3,845 customs officials working in total at the headquarters, central customs
       laboratory, six main custom houses, 28 customs offices and 14 customs branch offices.

       The KCS divides its customs territory into six territorial regions - Seoul, Pusan, Incheon,
       Taegu, Kwangju and Incheon International Airport. There is one Main Customs House
       which has in line authority over the ports of entry in each region. Besides processing
       routine customs work, the main customs house provides operational and technical
       assistance and participates in addressing major issues within its authority. Each customs
       house has a number of sub-divisions responsible for customs clearance, cargo
       management and supervision, intelligence, post-audit, investigation, and general
       administration. The central customs laboratory and four regional customs laboratories are
       responsible for technical services necessary for effective customs administration. The
       laboratories provide comprehensive analyses in deciding the tariff classifications of
       imports based on the International Agreement on the Harmonized Commodity
       Description and Coding System. At the National Tax Officials Training Institute and
       other training programs, customs staffs are trained in the practical knowledge and skills
       required for their duties.

       Border Guards

       TOTAL STRENGTH
       4,500 Marine Police/Coast Guard


       Organization

       The National Maritime Police Agency (incorporating the Coast Guard) is a civilian,
       maritime law enforcement organization with approximately 4,500 personnel and 74
       patrol craft, three salvage vessels and nine helicopters. Originally, the Coast Guard and
       the Marine Police were two separate organizations, but very recently the Coast Guard
       was taken over by the Marine Police. The agency has one deputy commissioner, four
       bureaus, 14 divisions, two offices, one workshop, one marine police academy and 13
       stations with 71 branches and 271 offices of entrance and clearance notice. Its duties
       comprise anti-piracy operations, prevention of smuggling, anti-pollution duties, law
       enforcement, illegal immigration, and search and rescue tasks. This service operates up to
       12 miles offshore on purely civilian duties. Any military activities arising within this 12
       mile limit are dealt with by the ROKA, and beyond the 12 miles, by the ROKN.




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       Security Forces

       TOTAL STRENGTH
       3,000,000 (Estimated)


       Civilian Defense Corps

       It is understood that the Civilian Defense Corps is a paramilitary force composed of the
       Homeland Defense Forces (Regional Combat Forces), which are made up of reserve
       officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers (up to the age of 33
       years), organized by township and administrative heads and responsible to the Office of
       Military Manpower Administration, and the Civil Defense Corps, which comprises all
       male citizens between the ages of 20 and 50 who are not in the Homeland Defense
       Forces, with certain exemptions such as firemen and policemen. The Civil Defense Corps
       units are organized at a variety of workplaces, as well as in every community, and they
       are under the overall control of the Civil Defense Headquarters.

       The Civilian Defense Corps was set up in the belief that the ROK required a defense
       posture which incorporated the entire nation, not just the armed forces. One of the central
       aims behind its formation was to foster a general appreciation of the joint responsibility
       for national defense and the need for a total commitment to defend against a North
       Korean invasion. Its chief task if to safeguard the lives and property of the population in a
       time of emergency or war, through activities such as air raid defense, search and rescue in
       a disaster, protection duties and other civil defense activities in support of pure military
       operations.

       Marine Police

       For details of its organization, see the Border Guards section.

       Presidential Security Service (PSS)

       The Presidential Security Service (PSS) is charged with providing security for the
       president, his immediate family and the Blue House, the presidential residence. The PSS
       is also authorized to protect former presidents, their spouses and minor children for seven
       years after leaving office. PSS is also charged with protecting security for visiting heads
       of foreign states, their accompanying spouse and family, and other visiting dignitaries
       when deemed necessary for national interest.

       The Kyong Mu Dae Presidential Security Police (predecessor to the present Presidential
       Security Service) was established in 1949, and was renamed Blue House Presidential
       Police in 1960. In 1961 the Security Force to protect Park Chung Hee, National
       Revolution Leader, was established. The PSS was established in 1963 after PSS Law 157
       was enacted, with Hong Jong Chul as its first Chief. After the 1968 attack against the
       Blue House by North Korean guerrillas, PSS responsibilities were increased. After the
       First Lady was fatally shot in a 1974-failed attempt to assassinate President Park Chung
       Hee by Moon Sei Kwang, acting under orders from the North Korean government, the


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       PSS was given significantly greater authority over presidential security operations
       including mobilization of military, police, and so on. These measures included enactment
       of Security Committee for presidential protection (Executive Order 7246) and of Security
       Control Unit for presidential protection (Executive Order 7246).

       A reduction of PSS responsibilities came after the assassination of President Park Jung
       Hee in 1979. This included abolishment of Security Committee for presidential protection
       (Executive Order 9692) and abolishment of Security Control Unit for presidential
       protection (Executive Order 9692). The 1981 revision of Presidential Security Law (PSL)
       included enactment of the Protection Law for former presidents and their families. The
       PSS began protecting the President-elect and his family, along with a revision of Security
       Committee for presidential protection. After North Korean agents commit a terrorist
       bombing attack in Myanmar in 1983, PSS responsibilities were broadened and intensified
       for the presidential entourage.

       Intelligence Agencies

       The Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was created in 1961, and in 1981 the
       agency changed its name to the Agency for National Security Planning (NSP). In 1994,
       the NSP had its law revised following the agreement between Korea's ruling and
       opposition parties and established an 'Information Committee' in the Assembly to lay a
       foundation for political neutrality. The NSP also launched operations against
       international crime and terrorism to protect the Korean people from international
       organized crime. In 1999, the NSP was reorganized into the National Intelligence
       Service. National Intelligence Service missions and functions include:

               Collection, co-ordination, and distribution of information on the nation's strategy
                and security
               Investigation of crimes affecting national security, including crimes that violate
                the Military Secrecy
               Protection Law, the National Security Law, which prohibit the incitement of civil
                war, foreign troubles, and insurrection
               Investigation of crimes related to the missions of NIS staff
               Maintenance of documents, materials, and facilities related to the nation's
                classified information
               Planning and co-ordination of information and classified information

       Foreign Forces

       TOTAL STRENGTH
       32,800 (US) (2005 estimate)


       Organization

       US forces have been continuously stationed in South Korea since American intervention
       in the Korean War. The initial occupation force, which had taken over the southern half
       of the peninsula in 1945 was withdrawn in 1948 before the start of the war, although a


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This is product of the Virtual Information Center (VIC). As such it represents the opinions of the various authors involved
           and not the opinions, assessments or positions of the DoD or any other government agency or entity.


       heavy advisory presence was maintained. The US Army led the UN forces against the
       DPRK's invasion in 1950 and, following the 27 July 1953 armistice agreement, remained
       there to keep the peace.

       The present US-ROK mutual defense treaty provides for a maximum of 37,000 US
       service personnel to be stationed in the country. By 2003, the US deployed 36,100
       military personnel in the ROK, comprising 27,500 army personnel and 8,600 air force
       personnel. In an emergency, US forces from Japan, Guam and Hawaii could reinforce
       rapidly.

       Since 1992 the US has been gradually changing the leading role of United States Forces
       Korea (USFK) in the defense of South Korea to a supporting one. In December 1994, for
       example, the US passed over peace-time operational control of the ROK-US combined
       defense system to a South Korean commander. Until then, control had been exercised by
       a US four star general.

       US forces are organized into an army headquarters, the 22nd Infantry Division and
       support elements. The US Air Force has a headquarters and two fighter wings of about 90
       combat aircraft, including 72 F-16s, 6 A-10s and 12 OA-10s.

       In January 2004, the US Forces-Korea announced that it will relocate all of its forces to
       the Osan-Pyongtek region by 2007. The USKF will hand over 10 of its critical missions
       to the ROK military including the control of the Joint Security Area, counter-battery, and
       maritime counter-infiltration mission.

       According to official statements, in order to increase "strategic flexibility of the US
       forces", the USFK announced a reduction of 12,500 troops from South Korea. 4,200 US
       troops were withdrawn from the Korean peninsula in 2004 and additional 5,800 troops
       will be redeployed from the USFK by 2007. Finally, the last batch of 2,500 troops will be
       withdrawn by end of 2008. Thus, in 2008, the total number of US troops stationed in
       South Korea will be reduced to around 25,000.

       Source: Jane‘s Information Group




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