U.S. Department of Justice
MBS:SSwingle Civil Division, Appellate Staff 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Rm: 7250 Washington, D.C. 20530 Tel: (202) 353-2689 Fax: (202) 514-8151
September 9, 2004
Via Federal Express Roseann B. MacKechnie, Clerk of Court U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit United States Courthouse 40 Foley Square New York, New York 10007 Re: Garb v. Republic of Poland, No. 02-7844 (2d Cir.)
Dear Ms. MacKechnie: Amicus curiae the United States of America respectfully submits this letter brief in r pneoh C ut Jl2,04O dr i cn t sb i i o bi s n h qet n e os tt ors u 720, red et gh um s o f r fo t uso s e ’ y r i e sn e e i “ ]e e ad fo o , e n e Sa s ur e ors eio i Republic of Austria v. [ ht r n is hw t U id te S pe C ut dc i n w h, h t t m ’ sn Altmann, 541 U.S. ___ (June 7, 2004) is relevant to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in this cs. Altmann makes clear that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. ae ” (SA ,hu b ap e t dt m n a orsui ii ia pseat etu s gi t F I)sol e pld o e r i cut j s co n l ot nc nsi aa sa d i e e ’ rd t n l - m t n fr g svr g. s e e osa ,net F I’t i s xet n§ 65a 3, oe n oe i A w dm nt t udrh SA sa n ecp o, 10( () i en re e kg i ) j i ii il ido xrpii s fln’ rpr ,uh shs c i sht e t u s co si t tepor t n o aespoe ysc a t e lm t w r h rd t n m e ao i t o a a e e subject of the 1960 Agreement between the United States and Poland, and does not encompass the broader range of property deprivations in violation of international human rights law. That exception also permits jurisdiction over a foreign state only where its own contacts with the United States satisfy the first prong of the exception, i.e., the state holds seized property in the
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United States in connection with its own commercial activity here. A court may not base jurisdiction over the state itself on the less extensive contacts of a juridically distinct instrumentality, on the basis that those contacts would allow jurisdiction over the instrumentality udrh t m o t ecp o’scn pog net e s fh xet nseod rn. e r e i I. Background
The plaintiffs are former Polish citizens or their heirs, who allege that Poland engaged in a ormaa ssri n Jws ci n fl wn Wol WaI cni an Jws ci n’ pgo gi tuv i e i iz so o i n vg h te l g r d rI ofct g e i iz s , s i h te property, encouraging violence against Jewish citizens, and otherwise discriminating against P l dse a i Jw ia e oto r ehm i o x e At uhh F I i pss o n’r i n e sn n f rt di t a m ng f v e n ei. l og t SA m oe a t l h e general rule of immunity for claims against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities, 28 U.S.C. § 1604, it creates exceptions to immunity where, inter alia, the action is based on a fr g s t s o m r aat i i o d et a et gh U id te;rh at n oe n te cm e i cv yn r i cy f cn t n e Sa so t co i a’ c l it r l f i e t t e i i o e poe y i t“ knn i ao o i e aoal ” n t poe ysn h U id n l s rpr r h t e iv li fn r t nla ad h rpr iit n e vv t gs a o tn tn i w e t e t Sa sn onco wt aoe n te cm e i at i o io nd r pr e b a te i cnet n i fr g s t s o m r a cv y rs w e o oe t y t i h i a’ c l it ad foreign instrumentality engaged in commercial activity in the United States. Id. § 1605(a)(1)-(3). T e ir torhlt th F I’t i s xet n olnt e pld o r F I h d tccut e h t SA sa n ecp o cu o b ap e t pe SA si d a e kg i d i conduct. Garb v. Republic of Poland, 207 F. Supp.2d 16, 28-30 (E.D. N.Y. 2004). The court also held that the commercial activity exception, although potentially available, was not satisfied bcue ln f ’lm w rbsd n h “u t sn ay oe i ato P l ds eas p i isc i s e ae o t qi e etl svr g c f o n’ a tf a e e n s il en ” a epor t n ftci n’ rpr , h h l l kd n d etf co t U id te. xrpii o i iz spoe yw i a o a e ay i ce et nh n e Sa s ao s te t c s c r f e t t Id. at 31-33. Finally, the court suggested that the takings exception would not be satisfied even if it were available, reasoning that numerous courts have held that international law is not violated
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b a oe i ’epor t n fto n aoa ’ rpr ,n fr et th Mi sy f y svr g s xrpii o i w nt nl poe yad ut rh t en ao s i s t h a e nt o ir Treasury appears to be part of the Polish state rather than an agency or instrumentality. Id. at 3438. This Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Garb v. Republic of Poland, No. 02-7844, 2003 WL 21890843, at *2 (Aug. 6, 2003). The Court held that jurisdiction turned o “ ht rh p i is * cu hv l im ty xet t hv t ic i s d d a d n w e et ln f * * ol aee t a lepc d o aeh rlm aj i t h e a tf d gi e e e a u ce it U id te” r ro nc etfh F I,n odr t d tccuto e r i n h n e Sa s pi teat no t SA ad re d h ir tortdt m n e t t o m e e e si e e t Sa D pr et pe SAply i r pct svr g i m n y o c i s gi t h te ea m n s r F I o c wt e eto oe i m ui frlm aa s e t t ’ i h s en t a n Poland arising out of post-War conduct. Id. at 2-*3 & n.1. T e ur e orgat df dn ’ et n o croa ,n vct ad e add h S pe C utr e e nat pti fre i r ad aa d n r ne m nd e s io tr i e m for further consideration in light of Altmann. 124 S. Ct. 2835 (2004). Altmann, which was dc e a et s ors eio, vl d lm aa sA sia s g uo Wol WaI ei d f rh C ut dc i i o e c i s gi t uta ri otf r d t i ’ sn n v a n r in d rI era conduct. See id.t 2324. h c i e bs frui ii w sh F I’t i s a24-26 T e lm d ai o j s co a t SA sa n a s rd t n e kg exception, although no such exception to the rule of foreign state immunity had existed at the time of the alleged wrongdoing. See id. at 2245-2247. The Supreme Court held that courts sol ap t F I ’pi i e o fr g s ti m n yo odcpe an t s t e hu pl h SA s r c l foe n tem ui tcnut r dt gh tu ’ d y e nps i a t - i e a ts enactment. Id. at 2252-2255. II. Discussion
Altmann hl t th F I sol b ap e t dt m n a orsui ii i a o sh t SA hu e pld o e r i cut j s co n l d a e d i e e ’ rd t n l post-enactment suits against a foreign sovereign. The FSIA grants sovereign immunity to a foreign state sued in a United States court unless the claim against it falls within the exceptions defined by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604-1605. In our prior brief to this Court, the United States
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explained that the commercial activity exception to the FSIA does not provide a basis for subject m trui ii oep i isc i s gi t o n bcueh “xrpii o poe y aej s co vr ln f ’lm aa sP l d eas t epor t n f rpr t rd t n a tf a n a e ao t b aoe n oe m n b svr g ats o t t e fcm e i at i ’ht oges y fr g gvr et y oe i cinth y o ‘ m r a cv y t C nr i n en e p o c l it a s i eddo a wt nhtxet noh F I . US A . r1-4 Altmann did not alter n ne t f l i it ecp o tt SA” .. m B.31. t l h a i e that analysis. However, we have not previously addressed the scope of the takings exception, which Altmann hl ap e t a c i s ruh a et F I’eat et T aecp o dn s o s plso l lm bogtf rh SA s nc n htxet n ei d i la t e m . i e svr g i m n yn ae “ w i r h i poe yae iv li o i e aoal oe i m ui icss i h h i t n rpr t nn i ao fn r t nla en t n c gs t k o tn tn i w are at issue and [i] that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or [ii] that property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is eggdn cm e i at i it U id te. 2 USC § 65a 3. s e xln nae ia o m r a cv ynh n e Sa s 8 ... 10( () A w ep i c l it e t t” ) a bl ,ln f ’lm d ntno e r h i poe yae i v li o i e aoa e w p i isc i s o oi l “ gt n rpr t n n i ao fn r t nl o a tf a vv i s t k o tn tn i l ” i it m ai o t s t e N rw e t si et eu r u e eto t a wt n h en g fh tu . o, hr h tn n nxse i m n fh w h e n e at e e rg qr s e ecp o’fspog rntase,osh poio si a te fti m n y ae xet nsit rn a ostf dde t rv i tp s to i m ui bsd i r e ii e sn r a s t solely on the lesser class of contacts of an instrumentality that would confer jurisdiction over that instrumentality under the second prong of the exception. 1. Section 1605(a)(3) applies only to takings in violation of the international law of state responsibility and expropriation. T e SA sai s xet n a i edd o eym ui h F I ’t n ecp o w sn ne t dn i m n y kg i t t for violations of the international law of state responsibility and expropriation, which governs a s t se ue f rpr bl g go aoa o ao es t A sna l r i cv f m te si ro poe y e ni tnt nl fnt rte bet c ad et er a’ z t o n i s h a. e r i o
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Congress, the exception should not be interpreted to substantially expand the universe of legal pi i e r an tpoe y i tt ta sre s bs fr ..or’ui ii , r c l e t go rpr r h h cn e a a ai o US cut j s co t n p s li t gs a v s s rd t n o include the full range of international human rights law affecting nationals as well as aliens. The legislative history of the FSIA explains that the takings exception was intended to gvr “ xrpii c i s ecm as g t nt nlao o epor t n f rpr oe E por t n lm , no ps n “ e aoazt n rxrpii o poe y n ao a ” i h i i i ao t without payment of the prompt adequate and effective compensation required by international l ,a w la “ k g w i a a ia o d c m nt yn a r”Foreign Sovereign a ” s e s t i s h h r r t r r i r i o int e w l an c e br y si a r u. Immunities Act of 1976, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 61. h ca c r ao o t ecp o’soe a llt R s t et dsr t n f 68 T i hr t i t n fh xet ns cp pr lsh ete n s ec p o o s a ez i e i ae e a m ’ ii t i e aoal pi i e o s tr pni lyw i br s t s i r i t y h n r t nla r c l ftee os it h h aa te d c m n o e tn i w nps a s b i, c a’ si a r epor t n fh poe y fln adtepor t n foe n aoa ’ rpr xrpii o t rpr o aes n i xrpii o fr g nt nl poe y ao e t i s ao i i s t without the payment of adequate, reasonably prompt, and effective compensation. See Restatement (2d) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 165-166, 185-187 (1965); see also Restatement (d o F r g R li s a § 1 (96 ( s tir pni e nei e aoal fr 3) f oe n e t n Lw 72 18)“ tese os ludrn r t nla o i ao A a s b tn i w injury resulting from (1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of another state that * * b id c m nt yo ( intco pn d y rv i fruto pnao.. s * ()s i r i o ,rc s o acm ai b poio o j cm est n ) A si a r ) e sn s i ” t R s t et ae c a i e aoal o s tr pni ly os o r u ta te h ete nm ks l r n r t nla ftee os itde nte le s t s e am e , tn i w a s bi ga a’ t a et fto n aoa ,ur hrsi ido e a “ k gsb t s to t r t n o i w nt nl bta eil t tcr i t i [ yh te fh em s i s t me tn a n ] ea e property of a national of another state. R s t et3) 721 ( paiadd. hri ” ete n(d § 1()e hs de) T e s am m s e no evidence that Congress intended to confer jurisdiction over the entire range of potential deprivations of property in violation of international human rights principles. Consistent with this, the takings exception has been interpreted by every court to have
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considered the question not to apply to the expropriation by a country of the property of its own nationals. E.g., Beg v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 353 F.3d 1323, 1328 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003); Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2002); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 711-712 (9th Cir. 1992); De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1395-1398 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2262 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting l ecut “osnu v w* *ht 10( () r e ne o ror’cness i * t § 65a 3’ e r c w s e a ) s fe t‘i ao o i e aoal ’ os o cvrxrpii s f rpr bl g go o v li fn r t nla de ntoeepor t n o poe y e ni t a o tn tn i w ao t o n cut ’o n aoa ”1 Notably, Congress has never overridden that uniform interpretation. on y w nt nl ) rs i s. In their prior briefs, plaintiffs relied on the legislative history reference to “i r i t y t i s s v ec t th t i s xet n a i edd o no ps a d c m n o ”a n a ei neh t a n ecp o w sn ne t ecm as si a r k g d a e kg i t svr g’r i o r i os i r i t n gi tto n aoa . oe i sa a reg u d c m n i aa si w nt nl E.g., peat B.t e n c l li s i ao n s i s A pln ’ ra l s 54. When viewed in context, however, the reference in the legislative history is to discrimination aa saes i.e., the very subject on which the law of state responsibility and expropriation gi tln — n i is focused. See Restatement (2d) § 166. Indeed, many of the sources cited by plaintiffs as ei ne fh cs m r i e aoal nr aa s“i r i t y epor t n v ec o t ut a n r t nla om gi td c m n o ” xrpii s d e o y tn i w n si a r ao adesh t i o nnnt nl poe yadhsed uprt a oei id dr t a n f o-aoa ’ rpr ,n t l spoto m rl t s e kg i s t u n me interpretation of the takings exception. See, e.g., peat R p a1 ( o o p wt A pln ’ el t 4 “ cm l i l s y t y h
Anm eo cuthv bsdhihl ns n cnl i t t fr g s t s u br for ae ae t r o i o a oc s nh aoe n te s e dg uo a i a’ seizure of the property of its own national does not, even if motivated by religious or racial discrimination, violate international law. Cf. Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir. 17)hl n,neAi T rSa t t t ai e ays i r i t y e ue fe i 96 (o i udr ln ot tu , aN zG r n’d c m n o si ro Jws dg e te h m si a r z h ci ns rpr d nt i a i e aoal ) A w ep ii t t t h poe iz ’poe y i o v len r t nla . s e xln nh e , e rpr te t d o t tn i w a e xt question before the court is not whether the discriminatory taking of Jewish property violated international human rights norms, but whether that conduct is within the class of cases against foreign states that Congress intended U.S. courts to hear under the takings exception. It is not.
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i e aoal ,aoazt n m snt i r i taa saliens or any particular kind of n r t nla nt nlao ‘ ut o d c m n e gi t tn i w i i i si a n alien’( paiadd)ibid. ( h m n u s na o j te * m ash r ho ”e hs de) m s ; “ e i m m t dr fu i * * en t i tf t i a d sc eg foreign nationals tr e eu cm est n ( paiadd) o e i fl o pnao”e hs de) cv l i m s . The interpretation of § 1605(a)(3) as limited to the international law of expropriation is fr ecni e b t s t oy akrp gi t h h t a eat — iprcl , e ut rofm d yh tu r bcdo aa sw i iw s nc d n a i a t h r e at n c e tu r h Second Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2). That statute, originally enacted in 16,a aee lorf mi oi t “co s t dc i td m s a u caeg g 94br f r cutr n k gh at fte otn o i i si hlni a s da o v n e a ” re s s t l n s t“ k g * i v li o t pi i e o i e aoal , c d gh pi i e o te t i * * n i ao fh r c l fn r t nla i l i t r c l f a an o tn e nps tn i w nun e nps cm est n n t o es na s eotn h sbet n T e tu hs os t t o pnao adh t rt dr st ui t susco. h s t e a cnie l i e h a d i i ” at s ny be i e r e tap oli cssno i t t i o ae poe yntht f s t s en n r e do pl n n ae i l n h a n fln rpr ,o t o a te tp t y y vvg e kg i t a a’ own national. E.g., Fogade v. ENB Revocable Trust, 263 F.3d 1274, 1294 (11th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). The FSIA takings exception was intended to harmonize the scope of foreign sovereign immunity with the act of state doctrine under U.S. law. See Canadian Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, S.A., 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), a ’, fd f 727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984). Lm t gh t i s xet n o fr g gvrm n s e ue fln’ rpr i i in t a n ecp o t aoe n oe et si ro aespoe ys i e kg i i n ’ z i t a o os t t i cut gnr r ut c t cnt eh F I ecp oso of l cnie wt or’ ee le c neo osu t SA xet n t cne s sn h s a l a r e i r jurisdiction over claims that a foreign state violated human rights, particularly where the conduct t k l e i it s t s w bre . o p c wt n h te o n odr See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361o a h e a’ s 363 (1993) (commercial activity exception does not confer jurisdiction over claims involving t t e y oe n oe m n s o c ad eaof e )Princz v. Federal Republic of o u b fr g gvr et ple n pnlfcr ; rr i n ’ i i s Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173-1176 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (waiver exception does not confer
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jurisdiction over Nazi-era slave labor case); cf. S i vSc lt ep ’Lba Aa mt .oi i P ol s i n rb h as e y Hamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 244-245 (2d Cir. 1996) (waiver exception does not confer jurisdiction over terrorism bombing alleged to violate jus cogens norms). Congress has also set careful limits on federal jurisdiction over tort claims against foreign sovereigns arising out of conduct occurring outside of the United States, providing that, as a general matter, noncommercial tort claims can be brought against foreign states only if the damage or injury occurred in this country. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439-441 (1989). Although Congress amended the FSIA in 1996 to allow for certain extraterritorial tort claims relating to terrorism, it strictly limited and defined the permissible claims and the class of potential defendants. See id. § 1605(a)(7). Construing § 1605(a)(3) to allow for international human rights claims would undermine these careful limitations. Fnl ,or’osnu i e r ao o t t i s xet n s o ecm as g i l cut cnessn r e t n fh a n ecp o a ntno ps n ay s t p ti e kg i i claims against a state by its nationals is consistent with international expropriation law, which was the premise of numerous claims settlement agreements entered into by the United States over the last century, including a 1960 agreement between the United States and Poland. As we described in our supplemental amicus filing on May 2, 2003, the United States and Poland et e i ohtgem n tste lm a s g uo t P lh oe m n s aoazt n n r n t ar eto elc i s ri otfh o s gvr et nt nlao ed t a e t a in e i n ’ i i i of property. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the G vrm n o t P lh ep ’R pb c ea i Ca s f aoa o t U id te oe et fh o s Pol s eul R gr n lm o N t nl fh n e Sa s n e i e i dg i i s e t t (July 16, 1960), U.S.T. 1953. Although the United States undertook in that agreement to settle the claims of U.S. nationals, it did not purport to settle or address claims relating to property that
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was not owned at the time of the taking by a U.S. national. The limited scope of the U.S.-Poland settlement agreement reflects the circumscribed nature of international law and practice cne i s tr pni ly o t epor t n fln’ rpr . thti et sl ocr n tee os itfrh xrpii o aespoe y A t t , e o ng a s bi e ao i t a m h e recourse for expropriation claims was espousal. It was a well-established principle of international law that states could espouse only claims relating to wrongs done to their own citizens, absent the consent of the state both of the third-party national and also the respondent s t C nr se oe i m n yn e a cssbthrin i i t n m c l s te oge r vdm ui i cr i ae,ut es on c i — uh e a a. s m t tn e d ao s c aoe t ttn ne ti l e aoa o t epor t g te m n t s w oe l r n — h ii eddo n u nt nl fh xrpii s ta ogh e hs e a t cd i s e an a o claims could be asserted in U.S. courts. To the extent that there is any remaining ambiguity about the scope of the takings exception, the foreign policy interests of the United States weigh against inferring the dramatic expansion of federal court jurisdiction that plaintiffs seek. As the Supreme Court recognized in its post-Altmann decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,2 S C.79 20)sr u “ ss f 14 . t 3 (04,e os rk o 2 i i avr fr g ply osqecs a c a d hn ..or ae p tstl iso t de eoe n o c cneune” r r t w e US cut tm to e“m t] n h s i i e ee st i [ e pw r foe n oe m n oet io n izn. Id. a26. sh C ut e ,t o eo fr g gvr et vrh r w ci s i n s e te ” t73 A t orhl “ e e d h pt tlm laoso t fr g r aos fh U id te o r on i ” ass f o n ai p ct n frh oe n e t n o t n e Sa s fe gin cue o ei i i e i li e t t c zg action for violations of customary international law should make courts reluctant to exercise j i ii oesc c i s bet “l r adt f m C nr so o o Id. at 2763. The u s co vruh lm asn a c am na ”r rd t n a e e o oge t d s. s F I cn i n sc “l r adt ;o h cn a , oges nc d h F I wt t SA otn o uh c am na ”t t ot r C nr eat t SA i h as e e e ry s e e h e s t ethtt a i eddo cd y svr g i m n y r c l “r et r on e i te nt iw sn ne t“oi ” oe i m ui pi i e pe n y e gi d n am a t f en t nps s l c z i e aoal . HR R pN .418,t , n r t nla ” .. e. o9-47a7reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605. This tn i w Court should reject the suggestion that Congress nonetheless intended to significantly expand
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US cut j i ii oepei s -a e c i s ruh b fr g ci n aa st i ..or’u s co vr r o l br d lm bogt y oe n iz s gi th r s rd t n v uy r a i te n e own governments. 2. Section 1605(a)(3) provides jurisdiction over a foreign state only where its own connections with the United States satisfy the statutory criteria under the first prong of the statutory exception. I ad i t r u i aai “ v li o i e aoal ”o n dio o e in t n i i ao fn r t nla fr tn q r g k g n o tn tn i w jurisdiction to exist, § 1605(a)(3) requires certain minimum connections to the United States: ( t si d rpr o poe y xhne frtipeetn h U id te i cnet n i h e e poe y r rpr ecagd o i“ r ni t n e Sa sn onco )e z t t s s e t t i wta o m r aat i cre o i t U id te b t fr g s t ; ri t si d i cm e i cv y a i n n h n e Sa s yh oe n te o ()h e e h c l it rd e t t e i a” i e z poe y r rpr ecagd o i“ o nd r pr e b a agency or instrumentality of rpr o poe y xhne frti w e o oe t y n t t s ad the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the U id te. n e Sa s t t” The district court correctly found that there was no basis for jurisdiction under the exception. Plaintiffs do not assert that the limited circumstances for jurisdiction under the first prong are satisfied, because they have not alleged that Poland or its Ministry of the Treasury have brought expropriated property into the United States. Nor, as the court suggested, is the second prong of the statute met, because that prong grants jurisdiction only over the agency or instrumentality that has the requisite jurisdictional contacts. We ot u tahrt t v wa i le i t U id te’a i s r fn cn neo de o h i rc a d n h n e Sa s m c bi i i e e e tu t e t t s u e Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and accepted by the district court in this case, that the test for determining the status of a foreign governmental ety s n gny rnt d sh s tie sol “ o t t ‘ rfnt n” fh ety n ta a aec o i e a t tet l hu l k oh c euco’o t n t i sa e a sf d o e o i e i, ad ht rtit t e fn tt ts n n gapro aoe n te pli lt c r n w e ei“ h y o etyh ia i er a f fr g s t s o tasut e h s e p i a t l t i a ’ ic r u ,
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o r hrn n tw oe t c rad uco ipeo i n y o m r a”Transaero, 30 ra ea ety hs sut e n fnt n s r m n t cm e i. t i r u i d al cl F.3d at 151. Under that standard, the Ministry of the Treasury was part of the Polish state itself, not an agency or instrumentality. Even if the Ministry were an agency or instrumentality, however, the takings exception still would not confer jurisdiction over the Republic of Poland because the seized property is not present in this country and the contacts of its agency or instrumentality under the second prong of the takings exception are not a proper basis for stripping the state itself of sovereign immunity. Section 1605(a)(3) is properly interpreted to strip immunity from a foreign state only if its own cn c stf t r u e etfrui ii udrh poio’fspog T apog ot t as h e i m n o j s co net rv i sit rn. ht rn, a s iy e q r s rd t n e sn r w i seicl adessui ii bsd n h cn c o t “ r g s t”eu e a h h pc i l dr e j s co ae o t ot t fh f e n te r i s c f ay s rd t n e as e o i a, q r much closer nexus with the United States than does the second prong, which provides for j i ii bsd nh cn c o “n gny rnt m n ly fh fr g s t”Iw u u s co ae o t ot t fa aec o i r eti o t oe n te t ol rd t n e as su at e i a. d turn the provision on its head to permit these lesser contacts of the agency or instrumentality to support jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign itself. Instead, the second prong should be understood as overriding the immunity only of the agency or instrumentality with the contacts at issue. It pen § 65a 3 t r u ehth fr g s t s w cn c ,n nths o n rr i 10( ()o e i t t oe n te o n ot t ad o t e f e tg ) q r a e i a’ as o its agency or instrumentality, meet the requirements of the first prong of the provision is buttressed by the differential treatment accorded foreign states and their agencies and i t m n li i t F I’aah etrv i ,8 ... 11. ht rv i m d i n r etie nh SA s tcm npoio 2 USC § 60 T apoio oie su ats e t sn sn fs olprayh “ aioav w t tt poe y foe n te iasl e i m n n a ilt t d i l i ”h “ e rpr o fr g s t s bo tym ue y tl e r t n e a h t i as ul f meeu o,w i poi n fr oe xas ei to eeu o aa st poe y f r xct n h e rv i o m repni r h fxct n gi th rpr o a o i ” l dg v gs i n e t
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foreign agency or instrumentality. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6626. A litigant who receives a judgment of unlawful taking by a foreign state may execute the judgment against property owned by the state only if the property relates to the taking; in contrast, a similar judgment against a foreign agency or instrumentality may be executed against any property owned by that agency or instrumentality. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(3), (b). Congress clearly envisioned that the attachment provisions would parallel the immunity provisions of § 1605(a)(3). See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6626. Further, the historic treatment of expropriation claims prior to enactment of the FSIA supports its interpretation as providing jurisdiction over foreign states only where the seized poe ys r etnh cut i cnet n i t fr g s t s o m r aat i, rpr ipe ni t s on yn onco wt h oe n te cm e i cv y t s i r i h e i a’ c l it while providing for jurisdiction over foreign state agencies or instrumentalities in a broader set of circumstances. Prior to enactment of the FSIA, foreign states enjoyed immunity from suit arising out of the expropriation of property within their own territory, see, e.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1200 (2d Cir. 1971), with the possible exception of in rem cases in which U.S. courts took jurisdiction to determine rights to property in the United States. E.g., Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 15 A.D.2d 111, 119 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961), a ’, 186 N.E. fd f 2d 676 (1952). In contrast, separately incorporated state-owned companies engaged in commercial activities of a private nature were generally not accorded foreign sovereign immunity. See, e.g., United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 201-203 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). In creating for the first time an exception to the in personam immunity of a foreign state, Congress adopted an incremental approach granting jurisdiction over foreign states
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that paralleled those few cases in which title to property in the United States had been in issue, while permitting, as had historically been the case, a broader class of cases against agencies and instrumentalities. Plaintiffs contend that their interpretation of the takings exception is compelled by the t tfh t i s rv i ,s rn t t ne§ 65a “ fr g s tsa nt e e o t a n poio as t gh , dr 10( ,aoe n te hl o b x e kg s n ei a u ) i a l i m n”nh seie c cm t csi l i t scn pog fa 3, h h of s m ue i t pc i i u s ne, c d gh eod rn o ( ()w i cne e fd r a nun e ) c r j i ii bsd pnh cm e i cn c o “n gny rnt m n ly f fr g u s co ae uo t o m r a ot t fa aec o i r eti o aoe n rd t n e cl as su at i s t”N t l udr le lt r d g fhtet oe ewtt df io o “ r g te o b ,neair ii e i o t t , gt r i h e n i ff e n a. ay t asc a n a xt h h e itn oi s t i§ 63a t scn pog fh t i s xet n olsii m n yo of a te n 10( , e eod rn o t a n ecp o w u tp m ui tall a” )h e kg i d r t fr g s t s gni adnt m n li w eeeany one of them owns seized property oe n te aec s n i r etie hnvr i a’ e su ats and engages in commercial activity in the United States. This result is plainly absurd, and is f t aod wt t F I ’l iav h t yw i m ks l rht oges intn n ll tds i h SA se s t e io , h h ae c at C nr d o i ed ay h e g li s r c e a s d t to permit the sort of corporate veil-piercing advocated by plaintiffs. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, a2 (a ti edd o r pct spr eui cldn ts f ie n [ r g s t t9 s t en ne t “ seth ea tj d ai ti o d f etf e n te tu t e e a r i e ie fr o i a ] aec s rnt m n li ” reprinted at 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6628; see also, e.g., First gni o i r etie ) e su ats , National Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 620-621 (1983). It would have made little sense for Congress to require that the instrumentality that owns or operates the seized property be the same instrumentality engaged in commercial activity in the United States in order for jurisdiction to exist under the second prong, if, once the test were satisfied, the state itself and all its instrumentalities would have been subject to suit. I sm t t t t c r ad ioy fh F I ’t i s xet n hwt tts n u , ee , r t e n h t o t SA sa n ecp o so h ii h x su u , sr e kg i a most reasonably interpreted to require that, before a foreign state will be denied immunity, the
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si d rpr m sb peetn h U id te i cnet n i aoe n te o n e e poe y ut e r n it n e Sa sn onco wt fr g s t s w z t s e t t i h i a’ commercial activities. Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM H. TAFT, IV Legal Adviser U.S. Department of State
GREGORY G. KATSAS Deputy Assistant Attorney General MARK B. STERN (202) 514-5089 SHARON SWINGLE (202) 353-2689 Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7250 Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
cc:
counsel listed on Certificate of Service
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, on the 9th day of September 2004, two copies of the foregoing letter brief for amicus curiae the United States of America were served on the following counsel by overnight delivery, postage prepaid: Stephen A. Whinston Edward W. Millstein Berger & Montague, P.C. 1622 Locust Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 Edward E. Klein Klein & Solomon, LLP 275 Madison Ave., 11th Floor New York, NY 10016 Mel Urback Law Offices of Mel Urback One Exchange Place, Suite 1000 Jersey City, NJ 07302 Joseph P. Garland Law Office of Joseph P. Garland 275 Madison Ave. New York, NY 10016 Kenneth F. McCallion McCallion & Associates LLP 16 West 46th Street; 7th Floor New York, NY 10036 J. Dennis Faucher Miller Faucher Cafferty and Wexler LLP One Penn Square West, Suite 2500 Philadelphia, PA 19102 Marvin A. Miller Miller Faucher Cafferty and Wexler LLP 30 N. LaSalle Street; Suite 3200 Chicago, IL 60602 Kenneth A. Elan Law Offices of Kenneth A. Elan 217 Broadway; Suite 606 New York, NY 10007 Owen C. Pell Karen M. Asner White & Case 1155 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036 Charles Chotkowski P.O. Box 320079 Fairfield, CT 06825
__________________________ Sharon Swingle Counsel for amicus curiae the United States of America