AcknowledgmentsIntroduction: The Limits of RationalityMargaret Levi, Karen S. Cook, Jodi A. O'Brien, and Howard FayePart 1 - The Theory of Rational Choice1. When Rationality FailsJohn ElsterComment: What Might Rationality Fail to Do?Geoffrey Brennan2. Rational Choice and the Framing of DecisionsAmos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman3. Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and UnsolvedMark J. MachinaComment: Should a Rational Agent Maximize Expected Utility?John Broome4. Rational Choice in Experimental MarketsCharles R. PlottComment: Individual Decision Making versus Market-Level Predictions: The Applicability of Rational Choice TheoryKaren S. Cook and Jodi A. O'BrienPart II - Preference Formation and the Role of Norms5. De Gustibus Non Est DisputandumGeorge J. Stigler and Gary S. BeckerComment: De Gustibus Non Est ExplanandumRobert E. Goodin6. Cooperation and Rationality: Notes on the Collective Action Problem and Its SolutionsMichael TaylorComment: On the Inadequacy of Game Theory for the Solution of Real-World Collective Action ProblemsMichael Hechter7. Norm-Generating StructuresJames S. ColemanComment: An Alternative Approach to the Generation and Maintenance of NormsStephen J. MajeskiPart III - Institutions8. Reason and RationalityArthur S. StinchcombeComment: Stinchcombe's "Reason and Rationality"Andrew Abbott9. Managerial Dilemmas: Political Leadership in HierarchiesGary J. MillerComment: Applying Rational Choice Theory: The Role of Leadership in Team ProductionRobert H. Bates and William T. Bianco10. The Social Evolution of CooperationRussell HardinComment: On Russell Hardin's "The Social Evolution of Cooperation"Carol A. Heimer11. Institutions and Their Consequences for Economic PerformanceDouglass C. North12. A Logic of Institutional ChangeMargaret LeviList of ContributorsIndex
Karen Schweers Cook (Editor)
Margaret Levi (Editor)