Creating Data on International Negotiation and Mediation

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					Creating Data on International Negotiation Strategies, Alternatives, and Outcomes

                                 John S. Odell

                                 20 April 2001

                     International Negotiation, forthcoming

       If greater efforts can be invested in generating uniform data on the international

negotiation process, I would nominate at least three key dimensions for fresh attention:

strategies, alternatives, and outcomes. Although these are not the only interesting ones,

better empirical knowledge about them is surely central. The outcome is the main reason

why scholars and practitioners alike are interested in negotiation in the first place.

Strategies are the most encompassing representation of what players do when trying to

influence the outcome, and for practitioners, strategies represent the range of choices

available. Our knowledge of how diverse strategies affect international outcomes is still

rudimentary and fragmented. The BATNA--the party’s best alternative to a negotiated

agreement with the other party—is highly likely to shape choices during the talks and

hence the outcome.

       This note takes materials from my recent book, Negotiating the World Economy,

and extends them a bit. It emphasizes ideas concerning strategies and treats the other two

concepts more briefly. This note is suggestive and preliminary in spirit; it does not

attempt to resolve many of the technical questions that would arise in producing and

using reliable indicators.


       The term “strategy” is pressed into service to mean many different things.

Meanings range from broader to narrower categories of behavior. In international

relations, one of the most common typologies has limited the options to two: cooperation

and defection. The list of modifiers that have been attached to “strategy” also includes

deterrence, compellence, coercive diplomacy, reciprocity, enhanced contingent restraint,

retaliation, bilateral, multilateral, and issue linkage. Pruitt’s and Rubin’s list (1986)

postulates contending, yielding, problem solving, breaking off negotiations, and inaction.

Young 1991 posits structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual forms of leadership in

institutional bargaining.

       Negotiating the World Economy, a book that concentrates on international

economic negotiations, offers a theoretical strategy continuum that helps pull together

some of the concepts that have been suggested separately. Let strategy mean a set of

behaviors that are observable at least in principle, and associated with a plan to achieve

some objective through bargaining. Strategies are part of the process of negotiation—a

sequence of actions in which parties address demands and proposals to one other for the

ostensible purposes of reaching an agreement and changing the behavior of at least one

actor.1 Tactics are particular actions that make up a strategy. A strategy may remain

constant throughout a bargaining episode, or the party may alter its strategy along the

way. Any strategy will necessarily be adapted to the special features of the situation at

hand; an ideal-type strategy will not manifest exactly the same tactics in every

application. Thus defined, a strategy does not necessarily specify every possible response

to every conceivable contingency. This notion is different from usage that is common

among game theorists.

       Suppose all behavioral strategy options are represented along a theoretical

continuum ranging between two polar ideal types: distributive or value-claiming

behavior, and integrative or value-creating behavior.2 This continuum is not special to

economic negotiations. At one pole is what I call the pure value-claiming or distributive

strategy, a set of actions that promote the attainment of one party's goals when they are in

conflict with those of the other parties.3 Offensive claiming tactics attempt to take value

from the others, whereas defensive claiming tactics aim to prevent the others from taking

value from the first. Distributive behavior is a rational response to a situation in which no

settlement can make both or all parties feel better off than they were prior to bargaining.

        Concretely, a strict value claimer insists on an agreement under which her side

will be better off than before at the expense of the others, or at least not worse off.

Failure to cite the others’ well being as a reason for negotiating is a sign of this strategy,

even if we do not take a statement of such concern at face value. The claimer insists her

side will make no concessions and resists doing so. The tactical menu also includes a

high opening demand, concealing information about true priorities, and criticism of the

other's positions. She may concede at a slow rate; delay; attempt to manipulate the

others’ beliefs about their alternatives and her own; and attempt actually to worsen the

others’ alternatives and improve her own. The explicit threat is a strong claiming tactic.

With a threat the claimer attempts to establish a commitment to a particular demand, in

order to lower the other's resistance point, shift the zone of agreement, and rule out

certain points inside it. Various ancillary tactics are used to increase threat credibility.

Seizing hostages is an even stronger move.

        The United States has employed relatively pure distributive strategies many times

to reduce another country's exports of particular goods. (It is not the case that we observe

only strategies in the middle of the spectrum). In these cases Washington demanded a

concession from an exporting state but refused to make any compensating concessions of

its own, such as increasing its imports of other products from the exporting country. In

October 1969, for instance, the U.S. government began a famous episode of claiming

from Japan over textiles trade. Washington's aide-mémoire described its objectives

concerning "the textile problem" not as seeking mutual benefit but exclusively by

reference to American concerns. It notes

       apprehension on the part of American management and labor over the

       rapid rise in imports of textiles and the adverse effect this can have on

       investment decisions and on employment; the importance which the

       Government of the United States attaches to the creation and preservation

       of employment opportunities for minority groups in the United States. . . .

The message called on Japan's government to accept a comprehensive five-year bilateral

agreement establishing a quantitative limit on exports to the United States of every wool

and synthetic fiber textile and apparel product. This document pointed to "strong

sentiment in the United States Congress for a legislated solution should the attempt to

achieve a negotiated solution fail."4 Later, after two years of fruitless bargaining with

Japan, President Nixon escalated from this thinly veiled threat to a public threat to impose

such limits unilaterally.

       Claiming is not restricted to the most powerful states. While offensive claiming

by the weak against the strong is rare, defensive claiming is common among all states. A

poor country requesting a gift and declining to reciprocate is attempting to shift value

from one party to another. Delay and refusal to make unrequited concessions are forms

of defensive claiming.

        The claiming strategy can include the tactical retreat--agreeing to accept less than

demanded earlier or give more than offered earlier, without a compensating gain. Falling

back belongs fundamentally to a distributive process by which pies are divided, rather

than a process that expands pies or bakes new ones, unless the fall back is part of a linked

exchange of concessions.5

        At the opposite pole is the pure integrative or value-creating strategy. It involves

actions that promote the attainment of goals that are not in fundamental conflict, actions

designed to expand the pie. Behaving as a pure value-creator, the first agent would

propose that the two parties negotiate toward an agreement designed to make both, not

just her side, better off.

        In Walton's and McKersie's well-known formulation based on U.S. labor-

management negotiations, 6 the ideal-type integrative process moves sequentially through

three phases. At first the parties explore, discover, and reveal the nature of the problem

and their own objectives and priorities. Throughout, openness about information is

favored (except information about the parties’ true reservation values). The negotiator

will state positions so as to facilitate identification of, rather than to conceal, underlying

concerns and priorities. She operates less like an institutional role-player with a fixed

brief to read, and more like individual assigned to take the initiative in solving a problem

that affects both sides. In a tense dispute, the pure value-creator listens carefully and

probes for underlying reasoning rather than immediately responding to attack with

equivalent attacks.

        The second phase is a joint search for potential solutions, which may include

baking a different pie rather than splitting the existing one, and joint effort to estimate

options’ likely consequences. Desired solutions stated in specific terms replace sermons

about abstract principles. Here too inventiveness is favored. In the final phase of an ideal

integrative negotiation, problem solvers combine their utility functions in some way and

test the invented alternative solutions against them. At this stage if not earlier, the parties

explore for concessions that might be valued differently and thus exchanged. The

integrative bargainer treats all partial agreements as provisional until all issues are settled,

to avoid excluding a possible re-packaging that would move the outcome closer to the


        Note that the second pole does not mean giving in or yielding unrequited

concessions. On the contrary, this concept denotes behaviors that are meant to make the

negotiator’s own side better off while making the other better off as well. Nor do

integrative behaviors necessarily indicate that the negotiator is motivated by altruism,

though altruism is not excluded by definition.

        Nothing requires a negotiator to choose one of these pure polar strategies. Indeed,

the ideal of pure integrative behavior has not been documented often in international

economic negotiations--only occasionally, as a phase in a longer process.7 Negotiators

sometimes mix distributive and integrative tactics, so that observed strategies vary by

degrees between the poles. The strategy spectrum ranges theoretically from pure

claiming to claiming diluted by minor integrative moves, to a balanced mix, to mostly

value-creative tactics diluted by mild claiming moves.

        To negotiate by mixing, the agent will commit her government to search for an

agreement that benefits all parties and not rule out possible concessions by her side. She

will invite the others to express their true concerns and priorities as opposed to their

public positions, and will avoid the harshest claiming tactics. Yet she will also delay her

own concessions and attempt to bias the distribution of joint gains in her direction. She

will defend her proposal and resist claiming by others. She may propose a principle of

fairness or a formula that would realize gains for both while also shifting their

distribution her way.8

       In principle mixing could be accomplished either sequentially or simultaneously.

One negotiator could begin with a relatively pure integrative strategy and then in a second

phase, when joint gains are in sight, shift to vigorous claiming over their division.

Another could attempt the opposite sequence. A third negotiator might try to mix tactics

from both sides of the continuum from the beginning and throughout.9

       In international relations two mixed strategies from the integrative side can be

seen in the 1942-1944 process that resulted in the Bretton Woods monetary agreement.

Both the U.K. and the U.S. governments took the initiative, each putting forward a

proposal for a new international organization designed to benefit many parties, not only

itself. For the U.S. this relatively integrative position was a dramatic change from the

historical record. The strategy was diluted with mild distributive tactics to protect special

U.S. objectives. The American negotiator initially proposed that Washington must have a

veto over the organization’s decisions. He rejected Keynes’s basic scheme to create a

new international money and expose the U.S. to far greater financial liability.

       The GATT’s Tokyo round of trade negotiations in the 1970s also illustrated

mixed strategies. This round has been described as "a rulemaking exercise of major

proportions."10 While bargaining to create this larger pie, the typical party also attempted

to claim the largest possible share of the gain for itself. In still other cases, we observe

mixed strategies from the other side of the spectrum--mainly distributive but diluted with

mild integrative tactics.11

        Theoretical tit-for-tat can be seen as one variant of a mixed strategy, wherein the

negotiator rewards the other for favorable moves and punishes the other for harmful ones.

Most, however, have conceived tit-for-tat more narrowly and mechanically, excluding the

joint discovery and creative activity captured by the notion of integrative behavior.12 One

previous operational scale of distributive and integrative negotiating behaviors also

misses this key innovation in Walton’s and McKersie’s theory. Donohue and Roberto

1996 define a set of actions ranging in order from threatening to complying. The latter

pole does not attempt to capture to exploratory information exchanges, brainstorming, or

searches for acceptable logrolls.

        Turning the proposed theoretical continuum into a reliable indicator would require

considerable technical work. As a first step, an appendix offers provisional operational

definitions of these main strategy types. Subsequent steps would be based on the

assumption is that a strategy is a pattern of actions with some stability through time,

rather than behavior that is expected to change from one sentence to the next during a

discussion. Thus coding strategies would mean looking for patterns of behavior in the

flow of micro-acts, not classifying micro-acts one by one. At the same time, the idea of

mixing elements from a continuum allows a way to represent some change in the

observed pattern during a single negotiation. To reduce reliability problems in coding a

relatively encompassing concept like this would naturally require development of

appropriately complex coding instructions, defining precisely what would count as a shift

to a different strategy. They would need to show how to merge inferences from different

forms of evidence, such as official statements and post-hoc interviews. The instructions

would need to define the time boundaries of the negotiation, the forms of evidence to be

coded (transcripts of secret talks, public statements issued by parties, press accounts,

interviews with participants after the fact), the unit of observation or point of

measurement, and the like. As usual, the instructions would need to be tested in pilot

studies and refined.


       A second worthwhile indicator would estimate the value of the party’s best

alternative to negotiated agreement and changes in that value. The batna refers to the

best course of action the party could take if the talks ended in impasse. Theoretically,

behavior and ultimately outcomes depend centrally on the parties’ alternatives. The

worse the party’s alternative, the lower its reservation value and the more eager it will be

to sign a deal. An improving alternative outside the talks can be expected tend to shift the

party toward harder distributive tactics inside. The party’s batna could change through

time and its value could in principle be measured continuously throughout the


       One approach here would be a set of material indicators, each of which proxies

the most important factors for a particular issue area. For a party negotiating an armistice

during an internal war, the proportion of the population under its control might proxy its

prospects of winning the struggle without negotiation. A decline in this proportion during

the talks would lead us to expect the negotiator to soften her demands in negotiations

over settlement terms. In Bosnia in 1995 as the battlefield tide turned against the

Serbians, Slobodan Milosevic spoke for the Bosnian Serbs and softened their position in

the bargaining, and the Muslim Sarajevo government stiffened its own. For some trade

negotiations, a rise in the price of the country’s chief export commodities could indicate

an improving alternative to negotiating an official agreement over that commodity. For a

country with a pegged exchange rate negotiating with foreign lenders during a balance of

payments crisis, the quantity of official financial reserves relative to the country’s import

needs can indicate how badly it needs a deal. Countries’ gross power assets and ratios

between these assets are probably less valid indicators, since countries allocate many

power assets to particular purposes and cannot convert them to other purposes quickly or

without substantial losses.

       Each of these is a tangible condition that we would expect to affect the value the

party would place on its alternative at a given time. Any material indicator, however, is

one step removed from the perceived batna, the subjective value the negotiator actually

places on her alternative, her actual belief about how badly she needs an agreement.

Perceptions could diverge from simple material conditions for both systematic and non-

systematic reasons. Consider the 2001 Hainan Island incident, when American and

Chinese aircraft collided and the Chinese government held the American crew and plane

hostage while demanding U.S. concessions. For that negotiation one might read China’s

or America’s batna off the distribution of power assets between the two countries, the

bilateral economic dependence running in each direction, China’s physical control over

the American aircraft and crew, and other material conditions. But evidence about what

Beijing’s and Washington’s leaders actually believed to be their best alternative courses,

in light of their subjective priorities, would certainly get us closer to an understanding of

their behavior. More generally, analysts would benefit if they had a set of valid

generalizations identifying relationships between material conditions and the most likely

beliefs, for example showing from evidence how the perceived value of one’s alternative

tends to fluctuate in response to changes in material conditions, over time in the same

country, or even in groups of countries.

       Of course creating uniform data to measure perceptions about alternatives or other

cognitive variables is a complex task. Not only does official secrecy restrict outsiders’

access to evidence about negotiators’ true beliefs. When evidence is in hand, each form

has at least some shortcomings. Scholars at different times have turned to public

statements by leaders and negotiators,13 editorials of government-controlled newspapers,

memoirs, participants’ unpublished personal papers, transcripts of historical meetings,14

interviews with participants during15 or after the events, questionnaires completed by

expert observers, histories, and combinations of these sources. Young and Schafer

(1998) review the state of the art in classifying and describing foreign policy leaders’

operational codes, cognitive maps, images, and conceptual complexity. Scholars have

improved these methods over the years but these techniques still fall short in significant

respects. Many of the applications have been qualitative rather than quantitative and

many have not concentrated on negotiations as such. Thus there seems to be potential for

additional fruitful work in this area, building on this foundation and probably using

multiple complementary forms of evidence.


       Presumably the ultimate reason to study the negotiation process is the assumption

that it affects the international outcomes. Yet many international relations scholars who

concentrate most on international and domestic power structures and institutions remain

skeptical that detailed negotiation process studies really add value sufficient to justify

their costs, over and above what can be known about outcomes by studying only

background conditions. For negotiation researchers, I believe a high priority should be

placed on pinning down the difference the process makes to the outcome, net of other

influences. This too is much easier said than done, of course.

       The negotiation outcome in the most general sense means whether the interaction

ended in agreement or deadlock, and how much was gained or lost by each party and by

the group of parties. The result could be either the shifting of value from one party to

another, or the joint solving of a problem with gains for all. Outcomes are also

sometimes compared as to their efficiency, their fairness, and their stability.16

       How much a negotiator gained or lost is understood most often by reference to the

status quo prior to the talks. Is the party better off, worse off, or about the same as

before? In a single case study the terms of an armistice might be compared to the

distribution of territory held by each fighting force when the talks began. The terms of an

official “voluntary” agreement to restrict Korea’s textile exports can be compared to the

higher value of its exports in a base period, measuring Korea’s loss due to the bargaining.

When parties have intangible as well as tangible goals, a quantitative measure limited to

the tangible will be an imperfect approximation.

       Furthermore, assessing an outcome relative to the status quo ante can be unfair to

a negotiator whose batna worsened after the process began, for instance because another

party issued a credible threat. It can be rational to agree to a loss relative to the status quo

ante if the best available alternative today is worse still. Defining gain and loss relative to

the party’s changeable batna gets us closer theoretically to the decisions that negotiators

really face. Thus in principle, a second outcome indicator could compare the terms of the

settlement for each party with a batna estimate for that party at the time of agreement.

Was the party better off, worse off, or about the same as it would have been had it walked

away from the table at that time?

        Yet faithfully measuring outcomes relative to batnas would raise complex

interpretive questions that arise when attempting to measure batnas empirically. To add

another illustrative technical issue to the list, if party A has issued a credible threat

against B, the value of B’s alternative logically should reflect a judgment about whether

A was credible or bluffing, since B’s true alternative was much better if A was bluffing.

Generally, assessing what A and B would have done had B walked away is inherently

speculative, and so is the value of the counterfactual alternative. Counterfactual

argumentation can in principle be carried out with some care in a case study and might be

persuasive to many readers.17 But no one to my knowledge has developed procedures for

employing counterfactual arguments uniformly across a large number of cases.

        A few attempts to measure outcomes over large numbers of cases illustrate

possibilities and problems. Some have used the simpler approach of defining relative

“success” operationally from one party’s standpoint. Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott 1990

classify 116 attempts to use economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes between 1914

and 1990 as to the relative success or failure for the sanctioner. Bayard and Elliott 1994

rate the degree of success in 72 United States attempts to extract trade concessions using

its section 301 law. Bercovitch 1996 classifies 593 attempts at international mediation

between 1945 and 1990 as to their success or failure. Druckman et al. 1999, in contrast,

classify 30 international negotiation outcomes as to how many disputed issues they

covered and whether the parties expanded joint gains, split benefits symmetrically, split

them asymmetrically, or ended in impasse.

        Others have observed outcome variations by means of comparative case studies.

These projects employ what amounts to ordinal qualitative measurement. George, Hall

and Simons 1971 contrast the greater U.S. success in using a strategy of coercive

diplomacy against Laos 1961 and Cuba 1962 with the failure vis-à-vis Hanoi in 1965.

Walton et al. 1994 observe negotiations between business managers and unions in 13

U.S. cases during the 1980s, and classify the outcomes uniformly as to the degree of

change in the substantive contract and the degree of change in union-management

cooperation. This study also measures management strategies qualitatively and reports

which strategy tended to achieve the greatest gains. Evans et al. 1993, Milner 1997, and

Odell 2000 illustrate the use of paired cases with outcomes that vary clearly but not

quantitatively.18 Ordinal measurement in a comparative case design is less precise than in

quantitative work and the sample is of unknown representativeness. But the conclusions

reflect much fuller information about and analysis of the cases selected, and they still

benefit from the leverage of comparison. Some mixture of qualitative and quantitative

methods in negotiation studies will be needed, since each compensates for shortcomings

of the other.19

                                           * * *

        In conclusion, new investments in creating data for analyzing international

negotiations should, in my view, give high priority to measuring negotiation strategies,

alternatives, and outcomes. Subsequent research could then study the effects of changing

batnas on behavior, and the conditions under which a given strategy gains more and less.

Such data creation projects would face many theoretical and technical dilemmas that

would require careful thought. It would also cost significant amounts of time and money

to measure negotiation dimensions satisfactorily over large numbers of cases--more than

single researchers could mobilize separately. But the United States, other countries, and

international organizations have spent much larger sums on other forms of scientific

research and on military forces. In the larger scheme of things, if more advanced

preparatory work showed that this form of research would be fruitful, allocating resources

to a better understanding of international negotiation would be a matter of setting



                         Operational definitions of strategy types

VALUE-CLAIMING STRATEGY. Code a party's strategy as "pure claiming" if any of

the following actions are observed and no more than a small minority of the behavior fits

the definition of "value-creating."


      criticizes the other country's (or countries’) actions or arrangements, blames it for

       the problem under discussion;

      attempts to exclude from the agenda issues on which her own country would

       probably have to make concessions;

      rejects or ignores demands for concessions or delays their consideration;

      avoids saying her own country is partly responsible for the problem under

       discussion, avoids expressing concern for the other’s objectives or a desire for a

       mutual-gain outcome, avoids making a proposal characterized a beneficial to the

       other parties or the world as a whole;

      manipulates information for her own advantage: avoids revealing information

       about own genuine objectives and priorities; makes arguments whose effect is to

       support her demands or refusal to concede and does not present information or

       arguments that are inconsistent with that position; e.g., argues that the other's

       alternative to agreement is worse for them than they realize, that our alternative is

       better than they realize, or that the other's forecasts showing future improvement

       for us (in absence of agreement) are not convincing, or that she simply does not

       have the capacity to deliver what is demanded; or that the other's proposal would

       harm our side or others;

      establishes a commitment to a particular outcome, by means of some public action

       tied to that outcome such that accepting less would be costly to the negotiator or

       her country;

      denies that he or she believes the other's commitments.

OFFENSIVE VARIANT: The negotiator also:

      demands concessions for the benefit of his or her own country;

      files a formal complaint against the other under global or regional rules;

      takes steps to worsen the other's alternative to agreement and improve her own--

       e.g. unilateral actions or negotiations with third parties that would help

       compensate it for a breakdown in relations with the other or provide itself with a

       superior alternative, or raise the cost of a breakdown for the other; actions could

       include introducing draft legislation for official consideration at home or "talking

       the national currency down";

      threatens to take action harmful to others unless they yield the desired


      actually imposes such penalties and implements its alternative to agreement.

DEFENSIVE VARIANT. The negotiator also:

      brings a counter-complaint against the other under international rules;

      threatens or imposes counter-threatens sanctions.

VALUE-CREATING STRATEGY. Code a party’s strategy as "pure value-creating" if

the following actions or tactics are observed and if no more than a small minority of the

behavior fits “value-claiming:” The negotiator

      states that the two (or more) parties have an interest in common or expresses

       concern for an objective held by the other;

      proposes negotiations designed to benefit both sides, usually aiming to agree on a

       joint approach to a common problem or an exchange of concessions;

      praises the other and avoids public statements criticizing the other country or

       blaming it for the problem or issue under discussion;

      invites the other to state frankly its genuine concerns and objectives and their

       priority order, as distinguished from its demands and proposals;

      proposes and implements a series of meetings whose only or main purpose is to

       engage the parties in joint study of problems and objectives they have in common;

      uses and refers to information about the issue or problem without shaping it to her

       own side's advantage; engages in an "even-handed" discussion of all the facts

       whether favorable or unfavorable to her side;

      proposes an exchange of concessions for mutual benefit;

      argues that a different conception of other's interests or a redefinition of the issues

       could lead to an agreement that would benefit both parties;

      proposes an agreement described as helpful to other parties as well.

MIXED OR COMBINED STRATEGY. Code a party’s behavior in a conflict or

negotiation as a “mixed” strategy if “claiming” and “creating” tactics are mixed in some

proportion, either simultaneously, or in a sequence dominated by claiming in one phase

and creating in another.

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Young, Michael D., and Mark Schafer. 1998. Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways

         of Assessing Cognition in International Relations. Mershon International Studies

         Review 42, supp. 1: 63-96.

Young, Oran R. 1991. Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development

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Zartman, I. William, and Maureen R. Berman. 1982. The Practical Negotiator. New

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             I use “negotiation” and “bargaining” interchangeably.
          This continuum is inspired by the investigations by Walton and McKersie (1965 and 1994) on

labor-management negotiation, where the concepts have proven valuable empirically, and by Lax and

Sebenius 1986, who coined the terms value-claiming and value-creating and made important additions to

the theory. Also see Sebenius 1992.
             Walton and McKersie 1965, chap. II; Lax and Sebenius 1986, chapter 2.
          United States aide-memoire of October 2, 1969, rpt. in Destler, Fukui, and Sato 1979, pp. 339-41.
             Some theorists, e.g., Pruitt and Rubin 1986, postulate yielding or making concessions as a

strategy separate from other strategies. But reducing demands or making concessions can have more than

one meaning and can overlap with other strategy concepts. Giving up concessions that are unrequited shifts

value from one party to another on balance. Making a concession in exchange for a concession by the other

can make both better off. To me it seems clearer, more useful, and consistent with other theory to

recognize these two as parts of different strategies rather than to combine the two into a single strategy type.
          Walton and McKersie 1965, chaps. IV and V. U.S. labor-management experience of the 1980s led

these authors to modify their earlier theory and make it more complex in some respects (Walton et al 1994).

The simpler 1965 formulation seems better suited to present purposes.

             For example, see Winham 1986, pp. 169-174, on the unusual process whereby European

Community and U.S. negotiators broke a deadlock over rules on trade subsidies and countervailing

measures during the Tokyo Round.
          See Winham 1977 for illustrations and Zartman and Berman 1982 for the useful concept of the

negotiation formula.
             Walton et al 1994, with strategy types defined slightly differently, find that mixing gained more

than either of their polar types in 13 episodes of U.S. labor-management negotiation during the 1980s.
              Winham 1986, p. 12.
              Negotiating the World Economy, chap. 7, develops two examples.
              Most empirical studies of tit-for-tat in international relations have concentrated on military-political

issues; see Hopmann 1974, Goldstein and Freeman 1990, Leng 1993, and Weber 1991. An exception is

Rhodes 1993.
              E.g., Bonham, Sergeev, and Parshin 1997, Duffy, Frederking and Tucker 1998; also see

Hopmann in the present issue.
              E.g., Levi and Tetlock 1980, Friedheim 1994.
              E.g., Beyers and Dierickx 1997.
              Hopmann 1996, 28-30.
              Fearon 1991 and Tetlock and Belkin 1996 discuss the techniques of counterfactual argument.
              Also see Druckman, the present issue, for other examples.
              Odell (forthcoming 2001) assesses the strengths and limitations of case study methods relative to

statistical methods.