Sudan Country Engagement Plan

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					SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN


SUDAN: COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN

1.     SUMMARY

This paper sets out our objectives for DFID’s engagement in the Sudan over
the short to medium term as part of the UK Government’s Sudan policy
framework.

Sudan has been beset by conflict for most of its history since independence in
1956. The latest round of civil war started in 1983 after the failure of the 1972
Addis Ababa accords. It has resulted in the death of over two million people
and the largest internally displaced population in the world (some four mi llion).
The current conflict in Darfur, Western Sudan has displaced over 1.5 million
and left over 2 million in need of humanitarian assistance and up to 70,000
dead since April 2004. In turn, the war has devastated infrastructure and
social services, exacerbating the poor state of development in a country of
around 35 million people. As a result, Sudan is one of the poorest countries
in the world.

International attention was focused on Sudan in 2004, mainly due to the
conflict in Darfur. There is a risk that so much attention on one part of the
country means problems elsewhere are not addressed. The comprehensive
peace agreement between North and South offers the prospect of a solution
for problems in other parts of Sudan, including Darfur and the East. The UN
and World Bank are working with the parties to the agreement to determine
future needs in Sudan. International assistance will now need to be expanded
and donors are planning how to build up their programmes to help meet these
needs. There is a high premium on a harmonised approach between donors.

The UK has been a lead donor in the Sudan since independence. In 2002, the
UK - along with the US and Norway - strengthened its engagement in Sudan,
particularly around fresh hopes for the peace process led by the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The UK has contributed
substantially to the humanitarian effort in Darfur.

The UK Government’s goals are to work with others in the international
community to support Sudan to reach a just and lasting peace, lay the
foundations for sustained poverty reduction, and thus begin to make progress
towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. We will
provide support under four headings. First, we will continue our work in
helping to meet humanitarian, recovery and reintegration needs to benefit the
poorest people and communities. Second , we will provide assistance to
implement the peace agreement, for example support for monitoring missions;
assistance with demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of combatants;
and local-level peace-building work. Third, we will support the development of
effective governance, including work with the justice and security sectors and
public administration. Fourth, we will work with the Sudanese to develop and
implement policies that will benefit poor people – a sound Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper, strong macroeconomic management and reorienting the
budget and sector policies towards poor people.


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DFID intends to expand its programme in Sudan if the peace agreement is
implemented and with progress to resolve the conflict in Darfur. Initially, the
majority of our resources will continue to go towards humanitarian needs, but
over time there will be a shift in emphasis towards longer-term development.
We will retain strong involvement in Darfur, while seeking over the medium-
term to re-integrate that element of our work back into our broad programme
and approach. Work on implementation of the peace agreement will require
early funding. We will gradually increase the amount we can put towards the
longer-term objectives of improved governance and policies. In addition, we
expect to pay our share of the costs of debt relief. Wherever possible we will
seek joint or complementary programmes with other donors.

We announced in October 2004 that the UK would commit £100 million for
Sudan the following year, provided that a Comprehensive Peace Agreement
is concluded and there is progress in Darfur. As well as increasing our
financial resources, we will also increase our staff resources in the region, and
aim to devolve responsibility for the programme to an office in Sudan during
2006. We will actively pursue options of joint offices or staffing with other
donors.

A risk matrix, facts about Sudan and a list of acronyms are annexed from
page 24.




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2.     CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES

2.1    Recent History

The Sudanese civil war is Africa’s longest-running conflict. The war is often
simplified into a North-South divide – or, more erroneously, a clash of Muslim
and Christian civilisations. In reality, the causes of the conflict are complex
and have been fuelled by persistent underdevelopment of marginalised areas
of Sudan and competition for access to political and economic power,
dominated by a Northern, Nile Valley-centred Arab, Muslim elite. Local
conflict (e.g. over grazing, water), control of humanitarian aid and
ethnic/religious mobilisation have also played significant roles. The current
conflict in Darfur, which started in early 2003, results from many of the same
problems, although in Darfur the warring factions are all Muslim. 2004 also
saw an upsurge in the conflict in the East of Sudan, such as Malakal and Red
Sea State.

Following independence in 1956, Southern discontent with the political order
evolved into guerrilla warfare across the South, led by the Southern ‘Anyanya’
movement. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which devolved some powers
to the South, provided a decade of respite. By 1983, this had been fatally
undermined by the Nimeiri Government’s centralising and Islamising policies,
and by disagreement among Southern politicians. Southern rebels and
mutineers coalesced into what became the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by Dr John Garang.

Nimeiri’s overthrow in 1985 and the subsequent transition to a democratically
elected government under Sadiq al-Mahdi failed to end the war. As
negotiations were promising progress in 1989, an alliance of military officers
and Islamists led by Omar al-Bashir seized power. The National Islamic Front
(later restyled the National Congress) has retained power to the present.

There has long been unrest in Darfur. The latest phase begain in February
2003 as a conflict between farmers and pastoralists over access to land and
water. It quickly escalated following an attack on El Fasher, North Darfur, by
the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A). Against a backdrop of the
failure of both the Khartoum government and the traditional leadership to
address the region’s problems, the political ground for rebellion was fertile.
There are two principal rebel movements: the SLM and the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM). The SLM and JEM recruited fighters from the
disenchanted populace of Darfur, drawing principally on the ‘African’ Fur,
Masalit and Zaghawa tribes. In spite of two ceasefire agreements and an
African Union (AU) monitoring mission, all parties continue to violate the
cease-fire, and proxy militias (loosely referred to as ‘Janjaweed’) still operate
with apparent impunity. For a sustainable solution, the political causes of the
crisis must be addressed.

Civil conflict in Sudan has been characterised by the following:-




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- Guerrilla conflict across much of the South, with major garrison towns held
by the Government of Sudan (GoS) army and its allies, and the SPLA holding
territory between. Internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees from the
North-South conflict are estimated to total over four million.

- Southern disunity, with SPLA splinters and other Southern factions allying
with the Government in return for weaponry to fight the SPLA. The 1997
Khartoum Peace Agreement formalised many of these alliances. Much
fighting is between Southerners, rather than between Southerners and the
Sudanese army.

- Conflict in the North. The Northern opposition joined the SPLA in the
National Democratic Alliance, reaching a limited political consensus in the
1995 Asmara Declaration. SPLA-led forces stepped up resistance activity in
the North-east. Government repression in marginalised areas of the North –
the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile – prompted local resistance,
which the SPLA backed. More recently, marginalisation of Darfur has
sparked a new uprising in the West, which has led to a crisis affecting over
two million people. Many Darfurians are now living in camps in Darfur or
across the border in Chad, unable to return to their homes due to widespread
insecurity, and dependent on international humanitarian assistance.

- Fighting for control of the oilfields which lie near the North-South boundary in
Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile. Since the Government began exploration
and exploitation here in the 1990s, there has been vicious fighting in this area
between the Government army, the SPLA and their respective allies.

- Peace efforts failed to bear fruit because both principal parties remained in a
sufficiently strong position, and international commitment to ending the conflict
through negotiation was limited. Only in the last three years, with the
Government’s power-base weakened, the low prospect of outright victory by
either side and a favourable combination of external factors, has the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process been
able to make progress. Peace talks for the Darfur conflict, mediated by the
AU are ongoing.

2.2    Poverty in Sudan

Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world. It ranks 138th out of 175 in
the UN Development Programme Human Development Index. The World
Bank estimates Sudan’s Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in 2001 at
US$340, which is the median value for Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank
statistics suggest better life expectancy and infant mortality in Sudan than the
Sub-Saharan average. These figures should be treated with some caution.
The 1993 census was compromised because of difficulty in accessing large
parts of the country: statistics on poverty in Sudan are patchy and information
on SPLM-controlled areas from a variety of surveys and studies tends to be
omitted from GoS data. Overall, the evidence suggests a high level of
inequality, which would suggest high numbers of poor people, both North and
South. One estimate of GNI in the South suggests a level of just $80 per


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capita, although this may reflect a very low level of monetisation and a lack of
any official data. Better data will start to emerge once peace is established.

The majority of poor people in Sudan live in rural areas. An indication of the
North-South discrepancy is that the average under-5 mortality rate was 105
per 1000 in the late 1990s in the North but 145 in the South. However, even
within the North, there are wide variations in the prevalence of poverty.
Women tend to be poorer than men and have more limited opportunities; in
government controlled areas, adult literacy in 2001 was 60% for men and
42% for women. An estimated 4 million people have been displaced internally
by the North-South conflict, many of whom face particularly difficult long-term
living conditions in camps. The conflict in Darfur has displaced over 1.5
million people, many of whom do not wish to return to their homes until
security improves.

Although official figures suggest water and sanitation coverage in Sudan
(62%) is slightly above sub-Saharan averages (60%), some estimates
suggest only 30% coverage of safe water in Southern Sudan, and in some
areas as low as 5-10%. Access to water is a particular problem in Darfur.
Disputes over the right of access to water wells and grazing land are
common, traditionally resolved by recourse to local tribal and religious
authorities, but they sometimes contribute to a wider conflict, notably in
Darfur. Humanitarian indicators in Darfur and Southern Sudan also suggest
widespread malnutrition. Years of drought in Darfur have preceded the current
crisis, which has caused two years of harvest to be missed. As a result, the
population will suffer from high food insecurity throughout 2005.

As well as poverty, the people of Sudan face a number of challenges. These
include:-

- Civil conflict. Belligerents on all sides have, as a matter of policy, targeted
civilian populations as a military policy resulting in death, injury, forced
displacement, destruction of infrastructure and a less effective humanitarian
response. In Darfur, villages have been wiped out and up to 70,000 have died
since April 2004. Currently 2.3 million people are estimated to be dependent
on humanitarian assistance. Over the longer term, military spending by the
belligerents in Sudan has also diverted resources away from social
expenditure.

- Inadequate access to systems of justice, and personal insecurity. Access to
justice is neither readily available nor widely understood by poor people in
Sudan. Women and children suffer particular exclusion. In GoS areas there is
a formal justice system, based on Sharia law. However many people choose
to use unofficial local courts, as they dispense traditional or common-law
justice more quickly or cheaply. In SPLM-areas customary law is given a
privileged place in the rural administration, but very little has yet been
achieved in committing customary law to paper, drafting legislation, or
disseminating written versions of laws widely. Chiefs are still the main
dispensers of justice.



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 - Widespread human rights abuses. Belligerents on all sides have committed
human rights abuses. The current conflict in Darfur is no different, with
widespread violations of human rights and targeting of civilians. A disturbing
feature of the conflict in Darfur is the prevalence of sexual violence as a
weapon of war. Even in relatively stable areas of Sudan, rights are regularly
undermined in relation to treatment of prisoners, lack of accountability by
enforcement agencies and little application of social and economic rights.

- Weak civil society. Potentially, civil society organisations could give poor
people access to health and education in the absence of government
services, and also hold governments to account for their actions and policies.
However, there are few strong civil society groups in Sudan. Although some
are beginning to find their voice, many are still in an embryonic state. The
relationship between civil society and authority is often uncomfortable and at
worst oppressive.

- Lack of policies to benefit poor people and high inequality. Sudan’s
economy has been growing considerably in recent years, but this growth has
not benefited the poor as much as it should. In addition, GoS spending, both
on delivering services and improving infrastructure, has been low by
international standards and has not been concentrated geographically or
sectorally in the areas which would improve conditions most for poor people.
This is in part because of high military expenditure, but also because the
systems of governance currently channel the majority of resources to elite
groups. Territorially, this has meant exploitation of resources by state-owned
or state-sponsored companies, with control of those resources assured by
military or security agencies. Political relations between the centre and the
periphery have been used to maintain control from the capital. GoS and
SPLM started discussions in September 2004 on a joint Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP) – known as the Poverty Eradication Strategy (PES).
The paper concentrates on reducing inequality and tackling exclusion and
marginalisation through decentralisation and community-led development.
However, the paper contains little about how the parties will implement the
strategy or probable timing and mechanisms for implementation. Previous
attempts did not cover SPLM-controlled areas and were unlikely to meet the
standards required for effective country-wide poverty reduction, nor the
international standards required for PRSPs to be considered under
international processes such as the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

- Strong economic reform, but low social spending. Statistics on the Sudanese
economy (which do not adequately reflect the situation in the South) indicate
important improvements in macroeconomic management since the mid-
1990s. Growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has averaged over 6%
annually since 1997, reflecting expansion in agriculture, industry and,
particularly, oil sectors. Inflation was reduced from over 100% in 1996 to
single digit levels by 2000. This reduction was achieved through cutting
public expenditure to around 11% of GDP (1999-2001) - which is very low
compared with an average in Sub-Saharan Africa of over 27%. Within total
public expenditure, defence is equivalent to 2-3% of GDP, yet social services
is around 1.5% of GDP, much lower than many other African countries.


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Moreover, social sector spending lacks a strong emphasis on the primary
level in either health or education.

- Massive and unsustainable external debt. Sudan’s external debt of $24bn
($20bn of which is in arrears) is owed to commercial and bilateral (Paris Club
and Arab) creditors as well as multilateral agencies. Normalisation of
relationships with international creditors, followed by debt relief under the
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, would open the way to
renewed lending from the international financial institutions, and so is an
important incentive for peace. However, resolving the problem will require
exceptional effort from the international community.          In particular, the
international community will find it hard to agree debt relief while there is still
conflict in Darfur. Financing of HIPC will require some large cash injections
from the international community to multilateral agencies, spread over about 5
years.

- Lack of investment. Apart from the oil sector, there has been little
investment in Sudan in recent years. Yet such investment would broaden
Sudan’s economic base, and provide another source of employment for the
country’s population. Investors have been put off by the continuing conflict,
the immense debt overhang, and inadequate protection provided by
legislation or by the courts.

 - Agricultural dependency. The economy is predominantly agricultural,
contributing about 46% of GDP in 2000 but since then its share has declined
as oil revenues have increased. About 70% of the population either live in
rural areas or are nomadic, with the agricultural sector accounting for 70% of
employment. Sudan is potentially self sufficient in basic foods, albeit with
inter-annual and geographical variations. About 60% of all crop production is
irrigated, highlighting the importance of sustainable management of water
resources. The destruction of the limited social and economic infrastructure
has disrupted agricultural and trading activity, especially in the South. This
has had serious impact on the livelihoods of the rural poor, traditionally
dependent on rain fed farming and livestock.

- Climate, terrain and size. These factors also complicate governance and the
delivery of services. The country is prone to natural disasters such as floods
and droughts. The sheer size of Sudan also makes it difficult to govern, even
at a state level. Infrastructure throughout the country is poor due to lack of
investment and the war. The road network presents logistical challenges for
humanitarian and development interventions, especially in the rainy season.
Sudan is the meeting point of the Nile river tributaries: the Blue Nile from the
Ethiopian plateau and the White Nile from the equatorial lakes region. Most of
the latter is lost to evaporation in the vast swamps of the Sudd. Yet much of
Sudan is arid and not suitable for cultivation, and water scarcity limits
development in many parts of the country.

2.3    International Involvement in Sudan




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International attention has focused on Sudan in 2004, mainly due to the
conflict in Darfur. The UN has passed three resolutions (as at end 2004), and
Sudan has been on the agenda of the AU, EU and G8 discussions. Many
donors and agencies that were not previously involved in Sudan have rallied
to the call of support to the humanitarian response. The AU has sent
ceasefire monitors and troops to Darfur – the first operation of its kind for the
AU. This has been, and is, very important but there is a risk that so much
attention on one part of the country means problems elsewhere are not
addressed.

At the regional level many states are concerned with Sudan for a variety of
political and economic reasons. For example Egypt, has placed much
emphasis on the use of Sudan’s Nile waters. Sudan has also gained attention
due to the profile of its Islamist government, its association with terror
networks (from the failed assassination attempt on the Egyptian President in
1995 onwards), and the portrayal of the North-South conflict as a fight
between Christianity and Islam (which has had particular resonance with
some Christian groups in the USA).

Since 1991, most western governments have suspended long-term aid and
development programmes in Sudan and simply provided assistance through
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the longest running humanitarian programme
in the world, as well as more recently to the Darfur crisis. OLS is led by the
UN, with the participation of local and international NGOs, and is based on a
negotiated access agreement with the principal belligerents in the North-
South conflict, allowing operations in territory held by either side.

Since 2000, three western nations – USA, UK and Norway – have been
working together in support of the IGAD-led peace process to encourage the
two principal parties (GoS and SPLM) to reach a ceasefire and work toward a
lasting solution to Africa’s longest running war. Peace talks on Darfur have
been supported by a number of international actors, including AU, EU, UK,
France, USA, Arab League, Chad and Libya.

2.4    The IGAD-led Peace Process

In June 2002 a combination of war weariness and international pressure
finally bought GoS and the SPLM back to the negotiating table and a new
round of talks under IGAD, an organisation of countries in East Africa and the
Horn of Africa, and chaired by Kenya. A comprehensive peace agreement
was signed in January 2005, if implemented, means a permanent end to the
civil war. The agreement, in allowing for devolution of power and resources,
and democratisation, offer solutions for problems in other parts of Sudan,
including Darfur and the East.

During the IGAD-mediated talks, GoS and the SPLM reached an agreement
on the key issues of self-determination of the South and application of Islamic
law in July 2002 (the Machakos Protocol), on wealth-sharing, power-sharing,
security arrangements, the “three areas” on the border between North and
South (Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and Abyei). These agreements


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allow for, amongst other things, a regional Government of Southern Sudan
(GoSS), power-sharing in a Government of National Unity (GNU), and a six
and a half year period after which a referendum will be held under which the
South will vote for or against secession.

A settlement between the SPLM and GoS is only the start of the process as
many other groups and factions will have to be accommodated in the political
transition to bring about a just and lasting peace. In particular, a political
solution to the crisis in Darfur will need to be found. International pressure
has been instrumental in moving towards a peace agreement and this will
need to be maintained, and substantial resources provided, if it is to be
successfully implemented.

2.5    Other Political negotiations in Sudan

Outside the IGAD Peace Process, other political negotiations continue in
parallel, but will be heavily influenced by the conclusion of a Comprehensive
Peace Agreement in the IGAD talks. In relation to Darfur, the AU is
sponsoring talks in Abuja between GoS and the Sudanese Liberation
Army/Movement (SLA/M) as well as the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM). Libya is also pursuing an initiative for reconciliation within Darfur by
bringing together many of the Darfurian traditional leaders. Humanitarian and
Security Protocols for Darfur were signed in Abuja on 9 November 2004, but
these still need to be implemented. The National Democratic Alliance – an
umbrella group of opposition groups - is pursuing talks with GoS in Cairo.

2.6    Post-Settlement Programme

The comprehensive peace agreement should allow greater engagement by
the international community in supporting the process toward lasting peace.
Such international support should be predicated on the commitments made by
the two parties in the final agreement, and in particular on making progress
along the necessary security, political/legal and socio-economic transitions.
The international community is also likely to look for progress towards
resolving the crisis in Darfur before significantly scaling up the volume of their
assistance. Transition is needed in the following three areas: security,
political/legal, and socio-economic. The peace agreement provides the blue-
print for these transitions and must be implemented.

Steps needed for successful security transition include disengaging armed
forces and maintaining a ceasefire, and undertaking a process of
demilitarising the state apparatus. International partners can support this
through monitoring missions, and providing funding and policy advice for
demobilising, disarming and reintegrating fighters within a context of longer-
term transformation of the security sector.

Political/legal transition will require the Sudanese to take forward elections
and other steps towards democratisation; protection of human rights;
decentralisation of power, as well as a more inclusive political process at the
centre; and reconciliation between the various groups towards a more united


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Sudan. International support can come through facilitation of initiatives aimed
at building the peace and strengthening capacity at all levels of government.
In particular, support can be channelled towards electoral processes and
bodies that uphold human rights.

In order to achieve socio-economic transition, Sudanese authorities will need
to share wealth and revenues, and reform macroeconomic policy. Policies
and budgets that target the poor will be particularly important, on which
international organisations can assist. They can also undertake a process of
debt relief for Sudan.

2.7     Post-Settlement Planning

As the parties have approached a settlement, key donors have talked to each
other and encouraged a coherent and coordinated programme of support for
multilateral (UN and World Bank) national framework. The UK has been one
of the lead donors in such coordination (with the USA, Netherlands, EC and
Norway).      The UN and World Bank have been undertaking a Joint
Assessment Mission (JAM) to determine the needs in Sudan over the pre-
interim and interim periods (6 and a half years from a peace agreement). This
process has led to much stronger coordination between donors at a sectoral
level, and between the parties to the peace talks at a strategic level.

Relationships between donors and Sudan will undergo profound changes in
the coming years. Many donors will be increasing their assistance but have
limited knowledge of the country. There will also be increasing engagement
with government systems, but the GoS and SPLM (as the emerging
Government of Southern Sudan – GoSS) are unfamiliar with most donors’
procedures and practices.

In these circumstances, transaction costs are likely to be high on both sides.
High priority should therefore be placed on donors working together, sharing
their knowledge and building common approaches and joint mechanisms for
their relationships with government; and on helping government systems to
evolve in ways which will make good use of development assistance.

It will take at least a year or two before Sudan becomes eligible to borrow
again from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (because
of current debt arrears), and it will take some time for the government to
reallocate spending away from the military. So initially most of the resources
for poverty reduction related activities will need to come from bilateral, EC and
UN sources. The absorptive capacity of Sudanese institutions in respect of
greatly increased donor financing has yet to be tested, but is likely to be
limited.

The table below lists some key donors’ planned areas of activity and roughly
how much is available for Sudan after a peace agreement.

Donor      Approxim- Sectors                                 Geographical
           ate annual                                        area


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SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN



          resource
Nether-   At leastHumanitarian assistance in           Focus on Darfur,
lands     €40m    Darfur and South Sudan, security     South Sudan and
                  (demining), peace-keeping,
          (approxima                                   conflict areas
                  governance and rule of law, local
          tely $52m)                                   Also a regional
                  administration, gender,              programme
                  education, health, HIV/AIDS
US     At least   Humanitarian assistance =            Focus on South,
       $593m      $500m (food aid = $320m,             Darfur, transition
                  health/water/food                    zone, east Sudan
                  security/livelihoods = $180m);
                  transitional and development
                  assistance in South Sudan =
                  $93m (infrastructure, governance,
                  primary health care, education,
                  economic recovery, civil society,
                  media, grassroots peace)
EC     At least   Humanitarian, food security,         War-affected
       €100m      education, health, peace building,   areas
       (approxima human rights, democratisation,
       tely       rule of law, governance, security
       $131m)
Norway At least   Humanitarian, capacity building,     Focus on South
       $46m       community reintegration, security,   and Darfur
                  peace monitoring and support,
                  education and infrastructure
UK     £100m      Humanitarian/recovery/reintegrati    All areas are
       ($187m)    on, implementation of peace          possible
                  agreement, public
                  administration/security/judicial
                  systems, policies for poverty
                  reduction




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3.       UK PROGRAMME AND RESOURCES 2003 – 2006

3.1      History of UK Engagement

In 1991, alongside other donors, the UK stopped its long-term development
assistance programme to Sudan. Since then, the UK has maintained a
humanitarian programme of about £7 million per year, depending on needs
within the country. In 2002 and 2003, in line with progress towards peace, the
DFID programme was broadened to include direct support for the peace
process and its monitoring mechanisms, confidence building measures such
as support for the education system and support to get ourselves and others
prepared for peace. Funds disbursed to Sudan in financial year 2003/4
totalled approximately £24.5 million. Between April 2002 and March 2004,
humanitarian activities included:

     •   £9.6m to international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) for
         humanitarian work across Sudan;

     •   £8.5m to International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) including
         work with internally displaced people and others affected by conflict;

     •   £7.8m to UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) for rehabilitation of schools,
         basic education and water/sanitation;

     •   £7.5m to World Food Programme (WFP) for food aid;

     •   £3.0m to UN Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF and Office of
         the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for humanitarian
         security operations and coordination;

     •   £4.0m for UN mine clearance programmes (half of which was funded
         by DFID’s Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department);

     •   £0.4m to UNDP for the ‘Juba Plus’ initiative on HIV/AIDS.

To support the peace process we have been providing funding for the IGAD
Secretariat; input into monitoring missions; and experts (for example on
demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration - DDR) to the talks. We are
also supporting activities that underpin the peace process through local
peace-building initiatives, DDR and support for human rights.

As a peace agreement drew closer and the parties became more involved in
planning for government after a peace agreement, we started some further
preparatory work. This has included support for the Joint Assessment
Missions (see section 2.7 above), for a Capacity Building Trust Fund for the
SPLM, for road rehabilitation in the South, for debt management, for police
training and for the UN plan for the return of internally displaced people. We
have also agreed support for a number of cross-cutting programmes with
international NGOs.



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There are also regional programmes supported by DFID that cover Sudan:
                n
the Nile Basin I itiative, which aims to achieve sustainable socio-economic
development through the equitable utilisation of, and benefit from, the
common Nile Basin water resources; and the Catalysing Access to ICTs in
Africa (CATIA) programme, which aims to enable poor people in Africa to gain
maximum benefit from the opportunities offered by Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) and to act as a strong catalyst for reform.
Sudan has been supported through our institutional partnerships with UN
agencies and the Red Cross movement, as well as by our Civil Society
Challenge Fund. DFID also contributes 12.5% of EC development assistance
in Sudan and 17% of EC humanitarian assistance.

3.2   UK Humanitarian Response to Darfur

The UK response to the crisis in Darfur has been to use political, diplomatic
and humanitarian channels, and work with the international community to stop
the conflict and stabilise the humanitarian crisis faced by the war-affected
people of Darfur; and, in the medium term, to return people to safety and
security. The humanitarian crisis has mainly been caused by displacement
from the conflict, so throughout we have maintained political pressure on the
parties to stop the fighting, and have been at the forefront of international
support for the African Union ceasefire monitors. We have also pressed for
conclusion of the comprehensive peace agreement between GoS and SPLM,
which offers solutions for the problems in Darfur.

In the early stages of the crisis, when very few agencies were engaged in
Darfur, we worked with other donors to bolster the UN’s capacity to respond,
by supporting the UN Disaster and Assessment Co-ordination team, and
seconding humanitarian expertise to OCHA to enable co-ordination. We have
consistently combined early funding for UN agencies with additional capacity
in the form of technical support, ie personnel and equipment. Our early NGO
funding was directed at those agencies already working in Darfur.

To enable the operation to build up from this low base, we put significant
support behind the provision of common logistics and services, which all
agencies needed in order to work effectively. We supported UN security, and
WFP logistics, operations, including air operations and also flew in directly
significant contributions of humanitarian goods for the common pipeline. We
provided NGOs with start-up costs, and encouraged them to become
operational quickly, complementing our funding with pressure on the GoS to
ease bureaucratic restrictions. We also provided airlifts for NGOs to enable
quick delivery of humanitarian goods. We pressed the UN to deploy senior
personnel to provide effective leadership and direction, and have consistently
lobbied other donors to increase their volume of humanitarian assistance.
Before August 2004, the USA, EC and UK had provided about 75% of the
total funding for the crisis. Even at the end of 2004 these three donors
accounted for over 60% of the response.

Once more agencies were engaged, we continued to support expansion of
the operation, encouraging agencies to push out to more outlying areas. We


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provided funding to UN agencies to consolidate their operations, engaging in
operational and high level dialogue to improve the quality of the response. We
have been in regular contact with the Heads of UNICEF, WFP, ICRC, World
Health Organisation (WHO), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) and UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

3.3   Objectives and approach

The UK Government’s overall goal in Sudan is to help the Sudanese reach
and implement a sustainable peace agreement, which will both lead to and be
supported by the reduction of poverty.

Goal: To support Sudan to reach a just and lasting peace and so lay the
foundations for sustained poverty reduction.

Objective 1: meet life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian, recovery
and reintegration needs.

Objective 2: assist parties to implement the peace agreement, including
military/ political arrangements, and to build the consensus for peace
more widely.

Objective 3: support the development of effective public administration,
security and judicial systems throughout Sudan.

Objective 4: support the development and implementation of policies for
poverty reduction.


To achieve these objectives, we will focus our activities on those areas where
the UK can offer comparative advantage in relation to other donors,
particularly in terms of our speed of response, flexibility and preparedness to
work in difficult policy areas. We place a high premium on harmonisation
between donors in Sudan. We are therefore keen to agree an appropriate
division of labour between donors, including which donor should lead in which
sector. The UK will only take the lead on a few of the areas of interest
outlined below. Our initial thinking is that we could take the lead on: rule of
law / safety, security and access to justice; disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration, leading to security sector reform in the medium/longer term;
debt relief (and poverty reduction strategy paper); and possibly certain issues
relating to delivery of basic services (please see sections below for more
detail on our plans in these areas). We will continue to prioritise our support
for humanitarian activities based on assessed need. The outcome of the Joint
Assessment Missions, and later, the Poverty Eradication Strategy, should
provide donors with a framework within which to provide assistance. It is
particularly important that these processes are Sudanese-led. We would like
to establish good joint working with other donors, including joint offices.

Objective 1: meet life-saving and life-sustaining humanitarian, recovery
and reintegration needs.


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SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN




DFID will match its humanitarian programme across Sudan to assessed need,
recognising that improved access to vulnerable populations will allow a
stronger response, and that needs are not likely to reduce in the near future.
History shows that Sudan is often vulnerable to food shortages, even famine,
requiring external donors to provide resources for large-scale relief
programmes. In addition, for the time being, a substantial part of the burden of
providing basic services (food, water, shelter, health, education), particularly
in the South and in central conflict affected areas, falls to the humanitarian
agencies. A high level of humanitarian need is likely to continue in Darfur at
least for the next 18-24 months. We intend to maintain our funding for as long
as is necessary, including to support a process of voluntary returns, which will
lead to the restoration of livelihoods for those affected by conflict.

Fundamental to our approach to humanitarian needs in Sudan in 2005 will be
an early indication of substantial support to the 2005 UN Workplan, which
outlines the enormous needs to be met across the country. Early indications
of support will allow UN agencies to plan interventions more effectively and be
better prepared for the added logistical challenges that will arise with the rainy
season. While maintaining the level of support required by Darfur, the
international community must not allow the current, justified, attention there to
divert resources away from other areas of Sudan where there are also acute
needs.

The provision of humanitarian services can go beyond saving lives and
include longer-term, developmental activities such as institutional support and
training. As the operating environment becomes more stable and local
institutions are strengthened, we will aim to make the delivery of services
more sustainable by building on current successful models and resources.
Our programme in the North will focus on poor communities in marginalised
areas, on linking delivery of services to peace building efforts, and on
generating sustainable systems for delivery of services at state level. In the
South our initial focus will be guiding the transition from humanitarian relief to
more sustainable, community-led and -maintained services. We expect this to
involve the new Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), local authorities and
NGOs, and INGOs, and to build on the experiences of local peace building
work. We will work through other donors in the delivery of basic services.

DFID will focus on interventions that are designed to provide benefits to the
poorest people and communities. In particular it will be important to contribute
to improved basic services in areas where Sudanese people displaced by war
may wish to return. These inputs should contribute to, and not undermine,
longer-term plans for sustainable development. We will support the UN
returns programme, with an emphasis on the reintegration of displaced people
into communities.

We may also provide support for co-ordination, research, logistics,
infrastructure or security, where these enable a more effective overall
response. Given the limited capacity to absorb and use aid effectively, we will
consider supporting interventions to alleviate these constraints. We will


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SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN



continue to work by preference through fewer, larger grants to agencies
working on the ground in order to keep our and their transaction costs down
and to maximise efficiency. Where possible, we will use a programmatic
approach: providing funding to key partners up-front against a jointly agreed
set of objectives. This will enable agencies to be more flexible and responsive
to a quickly evolving situation on the ground. Our main implementing partners
will continue to be the UN system, the Red Cross movement and INGOs.

DFID also intends to provide support for HIV/AIDS surveillance, prevention
and treatment to help strengthen the capacity of the GoS/GoSS to plan and
implement an effective response to the epidemic.

Objective 2: assist parties to implement the peace agreement, including
military/ political arrangements, and to build the consensus for peace
more widely.

Comprehensive ceasefire and security arrangements are being negotiated by
the parties as part of a final peace agreement. Furthermore, the conflict in
Darfur will also require international efforts to support peace there. We have
made some assumptions about the likely shape of a peace support-operation
and peacebuilding needs:

  •   there will be an international peace support operation, probably with a
      focus on monitoring the peace, rather than enforcing it. The
      international community will need to share the burden of funding and
      staffing this operation. Opportunities to build African capacity for peace-
      support should be taken;

  •   the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in the Nuba Mountains, AU
      Mission in Darfur, and Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) and the
      Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) in the South may be
      subsumed into the overall international operation. But the lessons
      learned from their establishment should be transferred to the larger
      operation;

  •   it will be important to strengthen civil society participation in
      consolidating peace. Media, information dissemination and confidence
      building measures related to the peace will be needed. However, local-
      level peace building is complex work and not well understood by most
      donors and agencies. There is a need to build on analysis and common
      understanding so that donors and agencies do not exacerbate these
      conflicts;

  •   development of a community-based demobilisation, disarmament and
      re-integration (DDR) strategy and programme will be necessary. The
      parties will need to set the parameters for this programme within the
      peace agreement. The UN will offer to take a lead role in co-ordinating
      the implementation of the programme with other agencies. This will
      need to feed into a security sector reform programme as set out under
      objective 3 below;


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SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN




  •   work with the militia groups will be key – both in local-level
      peacebuilding work and in plans for demobilisation of combatants;

  •   official capacity for human rights monitoring needs to be strengthened
      either within the international system or within the authorities - to
      significantly improve national ability to monitor needs and therefore
      provide a quicker response. Working with other donors, we will
      consider support for the Human Rights Commission and other relevant
      institutions to be established as part of the peace agreement as well as
      other mechanisms for improving respect for human rights.

So far, the UK has supported the ceasefire and security discussions at the
talks through provision of experts and through organising workshops to raise
awareness of the issues with Government forces and the SPLA. We have
also supported the DDR planning process and contributed significant funding
and personnel to the JMC, VMT, and AU Darfur operations and played a lead
role in their development.

We intend to remain engaged at the political and programme levels in all
these areas. Key areas for support include the implementation of the
ceasefire agreement and the security protocols. It is difficult at this stage to
define exactly what support we will need to give but the following are
indicative areas:

  •   developing options for support on issues related to army integration
      and force reduction in the interim period through the provision of
      technical assistance;

  •   assisting the JMC, VMT and AU mission in Darfur and the future UN
      Mission in Sudan with personnel and running costs;

  •   the provision of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR)
      expertise to the parties and to the UN system in co-ordinating the
      development of a DDR programme. In turn, we will consider funding
      for a DDR programme and support for reintegration activities;

  •   the funding of an evaluation of local peace-building processes to
      contribute to a common understanding of the issues ensuring our
      longer term development programme (particularly the service delivery
      programme) is informed by good understanding of conflict dynamics;

  •   cooperation with others on the potential for developing effective media
      structures and outlets, working in coordination with other donors,
      including the US and EC. We will discuss this in the context of the
      DFID Africa-wide CATIA project;

  •   work with Sudanese civil society organisations to develop capabilities
      in advocating for peace at the local and national levels;



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SUDAN COUNTRY ENGAGEMENT PLAN



  •   in collaboration with the UN and other partners, continue to support
      demining in Sudan.

Objective 3: support the development of effective public administration,
state security and judicial systems throughout Sudan.

Safety, security and access to justice, and security sector reform

Justice, legal and personal security systems in Sudan, North and South, have
been perceived as oppressive by many, and widely condemned by the
international community. The current justice and security systems in Sudan
do not deliver adequate access to justice to people in all parts of Sudan, and
especially to the poor and vulnerable who suffer most from injustice.
Successful implementation of the peace agreement will depend to a
considerable extent on remedying these omissions according to the
commitments included in the peace protocols. Restoration of peace and
stability in Darfur, as much as in other parts of the country, will depend on
combating the climate of impunity prevalent throughout the crisis. It is
important to ensure access to effective, objective justice and to the protection
of life and property by the security authorities.

The drafting of constitutions and legal codes that respect human rights, and
the creation of top-level judicial structures that ensure fair and equitable
treatment for all citizens will have to be undertaken at national and Southern
regional levels. The reintegration of trained legal personnel into the judicial
system of the South, and the further training of justices and lawyers, too, are
projects that will have to be undertaken at a governmental level. In the North,
the sharia justice system needs considerable reform in its resourcing and
functioning in order to ensure the government’s constitutional and
international commitments are respected. The poorest are also the least
aware of their rights. The system is strongly biased against women – who are
treated as property – and children, who are vulnerable to abuse and violence.

The new authorities will need to be able to guarantee personal security,
principally through effective accessible and impartial police forces. If they
cannot, they will in all likelihood see the growth of vigilante and other armed
groups, with the potential for further conflict.

We will engage in a process of support for the justice and personal security
sectors. This will be shaped under the leadership of the ministries and
agencies concerned in the GoS (and subsequently the Government of
National Unity - GNU) and in the SPLM/GoSS. Co-operation with other donors
such as UNDP will be essential, both as part of donor harmonisation and
because UNDP has identified “Rule of Law Capacity Building” as a major
priority. Redevelopment and effectiveness will take a considerable period to
achieve and be very much an incremental process. Initial activities are likely
to be in the following areas:

  •   confidence-building and lesson-learning activities with Sudanese
      authorities, North and South, to help them to understand where they


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       stand in relation to relevant international good practice after many
       years of isolation;

   •   support for UNDP in both North and South Sudan to develop its own
       legal expertise and prepare a co-ordinated justice sector reform
       strategy for governments and donors;

   •   programmes of capacity building for justice sector institutions in the
       North and South, again administered by UNDP;

   •   creation of improved training capacity for the National Police College in
       Khartoum and funding for initial training and equipment for the police
       force being created by SPLM/GoSS;

   •   funding for human rights sensitisation and awareness programmes
       implemented by UN High Commission for Human Rights over the
       whole of Sudan;

   •   development of the capacity of civil society in the fields of human and
       child rights, gender and legal awareness, so that they are able to
       engage with donors as partners, and critically engage with
       Government;

A £7.2 million two to three year Justice Sector Development Programme for
National and Regional Governments was approved by the Secretary of State
for International Development in October 2004. This first phase of UK support
includes rule of law capacity building, police development, human rights
support, UNDP legal sector strategy and co-ordination development, and
funds to support the initial operations of commissions to be set up under the
peace agreement protocols.

In addition we are considering what the UK’s role should be in providing
support to a framework for security sector reform, including oversight,
accountability and linkages between different parts of the sector.

Governance and public administration

The development of a functioning and effective system of public
administration, North and South, will be crucial for building a sustainable
peace. Capacity needs are great, particularly within the South, but
weaknesses are inherent at every level - local, state and regional/national - in
all areas of the country. With other donor partners, we will provide assistance
to planning, start-up activity and institutional strengthening in national/regional
and state administrations and in local government in both North and South.
Initially, we are likely to work in the following areas:

   •   strengthening central management agencies of the GoS Civil Service
       which will become the GNU Civil Service and receive a substantial
       influx of Southern officials;



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   •   building up state administrations where UK support for improved
       service delivery is likely to be concentrated;

   •   funding operational costs and initial capacity building activities in the
       newly created SPLM/GoSS Administration, through the UNICEF
       administered Capacity Building Trust Fund for the South;

   •   financing part of the Local Government Development Programme for
       the South, on which the lead in donor support is being taken by UNDP;

   •   providing support for in-service training – in country and abroad – for
       key officials in government, paying particular attention to gender
       balance and the special development needs of ex-SPLA who will join
       the Southern Administration.

Democracy

Sudan's prospects for successful and sustained pro-poor development will
depend on its capacity to operate political systems which provide
opportunities for all people, including the poor and disadvantaged, to organise
and influence state policy and practice. This has been a significant failure of
the Sudanese state in the past, contributing to the causes of conflict. We will
seek to ensure that the international community works with the Sudanese
people to improve the political systems to realise the aspirations set out in the
peace agreement. Where there are gaps, we will consider whether the UK
can help fill them.

While assessment of needs is at an early stage, two possibilities have already
been identified: pre-election political party strengthening and development
within the print and electronic media.

Objective 4: support development and implementation of policies for
poverty reduction.

To lay sound foundations for poverty reduction will require profound changes
to policy in many key areas: management of the economy, the development
process and the public sector.

Macroeconomic management

There will be new macroeconomic challenges as the economy is reunified and
the forms in which aid is delivered changes. The Sudanese authorities in
Khartoum have worked well with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
recent years, and the Fund can be expected to support macroeconomic
management effectively. The main challenge will be incorporating the South
and its new government structures into existing macroeconomic management
structures and practices. There are particular challenges on the conduct of
monetary policy, which will arise as the Wealth Sharing protocol is
implemented.



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During 2005, DFID, in liaison with the IMF and World Bank, will explore
whether the Sudan would be willing to participate in the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiati ve process to improve the transparency of management
of revenues from the oil sector. Transparent revenue receipt and use will be
essential in underpinning the Wealth Sharing protocol.

Debt

Resolution of Sudan’s debt problems is an integral part of the process of
normalising relations with the international community, and presents a major
incentive for peace because of the flows of international finance it should
unlock. The UK has agreed to chair a Support Group of key international
creditors and donors to help ensure coordinated action over 5-6 years after a
peace agreement for clearance of debt arrears and subsequent
implementation of debt relief through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) initiative. However, the international community will fi nd it hard to
agree debt relief while there is still conflict in Darfur and establishment of an
effective Support Group will depend upon an improvement in the situation
there.

Throughout 2004 DFID has undertaken informal preparatory activities, but the
intensity of effort will increase once the Support Group has been formally
established. We also intend to provide capacity building support for debt
management to the GoS. This support will focus on the External Debt Unit
within the Central Bank of Sudan but should also include links to the Ministry
of Finance and other ministries over time.

PRSP

International experience suggests that implementation of a sound Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) would help Sudan to make progress
towards the Millennium Development Goals. A sound PRSP process is also
needed to allow IMF and World Bank concessional lending and HIPC debt
relief; and for DFID to move towards a full development partnership with
Sudan. The Sudanese parties have made progress during 2004 in preparing
an interim Poverty Eradication Strategy (PES), and a draft interim PRSP was
prepared earlier, covering the North. A priority after the comprehensive peace
agreement will be to ensure planning for the South is integrated into the
existing work.

DFID may play a leading role in galvanising coordinated donor support for
developing the Sudanese PES, ensuring it draws from relevant experience
elsewhere but also fits with other policy developments in Sudan. Apart from
DFID advisory inputs, we could provide funding, possibly through multi-donor
channels, for consultation processes, technical assistance and building
capacity in government and civil society to understand and manage the PRSP
process.

Joint Assessment Mission



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A Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) was undertaken in 2004 under the
leadership of the World Bank and UN. The JAM attempts to bring together
and prioritise a wide range of needs in reconstruction and development in one
document. There has been strong interest and participation by the Sudanese
parties. The intended outcome of the JAM is a results/action matrix
prioritising needs in the first 2–3 years following a peace agreement across a
range of sectors. If a high-quality, realistic and Sudanese-owned report is
prepared this would allo w donors to coordinate their support within its
framework. The final JAM report will be presented to a planned Donor
Conference in Oslo following the comprehensive peace agreement.

DFID has been a core contributor to the JAM process. We hope that it will
inform both our own sector choices in support of the peace agreement and
how we can work most effectively with others.

Budget Policy and Management

It is important that budget allocations are in line with the policies and that
budget management systems ensure money is effectively spent. In the recent
past, GoS has spent more on defence than social services. Although there
may be modest reductions in defence spending over the medium term as a
result of peace, the main sources of additional finance for delivering services
that benefit poor people is likely to have to be increased international aid
reflected in the budget, as well as better use of domestic revenues. Budgets
that benefit the poor are likely to require a larger share of spending to take
place at the state or sub -state levels of government. Completely new systems
will have to be developed in the South.

DFID strongly promotes the strengthening of government budgetary systems
and, over time, channelling more and more aid directly through them ( s     a
Poverty Reduction Budget Support, PRBS). DFID policies would preclude
PRBS for Sudan at present, given current budgetary allocations and budget
management systems, but DFID should aspire to use PRBS as the instrument
to deliver most of its financial aid to Sudan in the longer term. In countries
where DFID and other donors provide PRBS in the context of long-term
development partnerships, processes have evolved for regular dialogue
between the donor community and the government about policies and
systems for achieving poverty reduction. These dialogue mechanisms have
provided important opportunities for building a common understanding among
donors about how the country is tackling poverty and how donors can best
support these efforts.

We will therefore work where required with both the GoS and the GoSS to
improve public financial management in coordination with the international
financial institutions and other donors. Given the lack of any systems in South
Sudan at present, the new government faces a huge challenge in establishing
appropriate systems. A key challenge for the donor community will be in
ensuring that they work closely together, with common systems and
processes wherever possible. The GoS has committed to converting its



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current budget systems to international standards, and we will seek to support
them in making this transition.

3.4   Future Resources

If peace is achieved and maintained, the UK intends to increase its assistance
for Sudan considerably. The DFID aid framework for Sudan is £94m for
2004/5 (£35m for Sudan, £55.5m for Darfur humanitarian and £3.5m from the
Africa Conflict Prevention Pool). We announced in October 2004 that the UK
would commit £100 million for Sudan next year, providing that a
Comprehensive Peace Agreement is concluded and there is progress in
Darfur. We will also increase our staff resources in the region and aim to
devolve responsibility for the programme to an office in Sudan during 2006.




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Annex 1 – risks to peace and poverty reduction

The table below identifies some of the key risks to reaching a sustained peace
agreement and poverty reduction in Sudan, along with some activities that
Sudan and its partners can undertake to mitigate those risks.

Key Risk             Likeli   Potential      Mitigation Activity
                     hood     Impact
                              (on poverty
                              reduction)
Peace Process and Pre-Interim Period
Peace Agreement           Med- High  Capacity building for peace
signed but not            ium        agreement institutions
implemented (eg                      Maintain international engagement
agreeing a constitution,
forming GNU, establishing
                                     Encourage joint working between
peace agreement                      GoS and GoSS
commissions, setting up
ceasefire monitoring
                                     Coordinated donor response
mechanisms)


Interim Period - Security Transition
Resumption of       Low - High            Peace support operation
SPLA/GoS conflict Med-                    Implementation of commitments
                    ium                   Well-managed demobilisation,
                                          disarmament and reintegration
                                          Properly implement wealth-sharing
                                          agreement
                                          Well-managed military
                                          reorganisation
                                          Peace dividend/ incentives
Regional and          Med-    Medium      Political Inclusion
localised Conflict    ium                 Conflict management
                                          Access to land
                                          Improved policing
                                          Local reconciliation
                                          Peace dividend/ incentives
Interim Period – Political/Legal Transition
No move toward        Low     Medium      Implementation of peace process
political inclusivity                     commitments
                                          Build appropriate legal frameworks
                                          Build political institutions
                                          Policies for poverty reduction
                                          Decentralisation
                                          Democratisation / elections
                                          Enhance media and civil society
No elections after 4 Low      High        Begin preparations in time
years                                     Support preparations
Human Rights          Med-    Medium      Peace support operation/
Violations            ium                 monitoring
                                          Access to justice
                                          Improved policing



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                                          Enhance media and civil society
Interim Period - Socio-Economic Transition
Insufficient funds    Med-   High         Careful macro-economic
for poverty           ium                 management
reduction                                 State capture of oil revenues
                                          Policies for non-oil sector growth
                                          and revenue generation
                                          Clear debt arrears
                                          Mobilise donor funding
                                          Reduce military expenditure
                                          Restructure budget towards poor
Weak poverty          Med-   High         Planning and implementation
reduction policies    ium                 capacity
                                          Policy advice
                                          Sound PRSP process
Weak absorptive       Med-   Medium       Institutional building
capacity              ium
Weak public           Med-   Medium       Country Financial Accountability
expenditure           ium/                assessment
management            High                Follow up action plan
Humanitarian          Med-   Medium       Disaster response/preparedness
disaster (flooding,   ium                 HIV programme
drought, HIV,                             Livelihoods support
disease)
Interim Period - International Intervention
Donor funding not     Med-   Medium       Donor mobilisation for 10 year post
sustained             ium                 conflict plan
Weak coordination High       Medium       Strengthen donor coordination and
and management                            UN/ multilateral mechanisms
of international                          Build capacity in Sudanese
assistance                                administrations for aid
                                          management
Approach that is      Med-   Low/Med- Strengthen government sector
short-term,           ium    ium          planning/coordination capacity
unsustainable and
generates
dependency
Aid reinforces        Med-   Medium       Aid targeted at poorest
structural inequality ium                 Use of analysis of causes of
                                          conflict
                                          Geographical spread




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Annex 2 – Sudan facts at a glance

Geography         The largest country in Africa - 2.5 million sq km (as large
                  as Western Europe). Dominated by the Nile and its
                  tributaries

Climate           Tropical in South; arid desert in North

Borders           Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda,
                  Democratic Republic of Congo, Central Africa Republic
                  and Chad. 853km of coastline to the Red Sea

Natural           Petroleum, agriculture, small reserves of iron ore, copper,
Resources         chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, gold,
                  hydropower

Population        35 million (est. 2004); growing at 2.5% a year

Ethnic Groups     Black African 52%, Arab 39%, Beja 6%, other 3%

Languages         Arabic (official), Nubian, Ta Bedawie, diverse dialects of
                  Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, Sudanic languages, English

Internally        Estimated to be 4 million from the North-South Conflict;
displaced         plus over 1.5 million in Darfur
people
Life expectancy   58.4 years

GNI per capita    US$340

External Debt     US$24bn, 85%of which is in arrears




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Annex 3 – acronyms

AU             African Union
CPMT           Civilian Protection and Monitoring Team
DDR            Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
DFID           Department for International Development
EC             European Commission
EU             European Union
G8             Group of 8
GDP            Gross Domestic Product
GNI            Gross National Income
GNU            Government of National Unity
GoS            Government of Sudan
GoSS           Government of Southern Sudan
HIPC           Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
ICRC           International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs           Internally displaced people
IGAD           Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF            International Monetary Fund
INGOs          International non-governmental organisations
JAM            Joint Assessment Mission
JEM            Justice and Equality Movement
JMM/JMC        Joint Monitoring Mission / Joint Military Commission
JNTT           Joint National Transition Team
OCHA           Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OLS            Operation Lifeline Sudan
PES            Poverty Eradication Strategy
PRBS           Poverty Reduction Budget Support
PRSP           Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SLM/A          Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SPLM/A         Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army
UK             United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN             United Nations
UNDP           United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR          United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF         United Nations Children’s Fund
USA            United States of America
VMT            Verification and Monitoring Team
WFP            World Food Programme
WHO            World Health Organisation




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