I cannot see how to refute the arguments for the subjectivity of ethical values, but I find myself incapable of believing that all that is wrong with wanton cruelty is that I don’t like it. BERTRAND RUSSELL 1st/2nd order scepticism • Russell’s concern regards the possibility of moral argument – 1st order scepticism • 2nd order sceptic: do not take talk/argument about values as something analogous to talk/argument about how the world is. • this is a metaphysical point. values are not part of the fabric of the world E.g. We can: (a) argue about how many people are in the room (b) argue about the colour of my hair (c) argue about whether the Iraq war is just In each case, Mackie encourages us to keep on arguing metaphysics In these cases we are arguing about: (a) the world (b) how the world systematically affects us (c) how the world affects us dependent on various practices/ways of living values are an effect – not ‘in the world’, but ‘in us.’ conditional on standards there are agreed standards for marking philosophy essays - there is a practice of this. • if ‘x is unjust’ is simply true, there is no objective requirement to refrain from doing x. • if this is true, it is so relative to standards • there is choice in standards • that does not mean they are arbitrary. argument from queerness • objective value has to provide to someone who knows it both direction and overriding motive. • ‘an objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it…it has to- be-pursuedness…built into it’ (p.40) • values pull, but the world doesn’t pull!