Beyond Behaviour Based Safety

							Beyond Behaviour Based Safety

Darren Head, Senior Consultant Noel Arnold & Associates, Australia

Abstract

Many organisations have invested heavily in improving their safety performance in the past decade and
significant improvements can be seen.

As companies strive to continuously improve their safety performance from a basic state of compliance, they
often find that safety improvement ‘plateaus’. This can be a source of frustration and disappointment for the
leadership group of any company. In some instances, organisations can be paralysed by the
‘safety/production’ antagonism, where safety is believed to be a cost and obstruction to production.

Behaviour Based Safety (BBS) systems have been used with some success to ‘kick start’ safety performance
through their ‘intuitive’ perspective on the cause of accidents.

However, the process fails to address the complex set of pre cursor conditions that inevitably exist prior to a
worker committing an “unsafe act” and resulting in an accident.

The focus on observing employees and modifying their behaviour via feedback seems to waste an opportunity
for us to learn from our people, listen to the stories that provide evidence of systemic failings and to
demonstrate leadership.

This paper proposes a process that goes beyond simply observing behaviour and is designed to encourage
‘active listening’ and promote safety leadership especially by Managers in the workplace. Using a ‘safety
model’ as a framework, an organisation can explore and understand its risk profile, use safety as a
mechanism to help achieve production objectives and help develop a culture of openness, trust and
mindfulness.

This process is termed ‘Relationship Based Safety’.




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                           1. Introduction

Behaviour Based Safety (BBS) has been an accepted part of modern safety interventions for approximately
20 years. The process is appealing to many organisations as it often serves to confirm their beliefs that
incidents and accidents are the direct result of ‘unsafe acts’ by careless or accident prone people. The BBS
process requires the construction of a list of ‘unsafe’ behaviours for a given situation and this list is used to
observe workers carrying out their tasks in the work place. The observer then provides feedback to the
worker and the theory suggests that providing positive feedback reinforces the desired behaviour and hence
the behaviour will be repeated.

A BBS process may have a role to play (or a variant thereof at the leadership level) in an organisations
attempt to improve safety performance (assuming it has addressed its OHS risks and achieved what is
reasonably practicable to do). However, there are limitations to the process in the short term and the process
itself is limited in its ability to address the causes of high consequence, low probability events.

Many organisations that implement a BBS process (and other interventions’) often hit the 'safety glass
ceiling' and can become frustrated with their efforts to improve their performance.


                                                        Relationship
                                                        Based Safety
Safety performance Level




                                               Smash!


                                                        The safety “glass ceiling”

                                       BBS




                                             Time

Diagram 1 Schematic representation of the concept of the safety ‘glass ceiling’.

An alternative strategy is presented here to improve safety performance and break through the safety glass
ceiling. The strategy (Relationship Based Safety) is focused on the understanding of business objectives, the
inherent operational business OHS risk and importantly, the building of workplace relationships rather than
simply observing behaviours. This strategy aims to contextualise safety and will assist an organisation in
providing it with a framework that is effective at addressing the cause of low probability, high consequence
events and high probability low consequence events. It is also a strategy that will assist in building
relationships in the work place, developing trust and mutual respect and ultimately improving organisational
culture and business performance.

It should be noted that the RBS strategy in no way abrogates the responsibility of Supervisors and Managers
to actively monitor and control workplace activities through regular inspections and audits as would be
expected in any effective OHS management system.

                           2. Background

According to the Macquarie dictionary; behaviour: 'manner of behaving or acting, action or activities of the
individual'.


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Using this definition, BBS (whilst not operating in isolation) presents safety as being based upon behaviour.
There are many other and arguably more important variables as a basis for safety. Current safety legislation
in Australia for example is based on performance (performance based legislation) and is far removed from
the concept of safety based on behaviour. Despite this, there remains a fascinating attraction to the notion of
‘behavioural safety’. It may be as a result of many of us knowing someone who has done something (a
behaviour) that led to an incident or near miss and it therefore provides an opportunity to attribute cause. The
corollary then, stop the behaviour, stop the incident seems to make intuitive sense.

In theory, the idea of a worker providing feedback to a co-worker regarding the use of equipment and/or
following safety rules etc appears an appropriate one. It is possible that in a highly enlightened organisation
(such as those achieving Shells’ “generative” culture, see Diagram 2) may be able to use an ‘observation’
process as a final check to ensure that ‘last line defence processes’ are working effectively. If this process
was initiated between workers in an environment of trust and cooperation, then this could represent an
effective and valuable “mates looking after mates” process. However, this is separate both in theory and
practice from conventional BBS.


 Evolutionary View                                                                         Generative


                                                                           Safety is how we do business around here



               Increasingly                                                 Proactive
                 informed

                                                            We work on the problems that we still find



                                                           Calculative


                                     We have safe systems in place to manage all hazards


                                      Reactive


                    Safety is important, we do a lot every time we
                                  have an accident
                                                                                          Increasing Trust &
                                                                                            Accountability

                   Pathological


      Who cares as long as we are not caught?




Diagram 2 The HSE ‘Culture Ladder’ after Shell, ‘Hearts & Minds’, 2003

The following six concerns need to be considered when an organisation seeks to implement a BBS safety
intervention.

    2.1 The First concern, Causation

The nature of a process that is based upon an individual's behaviour, as if this is a key variable in the
causation of accidents and incidents, should ring alarm bells in the ears of many safety practitioners. One of
the significant outcomes of investigations such as the Longford Royal Commission in to the explosion at the
Esso gas plant in Victoria in 1998 is that we understand more about the complex interrelationships between
contributing factors in major accidents. An organisation needs to ask itself whether it has the essential OHS
processes in place such as Hazard Identification, and Risk Assessment and Control, Incident reporting and
investigation, effective communication processes and comprehensive training.

It is not enough to be concerned with individual behaviours alone.




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     2.2 The Second concern, the word ‘behaviour’

The term 'behaviour' invokes a sense of negativity in many people. If a phone call is received from the school
principal wishing to discuss the behaviour of a child, it is not likely to be a positive discussion. What ever the
historic reasons for this negative word association, we should be aware and cautious of it. Safety needs to be
a positive process about helping people. It is believed that there is already negative public sentiment about
the concept of safety and the use of language that may inflame ill feeling toward the safety process should be
avoided.

     2.3 The Third concern, the erosion of trust

The practice of peers or managers 'observing' others in the work force sets a precedent for the work group.
Australian workers by and large have mistrust for authority and hence managers and even those peers that
have been allocated a position of 'power' (i.e. an observer) may not be trusted. The observation process
implies a lack of 'trust' in a work force by requiring people to observe or watch others. No matter how hard
attempts are made to present the process in a positive light, observing others is a process that does not fit
well with many Australians and as this paper will argue is unnecessary.

Any process that has the potential to damage trust in the work place needs to be carefully considered.

     2.4 The Fourth concern, ‘observe what’?

What is being observed? The 'critical behaviours' that are selected for observation are generally derived from
anecdotal site experience and/or incident reports and there are two problems with incident reports.

1.        In general, work places do not report any where near enough incidents to ensure that a statistically
          significant number of events are received for analysis; and

2.        Those incidents that are reported generally lack quality of investigation. They often fail to identify
          many critical causes and often opt for the obvious factor such as 'worker failed to wear correct PPE'.
          It is likely that the identified causes and hence behaviours in many incident reports may be partial at
          best in explaining the event and may not recognise the significant causes and hence may be
          potentially misleading at worst.

The process of placing credibility on the outcomes of the investigations that are known to be lacking in depth
and sophistication and then selecting the so called 'critical behaviours' is questionable.

     2.5 The ‘trivial many’ or the ‘critical few’?

The many types of behaviours that are commonly under scrutiny within BBS systems are typically activities
such as: looking at where individuals are going, holding on to hand rails when descending/ascending stairs,
putting our selves in the ‘line of fire’ such as walking beneath a suspended load or simply PPE compliance.
These behaviours are often associated with slips and trips, sprains and strains or ‘struck by’ type injuries and
are classified here as the ‘trivial many’.

Another way of considering the ‘trivial many’ versus the ‘critical few’ is to consider incidents in terms of
their probability and consequence.

          Type 1 incidents: High consequence low probability, events such as an explosion in a processing
          plant

          Type 2 Incidents: High consequence and moderate probability. These events would include such
          incidents as a person being struck by a Forklift and fatally injured

          Type 3 Incidents: Low consequence high probability, events such as trips and falls, strains and
          sprains.

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Which are the ones that are important for the organisation to focus on and control?

Generally, the 'low hanging fruit' safety controls are associated with Type 3 incidents. This is not to suggest
that a significant back strain is not a serious and debilitating for the individual and costly for the company,
but multiple fatalities or permanently disabling injuries are far more serious. However, the disproportionate
effort in trying to guard against Type 3 incidents in conventional BBS systems can distract an organisation
from focussing on Type 1 incidents.

       2.6 The Organisational Culture

An organisation needs to understand its level of cultural development. It needs to understand the level of
trust and respect between management and worker, the quality of its leaders and the effectiveness of its
communication and training processes. There has to be a level of “organisational preparedness” to accept a
major change process such as BBS. The process requires major organisational changes to the way employees
interact in the work place. Morgan and Zeffane (2003) discuss the “corrosive” effect of organisational
change on trust and hence organisations attempting to implement a BBS process that do not manage the issue
of ‘change’, may struggle to implement such as process.

       3. Discussion. Beyond BBS and toward RBS

In this section an alternative approach to that of BBS is discussed as a more effective safety intervention that
provides an opportunity for an organisation to address complex incident pre cursor conditions. Relationship
Based Safety (RBS) is structured around communication with the work force rather than observation. This is
achieved by establishing an organisational context for safety and participating in activities that directly
influence the culture of the organisation through active listening. There are 5 steps to the process:

(i)        Having a ‘mental’ model for safety that can be shared with the work force as a basis for
        communication.

(ii)       Understanding the organisational goals and objectives and how safety is part of these goals and
        objectives and sharing these with the work force.

(iii)      Understanding the OHS risk profile of the organisation and the critical processes such as those
        leading to Type 1 incidents and sharing these with the work force.

(iv)        Developing a culture of recording process variances to the norm expectation by all employees.

(v)         Ensuring Managers and Supervisors frequently listen to their people in relation to safety whilst
        actively monitoring activities.

       3.1 A Safety Model

The discussion so far has centred on behaviour. Safety is based on far more than the behaviour of individuals
and so safety efforts need to address the many other factors. In Australian legislation, hazard identification
and risk control are the corner stones of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) in conjunction with effective
communication and training (safe place vs safe person).

The following diagram introduces the five commonly recognised variables (elements) that combine to help
create a 'safe place'.

These are:

        •   people, knowledge, skills

        •   fit for purpose plant, equipment and substance



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     •    appropriate rules and procedures that are understood by all

     •    a well designed and planned work environment and

     •    an organisational commitment and accountability to the use and ongoing improvement of its OHS
          systems and the development of its people.
See Diagram 3 below.


                       Rules &                             Skills & Knowledge
                     Procedures



                         The
                        Safety
                        Space




                                                                        The Organisation



                          Plant &                         Work Environment
                        Equipment




Diagram 3 A conceptual model of how many safety systems elements overlap to create the ‘Safety Space’.
           After Borys, 2004.


Each element of the model affects the organisation’s ability to achieve its defined objectives, goals and
targets. In many significant incident investigations at least one of these elements can be found to be deficient
or failed to some degree.

An understanding of this safety model provides an insight into the weaknesses of a BBS process. By
considering the complexity created by the interaction of these five variables, one can appreciate the
inadequacy of focussing upon an individual's behaviour alone. Failing to manage this complex interaction of
variables, helps explain why organisations often 'hit the safety glass ceiling', See Diagram 1.

    3.2 Understanding the Organisations Goals

There are numerous top 200 ASX companies that make altruistic statements such as 'safety is our number
one priority'. However, no prospectus to date has stated that the aim of this company is to be the safest in the
world! So clearly, these statements can be misleading at best and become a basis of cynicism by the
workforce toward management. Employees understand the importance of production and the delivery of
profit to shareholders. Safety should not be treated as an outcome in its own right, it must be achieved as an
outcome of the business meeting its planned objectives.

Further, people who work for these companies generally understand the organisational goals and objectives
in terms of production and profit. Rather than stating 'safety is our number one priority' companies would
benefit by better communicating their corporate vision and how an employee can contribute to this goal.

Whilst people are concerned about their safety, they are interested in outcomes. It is important that an
organisation contextualises the importance of safety in achieving these outcomes. Safety people can
sometimes become fixated with the concept of ‘safety’ for safety’s sake and fail to appreciate the need of
people to be part of achieving production outcomes. People want to achieve outcomes and they would like to


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do this safely. If an organisation can recognise this and then ‘tap’ into people’s passion and creativity for
achieving outcomes and use safety as the mechanism for this, sustainable improvement is possible

Hopkins (Hopkins 2004) discusses the concept of 'on time running' with respect to the NSW railways.
Railway employees understood that the main objective for the organisation was to ensure that trains arrived
and departed on time. The organisations’ need and preoccupation with achieving 'on time running' flowed
through to individuals and their understanding and commitment to 'on time running' to the organisation
contributed to the failure of many of the OHS system processes. Business outcomes were achieved at the
expense of safety. This is clearly an unacceptable situation; however, the commitment of employees toward
the achievement of ‘on time running’ provides an opportunity for organizations to engage with their people
about safety.

In this paper, I want to use the term 'on time running' (OTR) to refer to the primary business objective of the
company or purpose of the company that most employees would relate to. This may also be referred to as the
‘production imperative’. Whether this is the number of house sales achieved for an estate agent, the number
of trains arriving and leaving on time for the railways, or the number of 'widgets' produced from a production
line. An employees understanding of the organisational goals is essential to enable Managers and
Supervisors to engage and discuss the OTR with them using the safety model as the framework to explore
safety performance and business productivity.

    3.3 Understanding the Organisational OHS Risk Profile

Organizations benefit when considering safety interventions by understanding its OHS risk profile. Processes
such as team based risk assessments and/or Hazops are invaluable in understanding these profiles. The risk
profile enables an organization to understand its hazards, ensure appropriate controls are in place and then
put processes in place to constantly review these controls to ensure their effectiveness. The effective
communication of these controls needs to occur across the organisation and personnel encouraged to record
any variance from the norm of these controls particularly with respect to processes recognized as being
higher risk.

Whilst it may be unrealistic for all employees to understand the risk profile in detail, it is possible for
individuals to have their own safety performance indicators that relate to an item or items from the risk
profile. Implementing specific individual performance measures that relate to the risk profile and their
controls further provides a mechanism for managers to engage with their people about safety.

    3.4 Developing a Culture of Recording Variances to the ‘norm’

This paper suggests that the term ‘recording’ is more inspirational than the traditional term of reporting
(although the process is essentially the same). Reporting is often associated with authority which may
include the legal system, the education system, management or the like and may involve singling out
individuals for penalty. As Reason (1997) states, “There are some powerful disincentives to participating in a
reporting scheme: extra work, scepticism, perhaps a natural desire to forget that the incident ever happened,
and above all lack of trust and with it, the fear of reprisals”. It is suggested here that the inference of a report
to some people may be a negative one. Negative language and perception (as previously stated with respect
to behaviour) should be avoided. The term ‘recording’ can be defined as ‘an account in writing or the process
of preserving the memory or knowledge of facts or events’ (Macquarie Dictionary). Rather than encouraging
personnel to ‘report’ (other than accidents) personnel are encouraged to record variances to expected
outcomes of the process and its controls. Recording can be used as an active performance measure and does
not require the employee to investigate ‘why’ with the potential to incriminate themselves and others, but
rather to ensure that they gather facts and record them.

Organisations need to consider strategies for developing and encouraging a recording culture within the
context of business process and OHS risk (as understood by defining the 'OTR' and developing a risk
profile).



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    3.5 Building Relationships: Stop Observing and Start Listening

Earlier in the paper a comment was made that observations may be unnecessary. Communication is far more
beneficial to the organization. There are normal business processes of meetings and reports for
communication but how can we frequently communicate with people about what they believe are the
important safety issues?

RBS requires senior personnel, managers and supervisors to be seen in the work place every day and to
discuss safety concerns and issues with their people. The sections above discussed the concepts of the OTR
and the safety model to provide a framework and mechanism to engage people in discussion about safety. It
is believed that the organisation benefits by knowing what people are thinking with regard to equipment,
procedures, training and the work environment impacting on the work process. Work groups are intimately
aware of what works and what doesn’t work and experience shows that they often have creative and practical
solutions to offer.

The work place visits also provide an opportunity to discuss information received from the recording of
events and incidents in the workplace and then discussing these. This can be done in conjunction with
activities such as routine inspections and need to be effective to ensure that maximum value is achieved by
the communication opportunity.

The process of listening and seeking input and ideas from the work group by the direct involvement of
management also has the benefit of developing trust in the work place and nurturing relationships.
Developing trust in the work place is critical to organisational performance (Morgan & Zeffane, 2003).
Respect is earned and over time, the culture becomes one of open sharing of knowledge, trust and respect.

    4. Conclusion

Organisations continue to struggle with improving safety performance. Millions of dollars are spent and
significant effort is made sometimes with limited success. Often organizations can 'hit the safety glass
ceiling' and many have turned toward BBS to reinvigorate safety performance.

This paper has argued that observations can be unnecessary and counter productive with their inherent
problems including the reduction of trust in the work place and offering little hope to help manage the
possibility of Type 1 high consequence, low probability events. In addition to regular workplace monitoring
and management activities, it is suggested that RBS provides more productive opportunities to improving
safety where the return on effort is likely to produce sustainable change driven by a fundamentally different
and enlightened process relative to simply observing employee behaviour.

Businesses need to understand that safety efforts are far more effective when understood within the context
of the business goals rather than simply complying with safety initiatives and legislative requirements.

By having cross organisational understanding of the business goals, OHS risks and defining the businesses
OTR factor (or the production imperative), it is possible to engage employee’s passion for achievement,
through a safety framework (model) to effectively achieve the OTR factor.

The process of building relationships (rather than observing employees) and using the framework of safety as
discussed above to create an informed and mindful workplace is a more valuable use of time and resources
for organizations. Relationships within the organisation will develop and improve as the organisation spends
time defining, understanding and communicating their business goals and risk profile and encouraging an
open recording culture that is supported by a program of active listening led by the managers.

References

Borys, D,. (2004) University of Ballarat, Graduate Diploma of OHM, course notes



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Cole, H.P. (2002) Cognitive-Behavioural Approaches to Farm Community Safety Education: A Conceptual
Analysis in, Journal of Agricultural Safety & Health B(2):145-159

Hopkins, A,. (2000) Lessons from Longford, CCH Sydney

Hopkins, A,. (2005) Safety Culture and Risk, CCH, Sydney.

Hopkins, A,. (2006)What are we to make of safe behaviour programs? In Safety Science 44 (2006) 583-597.

Krause, T,. (2005) Leading With Safety, Wiley Interscience.

Macquarie Dictionary

Morgan D. E., Zeffane R., (2003), Employee involvement, organisational change and trust in management,
International Journal of Resource Management, 14:1, February 2003

Reason, J. (1997),Managing the risks of Organisational Accidents, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1

Saksvik, P O, Quinlan, M,.2003,. Regulating Systematic Occupational Health and Safety Management,
Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations, V 58, Issue 1, 2003

Shell  International    Exploration    and    Production        BV,      (2003),‘Hearts       and   minds”
www.energyinst.org.uk/heartsandminds/docs/roadmap.pdf.




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