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					                                  Interview



 Evolution of Business Models in
 B2C E-Commerce: The Case of
 Fabmall
                                        K Kumar and B Mahadevan




T
      he meteoric rise of B2C E-commerce firms          Internet firm into a multi channel retailing
      during the late 90s and the subsequent burst      organisation signals the importance of changing
      ing of the dotcom bubble have left several        the business model in line with market develop-
questions unanswered in the minds of practitio-         ments.
ners about the viability of Internet ventures and
                                                        The experience of Sudhakar and his team in bring-
the need for appropriate business models. What are
                                                        ing about this transition has many distinctive fea-
we to learn from the Internet firms that have sur-
                                                        tures that other organisations could learn from.
vived this transition? What are the transformations
                                                        Having substantial clarity on the role of the
these firms have gone through in their business
                                                        Internet could well be an important element of suc-
model? Professors K Kumar and B Mahadevan dis-
                                                        cess. Further, the ability to select and focus unam-
cuss these issues in conversation with V S
                                                        biguously on customer segments could differenti-
Sudhakar, Managing Director of Fabmall.
                                                        ate an e-tailer and influence several elements of
Fabmart, a pureplay Internet retail platform, was       the business model. A successful business requires
set up in 1999 at the height of the Dotcom boom.        that there is a willingness on the part of the man-
Four years later, the startup transformed itself into   agement to change several operational features of
Fabmall, a multi-channel retail business, with six      the business model from time to time. Moreover
physical stores, and a significant presence in cyber    evolution of business models requires the manage-
space. During the course of the conversation,           ment to be passionate and yet objectively review
Sudhakar shows how the transition of a pureplay         the business assumptions periodically.



IIMB Management Review, December 2003                                                                   23
KK: In entrepreneurial literature, one clear                    ness meant that we could get orders from anywhere
categorisation is between evolutionary and revolu-              in the country. Therefore the competition was any
tionary ventures. A revolutionary venture typically             retailer anywhere in the country.
attempts to change the way the world lives. In my
                                                                Third, we decided to do it category by category, as
opinion Fabmall falls under this category because
                                                                though we were setting up a physical store. We
you are trying to change the way people buy. There
                                                                started with the music store, then we added books.
aren’t many examples of such ventures in India. So
                                                                Later, we decided to do jewellery. It is possibly the
from an entrepreneurial perspective, your busi-
                                                                most difficult product to sell online. The jewellery
ness model is of particular interest. Could you de-
                                                                store did fairly well and we realised the importance
scribe briefly the key principles behind the launch
                                                                of building credibility and trust. The fact that we
of Fabmart in September 1999?
                                                                delivered exactly as promised was something that
VSS: When I was the CEO of Planetasia, in the early             delighted customers.
days of the Internet, we used to
advise corporates on how to lever-                We were clear that Fourth, we were clear that in the first
                                                                                      phase of online business all cus-
age the Internet as a communica- our competition was
                                                                                      tomer orders would be sourced, pro-
tion platform. We built a website for
                                                                                      cessed and shipped by us, not by
Shopper’s Stop and wanted them to not just other online
                                                                                      the vendors. This would enable us
extend it to shopping online; we
were having discussions with
                                                      retailers. Our                  to retain control and guarantee ser-
                                                                                      vice quality to the customer.
Citibank to build an online payment competition was the
gateway . The issue in those days                                                     Finally, we wanted to establish
was, once you built the gateway,                   physical world,                    online retail as a sensible alterna-
who was going to use it? Without                                                      tive to physical retail. We knew that
                                                    because when                      it could never be a 100% replace-
the gateway, transactions through
the Internet would not be possible,                 customers are                     ment because there is an element of
and without transactions, the gate-                                                   criticality about physical retail. In
way did not make much sense. So looking at the value                                  fact I had a simple formula – in any
somebody had to break that chain. proposition it doesn’t online business, I will be able to get
We suggested to Citibank to set up                                                    only x% of all customers. Within that
an e-mall, where all their merchants matter whether they x I will get only y% of their share.
could set up shop and create a                                                        So the product of x and y is ulti-
transaction platform using the gate-
                                                  buy online or in a                  mately the market share that an
way. While they were comfortable                    physical store.                   online business could have. If xy
with the idea of the payment gate-                                                    could grow to about 5-10% in five
w a y, t h e m a l l w a s n o t t h e i r c o r e b u s i n e s s . years, we were talking very big business.
Planetasia, an Internet services company, too was                    BM: How did the customers respond to your ven-
not interested in setting up the mall. Consequently,                 ture initially?
a group of six promoters, five from an IT background,
set up Fabmart as an online retail platform in June                  VSS: Initially we were surprised by the positive
1999. We decided on a few basic parameters of es-                    response from the customers. Perhaps, when we
tablishing the business.                                             started the business, there were practically no ex-
                                                                     pectations on the part of the customers. The mere
First, we decided not to get lost in the Internet tech-              fact that customers were able to order online and
nology: we were very clear that the primary nature                   have it delivered was significant. But this success
of our business was retailing, and the Internet was                  started to build expectations. Customers began to
merely a channel. So from day one we decided to                      expect quicker delivery, wider range, more features
focus on the core success factors of a retail com-                   and so on. I think that was a positive change `– it
pany. The challenges involved in creating a new                      indicated that people can feel secure ordering
channel excited us.                                                  online, and start looking for better features and con-
Second, we were clear that our competition was not                   venience.
just other online retailers. Our competition was the                 BM: Your point about expectations – that good per-
physical world, because when customers are look-                     formances become qualifiers is indeed interesting.
ing at the value proposition that a retailer is offer-               What impact did this have on the business? What
ing, it doesn’t matter whether they buy online or in                 changes did you make in your business operations?
a physical store. Being an Internet based retail busi-


24                                                  Evolution of Business Models in B2C E-Commerce: The Case of Fabmall
VSS: One of the first things we did was a major          BM: What were the distinctive elements in the first
change in the software in September 2000. We             version of your business model? For example, I
realised that, for various reasons, we needed to         remember that you never looked at advertising as
source items from multiple cities. For instance, it is   a revenue stream while at that time it was consid-
better to source Carnatic music from Chennai than        ered as an important revenue stream by most B2C
from Mumbai. So we started shipping out of four          sites.
locations – Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad and
                                                         VSS: Any banner advertisement is typically a link
Mumbai. Moreover, as the business grew, we needed
                                                         to go elsewhere. We were very clear that we would
to source and ship from the closest point to the
                                                         avoid anything that drew the customer away from
customer. This required major changes in the soft-
                                                         the store. Secondly we were also clear that we would
ware and we ended up building a strong supply
                                                         like a customer to come only to shop – or to win-
chain focus into the solution itself.
                                                         dow shop.
With the new MLMP (multi-location, multiple-pay-
                                                      There are two distinct segments in online shopping;
ment) feature built into the software, we added suf-
                                                      one focusses on the serious shopper and the other
ficient flexibility for payment and customer service
                                                      on impulsive buyers. A portal like Indiatimes or
in several locations. We improvised as we went
                                                      Rediff is in the business of offering people differ-
along, adding features when we faced problems. In
                                                      ent activities such as mail services, news, chat and
this process, we were constantly
                                                                        shopping, converting all of them
striking the right trade-off between     We were clear from into revenue. We were clear from
the features and the software com-
plexity in order to ensure reliability the beginning that we
                                                                        the beginning that we were not a
                                                                        portal. What happens there is an
of the software.                           were not a portal. impulse driven buying model.
The second major change was the What happens there
                                                                        Ours is a need driven buying model.
introduction of grocery, where ide-
                                                                        It was a tricky call because clearly
ally orders have to be shipped the is an impulse driven
                                                                        the number of visits generated
same day. One way of achieving this          buying model.              would come down substantially in
is to stock the goods yourself, and
                                                                        a need driven buying model. But we
the second is to work off the pre- Ours is a need driven
                                                                        decided that it was hopefully a
mises of a retailer (the Tesco model). buying model. It was
                                                                        surer path and would clarify our
We chose the latter model. Working
on a partnership basis provided new
                                                                                     in the minds
                                         a tricky call but we positioning have seen it of the cus-
                                                                        tomer. We                 evolve in
learning opportunities for us and it
initially worked well. We started
                                        decided that it was a the last three years. Today if you
                                                                        look at Indiatimes or Rediff, per-
with Bangalore, then added Chennai surer path and would
                                                                        haps 70-80% of the business comes
and later Hyderabad. By this time
the Bangalore business had grown
                                       clarify our positioning from 30-50 impulse driven products.
to about Rs 7 lakhs (Rs 70,000) per
                                                                                the
                                         in the minds of the Whilelowernumber case,visitors is
                                                                        much          in our
                                                                                              of
                                                                                                   our aver-
month of sales out of a partner
whose business from the retail store
                                                customer.               age order value is much higher,
                                                                        with a much larger range. Moreover,
was about Rs 14-15 lakhs (Rs 1.4 - 1.5 million). As a
                                                      repeat purchase is also much higher.
result, the service quality and stocking levels
dropped and space constraints became evident. For     BM: This is very interesting. I think you have ac-
the partner it was a question of focus. If he contin- tually replicated a B2B model. In B2B a visitor does
ued to give us space, his business stood to suffer.   not browse a site the second time unless he is a
Moreover, these were individual retailers for whom    serious customer.
working capital was an issue.
                                                      VSS: Basically, we believe in depth. We don’t want
The other alternative was to look for multiple part-  to have ten of this and thirty of that. We decided
ners within a city, who were forward looking and      that in any particular category, our online store must
had good systems – a difficult proposition. So we     compare favourably with a physical store. Although
decided to have our own warehouse in Bangalore.       we couldn’t build a range as huge as Amazon.com’s,
It was a huge change for us because for the first     if we had access to the inventory of ten physical
time we actually had to buy, stock and do the entire  stores, we could be bigger than any single physical
inventory management for our business.                store. In the category of books that we sell for



IIMB Management Review, December 2003                                                                    25
instance, we carry 2.5 million titles of which around     outsourcing. This reduces the size of the
750,000 are available on any given day. This is far       organisation and increases the time available for
greater depth for a reader than any other retailer        market development, customer relations etc. For
selling books.                                            instance, in Planetasia about 40% of my time was
                                                          spent on people management, but in the first year
KK: On the subject of grocery, you mentioned that
                                                          of Fabmart, this took less than 10%.
before you decided to set up your own warehouses,
you had tied up with individual supermarkets. Did          BM: Your transformation seems to signal that
you consider looking at a more resourceful chain          brick and mortar aspects are important components
than individual stores?                                   of a business model. What exactly triggered this
                                                          move?
VSS: In 2000 there were not many grocery chains
in India. We spoke to Foodworld and later to Nilgiris  VSS: By the end of 2001 we realised that interna-
in Bangalore. But Foodworld had ideas of starting      tional retailers were embracing the concept of multi
their own online grocery. While Nilgiris initially     channel retailing. We also realised that in order to
appeared keen, they could not move forward on this     build a retail brand we needed to access the cus-
initiative for various internal reasons. So we had     tomer in multiple ways. Two of our colleagues came
no choice but to set up our own. We decided to go      from a physical retail background and had consid-
in for a warehouse rather than setting up a physical   erable experience with franchising, having worked
store. Initially, we switched over to                                    for Disney. They believed that our
the warehouse model in Bangalore, By the end of 2001 we strong focus on customer service
but continued with our Chennai and                                       could be leveraged gainfully by
Hyderabad partnerships. Later on              realised that              engaging in physical retail chains
we realised there was a consistent                                       as well.
pattern of partnership limitations international retailers
                                                                         BM:      What are the key elements
once we hit a business of Rs 7 lakhs
(Rs 70,000) per month.                  were embracing the of this transformation to a multi-
                                                                         channel operation? Why did you not
BM: When you started Fabmart in            concept of multi              have the same range of products in
1999 (with grocery added in 2000),                                       your brick and mortar setup as
there was enough experience from channel retailing. We well?
alternative models such as
Netgrocer, Webvan and Tesco. Go- also realised that in
                                                                         VSS: In order to make this trans-
                                                                         formation, we had to make two
ing by the processes you described
earlier, you seem to have reinvented
                                       order to build a retail choices: the mode of physical op-
                                                                         eration and the product category.
the wheel. What were the business brand we needed to
                                                                         Between investing in a physical re-
considerations that made it inevi-
                                                                         tail chain of our own and doing it
table? Were there other contextual access the customer
                                                                         on a franchise mode, we were in
reasons?
                                                                         favour of the latter at that point.
VSS: Tesco had not really come up         in multiple ways.
                                                                         Secondly, we had to choose our
into the public eye then – it caught
                                                                         product category. When we did an
public attention as a success story
                                                       analysis to understand what was needed to suc-
sometime during 2001. Early to middle 2000 were
                                                       ceed in each category, we realised that, except for
the days of Webvan, and what really proved to be
                                                       grocery, the products that we were selling online
disastrous to Webvan was a billion dollar invest-
                                                       required specialised knowledge of what to stock and
ment in a warehouse. So we believed that the key
                                                       how much. In apparel or jewellery you needed to
differentiator of the online models was avoidance
                                                       understand the trends in fashion, in books you had
of stocking and inventory management. The beauty
                                                       to estimate the volume of sale of each title, whereas
of this model is that it enables a strong outward
                                                       the grocery business is not subject to such signifi-
business focus – in the first eight to nine months
                                                       cant swings. By and large, what matters is building
of Fabmart, most of our time was spent on customer
                                                       technology to efficiently move your goods across
issues, attending to customer requests and so on,
                                                       the supply chain. In this sense, it is far more tech-
and not on internal issues like inventory manage-
                                                       nology-driven than merchandising skill-driven.
ment.
                                                       Moreover, by then we also had some experience in
Another factor, which I still believe is very critical
                                                       the field, with the online grocery business and the
especially for start-ups, is a significant degree of


26                                             Evolution of Business Models in B2C E-Commerce: The Case of Fabmall
warehouse. We had the necessary merchandising                namics of cost and operations are different for
skills—buying, managing supplies, warehousing                online and physical. So even if the brand, the man-
and stock taking—and infrastructure in place, and            agement and the commitment to the customer are
had developed systems and relationships with sup-            the same, the pricing could be different.
pliers. In our online business we were able to turn
                                                        One characteristic of the online business is that
over our inventory 15-16 times a year, which was
                                                        interaction with the customer is significant com-
better than most other retail stores. The only thing
                                                        pared to the physical store, which comes as a sur-
we needed to learn was how to sell in the physical
                                                        prise to most people. Similarly, though popular per-
store. So if we were going into physical retail, the
                                                        ception is otherwise, I believe there is a strong
obvious choice was grocery.
                                                        brand loyalty in the grocery business. If your qual-
KK: What are the advantages of a                                        ity, your range of products and pric-
franchisee mode of operation in            The dynamics of cost ing are within the parameters of
your business?
                                            and operations are what the customer is used to and
                                                                        what the competition is offering
VSS: The big advantage of a fran-
chise network is that you can scale
                                            different for online there is no real reason for the cus-
up investment substantially. Your          and physical. Even if tomer to shift. Although the com-
                                                                        petitor is just a click away, the cus-
investment into the stores comes               the brand, the           tomer will certainly check, but con-
from multiple people. Another criti-
cal difference is having an owner          management and the tinue to stay unless there is a huge
                                                                        disparity in the price.
sitting in the store, rather than an        commitment to the
employee. However, the difficulty                                            KK:      You seem to be investing
initially lay in finding the right kind
                                              customer are the               considerably less in the second
of franchisees and convincing                same, the pricing               phase, where you are building in-
them. It was difficult because we            could be different.             ventory, stores and physical infra-
had nothing to show except the                                               structure. How does that match with
online business, the warehouse and              In the online                the overall plan?
h o w w e m o v e d t h e s t o c k . We   business, interaction              VSS:     We have the legacy of a
gradually got them interested and
set up two stores in Bangalore.
                                            with the customer is              strong brand, which we are carry-
                                           significant compared               ing forward, so we are not spending
By this time, we realised that the                                            significantly on brand building. Our
physical grocery business was go-          to the physical store.             brand value and our good track
ing to be massive, and if you could                                           record ensure that our business
make it to the top ten grocery retailers in India, you       partners are willing to work with us. The going will
could get significant volumes and make profits even          be tough but challenging because the focus is to
though the margins in retail are low. Everything             see how to get the business cash positive and still
depends on how well you control your costs and               invest in growth. Our creativity will obviously be
how efficiently you move the merchandise across              put to test in newer and alternative areas. We have
the supply chain.                                            now focussed on the operating cost at a line item
                                                             level, which has brought in a significant budgeting
KK: You have two businesses under one banner:
                                                             focus. The budgeting is now done at a micro level.
online and offline. How do you manage both
                                                             Gross margin is a key focus area, far more critical
simultanously? What issues crop up in such a
                                                             than the top line. Today people at every level of the
multi-channel operation?
                                                             organisation are involved with the budget at the
VSS: By the end of 2002 we actually started look-            line item, expense level. They don’t talk top line,
ing at these two stores as two businesses within             they talk only bottom line.
the legal entity called Fabmall. In fact, in terms of
                                                             As far as the physical business is concerned, we
people, I am possibly the only common link between
                                                             are driving it through the franchisee route, with the
the two businesses today. At some point we may
                                                             store investments coming through the franchisees.
even look at splitting it into two separate
                                                             The inventory is the only investment we have and
organisations. Of course, we believe that the brand
                                                             the focus is on managing it well using technology.
name is very critical irrespective of whether they
                                                             We have four big stores and two small stores where
are two organisations or one, but I think we are yet
                                                             we do about Rs 1.2 crores (Rs 12 million) worth of
to exploit the synergy between the two. The dy-
                                                             business per month. We run on a total inventory


IIMB Management Review, December 2003                                                                         27
base of about Rs 75 lakhs (Rs 7.5 million). So we are      certain at some stages. It was a tough period for us.
able to leverage it reasonably well and we are             At various points we kept asking ourselves what
stretching the money to go much farther.                   we were willing to live with, and what we were will-
                                                           ing to give away. Moreover, we made the transition
BM: So, in the first version of the business model
                                                           despite being close to break point many times, which
the emphasis is on customer acquisition and trust
                                                           itself was a big thing. Many companies would have
building, and in the second version, you seem to be
                                                           succumbed at that stage. We did it with our busi-
looking at costs and bottom lines and making them
                                                           ness, our people and our vision intact.
more viable . . .
                                                          BM: Many B2C sites continue to have serious
VSS: I agree. The focus is on leveraging the brand
                                                                           fulfilment problems. How important
value built in the first phase of the
business and scaling it in the sec-
                                            A critical thing is that is fulfilment in a B2C online busi-
                                                                           ness?
ond phase.                                     we have trusted
                                                                           VSS: Fulfilment, support and genu-
BM: With 50% of the total turn- people and that has
                                                                           inely caring customer service are
over now expected from the physi-
cal infrastructure, how will you le-          paid off. When we very important. One of the biggest
                                                                           lessons we have learnt is that, how-
verage the online strengths in the               offered a no-             ever difficult it is, you stretch your
offline version of your business?
                                              questions-asked              last muscle to get the fulfilment
VSS: To b e g i n w i t h , o u r t r a c k                                right—as close to 100% correct as
record gives us the strength to look return guarantee on possible! Only then can you keep
into the second phase of the busi-           all goods including customers happy. I think we have
ness. If the first phase of the busi-                                      survived primarily because of our
ness had not existed it would pos- jewellery, people told efforts in that direction.
sibly not have been easy for us to            us we were being Another critical thing is that we
do what we are doing now. As I said
                                                                           have trusted people and that has
earlier, there is significant focus on foolish. But wherever
                                                                           paid off. For instance, when we of-
the viability of the business. We
were always careful with money,
                                            we have had returns fered a no-questions-asked return
                                                                           guarantee on all goods including
even in the dotcom boom days, but it has always been for
                                                                           jewellery, people told us we were
there is a huge difference between
being careful with your money and
                                                a good reason.             being foolish. But wherever we have
                                                                           had returns it has always been for a
creating a strong bottomline focus. Creating a vi-
                                                          good reason and most of the time they have taken a
able business is not easy, since we are still to reach
                                                          replacement rather than cash. Our return rate is ex-
critical mass. We have gained significant learning
                                                          tremely low. This I think also reflects the kind of
and maturity from the first phase, which is driving
                                                          customers we have–serious shoppers, not impulse
the second phase.
                                                          buyers.
From the merchandising perspective, we are no
                                                          BM: Your observations on the customer segments
longer seen as a predominantly IT oriented team.
                                                          in B2C are indeed interesting. It appears that dif-
Our retailing skills are not questioned now. A lot of
                                                          ferentiating and clarifying the target customer
the learning on customer service applies to the
                                                          segments can make a significant difference to the
physical business as well. From a technology point
                                                          success of the business.
of view too, the learning of the first three and a half
years is definitely useful.                               VSS: I agree. In the first phase of our business, we
                                                          focussed only on serious shoppers. We are now
BM: Changing the focus of the business, getting
                                                          trying to leverage impulse business that can both
a new set of investors on board and parting amica-
                                                          serve to introduce the brand, and build volumes
bly with your existing investors can be turbulent
                                                          and margins on the same platform. We are in the
events in the life of any company. But the way you
                                                          process of coming to a mutually beneficial arrange-
have described it, it all seems to have gone smoothly.
                                                          ment with MSN India. So far, MSN India has stayed
Can you tell us how all these fell into place?
                                                          away from shopping because they wanted to either
VSS: There are two parts to it. The last transition       do it well or not at all. If MSN brings traffic to the
was somewhat turbulent. There were no battles, but        impulse driven business, and we are able to induce
it was high pressure, with the outcome being un-          at least 20% of the traffic to move to serious



28                                              Evolution of Business Models in B2C E-Commerce: The Case of Fabmall
buying at a later point, we will be on to a good            deliberate strategy on his part to make investments
thing.                                                      dry up and discourage competition. Today, he is
                                                            the king, the game is over. The entry barriers are so
BM: That probably also signals the credibility and
                                                            high that nobody can get in and he is laughing all
positioning you have reached for MSN to enter into
                                                            the way to the bank.
such an agreement with you... How did you shut off
some of the revenue streams, which are tempting             BM: How does an entrepreneur sense when it is
to a new Internet pureplay firm? What were the              time for the next edition of the business model?
implications of your decisions, with regard to VC
                                                            VSS: I see a business model essentially as a route
funding, considering that in the initial stages,
                                                            to a goal. If you have stuck to your goal and your
money is the life-blood of a B2C venture?
                                                            path for some time and you do not see the results,
VSS: You have to be clear about who you are. We             it’s time for you to check whether your goal and
were very clear with our VCs from day one that our          your path are right. If you have realised that your
core interest was in retailing, using Internet as the       goal itself is wrong it is critical to be able to ac-
platform, and therefore we would not engage in              knowledge it unemotionally and move on. The key
anything that would take us away from our core              is for an entrepreneur to be able to be passionate
interest. So we never had too much pressure from            about a business and still be unattached to the ex-
them about advertisements or other revenue                  tent of taking a tough call if it needs to be taken.
streams.
                                                            We have been reviewing our business dispassion-
KK: What other mistakes do people often commit              ately to see whether it will be profitable in the long
when they start an Internet retailing venture?              term, whether we have the sustenance to reach criti-
                                                            cal mass and what we need to create that suste-
VSS: An Internet business requires significant and
                                                            nance. I am sure that if at some point we believed
sustained investment till you reach critical mass,
                                                            that it was not viable, we would have taken a tough
after which it will hopefully become a very profit-
                                                            call. Fortunately, we have passed this phase and
able business. Unfortunately, people did not realise
                                                            we now are within striking distance of making the
this in the early days. They assumed that anybody
                                                            business break even. For us it is always passion
with some amount of Internet knowledge and tech-
                                                            guided by objectivity. We are willing to relook at
nology experience could get into Internet retailing.
                                                            the goal and the path every six months and take
But it requires a lot of investment to build a brand,
                                                            calls as necessary.
relationships, logistic networks, and the stability
required on an ongoing basis. Amazon.com is a clas-         Our current business plan is like straddling two
sic case, a success story. They continue to invest          horses—one which can give us a short term boost
into acquiring customers even today, when they              both in terms of volumes and profitability, and the
could be a very profitable company without that             other which is going to be a long distance runner,
acquisition investment. Bezos took big risks. I used        which can become very profitable. In the online
to keep wondering why he wasn’t showing profits             business, the problem really is that profitability may
in the year 2000, when the company could have cut           still be two or three years away. But we believe that
back on the investment into customer acquisition            if we stay on, fight this battle, keep a strong
and declared profits. On hindsight may be it was a          bottomline focus, find creative ways of taking this


                                     Online and Physical Retail: Some Facts
 Fabmall today has two businesses – online and physical retail. The online business is expected to grow from
 transaction volumes of Rs 7.5 mn per month to a volume of Rs 20 mn per month in 18 months. At this level, it will
 generate a profit before tax of Rs 1 mn per month. As the volumes scale further, the expenses will not scale at
 the same level and therefore the profit margin on sales will grow at a much faster pace.
 The physical retail will grow exponentially. From revenues of Rs 4 mn per month in April 2003, it is already at Rs
 15 mn per month in November 2003 – a sales growth of 250% in seven months! The explosive pace of growth is
 expected to continue at least for the next three years. Beyond a critical mass, the profit margin on sales will
 probably settle at 3-4% of sales and may not rise with further sales.
 The two businesses fulfil two business needs – one can scale significantly and while the profit margin will not
 grow, the absolute profits can explode. The other business may not become a huge business but as the
 volumes grow, the profits can grow asymmetrically. It is important to understand the needs of each business
 and fuel its growth.



IIMB Management Review, December 2003                                                                           29
business forward and get to the critical mass, like        hypermarkets like Giant which are coming up and
Amazon has done, then it will be an extremely prof-        you also have new format kiranas like Subeeksha
itable business. Meanwhile with the new physical           in Chennai — and there are other supermarkets like
presence, we are getting the benefit of higher vol-        ourselves. I don’t think that value propositions from
umes and a short term boost.                               the different format of retailing have got frozen in
                                                           the minds of customers as yet. So in the next two
KK: So, in your assessment, for the pureplay
                                                           years there is going to be a huge power play be-
online business to reach a stage of viability, it will
                                                           tween all these entities and formats.
take some time. In the meanwhile, to ensure prof-
itability, you have shifted to the hybrid model.           Regarding the online business, there are two cus-
                                                           tomer profiles that are evolving – the serious cus-
VSS: That’s partly true. The multi-channel retail-
                                                           tomer and the impulse customer. With the serious
ing model also makes sense because it gives the
                                                           customer, I don’t think we have any real competi-
customer the option to buy whenever and wher-
                                                           tion today. Whereas with the impulse customer,
ever he wants, and is therefore more likely to suc-
                                                           there is Indiatimes, and to a lesser extent Rediff.
ceed. We believe that there is a synergy between
                                                           We have realised that the community of impulse
the two.
                                                           customers also needs to be courted, which is the
KK: Clearly there are two strategies for multi-            reason for our alliance with MSN. Moreover, even
channel offering. You may start in a pureplay              though you dispense with customer acquisition
Internet form and then add the physical channels,          spend, you still need to be visible to your existing
or you may start off as a physical player and then         customers through modes other than your email
go online. What are the pros and cons of these two         newsletters for them to remember you.
approaches?
                                                           KK: That would be a significant change in think-
VSS: In terms of focus from the management, if it          ing between 1999 and now.
goes from the Internet to the physical, there will be
                                                           VSS: Yes. For instance, the way you do merchan-
focus on both, whereas when it moves the other
                                                           dising for the impulse category is different. The
way, most likely the Internet will be inadequately
                                                           class of vendors you go to is different. In fact we
focussed. When a physical retailer moves to the
                                                           are planning to dedicate one person to merchan-
Internet, the Internet often never gets the respect,
                                                           dise for the impulse shelf, because the way you
the energy and the time that it deserves. In order to
                                                           think has to be different. But here we have to guard
succeed in it, the CEO should see the Internet as an
                                                           against inferior quality. Sometimes, the serious
integral part of the business. If you are already in-
                                                           shopper too can be impulse driven and we have to
volved in the business on the Internet, and if the
                                                           have products which straddle both.
physical channel promises larger volumes, there is
a greater chance that you would focus on that as           In conclusion, I must say that between running an
well. Moreover, there are fewer chances of channel         IT business and being a retailer, retailing is more
conflict if the transition is from the Internet to the     exciting and much more fun. It is tough, it is chal-
physical. The other way round, with the price dif-         lenging, but one thing I can say is that it is never
ferentials, the chances are that the Internet would        boring!
be viewed as a competing channel.
KK: Businesses always look at benchmarks in
their desire to be on the top. So who is your com-           K Kumar is Visiting Faculty, Corporate Strategy
petitor now, given this transition from online to            and Policy, IIM Bangalore. kumark@iimb.ernet.in
hybrid?
VSS: Today we have two businesses. So we have
to benchmark against competition in both of them.            B Mahadevan is Professor, Production and Op-
In the physical retail business, in grocery, our prime       erations Management, IIM Bangalore and Chief
competitor is FoodWorld – they are the largest and           Editor, IIMB Management Review.
the oldest and have definitely done a good job of            mahadev@iimb.ernet.in
building from scratch. There are the new
                                                           Reprint No 03403




30                                              Evolution of Business Models in B2C E-Commerce: The Case of Fabmall

				
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