Land Rental Markets in the Process of Structural Transformation by eddie22

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									Land Rental Markets in the Process of Structural Transformation: Productivity and Equity Impacts in China

Songqing Jin and Klaus Deininger World Bank

Outline
• • • • • • Background Key Questions Conceptual Framework & Hypotheses Data and Methodology Main Results Conclusions

Motivation
• Past studies have focused on the efficiency nature of alternative rental contracts taking the decision to rent as given, often under the environment of multiple market imperfections and (at least implicitly) an unequal ownership distribution of land. • With economic environment changes (i.e., rural non-farm opportunities), there is increasing potential for efficiencyenhancing rental even in a rural economy with equal land distribution. (In china, share of migrants 5% in 1988, 10% in 1998, 17% in 2000 - 124.6 million internal migrants). • Productivity impact was not well measured in the past studies mainly due to data availability. Data from both parties of rental transaction allow us to explicitly measure such impacts.

Key Questions
• How do non-farm employment opportunities affect rental markets? • Do land rental markets help reduce poverty and increase productivity? • Does the current rental markets realize their full potential? • What are the key factors prevent rental markets from performing at their full potential?

Model Setup
 Household is endowed with fixed amount of

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labor (Li) and land (Ai), and an exogenous level of agricultural ability (i) Household divide its own labor endowment between farm work and off-farm wage employment No farm labor market, renting of land incurs transaction costs 3 sources of income: agricultural production, wage income and rental income. Households maximize total income by optimizing labor allocation and choosing optimal operated land size through land rental markets

Conceptual framework
Max li,a , li,o , Ai
FOC

pf (i , li,a , Ai )  wli ,o  I in [( Ai  Ai )(r  TCin )]  I out [( A  Ai )(r  TC out )]

pf li ,a ( i , li ,a , Ai )  w
pf Ai (i , li,a , Ai )  r  TC
in

For tenants: For Landlord: For Autarkic household:

pfAi (i , li,a , Ai )  r  TC

out
in

r  TC

out

 pf Ai (i , li,a , Ai )  r  TC

Propositions
• Rental markets transfer land to “land-poor but efficient” producers. • Increase in transaction cost will expand the autarky range, thus reducing the number of producers participating in rental markets. • Increases of off-farm employment wage will increase total rental supply and lower equilibrium rental rate.

Innovations in estimation
• Analytically, we use data collected from both parties to test the predicted impacts of rental markets • Econometrically, we use an ordered probit model (OPM) to test the propositions derived from the model • Agricultural ability is explicitly included in regression • Transaction costs enter into threshold equations

Data sources
 A sub-sample of NBS’ regular consumption
survey
 8000 panel households, 800 villages, 9 provinces, 2002 to 2004  Detailed info on demography, assets, income, expenditure, agricultural production and rental participation.

 A follow up survey administered to those who
were actually involved in land transactions
 detailed info. on contract arrangement, net revenue obtained
from the land before/after transfer, occupation status and income level for both parties involved.

 A 2003 Village Survey

 Migration, Village income, land endowment, share of households
with land certificate, land policy arrangements such as land use regulation and restrictions.

Table 1. Descriptive Evidence
All Renting in Households renting in (%) Renting in from relative (%) Share with contract (%) Renting out Households renting out (%) Renting out to relative (%) Share with contract (%) Assets and income Owned land per capita Gini coefficient of land p.c. Per capita income (Y) of which from agri. (%) of which from migration/transfer (%) Village char. & land policy Share of members migrating (%) % migrating out of province Have land certificate (%) Renting to outsiders not allowed (%) Uncultivated land taken away (%) N&NE Coastal Centre SW

13.49 39.32 59.44 9.81 31.04 59.29 1.68 0.42 2983 58.38 15.70 17.83 39.61 81.16 13.53 9.74

10.72 58.59 37.84 6.15 55.81 22.73 2.30 0.44 3022 60.91 9.97 10.05 27.27 73.92 16.60 9.08

8.43 25.86 57.08 10.76 24.29 50.00 1.49 0.41 4184 49.42 13.59 17.07 17.60 83.05 25.74 15.72

20.50 35.08 66.50 13.68 23.18 75.00 1.42 0.36 2677 57.59 22.42 24.85 61.08 81.33 6.90 10.22

14.55 54.43 55.70 10.53 64.58 47.92 1.13 0.33 2158 63.43 18.42 22.03 51.03 92.02 4.83 4.09

Descriptive Evidence
 Rapid emergence of rental markets
• 13% (10%) rented in (out), with great variation
across regions

 Migration most active in centre and SW
where rental markets tend to be most active as well  Explicit and implicit rental restrictions still in place

Table 2: Household characteristics by rental status
Rent-in Household characteristics Owned land per capita Household size Members 15-60 years old Head’s age Head with secondary education. (%) Head with high school education. (%) Agricultural Ability Assets and income Value of total assets (Yuan) Per capital net income (Yuan) Share of income from agriculture (%) Share of inc. from wage (%) Share of inc. from migration (%) Share of inc. non-farm self emp.(%) 1.47 4.02 3.06 45.82 50.09 16.47 0.049 24,039 2734.14 64.73 7.31 18.78 9.17 Type of household Autarkic Rent-out 1.67 3.94 2.99 46.62 52.88 18.74 -0.016 27,417 3003.06 61.00 11.85 17.98 9.17 2.10 3.87 2.90 47.11 48.62 17.21 -0.007 29,467 3168.60 53.06 12.29 23.65 11.01

Characteristics by rental status?
 More land less labor rent out, less land
and more labor rent in  Poor (income/asset) rent in, rich rent out  More productive households rent in  higher share of income from non-farm (i.e., higher in all categories of migration, local wages and self-employment) rent out

Table 3: Productivity gains from land rental
All Tenants’ assessment Profit before transfer (Y/mu) Profit after transfer (Y/mu) Productivity gain (Y/mu) Productivity gain (%) of which to tenant (%) of which to owner (%) Land owners’ assessment Profit by owner b.f. transfer(Y/mu) Profit after transfer (Y/mu) Productivity increase (Y/mu) Productivity gain (%) of which to tenant (%) of which to owner (%) 317.65 584.74 267.09 84.08 65.33 34.67 N&NE 257.07 710.8 453.73 176.51 71.76 28.24 Coast 430.00 793.29 363.29 84.49 57.23 42.58 Central 302.31 530.29 227.98 75.41 68.75 31.25 SW 274.95 399.01 124.06 45.12 54.85 45.15

340.93 623.9 282.97 83.00 65.46 34.47

184.31 593.55 409.24 222.04 76.46 24.12

434.03 770.21 336.18 77.46 58.28 41.42

324.59 566.87 242.28 74.64 69.22 30.64

285.81 486.4 200.59 70.18 59.58 40.42

Table 5: Main income source of lease-out households before and after transfer Before Agric. production Local non-farm Migration Total After Agric. production Local non-farm Migration Total

15.91% 8.32% 32.91% 57.14%

0.63% 19.80% 2.62% 23.06%

0.18% 0.45% 19.17% 19.80%

16.73% 28.57% 54.70% 100.00%

Analytical results: productivity and structure impact
 Significant improvement in productivity (figures from
tenants and landlords are surprisingly consistent) • Gain 267 and 283 Y/mu, accounting for >80% net revenue increase, and 55% gain after overall productivity gain are controlled for, 2/3 of total gains to tenants and 1/3 to landlords Rental markets bring about considerable occupation shift • Vast majority of landlords (57%) derived main income from agri, followed by local non-farm (23%) and migration (20%) before renting out • only 17% relied on agriculture for main source of income, 55% derived main income from migration and 29% from local non-farm after renting out

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Table 6: Per capita net income of lease-out households before and after transfer Before After <1500 Y 1500-3000 Y 3000-5000 Y >5000 Y Total <1500 Y 1500-3000 Y 3000-5000 Y >5000 Y Total

9.84% 17.42% 1.81% 1.08% 30.14%

0.63% 24.82% 15.97% 1.99% 43.41%

0.09% 0.09% 12.82% 6.95% 19.95%

0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 6.41% 6.50%

10.56% 42.33% 30.69% 16.43% 100.00%

Table 7: Per capita net income of lease-in households before and after transfer Before After <1500 Y 1500-3000 Y 3000-5000 Y >5000 Y Total <1500 Y 1500-3000 Y 3000-5000 Y >5000 Y Total

10.57% 10.34% 0.00% 0.00% 20.92%

0.00% 36.78% 15.17% 0.00% 51.95%

0.00% 0.69% 17.01% 4.60% 22.30%

0.00% 0.00% 0.69% 4.14% 4.83%

10.57% 47.82% 32.87% 8.74% 100.00%

Analytical results: welfare impact

 Significant welfare improvement to both
parties: • 45% of landlords moved up their income level
by at least one category, 54% remained in the same category and only 1% moved down. Share of households in the bottom income group dropped by 20 percentage points from 30% to 10% after renting out. Although 2/3 of tenants remained in the same income category, 1/3 moved up and only 1% moved down. The share in the poorest group declined from 21% to 10%

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Table 8. Actual & perceived constraints to rental All N&NE Coast Central Tenants rationed in the past (%) Owners rationed in the past (%) 39.02 51.32 12.24 8.33 36.20 7.33 36.20 19.73 91.93 96.43 35.92 15.63 40.99 24.74 75.38 61.06

SW 33.67 15.24 35.71 25.00 76.25 92.59

Tenants having doubts about future (%) 44.54 65.79 Owners having doubts about future (%) 22.98 20.72 Tenants: RLCL improved market func. Owners: RLCL improved market func. 81.34 83.96 81.44 89.74

Table 4: Gains from land rental by transaction partner Renting out to Relative Non-relative Share of transactions (%) Profit after transfer (Y/mu) Profit before transfer (Y/mu) Net gain (Y/mu) Net gain to tenants (Y/mu) Net gain to owners (Y/mu) % of benefit to tenants % of benefit to owners 31.04 512.08 326.25 185.83 128.27 57.56 69.03 30.97 69.96 685.99 347.60 339.99 223.99 115.53 65.88 34.12

Analytical Results: Remaining Constraints
 40% demand-constrained, and 12% wanted to 
supply more in the past 45% (or 23%) not confident about renting in (out) desired amount of land in the future though 80% perceived passage of RLCL made transfer easier 40% (31%) rented in from (out to) relatives, 60% of transactions have contract, only 10% written, about a quarter with fixed term Net gain from renting to non-relatives is almost 80% higher than renting to relatives.

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Table 8: Determinants of land rental market participation Specification Without ability With ability Agricultural ability 0.402*** (8.89) Household land endowment (log) -0.199*** -0.311*** (24.24) (27.44) Number of members aged 15-60 (log) 0.071*** 0.062*** (8.23) (6.87) Value of total assets (log) -0.056*** -0.035** (4.27) (2.58) Head’s age (log) 1.777** 0.934 (2.31) (1.60) Head’s age squared -0.262** -0.152* (2.56) (1.95) Head completed secondary education -0.010 0.001 (0.42) (0.05) Head completed higher education -0.050* -0.043 (1.71) (1.40) Village per capita income -0.144*** -0.139*** (5.50) (5.20)

Table 8: Determinants of land rental market participation (cont’d) Lower bound equation (lease out to autarky) Share of village workers migrating out of province 0.367*** (8.52) Own land certificate 0.070** (1.98) Rule: Renting to outsiders not allowed -0.076** (1.96) Rule: Village takes back non-cultivated land 0.261*** (6.91) Village per capita land -0.044** (2.15) Upper bound equation (autarky to lease-in) Share of village workers migrating out of province -0.420*** (10.49) Own land certificate -0.033 (1.06) Rule: Renting to outsiders not allowed -0.014 (1.16) Rule: Village takes back non-cultivated land -0.131*** (3.58) Village per capita land -0.095*** (5.27) Log-likelihood -13032.05 No. of observations 19,570
Note: Time dummies and constants included but not reported.

0.407*** (9.03) 0.079** (2.11) -0.083** (2.06) 0.253*** (6.39) -0.049** (2.29) -0.385*** (9.34) -0.011 (0.35) -0.030 (0.80) -0.137*** (3.63) -0.117*** (6.29) -12070.83 18,390

Econometric Results
 Rental markets tend to transfer land from land    
abundant and labor poor households to those with little land and large amounts of labor Poor and more efficient households received land through rental markets Off-farm opportunities increase supply of land Migration encourage rental market participation, rental restrictions reduce participating in renting out, but not renting in Possession of land certificate increase rental participation

Conclusions and Policy Implications
 Rental markets increase productivity and tenants’ 
welfare by 60% and about 25%, and even larger increases in landlords’ income The potential for rental markets to contribute to the rural economy is very significant in the situation of rapid structural changes, even in the environment with very equal land endowment Although reform has helped increase tenure security and improved the functioning of rental markets, tenure insecurity issue remains

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