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									       Political Science 420: Weapons of Mass Destruction
                 Texas A&M University – Central Texas / Spring 2010
                                           Jeffrey Dixon
                        http://www.tarleton.edu/~jdixon/pols420.html
                              1:30-4:20 PM Thursdays
                            Tarleton System Center 120
Office: North Campus Room 17 (next to 206) Phone: (254) 519-5722
Email: jdixon@tarleton.edu                  x5722 on campus

Physical Office Hours (all PM): Mon 2:30-4:30, Tues 2:30-4:30, Wed 4:25-7:25
Virtual (Online) Office Hours (all PM): Thurs 7-10
Course Description
This course examines the physical and political effects of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, with
emphasis on issues of deterrence and arms control.

Course Objectives
This class has four central objectives. Assignments, lectures, in-class exercises, readings, and exams are all
designed to address four fundamental questions about the politics of weapons of mass destruction (WMD):
    1. Which weapons are considered WMD, and how are their effects similar or different from those of
        conventional weapons?
    2. In what ways – and why -- do international laws and international institutions treat WMD differently
        from other weapons?
    3. How does the possession of WMD by nations or their adversaries affect the decisions that those
        nations make?
    4. When and under what circumstances are WMD likely to be used, and what are the likely
        consequences?

Warning – Graphic Images
The study of WMD includes the study of their effects. As part of this class, we will be examining some
graphic photos of WMD casualties – people with burns, blisters, radiation poisoning, and disease. These
images are essentially political in character – they are part of the reason that the world treats WMD
differently from other weapons. You may wish to preview the lecture slides before class (they will be posted
online) in order to prepare yourself for their appearance in lectures.

Required Readings
The following books are required for this course.

                Title                         Authors             ISBN        Date/Ed         Publisher
  The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A       Kenneth Waltz, Scott
                                                                 0393977471    2nd/2002       W.W. Norton
           Debate Renewed                      Sagan
 Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism                                                         Oxford University
                                             John Mueller        019538136X      2009
     from Hiroshima to al Qaeda                                                                  Press
    Biological Weapons: From the
                                                                                              Columbia
Invention of State-Sponsored Programs      Jeanne Guillemin      231129432    New Ed/2006
                                                                                            University Press
    to Contemporary Bioterrorism



                                                                                                                 1
The other required readings are available for download or online viewing at the course website. For some
articles, you will have to login using your Tarleton username and password. Other readings are available
only on Blackboard.
        Beware! The lectures do not simply rehash the readings – they add new material and help you
        organize the evidence presented in the textbook. The “downside” to this is that you need both a good
        set of lecture notes and careful examination of the assigned readings to do well in the course. The
        upside is that lectures are actually worth attending, and if you email me questions about the readings
        I’ll address them in class.

Grading (90/80/70/60, rounded to the nearest percentage)
    Final Exam (30%). There is a comprehensive final exam, with questions drawn from throughout the
      course. The best way to study for the final exam is to put together good notes on BOTH the readings
      and the lectures, and to think seriously about the questions we discuss in class. 60% of the exam
      credit will consist of multiple-choice or true/false questions drawn about evenly from course readings
      and lectures. The remaining 40% will be a single essay question asking you to answer one of the four
      questions listed at the beginning of the syllabus, perhaps as applied to a specific type of WMD.
    Individual Homework Assignments (40%). Every take-home assignment in this course should be
      typed unless the instructions say otherwise. I require a hard copy, not an emailed document, to grade
      your assignment. In an emergency, email can prove you’ve completed the assignment – but I still
      need a hard copy to grade.
          o Regrades: You have one week from when I return an assignment to request a re-grade of
              some or all of the exercise. Just attach a note specifying the section you want regraded.
          o Late Assignments: If you hand in an assignment after its due date but before one week after
              the due date, you will receive 75% of the credit which you would otherwise have earned.
              After this one week period, no credit will be given.
    In-Class Work (30%). From time to time, we will have a small- or large-group exercise in class
      (discussion exercises, debates, or worksheets). I do not ordinarily announce these in advance. Each
      one is worth equal credit. You will receive 100% credit if you are there and participate throughout
      the exercise. However, if it becomes clear that you aren’t doing your part, then your credit will be
      greatly reduced.
          o Late Arrivals: If you miss part of an in-class assignment, I will reduce your participation
              credit. While I ordinarily make a reduction in proportion to the amount you missed, I may
              reduce credit even further if, in my judgment, the portion you missed was more important than
              the remainder of the exercise.

        Item                                                Points
        Assignment 1 (BWC Report)                           100
        Assignment 2 (Iranian Proliferation Analysis)       100
        Assignment 3 (India-Pakistan Deterrence Exercise)   100
        Assignment 4 (Nuclear Risk Analysis)                100
        Final Exam                                          300
        Participation Exercises                             300 (divided evenly between exercises)
        TOTAL POSSIBLE                                      1000
        895+ = A       795-894=B        695-794=C      595-694=D      594 or lower = F

Attendance
Attendance is required. While attendance as such is not a component of the final grade, it is exceedingly
difficult to do well without a good set of lecture notes – and the PowerPoint files I post online don’t include


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the explanations I give in class. Furthermore, it is rather challenging to complete in-class work when one is
not in the classroom.

Make-Up Work
Students must inform the instructor prior to an absence. Send me an email stating the dates(s) you will be
missing and the reason(s). You should also hand me a written note with this information in class. (Protect
yourself! Don’t rely on my memory – hand me something written that I can keep in my files). If all else
fails, you or a friend may call my office and speak to me or my voicemail. There are very few situations in
life that preclude making a phone call or having a friend do so; failure to contact the instructor prior to class
will normally rule out any sort of make-up. When you return, be sure to request the make-up work. It is
your duty to ask, not the instructor’s duty to remind you. Make-up exams and in-class work differ from
the original and are offered at the instructor’s convenience.

Academic Integrity (Tarleton State University Catalog, p. 37):
 University policy: Texas A&M University – Central Texas expects its students to maintain high
   standards of personal and scholarly conduct. Students guilty of academic dishonesty are subject to
   disciplinary action. Academic dishonesty includes, but is not limited to, cheating on an examination or
   other academic work, plagiarism, collusion, and the abuse of resource materials. The faculty member is
   responsible for initiating action for each case of academic dishonesty.
       o The student handbook contains the entire policy. It is online as well:
           http://www.tarleton.edu/~stuserv/handbook/AcademicRights.htm#Conduct
 Specific guidelines for this course:
       o The three most common violations I have observed while teaching at TSU-CT are:
                “Sharing” homework. Note that you may not “jointly” complete any of the homework
                   exercises in this course; these are to be completed by yourself alone. If you provide
                   another student with a copy of your homework and they copy it, both you and the copier
                   will be deemed to have violated the policy.
                Using direct quotes without quotation marks. Even if you are just using three- or four-
                   word phrases, you need to surround them with quotation marks if you didn’t create them
                   yourself. This is true even if you cite the source!
                Paraphrasing another person’s words without citing the source.
           o Once you have received the exam, do not discuss it with anyone else until both of you have
               returned the exam.
           o The normal penalty for a violation of academic integrity in any of my classes is a grade of
               zero for the work or a deduction of 20% (two letter grades) from your course grade,
               whichever is greater (see Sanction # 4 in the handbook). Infractions by previous violators (in
               this course or other courses) will result in course failure (see Sanction # 2 in the handbook)
               and recommendation for further disciplinary action by the TSU-CT administration.

Drop Policy
If you discover that you need to drop this class, you must go to the Records Office and ask for the necessary
paperwork. Professors cannot drop students; this is always the responsibility of the student. The records
office will give a deadline for which the form must be returned, completely signed. Once you return the
signed form to the records office and wait 24 hours, you must go into Duck Trax and confirm that you are no
longer enrolled. If you are still enrolled, follow up with the records office immediately. You are to attend
class until the procedure is complete to avoid penalty for absence. Should you miss the deadline or fail to
follow the procedure, you will receive an F in the course.




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Library Services
Information Literacy focuses on research skills that prepare individuals to live and work in an information-
centered society. Librarians will work with students in the development of critical reasoning, ethical use of
information, and the appropriate use of secondary research techniques. These techniques include: exploring
information resources such as library collections and services; identifying sources such as subject databases
and scholarly journals; executing effective search strategies; retrieving, recording and citing relevant results
correctly; and interpreting search results and deciding whether to expand the search. Library Resources are
outlined and accessed through the web page: http://www.tarleton.edu/centraltexas/departments/library/

Disability Services
If you have or believe you have a disability, may wish to self-identify. You can do so by providing
documentation to Sarina Swindell, the Assistant to the President for Diversity and External Education
Initiatives. Students are encouraged to seek information about accommodations to help assure success in this
class. Please contact Sarina Swindell, at swindell@tarleton.edu, 254-519-5711 or KLLN Room 104C. I
encourage students to speak with me about accommodations they might need to be successful in this class.

Amendments
Not all exigencies can be foreseen. I reserve the right to amend the syllabus at any time.




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                          Course Schedule – Check web site for updates!
Dates                 Topic                         Assigned Readings
 Jan 21      The Politics of “WMD”                                 None
 Jan 28        Chemical Weapons             Croddy, “Chemical Warfare: A Brief History” (Blackboard)
              The Development of
 Feb 4                                             Guillemin, Biological Weapons: Chapters 1-6
                  Biowarfare
           Modern Bioweapons: Effects             Guillemin, Biological Weapons: Chapters 7-10
 Feb 11
                and Responses                                  Assignment 1 Due
           A Poor Man’s Atom Bomb?
              The Doctrine of CBW           Koblentz, “Offense, Defense, and Deterrence” (Blackboard)
 Feb 18
            NO CLASS: Blackboard                      Sagan, “The Commitment Trap” (Proxy)
                  Discussion
                                                      Deadly Arsenals: Chapter 4 (Blackboard)
 Feb 25         CBW Proliferation
                                                        Deadly Arsenals: Chapter 1 (Online)
                                                “Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation” (Online)
                                            Giles, “The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological,
               Nuclear Weapons:                        and Chemical Weapons” (Blackboard)
March 4
             Construction and Effects                   Deadly Arsenals: Chapter 15 (Online)
                                               Dueck and Takeyh, “Iran’s Nuclear Challenge” (Proxy)
                                                                 Assignment 2 Due
                                                        Pry, “Societal Survival” (Blackboard)
March 11   Consequences of Nuclear War
                                                      Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Chapters 1-2
March 18   NO CLASS: SPRING BREAK                                       NONE
                                           Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Chapter
March 25       Nuclear Deterrence                                          1
                                                      Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Chapters 3-6
                                            Sagan, “The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and
                                                            Control Systems” (Blackboard)
                                                 Sidhu, “India’s Nuclear Use Doctrine” (Blackboard)
 April 1   Comparative Nuclear Doctrine
                                            Cheema, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command
                                                              and Control” (Blackboard)
                                                                 Assignment 3 Due
             Command and Control of        Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Chapters
 April 8
                Nuclear Forces                                            2-3
                                                     Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Chapters 7-11
                                                 Kroenig, “Importing the Bomb” (all but pp. 171-175)
April 15   Nuclear Proliferation: Causes
                                                                     (Blackboard)
                                                     Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb” (Blackboard)
                                           Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Chapters
                                                                          4-5
                                              Gartzke and Jo, “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and
               Nuclear Proliferation:         Interstate Disputes:” pp. 209-217 and 226 (Blackboard)
April 22
                 Consequences               Rauchaus, “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis:” pp.
                                                            258-268 and 271 (Blackboard)
                                            Beardsley and Asal, “Winning With the Bomb:” pp. 278-287,
                                                          295-298 and Table 4 (Blackboard)
                                             Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Chapters 12-15 and Epilogue
April 29        Nuclear Terrorism
                                                                 Assignment 4 Due
 May 6             FINAL EXAM                                         Review All



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POLS 420: Weapons of Mass Destruction
Assignment 1: The Biological Weapons Convention – A Simulation

This exercise is intended to simulate a new Review Conference of the BWC. Your task is to represent a
country in these talks and secure for your country a better security environment than that which it currently
enjoys. The homework part of the exercise requires you to do some reading and write a one-page answer to a
specific question about BW and the BWC.

Instructions:
    A. Read Chapter 10 of Guillemin. It provides a reasonable overview of issues surrounding the BWC.
    B. Review the Deadly Arsenals chapter about your country (linked online). Note what other WMD your
        country possesses, and whether it really needs BW for its security. Note also any concerns it might
        have about inspections.
    C. There is a list of questions on the reverse side of this page. Type about one page answering the
        question you are assigned. (If you have not been assigned a question yet, email me). Write the
        number here ______
           1. You will probably have to do some research to answer the question
           2. Critically examine a source before using it. For example,
               http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Threats_to_Israel/Syria.html is probably a biased
               source about Syria. Even the URL suggests the possibility, since Syria and Israel are rivals.
               It can be difficult to find unbiased information, but it’s out there.
           3. Be sure your one-page paper has a thesis statement – a clear answer to the question which you
               will then defend. Put your thesis statement in boldface/underline/italics for the benefit of the
               reader (other members of your “country” in the simulation).
           4. Cite your sources! Attach a separate sheet for this if necessary.
           5. The library has many resources that will help you on this assignment. Go to its web page and
               see the link to the online databases. Academic Search Complete is probably the best index for
               this exercise. For example, it links to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which has recent
               (and quite readable) articles about proliferation around the globe.




                                                                                                              6
 # Country                                              Question
  1 USA    Why does the US oppose adding a system of inspections to the BWC, given that it accepted
           such a system in the CWC?
  2 IRAN   What is Iran’s position on the addition of an inspection scheme to the BWC?
  3 ISRAEL What could convince Israel to sign and ratify the BWC?
  4 SYRIA  What could convince Syria to ratify the BWC?
  5 DPRK   What is North Korea’s position on the addition of an inspection scheme to the BWC?
  6 RUSSIA What is Russia’s position on the addition of an inspection scheme to the BWC?
  7 PRC    What is China’s position on the addition of an inspection scheme to the BWC?
  8 UK     What is the United Kingdom’s position on the addition of an inspection scheme to the
           BWC?
  9 USA    What do US biotechnology firms think of BWC inspections?
10 IRAN    Is Iran still conducting research that is forbidden by the BWC?
11 ISRAEL What are the primary reasons for Israel’s BW program?
12 SYRIA   What are the primary reasons for Syria’s BW program?
13 DPRK    Is North Korea conducting research that is forbidden by the BWC?
14 RUSSIA Is Russia conducting research that is forbidden by the BWC?
15 PRC     Is China conducting research that is forbidden by the BWC?
16 UK      Is the UK conducting research that is forbidden by the BWC?
17 USA     Is the US conducting research that is forbidden by the BWC?
18 IRAN    Does Iran favor the expansion of Article X of the BWC to include formal guarantees of
           peaceful biotechnology assistance?
19 ISRAEL Is Israel conducting research that is forbidden by the BWC?
20 SYRIA   Is Syria conducting research that is forbidden by the BWC?
21 DPRK    Does North Korea favor the expansion of Article X of the BWC to include formal
           guarantees of peaceful biotechnology assistance?
22 RUSSIA Does Russia favor the expansion of Article X of the BWC to include formal guarantees of
           peaceful biotechnology assistance?
23 PRC     Does China favor the expansion of Article X of the BWC to include formal guarantees of
           peaceful biotechnology assistance?
24 UK      Does the United Kingdom favor the expansion of Article X of the BWC to include formal
           guarantees of peaceful biotechnology assistance?
25 USA     Would the US support expanding Article X of the BWC to include formal guarantees of
           peaceful biotechnology assistance?
26 USA     Does the US want Israel to join the BWC?
27 USA     Does the US want Syria to join the BWC?
28 USA     Does the US want Egypt to join the BWC?




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POLS 420: Weapons of Mass Destruction
Assignment 2: Explaining Iran

This assignment is designed to expose you to the questions surrounding the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. It is intended that after you complete the assignment, you will be capable of applying the
lessons in the classroom to the specific case of Iran during our discussions.

Instructions:
    1. There are four readings assigned for March 4. Start by reading the last three, which are about Iran.
    2. Use the information you found in these three articles/chapters to answer the following questions.
        Each answer should be a complete argument, about one paragraph in length, with references to the
        articles you read.
            a. A complete argument means that you have a claim (your answer to the question), evidence
                (your citations or any quotations form the articles), and a warrant (reasoning that connects the
                claim and evidence).
            b. You may also know a claim by the name “thesis statement,” since virtually every essay you
                hand in for any class should have one.
            c. Note that your role is not simply to summarize but to take sides when authors disagree and to
                connect the dots when they do not directly address the questions themselves. Example: There
                is often a great deal of debate over the motives that drive countries to build WMD. You will
                need to choose the motive which best fits the evidence and defend that choice against the
                other authors’ arguments.
    3. Here are the questions:
            a. Questions about motives for WMD programs. Be clear to distinguish between defense
                (deterrence) against an enemy, power projection or prestige, or offensive intentions towards a
                particular target (or immediate battlefield use). In addition, if the motive was offensive or
                defensive, who was the target or perceived threat?
                      i. Why – and when -- did Iran begin a nuclear weapons program?
                     ii. Why -- and when -- did the Islamic Republic of Iran resume the program after initially
                         opposing it?
                    iii. Why – and when -- did Iran begin a biological weapons program?
                    iv. Why – and when -- did Iran begin a chemical weapons program?
            b. Questions about Iran’s current nuclear intentions
                      i. Is Iran still actively pursuing the construction of a nuclear weapon?
                     ii. (If no: Why does Iran – a country awash in oil – need nuclear power plants?)
                    iii. (If yes: What offer – if any – could the US make to Iran that would convince its
                         leadership to abandon the program?)
            c. Questions about Iran’s likely use of WMD. Consider whether it would use them offensively
                or on its own territory or the front line of a war, whether it would be likely to target military
                forces or civilians, and whether it would use them first or only use them to retaliate in kind
                (i.e. after it had been attacked by the same type of weapon by a foe).
                      i. Under what circumstances is Iran likely to use nuclear weapons (assuming it manages
                         to acquire them)?
                     ii. Under what circumstances would Iran be likely to use its chemical weapons?
                    iii. Under what circumstances would Iran be likely to use its biological weapons?
            d. Given your answers to a-c, what should US policy towards Iran’s WMD programs be?
                Specify both the goal (ends) and tactics (means) the US should use to pursue them.




                                                                                                                8
POLS 420: Weapons of Mass Destruction
Assignment 3: Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Deterrence

Overview
Your job in this assignment is to evaluate the stability of India-Pakistan nuclear deterrence. Nuclear
deterrence is generally thought to require a secure second-strike capability by each side. That is, even after
absorbing a surprise attack by the other side, each country must be able to inflict unacceptable damage to its
opponent. India has always enjoyed second-strike capability because most of Pakistan’s weapons cannot
reach far parts of India. This means that simply by storing its weapons some distance from the border, India
can protect itself for the next ten years or more. Pakistan, on the other hand, is entirely within range of most
Indian air forces. This vulnerability has led it to rush forward with the production and testing of ballistic
missiles capable of reaching distant targets in India, even if the Pakistani air force is destroyed on the ground.
But has it really succeeded in building a viable second-strike force? Given these facts, the primary threat to
strategic stability (from the perspective of rational deterrence theory) is the danger that India could destroy
Pakistan’s ability to retaliate (second-strike capability) in a nuclear first strike. We will use this exercise as
the basis for one or more in-class exercises.

Instructions
I.     Read Deadly Arsenals, Chapter 12 to understand Pakistan’s nuclear forces. The link is on the course
       website. The map and tables in the chapter are especially useful for this exercise.
II.    Simulate an Indian first strike on Pakistan, given both strategic and tactical surprise. This is the best-
       case scenario for a nuclear war from India’s standpoint, and a worst-case scenario for Pakistan’s
       military planners.
       A. Preliminary Information:
                 1. Assume that India has actually assembled about 75 nuclear weapons in secret and
                     forward-deployed its bombs and aircraft to bases near the border. However, India has
                     not yet miniaturized its warheads to enable them to be launched on ballistic missiles.
                     This is consistent with what we know about Indian capabilities – while they have plenty
                     of nuclear weapons, they are actually behind Pakistan (which traded know-how with
                     North Korea) when it comes to deploying nuclear-tipped missiles.
                 2. Available delivery systems: You are limited to India’s fleet of nuclear-capable aircraft:
                     Mirage 2000 (best), MiG 27, MiG 29, and Su-30. Assume that each aircraft can only
                     carry one nuclear weapon. For an estimate of how many of each aircraft India
                     possesses, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_of_the_IAF
       B. Strategic Objectives: Assume that Pakistan has at least a few road-mobile nuclear-tipped missiles.
           However, unless a crisis occurs, these are probably kept in hardened storage facilities to prevent
           theft or destruction of the weapons by domestic insurgents. Accordingly, to eliminate the
           Pakistani nuclear threat, India will have to
                 1. Destroy the two known locations of road-mobile missiles: Sargodha (a hardened facility
                     on the map in Deadly Arsenals) and Fatehjang (a “soft” facility 25 miles southwest of
                     Rawalpindi on your map).
                 2. Destroy Pakistan’s nuclear-capable aircraft before they can be armed with nuclear
                     weapons and depart their airfields. Assume that all of the aircraft listed in Deadly
                     Arsenals, Chapter 12 are potential Pakistani nuclear weapon delivery systems. Go to
                     http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/facility/airbase/index.html for a list of
                     Pakistan’s airfields. You need to destroy those that may accommodate Pakistan’s
                     nuclear-capable aircraft. Your goal is destruction of all MOBs and FOBs; additional
                     security is provided by destroying all satellite airfields.
                 3. Destroy Pakistan’s ability to retaliate over the long term by targeting its nuclear
                     weapons and nuclear facilities. You need not hit its research reactors and test sites, but
                                                                                                                 9
             you should destroy the rest of the facilities listed at the end of Chapter 12 in Deadly
             Arsenals.
C. Tactical Overview: In order to understand how nuclear attacks are planned – a key aspect of
   whether deterrence can be stable – you must understand how nuclear weapons destroy targets.
   “Soft” targets are unreinforced and unarmored, like people and their houses. They are easy to
   kill. “Hard” targets, on the other hand, are heavily reinforced. In order to determine the number
   and strength of Indian nuclear weapons required to destroy a given Pakistani target, you should
   understand how to calculate a “kill probability” for a given combination of weapon, delivery
   system, and target. Most of the following information is taken from David W. Hafemeister,
   Physics of Societal Issues: Calculations on National Security, Environment, and Energy, 2007:
   The general formula for a single-shot kill using a nuclear blast incorporates four central variables:
        A constant term derived from tests of nuclear weapons’ destructive power. This describes
           how much nuclear explosive power is required to generate a shock wave of a given
           strength. For our purposes, it is about .22, and already incorporated in the equation below.
           This assumes a surface or near-surface burst, because these produce the strongest shock
           waves near the point of detonation.
        The overpressure (strength of shock wave) required to destroy the target – in other words
           – its “hardness.” This is usually measured in pounds per square inch (psi). It only takes
           about 0.25 psi to shatter glass – this is roughly the equivalent of hurricane-force winds.
           Trailers are destroyed at 1 psi. Unreinforced masonry and brick walls crumble at 1.5 psi
           (tornado-strength winds); if reinforced with steel, they last until 2.5 psi, when all but the
           steel frame is destroyed. Some of today’s hardened missile and aircraft shelters are built
           from extremely strong reinforced concrete and partially buried underground. These can
           require up to 150 psi to destroy.
        Yield of the nuclear weapon, in megatons.
        The accuracy of the nuclear weapon (how far it lands from its target), in nautical miles
           (one nautical mile = 6076 feet). This is given as CEP, or circular-error-probable. A
           weapon is equally likely to land anywhere within the CEP. In World War II, most high-
           altitude bombers had a CEP of about one mile, while low-level bombing managed to
           improve this to about 1600 feet (0.26 nautical miles). By Vietnam, the US was able to
           achieve a CEP of 750 feet (0.12 nautical miles) using fighter-bomber aircraft. By the end
           of the war, unguided bombs were being delivered with a precision of about 365 feet (.06
           nautical miles), although this required dangerous, low-level attacks.
   Using these factors, we can calculate the single-shot kill probability (SSKP) for an attack on a
   target using a single nuclear weapon (copied from Hafemeister, p.38):




   Of course, all of this assumes that the nuclear weapon actually reaches the target area and
   functions as intended. There is always some probability that a bomb fails to detonate, or that the
   bomber or missile carrying it fails to make it to the target area. Missiles can misfire or even be
   shot down. Of course, bombers are extremely vulnerable to defending fighters and surface-to-air
   missiles (SAMs). In order to be more realistic, one more variable is needed to represent the
   reliability of the weapon/delivery system combination. The kill probability of a single attack is
   therefore:
                                  PK = R (SSKP)



                                                                                                      10
   where R is the reliability of the attack system (between 0 and 1). If there are multiple attacks, one
   simply uses the laws of probability to determine the chance that at least one of them destroys the
   target. So the joint probability of destroying a target with N attacks is
                                                  N
                                   PK jo int  1   [1  PK N ]
                                                 i 1
   Fortunately, I have an Excel file that does all the math for you. You only need to enter the
   reliability (between 0 and 1), yield of the weapon (in kilotons – Excel will convert it to megatons
   in the equation), its accuracy (in nautical miles), and the hardness of the target (in psi). If you
   would like to use two attacks instead of one, simply enter this information for the second strike as
   well, and the Excel file will tell you the probability that attack 1 destroys the target, the
   probability that attack 2 destroys the target, and the joint probability that the target is destroyed by
   the two attacks. You shouldn’t need more than two attacks to destroy a target, but if you want to
   calculate the joint probability that three attacks destroy a target, just plug in the data for the third
   attack on the next row and manually compute
   1 – [(1 – joint kill probability of first two attacks) * (1 – kill probability of third attack)]
   The same principle holds if you want to use four attacks. You can use two rows and manually
   compute
   1 – [(1 – joint kill probability of first/second attacks) * (1 – joint kill probability of third/fourth
   attacks)]

D. Download the Excel file from the course website and use it to create a table of targets and how
   you intend to destroy them. For most targets, success requires a 95% chance of destruction. For
   Sargodha and the MOBs, higher certainty is required – these must be destroyed with 98%
   probability. For each target, list the aircraft used and the number and size of warheads needed to
   gain 95% (or 98%) confidence that the target is destroyed – this refers to PK (1) if you use one
   weapon and PK (joint) is you use 2 weapons. For more weapons, see the formulas above.
         1. Assume that India’s nuclear arsenal contains the following weapons:
              a. 5 thermonuclear devices (150 kilotons each)
              b. 5 boosted-fission devices (50 kilotons each)
              c. 10 large fission devices (35 kilotons each)
              d. 20 moderate fission devices (20 kilotons each)
              e. 25 small fission devices (10 kilotons each)
              f. 10 tactical fission weapons (1 kiloton each)
         2. A circular-error-probable (CEP, or accuracy) of about 500 feet (.08 nm) is well within
            the capability of India’s delivery aircraft. However, for weapons larger than 20 kilotons,
            the pilot will have to release at a higher altitude in order to escape the blast. This
            reduces accuracy as follows:
              a. 1-35 kilotons: CEP = 500 feet (.08 nm)
              b. 50 kilotons: CEP = 650 feet (.11 nm)
              c. 150 kilotons: CEP = 800 feet (.13 nm)
         3. The reliability of the weapon is open to question. Essentially, reliability measures
            whether the aircraft makes it to the target and releases a bomb. So any aircraft shot
            down are considered “unreliable.” The data here are largely speculative, since it has
            been 30 years since Indian aircraft engaged targets in Pakistan. In previous conflicts, the
            Indians lost about one aircraft for every hundred sorties. This suggests .99 reliability.
            However, an Indian study in the early 1980s concluded that about half the attacking
            bombers would be shot down if India bombed the Kahuta reactor using conventional
            weapons (a reliability of .5). Given a surprise attack across the whole of Pakistan,
            however, an optimistic assumption would be that reliability = .98

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                 4. The hardness of the target varies. Exposed aircraft, even small fighters, are destroyed at
                     overpressures of 3 psi, so you can enter a hardness of 3 for FOB and satellite airfields.
                     However, the MOB airfields probably have hardened shelters for at least some nuclear-
                     capable aircraft, as does the missile facility at Sargodha. In these cases, a hardness of
                     150 psi should be used. Finally, nuclear facilities are likely to be effectively destroyed
                     by overpressures of only 5 psi (some structures will remain, but most will be too heavily
                     damaged to be usable).
III.   Evaluate the results of the first strike.
       A. Using a red pen or pencil, mark each strike on the attached map of Pakistan (you must use this
          one). Note: The web site listing Pakistan’s air bases also has a map showing their locations.
          Deadly Arsenals has a map showing locations of nuclear facilities. Use the following symbols,
          which will make our in-class exercise easier. For strikes using multiple weapons, add the kt
          together and use the symbol for the nearest yield.
                       150 kt = , 50 kt = , 35 kt = , 20 kt = , 10 kt = , 1 kt = 
       B. Does India have the capability for attaining a 95%/98% chance of destroying each target?
          Anything less than a nuclear weapon is unlikely to offer complete assurance of destruction. So
          you are limited to the number of nuclear weapons in India’s possession. Were you able to destroy
          all threats? If not, which threats would require follow-up with conventional weapons?
       C. How many nuclear weapons does India have left after conducting its first strike?
       D. Take a look at your map. Which cities, if any, are so close to your targets that you would have
          destroyed them as well?
       E. How much warning would Pakistan have of the attack? Find the farthest target from the Indian
          border and compute the time needed for an aircraft moving at about 1200 mph to reach the target
          (hint: multiply distance by .05 to get the number of minutes). Given this warning, would
          Pakistan have time to assemble its nuclear weapons, load them on its aircraft, and get the aircraft
          off the runway and away from the blast zone?
IV.    Evaluate the stability of India-Pakistan deterrence
       A. If you were Pakistan, would you feel secure from nuclear attack under the current conditions?
       B. List at least three steps that Pakistan could take to increase its odds of maintaining a second-strike
          retaliatory capability. Hint: Your suggested measures should do one or more of the following:
          decrease reliability of Indian aircraft, increase hardness of Pakistani targets, increase the number
          of Pakistani targets, decrease the reliance of Pakistan on aircraft to deliver bombs, increase the
          odds that Pakistani aircraft could escape destruction in the minutes between the detection of an
          Indian attack and the Indian nuclear strikes.
       C. To what extent would implementing the measures you just suggested convince India that Pakistan
          was actually preparing a first strike against India? That is, are your defensive measures likely to
          be viewed as offensive?
       D. Would your changes increase the probability of crisis escalation, unauthorized use, or accidental
          launch?
V.     Turn in:
       A. Your completed Excel spreadsheet.
       B. Your map with targets marked.
       C. Your typed answers to these questions.




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13
POLS 420: Weapons of Mass Destruction
Assignment 4: Argument Paper

Purpose: This assignment is intended to help you integrate the theoretical work on doctrines and deterrence
with the practical aspects of nuclear weapons that we discussed in class. It is also intended to walk you
through the process of designing and defending a policy position on weapons of mass destruction.

Assignment: Type an essay of at least 1200 words (example: about 5 double-spaced pages in 12-point Times
New Roman) accomplishing the following objectives, in order. Your essay should have an introduction with
a clear thesis statement that you will defend throughout the paper, clearly labeled sections addressing each of
the objectives listed below, and a conclusion that demonstrates that your solutions to these problems compel
one to support your thesis.

Reminder: You need to cite your sources. If you use a direct quote (three or more words) from any source,
you must enclose it within quotation marks and indicate the source (and page number, if applicable). If you
paraphrase a source, you must indicate the source. You may do this using parenthetical citations, footnotes,
endnotes or even working the citation into your sentences, as you prefer. You must attack a Works Cited or
Bibliography page listing all of your sources. Be aware that (1) quotation of even a few words without
quotation marks is an academic integrity violation, as is (2) paraphrasing an article that you don’t cite or (3)
citing sources which you did not consult.

Objectives: Your fundamental task is to prove that a change in the existing nuclear balance will increase or
decrease the risks to world peace.
   I.      Pick one change in the nuclear balance to address:
           A. North Korea develops intercontinental ballistic missiles
           B. India develops and deploys effective missile defense
           C. Israel renounces the first use of nuclear weapons
           D. The United States develops and deploys effective missile defense
           E. China modernizes and greatly expands the size of its nuclear forces
           F. Pakistan miniaturizes its weapons and deploys them on an arsenal of intermediate-range
                ballistic missiles
           G. The United States develops and deploys miniaturized nuclear “bunker buster” weapons (the
                Robust Nuclear Earth penetrator, or RNEP)
   II.     You will need to explain how military decisions are made in the country you describe and its
           potential rivals.
           A. Review the performance of organization theory, realism, and strategic culture (from the earlier
                Sagan chapter on doctrine) at predicting and explaining military doctrine in the state which
                you have chosen. In other words, how does the country you are studying make decisions
                about nuclear weapons?
           B. Do the same for your country’s rivals, since the fear of technological improvements by a
                country may spark pre-emptive war or crisis escalation by its rivals. How do they decide
                whether to employ their own forces?
   III.    Now examine the implications of the change you selected for your country and its rivals. For
           each of these countries, examine the following:
           A. What will be the effect on the country’s strategic situation? That is, will this change increase
                or decrease the country’s security, all else being equal?
           B. How would this country respond to these changes in its security situation, given your theory
                of its military decision-making? For example, a country which is threatened might do
                nothing, build up its own arsenal, adopt a pre-emptive nuclear doctrine, engage in nuclear

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         proliferation, attempt to construct a missile or air defense, delegate control of weapons to
         lower-ranking officials, or even initiate a nuclear war.
      C. Now consider interaction effects – If each country does what you expect, will this lead other
         countries to also change their behavior? For example, if the US threatens China and China
         responds by building nuclear weapons, the US might then need to respond to this increase,
         generating an arms race. Perhaps the Chinese buildup would trigger action by India, which
         might then trigger action by Pakistan, etc. Consider how each country is likely to react to the
         moves of its rivals.
IV.   Evaluate the stability of the changed world-system. Is the world a safer place or a more
      dangerous place?
      A. Has the probability of conventional war increased or decreased? Why? If conventional war
         does occur, is it likely to be more or less severe than in the status quo?
      B. Has the probability of nuclear war increased or decreased? Why? If nuclear war does occur,
         is it likely to be more or less severe than in the status quo?
      C. Finish up by assessing how critical your theory of military doctrine (from II) is to your
         argument. Would your conclusions still be true even if you were wrong about the military
         decision process, or is your assessment of doctrine critical to your final evaluation?




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