REPORT OF THE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ANALYSIS WORKSHOP FOR COUNTRIES OF THE HORN OF AFRICA NOVEMBER 2005
Water tankers in Gash Barka, Eritrea -Courtesy IRIN
THE NORFOLK HOTEL, NAIROBI nd rd 2 and 3 November 2005 Report prepared by: OCHA Regional Support Office for Central and East Africa
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P.O. Box 30218 Nairobi, Kenya Telephone: +254 -20 622 166 Fax: +254 20 622 632
Ireland
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Map of the Greater Horn of Africa Region ...................................................................................2 1.0 Executive Summary..................................................................................................................3 2.0 Cross Border Clusters .............................................................................................................4 2.1 Sudan-Chad-Eritrea ..................................................................................................4 2.1.1 Darfur-Chad ...........................................................................................................4 2.1.2 Eastern Sudan-Eritrea ...........................................................................................6 2.2 Ethiopia-Eritrea-Djibouti ......................................................................................... 10 2.3 Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya…………………………………………………………………13 2.4 Sudan-Uganda-Kenya…………………………………………………….....................16 2.5 Chad-Central African Republic………………………………………………………….19 3.0 Thematic Presentations …………………………………………………………………………… 21 3.1 Regional Discussions……………………………………………………………………. 21 3.2 Eastern Sudan……………………………………………………………………………. 22 3.3 Killer Pandemics & Threat of Avian Flu……………………………………………….. 23 3.4 Health Risks in the Horn of Africa……………………………………………………… 23 3.5 Integrated Food Security Classification Framework…………………………………. 24 ANNEXES Annex 1: Agenda. ..................................................................................................................... …25 Annex 2: Participants List………………………………………………………………………………27
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Regional Scenario Development workshop for the Greater Horn of Africa region took place on 2-3 November in the Ballroom of the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi. Regional representations from UN, INGOs, and donors joined their respective colleagues from countries in the region to provide a fairly comprehensive and complementary perspective and analysis of recent and forecasted regional events. In addition to its objective to give primary focus to events with regional or cross border significance, this workshop also made a more concerted attempt to work out the basic elements of a regional contingency plan. The contextual presentations were made, this time, from a cross border perspective rather than single country one. Five border clusters covering the nine countries (including Chad and Central African Republic for the first time) were examined: 1) Sudan-Chad-Eritrea, 2) Ethiopia-EritreaDjibouti, 3) Somalia-Kenya-Ethiopia, 4) Sudan-Uganda-Kenya and 5) Chad-Central African Republic. This clustering of countries was used throughout the workshop as the central element for scenario development, for identifying cross-border vulnerabilities and to develop a basic framework of a response plan to a simulated scenario based on the worst case situation. During this simulation exercise, participants were required to elaborate planning assumptions, identify the main consequences and needs for affected populations and develop a response at both country and regional levels. Challenges to the implementation of the response were also considered. Intense discussions centred on the rapidly evolving situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the implications for other countries in the region. The violence in Addis Ababa and troop movements to the border areas from both sides provided greater impetus for the preparation of emergency response plans even as the worst case scenario being elaborated steadily moved into the realm of the most likely. Djibouti, as a country sandwiched between these two larger neighbours, was largely expected to be the recipient of any impact of a border conflict, especially given the importance of its port to Ethiopia. The inter-clan conflicts along the Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia borders were examined as were those in the Karamojong Cluster (Kenya-Uganda-Sudan). The current relationship between northern Uganda and southern Sudan were discussed as well especially given the increase in LRA attacks in the area and the ongoing humanitarian emergency in both border areas. The Darfur crisis and the cross border links with Chad formed the focus of another cluster and included in that was the relationship between Darfur and Eritrea. Chad and the Central African Republic as newcomers to the workshop benefited from cross border analysis of political events within the two countries and how these impact on population movements and increasing vulnerabilities especially along the borders. The workshop also presented the opportunity for presentations by external resource persons on issues that could impact on the countries of the region. Dr. Gerard Prunier led a plenary discussion on the inter-linkages between the countries in the Horn of Africa and gave his analysis of certain recent and historical events. A presentation on humanitarian needs in the Kassala region of eastern Sudan was given by Sorcha O‟Callaghan of the Sudan Advocacy Coalition with a view to stimulating a harmonized advocacy approach for that area. Health risks in the region also formed a focus and this was enhanced by a thought-provoking presentation by Dr. Enric Freixa of ECHO on the threat posed by the Avian Flu and simple preparedness measures that could be undertaken now and in the future. To assist with the development of cross border response plans, Dr. Nick Haan of the Somalia FSAU presented the strategic response framework matrix for food security analysis. The workshop provided the forum for cross-sectoral discussion between partners working for and in the various countries of the region and allowed for the development of the basic framework of a response plan across borders. Several preoccupying crises in the region were examined integrally and regional impacts of internal events were scrutinized. The resulting report provides a tool that can assist in-country and regional level analysis and preparedness and it is hoped that in this way, contingency planning at all levels can be enhanced.
2. CROSS BORDER CLUSTER PRESENTATIONS
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2..1 SUDAN--CHAD--ERIITREA 2 1 SUDAN CHAD ER TREA
This cluster, designed according to political linkages between the 3 countries was examined in 2 sections because of the geographic distances and differing contexts at each border: for the DarfurChad border and for the border along Eastern Sudan and Western Eritrea. Nonetheless, Eastern Sudan actually has two possible scenarios which are interlinked but could each could occur independently of the other: the Hamishkoreib situation and the Eritrea-Ethiopia situation. Each section of the report includes the current humanitarian context, most likely and worst case scenarios and then a simulated cross border response plan. 2.1.1. DARFUR – CHAD 2.1.1.1 Current Humanitarian Context The current humanitarian context between Sudan and Chad is underlined by the on-going conflict in Darfur that has impacted on the situation in the region of eastern Chad, currently hosting some 220,000 Sudanese refugees. Increased insecurity and banditry, cease-fire violations and continued attacks on civilians and humanitarian personnel characterise the humanitarian situation and operational context in Darfur. The Abuja talks that continue to progress at a slow rate have not given respite to the current situation. Political instability in Chad has been triggered partly by amendments to the constitution in an attempt at extending the presidential term of the incumbent President Idriss Deby. However, internal fractions in the Chadian governing elite over support to the main rebel group in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), also continue to undermine stability in the Government as well as the army, This resulted in the recent defection of reportedly several hundred Chadian soldiers and commanders to join rebel groups in Eastern Chad and Darfur, adding further stress upon the already strained relations between the Governments of the two countries. Finally, the health of President Deby appears to be failing, further weakening a leader under great pressure from both political and military forces. This has led to speculations on how a possible change in leadership in Chad will occur and what impact this may have on the country as well as on border relations with Sudan. Currently some 3.5 million civilians are affected by the conflict with 1.8 million living in various IDP settlements throughout the region on both sides of the border. The prolonged crisis in Darfur has already had a devastating impact on the agricultural economy, severely hampering livelihood opportunities in the region. Although heavy rainfall was recorded in Darfur and in Chad this year, there is a continued need for food aid for approximately 3 million conflict-affected persons already receiving full monthly rations from WFP. Risks of epidemics – including, inter alia, Polio, Measles, Meningitis, HIV/AIDS - remain for Darfur and in refugee camps in Chad with the potential for these diseases to spread across borders. 2.1.1.2 Most Likely Scenario It is expected that there will be a change of leadership in Chad within the next six months. At the same time, the Darfur peace talks in Abuja will fail to produce a sustainable peace-agreement. The continued absence of peace added to declining livelihood opportunities will perpetuate the climate of lawlessness and impunity, increased banditry and more direct attacks on humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel. As a result, humanitarian access will drastically deteriorate with consequent scaling down of humanitarian presence in certain areas. Humanitarian access to populations in eastern Chad will also reduce and relief assistance to remote IDP settlements will decline due to security concerns (already happening in certain parts of West Darfur).Insecurity will prohibit IDP return to areas of origin. Even as humanitarian needs increase, funding will reduce thereby hampering both short and long-term recovery efforts. It is expected that disease outbreaks will plague the displaced populations.
The situation in Darfur has resulted in greater numbers of people fleeing to eastern Chad (if assistance is provided) and continued displacement of populations in Darfur -including from remote settlements to areas where assistance is still provided. There are continued gross human rights violations and an increased incidence of sexual and gender based violence. Humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel continue to be harassed with more assaults on them being noted. There is a reduction –suspension- of humanitarian operations and non-essential humanitarian personnel (West Darfur) are being evacuated partially due to the restricted humanitarian access. Mortality and morbidity rates remain high due to limited access to health services. In Chad, several reports have been received of tension between the refugee populations and host communities and this continues to
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fuel a sense of insecurity. Continued conflict in Darfur may increase the affected population from the current 3.5 million to 4.2 million including 500,000 new IDPs fleeing rebel groups who target nomadic and other communities. The nomads who are cut off from most sources of income and support due to the conflict are similarly at risk. There will be an increase of the population in need of food aid from the current three million. Emergency water and shelter will be needed for 600,000 people. 2.1.1.3 Worst Case Scenario The collapse of the peace talks in Abuja and intensified conflict in Darfur form worst case predictions. The disintegration of rebel groups and fragmentation of military authority structures added to increased „war-lordism‟ could lead to anarchy and serious insecurity. With assistance to affected populations completely and indefinitely suspended in some areas and with reduced international presence (including the possibility of a withdrawal of AU observers), there will be some displacement towards Khartoum and into camps. There could be more direct attacks on IDP camps in Darfur while decrease in service provision including the severe lack of water and health services, and restriction on food aid due to WFP‟s lack of access would significantly increase mortality rates. The change of leadership in Chad could trigger political chaos and further instability in eastern Chad where 220,000 Sudanese refugees are currently hosted in UNHCR camps. 2.1.1.4 Simulated Cross Border Response Plan A. Background: Complete collapse of the peace negotiations between Darfur rebel groups and the Government of Sudan. Disintegration of rebel groups who lose control of their troops on the ground leading to the escalation of conflict. Change of leadership in Chad triggering civil unrest and suspension of humanitarian operations in the east. B. Planning assumptions - Darfur - Decrease in access and further concentration of camps; insufficient capacity to respond to additional needs (outside camps); further restriction and access to population including nomadic groups - Chad – Sketchy access to eastern Chad; Immediate insufficient humanitarian presence; internal displacement in Chad; refugees walking back into Darfur or vice versa; breakdown of transport lines C. Humanitarian Consequences and Needs - Darfur affected population – 3.4 million; possibility of increased affected population to 4.2 million of which IDPs would be an extra 500,000 due to rebel targeting of other population e.g. nomadic population. - Trapped areas and inaccessible areas leads to increasing mortality rates - Coping mechanisms for non-affected population are further exhausted. - Widespread outbreak of diseases such as meningitis, hepatitis, etc - Increase in conflict affected population in need of food aid. Current numbers receiving food aid are three million (full WFP rations). - Need of water, shelter for 600,000 persons. - Protection needs for civilians, refugees, IDPs and vulnerable populations. - Displacement of Chadian population further to the south within Chad, possibly also into Darfur to assisted areas.
D. Minimum Response and Timeline DARFUR IN-COUNTRY RESPONSE 24 hours - scale-up existing assistance in larger camps (24 hours) 48 hours - extend additional assistance to other IDP concentrations 1 Week - shelter needs begin to be met; improve protection capacity in Darfur (ask AU to extend its mandate and review troop
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CHAD IN-COUNTRY RESPONSE 24 hours - increase water and shelter 48 hours to 1 week – tracing displaced or scattered populations 2 weeks – increase capacity of existing agencies, particularly in the north
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E. Main Response Challenges Darfur - limited capacity to respond to massive disease outbreaks - limited protection capacity - Insecurity of camps and transport routes and protection of convoys - lack of political cooperation from the Sudanese government - Impunity continues for armed actors/militia to attack civilian population, humanitarian workers, peace-kepers. Chad - Lack of capacity in northern camps; lack of resources (food, water, firewood) - Lack of security - Difficulty of extending assistance to host community - Cross border militia activity inhibits movement and access. F. Minimum response from regional actors Advocacy - Larger protective presence (AU should review its mandate) - Political advocacy to pressure the Sudanese Government to cooperate - Increased political pressure on the GoNU (Government of National Unity) to end military activities, impunity and violations on human rights - Increased political pressure in SLM/A to end military activity, harassment of humanitarian workers and assaults on AU monitors. Chad Negotiations to maintain access, for humanitarian corridors and assist in relocation of population to the south. - Surge capacity and rapid response funds.
2.1.2 EASTERN SUDAN-ERITREA 2.1.2.1 Current Humanitarian Context The situation at the border of eastern Sudan and Eritrea has been characterized by tension in Eastern Sudan between the Eastern Front (Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions Movement) and the Government of National Unity. Additionally, GoNU troop build-up and military presence as well as that of armed opposition factions on both sides of the border shapes the current context. Insecurity and attacks, including mine incidents, have been reported on the main road between Port Sudan and Kassala, particularly in the Hamish Koreib province, currently under the control of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and the Eastern Front. The SPLA has had a large troop presence in the Hamish Koreib area which has constituted the backbone of the military opposition to the Government of the Sudan, but in accordance with the CPA all SPLA troops must be withdrawn from the province by 09 January 2006 when the area is supposed to return to GoNU control. However, with increased military and political opposition to this move, it is anticipated that unless an agreement is negotiated between the Eastern Front and the GoNU, a violent confrontation may occur. The Eastern Front and GoNU are planning negotiations for December 2005 or January 2006, however internal fragmentation and disagreement on objectives as well as poor negotiation skills of the Eastern Front may impact the effectiveness of these talks. Humanitarian access to the Hamish Koreib province from Sudan continues to be denied by the Eastern Front until a negotiated agreement is in place with the GoNU. Hamish Koreib is situated within a broader context of longstanding political and economic marginalization, with a population increasingly impoverished despite the abundance of natural resources and the location of the key city of Port Sudan in the region. The humanitarian indicators in eastern Sudan are some of the worst in the country. The level of discontent with the status quo, particularly within the urban slums of Port Sudan and Kassala towns, has caused an increase in aggressive rhetoric and threats of violence unless the GoNU increases its attention to the problems in the region. This situation is as explosive as it is urgent, and examples of a „successful‟ rebellion from Darfur, largely over similar claims, it is not unlikely that the marginalized populations of eastern Sudan will resort to violence if the GoNU continues to ignore their plight. When the CPA was negotiated it did not properly take into account the situation in this part of the country, with exception of the SPLA held area of Hamishkoreib. 2.1.2.2 Most Likely Scenario
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The SPLA withdrawal from Hamish Koreib province is peaceful but negotiations fail to produce a sustainable agreement, either due to continued fragmentation within the Eastern Front over objectives or because negotiating skills are too poor to secure a proper arrangement (or both). The absence of a negotiated settlement between the Eastern Front rebels and the GoNU could lead to an attempt – th by either the Eastern Front or by the Beja Congress- to take over the Hamish Koreib province on 9 January 2006 when SPLA officially withdraws from the area. This would spur localized violence and possible disruption of transport of goods (including humanitarian) from Port Sudan and would cause increasing difficulty in humanitarian access. As a reaction to this, and under the pretext of securing its international border, the GoNU may seek a military takeover of the Hamish Koreib region, facing a militarily weaker Eastern Front. Depending on how the takeover materializes, the civilian population may be targeted in an attempt at eliminating any military opposition to the GoNU. Hamish Koreib returns to the GoNU but insecurity spreads unless GoNU is able to produce a peace dividend without a negotiated deal with Eastern Front. Depending on the nature of the GoNU intervention, the civilian population will remain in the vicinity of Hamish Koreib town as they have done in previous confrontations, most notably during the heavy fighting – including aerial bombardment - between the SPLA and GoS 1997 – 2000. This will result in limited displacement outside the province, but continued displacement of those outside Hamish Koreib. New internal displacements from militarized areas throughout the eastern region. GoNU will use overwhelming military presence to de-escalate tensions and maintain stability in the region. The low humanitarian presence in the East is not likely to change. Current tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia mount to the level of full-scale war between the two countries, but due to Ethiopian military superiority the conflict will reach much further into Eritrea than in the 1998 – 2000 border war. Ethiopia will enter Eritrea through Gash Barka and via Sudan with heavy machinery, forcing the population to flee north before entering Sudan. A military offensive into Eritrea will prompt a mass-movement into Sudan of up to 250,000 refugees mainly from Eritrea, many of whom will experience their second displacement into Sudan. Ethiopian use of Sudanese territory to enter Eritrea will cause internal displacement on the Sudanese side of the border. Displacement (refugees and IDPs) will occur in an area already heavily impoverished from decades of marginalization and under-development. In addition, the population has been subject to the prolonged presence of large numbers of refugees tearing on the limited resources. The global acute malnutrition rate in Gash Barka, currently 19-21%, is likely to have increased following the trek across the border. Eritrean support to Eastern Sudan rebels would diminish due to Eritrea‟s preoccupation with and possible military engagement with Ethiopia. Continued discontent among the eastern front rebels, particularly Beja Congress in Kassala will be noted and there are predictions that the Beja Congress th could possibly take over Hameshkoreib on 9 January when SPLA officially leaves. This would spur localized violence and a short disruption of transport from Port Sudan and would cause increasing difficulty in humanitarian access. The low humanitarian presence in the East is not likely to change. Populations at risk would include the new influx of refugees from Eritrea (200,000) who would put additional pressure on scarce resources among the existing refugee population in Gedaref. Some population movement is expected from eastern Sudan into Eritrea if the Beja take over Hameshkoreib. The humanitarian consequences in Kassala would include open conflict between GoS troops and Beja rebels. Humanitarian access to affected or vulnerable populations would be nonexistent, provoking increased needs in areas like Gedaref where an already vulnerable population of 1.5 million exists with extremely low response capacity. The main needs are for water, health care and services and shelter as well as the need to treat mine injuries. 2.1.2.3 Worst Case Scenario Armed conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia coincides with an armed confrontation between the GoS and the Eastern Front. The situation engulfs Port Sudan and spreads, encouraging new groups to join the battle to seize on the opportunity to be part of a brokered deal on power and wealth sharing; possibility of deterioration into a broader civil-war. GoNU takeover of Hamish Koreib generates mass displacement towards Port Sudan and Kassala while some 50,000 refugees enter the Kassala area from Eritrea. All displaced are in need of urgent emergency assistance in the first weeks. In addition the use of Sudanese territory by Ethiopia (in conflict with Eritrea) causes internal displacement where displaced populations, the communities that host them and the coping mechanisms they employ all come under further strain as insecurity rises and access is further restricted. Increased militarization of strategic areas will limit humanitarian access and possibly cause further internal population displacement in these areas. Humanitarian access to Hamish Koreib from Sudan is not possible and access from Eritrea is limited because of the
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conflict. Increased insecurity may affect the delivery of assistance and possibly cause the movement of people from rural to urban areas. Populations in the area become increasingly marginalized because there is no capacity for additional humanitarian assistance. In the worst case scenario where a full scale Eritrea-Ethiopian war would trigger massive refugee inflow into Kassala, we would see the increased presence of Sudanese government troops in the East. Government militias would continue to mobilize and arm causing localized tensions in the East as the SPLA withdraw. Access to Hamish Koreib from Sudan or Eritrea (humanitarian aid is currently accessed from Eritrea) is reduced and the increase in the placement of landmines completely removes the possibility for displaced and refugee populations to return. Refugees from Eritrea will arrive in waves as not everyone will be able to move within the first days as most of the population in Gash Barka is poor and does not have the means to travel far. Humanitarian assistance to the estimated 110,000 Eritrean and Ethiopian refugee population in Gedaref may be suspended and there will be no access to IDP populations in Kassala and other vulnerable populations. Conflict suspends traffic on vital and strategic supply corridor on the Port Sudan-Khartoum highway and impacts on food security in Eritrea. The Eritrea-Sudan border closes. Increased displacement, mortality and morbidity will prevail especially as there is no access to affected populations. Arbitrary arrests and human rights violations would compound the spread of diseases that results from the severe lack to health services. There are strong needs for increased humanitarian presence and assistance so that access issues –to IDPs; to water; to shelter and health services- are acute priorities. 2.1.2.4 Simulated Cross border Response Plan A. Background: Outbreak of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea triggering population inflow into Kassala. Beja take over of the east following the withdrawal of the SPLA. Increase in mine incidents in the east, leading to the disruption of refugee return. Widespread food insecurity added to multiple outbreaks of diseases including Avian Flu. B. Planning Assumptions - Kassala- Influx of refugees from Eritrea (200,000) - Beja take over of Kassala. - Population movement from eastern Sudan into Eritrea following potential Beja take over of Hameshkoreib. C. Humanitarian consequences and Needs - Increasing of population and needs- already vulnerable population of 1.5 million existing, response capacity is extremely low - Kassala- Water, health and shelter. - Kassala - Open conflict between GoS troops and Beja rebels. - Kassala – absolute no humanitarian access; population movement to Port Sudan or Gedaref where refugee populations are hosted. - Treating mine injuries D. Minimum response and Timeline EASTERN SUDAN IN-COUNTRY RESPONSE 24 hours – Emergency response with existing capacities in the area of influx. 48 hours – Response through national Red Crescent; some response by UNHCR and I/NGOs (IRC, OXFAM) already present in Kassala, Gedaref and Port Sudan and UNMIS. 1 Week - Food aid for accessible areas humanitarian organizations. 2 Weeks - set up new camps and begin advocacy E. Main challenges at Country Level - Severe access restriction to affected population, both displaced and host-population; - Lack of resources; limited humanitarian presence; chronic situation in the east; limited interest in the east; funding constraints; other competing emergencies. - Lack of access to militarized areas in the GoNU side of the border and increased insecurity - Mine infestation in the border region thereby limiting humanitarian interventions and haming the fleeing population;
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F. Minimum response regional actors - Regional Support - Advocacy on the overall situation in the east. - Diversion of funds (rapid response funds) to the east. - Identify new sources of support - Deployment of regional surge capacity of staff. In addition, carry out advocacy to develop strategy to link the Eritrea-Ethiopia situation with impact on eastern Sudan and also link it with the CPA and its possible non-inclusion of the marginalized population in the East. Put pressure for Egypt to mobilise supplies to the East.
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2..2 ERIITREA--ETHIIOPIIA--DJIIBOUTII 2 2 ER TREA ETH OP A DJ BOUT
2.2.1 Current Humanitarian Context The humanitarian situation in this cluster is underlined by five successive years of drought and food insecurity (to a lesser extent in Djibouti), a stalemated peace process between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the displacement of populations both internally and externally and seasonal health risks, including recent concerns about the renewed outbreak of polio and the prevailing threat of an outbreak of avian flu. There are 124,788 refugees in the three countries and 315,509 internally displaced persons in Ethiopia and Eritrea, the majority of the displaced in Ethiopia, where precise IDP numbers are 1 unknown. Despite better performance of the rains in the current cropping season in both Ethiopia and Eritrea, better harvests will not translate to food self sufficiency in either of the countries. It is estimated that upwards of 5 million people in Ethiopia are chronically food insecure and 47,500 2 people are receiving food assistance in Djibouti. Recent reforms by the governments of both Eritrea and Ethiopia in their humanitarian aid-relevant ministries and structures have led to considerable shrinking of operational space particularly in Eritrea. Furthermore, escalating tensions between the two countries impact negatively on humanitarian operations and constrict humanitarian space. 2.2.2 Most Likely Scenario-Stalemate The dominant element in scenario building for this cluster is the outcome of the peace process between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The most likely scenario was agreed to be continuing stalemate in the demarcation of the border ergo a continuation of the status quo. Favourable and improved performance of the rains during the current cropping season will yield better harvests and improvement in livestock conditions in both Eritrea and Ethiopia and lower the number of food assistance beneficiaries. There are 2.3 million, 8-9.5 million and 47.500 people at risk due to food insecurity in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti respectively. These numbers are added to the 124,788 refugees in the 3 countries and 315,509 IDPs. A continuation of the status quo would mean a rescheduling of food assistance from and increased malnutrition in Eritrea. Similarly, it would cause difficulties with the implementation of the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia and there would be a significant number of the food insecure population which would not be covered by humanitarian emergency assistance in 2006. Chronic food insecurity would continue in Djibouti with no significant lowering of the figures. An outbreak of the Avian Flu is expected. Humanitarian needs would cover the range of food and nonfood assistance. 2.2.3 Worst Case Scenario-Conflict The Worst Case Scenario is based on conflict breaking out between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This would assume the form of incursions and disruptions by Eritrea into Ethiopian territory short of conventional military invasion that would prompt an Ethiopian reaction which would in turn lead to an all out armed confrontation. An upsurge of the internal political unrest in Ethiopia could spread to areas outside the capital but security forces would maintain control. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia would disrupt supplies, including supply of chat into Djibouti from Ethiopia leading to social unrest in Djibouti. An outbreak of the Avian flu in Ethiopia is also foreseen in this scenario. Humanitarian operational environment and access is further restricted in Eritrea and Ethiopia. Populations that would be directly affected by the conflict would include 400,000 in Eritrea and 300,000 in Ethiopia but there will be little humanitarian impact in Djibouti. Up to 1 million people could become displaced internally in Eritrea but in Ethiopia this number would remain limited to the 300,000 directly affected by the conflict. The most severe humanitarian consequences would occur in Eritrea where severe shortages of NonFood items such as fuel and shelter would be noted and population displacement would be proportionally and absolutely the highest. Restrictions on access would pose further logistical constraints in the delivery of aid and there would be some potential for diversion of attention from other needy populations. Again, the humanitarian needs would be multi-sectoral and would include both food needs and the need for NFIs and services. 2.2.4 Simulated Cross Border Response Plan -Conflict A. Background
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The Horn of Africa Affected Populations Report (15/08/05) estimates IDPs in Ethiopia= 150-265,000; in Eritrea, = 50,509. Of the total number of beneficiaries, 9,500 are children. The EMOP is until the end of December 2005.
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Conflict breaks out between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This would assume the form of incursions and disruptions by Eritrea into Ethiopian territory short of conventional military invasion, followed by Ethiopia reaction, provoking an all out armed confrontation. The scenario envisages an upsurge of the internal political unrest in Ethiopia spreading outside the capital but security forces maintain control. The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia would disrupt supplies, including supply of khat into Djibouti from Ethiopia leading to social unrest in Djibouti. An outbreak of the Avian flu in Ethiopia is also foreseen in this scenario. Humanitarian operational environment and access is further restricted, principally in Eritrea and Ethiopia. The main issues of concern included the in-country capacity to cope, the likely operational environment for humanitarian aid delivery and access and the constraints that would pose challenges to the response. B. Planning Assumptions Pipeline/supply and logistics constraints principally fuel shortages Relocation or evacuation of some UN staff (Ethiopia: sub-office staff; Eritrea: country?); limited number of humanitarian actors Access to “hot spots” will be controlled; relationship with authorities will become more complex Possible donor “sanctions” or redirection of resources UNMEE is withdrawn Numbers of internally displaced o Ethiopia: 300,000 o Eritrea: 400,000 (initial) Existing food resources/stocks in country Ethiopia 300,000 MT in country; will require up to an additional 260,000 MT in the first six months (assuming cash resources are cut off through donor sanctions) Eritrea: 92,000 MT in country Lack of non-food items in-country Government – local and central – will take the lead in the coordination of assistance delivery. C. Consequences and Needs Conflict will internally displace significant numbers of people in both Ethiopia (Afar and Tigray) and Eritrea Debub and Gash Barka including recent refugee and IDP returnees. The IDPs cut off from livelihood and basic needs. Key needs include food, water, shelter, health care, protection as outlined below. Needs Ethiopia (300,000) Tigray and Afar 15,000 tents (assume others are hosted by local communities) 120,000 2.1m litres per day 50 tankers 60,000 kits 32,000 MT Eritrea (400,000) Populations along the TSZ 80,000 tents/plastic sheeting
Shelter
Blankets Water Other NFIs: jerry cans, bladders, pumps, etc. Food (for 6 months)
160,000 2.8m litres per day 60 tankers 80,000 kits 42,000 MT
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D. Response Plan Matrix Timeframe 24 Hours 48 Hours I week 2 Weeks.
Negotiate roles of humanitarian actors with government authorities; Activate/initiate coordination mechanisms Get info regarding numbers of people moving, locations Ensure water as first priority
E. Response Challenges Pipeline constraints Limited humanitarian personnel Limited access „Re-direction‟ of resources Specific Constraints Ethiopia: Currently there is a refugee camp (Sudanese) of 10,000 people on the border. UNHCR has made contingency plans to evacuate the refugees. However, the new site is inaccessible by road and the provision of food and other items will pose further logistical difficulties. F. Minimum Response at Regional Level Advocacy
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2..3 SOMALIIA – ETHIIOPIIA -- KENYA 2 3 SOMAL A – ETH OP A KENYA
2.3.1 Current Humanitarian Context The current humanitarian context for this cluster largely focuses on the geographical area where Kenya‟s northern border converges with Ethiopia and Somalia where resource- and ethnically-based conflicts have increasingly affected populations. The situation in El Wak is currently the most acute with approximately 17,000 Somali refugees and 35,000 IDPs on the Kenyan side of the border and about 15,000 IDPs in Somalia. Despite the signing of a peace agreement and ostensible cessation of hostilities, humanitarian assistance has been extremely limited and the situation continues to grow in severity. On the Ethiopia and Kenyan border sporadic conflict continues to affect residential populations and increases food and livelihood insecurity in these areas. Several incidents, usually involving theft of livestock and the use of violence, are reported each week. In July the attacks on Turbi in northern Kenya by Borana from Ethiopia and subsequent reprisal attacks led to the death of at least 70 people, many of whom were children. Continued trafficking of arms in the region is likely to be heightened further by the recent increase of arms coming into Somalia. The easy availability of weapons contributes to localized conflict and growing criminality. The increasing incidence of extremist activity in Somalia also poses a threat to regional stability which consequently impacts on the border regions and affects cross border movements key to pastoral livelihoods. During discussion, it was noted that the growing tension between Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as the post election unrest in Ethiopia have also had an impact in the border regions of Kenya and Ethiopia as clans and ethnic groups ally themselves with one or the other of two countries. Overall, current political tensions in the three countries will undoubtedly affect the humanitarian context in the border regions in some way. It was also noted that the use of landmines, as recently witnessed near the border towns of Burhache in Somalia and Liboi in Kenya, is a growing trend in the context of these localized conflicts.
Also central to the current context has been the poor climatic conditions in southern Somalia, northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia and, despite recent improvements in the Horn of Africa over the last three months, food security in these areas remains of concern. In addition parts of south eastern Ethiopia and the Juba Riverine area of Somalia have been affected by periodic flooding. There have been 17 confirmed cases of wild polio virus in Ethiopia and 2 in Somalia. The risk Avian Flu is high and Kenya and Ethiopia are cited as among the countries most at risk. 2.3.2 Most Likely Scenario Little improvement is expected for the humanitarian situation in El Wak and indeed a further decline is predicted. Needs are expected to span all sectors affecting displaced populations and the communities that host them. The continued „closure‟ of the Kenya / Somalia border affects delivery of assistance, trade and livelihoods. Regional dynamics contribute to growing instability in border areas and a further decline in civilian protection, health, food and livelihoods security. On the Kenyan/Ethiopian border, relations between the Gabra and Borana will improve in the wake of successful mediation efforts. Throughout the cluster, the nature of conflict continues to evolve and will include increased targeting of women and children and the diffusion of arms. Climate forecasts suggest that the deyr season rains will be normal to below normal. However, even normal rains in the catchment area of the Ethiopian highlands will lead to localized flooding of the Juba in Somalia. Below normal rains in-country, in Gedo and the Juba regions, will lead to a decline in food security and livelihood status for rain-fed agro-pastoralist and pastoralist groups already experiencing stress due to below normal gu 2005 rains. Pastoral areas will be affected by insufficient browsing and grazing with predictable increase in food and livelihood insecurity, vulnerability and greater economic migration. Insecurity and poor infrastructure will limit humanitarian presence. Although the risk of Polio in the region would continue, a severe outbreak would be contained by ongoing monitoring and immunisation. HIV/AIDS prevalence rates and trends would not show any significant variation (up or down). The implementation of the livestock ban affecting Somalia and other countries that export livestock via Somalia would continue with the same consequences for trade and livelihoods. 2.3.3 Worst Case Scenario Full scale hostilities would resume in the border area near El Wak incorporating clans from Ethiopia and leading to a further deterioration in the humanitarian situation. Somalia would become a proxy battlefield for conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Sporadic but high intensity rains would cause flooding in Ethiopia, Somalia and northern Kenya increasing the risk of epidemics and destroying livelihoods. Additionally, widespread flooding would increase vulnerability for riverine populations
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along the Juba River and its tributaries in Somalia, Somali region of Ethiopia and on the Kenya/Ethiopia border near Mandera Town. An alternative scenario which could occur simultaneously or in close temporal proximity with flooding would be one of poor rains in southern Somalia, Southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. This drought like situation would further impact on livelihoods and food security and contribute to growing tensions. The collapse of the TFG would trigger an escalation in instability and decline in protection, food and livelihood security and access even as malnutrition and disease augment. Civil unrest in Ethiopia could become widespread and spread to many areas outside of Addis Ababa. Similarly, the Constitutional Referendum in Kenya would spur large scale civil unrest. Neither situation is expected to prompt massive cross border population movements although localized and temporary internal displacement can be foreseen. The Wild Polio virus would spread throughout the region and this would be exacerbated by an outbreak of the Avian Flu. Aflatoxin, the maize blight that has plagued food stocks in Kenya for several consecutive seasons would re-occur with greater intensity and impact. 2.3.4 Simulated Cross Border Response Plan A. Background The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) collapses increasing insecurity throughout the country and there is a resumption of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both these situations contribute to an intensification of ethnic and resource based conflict on the Kenya / Somalia border (including in El Wak) which is further inflamed by divisions in Kenya over the referendum and civil unrest in Ethiopia. This escalation in hostilities would lead to displacement both with and across national borders. In addition, the September – December rains have been insufficient and have caused a further deterioration to pasture and water conditions in southern Somalia, northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia. Access to the affected areas is impeded by insecurity. B. Planning Assumptions: Emergency preparedness and contingency exercises have been carried out including the development of a contingency plan and the pre-positioning of stocks A common security assessment has been undertaken in all three countries Likely redeployment of military personnel from northern Kenya in advance of and following the referendum and law enforcement capacity in volatile areas of northern Kenya is reduced Communities in northern Kenya become increasingly marginalized over the referendum period Spoilers and extremist elements undermine peace negotiations in El Wak. Extremist activity in Somali further limits humanitarian access Minimal UN and NGO presence in affected areas Risk of attacks by extremist elements on humanitarian workers with implications for air access from Kenya to Somalia and Ethiopia to Somalia Security phase inhibits response in Somalia Difficulties in moving assistance through Kenya into Somalia although negotiations may be possible C. Consequences & Needs: Very poor protection environment Need for advocacy on cooperation modalities and on obligations Lack of access for humanitarian activities Widespread needs across all sectors Recurrent temporary population displacement Widespread livelihood insecurity and growing economic migration Restriction on pastoral movements Injury and fatality Targeting of women and children
D. Response Matrix Pre-emergency (preparedness) Common security assessment in all countries Up to date
Within 48 hours Undertake initial security assessment based on available information Assess risk to staff
Within 1 week Country teams agree on sector response Compilation of a response plan and an appeal if
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contingency plans in place and shared between countries Capacity and vulnerability mapping in place Identification of authorities and interlocuters Pre-positioning of items where necessary / possible
Establish a point of dialogue and negotiation through the HC/RCs Establish contact with joint border commission to discuss access / security Consult contingency plans Identify available and prepositioned supplies Conduct rapid needs assessment through national counterparts Country teams meet to discuss the situation and response Country teams consult between one another and through OCHA Contact NGO, local authority and CBO partners with a presence in the affected areas to establish their capacity to provide an initial response
necessary Country teams meet with donors Within 72 hours services underway through partner organisations Reassessment undertaken Establish the coordination parameters Negotiate access with national authorities
E. Challenges These were not elaborated during the allotted time. F. Minimum Response at Regional Level Address any coordination issues that cannot be resolved / undertaken at country level Liaise between country teams Liaise between country teams and head quarters Ensure technical coherence Support or undertake resource mobilisation Undertake advocacy Provide technical support Provide surge capacity and identify experts as necessary
2..4.. SUDAN--UGANDA--KENYA 2 4 SUDAN UGANDA KENYA
2.4.1 Current Humanitarian Situation The three countries form what is known as the Karamojong Cluster and typical for the border regions are cattle raids/cattle rustling with the most acute cross border raids occur between Turkana & Pokots in Kenya and Karamajong & Dodos in Uganda. There is ongoing disarmament of the border tribes in both Kenya and Uganda but these have not been coordinated or synchronized and some re-arming
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has been noted in recent times. The border region between Sudan and Uganda is dominated by conflict-induced displacement of 1.8 million in Uganda alone mainly due to Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA) attacks on civilians. The LRA activities and cross border movements prompts pursuit by the Ugandan People‟s Defence Force (UPDF) even to areas far within the Sudanese border. The flow of small arms whether for defensive or commercial purposes continues across the borders of all three the countries. Political processes in Uganda (Presidential elections in March 2006) and Kenya (Constitutional referendum in November 2005) are exacerbating ethnic strife and fuelling intercommunal tensions. The fragile state of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between north and south Sudan in January is of some concern especially in its impact on population movements across borders. The 1.5 million IDPs and close to 300,000 refugees in northern Uganda continue on General Food Distribution (GFD) and the large food aid programmes in all 3 countries are hampered by drought and insecurity. Due to recent bumper harvests in Karamoja, GFD has been phased out. Similar crop surpluses in parts of southern Sudan have been noted but there are still 3.2 million people receiving food aid in southern and eastern Sudan and Transitional areas. Poor rainfall with recurrent drought impacts on food security, especially in the Ilemi Triangle along the Sudan/Kenya/Ethiopia border. Population movements (including seasonal migration of birds) encourage spread of epidemic diseases with the main threats coming from Yellow Fever, Ebola, Polio and the Avian Flu. Natural disaster concerns include the active Mt Elgon volcano along the Kenya/Uganda border and the threat posed by landslides in western and south-western Uganda. Humanitarian access and aid delivery to vulnerable populations in border regions is often restricted due to insecurity. 2.4.2 Most Likely Scenario Political processes in Kenya and Uganda are not expected to have regional implications as any displacement will be localized and on a small scale. However, as the Government of Uganda puts greater focus on the elections, and with the threat of ICC indictment of its top leaders, the LRA is expected to step up its attacks on civilians prompting further displacement in southern Sudan and northern Uganda. Heightened vulnerability of displaced populations will ensue and spontaneous repatriation of Sudanese refugees from Uganda and Kenya will slow down. The CPA in Sudan is nevertheless expected to remain intact. Transmission of epidemic diseases remains a concern especially along border trade and transport routes. Although good harvests are expected to improve food security, shortfalls in the food aid pipeline coupled with mounting insecurity, could increase the need for GFD for displaced populations. 2.4.3 Worst Case Scenario The elections in Uganda triggers widespread violence and/or the NRMO (National resistance Movement Organization) ruling party collapses. The LRA may find sympathy with opposition movements or other exiled rebel groups with, as consequence, greater diffusion in attacks and atrocities committed against civilians and uncontrolled displacement of populations internally and across borders. The Karamojong could take advantage of UPDF pre-occupation to launch more intense cross border raids. The gradual collapse of the CPA in Sudan could further spur internal population movement as fighting occurs sporadically around garrison towns. The outbreak and spread of epidemic disease such as Yellow Fever or the Avian Flu are considered in this scenario. The humanitarian consequences of any and all of these events are much greater than present but now faced with diminished response capacity as humanitarian actors reduce or halt their activities and insecurity further curtails access. Humanitarian needs will be comprehensive in all sectors as high mortality and high morbidity are exacerbated by a lack of service provision and reduced resources to address needs. Insecurity hampers access to crops and resultant rampant food insecurity would spike the need for food aid in the face of reduced delivery possibilities.
2.4.4 Simulated Cross Border Response Plan A. Background The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan has collapsed and there are skirmishes mainly around the garrison towns. The LRA has increased its attacks, now with greater intensity, widely expanding the conflict zone to new areas in South Sudan and North Uganda. Humanitarian workers are new targets for LRA attacks both in Uganda and Sudan. With the UPDF being preoccupied with the conflict in the north, the Karamojong have re-armed and have begun a series of violent cattle raids across the border against the Pokots and the Turkanas in Kenya. WHO is also reporting 50 confirmed cases of Yellow Fever in the Imatong Hills in South Sudan.
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B. Planning Assumptions Directly affected population needing life saving response from conflict: 200,000; from cattle raids: 10,000; from Yellow Fever: 40,000 UNMIS will enforce Chapter 7 mandate (at least for protection of humanitarian workers) in situ There is still some access in conflict zone but more restricted in Imatong Hills & Eastern & western Equatoria, northern Uganda There are some humanitarian resources available for conflict Cattle raids remain in border areas only but with retaliatory attacks; limited response needed or possible Will not escalate into regional war but tensions increase between GoU and GoS Poor border coordination on Yellow Fever response C. Consequences & Needs Security level goes up: restrictions on humanitarian movement Possible resumption of North-South fighting in and around garrison towns; use of proxy militias; UPDF steps up vigilance along border Conflict spurs internal population movement within southern Sudan and with some cross border into Uganda & Kenya; no return from Uganda into Sudan. Current humanitarian progammes continue but with more restrictions; shift towards life saving assistance; delivery of humanitarian is curtailed to essential emergency assistance Increased internal displacement in Uganda; Increase in conflict-related fatalities and injuries Depletion of assets and resources for vulnerable populations; vulnerability & food security crisis Needs 200,000 in the border region need protection and food aid (=3,500 MT/month) Shelter needs and NFIs for 35,000 households along both sides of border (24,000 in Sudan; 11,000 in Uganda) 500,000 Yellow Fever vaccines with cold chain support (for people in directly affected area and for the neighbouring populations) Mobile health facilities with possibility for treating war injuries Water & sanitation Increased support to existing health facilities & nutritional programmes Security for humanitarian workers Financial and personnel resources D. Minimum Response at country level
Coordination Lead Agency: HC/OCHA Within 24 hours Within 48 hours Initiate emergency coordination mechanism. Situation appraisal: to define problems, needs, existing capacities (existing contingency stocks); approach local & national authorities, UNMIS Situation report Within 1 Week Within 2 Weeks
Information sharing & communication Information Lead Agency: OCHA
Resource mobilization Funding appeals Lead Agency: Individual Agencies + Coordination Structure Security analysis & action Lead Agency: UNMIS, UNDSS Food aid Situation analysis Deployment of personnel & resources
Security analysis & action
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Within 24 hours Lead Agency: WFP Identifying logistic resources Situation analysis from humanitarian perspective Identify protection needs for humanitarian workers Situation analysis Identifying logistic resources & stocks that could be diverted
Within 48 hours Positioning of stocks
Within 1 Week Within 2 Weeks Distribution of emergency food aid
Deploy security assets on the basis of needs Continue existing programmes and respond to changes
Protection Lead Agency: UNDSS UNICEF/UNHCR
Shelter & NFIs Lead Agency: UNICEF
Positioning of stocks Identification of implementing partners
Distribution of emergency assistance Camp set up
Health & Nutrition Lead Agency: UNICEF in Sudan, Uganda; MOH,WHO in Kenya Water & sanitation Lead Agency: UNICEF
Situation analysis: Existing facilities, response capacities, needs analysis
Establishing mobile health services for Yellow Fever (response & surveillance); Surveillance & vaccination in Kenya Distributing health kits Supporting existing programmes with human resources & material Monitor nutritional status
Situation analysis: determine displacement & settlement patterns
E. Challenges: Security/access Land mines Lack of infrastructure Inadequate resources Inadequate information Mobile populations Other shocks (avian flu, competing emergency…) F. Minimum Response at Regional Level Regional stocks Information & analysis Coordination between countries Liaison with headquarters Surge capacity Resource mobilization Links to donors/donor information ADVOCACY
2..5 CHAD--CENTRAL AFRIICAN REPUBLIIC 2 5 CHAD CENTRAL AFR CAN REPUBL C
2.5.1 Current situation The current humanitarian context for this cluster largely focused on the degradation of humanitarian indicators in CAR and the threat of political instability in both Chad and CAR as a result of the poor state of health of President Deby of Chad. CAR is suffering from a structural crisis having very important humanitarian consequences. Life expectancy is very low (total population life expectancy in 2005: 43.39 years) mostly due to the effects of excess mortality caused by AIDS, malaria, measles, high infant mortality and poor access to health services. In the northern part of the country, insecurity hampers the transit of goods thus constraining trade and economic exchange between the north and south of the country. Access to food markets is also very limited and malnutrition rates are high, due to food insecurity and poor access to water. Donor interest and humanitarian assistance in CAR is too minimal to have a real impact on people‟s lives.
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In both countries, the political situation remains fragile due to active dissidence and the poor representation of the political opposition. The risk of tension and increasing instability in the already unsafe zone between CHAD and CAR generates more population movements from CAR to Chad. It is estimated that around 40,000 refugees are now living in southern Chad with very limited access to basic services. This movement of population is due to the high level of insecurity prevailing in Northern CAR. The possible presence of oil in Northern CAR as a continuum of the Chadian oil fields may also fuel potential conflicts of interests between these two countries. 2.5.2 Most Likely Scenario The socio-economic situation is likely to deteriorate in CAR. The border between the two countries will remain open but at least de facto, humanitarian access may be limited or non-existent. Violence and troubles will prevail in the border region between Chad and CAR. There will be no population movements to Northern CAR from Bangui although Southern Chad remains relatively secure. Vulnerable populations in Bangui will be more vulnerable due to the non-payment of civil servants‟ salaries. 200 000 persons living at the CAR-CHAD border are threatened by malnutrition, bandit attacks and floods, even as increased looting and incidents of sexual violence become a serious concern. The risk of ethnic or religious cleavages heightens even as political tensions in Chad intensify due to political dissentions and the precarious health of the President. The worsening humanitarian situation in CAR increases the general mortality and access to food markets becomes extremely difficult. 2.5.3 Worst Case Scenario The President of Chad disappears or resigns, with corresponding violence, and thereby weakens the political weight of the President of CAR and opening the door to greater political turmoil in both countries. Floods in northern CAR added to the political instability will cause more new refugees to flee CAR to southern Chad, consequently increasing humanitarian needs in the border area. Epidemic diseases -especially Malaria and HIV AIDS- will increase mainly on the CAR side of the border, maybe to irreversible points. Population flows across the border trigger conflict in the border zone as food security deteriorates causing malnutrition and forcing people to consume toxic wild roots with fatal results. As conflict increases, more people leave from CAR to Chad and to some extent to Cameroon. Seasonal floods and drought in some parts of Chad exacerbate the situation. 2.5.4 Simulated Cross Border Response Plan A. Background Credible reports reaching you indicate that the president of Chad seems to have disappeared. Rumours as to his fate abound but the immediate situation is one of intense political jockeying for power in Chad. This impacts on political stability in CAR, which is already struggling with civil unrest due to the non-payment of civil servants‟ salaries. The rains have been particularly heavy and have submerged large areas of farmland in CAR. The impact of HIV AIDS is being felt throughout the two countries. B. Planning Assumptions The border between the two countries will remain open, at least de facto, but there may be no humanitarian access. No population movements to Northern CAR from Bangui, Northern populations move to Chad. Southern Chad stays remains relatively secure. Access / humanitarian response hard due to security: not possible from Bangui, easier but still difficult from Chad, Non-food and health items need to come from overseas, Minimal UN and NGO presence in affected areas Neither FOMUC nor Government can assure a return to security in Bangui or elsewhere, crisis risks lasting a long time. Non-essential humanitarian personnel evacuated. Humanitarian relays not operational. Vulnerable populations in Bangui in even more critical situation. Border areas (up to 2‟000‟000 people) in dangerous situation. Collapse of Government and entire administrative system. C. Consequences & Needs: Humanitarian situation is already so serious that aids is now extremely limited compared to needs. General and rapid deterioration of already difficult humanitarian situation Widespread needs across all sectors Recurrent temporary population displacement
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Humanitarian access very difficult
Increased humanitarian needs in Southern Chad, following arrival of new refugees from CAR
Within 48 hours Arrange an emergency coordination meeting with all humanitarian actors present under RC Authority, Assess risk to staff, evacuate all non-essential staff, through FOMUC or French military. Activate contingency plan, Activate emergency communication channels and request channels with HQ. Estimation of clear humanitarian needs. Establishment of monitoring systems (field missions etc), Coordination meetings continued, to find out who does what, and prioritise response components Within 72 hours services underway through partner organisations Within 1 week Country teams agree on sector response Compilation of a response plan and an appeal if necessary Country teams meet with donors Negotiate access in troubled zone Flash appeal based on assessments of needs made. Situation reports regularly produced and shared.
D. Response Matrix Pre-emergency (preparedness) Common security assessment in both countries Up to date contingency plans in place and shared between countries Capacity and vulnerability mapping in place Liaise with OCHA GVA New York on any worsening of the humanitarian situation Increased advocacy towards CAR structural and humanitarian situation
E. Challenges These were not elaborated during the allotted time. F. Minimum Response at Regional Level: Activation of a tripartite Committee (CAR, Cameroon, Chad), UN (including SC), Political mediation through the network of regional heads of state led by Gabonese president, UN (including SC), AU, Organization of Francophonie, Committee of Wise (RSG, Ambassador of France, etc). Advocacy: UN (at HQ and regional level); support from media (e.g. IRIN) if possible, Committee of Wise (RSG, Ambassador of France, etc), the network of regional heads of state led by Gabonese president Funding: Donors active at regional level (France, Germany, USA, EU, PRC); coordination by UN (including OCHA). Provide technical support and surge capacity and identify experts as necessary
3. PRESENTATIONS & DISCUSSIONS 3..1 Regiionall Diiscussiions 3 1 Reg ona D scuss ons
The country clusters format adopted for the Workshop generated insightful discussions on a number of cross border issues and concerns internal to countries with potential regional implications. This section briefly summarizes the discussions, some which transcend single clusters and represent varying views of participants. Eritrea/Ethiopia/Djibouti: Participants noted that predicting the timing of a renewal of hostilities between the two countries is difficult because of the irrational patterns of behaviour of the parties. There was much discussion as to the form such a resumption of fighting would take, with suggestions that it could assume an indirect/proxy pattern as part of Eritrea‟s strategy, which would not necessarily be welcomed by all communities in Ethiopia, particularly the Oromos. There was broad consensus that no direct external intervention from neighbouring states could be foreseen in the event of renewal
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of hostilities. If conflict was to break out immediately (in November/December) or during a period of intense internal instability in Ethiopia, Eritrea could have an upper hand. Participants observed that both countries face serious internal credibility dilemmas and some reports suggest that both countries have been actively re-arming and re-organizing their forces in readiness for renewed fighting, although it appears that none of the parties really knows what would trigger a new round of fighting. This actually represents a danger in the stalemate and tensions. The impact on Djibouti of a resumption of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea is considered minimal, even nil and the humanitarian situation there remains chronic but not an emergency. The flotilla of foreign forces in Djibouti is considered sufficient deterrence to any threat to the Port of Djibouti on which Ethiopia is dependant for import supply. Sudan/Chad and CAR: Discussions on this cluster centred on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for the Sudan (CPA), the conflict in Darfur, potential for regime change in Chad and the dynamics of these on the humanitarian situation. Participants observed and debated the plight of nomads caught up in the fighting in Darfur and the impact this has on their livelihoods, which have eroded steeply during the fighting. There was recognition that all is not well with the CPA, but that it will endure, at least for the time being. It was observed that one of the flaws of the CPA is that it leaves little for the many excluded political groups to share out. In this context, and considering the unwillingness of the Government of National Unity to re-open the CPA for further negotiations with these parties, pacifying Sudan remains a difficult task. The divisions between factions of the SLA will contribute to the continuation of the fighting in Darfur. Some participants contended that the situation in Darfur is worse and more complex than that in the South and will require a more ingenious approach to resolve. The sympathies of President Idriss Deby with respect to the parties in Darfur are unpredictable because of its ever-shifting position, whose sole objective is the continued survival of the regime in N‟Djamena. Political stability or the lack thereof in Chad also impacts on CAR whose regime is dependant on the alliance with President Deby. Somalia/Kenya/Ethiopia: The main focus of discussion in this group was the progress or lack thereof of efforts to re-establish state authority in Somalia. The view was expressed that the peace process remains precarious and its eventual success remains far from assured. The formation of the Transitional Federal Government, it was argued, is informed by a prescription unsuited to the Somalia situation, where clan affiliation in the South supersedes any nationalism or possibility for state cohesion. In contrast, clan compositions in Puntland and Somaliland appear amenable to viable administrative units. Ethiopia‟s role and interests in Somalia have seemingly receded in the wake of the internal political crisis in Ethiopia following the May elections. The safety and security of humanitarian personnel and what impact this has on humanitarian work was also discussed. Recent targeting of humanitarian workers in Somalia is the work of a fringe and does not have popular support. It was also observed that long-standing fears of the presence of Islamic extremists in Somalia are misplaced as the fragmented clan structure in Somalia is in discordance with the ideology of groups such as Al Ittihad al Islamiya. The only viable solution to rebuilding Somalia appears to be through a gradual building block approach, allowing for the emergence and consolidation of local administrative structures and regional governments such as the self-declared republics of Somaliland and Puntland. Negotiations for a united Somali state are then allowed to proceed between such units. Uganda/Sudan: it was argued that the détente between Uganda and Sudan is because of the LRA problem in northern Uganda. There appears to be a connection between developments inside Sudan and planned elections in Uganda in 2006. Support to the LRA from inside Sudan appears not to have ceased, but it is unclear whether it is officially sanctioned or is the work of rogue security elements in Sudan. The challenge for Uganda‟s leadership appears not to be its likelihood to be returned to office, but how to deal with the post-election period challenges. Overall, the discussions reflect the complexity and layered character of the issues in the Horn of Africa. This makes it difficult to neatly fit cross-border issues into iron-clad clusters. Inter-state relations and their impact on humanitarian developments in individual countries criss-cross the entire region.
3..2 The Siittuattiion iin Easttern Sudan 3 2 The S ua on n Eas ern Sudan
The Sudan Advocacy Coalition‟s presentation on eastern Sudan focused on the situation in the region particularly the causes and consequences of the brewing conflict in Eastern Sudan. Background to the Problem
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The peoples of eastern Sudan, with a population of an estimated 2.5 million, have long experienced extreme marginalization particularly in the Beja areas of the Red Sea Hills and the Funj areas along the Blue Nile. Underdevelopment and environmental degradation in the region are progressively threatening pastoralists‟ livelihoods as a result of lack of access to resources and the region is currently faced with a dire humanitarian crisis. In addition, key positions have been taken up by migrants from Khartoum leaving the local population with no or limited access to job opportunities and lack of access to the nation‟s wealth. The continued neglect of the region by the national and international community prompted the formation (nearly ten years ago) of an “Eastern Front,” comprising both the military elements of the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions (the Rashaida are one of the marginalized peoples of eastern Sudan) in order to air their grievances to the Government of Sudan and the international community. Several offensives have taken place with the largest taking place in June by the Beja. Humanitarian Situation Humanitarian indicators in eastern Sudan rank among the worst in the country. Humanitarian assistance has been ineffective with poorly targeted interventions. Health structures and educational systems are nearly non-existent and fighting has exacerbated the situation. The region also faces food shortages and access to vulnerable populations remains a major challenge. Concern has been raised on the limited presence of humanitarian actors in the region. Political Environment The opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to which the two main rebel groups belong continues to be isolated both on the political and economic fronts in Sudan. This is likely to further increase tensions in the east. The recent visit of an Eritrean delegation to Sudan indicates a “warming of relations” between the two countries and could in effect result in the waning of Eritrean support to the Eastern Front rebels and hence a possible decrease in the military capacity of the Beja rebels. The current capacity of the rebels is not exactly clear. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between north th and south Sudan on 9 January provides for the disengagement and withdrawal of the SPLA from the East by 9 January2006. The withdrawal of the SPLA and the death of Dr. John Garang (who supported the cause of the Beja) imply a substantial reduction of SPLA military support to the Beja. The SPLM appears to be inclined to continue offering political support to the Beja.
Risks and Opportunities The Beja demands are linked to development issues ranging from better access to resources, development funds, educational opportunities and health services. Tensions in the region over these grievances as well as new militancy have been noted with new players and new strategies coming on to the scene. The „closed‟ nature of the CPA leaves little room for new partners in the Government of National Unity and therefore in wealth sharing, further alienating members of the opposition in the east-who are to share with Darfurians the 14% allocated to other political parties in the North, including Umma and DUP-and risking an escalation of the confrontation. Suggested Solutions A political settlement in the East is a prerequisite to any efforts at redressing the dire situation in the region. This requires inclusive dialogue to address the root causes of the conflict. There is also a need to outline the strategy and funding for long-term investment in livelihoods and development for the region, most significantly, employment creation for the jobless youth who constitute a key plank of the fighters.
3..3 Kiillller Pandemiics and tthe Threatt off Aviian Fllu 3 3 K er Pandem cs and he Threa o Av an F u
In light of the growing level of concern relating to the threat of Avian Flu and the particular vulnerability of African countries, a presentation on global pandemics and Avian Flu was given by Dr. Enric Freixa, Medical Expert for ECHO. The presentation provided an overview of historical trends in killer pandemics (including Black Death, HIV/AIDS and SARS) and outlined key issues in relation to the risk, preparedness, surveillance and detection, diagnosis and treatment of Avian Flu. Whilst the human to human strain of the H5N1 virus has not yet emerged, and it is therefore not possible to know the exact extent of the disease, the presentation incorporated historical observations and
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available information to highlight these issues, particularly in relation to humanitarian operations. In closing, it was emphasised that humanitarian workers have a particular responsibility to be prepared and take precautionary measures in order to avoid compounding the problem and becoming an additional burden. The complete presentation can be found in the annex of this report. The particular vulnerability of health workers to the epidemic and the subsequent impact on their willingness to respond to a pandemic was an issue of concern raised in the question and answer session. In response it was suggested that health workers are used to working in difficult situations and are often exposed to potentially fatal diseases such as haemorrhagic fever and are used to taking strict precautions. Each person will have to make his or her own assessment of the risk involved. When asked to explain why the risk is greater in Africa, it was noted that the likelihood of early detection is minimal and that the infrastructure for effective surveillance is not in place. High risk seasons are believed to be Christmas - due to the increased numbers of poultry being slaughtered and the cold season when people tend to spend more time indoors and in close proximity. Participants also enquired about the risk from consumption of poultry and eggs. It was clarified that the virus would be neutralised at 70 degrees centigrade so cooked meat does not present a risk. In addition there has been no proof that eggs carry the virus but that even in the absence of a risk of Avian Flu, the consumption of raw eggs is not advisable. In relation to advice that Vitamin C may increase resilience to the epidemic, it was asked whether Vitamin A may be advantageous as well. In response it was noted that there may be many vitamins that would be of benefit but that in order to avoid confusion, one vitamin and one mineral (Zinc) have been recommended. Vitamin C is likely to offer the most advantages in this context.
3..4 Healltth Riisks iin tthe Horn off Affriica Regiion 3 4 Hea h R sks n he Horn o A r ca Reg on
Discussions on health risks in the Horn of Africa were preceded by a presentation of the outcome of a recent workshop for health professionals in the region. The main threats to populations in the HoA come from communicable diseases, especially new threats such as SARS and the Avian Flu, natural disaster –drought, floods, earthquakes, tsunami- and man-made disasters –conflict, chemical risks, etc. The following table provides a general summary.
Country Djibouti Communicable Disease Threats Malaria, cholera, Dysentery, Typhoid HIV AIDS prev.: 2.9% Dengue Fever, Malaria HIV AIDS prev.: 2.7% Polio, Meningitis, Acute Respiratory Infections, Diarrhoea, Malaria HIV AIDS prev. 4.4% Natural Disaster Drought, Floods, Tsunami Man-Made Disaster Poor sanitation, poor access to food and water, weak health services Poor sanitation, poor access to food and water, weak health services Poor access to food and water, civil unrest,
Eritrea Ethiopia
Drought, Drought, Floods, Volcanic Eruption, Earthquake
Kenya
Aflatoxin poisoning, Cholera HIV AIDS prev.: 6.7%
Malaria,
Drought, Floods, Volcanic Eruption, Tsunami, Earthquake
Somalia
Sudan
Uganda
Malaria, Rift Valley Fever, Leshmaniasis, Polio, Measles, Tuberculosis HIV AIDS prev.: 1.4% Polio, Pertussis, Measles, Meningitis, Diphtheria, tetanus, TB, STDs ARI‟s, Gastro-intestinal, Yellow Fever, Ebola, Sleeping Sickness, Kala Azar, malaria HIV AIDS prev.: unknown Cholera, Tuberculosis, Malaria HIV AIDS prev.: 7%
Drought, Floods, Tsunami
Population displacement causing overcrowding in camps, poor sanitation, poor access to food and water in drought affected areas; clashes causing insecurity; lack of care & treatment due to weak health services in border regions Insecurity, poor access to food and water, weak health services
Drought, Floods
Population displacement causing poor sanitation, poor access to food and water; widespread insecurity, weak health services
Localized drought, floods, mudslides, Volcanic Eruption
Insecurity, population displacement causing overcrowding, poor sanitation, poor access to food and water, weak health services
Across the region, the biggest threats are posed by Hemorrhagic Fevers such as Ebola or Marburg, SARS (Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome) and the Avian Flu.
3..5 IInttegratted Food Securiitty Phase Cllassiiffiicattiion 3 5 n egra ed Food Secur y Phase C ass ca on
23
The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification is a classification tool that has been developed by the Food Security and Analysis Unit of FAO which is currently being used extensively by humanitarian actors in the context of Somalia to provide context analysis and to inform response. The development of the tool has been ongoing and comprises six phases ranging from Food Secure with moderate to low risk to Famine. Nicholas Haan, Chief Technical Adviser for FSAU gave an overview of the classification system, detailing the different types of information it comprises, its relationship with planning and response, and its application. In the second part of the presentation, Mr. Haan provided an explanation of the reference characteristics for lives and livelihoods and the strategic response framework associated with each of the six phases. The full phase classification framework as well as the presentation can be found in the annex of this document. Following the presentation, participants asked whether and how the analysis produced by the tool is used by decision makers. In response it was noted that these linkages are being made. For example, the analysis is being replicated exactly in the CAP process where the response analysis was made based on the framework. Members of the UNCT for Somalia confirmed that the tool has been very effective in providing a national and district perspective. It was noted, however, that mapping of areas prone to conflict and stability needs to be developed further. Whilst the tool has been very useful in the context of Somalia, there have been problems in the context of other countries. It was pointed out that in order to obtain the type of information detailed in the phase classification for Somalia; a significant investment has to be made. However, the analysis can be made based on field observations if those making the observations have been well trained. In all cases information should be assessed for its relative reliability and a statement made accordingly. Questions were also asked relating to whether ranking crises in this way serves to push resources only towards the most severe emergencies and therefore failing to mitigate emerging situations. In response, it was noted that the tool should not do that and that its purpose is to identify where populations groups fit into the scale and to inform response accordingly. Participants suggested that greater efforts need to be made at field level to work together to form decisions at headquarters levels rather than the other way around.
ANNEX 1. AGENDA REGIONAL SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT WORKSHOP For the Horn of Africa
Wednesday November 2, 2005
Facilitator: Valerie Julliand, HoO, OCHA RSO CEA Resource Persons: Dr. Gerard Prunier, Director, National Centre for Scientific research (CFEE), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Steve Penny, International Federation of the Red Cross & Red Crescent Time 0830 Session Welcome Content/Objectives Outline of Meeting Objectives and Methodology Ground Rules and Administration Review of April 2005 Scenarios
0900
Regional Humanitarian Context Sudan-Chad-Eritrea Somalia-Ethiopia-Kenya Uganda-Kenya-Sudan Eritrea-Ethiopia-Djibouti Chad-Central African Republic
Presentation of cross-border clusters (10 Minutes + 15 minutes discussion) highlighting: Current cross-border context
1030 1045 Regional Humanitarian Context
Tea/Coffee
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(Continued)
1130 1300
Conflict, Drought & Politics in the HoA
Facilitated Discussion: Dr. Prunier Lunch
1400
Cross Border Scenarios
Group Work: Ethiopia-Eritrea-Djibouti: border ruling/food insecurity Uganda-Sudan-Kenya: cross border incursions/epidemics/cattle raids/SALW movements Sudan-Chad-Eritrea: cross border incursions/population displacement Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia: cross border clashes/pop displacement/food insecurity Chad-CAR: cross border incursions/pop displacement/food insecurity Tea/Coffee (in group)
1530 1630 Cross Border Scenarios Close
Group Presentation to Plenary
1730
Thursday 3 November, 2005
Facilitator: Valerie Julliand, HoO, OCHA RSO-CEA Resource Persons: Dr. Enric Frexia, Regional Medical Advisor, ECHO Dr. Michel Yao, Regional Health Advisor, WHO Sorcha O’Callaghan, Member, Sudan Advocacy Coalition Dr. Nick Haan, Food Security Analysis Unit
0830 0900 0930
Opening Eastern Sudan Avian Flu Risks & Preparedness in the HoA Health Risks & Vulnerabilities in the HoA Presentation: Sorcha O‟Callaghan, SAC Presentation: Dr. Enric Frexia, ECHO
1000
Presentation: on behalf of Dr. Michel Yao, WHO
1015
Response Planning Tool
Presentation: Dr. Nick Haan, FSAU Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Tea/Coffee
1045 1100 Cross Border Preparedness & Response Planning
Group Work: Cross Border Simulation Ethiopia-Eritrea-Djibouti Uganda-Sudan-Kenya Sudan-Chad-Eritrea Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia Chad-CAR
1300
Lunch
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1400
Cross Border Preparedness & Response Planning
Group Work: Cross Border Simulation Continued
1545 1600 Cross Border Preparedness & Response Planning
Tea/Coffee Groups Report to Plenary: Cross Border Simulation
1715
Cross Border Preparedness & Response Planning
Who Does What Where + Gap Analysis
1730
Workshop Conclusion & Evaluation
Annex 2.
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
ORGANIZATION AND DUTY STATION Country Representatives
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
NAME & TITLE
CONTACT ADDRESS (Email/Phone/Fax)
UNICEF CAR OCHA CAR UNHCR UGANDA OCHA UGANDA OCHA ERITREA WHO ERITREA WFP ETHIOPIA OCHA ETHIOPIA OCHA SOMALIA
Mamadou Bailo Baldet Programme Coordinator Maurizio Giuliano Public Information Officer Feixas Vihe Montserrat Deputy Representative Stephen Lukudu Deputy Head of Office Angela Berry Koch Deputy HC and Head of Office Touloum Dadhet Cesar Administrative Officer Lisetta Trebbi Programme Officer Paul Hebert Head of Office Kazimiro Jocondo Deputy Head of Office & OIC
mbbaldet@unicef.org maurizio.giuliano@undp.org FEIXAS@unhcr.ch lukudus@un.org b.koch@un.org touloumd@afro.who.int Lisetta.Trebbi@wfp.org hebert@un.org Kazimiro.rudolf@undp.org
26
10. UNHCR SOMALIA
Alessandra Morelli Senior Repatriation & Reintegration Coordinator Robert McCarthy Emergency Officer Laurent Saillard Coordination Officer Philippe Verstraeten EP & R Coordinator Sune Hjelmervick Gudnitz Humanitarian Affairs Officer/Policy
morelli@unhcr.ch
11. UNICEF SOMALIA 12. UNDP DJIBOUTI 13. OCHA SOUTH SUDAN 14. OCHA SUDAN -
rmccarthy@unicef.org laurent.saillard@undp.org verstraeten@un.org gudnitz@un.org
KHARTOUM UN Agencies 15. UNDP-BCPR - NAIROBI 16. WFP - NAIROBI 17. WFP REGIONAL OFFICE UGANDA 18. WFP REGIONAL OFFICE UGANDA 19. FAO – NAIROBI
Thomas Nyambane Programme Support Manager René McGuffin Regional Information Officer Kaija Korpi Salmela VAM Programme Officer Paul Irumba Programme Assistant Dianna Kopansky Emergency Operations and Liaison Officer Nicholas Haan Chief Technical Advisor Simon Narbeth Tanya Chapuisat Regional Emergency Officer Emmanuel K. Muamba Culture of Peace Network Coordinator, GLR Aurelien Buffler Desk Officer - CHAD, CAR, Guinea Janet Puhalovic Humanitarian Affairs Officer Derk Segaar Information Officer Valerie Julliand Head of Office Pierre Gelas Regional Disaster Response Advisor Jeanine Cooper Humanitarian Affairs Officer Lucy Dickinson Humanitarian Affairs Officer
thomas.nyambane@undp.org Rene.McGuffin@wfp.org Kaija.Korpi-Salmela@wfp.org Paul.Irumba@wfp.org Dianna.Kopansky@fao.org
20. FAO - FSAU 21. FAO - FSAU 22. UNICEF ESARO 23. UNESCO-PEER
nicholas.haan@fsau.or.ke simon.narbeth@fsau.or.ke tchapuisat@unicef.org grafadeco@yahoo.com
24. OCHA NEW YORK
buffler@un.org
25. OCHA GENEVA 26. OCHA IRIN – NAIROBI 27. OCHA RSO-CEA – NAIROBI 28. OCHA RSO-CEA – NAIROBI
puhalovic@un.org Derk@irinnews.org Valerie.julliand@regionalOCHA.org pierre.gelas@regionalOCHA.org
29. OCHA RSO-CEA – NAIROBI 30. OCHA RSO-CEA – NAIROBI
jeanine.cooper@regionalOCHA.org lucy.dickinson@regionalOCHA.org
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31. OCHA RSO-CEA – NAIROBI 32. OCHA RSO-CEA – NAIROBI 33. OCHA RSO-CEA – NAIROBI
Michael Ngabirano Humanitarian Affairs Officer Johnstone Oketch Reporting Officer Luluwa Ali Reporting Associate
michael.ngabirano@regionalocha.org johnstone.oketch@regionalOCHA.org luluwa.ali@regionalOCHA.org
International Organizations/NGOs/Other Partners
34. REDR-IHE EASTERN
AFRICA
35. p WORLD VISION EARO – h NAIROBI 36. WORLD VISION AFRICA
Alemayehu Kassa Regional Programme Manager Andrew Bone Regional Relief Coordinator Beatrice Teya Programme Coordinator Jean Marie Adrian Regional Director Lori Kunze Deputy Regional Director Sophie Battas Regional Humanitarian Coordinator - Horn, East and Central Africa Jo Nickolls Policy & Advocacy Advisor Gerard Prunier Senior Researcher Peter Omeny Inke Rosebrock Associate Expert Philip Thomas Head of Mission Christine Jamet Head of Mission Dan Maxwell Deputy Regional Director Mohammed Qazilbash Senior Programme Manager Betty Kweyu Program Coordinator Abdul E. Haro Northern Kenya Coordinator
redr@gibbafrica.com andrew_bone@wvi.org
beatrice_teya@wvi.org adrian@crsnairobi.org lkunze@crsearo.org SBattas@oxfam.org.uk
RELIEF OFFICE - NAIROBI
37. CRS – EARO 38. CRS – EARO 39. OXFAM GB -NAIROBI
40. OXFAM GB -NAIROBI 41. CENTRE FRANCAIS
JNickolls@oxfam.org.uk cfee@ethionet.et
D‟ETUDES ETHIOPIENNES – ADDIS ABABA
42. IGAD/ICPAC -NAIROBI 43. IOM – NAIROBI 44. MSF SPAIN 45. MSF BELGIUM 46. CARE INTERNATIONAL 47. CARE INTERNATIONAL
pomeny@iwayafrica.com rosebrock@iom.INT msfe-nairobi-cg@barcelona.msf.org MSFB-Kenya-HOM@brussels.msf.org maxwell@care.org MohammedQ@care.or.ke
KENYA
48. CARE INTERNATIONAL
Betty@care.or.ke
KENYA
49. 5 INTERMEDIATE 4 TECHNOLOGY . DEVELOPMENT GROUP
abdul520@yahoo.com
(ITDG) EASTERN AFRICA
50. SUDAN ADVOCACY
COALITION
Sorcha O. Callaghan Coordinator
sorcha@ci.or.ke
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Donors
51. CANADIAN HIGH
COMMISSION
52. USAID/DCHA/OFDA
Pamela Moore Third Secretary Jack Myer Principal Regional Advisor Alan Dwyer Regional Advisor Georgianna Platt Regional Advisor Dan Suther Regional Food Aid Advisor Brian Bacon Regional Food for Peace Officer Pol Dupaix Ass. Defence Attaché John Hayward Head of Office Jan Eijkenaar Technical Assistant, Southern Sudan Christophe Reltien Technical Advisor (Ethiopia & Eritrea) Enric Freixa Medical Expert Francesco Carboni Somalia Programme Advisor Ines Islamshah Deputy Country Director
pamela.moore@international.gc.ca
jmyer@usaid.gov
53. USAID/DCHA/OFDA
Adwyer@usaid.gov
54. USAID/DCHA/OFDA
gplatt@ofda.net
55. USAID/REDSO
DSuther@usaid.gov
56. USAID/REDSO
bbacon@usaid.gov
57. EMBASSY OF BELGIUM
defattbe@kenyaonline.com
58. ECHO – NAIROBI
John.HAYWARD@cec.eu.int
59. ECHO – NAIROBI
jan.eijkenaar@cec.eu.int
60. ECHO – NAIROBI
christophe.reltien@cec.eu.int
61. ECHO – NAIROBI
enric.freixa@cec.eu.int
62. ITALIAN EMBASSY
cooperazione@utlnairobi.org
63. SWISS COOPERATION
Ines.Islamshah@eda.admin.ch
OFFICE
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