Policies for the Poor

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					                                                                                                                                   Centre for
                                                                                                                                   Economic
           EUROPEAN ECONOMIC                                                                                                       Policy
                                                                                                                                   Research

           PERSPECTIVES

           Policies for the Poor
           Trade liberalization is an important ally in the fight
           against poverty in the developing world. But how can
           policy-makers ensure that its impact on the poor is as
           beneficial as possible? A new Report explains how to think
           through the key issues.
           O      penness to trade has long been seen as an
                  important element of sound economic
           policy – and trade liberalization as a necessary step
                                                                      will hurt someone, possibly pushing them into, or
                                                                      deeper into, poverty, and that some reforms may
                                                                      increase overall poverty even while they boost
           towards achieving it. At the same time, continuing         incomes in total. Thus, despite the general
           extreme poverty in developing countries is                 presumption in favour of trade liberalization,
           perhaps the biggest blemish on the global                  there remain important public policy questions of
           economic canvas. A new Report examines how                 how to implement it in a way that maximizes its
           our concerns about the latter should affect our            benefits for poverty alleviation and what to do
           attitude towards and implementation of the                 about any poverty that it does create or
           former. It draws on economic analysis and                  exacerbate.
           practical experience to construct a framework to               The Report contains a number of lessons for
           analyse the complex links between trade                    policy-makers, both general in terms of the broad
           liberalization and poverty. And it shows policy-           potential linkages between trade liberalization and
           makers how they can use the framework to                   poverty, and specific in terms of the linkages in
           identify the critical features in their economies so       relation to particular sectors and instruments of
           they can ensure that the poor benefit from                 trade policy:
           liberalization.                                            • The weight of evidence suggests that openness
               In general, the Report argues, trade                   to trade is good for growth and that growth
           liberalization is an ally in the fight against poverty:    benefits the poor. But to enjoy the full benefits of
           it tends to increase average incomes, providing            trade liberalization, it should be accompanied by
           more resources with which to tackle poverty. And           sound policies in areas such as transport and
           while it will generally affect income distribution, it     communications infrastructure, market facilitation,
           does not appear to do so in a way that                     competition, education and governance.
           systematically worsens poverty. Nevertheless, it is        • There are three broad pathways through which
           important to recognize that most trade reforms             trade liberalization can have a direct effect on




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            1                           3                            5                         7
            Policies for the Poor       Nice Try                     Different Strokes         It’s Good to Talk
contents




            Trade liberalization is a   Has the Treaty of Nice       Coping with inflation     How central banks
            key instrument for          improved EU decision-        differentials and other   communicate – with            NO.
            fighting poverty in the     making rules and             imbalances in the euro    the markets, the press
            developing world            should it be ratified?       area                      and the public


                                                                                                                               October 2001
The weight of            poverty: through its impact on the prices of           • In most countries, agriculture is the key sector
evidence suggests that   liberalized goods, through its impact on profits       for poverty alleviation: despite rising urban
openness is good for     and hence on employment and wages, and                 poverty, the poor are still predominantly rural,
growth and that          through its impact on the government’s fiscal          agriculture is their major source of income, and
growth benefits the      position. The outcome depends on whether the           farm incomes have large spillovers to others in the
poor                     poor are net consumers or producers of                 rural economy. Moreover, food accounts for a
                         liberalized goods, what types of labour they           major share of all poor people’s expenditure.
                         supply, and where their wages lie relative to the      Liberalizing agricultural trade, both unilaterally and
                         poverty line.                                          multilaterally and by both developed and
                         • Although it is possible to describe the pathways     developing countries, has the potential for
                         through which each aspect of liberalization might      considerable poverty alleviation, although
                         affect poverty, the impact of trade liberalization     particular groups of poor people may suffer.
                         on poverty is very country-specific. This means        • Trade in manufactured goods still faces
                         that policy-makers themselves will have to identify    significant barriers in developed countries (on
                         which of these pathways are the most important         products like clothing and footwear) and to a
                         in their particular circumstances.                     greater extent in developing countries.
                         • The range of potential linkages between trade        Liberalization will foster poverty alleviation by
                         liberalization and poverty is wide, but the most       enhancing growth and productivity and improving
                         important effects in any given country are likely to   resource allocation. But the conditions have to be
                         be relatively simple and obvious. Hence policy-        in place for firms to respond to new threats and
                         makers can develop suitable policy responses to        opportunities; and, even so, some manufacturing
                         help the poor gain from trade liberalization.          jobs may be lost. Safety nets may be necessary if
                         • For many dimensions of trade liberalization, the     alternative forms of employment are not rapidly
                         direct effects on poverty will be negligible. Where    available for displaced workers.
                         they are not, the appropriate response is not to       • Trade liberalization in services offers particularly
                         stop liberalizing but to proceed while pursuing        promising – but largely neglected – opportunities
Liberalization should
                         complementary policies to help the poor gain           for poverty alleviation, especially if temporary
be accompanied by
                         from liberalization and to provide social              movements of relatively unskilled workers were to
sound policies on
                         protection to support those who may lose. Trade-       be allowed. Some service reforms can aid the poor
infrastructure,
                         related compensation packages will not generally       directly – for example, those in transport, health
market facilitation
                         be feasible or desirable in developing countries.      and education, and others may increase unskilled
and education
                         • Trade liberalization almost inevitably involves      employment – such as tourism, or boost local
                         adjustment costs, notably job losses in formerly       efficiency and competitiveness – such as financial
                         protected sectors. The best way to ease the pain of    services.
                         transition is to protect social expenditure and        • The long-term effects of strengthening
                         ensure appropriate targeting of the poor, offering     protection for intellectual property rights are
                         a cushion without undermining their incentives to      uncertain, but in the short to medium term,
                         adjust.                                                although such moves may benefit some middle-
                         • Trade liberalization can change the nature of the    income countries, they will almost certainly hurt
                         risk and uncertainty that poor households face         small and poor economies.
                         although not always for the worse. It can also         • Specific interventions in international trade such
                         affect their ability to cope with risk and             as export subsidies, anti-dumping duties and local
                         uncertainty. Policies such as improving access to      content requirements will rarely be to the
                         credit markets can help a great deal here along        advantage of the poor, who have too little power
                         with improvements in asset distribution and in the     to prevent the transfers from being captured by
                         flexibility of local labour markets.                   other groups. Hence poverty concerns will rarely
                         • If the long-term benefits of the trade               justify resisting liberalization in those areas.
                         liberalization are to reach the poor, households       • Strengthening domestic labour or environmental
                         must be able to respond by adjusting their supply      standards may help the poor, but linking higher
                         of labour or their production of goods and             standards to trade agreements is much more likely
                         services. These supply responses will be               to hurt them.
Agriculture is the       influenced by where the poor are located and by              This article summarizes ‘Trade Liberalization and
key sector for poverty   their demographic structure and their gender,               Poverty: A Handbook’ by Neil McCulloch, L Alan
alleviation              health status, education and assets.                   Winters and Xavier Cirera. McCulloch and Cirera are at
                         Complementary policies are likely to be necessary      the Institute of Development Studies; Winters is at the
                         in such areas as investment in infrastructure and       University of Sussex and a Research Fellow in CEPR’s



2
                                                                                     International Trade programme. The research was
                         the development of markets for credit, agricultural      supported by the UK’s Department for International
                         inputs and services.                                                                            Development.



European Economic Perspectives No. 29                                                               Centre for Economic Policy Research
    Nice Try
The Nice summit of December 2000 sought to improve                                                                  Nice sought to ensure
                                                                                                                    that the EU
the European Union’s decision-making rules ahead of                                                                 institutions work
Eastern enlargement. A new CEPR Report argues that it                                                               efficiently after
largely failed in this objective, but that the Treaty should                                                        Eastern enlargement
be ratified nonetheless – it can be repaired at the next
Intergovernmental Conference in 2004.

T     he Nice summit had two goals: to remove
      obstacles to Eastern enlargement of the
European Union (EU) imposed by the
                                                       ECB to include five or twelve new members
                                                       would turn this critical policy-making body into an
                                                       unwieldy group that would have trouble making
Amsterdam Treaty; and to adopt reforms to              difficult decisions at the right time. The Nice
ensure that EU institutions will operate efficiently   Treaty simply invites the ECB and Commission to
and legitimately after membership nearly doubles.      propose solutions, and institutes an ‘enabling
According to CEPR’s latest Monitoring European         clause’ that allows limited ECB reform in what
Integration (MEI) Report, the summit was               amounts to a single issue Intergovernmental
successful on the first goal. It failed almost         Conference (IGC).
completely on the second.                                 The summit also sought to lock in a long-term
    The Amsterdam Treaty left three issues open,       enlargement procedure. But enlargement is a
explicitly requiring that they be settled before       process, not an event, and there is a strong                 The Treaty removed
enlargement: the size and composition of the           possibility that the first enlargement wave may              the obstacles to
Commission; extension of ‘qualified majority           seriously delay subsequent waves and hinder the              enlargement but made
voting’ in the Council of Ministers; and reform of     reform momentum in applicant nations. To                     EU decision-making
Council voting rules. The first two were not           redress this, the Report argues that the EU should           less effective
settled at Nice: on Commission reform, a               commit to a series of Maastricht-style ‘entrance
makeshift, temporary reform was adopted; and on        exam’ dates that lock in occasions for evaluating
qualified majority voting, there was basically a       whether nations are ready to join. This is not
house-cleaning exercise with little change in          necessarily a matter for Treaty changes, but Nice
sensitive areas.                                       would have been the ideal opportunity for a
    On reform of Council decision-making, Nice         political commitment to dates.
actually made things worse. With little more than         In terms of the institutional balance of power,
hurried, late-night staff work and their political     the Nice Treaty will significantly alter the way the
instincts to guide them, EU leaders adopted a          EU functions. The Report argues that because of
massively complex system. Using the quantitative       the Council’s reduced decision-making efficiency,
tools of voting theory, the Report reveals that far    the standard method of integration – which relies
from maintaining efficiency, the Nice voting           on legislation and the Council’s ability to act – will
reforms will lower the enlarged EU’s ability to act.   be slowed. Further integration is likely to be
Nice also lessens the system’s legitimacy, shifting    driven more by members’ initiatives, perhaps
power to large members to such an extent that the      channelled through new ‘enhanced cooperation                 The Treaty should be
historical balance between the EU as a union-of-       arrangements’. Thus, to the extent that the                  ratified and then
states and a union-of-people has been                  European Parliament and Commission derive their              repaired at IGC
fundamentally altered.                                 power from influencing legislation, Nice reduces             2004: institutional
    Nice was supposed to implement all the             their power.                                                 reform can wait but
institutional reforms necessary for enlargement.          As a body, the Council’s power will also be               enlargement should
But it largely ignored the fact that enlargement       diminished. The winners will be members who                  not
implies that the Governing Council of the              wish to proceed with deeper integration in the
European Central Bank (ECB) has the same               form of enhanced cooperation or outside the EU


                                                                                                                                 3
‘numbers problem’ that put Commission reform           framework altogether. The Commission has a
on the summit agenda. Enlarging an unreformed          crucial role in enhanced cooperation arrangements



Centre for Economic Policy Research                                                               European Economic Perspectives No. 29
Reform of ECB            so if they become more common the                       it would also reduce further the power of smaller
decision-making          Commission’s influence may expand. This may             members, the population threshold should be
should happen before     have been its biggest victory at Nice.                  lowered to one-half.
IGC 2004 with                So should the Nice Treaty be ratified? The              But all this presumes that EU leaders meant
authority delegated to   authors’ answer is a simple yes: institutional          what they said in Cologne: that the goal of Nice
independent experts      reforms can wait but Eastern enlargement should         summit was to ‘ensure that the European Union’s
                         not. Enlargement, quite simply, is a historical         institutions can continue to work efficiently after
                         imperative while Council voting weights will be a       enlargement.’ Yet the question remains: did EU
                         historical footnote. Moreover, killing the Treaty       leaders know what they were doing at 4:30 in the
                         would recreate the situation that first caused a        morning on Monday 11 December 2000?
                         problem. The Amsterdam Treaty made reform a                 In one view, EU leaders did not realize the
                         precondition for enlargement. This sequencing           strong inefficiency consequences of their actions;
                         was at least part of the reason why Nice became         the outcome was a collection of unintended
                         the longest IGC in history and still failed. When       consequences stemming from ill-prepared, late-
                         reform is a precondition, interests that are            night debates. This is not entirely implausible: the
                         lukewarm to enlargement enjoy important                 Council voting system that was adopted was never
                         leverage. Had enlargement instead been locked in        discussed during the IGC; and the reforms do not
                         first, such ‘hostage taking’ would have been less       look so bad from the perspective of the ‘EU15’ –
                         effective.                                              the Council that these leaders know well. Yet in an
                             Now, if the Nice Treaty is ratified, the            ‘EU27’ – a Council that might seem distant to
                         sequencing will be reversed. When reform is next        leaders who are unlikely to hold office for even
                         considered, enlargement will have happened or be        five more years – the efficiency consequences are
                         imminent and no one will face the choice between        dramatic.
                         accepting damaging reforms and delaying                     In another view, the EU leaders got what they
                         enlargement. There is even hope that the new            bargained for: a crippled legislative process that
Voting procedures in     members will have some say and this should make         strips the Commission and Parliament of their
the Council of           the reforms more sustainable. Fortunately, Nice         agenda-setting power and the old ‘Community
Ministers can be         also created an opportunity for reform: the IGC         approach’ of its viability. In such circumstances,
made more efficient by   to be held in 2004, for which the agenda could be       future integration will be guided by
lowering the majority    expanded to include ‘emergency repairs’.                intergovernmental initiatives with the large
criteria                     Can any of the damage be fixed before then?         members inevitably playing a role more
                         The ECB’s numbers problem should be fixed               commensurate with their economic and
                         soon, and the Treaty’s ‘enabling clause’ should         demographic importance. This view is also
                         make it possible well before IGC 2004. There are        plausible: for some members, integration has
                         three practical solutions: first, rotation of voting    reached the highest level perceived as legitimate by
                         rights among central bank governors; second,            the voters and their leaders may be satisfied with
                         representation of groups of members by a single         an EU where the key institutions are seriously
                         central bank governor; and third, delegation to a       constrained and decisions are mainly taken directly
                         group of independent experts, with the governors        between governments.
                         participating in the debate but not in the vote.            The question of which view is correct matters
                             The Report recommends the third option: it          greatly for what comes next. If it was an
                         would yield a manageable-sized voting body              oversight, then there is still time for emergency
                         whose composition was stable. Moreover, unlike          repairs and IGC 2004 provides a perfect
                         the other two options, it would not encourage the       opportunity. If it was wilful, it may take several
                         public to view monetary policy from a national          high-profile decision-making crises in an enlarged
                         perspective. The ECB is likely to be deadlocked         EU to mobilize the resolve necessary to repair the
                         over a solution, handing a unique opportunity to        Nice reforms. Either way, the Nice Treaty was no
                         the Commission. The Commission should exploit           better than a ‘nice try’. Although it failed to adjust
                         it by tabling the only rational proposal: delegation.   EU decision-making to the realities of a Union
The question remains         Assuming that EU leaders want the Council of        with 27-plus members, it did open the door to
whether the              Ministers to be able to act, IGC 2004 should            enlargement. It should be ratified and then
inefficiencies created   adjust the voting procedures instituted at Nice,        repaired at IGC 2004.
at Nice arose from       which involve a triple majority. The damage to the         This article summarizes ‘Nice Try: Should the Treaty
oversight or intent      efficiency of an EU of 27 members could be              of Nice be Ratified? Monitoring European Integration (MEI)
                         fixed by lowering two of the three majority                   No.11’ by Richard Baldwin (Graduate Institute of
                         criteria. Specifically, the next Treaty should lower    International Studies, Geneva, and CEPR), Erik Berglöf


4
                         the 74% vote threshold to two-thirds, which               (SITE, Stockholm School of Economics, and CEPR),
                                                                                    Francesco Giavazzi (Università Bocconi, Milano, and
                         would restore the Council’s ability to act. But since   CEPR) and Mika Widgrén (Turku School of Economics
                                                                                                and Business Administration, and CEPR).


European Economic Perspectives No. 29                                                                  Centre for Economic Policy Research
    Different Strokes
CEPR’s Monitoring the European Central Bank series brings an                                                       Inflation
                                                                                                                   differentials and
independent pan-European perspective to bear on key                                                                current account
issues facing the Bank. The latest Report examines                                                                 imbalances should
whether inflation differentials within the euro area matter,                                                       not be demonized
and defines a macroeconomic framework for the monetary
union.

S   hould the European Central Bank (ECB) be
    concerned about emerging inflation
differentials and current account imbalances
                                                       macroeconomic adjustment.
                                                           The current situation in Ireland provides a first
                                                       testing ground. The country can clearly sustain a
among members of the economic and monetary             high growth rate for the foreseeable future, but
union (EMU)? And should there be explicit policy       not quite the current growth rate. The Irish
coordination with the fiscal authorities of the euro   economy is now above its sustainable level of
area? These are some of the questions addressed        activity and should slow down. What form should
in CEPR’s latest Monitoring the European Central       the adjustment take? Given fast growth and strong
Bank (MECB) Report, published earlier this year,       investment demand, the appropriate current
and the September 2001 MECB Update.                    account position for Ireland may well be a deficit,
    The Report notes that there are widening           a reliance on world saving. This points to the
inflation differentials between high-growth            adjustment occurring through a reduction in
countries – Ireland and Spain in particular – and      external demand, and thus through inflation and             Inflation
the core of the euro area. Should the ECB worry?       real exchange rate appreciation. In other words,            differentials are the
The MECB team’s answer is that inflation               the Irish economy should be slowed down by                  way real exchange
differentials should not be demonized. In a            increasing the relative price of Irish goods, and           rates adjust in a
common currency area, they are the mechanism           thus by increasing the real income of the Irish             monetary union
for adjusting real exchange rates where adjustment     people.
is needed. So for a country in a currency union,           Ireland has a large budget surplus and at
above average inflation may be entirely                present, an even larger surplus may not be
appropriate. This suggests that having first           necessary. Indeed, there is a strong case for using
convinced citizens that inflation is an undesirable    part of the surplus to finance public investment to
phenomenon, governments and the ECB must               keep infrastructure in line with the rapidly growing
now proceed to step two and explain that               economy. But this is not the case in Spain, another
temporary inflation differentials can be desirable,    EMU member with above average inflation. The
leading to higher real income and the proper           Spanish current account deficit is large and getting
                                                       larger, but in contrast with Ireland, it is not
                                                       matched by high investment and high productivity
  Recent MEI Reports:                                  growth. Spain provides a clear case for slowing
  • Integration and the Regions of Europe:             down the economy through the use of fiscal
  How the Right Policies Can Prevent                   policy, rather than through a real appreciation and
  Polarization MEI 10                                  an increase in the current account deficit.
  Pontus Braunerhjelm, Riccardo Faini, Victor              MECB Update, published in September,                    Current account
  Norman, Frances Ruane and Paul Seabright             considers whether the current account deficits of           deficits typically
  • The Future of European Banking MEI 9               two other countries outside the core of the euro            reflect investment
  Jean-Pierre Danthine, Francesco Giavazzi,            area – Portugal and Greece – should be a source             booms in poorer
  Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden and Xavier Vives            of concern. It concludes that they should not:              EMU members
                                                       these deficits mostly finance the increase in
  • Social Europe: One for All? MEI 8                  investment rates induced by these countries’


                                                                                                                                 5
  Charles Bean, Samuel Bentolila, Giuseppe             deeper integration into the European Union (EU).
  Bertola and Juan J Dolado                            Outside financing is possible because the single



Centre for Economic Policy Research                                                              European Economic Perspectives No. 29
The Nice Treaty          currency and the single market have increased the
allows more formal       degree of financial integration in Europe. And             Previous MECB Reports:
dialogue between the     since external borrowing mostly finances                   • One Money, Many Countries MECB 2
ECB and euro area        investment, higher output in the future will pay for       Carlo Favero, Xavier Freixas, Torsten Persson
finance ministers        the interest on the foreign debt – again, no reason        and Charles Wyplosz
                         to worry.                                                  • The ECB: Safe at Any Speed? MECB 1
                             Moreover, the channel that could turn an               David Begg, Paul De Grauwe, Francesco
                         investment boom financed abroad into a balance of          Giavazzi, Harald Uhlig and Charles Wyplosz
                         payments crisis – that is, a currency mismatch
                         between foreign borrowing and domestic lending –
                         is much weaker within EMU, at least to the extent        because of a variety of short-run political
                         that foreign borrowing takes place within the euro       incentives and constraints, then explicit
                         area. So for a country that is integrating more          coordination may even be counterproductive.
                         deeply into the euro area and which starts with a            Formal meetings between the monetary and
                         level of income below average, a current account         fiscal authorities designed to coordinate policies
                         deficit is typically the manifestation of the build-up   are either unnecessary or harmful, the Report
                         of domestic capital. Stopping it would amount to         argues. Informal meetings may be a useful channel
                         closing down an important source of finance.             of information exchange. The benefits of this
                             Finally, the MECB team considers what attitude       exchange of information must, however, be
                         the ECB should take vis-à-vis the fiscal authorities     weighed against the possibility that these meetings
                         in EMU given its considerable degree of political        may be turned, by the fiscal authorities, into
                         autonomy, and whether or not it should volunteer         occasions for putting pressure on the ECB. The
                         to participate in policy coordination exercises. This    participation of the ECB president in the
                         issue has come to the fore following the EU’s Nice       Eurogroup meetings has to be viewed in this
                         summit: the Treaty provides a new institutional          context. These meetings may be useful as an
But explicit             framework that could formalize the currently             exchange of information, but, if they are
coordination of          informal dialogue that takes place among the             sanctioned as ‘formal’, they may become more
monetary and fiscal      twelve euro area finance ministers and between           than information exchange and so become
policy may be            them and the ECB president in the so-called              counterproductive.
counterproductive        Eurogroup.                                                   What about national fiscal authorities? Should
                             A peculiarity of the European situation,             the twelve finance ministers coordinate their
                         compared with, say, the United States, is that the       policies? If it was certain that fiscal policy
                         ECB faces not 1, but 12 fiscal authorities. This         decisions in each country were shielded from
                         raises two issues. The first is whether or not           short-term political incentives, coordination would
                         coordination among the 12 fiscal authorities is          certainly make sense. Coordination could,
                         necessary. The second is that it makes these             however, lower the political cost of incorrect
                         meetings more formal than, say, a weekly breakfast       policy actions, thus making them more attractive.
                         between the chairman of the Fed and the US                  This article summarizes ‘Defining a Macroeconomic
                         Secretary of the Treasury.                                 Framework for the Euro Area: Monitoring the European
                             So is explicit coordination of monetary and             Central Bank No. 3’ and the September 2001 MECB
                         fiscal policies necessary? The Report’s answer is no.        Update by Alberto Alesina (Harvard University and
                         If the monetary and fiscal authorities acting on         CEPR), Olivier Blanchard (MIT), Jordi Galí (Universitat
                                                                                       Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, and CEPR), Francesco
                         their own ‘keep their houses in order’, there is no       Giavazzi (Università Bocconi, Milano, and CEPR) and
                         need for explicit coordination. If the fiscal                 Harald Uhlig (Humboldt Universität zu Berlin and
                         authorities deviate from prudent fiscal policies                                                       CEPR).


                             HOW SHOULD CONCERNS ABOUT EXTREME POVERTY IN DEVELOPING
                             COUNTRIES AFFECT ATTITUDES TOWARDS, AND IMPLEMENTATION OF,
                             TRADE LIBERALIZATION?
And coordination of
                             The Institute of Development Studies invites you to attend a panel discussion on this issue.
national fiscal
                             (Questions from the floor are welcome in advance by email or on the evening before the discussion
policies could lower
                             has started)
the political cost of
bad policy                   Speakers: Barry Coates, World Development Movement; Dr Neil McCulloch, Institute of
                             Development Studies; Kevin Watkins, OXFAM; and Professor L Alan Winters, University of Sussex.
                             Date: 6:30pm on Thursday 1 November 2001.


6
                             Venue: The Conway Hall, 25 Red Lion Square, London, WC1R 4RL.
                             For more details contact Clare Gorman, IDS. Email: C.Gorman@ids.ac.uk Tel: 01273 877752



European Economic Perspectives No. 29                                                                 Centre for Economic Policy Research
    It’s Good to Talk
Gone are the days when monetary policy-making was                                                                    The case for
                                                                                                                     transparency is based
conducted largely behind closed doors: central banks are                                                             on both policy
becoming increasingly open in their communication                                                                    effectiveness and
strategies. A new Report evaluates how they talk – to the                                                            democratic
                                                                                                                     accountability
markets, the press and the public.

N      ot so long ago, secrecy was the watchword in
       central banking circles. Now, the
unmistakable trend is towards greater openness
                                                          more difficult one for central banks with multiple
                                                          goals. But they should articulate their aims as best
                                                          they can. Central banks should also reveal a great
and transparency. Increasingly, the central banks of      deal about their methods, including their forecasts,
the world are trying to make themselves                   the models used to derive them and to explore
understood rather than leaving their thinking             alternative policies, and the precise methods for
shrouded in mystery. A new CEPR Report,                   implementing policy changes.
published jointly with the International Center for           The Report recommends that central banks
Monetary and Banking Studies (ICMB) in Geneva,            reveal at least the broad contours of their
describes and evaluates how central banks talk to         forecasts as often as they are made. This runs
the markets, the press and the public.                    counter to the old conventional wisdom that
    The case for transparency is very strong, the         central banks should never give ‘forward-looking’
Report argues: it is based on both policy                 information. Should the central bank publish a
effectiveness and democratic accountability.              conditional forecast predicated on unchanged
Monetary policy is more effective when the central        monetary policy, or base its published forecast on         There are valid
bank is better able to condition the market               its actual projections of future monetary policy           reasons for secrecy but
expectations that are so critical to the transmission     changes? The authors’ pragmatic view is to                 it should be the
of monetary policy. And transparency and                  acknowledge that central banks typically do not            exception, not the rule
accountability go hand in hand with central bank          formulate explicit plans for future monetary
independence – a kind of exchange for the broad           policy, and so cannot reveal future policy changes.
grant of authority.                                           Central banks should provide more
    The essential message that any central bank           information about their internal models than they
must convey to the public is its policy regime: what it   have historically done. But most central bank
is trying to achieve; how it goes about doing so;         watchers only care about the bank’s basic view of
and its probable reactions to likely contingencies.       how the economy works, so well chosen words
Of course, no central bank can spell out in               supplemented by a few key numbers may suffice.
advance its reaction to every conceivable                     When they intervene in foreign exchange
contingency; nor is it necessary to reveal every          markets, central banks almost always try to catch
detail of its operations. Two guiding principles          market participants by surprise, and they rarely
apply:                                                    reveal how and when sterilized interventions have
                                                          taken place. Lack of sufficient ammunition –
• First, the bank should reveal enough about its
                                                          foreign exchange reserves – to affect market
  analysis, actions and internal deliberations for
                                                          behaviour can justify this departure from
  interested observers to see the logic behind
                                                          transparency, according to the Report.                     Central banks should
  each policy decision.
                                                              In contrast, all decisions about domestic              spell out their
• Second, the burden of proof should be on                monetary policy should be publicly announced as            objectives and their
  those who would withhold information. There             soon as they are made, with no informational               methods, including
  are valid reasons for secrecy but it should be          advantage to select ‘insiders’. Central banks should       their forecasts
  the exception, not the rule.                            also provide indications about their tentative
What should central banks talk about? First, they         future plans, perhaps through statements about


                                                                                                                                   7
need to spell out their long-run objectives clearly.      which way they are ‘leaning’.
This is a simple task for banks with a single target,         The precise ways in which a central bank
such as the inflation rate or the exchange rate, a        communicates will vary depending on whether


Centre for Economic Policy Research                                                                European Economic Perspectives No. 29
 The Fed should            monetary policy decisions are made by a single                target, improves its published forecasts and
 explain its objectives,   individual or, as is increasingly the norm, by a              publishes minutes.
 forecasts and policy      committee. If decisions are made by a committee,            • Having been granted independence in 1998,
 decisions more clearly    the communications strategy will also vary                    the Bank of Japan (BOJ) has become much
                           depending on whether decisions are presented as               more open than it used to be. The Report
                           achieved by consensus – a collegial committee – or            recommends that the BOJ clarifies its inflation
                           by individuals voting their own preferences – an              objective and provides a better explanation of
                           individualistic committee.                                    the reserve-targeting policy regime that it
                               Policy decisions are usually announced with a             adopted earlier this year.
                           brief statement. In the case of a single decision-
                                                                                       • The Bank of England adopted inflation
                           maker, the statement should explain the reasoning
                                                                                         targeting in 1992 and became independent in
                           behind the decision. A highly individualistic
                                                                                         1997. Both events led to dramatic increases in
                           committee may find it difficult to agree quickly on
                                                                                         transparency, which, by now, place the Bank
                           a statement, but in this case, detailed minutes –
                                                                                         near the vanguard. The Report recommends
                           including the vote – should be released as soon as
                                                                                         that the Monetary Policy Committee issues a
                           possible. In collegial committees, there is room for
                                                                                         statement immediately after each meeting and
                           choosing how much to explain immediately (in the
                                                                                         tries to limit the multiplicity of alternative
                           statement) or later (in the minutes).
                                                                                         viewpoints.
                               Conflicting signals emitted by committees
                           confuse markets and get in the way of                       • The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has been
 The ECB should            transparency. Committees must strive to convey a              leading in central bank transparency since its
 publish minutes and       consistent message even though the transparency               1989 reform. It now even publicly projects its
 clarify the time          of individualistic committees means that                      own future behaviour. The Report can
 horizon for its           differences of opinion are inevitably aired in                recommend no further steps to improve
 inflation target          public.                                                       transparency.
                               So how do central banks actually talk? The                     This article summarizes ‘How Do Central Banks
                           Report concludes with a review of the                       Talk? Geneva Reports on the World Economy No. 3’ by Alan
                           communications strategies of some of the most                     Blinder (Princeton University), Charles Goodhart
                                                                                          (London School of Economics), Philipp Hildebrand
                           prominent central banks:
                                                                                        (Union Bancaire Privée), David Lipton (Moore Capital
                            • The US Federal Reserve has changed its                          Strategy Group) and Charles Wyplosz (Graduate
                              communications policies dramatically since               Institute of International Studies, Geneva, and CEPR).
                              1993, and while perhaps still lagging behind
                              other central banks, it is clearly moving toward
                              greater transparency. The Report recommends              More Geneva Reports on the World Economy:
                              that the Fed states its objectives more clearly,         • Can the Moral Hazard Caused by IMF
                              publishes its forecasts and clarifies their nature,      Bailouts be Reduced? Geneva Special Report 1
                              and offers fuller statements to explain its              Barry Eichengreen
                              policy decisions.                                        • Asset Prices and Central Bank Policy
                            • The European Central Bank’s (ECB) much                   Geneva Report on the World Economy 2
                              criticized communications policy is                      Stephen G Cecchetti, Hans Genberg, John
                              complicated by the short history of the Bank,            Lipsky and Sushil Wadhwani
 The Bank of
                              its multinational nature and its confusing ‘two
 England should try to                                                                 • An Independent and Accountable IMF
                              pillar’ monetary strategy. Nonetheless, it is
 limit the multiplicity                                                                Geneva Report on the World Economy 1
                              already more transparent than the Bundesbank
 of alternative                                                                        José De Gregorio, Barry Eichengreen, Takatoshi
                              ever was. The Report recommends that the
 viewpoints                                                                            Ito and Charles Wyplosz
                              ECB clarifies the time horizon for its inflation


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Description: Policies for the Poor