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                                                                       The Heg Debate
***Heg Good Debate*** ........................................................................................................................................ 2
Thayer 1/3 ............................................................................................................................................................... 3
Thayer 2/3 ............................................................................................................................................................... 4
Thayer 3/3 ............................................................................................................................................................... 5
Khalilzad ................................................................................................................................................................. 6
Ferguson .................................................................................................................................................................. 7
Heg Good – Democracy.......................................................................................................................................... 8
Heg Good – Economy............................................................................................................................................. 9
Heg Good – Prolif ................................................................................................................................................. 10
Heg High/Sustainable ........................................................................................................................................... 11
Heg Bad Inevitable ............................................................................................................................................... 12
Heg Bad Inevitable ............................................................................................................................................... 13
***Heg Bad Debate*** ........................................................................................................................................ 14
Heg Bad – Russia/China ....................................................................................................................................... 15
Heg Bad – Korea 1/2............................................................................................................................................. 16
Heg Bad – Korea 2/2............................................................................................................................................. 17
Heg Bad - Terrorism ............................................................................................................................................. 18
Heg Bad – Prolif ................................................................................................................................................... 19
Heg Bad – Economy ............................................................................................................................................. 20
AT: Deterrence...................................................................................................................................................... 21
Offshore Balancing Coming ................................................................................................................................. 22
Offshore Balancing Good ..................................................................................................................................... 23
Offshore Balancing Good ..................................................................................................................................... 24
Soft Power is a Myth............................................................................................................................................. 25




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                                            ***Heg Good Debate***




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                                                             Thayer 1/3
Heg is sustainable and critical to international stability
Thayer 06 – Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Missouri State University
[Thayer, Bradley A., ―In Defense of Primacy.,‖ National Interest; Nov/Dec2006 Issue 86, p32-37]edlee

Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign
military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might;
and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its
landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its guises,
must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would
lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of
primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state?
Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power
capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military
capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous
folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment
acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment
focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action—but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of
primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensuring American
primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring
that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's
worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they
shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a
strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed,
retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will
exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it
cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats
must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or
making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes
to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the
animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of
international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and
strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be
confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a
key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries
to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved
by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global
commons"—the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space—allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders,
while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its
allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased. (2) This is not
an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today—in a world where
American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display—is that countries want to align themselves with the
United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the
power of the United States for their own purposes—their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84
are allied with America—their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements—and they
include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from
the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in
its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy—and the bandwagoning effect—
has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states

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                                                            Thayer 2/3
and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create
coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be
stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of
Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling
Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by
the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China,
Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the
United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently
resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great
power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power.
China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric
strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not
be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for
the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.
The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases—Venezuela, Iran, Cuba—it is an anti-U.S. regime
that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or
Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an
era where there was a dominant power—Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long
recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the
current international order—free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing
democratization is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system
can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be
reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages
followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal
order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't
know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the
security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive
outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership
reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American
primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned—between Greece and Turkey, Israel and
Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow
Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a
Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second,
American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of
liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because , as
John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United
States and be sympathetic to the American worldview. (3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy.
In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly
reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more
open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so,
in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have
faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of
tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the
rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a
peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be
more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan,
where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces


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                                                            Thayer 3/3
threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq
on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even
the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been
made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has
been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global
economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free
trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability
and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the
poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-
being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and
growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic
spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to
the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the
World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his
youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is
through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through
American primacy. (4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of
American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has
been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the
globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over
fifty operations since the end of the Cold War—and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S.
military is the earth's "911 force"—it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire
department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States
assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the
Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington
followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with
the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid,
disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could
have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the
U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done
more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of
Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of
America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the
United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million
homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring
relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect
from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11,
polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for
Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in
the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military
conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is
a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.
THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits .
None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the
international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient
issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia
or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's
face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.


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                                                             Khalilzad
Leadership prevents global nuclear exchange
Khalilzad 95, Defense Analyst at RAND
(Zalmay, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War" The Washington Quarterly, RETHINKING
GRAND STRATEGY; Vol. 18, No. 2; Pg. 84)

<Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global
rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a
vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would
have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values --
democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively
with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and
low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival,
enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers,
including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a
multipolar balance of power system.>




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                                                            Ferguson
Multipolarity is unlikely – the alternative to the unipolar system is apolarity – a global vaccum of power
Ferguson 4
Niall Ferguson 04 Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History @ Harvard University, Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution
 (When Empires Wane, http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110005244)
Yet universal claims were an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the
existence of other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was political fragmentation. And that
remains true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational
institutions, but downward. If free flows of information and factors of production have empowered multinational corporations
and NGOs (to say nothing of evangelistic cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology has
empowered criminal organizations and terrorist cells, the Viking raiders of our time. These can operate wherever they
choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global. It is, in fact, increasingly confined
to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Sarajevo. Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming
retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might find
itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the one
of the ninth century. For the world is roughly 25 times more populous, so that friction between the world's "tribes" is
bound to be greater. Technology has transformed production; now societies depend not merely on freshwater and the
harvest but also on supplies of mineral oil that are known to be finite. Technology has changed destruction, too: Now it is
possible not just to sack a city, but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization has been raising living
standards, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. Deglobalization--which
is what a new Dark Age would amount to--would lead to economic depression. As the U.S. sought to protect
itself after a second 9/11 devastated Houston, say, it would inevitably become a less open society. And as Europe's
Muslim enclaves grow, infiltration of the EU by Islamist extremists could become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over
the Middle East to breaking point. Meanwhile, an economic crisis in China could plunge the Communist system into
crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that have undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors
would lose out, and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the
Dark Age would be felt on the margins of the waning great powers. With ease, the terrorists could disrupt the
freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers and cruise liners while we concentrate our efforts on making airports secure. Meanwhile,
limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in Korea and Kashmir; perhaps ending catastrophically in
the Middle East. The prospect of an apolar world should frighten us a great deal more than it frightened the heirs
of Charlemagne. If the U.S. is to retreat from the role of global hegemon--its fragile self-belief dented by minor
reversals--its critics must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony. The alternative to unpolarity
may not be multipolarity at all. It may be a global vacuum of power. Be careful what you wish




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                                                   Heg Good – Democracy
US hegemony is essential democracies
Larry Diamond, Senior researcher fellow at Hoover Institution, Orbis, ―Beyond the Unipolar Moment: Why the United States Must
Remain Engaged‖, p. 405-413, 1996

In the past,global power has been an important reason why certain countries have become models for emulation
by others. The global power of the United States, and of its Western democratic allies, has been a factor in the
diffusion of democracy around the world, and certainly is crucial to our ability to help popular, legitimate democratic forces deter
armed threats to their overthrow, or to return to power (as in Haiti) when they have been overthrown. Given the linkages among
democracy, peace, and human rights-as well as the recent finding of Professor Adam Przeworski (New York University) that
democracy is more likely to survive in a country when it is more widely present in the region-we should not
surrender our capacity to diffuse and defend democracy. It is not only intrinsic to our ideals but important to our
national security that we remain globally powerful and engaged-and that a dictatorship does not rise to hegemonic
power within any major region.

Extinction is only possible absent a world with proliferating democracy
Larry Diamond 1995, staff, ―Promoting Democracy in the 1990’s‖, Oct, p. online:
http://www.carnegie.org/sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01.html lexis

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia
nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly
powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the
institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very
source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional
threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for
legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this
century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war
with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders.
Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face
ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass
destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading
partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible
because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets
to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult
to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties,
property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of
international security and prosperity can be built.




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                                                   Heg Good – Economy

Heg prevents global economic collapse
Starobin- writer at national journal- 2006.
 (Paul Starobin. ―Beyond Hegemony.‖ National Journal. 12/1/06.
http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2006/1201nj1.htm.)

Chaos
In his 2005 book "The Case for Goliath," Mandelbaum's core thesis is that America acts not as a kind of empire,
bullying lesser subjects purely for its own selfish ends, but as a world government for the society of nations, providing
necessary "public goods." The most important such good is security. Mandelbaum is not arguing that America is
motivated by altruism -- he is saying that America, in following its own global interests, is benefiting everyone. He offers this
analogy: "The owner of a large, expensive, lavishly furnished mansion surrounded by more-modest homes may
pay to have security guards patrolling his street, and their presence will serve to protect the neighboring houses
as well, even though their owners contribute nothing to the costs of the guards. That is what the United States does in the
world of the 21st century." Mandelbaum does not dwell on what an American withdrawal from this role would mean for the world,
except to say, "The world would become a messier, more dangerous, and less prosperous place," perhaps yielding "a
repetition of the great global economic failure and the bloody international conflicts the world experienced in the
1930s and 1940s." Whatever the "life span" of America's role as the world's government, he writes in the book's last sentence, other
countries "will miss it when it is gone.

Economic collapse causes World War Three
Mead, 9 – Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations
(Walter Russell, ―Only Makes You Stronger,‖ The New Republic, 2/4/09,
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2)
History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring
messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the
Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the
American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of
financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned
German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts
might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if
we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.




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                                                     Heg Good – Prolif
Heg solves prolif – international organizations
Thayer 06 – Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Missouri State University
[Thayer, Bradley A., ―In Defense of Primacy.,‖ National Interest; Nov/Dec2006 Issue 86, p32-37]
Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy—and the bandwagoning
effect—has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior
of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to
create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN,
where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the
UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its
charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan
proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You
can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States.

Proliferation leads to extinction.
Victor A Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis,
Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90
In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such
shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the
weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the
American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ―six shooters‖ on their hips,
the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to
bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.




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                                                           Heg High/Sustainable
Military, economic and technological power ensure that US hegemony is sustainable
Brooks and Wohlforth ‘8
(Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth 08 Associate Professors in the Department of Government @ Dartmouth College, (World Out of Balance, p. 27-31))
―Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing,‖ historian Paul Kennedy observes: ―I have returned to all of the
comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and
no other nation comes close.‖ Though assessments of U.S. power have changed since those words were written in 2002, they remain true. Even when
capabilities are understood broadly to include economic, technological, and other wellsprings of national power, they are
concentrated in the United States to a degree never before experienced in the history of the modern system of states and thus
never contemplated by balance-of-power theorists. The United States spends more on defense that all the other major
military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and
technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make any effort to match U.S. capabilities even
more daunting that the gross spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the
scale of the long-term investment that give the United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities.
As table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain
combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American. And this disparity has been sustained for decades:
over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has invested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D. These
vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after
the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest U.S. forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is
credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises
from ―command of the commons‖ – that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry
Posen puts it, Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more
fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the
commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political
assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a
hegemonic foreign policy             than any other offshore power has ever had. Posen’s study of American military primacy ratifies Kennedy’s
                                                                   It is the combination of military and economic
emphasis on the historical importance of the economic foundations of national power .
potential that sets the United States apart from its predecessors at the top of the international system. Previous
leading states were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both . The
British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, shared the world with other powers that matched or exceeded
them in some areas. Even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and
outgunned by both France and Russia. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was dominant economically as well as in
air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a
superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia. The United States’ share of world GDP in 2006, 27.5 percent, surpassed that of
any leading state in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily depressed
every other major economy). The size of the U.S economy means that its massive military capabilities required roughly
4 percent of its GDP in 2005, far less than the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the Cold War,
1950-70, and the burden borne by most of the major powers of the past. As Kennedy sums up, ―Being Number One at great cost is one thing; being
the world’s single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.‖




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                                                    Heg Bad Inevitable

Their heg-bad arguments are irrelevant when we control the uniqueness debate – history proves that the
United States has and will always trigger the link to their heg bad arguments by being neocons
Kagan 07 Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
[Robert ―End of Dreams, Return of History‖ Policy Review (http://www.hoover.org/publications/p...512.html#n10)]

The first illusion, however, is that Bush really changed anything. Historians will long debate the decision to go to
war in Iraq, but what they are least likely to conclude is that the intervention was wildly out of character for the
United States. Since the end of World War ii at least, American presidents of both parties have pursued a fairly consistent
approach to the world. They have regarded the United States as the ―indispensable nation‖2 and the ―locomotive at
the head of mankind.‖3 They have amassed power and influence and deployed them in ever-widening arcs around the globe on behalf
of interests, ideals, and ambitions, both tangible and intangible. Since 1945 Americans have insisted on acquiring and
maintaining military supremacy, a ―preponderance of power‖ in the world rather than a balance of power with other nations.
They have operated on the ideological conviction that liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of government and that other
forms of government are not only illegitimate but transitory. They have declared their readiness to ―support free peoples
who are resisting attempted subjugation‖ by forces of oppression, to ―pay any price, bear any burden‖ to defend
freedom, to seek ―democratic enlargement‖ in the world, and to work for the ―end of tyranny.‖ 4 They have been impatient
with the status quo. They have seen America as a catalyst for change in human affairs, and they have employed the
strategies and tactics of ―maximalism,‖ seeking revolutionary rather than gradual solutions to problems. Therefore, they have often
been at odds with the more cautious approaches of their allies. 5 When people talk about a Bush Doctrine, they generally
refer to three sets of principles — the idea of preemptive or preventive military action; the promotion of democracy
and ―regime change‖; and a diplomacy tending toward ―unilateralism,‖ a willingness to act without the sanction
of international bodies such as the United Nations Security Council or the unanimous approval of its allies. 6 It is worth asking
not only whether past administrations acted differently but also which of these any future administration, regardless of party,
would promise to abjure in its conduct of foreign policy. As scholars from Melvyn P. Leffler to John Lewis Gaddis have shown,
the idea of preemptive or preventive action is hardly a novel concept in American foreign policy. 7 And as policymakers
and philosophers from Henry Kissinger to Michael Walzer have agreed, it is impossible in the present era to renounce such
actions a priori.8 As for ―regime change,‖ there is not a single administration in the past half-century that has
not attempted to engineer changes of regime in various parts of the world, from Eisenhower ’s cia-inspired coups in
Iran and Guatemala and his planned overthrow of Fidel Castro, which John F. Kennedy attempted to carry out, to George Herbert
Walker Bush ’s invasion of Panama to Bill Clinton’s actions in Haiti and Bosnia. And if by unilateralism we
mean an unwillingness to be constrained by the disapproval of the un Security Council, by some of the nato allies, by
the oas, or by any other international body, which presidents of the past allowed themselves to be so constrained?
These qualities of American foreign policy reflect not one man or one party or one circle of thinkers . They spring
from the nation ’s historical experience and are a characteristic American response to international circumstances. They are
underpinned, on the one hand, by old beliefs and ambitions and, on the other hand, by power. So long as Americans elect leaders who
believe it is the role of the United States to improve the world and bring about the ―ultimate good,‖10 and so long as American power
in all its forms is sufficient to shape the behavior of others, the broad direction of American foreign policy is unlikely to
change, absent some dramatic — indeed, genuinely revolutionary — effort by a future administration.




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                                                     Heg Bad Inevitable
Obama will continue to intervene as a hegemon
Kagan 7 Robert Kagan Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ―Obama the Interventionist‖
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...042702027.html)
America must "lead the world in battling immediate evils and promoting the ultimate good." With those words, Barack Obama put
an end to the idea that the alleged overexuberant idealism and America-centric hubris of the past six years is about to give
way to a new realism, a more limited and modest view of American interests, capabilities and responsibilities. Obama's speech at
the Chicago Council on Global Affairs last week was pure John Kennedy, without a trace of John Mearsheimer. It had a
deliberate New Frontier feel, including some Kennedy-era references ("we were Berliners") and even the Cold War-era notion
that the United States is the "leader of the free world." No one speaks of the "free world" these days, and Obama's insistence that we
not "cede our claim of leadership in world affairs" will sound like an anachronistic conceit to many Europeans, who even in the 1990s
complained about the bullying "hyperpower." In Moscow and Beijing it will confirm suspicions about America's inherent
hegemonism. But Obama believes the world yearns to follow us, if only we restore our worthiness to lead. Personally, I like
it. All right, you're thinking, but at least he wants us to lead by example, not by meddling everywhere and trying to transform the
world in America's image. When he said, "We have heard much over the last six years about how America's larger
purpose in the world is to promote the spread of freedom," you probably expected him to distance himself from this
allegedly discredited idealism. Instead, he said, "I agree." His critique is not that we've meddled too much but that we
haven't meddled enough. There is more to building democracy than "deposing a dictator and setting up a ballot box." We must
build societies with "a strong legislature, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, a vibrant civil society, a free press, and an
honest police force." We must build up "the capacity of the world's weakest states" and provide them "what they
need to reduce poverty, build healthy and educated communities, develop markets, . . . generate wealth . . . fight terrorism . . .
halt the proliferation of deadly weapons" and fight disease. Obama proposes to double annual expenditures on these
efforts, to $50 billion, by 2012. It's not just international do-goodism. To Obama, everything and everyone everywhere is of strategic
concern to the United States. "We cannot hope to shape a world where opportunity outweighs danger unless we ensure that every
child, everywhere, is ta ught to build and not to destroy." The "security of the American people is inextricably linked to
the security of all people." Realists, call your doctors. Okay, you say, but at least Obama is proposing all this Peace Corps-like
activity as a substitute for military power. Surely he intends to cut or at least cap a defense budget soaring over $500
billion a year. Surely he understands there is no military answer to terrorism. Actually, Obama wants to increase defense spending.
He wants to add 65,000 troops to the Army and recruit 27,000 more Marines. Why? To fight terrorism. He wants the
American military to "stay on the offense, from Djibouti to Kandahar," and he believes that "the ability to put boots on the
ground will be critical in eliminating the shadowy terrorist networks we now face." He wants to ensure that we continue to have "the
strongest, best-equipped military in the world." Obama never once says that military force should be used only as a last
resort. Rather, he insists that "no president should ever hesitate to use force -- unilaterally if necessary," not only "to
protect ourselves . . . when we are attacked," but also to protect "our vital interests" when they are "imminently
threatened." That's known as preemptive military action. It won't reassure those around the world who worry about letting
an American president decide what a "vital interest" is and when it is "imminently threatened." Nor will they be comforted to hear that
"when we use force in situations other than self-defense, we should make every effort to garner the clear support and participation of
others." Make every effort? Conspicuously absent from Obama's discussion of the use of force are four words: United
Nations Security Council. Obama talks about "rogue nations," "hostile dictators," "muscular alliances" and
maintaining "a strong nuclear deterrent." He talks about how we need to "seize" the "American moment." We
must "begin the world anew." This is realism? This is a left-liberal foreign policy?




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                                             ***Heg Bad Debate***




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                                                   Heg Bad – Russia/China
Heg causes Russian-Sino alliances to counterbalance – causes nuclear extinction
Paul Craig Roberts 07 Senior Research Fellow @ the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, William E. Simon Chair in Political
Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (―US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance,‖
http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts218.html)

This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of
troops and combat vehicles. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgkyzstan, and Kazakstan are participating. Other
countries appear ready to join the military alliance. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to
neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can
dictate its course. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers, read by Russians and Chinese, about why
the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. Cynics believe that the neocons
are just shills, like Bush and Cheney, for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of
the armaments industry. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. Russia
and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration’s unprovoked aggression in the world to take
neocon intentions seriously. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts, it
most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear
conflict. In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict, the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on
Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic
missiles with cruise missiles. Neocons are people who desire war, but know nothing about it. Thus, the US failures in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. However, US administrations after Reagan’s have broken the agreements
and understandings. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia’s borders. The Bush
regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of V. Putin. These are gratuitous acts of
aggression. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic
development, not to their militaries. Yet, both are being forced by America’s aggressive posture to revamp their
militaries. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: a nuclear exchange between the US,
Russia, and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach. In a mere 6.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed
the world’s good will toward the US. Today, America’s influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars
to bribed heads of foreign governments, such as Egypt’s and Pakistan’s. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid
for Musharraf, he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an
Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with
nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound, the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond
recklessness. The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler’s.




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                                                   Heg Bad – Korea 1/2
Hegemony spurs Korean war – deterrence doesn’t check
Christopher Layne 06 Research Fellow @ the Independent Institute, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies @ the Cato Institute
(The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 164-5)
America’s hegemonic strategy holds that in East Asia (and in Europe) the United States must (1) protect U.S. allies
from ―rogue states‖ armed with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction; (2) remain in Eurasia to prevent great
power rivalries from erupting into war by providing regional deterrence and reassurance; and (3) underscore the credibility of its
commitments by fighting in defense of its allies if deterrence fails. This is potentially a high-risk strategy. Its viability hinges
on a key question: How credible are American security guarantees in East Asia? America’s East Asian strategy is most
immediately challenged by North Korea. Although Pyongyang claims it has nuclear weapons, it is uncertain whether it
actually does. If it does not presently have them, however, it certainly is close to having some weapons in hand, and – unless
something happens either diplomatically or militarily to interrupt its weapons development program – its arsenal could grow
considerably during the next few years. Moreover, Pyongyang currently has ballistic missiles capable of
delivering nuclear warheads against targets in South Korea and Japan, and it could have some intercontinental
missile capability in a decade or so. The North Korean regime’s unpredictability, its nuclear ambitions, and the military standoff
along the 38th parallel between North Korean forces and U.S. and South Korean troops make the peninsula a volatile
place. Conflict is not inevitable, but neither is it unimaginable. If diplomacy fails to bring about a North Korean
agreement to dismantle its nuclear weapons, the United States may decide to strike preemptively in an attempt
to destroy Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities. It is impossible to know whether this would spark an all-out war on
the peninsula. On the other hand, fearing it might be the target of such strikes or a U.S. campaign to bring about regime change,
North Korea might lash out irrationally in ways that confound the predictions of deterrence theory. Given that the
American homeland currently is not vulnerable to North Korean retaliation, the U.S. deterrent umbrella should dissuade Pyongyang
from using nuclear weapons to attack civilian or military targets in South Korea or Japan. Whether North Korea actually would
be deterred, though, is a huge unknown. Three things are known, however. First, if North Korea has nuclear weapons,
U.S. troops in South Korea, and possibly in Japan, are hostages. Second, even a nonnuclear conflict on the
peninsula would be costly to the United States (notwithstanding the fact that the United States ultimately would prevail on
the battlefield). Third, U.S. troops in South Korea act as a trip wire, which ensures that, if war does occur, the United
States automatically will be involved.




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                                                    Heg Bad – Korea 2/2
And, Korean conflict results in apocalypse
Pat Fungamwango 99 (Africa News, Third world war: Watch the Koreas, 10/25, lexis)
If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to
a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in
the early 1950s, military tension between the hardline communist north and the American backed South Korea has
remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North
or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any
eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of
South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-
reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America
and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the
impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is
extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their
country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its presence in South Korea
was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has vast economic interests in South Korea. She
points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the
north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters
after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission.
However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal
gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the
north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all
descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself. Some of the armada that was deployed in the
recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet
permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in
the world. The border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surfaceto- air missiles and is
constantly patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any
military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers and
a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as a developing country, she can however be
classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-
range missiles. Last year, for example, she test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed
the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been fears that she was planning to test
another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that military tension on the
Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore significant that the American
government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards normalising relations with North Korea.




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                                                          Heg Bad - Terrorism
Primacy causes terrorism
Christopher Layne 06 Research Fellow @ the Independent Institute, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies @ the Cato Institute
(The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 190-1)
The events of 9/11 are another example of how hegemony makes the United States less secure than it would be if it
followed an offshore balancing strategy. Terrorism, the RAND Corporation terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman says, is "about power: the
pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change."86 If we step back for a moment fro m our
horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war:
force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives . As Clausewitz
observed, "War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object."88 September 11
represented a violent counterreaction to America's geopolitical-and cultural-hegemony. As the strategy expert Richard K.
Betts presciently observed in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article: It is 'hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be
hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so
long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on
Islam.89 U.S. hegemony fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a form of "blowback" against
America's preponderance and its world role.90 As long as the United States maintains its global hegemony-and its
concomitant preeminence in regions like the Persian Gulf-it will be the target of politically motivated terrorist
groups like al Qaeda. After 9/11, many foreign policy analysts and pundits asked the question, " Why do they hate us?" This
question missed the key point. No doubt, there are Islamic fundamentalists who do "hate" the United States for cultural, religious, and
ideological reasons. And even leaving aside American neoconservatives' obvious relish for making it so, to some extent the war on
terror inescapably has overtones of a "clash of civilizations:' Still, this isn't-and should not be allowed to become-a replay of the
Crusades. Fundamentally 9/11 was about geopolitics, specifically about U.S. hegemony. The United States may be
greatly reviled in some quarters of the Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in
the affairs of the Middle East, it's hardly likely that this detestation would have manifested itself in something like
9/11. As Michael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, puts it, "One of the
greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how to confront the Islamist threat lies in continuing to believe-at the urging of senior U.S.
leaders-that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than for what we do."91 It is American policies-to be
precise, American hegernony-that make the United States a lightning rod for Muslim anger.

A terrorist attack causes extinction.
Sid-Ahmed ‘04 Political Analyst, Al-Ahram
(Mohamed, Al-Ahram Weekly, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)
This means that fundamental changes must be brought to the world system itself. The phenomenon of terrorism is even more
dangerous than is generally believed. We are in for surprises no less serious than 9/11 and with far more devastating
consequences. A nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far
from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology,
had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the technology is a secret for nobody. So far, except for the two bombs dropped on
Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten. Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This
completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where anticipatory measures can determine the course of
events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures, including the invasion of a sovereign state
like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring WMD, proved to be unfounded.
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative
features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves,
police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and
ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of
world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a
third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs
over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be
losers.


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                                                      Heg Bad – Prolif
U.S. Hegemony is the cause of proliferation – countries need WMDs to stop intervention
Noam Chomsky, Linguists Professor @ MIT, HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL, 2003, pp. 37-8
Several leading figures of the foreign policy elite have pointed out that the potential targets of America's
imperial ambition are not likely simply to await destruction. They "know that the United States can be held at
bay only by deterrence," Kenneth Waltz has written, and that "weapons of mass destruction are the only means
to deter the United States." Washington's policies are therefore leading to proliferation of WMD, Waltz
concludes, tendencies accelerated by its commitment to dismantle international mechanisms to control the resort
to violence. These warnings were reiterated as Bush prepared to attack Iraq: one consequence, according to
Steven Miller, is that others "are likely to draw the conclusion that weapons of mass destruction are necessary to
deter American intervention." Another well-known specialist warned that the "general strategy of preventive
war" is likely to provide others with "overwhelming incentives to wield weapons of terror and mass destruction"
as a deterrent to "the unbridled use of American power." Many have noted the likely impetus to Iranian nuclear
weapons programs. And "there is no question that the lesson that the North Koreans have learned from Iraq is
that it needs a nuclear deterrent," Selig Harrison commented."


Proliferation leads to extinction.
Victor A Utgoff, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis,
Summer 2002, Survival, p.87-90
In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such
shoot outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the
weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed towards a world that will mirror the
American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ―six shooters‖ on their hips,
the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather together on a hill to
bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.




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                                                     Heg Bad – Economy
US hegemony destroys the economy
Ivan Eland 02, Director of defense policy studies Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes Out: The New
Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf)
                                                                              economy and its military and federal
Most of all, the strategy of empire is likely to overstretch and bleed America’s
budgets, and the overextension could hasten the decline of the United States as a superpower, as it did the Soviet
Union and Great Britain. The strategy could also have the opposite effect from what its proponents claim it would
have; that is, it would alarm other nations and peoples and thus provoke counterbalancing behavior and create
incentives for other nations to acquire weapons of mass destruction as an insurance policy against American military
might.

Nuclear War
Mead, 9 – Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations
(Walter Russell, ―Only Makes You Stronger,‖ The New Republic, 2/4/09,
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2)
History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring
messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the
Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the
American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of
financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned
German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts
might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if
we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.




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                                                        AT: Deterrence
Heg doesn’t deter conflict – engagement makes wars statistically more likely
Gholz, Press and Sapolsky 97 - Gholz and Press are doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at MIT,
Sapolsky is Professor of Public Policy and Organization in Political Science at MIT, and Director of MIT defense studies program
(Eugene, Daryl, Harvey, "Come Home America" International Security vol 21, no 4, spring, pg 30)
Several prominent analysts favor a policy of selective engagement.70 These analysts fear that American military
retrenchment would increase the risk of great power war. A great power war today would be a calamity, even for
those countries that manage to stay out of the fighting. The best way to prevent great power war, according to these analysts, is to
remain engaged in Europe and East Asia. Twice in this century the United States has pulled out of Europe, and both times great power
war followed. Then America chose to stay engaged, and the longest period of European great power peace ensued. In sum, selective
engagers point to the costs of others' great power wars and the relative ease of preventing them. The selective engagers' strategy
is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force
for great power peace. In today's world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement
will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict.
Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their
strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a
future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are
bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America's effect on
the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would
lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America's major allies have sufficient military
strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model.
The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security, frighten their neighbors. The
risk of spirals is great when offense is easier than defense, because any country's attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive
capability against its neighbors. The neighbors' attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and
tempt them to launch preventive war.71 But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages.
Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has a long land border with Russia, but
enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which stands between it and Japan. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia,
its ever trusted ally, strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an
attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In fact, no other
region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia.




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                                               Offshore Balancing Coming
Off-shore balancing coming – result of hegemonic decline
Layne in '98
(Christopher, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, World Policy Journal, "Rethinking
American grand strategy:
Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?" Volume 15, Issue 2, Summer, Proquest)

My argument for adopting an alternative grand strategy is prospective: although it may be sustainable for perhaps another decade.
American hegemony cannot be maintained much beyond that period. The changing distribution of power in the
international system--specifically, the relative decline of U.S. power and the corresponding rise of new great powers--
will render the strategy of pre-dominance untenable. This strategy is also being undermined because the credibility of
America's extended deterrence strategy is eroding rapidly. Over time, the costs and risks of the strategy of
preponderance will rise to unacceptably high levels. The time to think about alternative grand strategic futures is now--
before the United States is overtaken by events. In advocating an offshore balancing strategy, I do not deprecate those who believe
that bad things (increased geopolitical instability) could happen if the United States were to abandon the strategy of preponderance.
Indeed, they may; however, that is only half of the argument. The other half, seldom acknowledged by champions of preponderance,
is that bad things--perhaps far worse things--could happen if the United States stays on its present strategic course. Grand strategies
must be judged by the amount of security they provide; whether they are sustainable; their cost: the degree of risk
they entail; and their tangible and intangible domestic effects. Any serious debate about U.S. grand strategy must use these
criteria to assess the comparative merits of both the current grand strategy and its competitors. The time is rapidly approaching
when the strategy of preponderance will be unable to pass these tests. The suggestion that the days of American
hegemony are numbered no doubt will be met with disbelief by advocates of the current grand strategy. This is
unsurprising. Having fulfilled their hegemonic ambitions following the Soviet Union's collapse, the advocates of preponderance want
to keep the world the way it is. American grand strategists view the prospect of change in international politics in much the same way
that British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury did toward the end of the nineteenth century. "What ever happens will be for the worse,"
Salisbury said, "and therefore it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible." However, it is the very fact of the
Soviet Union's collapse that has knocked the props out from under the strategy of preponderance. The United
States could be hegemonic only because the Soviet threat caused others to accept American preeminence as preferable to Soviet
domination. The United States could enjoy the relative predictability and stability of the bipolar era only because of the effects of
bipolarity itself. Simply put, without the Cold War, America will not be able to preserve its Cold War preponderance
or stability. International politics is dynamic, not static. As Paul Kennedy has observed, "It simply has not been given to any one
society to remain permanently ahead of all the others ...." 30 The conditions that made American preponderance Possible are
changing rapidly. Make no mistake: sometime in the early decades of the twenty-first century, America's grand strategy will no longer
be preponderance. If the United States does not choose now to begin making the transition to a new grand strategy
better suited to the new century’s emerging international realities, events will force it to do so.




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                                                Offshore Balancing Good
Offshore balancing doesn't increase the risk of war - historical record proves
Layne in '98
(Christopher, Visiting Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, World Policy Journal, "Rethinking American grand
strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?" Volume 15, Issue 2, Summer, Proquest)

<The advocates of a strategy of preponderance also claim that U.S. security commitments in Europe and East
Asia are a form of insurance. It is, they say, cheaper and safer for the United States to retain its security commitments and
thereby deter wars from happening than to stand on the sidelines only to be compelled to intervene later under what presumably would
be more dangerous conditions. There are two responses to this argument. First, it is unsupported by the historical record.
Second, it is not evident that the strategy of preponderance will, in fact, minimize the risk of US, involvement in
future wars. The argument that the United States invariably is drawn into major overseas conflicts is wrong. Since America
achieved independence, great power wars have been waged in Europe in 1792-1802, 1804-15, 1853-55, 1859-60, 1866,
1870, 1877-78, 1912-13, 1914-18, and 1939-45. The United States has been involved in three of these wars, but it could
have safely remained out of at least two of those in which it fought. In 1812, while the British were preoccupied with
the Napoleonic threat, the United States initiated war with Britain to advance its own national ambitions. And as the
late political scientist Robert Osgood has demonstrated, America's intervention in the First World War was not driven by
any direct threat to its security interests. 28 The United States was not compelled to enter the Great War; largely as
a result of Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, it chose to do so, arguably with disastrous consequences. U.S.
intervention in the Great War was driven by snowball/domino concerns similar to those imbedded in today's strategy of
preponderance. An interesting study awaits on what would have happened had the United States not intervened in
1917. The argument can be made that the war would have ended in a compromise peace. Peace, indeed, might have
come before the revolutions that destroyed the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. A compromise peace might
not have sown the seeds of social and economic unrest that facilitated Hitlets rise to power. Had such a peace
occurred, would a second great war have been waged in Europe? Possibly. But, if so, it would have been a
much different war than the Second World War; and it might have been a war the United States could have
avoided.




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                                                  Offshore Balancing Good
Offshore balancing prevents global conflict with the United States
Christopher Layne 06 Research Fellow @ the Independent Institute, Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies @ the Cato Institute
          (The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, p. 160-61)

An offshore balancing grand strategy would have four key objectives: (1) insulating the United States from
possible future great power wars in Eurasia; (2) avoiding the need for the United States to fight ―wars of credibility‖ or
unnecessary wars on behalf of client states; (3) reducing the vulnerability of the American homeland to terrorism; (4)
maximizing both America’s relative power position in the international system and its freedom of action strategically. Unlike
America’s current hegemonic grand strategy, offshore balancing is a multipolar – not a unipolar – strategy, and therefore it
would accommodate the rise of new great powers while simultaneously shifting, or devolving, to Eurasia’s major powers the primary
responsibility for their own defense. In this respect, not only is offshore balancing a strategy of devolution but it also is a strategy of
deflection. By drawing back from Eurasia, and refraining from pushing others around, the United States gives them a lot
less reason to push back. Rather than focusing their grand strategic attention on the United States, they would
pay more attention to their neighborhood rivals. As an offshore balancer, the United States could maximize its
relative power effortlessly by standing on the sidelines while other great powers enervate themselves in security
competitions with one another.




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                                                   Soft Power is a Myth
Soft-Power is wrong - Realism
Tysha Bohorquez, Member of the UCLA International Institute, 2005
[―Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics‖ REVIEW, UCLA International Institute, Dec. 1st,
http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=34734]
Nye’s view is, of course, not held by all. His critiques include David Frum, a former speechwriter to President George W.
Bush and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Frum co-authors An End Evil to Evil: How to Win the War on
Terror with Richard Perle . They consider themselves ―realists‖ and fully reject Nye’s concept of soft power .
While some argue that the U.S. government has overstepped its boundaries in the international arena, Perle and Frum claim that
overthrowing the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq was not enough. Perle and Frum support the use of military action against
North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya and Saudi Arabia. To them, soft power is irrelevant for a country without military rivals.
However, this rejection of soft power is not limited to Perle and Frum. Bush’s recent appointment of Bolton as
the U.S. ambassador to the UN surprised many because he had been criticized for stating that, "there is no such
thing as the United Nations. . . If the U.N. secretary building in New York lost 10 stories, it wouldn't make a bit of difference.‖
These are not the remarks of someone convinced of the importance of soft power. Frum and Perle’s vision of the
world is too black and white, defined by an ―us against them‖ mentality. In their book, An Evil to Evil: How to Win the War on
Terror, both authors state that, "there is no middle way for Americans. It is either victory of holocaust." There is no
room negotiation within a framework that is so rigid. This philosophy disregards the possibility of the co-
existence of hard and soft power, where states not only rely on military force but also negotiate collaboration with allies,
however difficult that may be. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is another skeptic of soft power, in fact, he admits to not even
understanding the term, claiming that popularity is ephemeral and should not guide U.S. foreign policy. Rumsfeld asserts that
America is strong enough to do as it wishes with or without the world's approval and should simply accept that others will envy and
resent it. According to him, the world's only superpower does not need permanent allies; the issues should determine the coalitions,
not vice-versa. Rumsfeld and Nye appear to present dramatically divergent approaches to international relations. Nye claims that
soft power is necessary, thus, providing a balanced approach. Nye, however, does not view hard and soft power
as mutually exclusive. He recognizes that there is a need for hard power but that it has limitations. Perle and
Frum on the other hand, miss diplomacy’s nuanced approach and the importance of building consensus among
allies. Nye’s analysis, conversely, is useful in that it provides a framework for understanding the nuances necessary to achieve this
consensus.




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