Higher Ed PKI Certificate Policy

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Higher Ed PKI Certificate Policy Powered By Docstoc
					 Higher Ed PKI
Certificate Policy
     David L. Wasley
  University of California

   I2 Middleware Camp
       David L. Wasley
          02/02/02
     Office of the President
    University of California
                     HEPKI-PAG
 HEPKI   is a cooperative effort of CREN,
  EDUCAUSE/Net@EDU, and Internet2
 Policy Activities Group (PAG) works on trust
  issues and trust framework for PKI
     Why do you trust? How much trust is enough?
     Certificate Policy -- now in DRAFT
     Certification Practices Statement -- T.B.D.
          Will also draft a PKI CP/CPS Implementers Guide
     Directory Policy -- next “interesting” hurdle
                                                             2
        Certificate Policy is …
 the basis for trust between unrelated entities
 not a formal “contract” (but implied)
 a framework that both informs and constrains a
  PKI implementation
 a statement of what a certificate means
 a set of rules for certificate holders
 a way of giving advice to Relying Parties

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                HEPKI HE CP
A    “generic” CP for higher ed PKI
     Based on IETF RFC 2527
     A set of rules and requirements intended to foster
      inter-domain trust
     All implementation specific details deferred to
      associated Certification Practices Statement
 Compatible with   the Federal BCA policy
 Four “levels of assurance”
     from “Rudimentary” level (minimal overhead)
     to “High” (requires photo IDs & smartcards)          4
            CP says basically…
 Who is responsible for the RA/CA operation
 What is the community served
     Important for RP to know what meaning to derive
 What are the rules for identifying Subjects
 What’s in a certificate
 What constraints are there on operation of the CA
 What must be done if something goes wrong

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                   PKI Players
 Policy   Management Authority (PMA)
     Responsible for developing and enforcing policy
 Certificate Authority (CA)
     Operational unit(s)
     Term also applies to the entire set of PKI functions
 Registration Authority      (RA)
     Optional, given responsibility for I & A
 Subjects and    Relying Parties
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                     Framework
 Document     identity
     OID for the CP and OIDs for each LOA
 PMA     and community are defined in the CPS
     Relying Party can’t make assumptions unless so stated
 CP   is transitive throughout the hierarchy
     Authorizing CA has responsibility for authorized CA
 Liability limitations
     CPS can proscribe specific uses of certificates
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                  Applicability
                 issued certificates is based on
 Applicability of
  Level of Assurance (LOA)
     Rudimentary - very low risk apps; data integrity
     Basic - for apps with minimal risk
     Medium - modest risk, including monetary loss
     High - secure apps; transactions of significant
      financial consequence
 RelyingParty must make the decision about
  what LOA is required
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         Obligations of the Parties
 CA,   RA, Subscriber, Relying Party, Repository
     “the right thing” depends on LOA
 RP   is problematic since there is no “contract”
     “Requirements” are advice, e.g. checking CRL
     Sometimes a contract may be needed, e.g. FERPA
 Audit   requirements
     CA must be audited by a qualified third party
     May review audits of subordinate CA’s
                                                       9
 Identification and Authentication
 Different   requirements for each LOA
     Photo ID required for Medium or High LOA
     ID Document S/N’s must be recorded and archived
 Types   of Subject names
     If included, must be meaningful
     Must be unique for all time
 Association ofSubject with “directory data”
  must be accurate
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           Operational Requirements
 CA   must protect its private key appropriately
     Must not generate key pairs for Subjects
 Certificate management
     Revocation required at Basic or higher LOA
          Requires standard CRL; allows for OCSP
          Relying Party required to check for revocation
     Suspension not used
 Security Audit        Procedure
     Everything that might affect the CA or RA             11
         Physical, Procedural and
        Personnel Security Controls
 CA   Roles
     Administrator - sysadmin; installs & configures
     Officer - approves issuance and revocation of PKCs
     Operator - routine system operation & backup
     Auditor - reviews syslogs; oversees external audit
 Separation of   roles required
     at least 2 people (Admin./Op. & Officer/Auditor)
     at least 3 at higher LOAs
 Some    tasks require action by 2 out of 4 persons
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      Technical Security Controls
 FIPS   140 Technical Security
     Level depends on LOA
     Key sizes and private key protection requirements
 Escrow    of end-entity decryption (private) key
     CA must have possession of key before issuing PKC
     Must NOT escrow any other private key
 Computer  platform and network controls
 Engineering and development controls
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 Certificate and CARL/CRL Profiles
 Certificate profile      is x.509v3 or higher
     Details in CPS
     CertPolicyID is the LOA OID
     CPSuri points to the on-line signed CPS
          CPS specifies CP OID and URL for on-line copy
     Certificate serial number must be unique across all
      PKCs issued by this CA
     Considering adding URI to authorityInfoAccess
 CARL/CRL          is x.509v2 or higher
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     Other CPs for Comparison
 Federal BCA   Certificate Policy
 EuroPKI CP, Swedish Univ. CP, SURFnet CPS
 Globus Grid CP
 Draft Model Interstate Certificate Policy
 Commercial PKI CPs (very different)
 CP for the State of Washington
 NACHA CARAT guidelines

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                  HE CP Status
 Draft   completed
     http://middleware.internet2.edu/certpolicies/
     Being vetted to wider audience, e.g. NACUA
 Companion   HEBCA CP needs to be reviewed
  to ensure compatibility
 Generic OIDs may be acquired for CP, LOAs
 Example CPS(s) will be generated
 Notes for CA implementers will be created

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                     PKI-Lite
 Cookbook  approach to getting started w/PKI
 Minimal requirements
     Roughly equivalent to issuing student ID cards
 Primarily forintra-campus applications
 Should be sufficient for signed e-mail (S/MIME)
 Simple CP/CPS single document
     See http://middleware.internet2.edu/hepki-tag/
 CREN     may issue the authority certs
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