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MANIFESTO Powered By Docstoc


           31ST JULY 1983

Chapter                                         Page

  1. Historical Roots of the     ………………………………   2
     Problem of the Sudan

  2. The Origins of       ………………………………………       4
     Liberation Movements
     In the Underdeveloped
     Areas of the Sudan

  3. The Anya- nya         ………………………………………      5

  4. The Addis Ababa “Peace      ………………………………   6

  5. The Political Dismantling   ………………………………   7
     Of the Addis Ababa
     Agreement and Ensuing
     Political Crisis

  6. The Military Dismantling  ………………………………     9
     Of the Addis Ababa
     Agreement and the Ensuing
     Military Crisis

  7. Formation and Objectives    ………………………………   11
     of the SPLA and SPLM

  8. Strategy and Objectives     ………………………………   12
     Of the Southern Movement

  9. Real and Potential Enemies ………………………………    14
     of the SPLA/SPLM

  10. Real and Potential Enemies ………………………………………16
      of the SPLM

  11. Conclusion and Prospective ………………………………   17
      for the Future

                                    CHAPTER ONE


1. The so-called “Problem of Southern Sudan” is really a general problem in the
   Sudan. It is generally a “problem of Backward Areas” in the whole country that
   is particularized and exacerbated in the South by successive oppressive minority
   clique regime in Khartoum. In fact, the problem has its origins in the spread of
   capitalism and colonialism towards the end of the last century when Africa was
   divided up among European colonial powers and the policy of divide-and-rule
   instituted among and within the colonies. Differences between North and South
   Sudan arising from levels of socio-economic development, nationality, culture
   and religion were aggravated during the colonial period as a matter of policy. It is
   the colonial policy of divide-and rule and the mechanics of peripheral
   development in the Sudan that are mainly responsible for the post-independence
   crises in the country.

2. Internal contradictions and crises within the capitalist system were precipitated by
   the First and Second World Wars. After the Second World War direct colonialism
   became untenable and collapsed, that is domination by international finance
   capital and establishment of dependency relations between capitalist countries and
   former colonies that were “granted” independence. The transformation from
   direct colonialism to indirect colonialism (neo-colonialism) was accomplished
   through granting of “independence” to the colonies.

3. When it became clear that genuine wars of liberations were imminent and would
   result in total de-colonization and establishment of genuine independent states in
   Africa colonialism struck a deal with the emerging African Bourgeoisified
   bureaucratic elite. These Africans who helped the administration of direct
   colonialism (the elementary school teachers, nurses, church boys, priests,
   corporals, petty traders, etc) were encouraged to form political parties and were
   invited to the metropolitan capitals of London, Paris, Brussels to negotiate the
   “terms of independence”. These gentlemen went and returned with the
   “instruments of independence” locked up in their brief-cases to be greeted at
   airports with great joy and expectation by the masses. Oh, poor masses! They did
   not know what was contained in those brief-cases; it was neo-colonialism.
   Colonial administrators were simply replaced by native administrators, but
   exploitation of the colonies for the benefit of the colonial powers continued

4. Neo-colonialism brought about the second re-division of Africa. Those colonies
   that would bee big to be administrated indirectly through the local elite were
   divided up into small neo-colonies. Thus, British East Africa was divided into the
   “independent” states of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda; British Central Africa
   was divided up into what are now Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi; while French
   Equatorial Africa was divided into three neo-colonies, the elite around lake Chad

were encouraged to go and “bring their independence from Paris as Chadians,
those around the City of Brazzeville as Congo Brazzevillians, and, for want of a
better name, those in the middle became Central Africans. Thus from two British
and two French colonies 14 independent African states were created.

                                 CHAPTER TWO

                            THE SUDAN

5. The liberation Movements in the backward areas of the Sudan which became
   known as Anya-nya in the South, SUNNI and GUN in the West and Beja
   Congress in the East, were a direct product of the phenomenon of post-World War
   II African independence. This “independence” was predicted on the result of the
   colonial policy of divide-and-rule which pitted the North against the rest of the
   country in terms of colonial peripheral development by all minority clique
   regimes in Khartoum, and herein lies the essence of the so-call- “Southern

6. It is necessary at this point to pause and define the term “the North”, so that it is
   never again misquoted, misinterpreted and used by the oppressive minority clique
   regimes in Khartoum to divide the Sudanese people. The “term North” is used
   throughout the Manifesto to refer to those areas in the Northern Sudan in which
   peripheral development became necessary in order to facilitate cheap extraction of
   surplus by the colonial regime. It therefore includes the old Province of Khartoum
   and Blue Nile, and excludes all other areas in Northern Sudan. The old Provinces
   of Darfur, Kordofan, Kassala and Northern Province are underdeveloped areas
   just like the Southern Provinces of Bhar el Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile that
   are known as Southern Sudan.

7. What we have defined as underdeveloped areas in Northern Sudan are the most
   deceived and neglected by the ruling minority clique regime in Khartoum. These
   minority clique regimes have always used the question of nationality and religion
   to isolate the struggle in the South from that of the underdeveloped areas in the
   North. Hitherto, the focus has been on the South, but the principal lessons of
   liberation movement in the South can be generalized to all underdeveloped areas
   in the rest of the country. The liberation movements in the North like those in the
   South, have their origins in the past unequal peripheral colonial development and
   post-independence anti-liberation schemes by Khartoum representative minority
   clique regimes in collusion with both advanced and primitive international

8. There was mush more colonial exploitation, and therefore peripheral
   development, in the North than in backward areas of the Sudan. Cotton trade
   competition between British and the rest of the capitalist world, especially
   America and China necessitated the development of the Gezira for cheap
   extraction of cotton to feed the ailing textile industries of Manchester and
   Liverpool. It became necessary to provide the North with general and technical
   education in order to produce the required native junior staff to assist the colonial
   administration in the extraction of surplus.

                              CHAPTER THREE

                               THE ANYA-NYA

9. The problem of underdeveloped areas was particularised in the South especially
   in the field of education. Education in the South was left to various Christian
   Missionary Societies that had no further motive beyond providing the necessary
   education for the propagation of their faith. Unlike the case in the North, there
   was no necessity in the South to train junior administration. The Northern elite
   therefore developed much more rapidly than the Southern one as a matter of
   colonial policy, and this was to become the central problem in the Sudan’s post-
   independence politics.

10. When Sudan became “independent” in January 1956, colonial jobs were
    “unfairly” divided between the North and South. The Southern elite felt cheated
    and betrayed by the British colonialism. However, the unfair distribution of
    colonial jobs between North and South, as pointed out earlier was an historical
    necessity rooted in the unequal peripheral development of the North and the South
    during the colonial period.

11. As Northernization of the Civil Service became imminent in the South, the
    Southern Army Garrison at Torit mutinied in August 1955, four months before
    “independence”. This mutiny marks the beginning of Anya-nya I and 17 years of
    war (1955-1972). Anya-nya I was thus precipitated by dissatisfaction with
    Sudanization, that is, by the unfair distribution of colonial jobs between the
    Southern and Northern bourgeosified bureaucratic elite.

12. The Objectives and the aims of Anya-nya I therefore centred around jobs and job
   titles. The jobbist character of Anya-nya I forms an important experience from
   which the present Movement (SPLA) has a great deal to learn. During Anya-nya I
   there was a proliferation of Governments and political parties such as SANU,
   SSLF, Southern Front, Sue Republic, Nile Provisional Government, the State of
   Anyidi and many others. Each of these “government” and parties was complete
   with its Western-type cabinet. The Bourggeoisfied Southern Bureaucratic elite of
   Anya-nya I were quite content with the job titles carried no functions. Similarly,
   in the armed component of the Movement, Anya-nya I had many field-grade
   officers (generals, brigadiers, colonels, etc) without armies to command. The
   SPLA will never allow such fake governments and parties to exist.

                               CHAPTER FOUR


13. The desire of Southerners of ministerial titles and similar positions in the army
   and Civil Service was at last belatedly satisfied in 1972 in Addis Ababa instead of
   1956 in London. The Addis Ababa Agreement was a deal between the Southern
   and Northern bourgeosified bureaucratic elites. The Northern elite dictated the
   terms while the Southern elite compromised the interests of the masses in return
   for jobs which had long been denied them. The jobs that Southerners felt should
   have been given to them in 1956 were finally given to them in 1972 at an
   estimated cost of one and half million lives. The Agreement was thus bound to
   collapse as it ignored the real interest of the masses of the people. The Southern
   elite would use the Agreement as a means to enrich themselves, while the
   northern elite, having removed the armed component (Anya-nya I) at Addis
   Ababa, would try to return the country to the pre-1972 status quo when they were
   dominant in both North and South.

                                 CHAPTER FIVE

                       ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT

14. The minority clique regime in Khartoum quickly moved to dismantle the
    Agreement almost from the day it was signed. On the political side the ruling
    Northern elite initiated policies designed to undermine the Addis Ababa
    Agreement. These policies include the following:

       a) Determination of leadership in the “Autonomous Southern Region” by the
          minority clique regime in Khartoum.

       b) Construction of the Jonglei Canal, and especially the plan to resettle two
          and a half million Egyptian peasants along the Canal. This plan led to
          mass unrest in the South, leaving three students dead, and several
          politicians arrested.

       c) Capricious and unconstitutional dissolution of Southern People’s Regional
          Assemblies and Governments in 1980, 1981 and 1983.

       d) Attempts to redraw the border between Northern and Southern Sudan to
          include the oil area, the rich agricultural lands of Renk and the nickel and
          uranium discoveries in the South as part of the North.

       e) Decision to build the oil refinery in Kosti instead of Bentiu, where oil was
          discovered in Southern Sudan. It was later decided to abandon the Kosti
          refinery, and pipe the crude to Port Sudan for export.

       f) Deliberate neglect of the South in terms of socio-economic development.

       g) Integration of Sudan with Egypt and conclusion of Joint Defence Treaty
          between the two countries.

       h) Division of the South into more regions in order to weaken the South
          through divide-and rule. This policy was supported by part of the Southern
          elite that saw benefits in a divided South and opposed by those who saw
          losses. The same politicians changed sides several times within a day in
          support or in opposition to re-division of the South, depending on
          changing fortunes as to which side was seen to be winning.

15. The Above attempts by the repressive minority clique regime in Khartoum to
    dismantle the Addis Ababa Agreement on the political front were used by

   prominent Southern politicians to organize several opposition groups including
   the following:

   1.     NAM            - National Action Movement

   2.     MTLSS          - Movement for Total Liberation of Southern Sudan

   3.     ECC            - Equatoria Central Committee (for re-division).

   4.     CUSS           - Council for the Unity of South Sudan.

16. In the Northern backward area, the old CNF (Congress of New Forces, which
    included the Fur, Nuba and Beja) took advantage of the potential crisis in the
    South and organised African-based coups against Khartoum. One of these was led
    by Lt. Col. Hassen Hussein in 1975, and later developed into guerrilla movements
    led by people like Lt. Col. Yacoub Iamael and Major Zekeria Abdalla.

                                   CHAPRT SIX

                         ENUSING MILITRY CRISIS

17. On the military side the minority clique regime in Khartoum initiated several
    policies to dismantle the Addis Ababa Agreement. These policies included the

       a) Absorption of 6,000 Anya-nya guerrillas in 1972 into the Sudanese armed
          forces, leaving about 32,000 to be absorbed in unproductive civil jobs, and
          paid under a special fund. When the fund was exhausted two years later
          these 32,000 Ex-Anya-nya guerrillas were summarily dismissed and left in

       b) Integration of the 6.000 absorbed Anya-nya guerrillas into the rest off The
          Sudanese army within the Southern Command. This policy was fiercely
          resisted by the absorbed Anya-nya. It resulted in several mutinies, such as
          the Akobo incident led by Lt. Vincent Kuany and Corporal Bol Kur.
          Elements of this mutiny combined with some of the dismissed 32,000 Ex-
          Anya-nya laid off workers and formed what become known as Anya-nya
          II. The origins and objectives of Anya-nya II were therefore similar to
          those of Any-nya I; both were dissatisfies with the jobs offered or denied
          them by the Northern and Southern bourgeosified ruling elites.

       c) Transfer to the North of the 6.000 absorbed Anya-nya I battalions and
          their planned eventual liquidation in Northern Sudan. The plan envisaged
          the transfer of three battalions during 1982/83 and the remaining battalions
          in 1983/84. The first transfer included battalions 105, 110 and 117.
          Battalion 110 (Aweil) has all been transferred except for its support
          company that is still resisting in Melut. Battalion 117 (Kapoeta) is still
          resisting transfer except for one company. Battalion 105 (Bor) resisted and
          planned to capture Juba before their transfer could be implemented. The
          second transfer for 1983/84 (Nasir), 111 (Rumbek and 116 (Juba).

18. The Above attempts by the repressive minority clique regime in Khartoum to
    dismantle the Addis Ababa Agreement on the military side were used by
    prominent absorbed Anya-nya I officers as a basis to organize two contingency
    plans within the Sudanese Army.

       a) The first plan was to attack and capture Juba, Capital of the Southern
          Region. This plan was to be executed by battalion 105 with reinforcement
          from Torit and Kapoeta, and from Anya-nya II who were to assemble near

   Ayod and Pachalla. A socialist government was to be established in Juba
   and measures taken to assist in transforming the situation in Khartoum.

b) The second plan, in the event that Khartoum attacked first displacing and
   dislodging Battalions 105 and 104 from their bases, was to regroup and
   reorganize to wage a protracted armed struggle for the total liberation of
   the Sudan. It is the second plan that has become necessary. Khartoum
   attacked Bor and Pibor Garrisons on 16/5/1983, and later the Ayod
   Garrison attacked Khartoum forces that were sent to arrest the

                               CHAPTER SEVEN

                       FORMATION AND OBJECTIVES
                         OF THE SPLA AND SPLM

19. The battles of Bor (commanded by Major Kerubino Kuanyin), Pibor and Ayod
    (commanded by Major William Nyuon) caused widespread desertions in other
    units of the Southern Command and in Northern Sudan, and an exodus of
    refugees to bordering countries.

20. Elements of the military and political organizations in paragraphs 15 and 18 have
    established the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and Sudan People’s
    Liberation Movement (SPLM). Although the Movement has started by necessity
    in the South, it aims eventually at engulfing the whole country in socialist
    transformation. The SPLA is fighting to establish a United Socialist Sudan, not a
    separate Southern Sudan.

21. The immediate task of the SPLA/SPLM is to transform the Southern Movement
    from a reactionary movement led by reactionaries and concerned only with the
    South, jobs and self interest to a progressive movement led by revolutionaries and
    dedicated to the socialist transformation of the whole country. It must be
    reiterated that the principal objective of the SPLA/SPLM is not separation for
    the South. The South is an integral and inseparable part of the Sudan. Africa has
    been fragmented sufficiently enough by colonialism and neo-colonialism and its
    further fragmentation can only be in the interests of her enemies.

22. The separatist attitude that has developed in the South since 1955 has caught the
    imagination of the backward areas in Northern Sudan. Separatist Movements have
    already emerged with guerrillas fighting in Western and Eastern Sudan. If left
    unchecked, these separatists movements in the South, East and the West coupled
    with the stubborn determination of a repressive minority clique regime in
    Khartoum to hang on to power in the Sudan at all costs will lead to the total
    disintegration of the Sudan. This imminent, latent and impending disintegration
    and fragmentation of the Sudan is what the SPLA/SPLM aims to stop by
    democratic solution to both the nationality and religious questions within the
    context of a Unite Socialist Sudan.

                                 CHAPTER EIGHT

                        STRATEGY TO TRANSFORM THE
                           SOUTHERN MOVEMENT

23. A general strategy to transform the Southern Movement into a genuine liberation
    movement is developed in detail in the political programme of the SPLA/SPLM
    and it is presented below in summary form. It consists of the following highlights:

       a) Establishment of a Sudan People’s Liberation Army SPLA) and Sudan
          People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to wage a protracted armed

       b) Early determination of the correct leadership of the SPLA and SPLM so
          that the movement is not hi-jacked by counter revolutionaries.

       c) Maintenance of contact with the enemy through guerrilla harassment and
          semi-conventional engagements in order to maintain the momentum of
          war. Initially, the practice of engaging the enemy the mass must be
          avoided. The war will be protracted because of the present size of the
          enemy and that of the SPLA. The power of the SPLA will grow from the
          small nucleus it now is to a conventional force that will be able to destroy
          Sudan’s reactionary army.

       d) The SPLA must regroup the scattered fighting forces in Southern Sudan,
          win their confidence, give them further military and political training and
          through war and correct conduct, win the confidence and support of the
          masses of the people.

       e) In order to be able to regroup and politicise the fighting forces effectively,
          the SPLA shall need to establish its own progressive camps apart from
          those of Anya-nya II, which are more or less tribal and sectional camps.
          The SPLA will then work to win the confidence of Anya-nya II forces and
          bring them under SPLA command.

       f) Establishment of an effective propaganda machinery to involve as many
          masses of the people as possible. This will include among other methods
          of propaganda and agitation, the establishment of an SPLA radio station.

       g) Establishment of political office in all countries to pursue external contacts
          for military and other assistances. Such offices will, of course, be under
          the supervision of SPLM Headquarters.

       h) Establishment of an institute for Revolutionary War studies in a liberated
          area for training political and military cadres. These cadres will be drawn

   from the many students, workers and officials who have left or will leave
   the towns for the bush. Officers and other ranks who desert Sudan’s
   reactionary army will be screened and required to attend this institute for
   political orientation and refresher military training.

i) Transformation of the fighting units in the field into organic units of the
   SPLA. The trained cadres from the institute for Revolutionary War
   Studies shall take over these units, and impart their revolutionary
   knowledge and practice to all under their commands.

j) Politicization, organization and militiaization of the peasantry shall follow
   as areas become liberated.

k) Contacting opposition groups in both North and South with the view of
   forming a United Front with these groups, provided that leadership of such
   a front remains armed and progressive.

l) Finally, it shall be necessary to seek and obtain intellectual, moral,
   military and other material assistance from any country or international
   organization that is sympathetic to the aims and objectives of the

                                 CHAPTER NINE

                       REAL AND POTENTIAL ENEMIES
                            OF THE SPLA/SPLM

24. Having established the general objectives and strategies of the SPLA/SPLM, it is
    necessary to clearly identify the real and potential enemies of the Movement who
    will attempt to sabotage its plans.


       a) The Northern Sudanese Bourgeoisified and Bureaucratic elite

          The Northern elite have everything to lose from a socialist revolution.
          Their domination in both North and South will be destroyed and their
          multi-storey building and other properties might be lost. They will fight
          fiercely to protect these interests using Khartoum’s reactionary army
          which is itself a part and backbone of Sudan’s ruling elite.

       b) The Southern Sudanese Bourgeoisified and Bureaucratic elite

          This elite falls into two main categories, those who were and those who
          were not associated with Anya-nya I. Their interest is the same, although
          they have internal differences as to who should be dominant politically in
          the South. Their real interest, like that of the Northern elite, is self-
          enrichment including the building of multi-storey buildings and
          amassment of other forms of wealth. Under the circumstance, either of
          these categories of the Southern elite will try to hi-jack the SPLA/SPLM
          by infiltrating its leadership and taking it over for their own advantage, or,
          failing to hi-jack the SPLA/SPLM they will try to organize their own
          political parties similar to those of the 1960s with likely assistance from
          international reactionaries. The Southern and Northern bourgeoisified and
          bureaucratic elite will sometimes be in conflict with each other as they
          were during the 17 years war, and at times in collusion as they were in
          1972 when they concluded the Addis Ababa Agreement. Both will always
          try to deceive the people by using the nationality and religious questions to
          further their own advantage and keep the Sudanese people in both
          Southern and Northern Sudan divided and weak.

       c) Religious Fundamentalism

          Religious fundamentalism, like the nationality question, will continue to
          be used by the Sudanese ruling clique in both North and South as a tool to
          deceive the people in order to perpetuate their rule and exploitation. The

     SPLM provides a correct and consistent policy on religion. Under SPLM
     Government there shall be separation of state and mosque and church. All
     religious faiths in the country shall have complete freedom to practice
     without hindrance or intimidation, provided that this freedom is not
     abused and used for political purposes. Sunday shall therefore remain a
     holiday and day of worship in the South, while Friday shall continue to be
     a holiday and day of worship in Northern Sudan.

  d) The Anya-nya II Reactionary Commanders

     These commanders will try to protect their warlord interest as these will be
     threatened by a people’s revolutionary war, which necessarily prohibits
     any acts of banditry. It is also likely posing in some form as South
     Sudanese liberation movements will spring up and try to collude with
     Anya-nya II bandits


  a) African and Arab Reactionary Countries

     These countries have real and imagined interests in the Sudan. They will
     also feel threatened by socialist engulfment, and will be instigated by
     international reaction.

  b) Imperialism

     Imperialism has real interest in the Sudan. The Sudan is potentially rich in
     agriculture and actually rich in minerals (oil) and uranium) in the Southern

                                    CHAPTER TEN

                         REAL AND POTENTIAL FRIENDS
                                OF THE SPLM

25. As in the case of real and potential enemies, it is also necessary to identify clearly
    the real and potential friends of the SPLA/SPLM.

   I       Internal Real and potential Friends of the SPLA/SPLM

        a) Workers, peasants and their mass organizations.

        b) Students and revolutionary intellectuals.

        c) Progressive elements within the Sudanese Armed Services (Military,
           police, prisons and game wardens).

   II      External Real and Potential Friends of the SPLM

        a) Socialist and progressive countries in Africa.

        b) Other socialist and progressive countries in Europe, Asia and Latin

        c) Other countries, national and international organizations and agencies
           sympathetic to the aims and objectives of the SPLM.

                               CHAPTER ELEVEN


26. The SPLA/SPLM is convinced of the correctness of its socialist orientation. The
    SPLA/SPLM programme is based on objective realities of the Sudan and provides
    a correct solution to the nationality and religious questions within the context of a
    United Socialist Sudan, thereby preventing the country from an otherwise
    inevitable disintegration.

   The SPLA/SPLM will learn from the accumulated bitter experience of 17 years of
   war by Anya-nya I, more years by Anya-nya II, the several coup attempts (1971,
   1975, 1976 and present revolts in Southern, Western and Eastern Sudan.

   Finally the SPLA/SPLM is convinced that the necessary internal and external
   conditions exist to enable it to transform the Southern Movement from a
   reactionary into a genuine people’s liberation movement that will spearhead
   socialist transformation of the Sudan, beginning in the South where peripheral
   development and dependency relations are weakest and spreading to all parts of
   the land.

   Equipped with correct theory and practice, determined to persist in the struggle
   and armed with material, moral and organizational support of the masses of the
   Sudanese people the SPLA will surely win.