Introduction to The Distinguishing Features of Leninist Political by dfhrf555fcg


									Introduction to The Distinguishing Features of Leninist Political

We are seeking to practice the scientific approach to politics of Marx and Lenin. Thus the
text which follows seeks to elaborate systematically what constitutes a Leninist political
practice. Essentially, the objective of Leninism is the establishment of a communist
society via socialism, the transition period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Many
would agree with this objective but reject Leninist practice. This rejection manifests itself
in a fixation with a particular organisational form or type of struggle. Leninist political
practice does not have fetishes, but considers the likely consequences of a particular form
of struggle nd opts for the form most likely to promote its objectives. It is, therefore, not
"unprincipled", because the objectives to be achieved are clear, and inform the practice.
Thus, it is clearly distinct from a political practice which eschews principles, ie
opportunism, and also from the opposite deviation of being politically paralysed by too
many "principles". Such paralysis generally arises from the error of elevating a strategy
or tactic to a principle An example should clarify this.

Based on their understanding of the bourgeois state, Leninists reject attempts to achieve
socialism through electoral struggle. But rejection of parliamentarianism does not rule out
participation in electoral or reform struggles when they can promote short-term advances.
Fundamentalists fail to make this distinction and thus reject any involvement in electoral
or reform struggles "on principle". Opportunists, by contrast, are satisfied with only the
short-term gains and thus will engage in reform struggles as ends in themselves-to win
better wages, more party members, or whatever.

What constitutes a Leninist political practice in contradistinction to these other tendencies
is outlined in the text, which sets 6ut three classes of conjuncture, describing in broad
terms the type of party activity appropriate to each class. Such a classification is not a
substitute for conjunctural analysis. Quite the reverse. Leninists must have a detailed
knowledge of the situation in which they are working and the possible courses of
development in order to intervene effectively using a political programme developed
primarily from their analysis. The classes of conjunctures are specified to provide a
directed research programme, just as preliminary categories and definitions are drawn up
in all scientific research. They also enable us to analyse new situations as they arise. It
must be noted, however, that there is no necessary sequence of movement between types
of conjuncture: history is not a straight path but a route which zig zags. and turns back on
itself. When Leninists suffer a reverse they need not necessarily advance over the same
ground or by the route by which they retreated.

Looking at the particular types of conjuncture outlined some points should be noted.
Revolution is not possible in all social, political and economic conditions. Contrary to the
belief of many on the Left that the manifestations of contradictions at the economic level
inevitably imply a revolutionary situation, reality is much more complex. Economic
crises do not necessarily develop into political crises, let alone into a military crisis, a
necessary feature of revolutionary situations. In a revolutionary conjuncture, the choice is
between a reestablished capitalism and a defeated working class, or socialism-the
dictatorship of the proletariat and the erosion of the capitalist mode of production. The
choice is never between capitalism or communism, let alone socialism or barbarism. As
Lenin said, those who expect a revolution in which the bourgeoisie are all lined up on one
side and the proletariat on the other will never live to see it. In non-revolutionary
conjunctures the options appear even less distinctly. In particular, in a restructuring
conjuncture it may appear that Leninists are faced with the choice of supporting
capitalism by opting for a particular form of restructuring, or supporting the proletariat by
calling for all manner of resistance to all forms of restructuring, but this is a bogus
choice. In a situation where the conditions for a revolution do not exist, as in Britain at
present, it is inevitable that capitalism is going to restructure itself, the form of
restructuring being determined by political struggle. Leninists, then, have two choices.

The first option is to try to affect the course of that restructuring for the benefit of the
working class: for example the development of greater class polarisation, with increased
class cohesion and strengthened working class ideology; the weakening of the material
bases of ideologies which divide the working class, eg racism, sexism, nationalism; the
increased self-confidence of the working class in its collective ability to take charge of
society. If a crisis is not revolutionary, restructuring must take place under the existing
state power. If the working class is to influence the restructuring, it must make demands
on the state. However, in fighting for reforms, communists never lose sight of their
eventual aim or permit the belief that the existing state apparatus can serve as an
instrument of proletarian state power: reformism must be strenuously opposed.
Reformism is the idea that socialism can be achieved through a gradual accretion of
reforms won by constitutional means and without the overthrow of bougeois state power.
Our view is that the struggle for reforms can only prepare more favourable conditions for
the future overthrow of bourgeois state power.

The other option is confinement to propaganda work, disregarding changes in material
conditions, whether on the grounds that the restructuring cannot be influenced or that
involvement in reform struggles will only foster illusions in the working class.

To the first objection one can say: "Suck it and see!"; at the very least the analysis and
experience of political struggle gained will be valuable. To the second, the obvious retort
is that there is no inevitability about the outcome of political struggle. The outcome
depends on the relative strengths of the forces involved. Leninists cannot intervene and
lead the struggle in a revolutionary crisis without having already developed their
political, ideological and organisational practices. These practices cannot be developed in
a political vacuum. If Leninists have always waited immobile or stood aside for fear of
being contaminated with reformism, when all the conditions for a revolutionary situation
exist they will be unable to influence its outcome. Communists must be aware of the
possibility of deviations, but must not become paralysed and impotent in the face of these
dangers. As Lenin pointed out:
"The greatest, perhaps the only danger to the genuine revolutionary is that of exaggerated
revolutionism, ignoring the limits and conditions in which revolutionary methods are
appropriate and can be successfully employed."




Leninist politics are the practice of a specific organization: a communist party. This has
as its professed aim the introduction of a communist society. This aim is not unique to
Leninism. A number of non-Leninist political organizations profess the same aim. What
distinguishes a Leninist party is the way that it combines and systematizes a number of
distinct practices of intervention. It combines theoretical practice, ideological practice,
intervention in economic struggles, organizational work, and in some cases military
leadership, in order to intervene in the process of political class struggle. What makes its
intervention scientific is the dominant position held, within this combination, by
theoretical practice.

At each moment, each specific practice is guided and controlled by a party line which
itself grows out of the party's partisan standpoint and theoretical analysis of the current


The specific objective of party theoretical work is to analyse economic and political
conditions sufficiently concretely to provide the basis for an effective political line. Since
political class struggle always takes place within the confines of a given state, and since
forces external to the state can only operate through internal agencies this analysis must
be directed initially at conditions in the party's home state. The ability to carry out
concrete analysis is the fundamental precondition for a Leninist political practice. If
inflexible organisational and political formulae are substituted for conclusions arrived at
by concrete analysis, then the practice of the party is reduced to just one more random
element within a political process which is not understood by those acting in it.
The level of sophistication and precision of the party's analysis will vary with a number
of factors, among which are: the sources of information available to it, the rapidity with
which the situation is changing, and the party's past experience. No one unvarying
sequence can be laid down for party theoretical practice, only certain general problems
whose resolution greatly aids concrete analysis.

Marxism-Leninism holds that the forces which enter into the process of political struggle
and the issues over which they struggle arise on the basis of class contradictions defined
prima4ly at the level of the relations of production. Therefore, if the party is not to accept
as given the ideological representation assumed by these forces, it must have its own
analysis of the dominant system of production relations.

Using the theory of historical materialism it is possible to derive certain general laws and
tendencies associated with the reproduction of these relations of production, and also the
characteristic range of technologies of forms of appropriation of nature. Under capitalist
relations of production we may find manufacture, machine industry, and automated

Each system of production relations may be conceptualised as a basic invariant system of
real economic property relations which make possible a given mode of exploitation
(extraction of surplus labour). For example in capitalism the core economic property
relations involve the separation of the direct producers from the means of production
(class of pro pertyless proletarians), the commodity form of the products of social labour
(including labour power) and the ownership of the means of production by capitalist
enterprises. But to these invariant property relations there corresponds a certain field of
variation of specific property forms. For example, the degree of capital concentration
may vary, as may the degree of state ownership, and the degree to which workers have
subsidiary sources of income.

It is not enough just to identify the dominant production relations; the concrete
combinations of forms of property and material production within dominant relations
must also be

identified. Most important of all it is necessary to identify the conditions of reproduction.
What forms of production and property have an extended and which a contracted
reproduction? What contradictions are developed in the general process of economic
reproduction? What are the long run tendencies in the reproduction process, and what
stage have they reached, eg, exhaustion of the latent reserve army, rising organic
composition of capital?

Having identified the contradictions arising from the reproduction process and their
hierarchical articulation, it becomes possible to understand both the objective causes of
current political struggles, and the probable trajectory of future social development.

It must be recognised that every conjuncture within which a party acts is unique and has
to be analysed separately. Communists must assimilate the lessons to be learned from
class struggle at other times and in other countries but these must be tested for their
relevance against the concrete analysis of the concrete situation in which the party is
operating. It is, however, possible to divide conjunctures into certain general classes
according to broadly defined states of the class struggle, to each of which there
corresponds a general orientation of party work. These general classes are Prawn up to
aid recognition of the courses of action most likely to be fruitful. It is not however
sufficient to recognize the class of conjuncture-the conjunctural analysis must first be
carried out.


Contrary to the catastrophist views which have often held sway among Marxists,
capitalism often sustains periods of relative social stability. There are certain invariant
contradictions of capitalism-social production vs private appropriation, capital vs wage
labour-but when exploitation and the accumulation of capital are proceeding "smoothly"
class antagonisms remain latent rather than explosive. The capitalist system develops on
the basis of its contradictions but these contradictions are not manifest as open social
conflict. For instance, there is an inbuilt economic contradiction between bourgeoisie and
proletariat under capitalism. From these there arises a struggle over the distribution of the
social product. But at most times only a tiny minority of workers participate in such
economic struggles as strikes, work-to-rules, boycotts etc. The economic struggles
themselves in no way threaten the capitalist social order.

During periods of stability the existing state superstructure and juridical forms of private
property suffice to ensure the continued reproduction of the economic base. When this
base is predominantly capitalist, this stability implies the absence of antagonistic
contradictions blocking the process of capital accumulation. Stability implies that the
social relations as a whole constantly reproduce the preconditions of a certain trajectory
of economic development. The classic example of such a period is Britain in the second
half of the 19th century when an expanding world market, free trade, and a growing
labour force allowed for a long period of stable capitalist development.

Conditions of long term economic and social stability in which no serious crisis is as yet
forsecable, set severe restrictions on the political actions of a revolutionary party. In the
absence of a serious social crisis, resulting either from the accumulation of economic
contradictions, or from some external shock like war or invasion, opportunities do not
exist for a communist party to effectively intervene in the political life of the nation. As
Bordiga put it, describing the European scene in 1965, the situation is generally
unfavourable and the party's work must take this into account. Though unable to
intervene in the national political process, the party must still engage in practical political
The CP may not be able to wield any mass influence, but it can prepare theoretically,
ideologically and organisationally for the occasion when it could have such influence.

Theoretical preparation takes the form of the development of marxist theory.
Fundamental concepts must be elaborated and refined, lessons of previous history must
be assimilated, and above all, understanding of the present situation deepened. Critiques
and refutations of the dominant themes of contemporary bourgeois ideology must be
developed. Theoretical work produces new knowledges. Ideological work produces a
transformation of 'consciousness' among either individuals or social classes. The
precondition for the effectiveness of ideological work on a mass scale, on the scale of
classes rather than a few individuals, is that it be accompanied by transformations in the
practical activity of the masses. In conditions of social stability these transformations do
not take place and the scope of ideological work is correspondingly limited to the
propagation of communist ideology among relatively small numbers of individuals.
Communist ideology formulates, in a particular context, the scientifically derived
propositions of communism in the language of popular ideology. The result is neither
fully scientific nor comprehensive, but creates within the listeners'/readers' ideology
contradictions between their previous ideology and the raw communist notions being
presented. Communist ideological work, whether educafion, propaganda or agitation,
forces a choice: maintain the old ideas or break with them.

In periods of social stability, ideological work is the key link of party activity. It is
directed towards advanced workers and individuals with a serious commitment to
communism from other social classes and carried out in three general forms.
    1.   The party promotes the development of a socialist education movement.
    2.   The party popularises the basic principles of communism, criticises the dominant themes of bourgeois ideology, and through its
         exposure and analysis of topical issues, reveals to the working class the interests and activities of other social classes.
    3.   Through its intervention in individual reform struggles, the party breaks some of those participating from the hegemony of
         bourgeois ideology.

The very fact of relative social stability means that these various forms of ideological
work will not have a mass influence. Their result is to produce a comparatively small
cadre of communists and communist sympathisers. The organisational work of the party
fuses these elements into a functioning centralised political organisation. This involves
both the ideological formation and practical training of individuals on the one hand, and
on the other the combining of these individuals into cells, fractions, branches etc., each
with a structured collective workstyle and definite allocation of tasks.

In addition to the party organisation proper, with its full members, the party develops a
periphery of working associates and sympathisers in various front organisation within
which it has a dominant influence.

"Smooth" capital accumulation can sustain periods of social stability, but accumulation is
an inherently contradictory process and these inherent contradictions (private
appropriation vs social production, wage labour vs capital) make periodic crisis
inevitable. These basic contradictions do not, however, appear as the immediate causes of
particular crises. Instead a conjunctural crisis is necessarily the result of contradictions at
the level of the superstructure, since it is this which normally ensures the continued
reproduction of the economic base, in the face of its inherent contradictions.

If the party is well prepared theoretically, i.e. has appropriated and developed marxist
theory in relation to the

analysis of the conjuncture, it will be able to detect antagonistic tendencies maturing the
socially stable period before they come to a head in an open crisis. In these
circumstances, although we are still Pealing with a socially stable conjuncture, the
orientation of party work will change. As a priority the party must analyse the situation
and identify the hierarchy of contradictions produced by antagonistic tendencies within
the base and superstructure. This involves specifying which of the various contradictions
is the most acute, which is the most chronic, and how the various contradictions
articulate. This enables a prediction to be made regarding the general issues which will be
at stake in the crisis when it finally breaks. By examining the contradictions it is possible
to determine various ways in which they could be resolved. It is around the precise form
of resolution that non-revolutionary class struggle will revolve.

The economic issues at stake in a class struggle never amount to a clear opposition or
choice between capitalism and communism. What is at stake in any particular struggle is
not this general historical opposition, but specific changes in either the existing property
relations or political superstructure. The party must draw up analyses of the spectrums of
possible superstructural and basic changes that correspond to the resolution of specific
contradictions in the conjuncture.

The party is then in a position to draw up a strategic line. This line aims to force that set
of resolutions to the contradictions that is most favourable to the long term interests of
the proletariat. It aims to make the ensuing crisis the opportunity for a restructuring of
social relations that is to the benefit of the working class. Just how radical the
restructuring will turn out to be, which contradictions will be resolved, and on just what
terms, only the actual playing out of the crisis can reveal. But this element of
unpredictability does not reduce the party's strategy to the status of an arbitrary list of
demands picked at random out of thin air.

Immediate party objectives propose certain forms of resolution of various contradictions.
What distinguishes these from a "shopping list" of reforms, is that the resolution of these
contradictions is historically necessary. In other words if not resolved, they are
reproduced with increased acuteness until so resolved. But the fact that certain
contradictions must be resolved does not necessarily mean that there is only one way in
which this can happen. The party seeks not merely their resolution, but their resolution on
working class rather than ruling class terms. In this case, the extent of the restructuring
and its degree of radicalness will turn on the balance of forces during the crisis. The
problems posed here are thus tactical rather than strategic. In advance, all the party can
do is aim for a particular alliance of class forces in the crisis. Once the crisis breaks, new
tactical lines have to be developed to handle the actually existing balance of forces.
Such practical interventions as the party now embarks upon over and above the activities
that it would normally engage in when no developing crisis is apparent, are guided by its
strategic line. At the minimum it engages in propaganda centred on this line, exposing the
contradictions that are leading towards crisis and pointing out how the party advocates
resolving them in the working class interest. Organisational work extends from attempts
to build campaigns around specific items of strategy to exploratory attempts to see the
possibilities of constructing a broad front organisation around the programme of
restructuring envisaged in the strategic line.


A general social crisis may be precipitated by either economic or political events. Such
economic events as a sharp rise in prices, a wave of economically motivated strikes
involving large parts of the working class and which disrupts economic life, or even a

economic recession might provoke a general social and thus political crisis. Alternatively,
political events like a parliamentary crisis, a war, or a sudden spontaneous upsurge of
mass protest against the government as in France in '68, may be the detonator. If such a
crisis occurs, it is crucial to the orientation of party work to decide if it is potentially

The fundamental question in any revolution is the question of state power. In a
revolution, the state power of one class is replaced by that of another. In a revolution
which involves the replacement of one kind of exploitation by another, (e.g. the
bourgeois revolution which overthrew feudalism) the existing apparatus may, to a large
extent, survive the transfer of state power from one class to another, or at least changes in
the institutions which constitute the state apparatus may be slow and piecemeal. A
proletarian revolution, on the other hand, which aims at the ending of all exploitation,
must involve the smashing of the existing state apparatus. The bourgeois state apparatus
is the structural embodiment of:

   1. a political practice in which politics is divorced from production and becomes a
      domain of professional career politicians, and
   2. the ideology of the state standing "above classes", "above society", as a "neutral
      arbitrator". i.e. the ideology which serves to conceal class struggle to the benefit
      of the exploiting class. If the proletariat is to exercise state power this apparatus
      must be broken up and replaced by a new apparatus which directly and clearly
      serves the class interest of the workers-the state of the dictatorship of the

In this context the precondition for the process of proletarian revolution is the inability of
the existing state apparatus to exercise state power.

The minimum preconditions for a state apparatus to exercise state power are:
    1. it must have an effective executive centre;
    2. this centre must be able to command the various subordinate state apparatuses;
    3. these must include a hegemonic coercive/military force. Where the executive (or
       an executive) remains in control of

the military, then a transfer of state power involves the outright defeat of the existing
state. Where conditions do not permit its military defeat or internal disintegration, then a
revolutionary situation does not exist, and the crisis will at most lead to a restructuring
under the ultimate hegemony of the existing ruling class. In such circumstances the party
must work to produce the best possible compromise terms for the working class.

In a restructuring crisis, the following factors may induce the state to make compromises
with the working class, or other subordinate classes.

    1. The long term need of the bourgeoisie to maintain the legitimacy of the existing
       state apparatus in the event of a party or coalition of parties that does not
       represent the hegemonie bourgeois bloc being elected to government.
    2. The need to maintain social peace and the ideological standing of the existing
       state in the event of large scale outbursts of mass discontent-e.g. May '68 in
       France, or the workers riots in Poland in '70 and '76.
    3. The need to come to terms with the economic power of the working class
       exercised through various forms of unions. Possible examples of this are some of
       the US New Deal measures in the '30s and the compromises made by the British
       ruling class during WW II.
    4. The recognition that certain reforms are necessary for economic development to
       continue. Examples of this are the British factory legislation of the 1840's and the
       introduction of the mixed economy with Keynsian interventions post 1945.

In the absence on the CP's part of a clear conception, derived from theoretical analysis, as
to just which kind of reforms are historically necessary and conjuncturally possible in the
crisis, its outcome will probably be a compromise on terms chosen by the bourgeoisie.
For example, the bourgeoisie will be willing to make economic concessions over wages
even if this necessitates inflation, rather than allow changes in property relations or in the
state structure to take place. In France in '68 in the absence of correct communist
leadership, the bourgeoisie got away with conceding no more than a few wage rises. In
Italy, by making economic concessions at the same time ('68-9) the bourgeoisie have
been able to postpone their restructuring crisis until the late '70s.

A CP that has done its analysis in the preceding period will be aware of the issues that
will figure in the crisis, and will thus have fulfilled the first prerequisite for a scientific
intervention in the political life of the nation. For some time now, it should have been
cairying out propaganda on and around the main issues of the crisis. With the upsurge in
political interest and participation on the part of the masses that is induced by a social
crisis, it becomes possible to switch from propaganda-which necessarily only reaches
advanced elements on the periphery of the party-to agitation which affects the masses in
large numbers. This requires the identification of tactical objectives derived from an
analysis of the short term aspects of the conjunctural situation and the party's immediate
restructuring objective. These tactical objectives can then be expressed in the form of
slogans which take into account the current stage of development of popular
consciousness. The promulgation of such slogans constitutes the key link in the
ideological aspect of the party's political intervention.

At this stage, the party's organisational work consists in:

   1. promoting the development of new political structures within which the masses
      can be drawn into active participation in political life;
   2. trying to win support for its immediate objectives within these structures;
   3. trying to build up fronts or coalitions around the major strategic objectives of the
      party, these being either coalitions with other pre-existing political organisations,
      or, preferably, mass organisations in their own right;
   4. trying to use its influence within the economic organisations of the working class
      to commit them to struggle for its immediate objectives; these objectives may
      encompass the restructuring of the working class organisations themselves.

Many of these activities would also have to be carried out in a revolutionary conjuncture,
but with this difference: in a revolutionary conjuncture these are preparations for
insurrection, the smashing of the existing state power and the direct enaction of working
class economic objectives; in a non-revolutionary conjuncture these are aimed at backing
up demands made upon the state power. The practice of advancing practicable demands
upon the state power is an indispensible component of communist political practice in a
restructuring conjuncture, but merely diversionary in a revolutionary situation. There are
no situations within which the so-called 'transitional' demands have application.

The success or otherwise of the party's strategy during the restructuring crisis will have a
crucial influence upon the ensuing period. The contradictions resolved, and the mode of
their resolution will determine:

   1. what will be the terrain of class struggle in the. ensuing period;
   2. which contradictions are likely to precipitate the next crisis. In a non-
      revolutionary crisis it is therefore in the working

class interest that restructuring be as progressive as possible, in the sense of establishing a
terrain that is favourable for proletarian class struggle, that is, for the development of the
cohesiveness, initiative, and combativity of the working class. It is impossible to specify
in advance of concrete conjunctural analysis the specific content of such a "progressive
restructuring" but at the most general level such elements as the concentration of capital,
the advance of class polarization and the growth of the proletariat, can be identified as
tending to give rise to a more advanced terrain. A good example of this is provided by the
various anti-imperialist movements of the last three decades. Even where these have
merely transferred power from the imperialist to the local bourgeoisie, they have often
brought about a restructuring in economic conditions, which has led to an accelerated
development of capitalism, growth of the proletariat, and a change in political and
ideological conditions which has led to greater strength and assertiveness on the part of
the working class.

A proletarian party that has played a leading role in. fighting over the terms of the
restructuring, and has been seen to take the initiative and force the pace, is likely to
experience a growth in influence and support as a result. A more radical restructuring will
also be in the immediate interest of many sections of the working class and its allies (and
also inevitably sections of the bourgeoisie), so victories won here rebound to the credit of
those who fought for them. To oppose restructuring on the grounds that it benefits
leading sectors of the bourgeoisie, would ideologically tie the working class to the petty
bourgeoisie and to the ideological structures within which the bourgeoisie has previously
accommodated working class interests: an example of this is the left's opposition to EEC
entry, which tied the working class to the petty bourgeoisie and to chauvinist labour


A revolutionary conjuncture is one in which there is a real possibility of state power
passing from the hands of the ruling class. In all such conjunctures the decisive element is
military force. Political power is transformed at gunpoint. It is possible to usefully
distinguish four types of revolutionary conjunctures in which the transfer of power is
   a.   peaceful transfer of power brought about by the latent presence of superior forces on the revolutionary side; e.g. Mongolia 1923-4;
   b.   transfer of power due to the defection of the decisive element of the armed forces of the existing state to the side of the revolution
        e.g. March 1917 in Russia;
   c.   peaceful transfer of power clue to the collapse of the executive organs of the state and the consequent lack of co-ordination in the
        military, e.g. initial establishment of the Paris Commune with the disintegration of the imperial executive;
   d.   violent transfer of power by means of insurrection or civil war:October revolution, Chinese revolution.

The importance of the military factor in revolutions is so obvious that it scarcely needs to
be emphasised, except to point out, that even in case c) power can only be retained if the
revolutionary forces are able to organise an army before the enemy re-establishes its
executive. It is sheer adventurism to advance revolutionary objectives (i.e. ones
necessitating the transfer of power) as slogans in a period when military factors make a
transfer of power impossible. Against every democratic and constitutional prejudice it has
to be emphasised that the military situation determines where effective state power lies in
a revolutionary conjuncture. Repeated experience has shown that a well disciplined and
trained army under decisive centralised command can suppress any threat to the state
power other than a superior army. An army cannot be successfully opposed by trades
unions or other peaceflil organfsations of the proletariat. Chile is only the most recent
proof of this. The one possible counter example, the French withdrawal from occupation
of the Ruhr in 1924, owed less to passive resistance than to international political and
financial pressures.

To say that the military question is decisive in revolutionary situations does not mean that
the revolution reduces to a question of military organisation. The prerequisite for a
favourable military balance is often the existence of widespread political support for
revolutionary objectives. Bourgeois control over the armed forces can only be broken by
their political subversion. An armed insurrection would probably fail, and a revolutionary
civil war certainly fail, without a large measure of political support. The party cannot
sirnply carry out a military putsch regardless of the political balance of forces. Apart
from the immediate military question, working class state power can be maintained only
if it is possible to destroy the mass base of bourgeois state power, which depends on a
mass mobilisation of the workers in support of the revolution, and also crucially on a
correct policy of class alliances with respect to the other classes affected by the process
of proletarianisation (in countries with a large peasantry-a worker/peasant alliance; in
advanced capitalist countries alliance with sections of the salariat and petty-bourgeoisie).

On the other hand the necessity for popular support for the workers party cannot be
reduced to a question of percentages. Communism does not subscribe to any simplistic
majoritarian ideas, and in fact revolution is possible with the active support of only a
minority of the population, provided that the majority of the popular classes in struggle
do not actively oppose the communists and provided that the military situation is
favourable. The revolution does not have to be legitimated according to the criteria of
bourgeois democracy, and in this sense the communists have no "democratic" prejudices.
Nonetheless it is a cardinal point of Leninism that the development of the dictatorship of
the proletariat must involve the development of a higher form of democracy by and for
the working class. In contrast to bourgeois democracy, which allows the working class a
choice between rulers every few years, proletarian democracy aims at reorganising the
workers as the ruling class. Communists do not make a fetish of particular democratic
insititutions, and under certain circumstances it may be necessary to suspend formal
democratic procedures, but these circumstances are exceptional and must be justified as

When the party argues that a revolutionary conjuncture is in existence or is imminent,
then is the time to put forward its socialist programme as a imminent objective of the
working class. What distinguishes the socialist programme is not the immediate objective
it puts forward; indeed, many of these might be attained through reforms within the
bourgeois regime; it is the fact that taken as a whole, at that point in time, it is
economically feasible but politically incompatible with the continued rule of the

The existence of a revolutionary situation clearly presupposes a high level of militancy
and combativity on the part of the working class and its allies. One of the features of such
a situation is likely to be the spontaneous crystallisation of that class power in the form of
alternative political structures (e.g. councils, soviets). These can be the germs of an
alternative state apparatus (although a particular institutional form doesn't guarantee a
correct political line), and the party should attempt to promote their development in that
direction. If the military situation is favourable and if the structures have drawn large
sections of the working class directly or indirectly into them then the party should
agititate for them to seize power. For such agitation to succeed the party will probably
have to become the dominant organisation within these structures, even if this is achieved
through alliance with some other revolutionary party
If on the other hand the revolutionary situation is precipitated with such a suddenness that
the party is faced with the possibility of seizing state power in advance of the
crystallisation of popular organs of working class political power it must call for, and
play a leading role in, the development of such organs to broaden the base of the new
state power.

In addition to the ideological work of preparing the working class for the seizure of
power, and the organisational work of promoting working class political structures, the
party must prepare itself to rule. It must prepare to become the effective nucleus of the
new state power with a clear programme of immediate tasks and priorities.

Finally, the party should have a military programme. The form that this should take is an
open question, demanding both theoretical analysis and concrete examination. It is
bound, however, to have two key elements: subversion of the standing army and
consititution of a red army. Row a red army is to be formed cannot be laid down in
advance. The mutiny of regular army regiments, the arming of the populace by the state
in the event of an external threat, and the independent formation of a red army from a
nucleus of workers militias and guerrilla forces seem to be the three main alternatives
open. It should be borne in mind that it is rare for an irregular force to be able to defeat a
well equipped, trained and disciplined regular army in an urban setting.


Leninist political practice is based upon the theory that in the course of social
development there occur certain nodal points from which the paths of possible
development diverge. At such nodal moments, relatively minor changes in the play of
class forces can have a decisive influence upon the course of development that society
subsequently takes. The existence of such divergent courses of possible development can
be derived from analysis of the contradictions inherent in social development during
relatively stable periods. Analysis can also reveal the class forces likely to be in play at
nodal moments and the alliances necessary for a particular outcome to be achieved.
Political practice is then directed to bring about the required alignment of forces at the
crucial point in time.

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